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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

David Finnigan

ENTITLED

A Study of Civil-Military Relations

in the Soviet Union

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences

DEGREE OF

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Instructor in Charge

APPROVED: Richard Martt

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF Political Science
A STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
IN THE SOVIET UNION

BY
Dave Finnigan

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The question of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union is a difficult one. First, there is the issue of defining the terms "military" and "civilian" in the Soviet Union. Some have felt it more appropriate to refer to relations between the Communist Party and the military. Yet, even that kind of an approach is misleading, since most of the Soviet military belongs to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, many Western analysts believe that a set of complex relationships exists between the military and the civilian government. Such relationships are important and are characterized by separate interests on both sides which may or may not be in harmony. This paper is an attempt to examine both sides of the relationship for a period of 1971 through 1983. The purpose is to discover interests that may be shown as important on both sides, as well as changes that may occur over time. Before entering into the heart of the issue it is necessary to examine several models of Soviet civil-military relations.

In considering civil-military relations and models for their analysis three basic approaches have been developed by Western students of the Soviet military. These are: the "conflict approach" of Roman Kolkowics, the "Institutional-Congruence" model of William Odom, and the "Participatory" model of Timothy Colton. All three differ from one another in their approach and form a spectrum of views on the Soviet military. To a certain extent all are useful, but none can
adequately explain all facets of the relation between the mili-
tary and the Party in the Soviet Union.

The first author, Roman Kolkowics, sees the relationship
as a conflict between two opposed interest groups. Further-
more, not only is the relationship conflict-prone but it also
threatens the political stability of the Soviet state.¹ Conflict
exists between these two groups because of five anti-
thetical traits in the two organizations.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elitist</td>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Autonomy</td>
<td>Subordination to Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>Proletarian Internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment from Society</td>
<td>Social Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroic Symbolism</td>
<td>Anonymity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the military seeks to be elitist and to have professional
autonomy, while the Party wishes egalitarianism and subordina-
tion to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The military has a strong
sense of identity with the state and nationalism, but also
seeks a detachment from society. Conversely the Party supports,
because of its ideology, a policy of Proletarian internationalism
and social involvement. Lastly, the military is concerned
with heroic symbolism, while the Party encourages anonymity.

This conflict-prone relationship threatens the state be-
cause the military, with its control of armed men, represents
an inherent challenge to the Party.³ For Kolkowics, then, the
controls that the Party has placed over the military are im-
portant because, without them, the Party would soon be domi-
nated by the military.
The Kolkowics model sees relations between the Party and the military as those of two opposing interest groups which are inherently in conflict as a result of certain essential characteristics of both. This view leads to the conclusion that there is little cooperation between the two or that cooperation is impossible because their interests do not correspond. This view is challenged by William Odom who disagrees with Kolkowics and believes that there can be and is cooperation between the Party and the military.

First of all, Odom does not accept the view that the Party and the military are two separate and opposed interest groups with antithetical traits. In fact, he argues that Kolkowics's assertion of five "natural" and "desired" traits of the two interest groups suffers from empirical and definitional problems. In other words, after closer examination, it becomes difficult to determine whether or not these traits are "natural" to the military or desired by the Party. In fact, there is much overlap between the two groups and their traits. This leads Odom to conclude that:

A much more compelling argument would be that the privileged military elite and party elite both have an equal stake in the Soviet state and the present political order. Therefore, according to Odom, there occurs a value-congruence between the two. Each needs the other and both are willing to cooperate to the benefit of both and the whole political order.
Timothy Colton argues for a participatory model in regarding the relations between the Party and the military. Colton maintains that too much emphasis has been placed on Party control mechanisms. He believes that emphasis should be more appropriately placed on examining military participation in politics.⁶

As part of his argument, he shows that the Main Political Administration (MPA), which is supposedly controlling the military institution, has itself begun to identify and support the military in its views.⁷ This view of the MPA as the arbiter of the needs of the military is supported by Fritz Erzmath and Vernon V. Aspaturian in their examinations of Soviet military politics.⁸ Thus, what was once an instrument of Party control over the military has become a spokesman for the interests of the military.

According to Colton, the military participates in three broad issue areas and uses three basic means. For issues, the military is concerned with decisions and policies which may effect its institutional interests, the values and interests of certain officers, and societal issues which effect all civilians as well as officers. The military has also three ways to influence policy decisions. This can be done by expert advice, political bargaining, or force.⁹

Colton argues that the Soviet military participates in political decisions in all three areas and will use both advice and political bargaining. It has not, however, resorted
to force. Colton believes that the military does have the capability to use force, but has not desired to do so. The reason that the military has not used force is that through its participation in the political process its needs and demands have been satisfied. Therefore, there has been no reason to use force. Colton sums up his view, which is very similar to that of William Odom, in this manner:

Clearly both army and party have benefited from the relationship. The party, on the one hand, has realized important policy goals and has been spared the challenges from an aroused officer corps that have beset civilian regimes in many other political systems, particularly in modernizing societies. The army, on the other hand, has had its ideological, material, status, and professional interests maintained and enhanced by Party policy.

These are the three basic models for assessing relations between the Party and the military in the U.S.S.R. The Kolkowicz model argues for the existence of inherent conflict between the Party and the military. The other two do not see inherent and inevitable conflict, but argue that cooperation occurs between the two. The model of Colton does include the possibility of conflict, if the interests of the military are not being served. In Odom's model conflict is not viewed as very likely. He sees the military and the Party as having too much at stake in the present political order to risk disrupting it through conflict.

Each of these three models assumes and implies a set of basic interests which the military, as a group, seeks to have met by the Party. These are in order of importance: A desire
to maintain high levels of investment in heavy industry; a desire to maintain a certain amount of international tension to justify high defense spending; and a desire to maintain ideological conservatism.  

As with all military establishments the necessity for higher defense spending is their most overriding concern. Fleet Admiral Gorshkov, in an address for the anniversary of the creation of the Soviet Army, reminded the Politburo of their promises and responsibilities:

At the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Yuriy V. Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed: The Politburo has considered and does consider it a matter of obligation to give the Army and Navy all they need, especially in the current international situation.

Thanks to unflagging concern by the Communist Party and the selfless labor of Soviet people, our Army and Navy are equipped with the most modern weapons, including nuclear missiles, and with mighty combat technology.  

The Soviet military believes that it is the duty of the Party and the people to provide all that is necessary for the military to form an adequate defense. As a corollary, it is the duty of the Soviet Armed Forces to provide the defense of the Soviet state.

As a second interest, the military also seeks emphasis on spending in heavy industry as opposed to "light" or consumer industry. In fact, part of the early Brezhnev coalition was based on the advocacy of increased defense and heavy industry spending at the expense of light industry.
earned him the support of the military. The military sees emphasis on heavy industry as necessary to provide the advanced weaponry needed for defense.

Thirdly, it is argued that the military seeks to promote a certain amount of international tension so as to justify military spending. This is less a conspiracy on the part of the military than it is a tendency to see the world in gloom-tinted glasses. This leads Malcom Mackintosh to conclude that, in general, the military favors a hard-line foreign policy, but when it comes to actual deployment of forces they tend to be cautious. The military, because of their way of viewing the outside world and because of a need to justify their defense spending, support hard-line foreign policies and the view of the international situation as being in general hostile.

Lastly, the military favors conservative ideology and national unity. The military supports tight controls over society to insure morale and provide unity. Dissenters must be dealt with swiftly and harshly. De-Stalinization must not go so far as to disrupt unity in the society. For the military, a stable and unified society is of the utmost importance and a conservative ideology is believed to promote this.

Of the three models, a combination of the Colton and Odom models is the approach used in this paper. The Kolkowicz model has merit in arguing that there are certain interests or objectives which the military wishes to achieve. Nevertheless,
there is little justification to be found for the assertion that there is an inherent conflict between the two. Not only is it difficult to find evidence of such but it does not appear to be in the best interest of either institution to engage in a struggle which can only cause harm for both of them. William Odom is correct in arguing that there are many areas in which both the Party and the military have similar interests but he gives the impression that the military has simply become another bureaucracy of the Party. This does not seem to be the case. The military is not just another bureaucratic and administrative arm of the Party. It participates and supports the Party because its needs are being met. According to Colton:

The army has certainly displayed no inclination whatever to use force to further its institutional aims. These aims have been well served by the regime.

The central aim of this paper is to incorporate some of those interests listed above along with other possible interests to form questions about relations between the Party and the Military. Also considered simultaneously, will be questions relating to the Party and their interests as implied by a discussion of basic military interests. A central theme will be one of comparison and contrast. In other words, do the interests and viewpoints of the military and the Party ever converge over time or do they always stay divergent? In examining the central themes of relations between the Party and the military this paper takes the approach of looking at
major speeches made by representatives of both sides. These speeches were then analyzed in the hope of answering a bank of questions which would allow some general conclusions to be made. The questions that were used in the analysis were:

1) What is the relative importance of the national military security as compared to detente relations, and vice-versa, for the military and the Party?

2) Where does heavy industry rank as compared to light industry for the military and the Party?

3) What are their views on the hostility or perceived threat of U.S. and NATO?

4) What is the importance of increased defense spending as compared to other spending areas for both areas?

5) Does the military always call for increased defense spending?

6) Do the military and the Party agree or disagree on answers to the above questions?

7) Do the answers to these questions change over time, and if so, how?

On the military side, the speeches of Defense Ministers Andrei A. Grechko and Dmitri F. Ustinov were examined. On the Party side, the speeches were primarily those of Leonid I. Brezhnev. Yuriy V. Andropov was of lesser importance due to the shortness of his office and his sickness through more than half of it. To insure accuracy and to even out other third factors, an attempt was made to use speeches which were
given to the same audience or at the same occasions. Therefore, in following this approach most of the data came from speeches given during the three Party Congresses of 1971, 1976, and 1981 or from speeches given at May day or November 7, October revolution ceremonies. Hopefully, this will have eliminated most of the biases that may have occurred in the speeches.

The paper has been divided into two sections. The first deals with economic questions and issues. The second deals with questions of foreign policy. Both are interrelated, especially for the military who strongly view economic policy as an adjunct to foreign policy and defense issues. A time scale of approximately 1971 to 1983 was used in the examination.

Economic Issues

Beginning in 1971 at the 24th CPSU Congress the major focus of discussion on economic policy was the 9th five year plan for the development of the U.S.S.R. national economy from 1971 to 1976. The goal as stated by the resolution was:

The chief task of the five-year plan is to ensure a significant upswing in the material and cultural level of the people's life on the basis of high development rates in socialist production, its increased efficiency, scientific and technical progress and the accelerated growth of labor productivity.10

The resolution later goes on to define what is meant by socialist production, making it clear that it is light industry or
consumer goods which is intended.

In implementing the chief tasks of the five-year plan, it is necessary: to ensure high growth rates in and the proportional development of socialist production, especially agriculture, light industry and the food industry, and significantly to increase the efficiency of all branches of the national economy.\(^2\)

In this resolution submitted to the 24th CPSU Congress there is a strong commitment to increase consumer consumption, mainly in the form of expanding light industry. In their speeches at the same CPSU Congress, Brezhnev and Kosygin quote the same phrase of the resolution and argue for the same commitment.\(^2\)

The plan for expanding light industry was first explained by Brezhnev in his opening speech at the 24th Congress. He began the section on heavy industry by making the usual statements about the importance of heavy industries and defense industries to the economic well-being of the country. He then made this statement which is the crux of the entire 9th five-year plan.

Finally, the development of heavy industry assumes special importance because without this it is impossible to accomplish the fundamental tasks of increasing the people's well-being. Heavy industry must substantially expand the production of means of production for the accelerated development of agriculture, light industry, and the food industry and the still greater development of housing construction, trade and everyday services to the population.\(^2\)

Brezhnev goes on to make the message even clearer by stating:

The Party is setting still another important task for heavy industry--to expand the production
Brezhnev was arguing for an interesting coalition. He was suggesting that the debate did not need to be light industry/consumer goods versus heavy industry and defense but fundings could have continued for heavy industry and defense if they were willing to put some of their productive capacity towards production of consumer goods. This meant continued support of heavy industry because of its importance to maintaining the proper level of defense capability. Did the military accept this deal? If silence signals acceptance then there was agreement with this general plan. At the time, the then Defense Minister, Andrei A. Grechko, was more concerned with the international situation and the need for increased defense spending. In his speech in response to Brezhnev's report to the 24th CPSU Congress, Grechko emphasized the need for defense spending due to the hostile international situation. Increased defense spending is what the military wanted and that is what they got. An examination of Table 1, which is a compilation of Soviet military expenditures as estimated by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, shows that during the years of 1971 to 1976 an increase in defense spending at levels greater than before occurred. From this evidence it is clear that there was a commitment on the part of the Party to increase light industry and to
Table 1: Soviet Military Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Millions of dollars, Constant to 1979</th>
<th>Change from Year Before, rounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>140948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>147032</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>153067</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>7000</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>165999</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>173974</td>
<td>8000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>176984</td>
<td>3000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>179998</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>183000</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>188032</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See footnote # 26.

increase defense spending. Heavy industry and the defense industry were to provide the means to increase consumer production. For the military, the overriding concern was increased defense spending. This desire was satisfied for them, and due to the lack of response on the heavy industry - light industry deal, it would appear that this also, at least, was not opposed. Underscoring the Party's commitment to defense was Kosygin's report to the 24th Congress:

The Party Central Committee and the Soviet government have devoted and are constantly devoting attention to the strengthening of the country's defense capability and the development of the defense industry. We are obliged to do this by the present international situation and by the interests of our homeland's security.27

In 1971, at the beginning of the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev was advocating a deal. An economic deal which would allow him to increase the production of consumer goods and yet would allow him to continue high levels of spending in heavy
industry and defense. This became the basis for Brezhnev's support in the Party and formed an important theme in the relationship between the Party and the military. The military would get its money but it would have to pay its share by promoting consumer production.

This economic deal was what was intended by Brezhnev, but was this what really occurred during the period of 1971 to 1976? As has been shown before in Table 1, defense spending did increase at significant rates during this period. The information for Table 2 was taken from a Soviet economic statistics publication. On this table group A indicates heavy industry while group B signifies light industry. While Soviet economic data is considered to be at best unreliable, these can be taken at face value because what is important is not the numbers themselves but the changes and rates of change present in them. What they show is quite interesting.

Table 2: Investment Capital Spent on Heavy Industry and Light Industry Money Spent in Billions of Roubles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group A (heavy industry)</th>
<th>Change in Group A</th>
<th>Group B (light industry)</th>
<th>Change in Group B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>+.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>+0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>+.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>+.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>+1.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>+.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Footnote #28.
They show that, although in the speeches made by the Party leadership there were claims that light industry and consumer goods were to be of top priority, this did not occur during the actual carrying out of the 9th five-year plan. Why did this occur? It would seem very unlikely that the leadership never really intended what their speeches said. Therefore, the answer lies in a cause that occurred after the speeches and during implementation. In the end, what this shows is that the military still came out with their needs being met. Defense spending and heavy industry were both increased.

In 1976, at the 25th Congress, the importance of light industry was again maintained. It is also clear that in this 10th five-year plan heavy industry was considered of prime importance:

"The essence of the Party’s economic strategy permeating both the 10th Five-Year Plan and the long-term plan, is a further build up of the country’s economic might, the expansion and fundamental renewal of productive capacity, and the ensuring of stable, balanced growth for heavy industry -- the foundation of our country.

Why the change? Part of the reason lies in the failure of heavy industry to fulfill their part of the bargain. According to Brezhnev:

We still have not learned how, while ensuring high rates for the development of heavy industry, to develop Group B and the services sphere at an accelerated pace also.

Nevertheless, it is also clear that Brezhnev was also unwilling to completely break the new economic deal."
The output of consumer goods by the heavy industry enterprises will remain very important. The Party will hold strictly responsible those executives who, under various pretexts, fail to fulfill their established plans for the production of those goods.

This tilt towards heavy industry is important, because assuming that the military does support heavy industry over light industry, then this coalition and the gradual change of the Party to increased support for heavy industry shows a point at which the interests of the military and the Party converged. Thus, during the 25th CPSU Congress, the Party was converging in views toward those of the military.

In 1981, at the 26th CPSU Congress, the political forces shifted to favoring light industry again. Brezhnev made this statement in their favor: "The expansion of the production of consumer goods, the improvement of their quality and the development of the services sphere are acquiring paramount importance in the Party's efforts to bring about an upswing in people's well-being." That Brezhnev argued for an increase in consumer production is not surprising. The interesting point is that he no longer accompanied this with a call for an alliance of heavy industry and light industry. The calls are for increases in light industry higher than heavy industry.

As you know, comrades, the draft Basic Guidelines for the next five-year plan stipulate a certain acceleration in the development rates of Group B - they will be somewhat higher than the growth rates for Group A. This is good. The objective is to
create a consumer goods and services sector that is truly up to date and meets the people's requirements.\textsuperscript{33}

This planned increase in the growth rates of light industry was also the first area of importance for Prime Minister Tikhonov's speech on light industry.\textsuperscript{34}

According to these speeches, light industry in the minds of the Party had taken precedence over spending for heavy industry. The figures for 1982 bear this out. Spending for light industry grew by .4 billion roubles - the highest increase yet - while heavy industry grew by 1 billion roubles. Nevertheless, higher spending levels for heavy industry continued.

Table 3 shows a compilation of economic figures for the periods during which these plans were in process. What these figures show is that, the CPSU Congress speeches notwithstanding, there has been a significant and protracted commitment on the part of the top leadership of the Party to increase defense and heavy industry spending. These figures show a lack of commitment to light industry in real terms. Table 4 shows even clearer the Party's commitment to increased defense spending. Up until 1980, over 50% of the Soviet budget went to defense spending. A sizable figure emphasizing the importance of defense spending to the Party.

In their speeches the Party leaders have shown a great desire to increase the living standards of the Soviet population by increasing consumer goods through light industry.
Table 3: Combined Economic Figures: 1970-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense Spending in billions of dollars, Constant in 1979</th>
<th>Change in Defense Spending, Rounded</th>
<th>Heavy Industry in Billions of Roubles</th>
<th>Change in Heavy Industry</th>
<th>Light Industry in Billions of Roubles</th>
<th>Change in Light Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>140948</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>+.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>147032</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>+.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>153067</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>+1.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>160011</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>34.7</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
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<td>8000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>183000</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>188032</td>
<td>5000</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>43.5</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>+.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Footnote #35.
Table 4: Military Expenditures as a Percentage of Central Government Expenditures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Expenditure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>61.5</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>48.3</td>
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Source: See Footnote # 36.
This support has been evident throughout most of the speeches given by Brezhnev and others. On the other hand, when actual economic figures published by the Soviets are compared this desire is not realized in those figures. When it comes down to roubles and kopecks, Soviet spending priorities have been characterized by this hierarchy: defense, heavy industry and last light industry. This does not even count agriculture which has been placing third, ahead of light industry. Thus, in words and intentions, the Party has wanted to support light industry but in reality this has not occurred.

A reason why military and heavy industry spending has been of greater importance derives from the Colton and Odom models. The Party has been gaining the support of the military through large increases in defense spending and to a lesser extent heavy industry. This conclusion fits in with the participatory model of Timothy Colton who argues that the military will participate in the political process to meet its needs. One of these needs is defense spending.

That the increased defense spending was a way to insure support from the military becomes even more evident when considering the statements made by the military in the foreign policy area. These increases in defense spending were made during the time of detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The international situation had an important effect on modifying the relations between the Party and the military. This, in the economic realm, was a key structure in military
and Party relations between 1971 to 1983.

**Foreign Policy Questions in Soviet Civil-Military Relations**

The second half of this paper deals with issues relating to foreign policy during the period of 1971 to 1983. Foreign policy questions relating to the possibility of detente with the U.S. and the perceived hostility of the U.S. and its allies were of importance to the military and the Party. One important question was the issue of detente.

An examination of a speech given by Brezhnev during the 24th Congress shows that the Party did consider detente with the U.S. as possible and desirable. He declared that:

> We proceed from the premise that the improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is possible. Our principled line with respect to the capitalist countries including the U.S.A., is consistently and fully to implement in practice the principles of peaceful coexistence, to develop mutually advantageous ties and -- with those that are ready to do so -- to cooperate in the field of strengthening peace, making mutual relations with these as stable as possible.\(^37\)

This belief in the importance of detente was again made evident by Kosygin, who emphasized the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to enter into economic cooperation with the capitalist countries.\(^38\)

These statements show that the Party intended to seek detente with the U.S. and its allies. This detente was to be mainly in the form of increased economic cooperation. Emphasis is placed on this Soviet intention for increased
economic cooperation because from Brezhnev's and Kosygin's speeches it is clear that detente did not mean that defense spending would be decreased or even leveled. This is confirmed by the estimated defense spending figures during the time of the 9th five-year plan in Table 1.

Economic relations with the U.S. and Western Europe were important because they were to be the means for revitalizing the Soviet economy. This trade also helped the Soviet arms buildup by allowing funds to be diverted to military spending.

The response of Defense Minister Andrei Grechko to detente was cautious and ambivalent.

The Soviet Union is struggling, as it always has, for genuine peace, for the freedom and equality of all peoples, for their inalienable right to decide their own fate without outside interference. However, in conditions of acute international tension and the imperialist state's incessant arms race, our country is compelled to take the necessary defensive measures and to reinforce its peaceful policy by strengthening its defense capability and increasing the combat potential and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

An interpretation that can be made from this quote is that the military did not agree with the Party that peaceful coexistence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could exist. They also did not consider detente relations to be desirable. On the other hand, as indicated by the first half of the quote, the military was willing to support the policy of detente although they did not consider it to be desirable. This support may have been given in return for increased defense spending. This argument is supported by the large
increases in military expenditures which occurred during 1971 to 1976. Therefore, in 1971, the Party was advocating detente. The military agreed to support the policy in return, most likely, for increased defense spending. As time went on detente weakened and disintegrated. This strengthened the position of the military. This was reflected in later speeches which placed less emphasis on detente and more on strengthening defense.

In 1971, the plan for the next five years was stated to be one of promoting detente relations between the Soviet Union and the West. This policy continued through these years and in the eyes of the Party leadership was successful. In his speech to the 25th Congress in 1976, Brezhnev stated that considerable progress had been achieved during this period.

Although world peace is still by no means guaranteed, we have every reason to say with confidence that improvement in the international climate is convincing evidence that the achievement of lasting peace is not merely a good intention but a completely realistic aim.41

For Brezhnev and the Party, this improvement in the international climate resulted primarily from the improvement of relations with the U.S. In fact, the most likely reason for a Soviet perception of improving relations was the completion of the SALT I and II treaties: "The turn for the better in our relations with the largest power of the capitalist world - the United States of America - has, of course, been of decisive
importance in lessening the threat of a new world war and in strengthening peace. \(^{42}\)

Foreign policy is not made in a vacuum and is greatly affected by international events. Thus, the speeches on foreign policy questions reflect these international developments. Three notable events occurred during the period when the speeches cited above were made: the signing of the SALT I treaty in 1972; the Vladivostok talks of 1974; and the completion of the Helsinki accords in 1975. The SALT I treaty and the Vladivostok talks dealt with issues relating primarily to nuclear strategic weapons. SALT I included: 1) A ban on ABM development 2) A five-year agreement fixing the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers on both sides. Lastly, an agreement to use national technical means of verification to ensure compliance and a promise not to interfere with the other side's satellites. The Vladivostok talks concluded limitations on strategic systems, including bombers, not included in SALT I.

The Helsinki accords gained for the U.S.S.R. recognition of the political status and territorial boundaries of Eastern Euro

It also dealt with important issues of economic and technical cooperation between East and West. It is with these accomplishments in mind that Brezhnev made the statements that relations had improved between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that the Party was committed to a foreign policy of detente. The aim
was to conclude arms control agreements and reduce tension. It was also to increase trade with the U.S. and Western Europe. The military's reaction to this new foreign policy was mixed. The quotation from Defense Minister Grechko's speech in response to the Brezhnev opening speech at the 24th Congress shows that the military stated its support for the new policy of peaceful coexistence or detente. On the other hand, in the same statement, Grechko emphasized the belief that there still was a continued U.S. threat. This had the implication that increased defense spending was necessary to counter the U.S. threat. This same reaction by Grechko occurred again in his 1974 speech during the October Revolution festivities in Red Square. First Grechko stated:

Great successes have been achieved in the implementation of the Peace Program set forth by the 24th CPSU Congress. The principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation among states regardless of their social systems are becoming more and more firmly established in the practice of international relations.\(^{43}\)

This stated the support of the military for the policy of peaceful coexistence. Later, in the same speech he stated reservations about the level of hostility in the international situation: "The forces of international reaction and aggression have not laid down their arms. They oppose the positive changes in the world arena, and they are striving to poison the international atmosphere and to return the world to the time of the 'cold war'."\(^{44}\) This mixed reaction of the military
leaders to detente was a continuing one and its thread can be traced very easily in the speeches of Defense Ministers Andrei A. Grechko and Dmitri F. Ustinov throughout the 1970s.

Again, in 1975 during the October Revolution Red Square ceremonies, Grechko reiterated his position that peaceful coexistence had been successful, specifically mentioning the Helsinki accords. At the same time, he also mentioned the concerns of the military about the situation in the world.

... As a result of the consistent implementation of the Peace Program adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress, the coordinated policies of the fraternal socialist countries and the struggle of all peace-loving forces, the international situation is developing along lines of the further easing of tension and of constructive mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems.

Further on, in contradiction to what he just said, he stated: "However, aggressive imperialist forces that are stubbornly opposed to the easing of international tension and are stepping up the arms race are still active in the world." This attitude of mixed reaction was evident not only in the speeches of Grechko but also in those of his successor, Dmitri Ustinov. Ustinov, at the same Red Square ceremonies in 1976, gave in a long quotation the best example of the military's cautionary and ambivalent approach to detente.

Our Party's Central Committee and the Soviet government are persistently and consistently implementing the program, worked out by the 25th CPSU Congress, of continued struggle for peaceful and international cooperation; for the freedom and independence of peoples. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the progressive public of the world at large,
favorable new conditions are being created for the development of the process of the easing of international tension and cooperation between states of different social systems and cultural fields.

At the same time it is quite evident that the successes of detente are evoking stubborn opposition from aggressive imperialist circles. Ignoring the will of the peoples and the sovereign rights of states, they are striving to check the progressive development of the world revolutionary process, inflate military budgets and continue their dangerous provocation in various parts of the world.47

Therefore, as evidenced in the above speeches, the military felt obliged to support detente. Yet, it is also clear from the speeches that it also had reservations. As time went on these reservations strengthened.

An examination of the speeches given at the October Revolution Red Square ceremonies for 1978, 1979, and 1980, shows that over time the attitude of the military shifted towards greater hostility to the U.S. and the detente process. During Red Square ceremonies in 1978, Ustinov made this statement:

In international developments the irresistible process of further changing the correlation of forces in favor of peace, democracy and socialism is continuing. At the same time the international situation remains complex. It is aggravated as a result of the striving by the aggressive, imperialist circles to return the world to the Cold War. They are whipping up the arms race, trying to achieve military superiority over the socialist countries and interfere in their internal affairs.48

Then, in 1979 at the Red Square ceremonies, he said:

The main direction of this initiative is the further deepening of the process of detente and the strengthening of peaceful cooperation between states.
As a worthy example of consistent implementation of the principles of Leninist foreign policy, the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union open up the possibility of avoiding another escalation of the arms race, and of stepping onto the path of real disarmament. 49

And later he said: "The interests of the security of our Motherland and the complicated international situation demand from the Soviet people high vigilance and the strengthening of the economic and defense might of the Soviet State." 50

Lastly, in 1980, Ustinov at the Red Square ceremonies made this vitriolic attack.

The peace-loving direction of international politics is opposed by forces of oppression, militarism, and aggression, the actions of U.S. imperialism and the aggressive NATO bloc. They are striving to return mankind to a new Cold War, increasing military preparations. The latest step increasing the danger of a nuclear missile conflict is the adoption of the United States of the so-called new nuclear strategy. 51

A comparison of these speeches with the earlier ones shows a dramatic shift in attitudes. Especially comparing the 1974 speech of Grechko with the 1980 speech of Ustinov. In the 1974 speech, Grechko mentioned the Peace Programs as being successful but cautioned that the international situation was still hostile. In the 1980 speech, Ustinov concentrated on the hostility of the U.S. and the peace-loving intentions of the U.S.S.R. He did not mention at all the Peace Program begun during the time of the 24th Party Congress and reaffirmed during the 25th Party Congress. Part of the shift is probably due to the fact that these are two different men but this is not a totally satisfactory answer. The speeches that Ustinov
made in 1976 and 1978 were restatements of the points made in speeches of Grechko in earlier years. The answer lies in outside events not wholly under the control of the Soviet military or Party.

The factors which resulted in a shift in the attitude of military representatives also had an effect on the policy of the Party. The main effect of the outside events was to place the Party in a quandary over the future of detente. On the one hand, Brezhnev emphasized the threat of the U.S. and its unwillingness to pursue a policy of detente. "Opponents of detente, of limiting armaments and of improving relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have noticeably stepped up their activity of late." And also later in the speech he stated:

Military spending is growing at an unprecedented pace. In the U.S., it has reached $150 billion a year. But even these astronomical figures do not suit the American military-industrial complex—it demands more. Yielding to Washington's demands, the U.S.'s NATO allies have pledged—though some did so very reluctantly—to automatically increase military appropriations almost until the end of the century. 52

The outside factors which have influenced the speeches of the military and the Party had been the failure and death of detente. Beginning in the late 1970's with the Senate's refusal to ratify quickly the SALT II treaty and its withdrawal from Senate consideration by President Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, detente declined and died. In his speeches to the 26th Congress, Brezhnev referred to
huge military expenditures in the U.S. These military expenditures were those of the new Reagan administration which, in 1981, began a large arms build-up. These outside factors brought the military and the Party into agreement that there was a significant threat from the U.S., in their view. The Party was not as negative about detente as the military but their respective positions on this issue were drawing closer. This was favorable for the military. It is clear from speeches before and leading up to this time that the military was never too thrilled about detente with the U.S.

It is also clear that, for the Party, the failure of detente put them into a quandary. Brezhnev acknowledged the threat of the new U.S. arms build-up but he was unwilling to abandon detente. From the same speech in which he attacked the Americans for bringing on a new cold war he made this very moving appeal.

The danger of war does indeed hang over the U.S., as it does over all other countries in the world. But its source is not the Soviet Union, not its mythical superiority, but the arms race itself and the continuing tension in the world. We are prepared to combat this genuine, not imaginary danger—hand in hand with America, with the European states, with all countries on our planet. To try to prevail over the other side in the arms race or to count on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness.54

This appeal was followed by an offer to continue the appropriate talks on strategic arms, presumably SALT III. 55
But, for some in the Party, this possibility was seen as extremely remote. For them, the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence had brought a U.S. reaction in the form of greatly increased military spending. The failure of detente and ever increasing world tensions were blamed solely on the U.S. This was the view of Politburo member V. V. Grishin who stated in a long, vitriolic excerpt at an October Revolution ceremony that:

The vast significance of this policy for the fate of mankind is becoming especially apparent today, when the U.S. ruling circles have taken it into their heads to cancel everything positive that was achieved during the 1970s, to bury detente and revive the cold war. Under cover of the myth about a Soviet threat, they have embarked on a course upsetting the existing military-strategic parity between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., gaining military superiority for themselves and dictating political conditions to others from a position of strength. Monstrous doctrines that justify the permissibility of nuclear wars are being proclaimed. Claims to world hegemony rest on a policy of an unrestrained arms race. More and more new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, intended for deployment on the ground, at sea, and in the atmosphere, and now even in outer space, are being created. Gigantic sums of money, running not into just billions but trillions of dollars are being spent for these purposes.56

In the end, the Party resolved its dilemma in much the same way the military had resolved its early on. It decided to argue that the international situation was hostile and unfavorable. This required a strong defense. Nevertheless, the possibility for talks was left open. This compromise formula was reflected in Ustinov's October Revolution speech at the Kremlin palace of Congresses. 57
Even with this compromise solution, as time passed the weight of the international situation and the military were against detente. In his Red Square ceremonies speech in 1982, Ustinov concentrated on the U.S. threat, rather than on the prospects for detente:

Firmly defending the interests of socialism and the freedom and national independence of peoples, the Soviet Union takes into consideration the fact that the aggressive forces of imperialism, above all those of the U.S., have brought the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level, are inciting armed conflicts in various parts of the world, and are irresponsibly threatening the use of nuclear weapons.58

Several conclusions can be drawn from this litany of speeches, the first of which is that the prime initiator and articulator of foreign policy remains the Party. The military may advise, persuade, and badger, especially in their speeches but the last word remains with the Party. In the early years of detente, from 1971 to 1978, the speeches of the military were such that they accepted the policy of peaceful coexistence of the Party and its success. But, in the same speeches, they would argue the need to be concerned with the U.S. threat. It was not until the late 1970s that the military could emphasize openly the threat of the U.S. and its allies rather than the possibility for detente. In a fashion the military could say: "I told you so!" All along, they had not supported detente wholeheartedly. Even so, the Party was not forced to give up detente by the military. It had done so willingly after the failure of detente.
The second conclusion flows from the first; namely, that the speeches of both sides reflect compromises in their stands on foreign policy. The military, at first, compromised the most. Later, it gained what it had lost because of the failure of detente in the Soviet perspective. One could easily argue that the military really did not give up anything because during this period it gained large increases in Soviet military spending. On the other hand, indications from speeches, plus the fact that it dropped support as soon as it was possible, lead to the conclusion that the military supported detente only reluctantly.

The third conclusion is that the Party has been the prime supporter of detente. It has had the most at stake in its success. So much so, that even in the later years when events were against it, the Party continued to hold out hopes for the revival of detente. For the military, detente was not seen as important and in fact could be seen as a danger. Both sides were influenced greatly about detente by events which were completely out of their control. The failure of SALT II and the arms build-up of the Reagan administration were notable examples.

Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union concerning foreign policy are characterized by a degree of conflict and compromise on both sides. The tone of the speeches of the military leaders shows that their perception of the degree of threat from the U.S. and NATO is high. Even during the
height of detente, the speeches were warning of the hostility of the international situation. This is strikingly different from the Party under Brezhnev, who had at times viewed the international situation as quite favorable. Even when it had soured he was unwilling to abandon detente. This difference in views stems from the different means of enhancing national security; detente versus military force. One emphasizes military force or national military security, while the other emphasizes economic and political relations or detente. Both are believed to enhance national security.

The Party has considered detente of prime importance. This importance has derived from a desire to fulfill certain policy objectives. First was the desire for Western technology to modernize the Soviet economy. Second was Moscow's China problem. Detente with the U.S. and the West would provide maneuvering room while negotiating with the Chinese. It would also reduce the likelihood of a two front confrontation with NATO and China. Thirdly, detente was a means to gain formal Western recognition of Eastern European boundaries. Lastly, and most importantly, was the need to relax the international environment and to stabilize the strategic arms race. A realization occurred that the present situation could not continue at such high levels of tension. Thus, because of these objectives, detente was an economic and political program as well as a military-security one.
For the military detente was inimical to their interests. The purpose of detente, by definition, was the relaxation of tensions. This meant that much of the reason for being of the military would be lost. This would occur because if the international situation is increasingly favorable and less hostile than the importance of the military decreases. Thus, the military, partly because its their job to find threats in the world, and partly because it is a threat to their institutional interests consider the issue of national military security to be more important than detente relations.

This line of reasoning leads to a possible conclusion that a reason for increased Soviet military expenditures was detente itself. To gain the support of a reluctant military, increased military spending was promised. This was not the only reason for the arms build-up - which has a multitude of causes - but it is one which fits the evidence. Increased military expenditures and the Soviet arms build-up also had the effect of increasing the role of the military in foreign policy.

Detente allowed the creation of a nuclear "canopy" supported by the SALT process and strategic nuclear parity of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Under this "canopy" the availability of conventional strategic forces became important. The creation of a Soviet "blue water" navy and air transport system, plus the increasing access of the Soviet Union to air and naval facilities, gave the Soviet Union greatly
increased power projection turning it into a global power. All of these events had an influence on relations between the Party and the military. The conclusion is that the military made up for the detente process by the increasing importance of conventional strategic forces which are controlled by the military. Soviet foreign policy in the 1970's and 1980's has been increasingly characterized by the military dimension. Whether from the preponderance of Soviet military power in Europe to the Afghanistan invasion in 1979. It is very likely that the military will continue to have influence in the foreign policy realm as long as military power continues to be a primary reason for Soviet super-power status.

For the Party, its role as the main creator, initiator, and articulator of foreign policy will continue. Foreign policy has not only a military dimension, but also economic and political dimensions. It is in these latter two, that the supremacy of the Party is quite evident. It is because of its prime role in all these dimensions that the Party does not always agree with the military. The military can only play an effective primacy role in the military dimension. Thus, it is most concerned with military spending, national military security, and the world threat. Differences arise between the two because the Party is also concerned with foreign economic and political issues which may contrast with the military dimension.

As has been mentioned above, the Party had several
objectives which they wished to achieve through a policy of
detente. These objectives were economic, military, and
political. That was the problem; for detente to succeed in
theory and by definition emphasis on the military was to be
reduced and hostilities lessened. This would be opposed by
the military. This opposition, in the beginning, was neutra-
лизated by the Party because detente was very important to
them. Detente was a foreign policy which also had implica-
tions for domestic policy. The transfer of grain shipments
and western technology were of great importance to the Soviet
economy. The importance of detente also explains the reason
why Brezhnev in his early speeches emphasized the favour-
ability of the international situation for peace and detente.
He could hardly have argued for detente and then pointed out
the hostility of the U.S. and its Western allies.

In summary, these conclusions about Party and military
relations as they are affected by foreign policy can be
reached:

1) The military, as shown in the speeches of Defense
Ministers Grechko and Ustinov, believe that national mili-
tary security is of greater importance than a policy of
detente.

2) The Party has placed greater emphasis on detente,
as compared with national military security. Although mili-
tary security was still of great importance.
3) The military perceived the threat of the U.S. and its NATO allies to be high and had consistently said so.

4) The Party has not viewed the U.S. threat to be as great as the military has. On the other hand, during the early 1980's it was beginning to see a hostile U.S. reaction.

**Summary and Conclusion**

In the economic aspects of the relationship the Party predominates because it is the formulator of the economic plans which will guide the growth of the Soviet economy. Again, the military may advise and persuade but the ultimate authority rests with the Party. Much of the economic policy centered around a debate over heavy industry versus light industry. The Party in its actual spending allocations has shown a priority for heavy industry over light industry. This places it in agreement with the military who have considered heavy industry more important. In the long run, what has concerned the military the most has been military spending. These have grown at high rates and have been at levels of 50% of central government expenditures for the Soviet Union. In so far that the military has been concerned about economic issues, it has been so over defense spending levels. The military and its leaders have shown much more activity in concern over foreign policy and relations with the U.S. and the Western nations.
As is the case in the economic area, in the foreign policy realm the Party remains predominant. Much of the debate concerned the desire for detente and its objectives versus the need for national military security. As time went on and detente declined, the issue of national military security came to be more important. This is clearly reflected in the last speeches of Brezhnev and Ustinov. For the military this meant a vindication of the position they had supported all along, while it placed the Party in a difficult position since it wished to continue detente but, according to the analysis of the international situation, this could not be done.

Increased military spending also had an effect on foreign policy. During the mid 1970s, the Soviet Union entered into a huge arms build up which allowed it to become a global power. Much of the Soviet Union's global super-power status resulted from its military power. Thus, because military power has become important in foreign policy the military has now gained influence in this area.

The seven questions posed at the beginning of this paper may now be answered.

1) What is the relative importance of national military security as compared to continuing detente relations, and vice-versa, for the military and the Party? The answer is that the Party has ranked detente to be of greater importance than national military security. Over time this position has
been modified to an extent that detente was not supported as strongly as it was before. The position of the military has been that at the very least detente should be pursued cautiously and at worst detente is a threat to national security. A great part of the difference of views on detente results from differing perception of the U.S. threat. This is a debate very similar to the one in the U.S.

2) What are the views of the Party and the military on the hostility or perceived threat of the U.S. and NATO. In general, the military leaders have shown the greatest mistrust towards the U.S., while the Party has been fairly optimistic and sanguine about the world situation. Some of the reasons for this go hand in hand with reasons for detente. For instance, to support a policy of detente requires a belief that the world situation is fairly peaceful and that you are favored in it. On the other hand, those who oppose detente do so because they believe the situation to be hostile and not necessarily in their favor. Thus, detente is seen as a threat to national security. The exact opposite will be argued by those who support detente. They will argue that detente by enhancing peaceful relations adds to national security.

3) What is the importance of increased defense spending as compared to other spending priorities? For the military, it is clear from the speeches that this is the number one spending priority. It is the duty of the Party to provide the necessary funding for defense projects. Coupled with
the military's view of a hostile world, this usually means that more is not enough. Also for the Party, during the time period examined, military spending has been a priority item. It has taken up approximately half of all expenditures each year.

4) Does the military always ask for increased defense spending? The answer is yes. In every speech examined that was given by the military leaders there was a call for more money for defense. Defense against the U.S. threat requires many roubles and the Soviet leadership must be constantly reminded of this.

5) Where does heavy industry rank with light industry for both sides? As was noted in the discussion of economics, heavy industry has ranked comparatively higher than has light industry for both sides. The military has favored heavy industry because it is necessary for defense productions. The Party has favored heavy industry because the traditional Soviet economic model favors heavy over light industry. It is also a much more spectacular area and easier to control.

6) Do the military and the Party agree or disagree on the issues raised by the above questions? Both have agreed on some issues, such as the importance of heavy industry and the need for high levels of military expenditures. Conversely, they have disagreed on the desirability of detente and the significance of the U.S. threat. Nevertheless, even though there has been heated disputes, this does not mean
protracted conflict. When there has been a disagreement on issues the Party has won out. Their primacy in both the foreign policy and economic realms has been acknowledged by the military.

7) Do these views change or converge over time? Yes, they do but this occurred only in the foreign policy area. Some of the views and attitudes of both have remained constant. It is the Party's perception of the value of detente which has changed over time. In the beginning, the Party was quite excited about detente and was very optimistic about its potential for solving Soviet domestic and foreign problems. The enthusiasm and support for detente waned as expectations for success were not met. The failure of SALT II and the lack of success in trade were major disappointments. Thus, because the military had from the start not considered detente to be desirable, the positions of the two began to converge as the Party retreated from detente. This was reflected in the last speeches of Brezhnev and Ustinov.

In conclusion for the whole paper these remarks can be made. First the Party remains as the dominant actor in civil-military relations. Second, where the relations have been the most active and changing has been in the area of foreign policy. The military indicates in its speeches that economics as it relates to defense spending is an adjunct to foreign policy. Third, increased military expenditures especially in the conventional area have contributed to the influence of
the military in foreign policy. Fourth, the high military expenditures have had the effect of "buying" the support of the military. Lastly, events in the U.S. can be and are reflected in the speeches made by the Soviet leaders. For instance, one of the speeches refers to Presidential Directive # 59 which changed the U.S. strategic warhead targeting. Other speeches referred to President Reagan's comments on limited nuclear war. Presidents, high governmental officials, and Presidential candidates should keep in mind that they have two audiences; an American and a Soviet one. What they say, can and will be used against them.

In general, civil-military relations in the Soviet Union remain a complicated affair. The lack of really hard data is the greatest obstacle to their analysis. Hopefully, this attempt of analysis of the data available in the form of speeches will shed some light on the topic.
Footnotes


2 Ibid., p. 23.


5 Ibid., p. 15.


7 Ibid., p. 225.


9 Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority*, p. 234.

10 Ibid., p. 279.

11 Ibid., p. 279-280.


20. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p. 21.

31. Ibid.

33 Ibid., p. 20.


36 USACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, p. 66.


40 Speech by Grechko in response to Brezhnev's report to the Congress," CDSP, XXIII #16, May 18, 1971, p. 23.


42 Ibid., p. 9.

43 "Grechko's speech from Red Square on Nov. 7," CDSP, XXVI #45, December 4, 1974, p. 5.

44 Ibid.

45 "Speech by Comrade A. A. Grechko at Red Square on Nov. 7," CDSP, XXVII #45, December 3, 1975, p. 5.

46 Ibid.

47 "Speech by D. F. Ustinov at Red Square on Nov. 7," CDSP, XXVIII #45, December 8, 1976, p. 4.


50 Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 11.

55 Ibid., p. 13.

56 "Grishin Keynotes Nov. 7 Celebration," CDSP, XXXIV #44, December 1, 1982, p. 4.

57 "Ustinov keynotes Nov. 7 celebration," CDSP, XXXIII #45, December 9, 1981, p. 5.

58 "Speech by Ustinov at Red Square Ceremonies on Nov. 7," CDSP, XXXIV #44, December 1, 1982, p. 6.


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