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INTRODUCTION

Personality, popularity, and power. Can these three concepts be linked together in terms of the United States presidency? To my knowledge, no one has to date proposed a theory linking these three ideas. However, theories have been advanced which show direct links between each two of the three. A synthesis of the major theories I have discovered in present political science literature is as follows:

Several political scientists have written that a certain personality type in a President will lead to greater popularity. Others have identified a connection between a President's popularity and his ability to secure various powers. Finally, a few claim that a powerful President will consequently enjoy great popularity.

Digesting all of these hypotheses at once, in the format which I have presented them, can be a difficult procedure. Therefore, I will be working with the following diagram (developed by Professor Michael Krassa) throughout my
essay as I present my interpretation and evaluation of the above hypotheses as they have been advanced by prominent political scientists of the twentieth century. As the basis of my evaluation, I will be referring to the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.

Figure 1.

PERSONALITY ----------> POPULARITY ----------> POWER
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|   |    |
CHAPTER ONE:

DEFINITION OF THE TERMS

To begin with, definitions of the terms "personality," "popularity," and "power" are necessary. I will not be working with the common, everyday meanings of these terms. Instead, I will be using operational definitions. By operational definitions I am referring to their connotations within a particular setting. More precisely, "operational definitions stipulate which specific indicators (or observations) are to be assigned which specific meanings" (Selltiz, 1976: 40). For the purposes of this thesis, the setting for the operational definitions of "personality," "popularity," and "power" will be defined with regard to the United States presidency.

PERSONALITY

First, the term "personality" refers to the publicly perceived image of a President. The setting of the United States presidency is characterized by an extremely promulgated public and private life. "Everything [the
President] says and does (or fails to say, omits to do), becomes significant in everyone's appraisal regardless of the claims of his "officialdom" (Neustadt, 1976: 148). Americans not only see their President speaking to Congress on the state of the union, but they also see him taking his wife to the hospital for a mastectomy. These reported images, public and private make up the perceived personality of the President. The American public receives these images through various mechanisms. The most significant ways in which the President's personality is conveyed is through television coverage of speeches and debates, newspaper and magazine articles, political advertisements, public statements made by others, and biographical books. Clearly, the American public perceives the personality of their President through the publicized reports of his public as well as his private life.

The types of public and private presidential activities which are reported determine the personality label a President will be given. For example, if the public is told that the President does not support the Social Security system, he will be perceived as a person who has little or no compassion for the elderly. On the other hand, if a President is shown speaking to teenagers about saying "no" to drugs, the public will see him as a man who is concerned about America's youth. With regard to private activities, if a President is shown playing with his children in the Oval Office, he will be viewed as a family man. However, if the
public learns that a President is keeping a mistress, he will be recognized as a man with little regard for his family. Thus, the image the American public receives of their President, whether projected intentionally or unintentionally, helps determine the personality label he will be given.

I have narrowed a wide array of possible personality labels for a President down to three basic continua. At opposite ends of each continuum are contrasting personality types. The image a President projects is placed anywhere along each continuum. The placement depends upon the public's perception of the President, and consequently their opinion as to what type of personality he has. The three continua of personality labels for Presidents I will be using are as follows:

![Image of continua for personality labels]

Which end of each continuum is considered a positive attribute and which is considered a negative attribute depends upon what the American public respects or desires at
that particular time. The public can be shown to have favored different personality types in different eras in American history. Wars, depressions, and national events are three contributing factors to what personality types are favored (Barber, 1972: 9). For example, Barber argues that in time of war, the public prefers a strong leader, but some aspects of such strength may not engender a positive evaluation in times of peace and prosperity.

For the purposes of this essay, I will be examining the era which includes the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. During this era, the American public responded positively to Presidents with refined yet spontaneous personalities. Furthermore, a big spender personality was received affirmatively during the early and middle 1960s. But by the beginning of the next decade, fiscal conservatism was desired in a President. So, for the era I will be focusing on, the personality labels of refined, spontaneous, and big spender (changed to fiscal conservative) were respected and desired by the American public. Therefore, these personality labels will represent a positive score on the above continua.

POPULARITY

Second, the operational definition of "popularity" in the United States presidency is the appreciation, admiration, and sometimes even adoration of the American public. A President who is popular reaps positive coverage by all forms
of the media and is well-received in appearances throughout the country. In an operationalization of these concepts, popularity can be measured by opinion polls and election results. The elections which assess a President’s popularity include both Presidential and Congressional elections. Congressional elections reveal public approval or disapproval of the President’s party based on his performance thus far. As Tufte explains, "it is reasonable to expect that voters upset by the performance of the President will take their dissatisfaction out on the congressional candidates of the President’s party" (Tufte, 1978: 108). Congressional elections in an off-year are of special significance since a President’s party almost always loses seats in an off-year. Because American voters "cannot change administrations at midterm elections, they can only express their approval or disapproval [of the administration] by returning or withdrawing legislative majorities" (Tufte, 1978: 106). So, in most cases, a gain or only a minimal loss of seats by the President’s party indicates presidential popularity. Plainly, presidential popularity is evidenced by high opinion poll ratings and election victories.

POWER

Finally, the operational definition of "power" in this thesis is the ability or capacity to exercise control or authority over Congress, the economy, and the media. Obviously, a President may possess control over other
institutions or systems, but this thesis will focus only upon these three major aspects of presidential power.

First, as Richard Neustadt has established, presidential power over Congress is essentially the power to persuade (Barber, 1972: 17). This power is exemplified in the ability to "push" particular measures through the institution. A President who is capable of winning Congressional approval of a controversial bill can be said to possess a certain amount of power. This power is the power to persuade and convince opponents to support a program and enact it into law. Clearly, presidential power over Congress refers to the ability to successfully persuade Senators and Representatives to vote for presidentially-initiated bills.

Second, presidential power over the economy is illustrated by the capacity to determine the timing of increases in transfer payments such as Social Security and veteran's benefits. A President can also exert power over the American economy by proposing a cut or postponing an increase in taxes and by mediating strikes and potential strikes (Tufte, 1978: 9). All of these measures have an effect on the real disposable income of Americans, and therefore affect the economy. Thus, through the manipulation of transfer payments and tax rates, and the mediation of strikes, a President can exercise considerable power over the economy.
Third, presidential power over the media is typified by the ability to influence which news stories will be broadcast and which will not. Furthermore, a president may even be able to determine the type of news coverage he receives: positive or negative. The President controls these aspects of the news in various ways. He may call press conferences whenever he desires; he may release only those stories which he wants published; or, when a "leak" occurs, he may request that the press not publish the story. Moreover, the President may call journalists to the White House to cover a family gathering or some other positive activity of the president. Obviously, presidential control over what the media publicizes, and how it publicizes it, is presidential power over the media.

In order to actually use the operational definition of "power" in terms of the United States presidency, criteria of measurement must be established. There must be some grounds upon which to justifiably contrast the amount of power various Presidents possessed over Congress, the economy, and the media.

To begin with, an accepted standard of measure of presidential power over Congress is the percentage of bills successfully pushed through the two houses. A high percentage of presidially-initiated bills passed by Congress indicates a great deal of power. So, a President
with a high percentage of bills passed is considered to have possessed considerable power over Congress.

Next, one measurement of presidential power over the economy is the percentage change in real disposable income. Nearly all Presidents have the power to manipulate the economy through the timing of transfer payment increases and tax rate changes, and many Presidents have the capacity to successfully mediate labor strikes. However, some Presidents are more adept at using these powers than others. Their skill can be measured in the size of the change in real disposable income. Therefore, all other things being equal, the President who can bring about the greater change in real disposable income can be considered as having more power over the economy.

Finally, two accepted measures of presidential power over the media are the percentage of news stories the President is able to suppress for any amount of time (of those we have eventually learned about) and the percentage of positive news stories published about him. A high percentage in either of these cases or both illustrates presidential power over the media.
CHAPTER TWO:

THE LINKS IN THE LITERATURE

Now that the operational definitions have been established for the three concepts which will be used, the theories linking them together shall be presented. The theories presented are my interpretations of theories which have been advanced by prominent political scientists of the twentieth century.

Each of the three theories linking the concepts of presidential personality, popularity, and power can be viewed individually as well as collectively. I will first present each hypothesis separately, and then I will consider them as a single model.

PERSONALITY -----> POPULARITY

A certain personality type can enhance the popularity of a President. As defined earlier, "personality" refers to the publicly perceived image of a President, and "popularity" alludes to the appreciation, admiration, and sometimes even adoration of the American public. In order for this
perceived image to command respect, it must be made up of attributes which are positively regarded by the public. Obviously then, a President who displays these attributes to the public will be given a venerable personality label.

An affirmatively received personality label leads to high popularity in a very basic manner. If a President communicates the image the public desires, he will be well-liked. In other words, if the public admires a President who is refined and not crude, a President who is able to project refinement in his actions will be more likely to be popular. The people will be more likely to respond positively in opinion polls and elections to the refined President than to the one who is crude. The President wins public approval by giving them what they want.

This theory linking presidential personality and popularity has been set forth by James Barber. In his book, *The Presidential Character*, Barber refers to the "presidential character" and how it is perceived by the American public. He states that the presidential character is a product of what the public sees of a President's political style (Barber, 1972: 4). Furthermore, "a President's personality interacts with the national 'climate of expectations' dominant at the time he serves" (Barber, 1972: 6). Finally, Barber links specific political styles and personality labels to opinion poll ratings. When a President acts desirably in a given situation, "there is a
favorable spurt in the Gallup poll" (Barber, 1976: 5). As can be seen, James Barber has established the link between presidential personality and popularity.

POPULARITY ———> POWER

Presidential popularity can be linked to presidential power. This link is based on three sub-links connecting popularity with the three types of power: power over Congress, the economy, and the media. Each of these connections have been advanced by various political scientists. In the following pages I will reveal the bases of these claims as well as the notable political scientists who advanced them.

Popularity ———> Power Over Congress

First, presidential popularity carries with it presidential power over Congress. A President who is admired and respected by members of Congress will find it much easier to persuade them. They will be more willing to follow his requests if they respect, or even like, him. On the other hand, a President who is not respected by the Congressmen themselves can still exercise power over them. If the President has gained the respect and admiration of the American public, he will be capable of persuading Congressmen to support his policies. The reason for this is that a popular President has the electorate's backing, and most elected representatives do not want to go against the wishes
of their constituents. Therefore, they provide support for the President's bills in order to fulfill their role of "representative" and, more pragmatically, to maintain their seat in Congress. Clearly, a President can use his popularity with the Congressmen themselves as well as with the American public as a tool to persuade Congressmen to support his policies.

Richard Neustadt has advanced the theory linking presidential popularity and power over Congress. In proposing this connection, Neustadt has also recognized popularity in terms of Congress as well as the American public. First, with regard to congressional popularity, he states that "their judgement of him is a factor in his influence with them" (Neustadt, 1976: 126). In other words, his ability to persuade them to support his policies depends in part on what they think of him. If the Congressmen think highly of him, they are more likely to go along with his wishes. Secondly, Neustadt acknowledges that popularity with the American people can help a President wield power over Congress. In his book Presidential Power, he states that "his power stakes are not confined to his relationships and reputation inside Washington; his influence depends, as well, on his apparent popular prestige" (Neustadt, 1976: 153). More specifically, "[Congressmen] also have to think about his standing with the public outside Washington. They have to gauge his popular prestige" (Neustadt, 1976: 154).
Neustadt goes on to say that "because they think about it, public standing is a source of influence for him, another factor bearing on their willingness to give him what he wants" (Neustadt, 1976: 154). Plainly, Neustadt's establishment of the link between popularity and power over Congress can be summed up in his statement that "[a President's] bargaining advantages in seeking what he wants are heightened or diminished by what others think of him" (Neustadt, 1976: 131).

Popularity -----> Power Over The Economy

Second, presidential popularity can result in power over the economy. As stated earlier, presidential power over the economy rests heavily on the ability to control the timing of transfer payment increases and tax rate decreases, as well as the capacity to mediate strikes and potential strikes. However, in order to implement these powers, the President must be popular. For example, to make changes in transfer payments or tax rates at the time desired, the changes themselves must first be approved by Congress. This is one point where popularity becomes important. A President who is popular will have the necessary backing to convince Senators and Representatives to go along with his requests. As a result, his economic proposals will be more likely to be passed by Congress and become law. Then the President will be able to implement them when he desires, and consequently will have great control over the economy.
Similarly, in order to successfully mediate a labor dispute, the President's proposal must be accepted by both sides. A President who is popular will find this task much easier. The reason is that people are much more likely to follow the wishes of a President who they respect and admire than one who is not popular. Therefore, a popular President can exercise control over the economy by mediating strikes. Plainly, popularity does increase the President's economic power.

This theory linking presidential popularity and power over the economy has also been advanced by Richard Neustadt. With regard to power over the economy in terms of making changes in transfer payments and tax rates, Neustadt points out that one thing a President desires is the cooperation of Congress in "aiding him in attaining policy objectives" (Neustadt, 1976: 159). These "policy objectives" may include raising real disposable income through increases in transfer payments and decreases in taxes. As stated earlier, Neustadt believes this Congressional cooperation is greatly determined by their opinion of the President. If they like him, they are much more apt to support his objectives. Consequently, his popularity can give him power over the economy. Further, Neustadt feels that a President's power over the economy with regard to labor disputes is determined considerably by his popularity. He states that "status and authority yield bargaining advantages" (Neustadt, 1976:
Therefore, a President who is able to gain a view of status and authority from his public will be at a greater advantage in bargaining with them. Basically, a popular President can exert control over the economy by getting both sides of a labor dispute to respect his authority and consequently accept his proposal. As can be seen, Richard Neustadt has advanced the proposal linking popularity to power over the economy.

Popularity ----> Power Over The Media

Lastly, presidential popularity can affect his power over the media. This phenomenon can occur for two reasons. First, a President who has the admiration of the American people as well as the media will be capable of persuading reporters to follow his wishes. In other words, when everyone respects the President, the media will be more likely to follow his requests to keep a story silent. Second, the public's and the media's positive attitude toward the President will probably result in more positive coverage of him. If the media personnel admire a President, they will focus on his good points in their coverage of him. Therefore, a President's popularity with the public and the media can lead to power over the media in the form of cooperation in following the President's requests and covering him in a positive manner.

This theory proposing that presidential popularity affects power over the media is briefly alluded to by Richard
Neustadt. In *Presidential Power*, he states that "the prevalent impression of a President's public standing tends to set a tone and to define the limits of what Washingtonians do for him, or do to him" (Neustadt, 1976: 155). By "Washingtonians," Neustadt is referring to the media assigned to cover the President as well as government employees. He is simply saying that if a President is popular with the public, the media will cover him in a more positive tone and will be more likely to honor his requests. Apparently, Richard Neustadt believes presidential popularity leads to power over the media.

**POWER ----> POPULARITY**

Just as there is a link running from presidential popularity to presidential power, so is there one running in the opposite direction. Presidential power can result in presidential popularity. This link can be founded on several bases. These bases center around the three types of power: power over Congress, the economy, and the media. Each of these presidential powers have been linked to popularity by various political scientists. In the following pages I will state the basic theory for the connection between each type of presidential power and its resulting popularity. I will also recognize the prominent political scientists who have advanced these theories.
Power Over Congress ----> Popularity

Presidential power over Congress can improve presidential popularity. Since power over Congress refers to the ability to "push" particular measures through the institution, in order for this power to result in popularity, these measures must be viewed as desirable by the public. They must be policies which will have a positive effect on, or are supported by most Americans. Examples of such policies may include stricter pharmaceutical drug testing laws, more rigid laws concerning air traffic controllers, and more stringent environmental laws. A President who proposes these types of measures, and secures their passage into law by Congress, receives the admiration of the public. His opinion poll ratings rise, and he secures electoral victories for himself and his party. Plainly, a President can transform his power over the Congress into popularity.

Richard Neustadt has recognized the link between power over Congress and popularity. He explains the connection by stating that "his prestige turns on what the members of the public think they want and think they get. He affects their thoughts by what he does" (Neustadt, 1976: 175). Therefore, if what he does is successfully "push" popular measures through Congress, then his prestige with the public will improve. He will be more popular. Clearly, the theory linking power over Congress and popularity is backed by Richard Neustadt.
Power Over The Economy ----> Popularity

Presidential power over the economy can increase presidential popularity. As stated in the definition, power over the economy refers to the capacity to determine the timing of transfer payment increases and tax rate changes and to successfully mediate labor disputes. Nearly everyone has strong feelings toward economic matters, especially those which "hit home." Most Americans like to see an increase in their real disposable income and a decrease in their taxes. Therefore, a President who is able to bring about either of these situations receives the appreciation of his public. He becomes popular.

This theory linking economic power and popularity has also been advanced by Richard Neustadt and Edward Tufte. Neustadt briefly alludes to this connection in Presidential Power. He explains that "paychecks and grocery bills are quite distinctly matters of real life" which affect the public's opinion of the President (Neustadt, 1976: 165-6). More specifically, Tufte establishes the connection between these two concepts in his book entitled Political Control of the Economy. He states that "several studies have found that upswings in real disposable income per capita are highly correlated with greater electoral support for incumbents" (Tufte, 1978: 10). The studies on which he bases his claim span four presidencies and cover the years of 1952 through 1972. Tufte also cites Gallup opinion poll ratings which
reveal increases in presidential approval ratings following increases in real disposable income (Tufte, 1978: 115). Clearly, the theory linking presidential control over the economy and popularity has been established.

Power Over The Media -----> Popularity

Presidential power over the media can yield presidential popularity. By controlling what the media broadcasts, and how it broadcasts it, a President can win the adoration of the American public. If the President is able to call great attention to accomplishments he has made, keep scandals from the public, and ensure he will always be seen in a positive light, the population will think highly of him. The American public will have no reason to believe otherwise. The media is their only real source of day-to-day information on the President. Therefore, if the President can exercise control over what the media broadcasts, then he can ensure his own popularity.

Richard Neustadt has also proposed this theory linking power over the media to popularity. He recognizes the fact that "[a President's] look in 'everybody's' eyes becomes strategically important for his influence" (Neustadt, 1976: 131). More precisely, how the media portrays the President to everybody is crucial in determining how everybody thinks of him. Therefore, presidential power over the media (the ability to influence which news stories are broadcast, which are kept silent, and how the President is covered) can
improve presidential popularity. To support this claim, Neustadt points out that "the professional reputation of a President in Washington is made or altered by the man himself" (Neustadt, 1976: 148). As a result, if the President controls the media, he has that much more capacity to control the professional reputation he is given.

SUMMARY

Clearly, the links between presidential personality, popularity, and power have been established. First, the connection between personality and popularity depends upon the particular era. For the time period I will be referring to, that which encompasses the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, three main personality types were positively received by the American public. These personality types were refined, spontaneous, and big spender (changed to fiscal conservative in the latter part of the time frame). Second, the link between popularity and power is based on persuasion. Popularity, as evidenced by election victories and high opinion poll ratings, provides a President with the power to persuade. This power can be exercised over Congress, the economy, and the media. Finally, power is connected to popularity by means of feedback. A President who exercises power over Congress, the economy, and the media receives positive feedback through electoral successes and improved opinion poll ratings. In other words, his power augments popularity. Therefore, each of the individual links
have been established: personality leads to popularity, popularity yields power, and power produces popularity.

In the introduction to this thesis, I presented a diagram which displays each of these individual links as one collective unit. After having fully defined and explored each term and link, the diagram can now be supplemented with the various characteristics and bases for each concept and its connection with another. Hopefully, this will aid in the understanding of the theories linking each of these concepts in the United States presidency.

Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONALITY</th>
<th>POPULARITY</th>
<th>POWER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Refined</td>
<td>1) Election wins</td>
<td>1) Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Spontaneous</td>
<td>2) Opinion poll ratings</td>
<td>Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Big Spender (later Fiscal Conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2) Over the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) Over the media</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(FEEDBACK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE:

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

In the preceding pages I have presented several theories regarding the United States presidency as advanced by prominent political scientists of this century. Included in this presentation are definitions of the concepts involved, interpretations of the theories, and references to selected political scientists' establishment of these theories. However, this is not enough. These theories must be evaluated. They must be tested with regard to actual presidencies.

For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, I will referring to the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon. These three presidencies span the years of 1960 through 1974. This era in American history was characterized by a great deal of turmoil and change. It began with a sense of calmness and stability, but by the time Nixon resigned in 1974 much of that stability was gone. Americans had run the full gamut in terms of beliefs and views toward the presidency. Therefore, this era supplies a
ich variety of circumstances in which to test these
hy. theses.

My evaluation of each of these theories will consist of
a recognition of the existence of the link as well as a
measurement of its degree. I will rely upon accounts from
varying sources for each of the presidencies in my tests of
the links. Essentially, I will exemplify the links between
personality and popularity, popularity and power, and power
and popularity. Then, using the measurements defined
earlier, I will assess the degree of each link for the given
Presidents. Thus, the testing of these three hypotheses will
be comprised of a recognition of each link in at least one
presidency of the era and a measurement of its significance.

PERSONALITY —> POPULARITY

As stated in the definitions, "personality" refers to
the publicly perceived image of the President, and
"popularity" is the appreciation, admiration, and possibly
even adoration of the American public. However, the link
between these two concepts depends upon the President's
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James Barber has pointed out, several factors can determine
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PERSONALITY -----> POPULARITY

As stated in the definitions, "personality" refers to the publicly perceived image of the President, and "popularity" is the appreciation, admiration, and possibly even adoration of the American public. However, the link between these two concepts depends upon the President's ability to convey to the public the image it desires. As James Barber has pointed out, several factors can determine the type of personality the public desires in a given era (Barber, 1972: 9). This was the case for the years spanning 1960 to 1974, as economic, social, and international pressures resulted in three personality attributes being received favorably by the public. These attributes can be
summarized as embodied in a refined, spontaneous, big spender (changed to fiscal conservative toward the end of the time period). The counterparts to these personalities, crude, calculating, and fiscal conservative (later changed to big spender), were consequently viewed negatively in the eyes of the public. Therefore, the existence of the link between personality and popularity can be proven by showing Presidents who conveyed the former images were subsequently popular, and Presidents who communicated the latter images were not popular. This very thing can be done with the presidencies of the 1960s and early 1970s. In other words, the link between personality and popularity can be seen clearly in the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.

John F. Kennedy

The presidency of John F. Kennedy exhibited a positive link between personality and popularity. JFK successfully conveyed the personality Americans desired in the early 1960s, and as a result he enjoyed great popularity.

At the beginning of the decade, the American public was looking for a change. "Currents of aberration, anxiety, frustration, and perhaps even boredom" were present in society (Toscano, 1978: 12). The Eisenhower years had initially been characterized by "flabbiness and self-satisfaction," but with the succession of events which occurred both at home and abroad, Americans had changed their
outlook. These events included the "rising tide of the struggle for Black equality" in America, anti-American protests throughout Latin America and Japan, and the launching of the Soviet Sputnik (Toscano, 1978: 10-11). By the presidential election of 1960, "a budding idealism was gathering to challenge the narrow materialism many saw in the Eisenhower years and the self-satisfaction produced by prosperity was undercut by a growing sense of apprehension concerning the directions America would take in the new decade" (Toscano, 1978: 10). As a result, Americans were looking for certain qualities in the man they would elect to be their new President. These qualities were youth, urbaneess, religion, ethnicity, and intellectualism. "So it was that John Kennedy, for the young, for the 'metro' American, for the Roman Catholic, for the ethnics, and for the academics, became a public figure who was seen as representing ideals and a style of leadership which touched a responsive chord among these diverse groups in American society" (Toscano, 1978: 13). And so it was that these qualities enabled John Kennedy to convey a sense of refinement, spontaneity, and big spending that would make him popular.

Kennedy exhibited these three qualities in his political and personal lifestyles. First of all, JFK displayed refinement in his political rhetoric. His elocution illustrated the fact that Kennedy was a rationalist and an
intellectual. "He wanted political campaigns to be conducted like debates -- courteous but candid, friendly but frank, incisive without becoming inflammatory . . .," which is how he spoke both before and after the 1960 presidential campaign (Barber, 1964: 32).

Kennedy was "cool, collected, courteous, and terse . . . He kept his emotions under tight control. He did not lose his temper inadvertently . . ." (Neustadt, 1976: 275). In many situations, "Kennedy was remembered not so much for what he said as for the impression of expertise, precision, and judgement he conveyed" (Barber, 1972: 315). Clearly, John F. Kennedy displayed a sense of refinement in his rhetoric.

Similarly, JFK exhibited refinement in his personal mannerisms. The son of self-made millionaire and United States ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy and Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, the daughter of the Mayor of Boston, JFK was brought up well-versed in the social graces (Barber, 1972: 295). His three years at Harvard University and his one year studying abroad also enhanced his social charm. The American public witnessed this refinement in Kennedy's graceful wit and charm so commonly termed "charisma." From elegant tours of the newly restored White House with his gorgeous wife Jackie, to humorous, yet poignant, speeches to his people, JFK was beautifully polished. As Richard Neustadt has pointed out, "his manners were impeccable, his charm
impelling" (Neustadt, 1976: 273). Obviously, Kennedy's well-learned elegance was reflected in his refined mannerisms.

The second of the desired qualities, spontaneity, could be seen in Kennedy's rhetoric as well as his decision-making. Kennedy displayed extemperaneousness while speaking on several occasions. This spontaneity was most likely to come out in the form of humorous quips directed either at himself or others. Its effect was usually to ease the tension of a situation, and was nearly always received positively (Neustadt, 1976: 275). This spontaneity also surfaced in Kennedy's immediate and public "shouldering of the blame" for the Bay of Pigs fiasco (Barber, 1972: 324). He did not attempt to hold off any public disclosure; he just told it like it was almost immediately after it occurred. In the area of decision-making JFK also exhibited a thoughtful spontaneity. He "displayed great eagerness to receive and a quickness to assimilate information. This tended, like a draft in a chimney, to pull decisions to the top," where he acted in a quick and determinate manner (Polsby, 1973: 135-6).

This behavior can best be seen in an examination of the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy quickly gathered all necessary information, met with his cabinet, and decided to impose a blockade, probably one of the biggest decisions made this century, all within five short days. When initially informed of the situation, the American public did not realize with
what speed their President had made his decision. However, after the crisis was over, Americans were made aware of the swiftness Kennedy exercised in deciding upon the blockade, and were grateful for his ability to react quickly in a crisis. Plainly, JFK's spontaneity and decisiveness in rhetoric and decision-making was recognized and received positively by the public.

Finally, John F. Kennedy displayed the third quality, a tendency for big spending, in the policies he advocated. Later dubbed as "the war against poverty," Kennedy became active in promoting plans for an attack on chronic poverty during the course of 1963 (Neustadt, 1976: 270). Included in this attack were calls for "higher minimum wages, expanded health services, better housing, more protection for the aged, and perhaps family benefits like those adopted in Canada" (Burns, 1964: 23). And he intended to push for appropriations from Congress for these programs. He felt that sometimes a deficit budget is better if it enables us "to get this country moving again" (Wicker, 1968: 86). Although few of these programs were implemented by Congress during his term, the American people knew he was pushing for them. Clearly, JFK advocated big spending policies during his presidency.

As can be seen, John F. Kennedy was successful in conveying to society the characteristics it desired in the early 1960s. The American public perceived his refinement,
spontaneity, and big spending tendencies and reacted positively. As a result, Kennedy enjoyed high approval ratings in the Gallup poll and Democratic gains in Congress. In opinion polls, Kennedy experienced remarkably high approval ratings throughout his presidency. The public reacted to his personality with a popularity index average of 70 percent approving, higher than all presidents in recent history including Franklin D. Roosevelt (Gallup Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). In particular, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Kennedy's immediate and public shouldering of the blame, "his Gallup poll rating leaped up to 82 percent" (Barber, 1972: 324).

Kennedy's publicly perceived personality also yielded midterm election success for his party. In 1962, he was not only able to "prevent further Republican gains in the Eighty-Eighth Congress," but also helped the Democrats to win additional seats in both houses (Wicker, 1968: 146). As evidenced by the high opinion poll ratings and midterm election wins, JFK was able to project the personality characteristics the people desired, and consequently he enjoyed great popularity with them.

Lyndon B. Johnson

When Lyndon B. Johnson took office in November of 1963, Americans still desired the same qualities in their president as they had for the last three years. They were looking for a refined, spontaneous, and big spending president. However,
LBJ could not project all three of these qualities as Kennedy had. He was neither as refined nor as spontaneous as Kennedy. He possessed a dramatically different personality than his predecessor. Until the public was gradually made aware of this fact in 1966, LBJ enjoyed great popularity. However, when Americans finally learned of his crude and calculating nature, his big spending social policies were not enough to save him. By the end of 1968, Johnson's popularity with the public had slowly but surely disintegrated.

On the personality continuum stretching from refined at one end to crude at the other, Lyndon Johnson would have to be placed nearer the crude end of the spectrum. In both his political and personal lifestyles he projected a sense of vulgarity. This vulgarity could be seen in his rhetoric and actions.

Rhetorically, Johnson used crude language to address all those around him. "Aides were showered with abuse when they were not showered with kindness. Johnson's private language by all accounts [was] expressive, earthy, anecdotal, and revealing" (Polsby, 1973: 164).

Similarly, LBJ was unrefined in his actions. "Men said he was flamboyant and a trickster. It was reported that he bullied his staff, and every reporter in Washington was familiar with stories of Johnson's personal vanity and occasional pettiness toward those who crossed him" (Wicker, 1968: 154). Moreover, LBJ had an aura of intimidation and
shameless was about him that made men feel that if they did not go along with him there would be "the most frightful and embarrassing row" (Reston, 1973: 166). His personality just was not refined. He was a "moody man and he suffered fits of depression" (Kilpatrick, 1973: 197). Finally, Johnson was "blunt and intolerant of mistakes" (Reston, 1973: 167).

Although all of these crude actions did not take place in the public arena, the American people did eventually learn of their President's unrefined behavior, and Lyndon Johnson was consequently perceived as crude.

On the second personality continuum, ranging from spontaneous to calculating, Lyndon Johnson's personality was perceived as calculating. As mentioned earlier, he had a reputation for scheming, but his calculating went much deeper than that. LBJ kept a great deal of important information from the public. His purpose was to enable himself to twist the facts to fit the actions he would take. In fact, his attempts to manipulate and fool the public into support may be interpreted as LBJ's own recognition that his power was, in part, determined by his popularity.

The best illustration of this is Johnson's management of the Vietnam War. He began by lying about what actually happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in order to win approval for his Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August of 1964. This resolution allowed Johnson to flex his muscles. "One of his aides said later that one of the President's purposes had
been 'to win Republicans and conservatives with a responsible show of force'" (Wicker, 1968: 227). He accomplished his goal as his popularity rating jumped 14 percentage points just in time for the upcoming presidential election. LBJ had simply shaped the circumstances to fit his needs. He had carefully calculated just what had to be said in order to accomplish his goals.

This same sort of calculation persisted throughout the Vietnam War. For example, in a campaign speech on September 25, 1964, Johnson exclaimed, "We are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the game, and we are not going south and run out . . . We are going . . . to try to get them to save their own freedom with their own men . . . " (Wicker, 1968: 231-2). At the time he made this speech, LBJ was actually making plans, which he later carried out, for increased U.S. troop involvement in Vietnam. He purposely used misleading rhetoric like this in order to win the "Consensus" and therefore the election. Johnson even went so far as to deceive the public on the true cost of the war "for fear that Congress would cut the administration's domestic programs" (World Year Book, 1967: 23). Johnson's calculating nature was ultimately revealed to the public as "the President's official statements were widely questioned in the press" (World Year Book, 1967: 23). Due in part to this calculating image, Lyndon Johnson was not received positively by the American people at that time.
Finally, although LBJ was able to project a big-spending image in his first few years, it was not enough to keep him afloat. Johnson pushed through Congress the publicly desired spending programs Kennedy had proposed before his death. However, his "Great Society" program could not sustain his popularity for long. During 1966 "he was criticized for neglecting the war against poverty as the costs of the war in Vietnam continued to rise" (World Year Book, 1967: 382). And as he tried to maintain his commitment to America’s urban and rural poor, middle-class opposition to any more social benefits for the nation’s poor began to rise in full force (World Year Book, 1967: 382). Plainly, although it was a source of popularity early on, Lyndon Johnson’s tendency toward big spending for social reform did not win him many popularity votes toward the end of his term.

As can be seen by examining Johnson’s years in office, LBJ enjoyed a good deal of popularity until his true character was revealed to the public. Early on, he delighted in high approval ratings and, more significantly, an overwhelming victory in the 1964 presidential election. Johnson collected 486 electoral votes compared to his opponent Goldwater’s 52 (Congressional Quarterly, 1979: 40). Furthermore, LBJ won 61 percent of the popular vote, the highest percentage up to that point in the history of United States presidential elections (Congressional Quarterly, 1979: 33). However, the tide soon changed. "While the
President apparently retained overwhelming popular support across the nation, a small but influential group of people who saw him up close were increasingly uneasy, unhappy, and uncharitable about him" (Otten, 1973: 194). It was not long afterward that the American public also became aware of the "real" Johnson and reacted negatively to his true personality. During the last two years of his administration, LEJ's approval ratings consistently fell. After beginning his presidency with an approval rating of 79 percent in December of 1963, Johnson's popularity dropped as low as 35 percent in late August, 1968 (Gallup Opinion Index, Oct. 1968: 5). In fact, Johnson's final average came to only 54 percent, much lower than Kennedy's 70 percent rating (Gallup Opinion Index, Oct 1968: 5). Clearly, Lyndon Johnson's perceived personality of crude, calculating, and big-spending made him unpopular with the American people.

Richard M. Nixon

Richard M. Nixon took office at a time when Americans were looking back in some perspectives and looking forward in others. After the crass and deceptive administration of Johnson, the public wished for a return to the refined and spontaneous ways of Kennedy. In contrast, following eight years of big-spending policies, the American people wanted to "put a lid on it." Governmental spending, both domestic and foreign, seemed to have gotten out of control, and as a result a fiscally conservative president was desired. So,
the personality types received positively by the American people from 1968 to 1974 were refined, spontaneous, and fiscally conservative. Therefore, a moderately refined, and fiscally conservative Richard Nixon was able to secure a fair amount of popularity for some time.

The first personality characteristic, refinement, is not something which came naturally for Richard Nixon. He was the son of an ex-trolley operator that seemed to try his hand at every trade in an effort to keep his family fed (Barber, 1972: 396). In Richard's young life the Nixon's spent several years struggling against genuine poverty (Barber, 1972: 396). As a result, Richard Nixon was not brought up with the social graces that children of upper class families were. Refinement was not naturally "bred" into him as it was for John Kennedy. Consequently, he had to work at being polished.

Through a great deal of personal effort, Richard Nixon was able to convey a moderate sense of refinement to the public. The most obvious area in which he displayed this quality was his "arms-length" style with those around him (Pierson, 1973: 206). He did not approach people with personal or degrading questions as Johnson had, but instead kept his distance and remained quiet and polite. "Nixon never castigated an underling, except perhaps in the inmost intimacy of his personal staff and his family. He was, moreover, compulsively unable to fire or dress down an aide"
(Evans, 1971: 5). He simply just did not blow off steam at those around him.

The public was made aware of his refined mannerisms through the publishing of comments by those who dealt with Nixon. However, despite his polished manners, Nixon was never really perceived as having "the appearance of charm" by the American people (Evans, 1971: 4). "He waged an endless battle to overcome that lack, but the effort usually fell short. At the root of this incapacity was his loneliness, and the loneliness was partly an inheritance of birth in a poor and undistinguished family, partly his environment as a poor boy, partly the harsh way politics had dealt with him" (Evans, 1971: 4). He also lacked the wit and humor Americans had grown to love in Kennedy (Evans, 1971: 6). Clearly, although he lacked charm, Richard Nixon was able to communicate a basic sense of refinement to the American people through his behavior toward those around him, especially in contrast to his immediate predecessor, LBJ. This consequently gave him a slight popular edge over LBJ when it came to personal style.

While Nixon was able to convey moderate refinement in his mannerisms, he was not capable of communicating the second desired personality trait: spontaneity. In the early years it was not so much that he was calculating; it was just that he could not make any decisions spontaneously. Nixon's administrative style was composed of "order, privacy,
thorough staff work, and plenty of homework for the President himself" (Polsby, 1971: 201). Nixon's style has been described as "far more structured than Lyndon Johnson's," and rightly so (Sample, 1971: 204). He had a passion for organization. When an issue arose, Nixon would assign certain aides and those members of his Cabinet in the problem area to get all possible information regarding the issue. Then, before making a decision, Nixon would gather the results of interviewing and study, listen to debate by his advisors, and "retreat—sometimes to his oval office, more often to the Lincoln sitting room in the family quarters of the east wing—to make up his mind" (Sample, 1971: 203). His decision would finally come, but only after careful consideration of the options. Furthermore, Nixon "tended to concentrate on one issue at a time," which slowed down the entire decision-making process of the administration even more. Plainly, Nixon was not known for spontaneity in his decision-making.

Although he may have only been perceived as "unspontaneous" in his early years, Richard Nixon went on to earn the reputation of calculating. The obvious reason for this is Watergate. This scandal revealed his calculating nature. The American people learned that their President had instigated unlawful activities for his own advancement, and devised lies to cover-up his participation. Moreover, he had installed a tape-recorder in his office to record conversations with unknowing participants. When the public
learned of these activities, it reacted with a drastic drop in presidential approval rating and the threat to impeach. Obviously, as the deceptive and calculating side of Richard Nixon was revealed to the public, his popularity disappeared.

Finally, Richard Nixon was able to convey a fiscally conservative image at a time when the majority of Americans desired this. Johnson’s Great Society program and the Vietnam War had taken a heavy toll on the United States economy. By the year 1970 inflation was beginning to get out of control, and the American public was not pleased with its effects. In fact, some called the inflation "a crisis ripping at the innards of America" (Evans and Novak, 1971: 182). President Nixon reacted to this situation first by reducing former President Johnson’s "uncuttable budget by four billion dollars" (Evans and Novak, 1971: 186).

"Seemingly, Nixon had moved quickly and masterfully to bring the budget under control - an indispensable asset in his fight against inflation" (Evans and Novak, 1971: 187). In response to this action his popularity rose approximately six percentage points (Gallup Opinion Index, September, 1974: 12).

Then, in mid-1971, he implemented a wage and price freeze to further curb inflation. This action was received positively by Americans as Nixon’s popularity rating rose approximately four points (Gallup Opinion Index, August, 1974: 12). In a further attempt to control inflation, Nixon
reduced federal spending by cutting back on social programs in early 1973. Though not as well-received as his wage and price freeze, this trimming of the budget was desired by the middle and upper class segments of society (Gallup Opinion Index, March 1973: 6). As a result, Nixon's popularity rating did not fall as drastically as it could have given the crisis state of inflation. Clearly, Nixon demonstrated fiscal conservativism in his attempts to curb inflation. Since this was the publicly desired image at that time, Nixon enjoyed moderate popularity because of it.

As can be seen, Richard M. Nixon experienced a good deal of popularity early in his presidency as he conveyed a refined and fiscally conservative personality. In fact, his popularity peaked at 68 percent and did not drop below 53 percent in his first four years in office (Gallup Opinion Index, September, 1974: 12). However, with the publication of his involvement in the Watergate scandal, Nixon's popularity tumbled. He was viewed as a scheming, calculating man, and the American people did not react to this positively. Richard Nixon's presidential approval rating dropped to an all-time low in United States history of 24 percent (Gallup Opinion Index, August, 1974: 10). This figure is even more significant when one considers that of the 24 percent approving, only 13 percent strongly approved of the job the President was doing (Gallup Opinion Index, September, 1974: 13). As mentioned earlier, a threat to
impeach President Nixon arose, but he resigned from office before the threat could be carried out. Clearly, while enjoying moderate to good popularity early on, due to his refined and fiscally conservative image, Richard Nixon lost the admiration of the American people when his calculating nature was revealed.

SUMMARY

The three personality continua -- refined to crude, spontaneous to calculating, and big spender to fiscal conservative -- have all been identified for the era of 1960 to 1974. In this era, refinedness, spontaneity, and big spending (changed to fiscal conservatism in late 1966) were seen as positive attributes, while their counterparts were viewed negatively.

The three Presidents of this era, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, can be measured in terms of these personality continua. This measurement is best understood in a placement of these Presidents on each continuum according to the degree in which they possessed a given attribute. Shown below is a chart identifying each attribute as well as the degree to which Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon exemplified them.
Figure 4.

REFINED CRUDE
(+)
| -K------N----------J- |
(-)

SPONTANEOUS CALCULATING
(+)
| ---K-------------J---N- |
(-)

BIG SPENDER FISCAL CONSERVATIVE
(+/-)
| -J--K--------------N-- |
(-/+)

Legend:

K = John F. Kennedy's placement on each continuum
J = Lyndon B. Johnson's placement on each continuum
N = Richard M. Nixon's placement on each continuum

POPULARITY ----> POWER

Popularity is the appreciation, admiration, and sometimes even adoration by the public. Power is the ability or capacity to exercise control or authority over Congress, the economy, or the media. The link between these two concepts is persuasion: popularity enables a President to exercise the power of persuasion in these three areas. Therefore, a President who is popular will enjoy great power.

This is the basic hypothesis behind the theory linking popularity and power. In order to test this hypothesis, it must be shown that a popular President is able to push bills through Congress, effectively control the timing of economic measures, successfully mediate labor disputes, and
influence the broadcast of news stories. In examining the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon this theory holds true. A President who enjoys popularity, enjoys power over Congress, the economy, and the media.

Popularity ----> Power Over Congress

As Richard Neustadt has stated, "[a President's] bargaining advantages in seeking what he wants are heightened or diminished by what others think of him" (Neustadt, 1976: 131). So, a President who is popular with either the members of Congress, the American public, or both will have the capacity to push controversial bills through Congress. This theory successfully withstands the test with regard to the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.

As established earlier, Lyndon Johnson was a popular President during his early years. As a result, he was able to exercise a great deal of power over Congress. The most obvious pieces of evidence of this are his numerous social programs collectively called the Great Society program. After winning "an overwhelming mandate" from the people in the 1964 presidential election, Johnson recognized that he could "swing Congress decisively" (Wicker, 1968: 231). His great popularity enabled him to persuade Congress to adopt his vast social programs. In fact, "in the early months of 1965, it could fairly be said that no President - save possibly F.D.R. in 1933, in vastly different circumstances - had disposed of so much sheer political power, or faced such
a limitless future of achievement, as did Lyndon Johnson" (Wicker, 1968: 234). The reason being that he was popular.

"'No matter how sophisticated a guy is, he's flattered and impressed by attention from the President of the United States,' says a very sophisticated Senate Democrat" (Otten, 1973: 189). The above statement was made in April of 1965, and accurately reflects the feelings of the majority of Congressmen toward President Johnson. Over 500 of the 535 invited Senators and Congressmen attended the President's evening briefings and buffets at the White House; nearly all of them taking advantage of the opportunity to have their picture taken with the President and First Lady (Otten, 1973: 191). While many of them attended because they liked President Johnson and were honored to accept his invitation, some of the Congressmen may have accepted merely to present a good image of themselves, with regard to their relationship with the President, to the Johnson-adoring public.

Similarly, Johnson's "invitations" to support his programs were accepted by most Congressmen, and for many of the same reasons. Either a Congressman liked and respected LBJ enough to support his policies, or his constituents felt strongly enough about the President to compel him to give his support.

Thus, a President who is well-liked by members of Congress and/or the general public will be capable of persuading Congressmen to support his policies. As shown by his high approval ratings and the size of his overwhelming
election victory, Lyndon Johnson was popular in his early years as President. Due to this popularity, he was able to get his Great Society program passed. This was an incredible accomplishment considering the vastness of the program and the controversial nature of some of its aspects. However, through his popularity with individual Congressmen as well as the American people as a whole, President Johnson had the power to see his program through.

Clearly, the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson exemplifies the link between presidential popularity and power over Congress. In the first three years of his presidency, Johnson's popularity with both members of Congress and the public yielded him considerable power over Congress. His high approval ratings and overwhelming election victory enabled him to get his Great Society program through Congress. Therefore, the link has been confirmed with regard to the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson: presidential popularity has a positive correlation to power over Congress.

Popularity ---> Power Over The Economy

The theory linking presidential popularity to power over the economy has been advanced by Richard Neustadt. He advocates this theory on two bases. He states that popularity with both Congressmen and the American public leads to power over the economy. Popularity with these two groups of people enables a President to get crucial economic measures through Congress. Also, popularity with Americans
in general can aid a President in settling an important labor dispute. These two activities, pushing economic measures through Congress and mediating labor disputes, each have significant effects on the economy. They both can play a role in determining real disposable income. This link between presidential popularity and power over the economy is best exemplified in the presidencies of Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy.

Richard Nixon enjoyed substantial popularity in his first five years in office. He won convincingly over Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election and McGovern in the 1972 election. Moreover, his approval rating peaked at 68 percent in November of 1969 and January of 1963 (Gallup Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). This popular standing enabled Nixon to push through Congress several major economic measures.

Although inflation was a weighty problem which tugged at President Nixon's popularity, he was able to sustain a popular standing sufficient to ensure the passage of his controversial price-wage controls in January of 1969 (Evans and Novak, 1971: 185). At this point in his term, Nixon was popular with both Congress and the American people. His overall approval rating was 59 percent (Gallup Opinion Index, January, 1969: 1). In terms of real disposable income, this measure did not actually bring about an increase. After all, wages were frozen to their current rate. However, by also
freezing prices, inflation was held in check and real disposable income remained constant. Therefore, instead of declining, as it had been in previous months, American’s real income continued to buy what it had been. Clearly, Nixon’s popularity in early 1969 enabled him to exercise some control over the economy through his wage and price freeze measure.

Also, many Americans responded to some of Nixon’s "jawbone appeals" to keep prices, spending, wages, etc. under control. The fact that the public did respond is a sign of his popularity. Thus, popularity is directly linked to power over the economy in this instance.

With regard to popularity leading to power over the economy in the form of successfully negotiating labor disputes, we can look to the presidency of John F. Kennedy. In 1962, a showdown between the AFL-CIO and the steel companies had come to a head (World Year Book, 1963: 422). At this time, Kennedy’s approval rating was high. Consequently, he was able to use this popularity, especially with laborers, to negotiate a settlement between the two sides. By getting the steel industry to roll back a price increase, JFK saved the United States’ economy from certain damage (Evans and Novak, 1971: 184). Therefore, President Kennedy’s popularity yielded him power over the economy.

As has been shown, the link between presidential popularity and power over the economy existed in the
presidencies of Richard Nixon and John Kennedy. Thus, the theory holds true in these instances.

Popularity ----> Power Over The Media

Richard Neustadt has advanced a theory linking presidential popularity and power over the media. He states that, "the prevalent impression of a President's public standing tends to set a tone and to define the limits of what Washingtonians [including media personnel assigned to Washington] do for him, or do to him" (Neustadt, 1976: 155). Therefore, a President who is popular will be covered in a positive manner by the media, and he will be capable of exercising considerable influence over the media as to what is broadcast and what is not.

This connection between presidential popularity and power over the media can be shown to have existed in the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Kennedy enjoyed tremendous popularity while in office. His approval rating reached a high of 83 percent and a very respectable low of 57 percent (Gallup Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). Moreover, his average approval rating was an unprecedented 70 percent. Finally, Kennedy's popularity was exhibited by Democratic gains in Congress in the 1962 midterm election. Obviously, President Kennedy was popular.

This popularity led to power over the media in two ways. First of all, JFK was able to convince the media to keep certain stories silent for a specific period of time. One
good example of this is the Cuban Missile crisis. President Kennedy persuaded the media to withhold from the public any information it had on the situation until he could tell them himself. Obviously, the media was not required to keep the story silent, but news personnel respected Kennedy and went along with his wishes.

Second, the media covered President Kennedy only in a positive light. It brought to the public's attention Kennedy's good points and rarely exposed his bad. This resulted in the "Camelot" image. In fact, 'President Kennedy's public image,' declares Lashy, 'clashed mightily with his private life. The public image, presented through an all-too-willing media, was that of the good husband, the kind family man, and the perfect father. Camelot was never sullied by what really was going on behind the scenes, the sybaritic, hedonistic life led by a President who felt he could do anything and get away with it' " (Smith, 1980: 113).

Malcolm Smith goes on to state, "The reason this side was rarely revealed to the public is that Kennedy managed the news. He kept good relations with many reporters . . . ." (Smith, 1980: 143). Clearly, John F. Kennedy's popularity with the American people, and with the media in particular, enabled him to exercise power over the media.
POWER ----> POPULARITY

Two links exist between popularity and power. The first runs from popularity to power and has been discussed in the preceding pages. The second, running from power to popularity also can be demonstrated. The link for this variation of the connection between presidential power and popularity is feedback. The public's reaction to various acts of power performed by the President is the feedback which determines a change, if any, in his popularity. In most cases, the President uses his power in such a manner as to increase his popularity. Thus, presidential power over Congress, the economy, and the media can lead to presidential popularity.

For the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, this theory does hold true. Each President exhibits a different type of power which leads to increased popularity for him.

Power Over Congress ----> Popularity

Power over Congress refers to the ability to "push" particular measures through the institution. However, in order for this power to result in popularity, these measures must be viewed as desirable by the public. They must be policies which will have a positive effect on, or are supported by, most Americans. President Johnson's social programs and policies collectively, termed "the Great Society," were a prime example of this. As a result, his
power over Congress in getting this program passed won him great popularity.

Johnson's Great Society program was desired by a majority of Americans. Its provisions included federal aid to the poor through the growth of welfare, major public initiatives in health care, federal housing projects, economic developments in the black community, and federal aid to education (Ginzberg and Solow, 1974: i-ii). Clearly, these programs promised relief for various segments of society. From helping the poor through welfare to aiding middle-class students in gaining a college education, the Great Society program was desired by the majority of Americans.

Despite the program's popularity, it was still difficult to steer it through Congress. The program was vast, complex, and far-reaching. Furthermore, each individual measure which made up the program had to be voted on separately. Thus, it required a great deal of lobbying on President Johnson's part to get the program passed largely intact. However, LBJ possessed enough power over Congress to secure the Great Society's passage in only two years (Ginzberg and Solow, 1974: 8).

As a result of President Johnson's power over Congress and his ability to get his programs passed, he was able to maintain consistent popularity with the American people. From early 1964 to late 1965, the time period in which
Johnson was pushing the bulk of the Great Society program through Congress, his popularity rating averaged 69.7 percent (Gallup Opinion Index, February, 1966: 3). More significantly, Lyndon Johnson won an incredibly lopsided presidential election in 1964. As Richard Neustadt stated, "[the President's] prestige turns on what the members of the public think they want and think they get" (Neustadt, 1976: 175). Obviously, the theory linking presidential power over Congress and popularity is lent credibility by Lyndon Johnson and his Great Society program.

Power Over The Economy ----> Popularity

Power over the economy was defined earlier as the capacity to determine the timing of transfer payment increases and tax rate changes and to successfully mediate labor disputes. Theories linking this power to presidential popularity have been advanced by Richard Neustadt and Edward Tufte. Neustadt explains that "paychecks and grocery bills are quite distinctly matters of real life" which affect the public's opinion of how well the President's performing his job (Neustadt, 1976: 165-6). More specifically, Tufte states that "several studies have found that upswings in real disposable income per capita are highly correlated with greater electoral support for the incumbents" (Tufte, 1978: 10). Therefore, if a President is able to control those aspects of the economy pertaining to real disposable income,
he will find it easier to increase or maintain a high popularity rating.

President Richard M. Nixon was able to do just that. He was able to control the timing of increases in transfer payments so as to increase real disposable income and consequently his popularity. One source of evidence for this involves President Nixon’s support of a social security benefit increase bill passed by Congress and his subsequent signing of it in October of 1972. After winning Congressional approval of the bill and signing it into law, Nixon ordered his administration to send out notices explaining that the 20 percent increase in their benefit check "was due to a new law ‘enacted by the Congress and signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon’ " (Tufte, 1978: 31). The note went on to say, "The President also signed into law a provision which will allow social security benefits to increase automatically if the cost of living goes up" (Tufte, 1978: 32). Thus, President Nixon was able to exercise power over the economy through his ability to control the timing of those increases in real disposable income deriving from Social Security payments.

This increase in real disposable income helped bring Nixon great popularity with the American people. The most obvious manifestation of this is Nixon’s overwhelming presidential election win over McGovern in 1972. Nixon captured 520 electoral votes compared to McGovern’s 17
(Congressional Quarterly, 1979: 60). His approval rating also correlated positively with this power as he reached his high of 68 percent in January of 1963 (Gallup Opinion Index, September 1974: 10). Clearly, the link between presidential power over the economy and popularity can be shown to exist in the presidency of Richard M. Nixon.

Power Over The Media ----> Popularity

Presidential power over the media can lead to popularity. By controlling what the media broadcasts, and how it broadcasts it, a President may win the adoration of the American public. More specifically, if a President is able to call great attention to accomplishments he has made, keep scandals from the public, and ensure he will always be seen in a positive light, the population will think highly of him. In the case of President John F. Kennedy, his power over the media enabled him to increase his popularity even more.

JFK exercised power over the media in two different areas. First of all, he was able to control, to an extent, when certain news stories would be broadcast. For example, when the Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred, President Kennedy persuaded the media to withhold news of the event until he had a chance to go before the American people and explain it to them himself. The result was that the President's Gallup poll rating actually leaped to 82 percent instead of drastically falling, as would have been predicted (Barber,
1972: 324). Second, President Kennedy had the capacity to determine the way in which he would be portrayed to the public. From inviting reporters to the Oval Office to photograph him playing with his two children, to accompanying his beautiful wife Jackie on the nationally televised tour of the newly renovated White House, JFK ensured his portrayal as a devout family man. Clearly, President Kennedy exercised substantial control over the news.

Kennedy managed the news by keeping good relations with many reporters and lashing out (privately) against those who wrote unfavorably of him (Smith, 1980: 143). This "lashing out" consisted of "cancelling subscriptions to the White House, verbal abuse and beratement from Bobby (then Attorney General), and of [having] reporters' taxes audited" (Smith, 1980: 143).

Kennedy's management of the news definitely led to popularity. His perfect timing in his release of the news of the Bay of Pigs fiasco meant an increase in his approval rating rather than the expected decrease (Barber, 1972: 324). Furthermore, his perfect orchestration of the Camelot image presented to the American people produced the highest average approval rating in recent history (Gallup Opinion Index, September, 1974: 10). As can be seen, President Kennedy's power over the media resulted in popularity for him.
CONCLUSION

At the start of this thesis, I set out to show that certain aspects and evaluations of presidential performance are linked. These links involve the personality, popularity, and power of a President. While all of these links may have previously been advanced in political science literature, I substantiated and illustrated each individual link with evidence from the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.

I accomplished what I set out to do by demonstrating that a connection exists between the personality of each of these Presidents and their popularity. This connection, however, depends upon the type of personality desired in a given era. Furthermore, I demonstrated that the level of popular support of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon directly influenced their power over Congress, the economy, and the media. Finally, I established that the exercise of presidential power in any of these three areas yielded a degree of popularity for the President. Plainly, each of
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these links between personality, popularity, and power has been shown to exist in the United States presidency.

However, these links are not meant to be considered solely in an individual sense. They are simply pieces which fit together to form a system of interdependent relationships. Each is affected by the other, either directly or indirectly, and therefore each can be linked together. As a result, they should ultimately be considered as one explanation for certain aspects of the United States presidency.

From personality, to popularity, to power, and back to popularity, each characteristic of a President produces, or is the product of, other characteristics. In essence, these aspects of the presidency are related in a cyclical manner. One characteristic leads to another, which leads to another, which leads back to the second. Thus, if a President is fortunate enough to possess one of these qualities, he may be able to use it to gain the others, or simply reinforce what he already has. For example, a popular President may use his popularity to gain power over the media, which in turn can have a positive effect on his popularity, which consequently may enhance his power over Congress, and so forth. On the other hand, if a President does not possess a certain characteristic, he may find that a breakdown will occur in the attributes he already has. For example, a popular President who does not possess power over
the media may find that this lack of power will result in a breakdown of what he already has: popularity. As can be seen, a cyclical relationship exists between these links in the presidency.

Clearly, personality, popularity, and power make up a system of interdependent relationships in the United States presidency. The links of this system have been advanced by prominent political scientist, and shown to have existed in the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Therefore, a President possessing one of these attributes is capable of gaining the others. However, if a President does not possess any of these characteristics to begin with, will he ever be able to win any of them? Can he ever break into the "system?"


