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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

AARON BRAYTON LINCOLN

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AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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THE SOCIALIZATION OF SOLDIERS

AND

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

BY

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THE SOCIALIZATION OF SOLDIERS
AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

Section 1: The Traditional Theory

In order to examine the formation of a soldier we must first understand the function of the soldier. Similarly, in order to understand the function of the soldier we must know the purpose of the military. There have been several definitions of the purpose of the military, but we will rely on Morris Janowitz's conception that "the military profession, as defined by civilian society and by itself, are 'managers of the instruments of violence'"[1]

With such a definition, the role of the soldier within the institution becomes seemingly obvious. According to Janowitz, the ultimate function of the soldier is to be an "effective killer". In order to transform a person into a soldier he or she must be trained to kill on command without hesitation. Though this is a common understanding of a soldier's profession, it may not be clear how exactly one can "train" a person to do such a thing. Any society that adheres to such principles must develop a rationale for the existence of a force that "manages" violence through professionals in the art of killing. In the United States we have specified the primary organizational goal of the military within our constitutional form of government as the defense of the nation from aggression by another nation. Similarly, almost all other nations of the world have relied on what military scholars refer to as the "theory of sovereignty" to justify their self-defense as a nation-state. This specification of the organizational goal determines the requirements of the military as a force and consequently, the inherent need for training to produce soldiers who can accomplish this goal.

This need indirectly defines the standards of socialization to the military style of life that are expected of soldiers. The techniques used to reach these standards of socialization are thus of utmost importance to the mission of the military as an institution. "All nations regard the maintenance of an army as necessary to 'protect the national interests,' whether threats to them are real , imagined, or invented. An army can fulfill its purpose only if it has the will to kill. To accept the basic premise , the people of a nation must accept in their midst a force trained to kill effectively and on command."2 Inherent in this acceptance is the "theory of right"; that the sovereign has the right to grant authority to the military. In order for the military to accomplish its mission the sovereign grants legitimate authority to constitute a specific environment that facilitates the training and socialization of soldiers. Under this premise the nations of the world have subjected soldiers to all forms of behavioral constraints under a superstructure of discipline, as well as attempting to develop values, beliefs and attitudes which are congruent with the needs of the state.

The basis for this legitimate authority is the essence of the theory of soveriegnty in all of the government's structures, not only the military's mission. This traditional theory of right has been discussed in the discourses of Western Cultures since medieval times. Later, we shall give an historical perspective on the development of this approach from fuedal kings to monarchies to nation-states. In contemporary discourses on the role of the military this ideological approach to the right of the nation-state pervades. For example, in the extensive work of Samuel Huntington, _The Soldier and the State_, he asserts; "The military profession exists to

serve the state. To render the highest possible service the entire profession and the military force which it leads must be constituted as an effective instrument of state policy."3

Of course, the superior power of the sovereign over its branches (including the military) underlies this theory of right. Therefore, power emanates from the top or center sovereign source (the nation-state) and diffuses downward, or outward, through the hierarchy of institutional branches. This conception of power is embodied in the discourses of contemporary military scholars. Huntington adheres to this principle: "Since political direction comes *only* from the top, this means that the (military) profession *has to be* organized into a hierarchy of obedience." This precept has led to a superstructure of discipline within the military. He explains: "For the profession to perform its function, each level within it must be able to command the instantaneous and loyal obedience of subordinate levels." The military profession is characterized by an ethic that promotes a hierarchical organization in which "loyalty and obedience are the highest military virtues...."4 The sovereign demands and legitimates this obedience and therefore is thought to "control" this obedience. This control is expressed in terms of the hierarchy and embodies Western Culture's formulation and definition of power:

Power is the capacity to control the behavior of other people. A power relationship has at least two dimensions: the degree or amount of power, that is, the extent to which a particular type of behavior is controlled by another; and secondly, the scope or locus of power, that is, the types of behavior which are influenced by the other individual or group." Furthermore, "power exists in two forms, formal authority and informal influence....Formal authority involves the control of one person over the behavior of another on the basis of their

respective positions in a defined structure. Authority does not adhere in the individual but is an attribute of status and position....Informal relationships also exist where one person, or group of persons, controls the behavior of other persons not because they occupy particular positions in a formal structure, but because they control other sanctions or rewards....Its distinguishing characteristic, however, is *always* that it inheres in specific individuals or groups, not in the roles or statuses which those individuals or groups occupy.5

It will be the function of the following discussions to analyze the consequences of such a definition of power in a strictly hierarchical formulation. A formulation that is, although seemingly dynamic, a limited model that views power primarily as a consequence of direction emanating from sovereign control. This traditional theory which supposes that power is invested only in status positions or the individual or group, has been the basis for defining power as long as the theory of sovereignty has existed. An effort will be made to show certain faults in this theory and provide alternative methodologies for analyzing the nature of power and the role of the military in contemporary society.

FOOTNOTES

Section 1: The Traditional Theory

1. Morris Janowitz, _The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait_, The Free Press, New York, 1971, p.x

2. Donald Duncan, _The New Legions_, Random House, New York, 1967, p.105

3. Samual P. Huntington, _The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations_, Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957, p.73

4. Huntington, _The Soldier and the State_, p.73 (italics mine)

5. ibid., p.86 (italics mine)

Section 2: A Structuralist Perspective

A rather distinct perspective on the Theory of Sovereignty can be produced by examining the works of Michel Foucault. Foucault is a French "structuralist" who differs radically from the traditional theory in distinguishing the role of the sovereign in the existing schema of power. In his text, _Power/Knowledge_, he explains that "the essential role of the Theory of Sovereignty, from medieval times onward, was to fix the legitimacy of power; that is the major problem around which the whole theory of right and sovereignty is organised." In other words, the traditionalist perspective has utilised the theory of sovereignty to legitimize the right to exert power over others. This is no doubt, an obvious precept of Western Culture's definition of power which has been accepted as an ideology up to this very moment. Yet Foucault offers a deeper explanation for this theory. "When we say that sovereignty is the central problem of right in Western Societies, what we mean basically is that the essential function of the discourse and techniques of right has been to efface the domination intrinsic to power in order to present the latter at the level of appearance under two different aspects: on the one hand, as the legitimate rights of the sovereignty, and on the other, as the legal obligation to obey it."1

In general, this principle has enabled Western societies to develop legal apparatus, juridical systems, military and police organisations, health and welfare institutions, and an ideological discourse of sovereign right to impose power and justify the inherent domination that results. The unique essence of Foucault's work has

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been "to reverse the mode of analysis followed by the entire discourse of right from the time of the Middle Ages." His aim, therefore "was to *invert* it, to give due weight, that is, to the fact of domination, to expose both its latent nature and its brutality...to show not only how right is, in a general way, the instrument of this domination-which scarcely needs saying-but also to show the extent to which, right (not simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatus, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations that are *not* relations of sovereignty, but of domination."2

To summarize the basic thrust of his argument, it is suggested that a new form of power exists which is different than, but rooted in, the theory of the sovereign, this is the "disciplinary mechanism". This assertion is the basis of Foucault's "Theory of Repression" in "A Society of Normalization." He contends that since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the form of power has progressively moved toward a disciplinary society. This new formulation of power has been hidden, or effaced, by the principles of sovereignty that have been urged on by the traditional discourse of right. Foucault opposes the traditional hierarchical formulation of power and claims that instead, beyond the macro-economy of power relations between state institutions, a micro-economy of power has been established at the level of the individual.3

He argues that power does not stem from the sovereign (the state apparatus of the nation-state), but from the control of "bodies" and the normalization of the individual in an elaborately complex system of institutions and mechanisms. Yet, before we can operationalize these concepts for a discussion of the

military, we must clarify two problematic aspects of Foucault's work. In order to differentiate between the traditionalist perspective and this structuralist perspective we must first be aware of the differing approach to the role of the soveriegn, which we have been describing, and second, there are several methodological precautions which are needed to study the nature of power in terms of these disciplinary mechanisms.

In regard to these precautions, Foucault informs us that "we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the...sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilisations of their localised systems, and toward strategic apparatuses...we must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination."4 In traditional terms, the study of power is limited to the power relations within the hierarchy of state institutions. The "politics" between these institutions (or individuals within them) is the realm in which power is thought to be exercised. In terms of military power this approach is subsumed under the heading of "Civil-Military Relations". In an expanded arena, the traditional definition of the nation-state as the sovereign becomes problematic when confronted by Foucault's perspective. The current constitutional form of government in a nation-state format, is a relatively recent phenomenon which has transformed from the monarchies of Europe. Yet it is essentially the same theory of sovereignty which guides the traditional formulation of power.

Morris Janowitz has attempted to give an historical

perpective on the changing relations between sovereigns and their militaries as the political structures of these countries have transformed. His texts, <u>The Professional Soldier</u> and <u>The Political Education of Soldiers,</u> outline the development of the military as a "profession" and the institutional characteristics that accompany it. Janowitz and his contemporary, Stephen D. Wesbrook, claim that although military structures have changed there are only three primary models which can be described. These include the traditional or Aristocratic Model, the Liberal-Democratic Model, and the Penetration Model. According to Janowitz, there is no contemporary example of the Aristocratic Model. The Aristocratic Model was only characteristic of Europe prior to World War I. It was replaced by the Liberal-Democratic Model in Europe when the Monarchies and aristocracies were overwhelmed by popular revolutions. The Penetration Model is characteristic of contemporary authoritarian regimes as well as most communist countries.5

Janowitz describes the transition of the militaries of Europe from relatively unorganized forces that were led by aristocrats to highly organized forces that were controlled by the state and were characterized by "professional" officer corps. He claims that the military of the United States is based on the Liberal-Democratic Model and is rooted in the development of a professional ethic that stems from European armies. What Janowitz and other military scholars that use the traditional approach to power take for granted is the transformation of the locus of power that occurred along with these transitions in structure. According to Foucault, they neglect to take into account in their historical perspective the underlying disciplinary mechanisms which accompanied professionalism. In this sense, Foucault would suggest

that the traditionalists are trapped in an analysis that inherently does not examine the "true" nature of power that exists today! He explains that a deeper investigation into the structural transformations of the theory of sovereignty reveals the true form of power that is in operation. To clarify, we must evaluate the solid body of historical fact upon which the entire juridical-political theory of sovereignty is rooted. We will find that the theory of sovereignty has gone through fundamental changes that have eluded the traditionalists. According to Foucault, the theory of sovereignty has played four roles in the history of its existence.

In the first place, it has been used to refer to a mechanism of power that was effective under the fuedal monarchy. In the second place, it has served as instrument and even justification for the construction of the large scale administrative monarchies. Again, from the time of the sixteenth century and more than ever from the seventeenth century onward,...the theory of sovereignty has been a weapon...which has been utilised...either to limit or else to reinforce royal power....Finally, in the eighteenth century, it is again this same theory of sovereignty,...that we find in its essentials in Rousseau and his contemporaries, but now with a fourth role to play: now it is concerned with the construction, in opposition to the administrative monarchies, of an alternative model, that of parlimentary democracy. And it is still this role that it plays at the moment...(in various forms, including the Constitutional Democracy of the United States).6

Foucault says that at its inception, the theory served its initial function and actually did address the general mechanisms of power that were in effect in fuedal and monarchical societies. The basic structure of power which needed to be conveyed was indeed "the relationship of sovereign-subject." "But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have the production of an important phenomenon, the emergence, or rather the

invention, of a *new mechanism of power* possessed of highly specific procedural techniques, completely novel instruments, quite different apparatuses, and which is also...absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty."7 This is the origin of the disciplinary mechanism which seeks not to punish but to correct and train. The military was one of the primary sources which developed these *"positive"* techniques of disciplinary power. Later we will discuss the nature of these mechanisms.

Foucault claims that this disciplinary power emerged under the legitimacy of the sovereign. Yet, it turns out to be "in every aspect the antithesis of that mechanism of power which the theory of sovereignty described or sought to transcribe." Originally, it was meant to develop an understanding of the relationship between the sovereign and a subject. It has now become a means of justifying a system of domination that is constantly exercised by means of *surveillance*. In fact, this new type of power can not be formulated in the terms of sovereignty. The terms of the theory never provided for, and simply can not provide for continuous systems of surveillance nor an economy of domination. It reaches beyond the scope of the original theory. "This non-sovereign power, which lies outside the form of sovereignty, is disciplinary power. Impossible to describe in the terminology of the theory of sovereignty from which it differs so radically..."it was instrumental in creating Industrial Society and the accompanying forms of legal codes, institutions, governments, and ideologies that exist today. The domination has been unconsciously accepted because"...the theory of sovereignty, and the organisation of a legal code centred upon it, have allowed a system of right to be superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual

procedures, the element of domination inherent in its techniques, and to guarantee to everyone, by virtue of the sovereignty of the state, the exercise of his proper (individual) sovereign rights."8

In conclusion, we find that "...it became necessary for disciplinary constraints to be exercised through mechanisms of domination and yet at the same time for their effective exercise of power to be disguised,..." in a discourse of sovereignty. However, even though "...a theory of right is a necessary companion of (disciplinary power), it cannot in any event provide the terms for its endorsement. Hence, these two limits, a right of sovereignty and a mechanism of discipline...define the arena in which power is exercised."9 This general description of power can now be used to describe the nature of these disciplinary mechanisms and the consequences of this type of power on the military.

FOOTNOTES

Section 2: A Structuralist Perspective

1. Michel Foucault, _Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & (and) Other Writings 1972-1977_, ed. Colin Gordon (trans.), Pantheon Books, New York, 1980, p.95

2. Foucault, _Power/Knowledge_, p.95 (italics mine)

3. Foucault, ibid., p.102

4. ibid., p.96

5. _The Political Education of Soldiers_, ed(s). Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, Vol.II, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution and Peacekeeping, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1983, p.18

6. Foucault, op. cit., p.103

7. ibid., p.104 (italics mine)

8. ibid., p.105

9. ibid., p.106

Section 3: The Process of Discipline

The disciplinary mechanism is a source of power that is different than, yet inseperable from, the theory of sovereign right. Thus far, we have presented the discourse of the sovereign and outlined its basic principles. The theory of right legitimizes the superstructure of discipline that has been established while effacing its inherent domination. The techniques employed within this new form of power can be sampled by examining the military institution which is an underlying girder in the superstructure of repression. The focus of this discussion will be on the nature of this disciplinary power and its processes. It is not the case that there has been an extensive scholarly discourse on the theory of sovereignty while this disciplinary power has been undiscussed or unknown. Rather, it has been discussed, but the discourse has always been grounded in the theory of right and thought to be controlled by the sovereign within the traditional shcemata of power.

In fact, much of Janowitz's work is an effort to describe the changing structure of discipline in the military. He claims that the emphasis of the modern military has shifted from domination to initiative. In the words of S. L. A. Marshall, "The philosophy of discipline has adjusted to changing conditions....the quality of the initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues."[1] Janowitz suggests that military discipline and authority shifted "from authoritarian domination toward a greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus". Accordingly, he believes this is a more rational, scientific and managerial

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approach to the problems of military organization. In the
end, he is attempting to emphasize the innovations of
contemporary societies to replace strict discipline.
Colleagues of Janowitz, such as Stephan D. Wesbrook, David
R. Segal and Charles C. Moskos, rely on this new
definition of discipline which is based on initiative and
motivation in their discourses on the All-Volunteer Force
which exists in the United States today. They argue that
major transformations have occurred in the nature of
discipline since the elimination of the draft in the
post-Vietnam era. Perhaps there have been changes;
unfortunately they are ever more symptomatic of the
traditional theory of right.

To clarify, the transformations of the structure of
discipline within the military simply serve to further
efface the true nature of power which is operating. They
have continued to legitimize the underlying domination by
proposing "scientific" innovations that make the
discipline seem less harsh, rigid, or brutal. This
discourse on discipline is only an attempt to improve,
making more effective, the techniques of domination; it is
not intended to describe the nature of this disciplinary
power. Foucault argues that this discourse of discipline
is quite different from the discourse of right. The
changes in structure have usurped power from the theory of
sovereignty and are beyond the scope of that theory.
"Disciplines are the bearer of a discourse, but this
cannot be the discourse of right. The discourse of
discipline has nothing in common with that of law, rule,
or sovereign will. The disciplines may well be the
carriers of a discourse that speaks of a rule, but this is
not the juridical rule deriving from sovereignty, but a
natural rule, a norm. The code they come to define is not
that of law but that of normalization."

No matter how the traditionalists describe it, the process of disciplinary normalization is essential to the military function. This process is necessarily dependent on obedience and conformity. The norm is the new standard. The norm becomes defined by the techniques of disciplinary normalization. It is not codified by the sovereign, nor the legal apparatus of the state and/or the military. The regulations and the standards of various forces, are only used to identify and declare the norm; but the norm defines and transforms the "law". The process of normalization is dependent on the disciplinary mechanism to enforce and correct the standards of the norm. Even today, the military relies on this principle when it socializes new recruits. They acknowledge its usefulness in attaining conformity.

For example, Reuven Gal, in an essay on "Commitment and Obedience in the Military", suggests that "Military obedience is initiated by fear and punishment during the early phases of socialization into military life. It is enhanced by threat and sanction and instilled through endless drill and orders. Obedience is gradually replaced by internalized patterns of behavior that become autonomous."3 In other words, a soldier only complies with the order at first because of his fear, but later as he becomes socialized into the military style of life he gains confidence and initiative, which are a result of conformity. Conformity is characterized by "internalized agreement with externally located rules, norms, and conventions." It is to be distinguished from mere compliance by "inner" agreement with others, not simply based on the anticipated immediate consequences of disagreement. Thus, compliance is obedience to authority, which may facilitate future conformity. "Conformity may be conscious or unconscious, and the conforming individual

may may not be aware of non-conformist (or deviant) attitudes."4

"But underneath, at the baseline, military personnel are controlled through their fear of negative sanctions. Even when the legitimacy of an organizational goal is questionable, if behavior is motivated by obedience, well-indoctrinated soldiers will continue to comply even though orders are debatable....Thus, fear and external power predominately generate military discipline and its obedient behavior."5

The idea that changes have occurred in the nature of discipline is reliant on a traditionally "humanist" perspective which is constituted by the "knowledges" gained in the sciences. In their efforts to make a more efficient and modern military force the traditionalist defer to the "neutral" rationality of sociologists, political scientists, psychologists and other scientists who debate the best techniques and reforms to apply in facilitating socialization to military culture. For example, Stephen D. Wesbrook, in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, seeks to examine sociopolitical training in the military. He is concerned with the roles of indoctrination and civic education in a military institution. He distinguishes between the two by determining the objectives, methods, and content used. For example, the objective of education is to *impart knowledge and capabilities* that allow a person to survive in and contribute to collective life. On the other hand, the objective of indoctrination is to *influence or control attitudes, opinions, and behavior*. Education is characterized by the presentation of information in an unbiased manner and the reliance on reason, logic, and the scientific method of inquiry; while indoctrination is characterized by the presentation of information designed

to deliberately manipulate the individual into a desired
response, most often by the use of symbols designed to
appeal to emotion. Therefore the content of education
carries the presumption of truth or validity while
indoctrination is characterized by distortion and
half-truth.6 With these sociological definitions in mind,
we can differentiate between specific programs which have
either civic education or indoctrination as their dominant
character. We can also determine whether the program is
primarily oriented toward either social or political
training. Wesbrook can then recommend the best program
available and determine whether it is a viable alternative
for our military and what innovative reforms are required.

This type of scientific discourse has been the basis
for most of the contemporary work by military scholars.
This is still the discourse of discipline because, in
essence, their aim is to improve the methods of
normalization. The human sciences seek to bridge the
function of the military as defined by the theory of
sovereign right with the superstructure of discipline
which has been established. Similar discourses have been
produced for health, law, criminology, and industry.
Foucault argues that the discourse of the human sciences
is not rendered by the advancement of rationality or
knowledge of human behavior but by the juxtapositioning of
these two heterogeneous discourses, the theory of right
and the mechanisms of discipline. He suggests that "in our
own times power is exercised simultaneously through this
right and these techniques." And if these techniques end
up in conflict with the theory of right, which is
inevitable, the procedures of normalization influence and
change the laws through the use of scientific knowledge.
The result of this is the "global functioning of what
(Foucault) would call a *society of normalization.*"7

Without digressing further, we conclude that this expansion of "neutral" knowledge is used as an arbitrating discourse between the disciplinary normalizations and the theory of right, which inevitably come into ever more conflict. The Human Sciences justify the usurpation of power by disciplinary mechanisms (which are developed by scientific knowledge). To return to the discussion of the military disciplinary power we must be aware of another methodological precaution to this structuralist perspective. Foucault's analysis has not been concerned with the general mechanisms of power in terms of legitimate forms at the level of the state, or the sovereign; on the contrary, it is concerned "with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions. Its paramount concern, in fact, should be with the point where power surmounts the rules of right which organise and delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention." According to Foucault, "What is needed is a study of power ...at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there-that is to say-where it installs itself and produces its real effects."8

In military terms, this is the soldier, whether he be enlisted or an officer, each is subjected to rigorous behavioral and ideological constraints. In this sense, there is little difference between the "specialist" and the "professional", as Huntington defines the difference between enlisted and officer. Though differences exist in terms of expectations, responsibilities, and variations in

training technique, for an analysis of the processes of normalization we simply need to expose the inner nature of these techniques; namely, the inherent domination which they embody. The entire discourse of professionalism, which tries to seperate the role of the officer corps completely and give it an identity and ideology of its own, is only useful in a traditional theory of power. Each individual who enters the military is subjected to disciplinary mechanisms when he is sent to basic training or basic camp. For our purposes the term "basic training" refers to both enlisted and officer training.

If we examine texts written by veterans about their military experiences, such as Donald Duncan's The New Legions, we can begin to piece together an analysis of disciplinary mechanisms at their point of application. Unfortunately, we are relying on personal interpretation of experience when we use autobiographical texts. The New Legions is not a scientific analysis nor an elaborate theory. Rather, Duncan simply attempts to describe the process of socialization that he perceived. Perhaps there is little value in personal accounts, but what other way do we have to reach the personal level of normalization? As Duncan explains, "Millions of words, unheeded by most, have been written about military power and control. Perhaps a look at the *inner machinations* and how they affected me and others might make the picture clearer."9

Duncan reaches an almost "psuedo-structuralist" perspective on the military which is quite insightful. In rather straightforward terms Duncan explains: "Basic training does many things to men. Nobody remains unchanged by it. An analyst could write at the top of a piece of paper, 'The Purpose of Basic Training Is:'-and go on to fill the page with a list that would include: instill discipline, learn how to work as a team, gain proficiency

in weapons, create motivation, and so on. This is
unnecessary verbiage, listing the means; one line would
suffice to define the true end: 'The purpose of basic
training is to make each man a soldier, that is, an
efficient killer." So we return to our earlier definition
of a soldier's function. Moreover, no matter what function
he or she may ultimately serve, a soldier is first taught
the art and science of killing. "I urge those who regard
as intemperate the word 'killer' to define soldier to
watch a basic training class in bayonet drill....What are
they doing? They are learning to kill by the numbers in
one of the most primitive and personal ways." They are
then trained in marksmanship to make them more efficient
killers with more efficient weapon technology. "To make
them an efficient part of an organization whose end
purpose is to kill, certain fundamental steps are
followed."10

These steps develop into a systematic program by
which to insure efficiency and the correct training of
soldiers. These processes have been improved upon and
perfected since the inception of the disciplinary form of
power. The invention of such disciplinary steps correlates
with the transformation of power. Foucault examines this
historical transformation in the military by discussing
certain changes in the theory of the Ideal Soldier. In the
seventeenth century the ideal figure of the soldier
"...was someone who could be recognized from afar; he bore
certain signs:...natural signs (in stature and bearing)...
and although it is true that he had to learn the
profession of arms little by little,..." there were
certain physical characteristics which determined those
most naturally suited for the profession. But, "by the
late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something
that can be *made*; out of a formless clay, an inept body,

the machine required can be constructed; ..." the body can be trained, corrected, mastered and automated by habit.11 For example, an army ordinance of 20 march 1764 reads in part:

Recruits become accustomed to 'holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to sticking out the belly, throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders; and, to help them aquire the habit, they are given this position while standing against a wall....Likewise, they will be taught never to fix their eyes on the ground...to remain motionless until the order is given...(and) lastly to march with a bold step....12

The essence of this ordinance still persists today. Through it, the recruits are subjectively trained to meet objective standards. The body of the individual is subjected to normalization and conforms to the uniformity which is desired. This is a type of disciplinary power which "produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)."13 The realm of the "individual" is permeated by the processes of mass normalization. Duncan describes how "(e)ach recruit is subjected to a leveling process or depersonalization. While the hypothesis that all men are created equal may be valid, nobody suggests that 'equal' means 'same'." Even though we all come from different socio-economic and educational backgrounds, bringing with us our own personally developed sense of values; the military will break them down, then reorganize them, and instill a new set of normalized values among its personnel. But "before the military can impose its own particular and alien values on masses of men, it must first level all to a common base. It cannot erase the learned mechanical

functions or the physical skills and dexterity gained; nor does it desire to do so. Rather, it endeavors to eliminate many of the individual's personal views so that his skills can be utilized *by and for the military*....This reduction of the individual is done in a series of steps, each making the next one easier. The mass physical is one such step....(which) leaves a feeling of debasement...feeling embarrassed and less than human...."14

Depersonalization is the first step toward normalization. The individual becomes a uniform body that is subjected to inspection, registration and correction. Foucault suggests that these techniques were an invention of the classical age. He asks, "What was so new in these projects of *docility* that interested the eighteenth century so much? It was certainly not the first time that the body had become the object of such imperious and pressing investments; in every society, the body was in the grip of very strict powers, which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations. However, there were several new things in these techniques." These included: the scale of control, involving the subtle coercion of the individual at the level of the mechanism itself (infinitesimal power over movements, gestures, attitudes, etc.); the object of the control, involving the efficiency of movement; and the modality of the control, involving uninterrupted supervision and coercion (surveillance) in time, space, and movement.15

"These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility" are called "disciplines".16 The techniques of these disciplines facilitate the process of depersonalization. "Depersonalization can take place only if the subject is seperated from normal references,

that is, his social environment. This seperation is both physical and symbolic, and the uniform, haircut, and new vocabulary are only part of it....The military post is seperated from the civilian populace, physically by fences and guards, and socially by its values, laws, and purpose for being...All aspects of life (work, play, sleep) are conducted within the confines of the military post under one central authority." "The closeness of barracks life, the continual lack of privacy and forced social relationships...are part of the process. Civilian clothes are packed and stored...and now men even look alike in their uniforms. Regardless of education or former social level, all are talked to in the same way and moved from place to place in large groups." Duncan explains that "outwardly, this seems to be a democratic process because it removes class consciousness. Actually it is a substitution, replacing one type of class consciousness for another."17 This new type is rank, which is gained by obedience and survival in the organization. It is the basis of the hierarchical schemata of power that is designed by both the the disciplines and the discourse of right. Rank brings with it priviledge and immunity from certain forms of discipline. The cost of rank to the individual is his individuality; he has conformed to a military set of values.

This is accomplished early on through a process of reorganization (normalization). Once a recruit is depersonalized and disorganized he begins a reorganization phase. Duncan desribes this as "Reorganization Syndrome." "The recruit's first step in reorganization is to overcome confusion, which he does by learning the ropes-no matter how contradictory the do's and don'ts-and by finding out what he can and can't get away with. He is presented with a new set of regulations and house rules (norms) and

strange requirements of conduct, all explained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial....Actions which at worst would be considered bad manners in a civilian are now punishable crimes."18 For example, insubordination, absence without leave, desertion, or conduct unbecoming an officer.

A soldier is a member of a seperate community; a secondary community inside the primary community. Ha enters a society were the slightest deviation from the norm will be noticed. So he attempts to comply to remain unnoticed; to avoid punishment or reprimand. In short, the system is controlling his behavior and compliance is gained with a minimum of physical supervision. Duncan explains, "The recruit has now learned how the system works and how he can work within its confines. he *believes* he can make it work *for him*, in other words, beat the system by utilizing the new-found reward-punishment system....The way to beat the system is to excel in it...."to gain priviledge and rank.19

"Natural desires for individuality and recognition become manipulatory tools." There are two ways to gain recognition in the military; either excel in it or be a "screw-up", a deviant. If you try to excel you must be the "best" at something; anything. Each individual tries to have the best made bunk, the shiniest boots, the best-pressed uniform, etc.. In the case of excelling, "the result of striving for individuality is mass conformity to official standards."20 If you are the deviant you will be singled out for negative sanctions; or blamed for the entire group's punishment. In either case the deviant will be punished and corrected. The purpose of the military is to transform men into soldiers. Thus, its "positive" technical role is accomplished through a system of perpetual normalization. In other words, the

non-conformist deviant" is punished in a new mode, utilizing a d of perpetual surveillance over every movement, ge and behavior. This technique is unique to this new of power.

This positive technical role was recognized formally in an essay, by Captain M. B. Stewart in 1905, which formulated the doctrine of "positive" discipline. "Succinctly, the atmosphere of the army today is one of clean lives, honorable dealings, an ethusiastic devotion to country, an atmoshphere enforced by a system of rigid discipline whose object is the correction and encouragement, rather than the punishment, of the individual." He outlined the positive techniques which he believed would best insure military discipline: "interest in the material well-being of the soldier, the competence of leadership, and the inculcation of 'confidence and self-reliance.'"21

Janowitz suggests that this doctrine was adopted by the military even before the industrial organizations began to formulate positive managerial human relations. The military met its managerial dilemmas by incorporating the basic concepts of psychology and applied them through this new form of disciplinary power. The tensions that arise between military discipline and democratic political ideology are effaced by justifying this positive training and legitimizing it by a legal code. Stewart suggests that "military power is not absolute and military law protects personal rights and liberties by limiting the powers of the commander."22

Prior to the introduction of this new form of discipline the "delinquent" was subjected to exemplary punishment--not correction. It is the postitive role of transformation that institutes this new definition and mode of punishment. The military, like the rest of

society, realized that it is more efficient in terms of economy of power to place people under surveillance rather than to subject them to some exemplary penalty. Foucault suggests that the moment this transition in mode occurred was the origin of the disciplinary mechanism, which, in this capillary form of exercise is "...the point where power reaches into the very grain of the individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives."23 In a disciplinary institution, such as the military, conformity is the common rule while deviance is rare. Deviance is quickly checked once spotted. The source is identified, then punished, corrected, or eliminated, and thus regulated and controlled. The non-conforming individual is easily spotted if functional mass conformity exists. In the military, like all disciplinary institutions in our society, "...individualization is 'descending': as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance..., by comparative measures that have the 'norm' as reference."24 "What is specific to the disciplinary penality is non-observance, that which does not measure up to the rule, that departs from it. The whole indefinite domain of the non-conforming is punishable."25 "The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, heirarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes and requires conformity."26

The military has many of these characteristics of discipline in common with other institutions. Foucault suggests that the military is just one facet in a complex archipelago or penumbra of societal institutions which

utilizes this formulation of power. Disciplinary
mechanisms have permeated society; the military
influencing other institutions and vice versa. "The
'invention' of this new political anatomy must not be seen
as a sudden discover. It is rather a multiplicity of often
minor processes, of different origin and scattered
location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another,
support one another,...converge and gradually produce the
blueprint of a general method. They were at work in
secondary education at a very early date, later in primary
schools; they slowly invested the space of the hospital;
and, in a few decades, they restructured the military
organization."27

The next section will analyze the consequences of
this convergence, or interpenetration, between
institutions. The structure and ideology of the military
organization has disseminated into the primary community
via these techniques. Through this process we have created
a society that is based on normalization. In this sense,
power is no longer in the sphere of state sovereignty but
has entered the realm of the individual where power
relations are operating through disciplinary mechanisms.
In this way, military values and ideology have converged
with society as a whole. "The process of changing a man
into a soldier is brutalizing even if he never kills
another, and sadly, the individual seldom recognizes his
own brutalization, his changing sense of values. The
process of changing a nation into a military society is
equally brutalizing, and just as sadly, few of its people
recognize the transformation."27

FOOTNOTES

Section 3: The Process of Discipline

1. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 40

2. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 106

3. Reuven Gal, "Commitment and Obedience in the Military: An Israeli Case Study", Armed Forces & Society, an Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 11, Number 4, Summer 1985, Eds. Morris Janowitz and David Segal, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, p. 554

4. Key Concepts in Communication, Eds. John Fiske, Tim O'Sullivan, John Hartley and Penny Saunders, Chaucer Press, 1983, pp. 47-8.

5. Gal, op. cit., p.554

6. The Political Education of Soldiers, p. 16.

7. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 106 (italics mine)

8. Foucault, ibid., pp. 96-7

9. Donald Duncan, The New Legions, p. 95 (italics mine)

10. Duncan, ibid., pp. 96-7

11. Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish, The Birth of the Prison, (trans.) Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York, 1979, p. 135

12. Foucault, ibid., pp. 135-6 (italics mine)

13. ibid., p. 138

14. Duncan, op. cit., pp. 97-8 (italics mine)

15. Foucault, Discipline & Punish, p. 136 (italics mine)

16. Foucault, ibid., p. 137

17. Duncan, The New Legions, pp. 98-9

18. Duncan, ibid., p. 100

19. ibid., pp. 100-1 (italics mine)

20. ibid., p. 102

21. Janowitz, <u>The Professional Soldier</u>, p. 39

22. Janowitz, ibid., p.39

23. Foucault, <u>Power/Knowledge</u>, p. 39

24. Foucault, <u>Discipline</u>, 139

25. Foucault, ibid., p. 179

26. ibid., p. 304

27. ibid.

28. Duncan, <u>The New Legions</u>, p. 248

Section 4:   Interpenetrations

"This is not an indictment of the U. S. Army's methods of conducting basic training. Although refinements and minor variations are possible, this is the way a soldier is created. That this metamorphosis can be accomplished in eight weeks or less without employing physical abuse or hypnosis is a testament to the efficiency of the total organization. The fundamental principles-depersonalization, isolation, reorganization-are not unique to the United States military. The Army of any country utilizes these techniques; to do otherwise would be to risk having an ineffective, unresponsive force."[1] Therefore, the purpose of this paper is not to propose that our society requires a revolution that eliminates this disciplinary power. Rather we must come to grips with the fact of domination and recognize the true nature of disciplinary normalization so that we can limit the proliferation and usurpation of power beyond our current theoretical perspective. As we have said, the process of normalization is essential to the mission of the military in contemporary society. If this basic premise is accepted then the domination that accompanies the military must continue to exist. However, the historical trend toward convergence of these characteristically "military" structures with civilian society is not acceptable. Therefore we would conclude that in contemporary society, if it is absolutely essential to utilize these disciplinary mechanisms in order to produce soldiers into an effective and functional military; then we must create a truly professional military force that is isolated and segregated from,

31

yet controlled by the civilian sector. If this proposal is taken to the extreme, the military's political influence could not be completely removed. Yet, we could begin to resist this convergence while also limiting the political influence of the military on both the state (sovereign) and individual (disciplinary) levels. By incorporating a structuralist perspective we can return the military to its original definition while reevaluating its function and role in the future.

Clearly, the miltitary's political influence is not limited to its formal role. In fact, the military's influence is much more pervasive in its informal or disseminated form. The notion that the definition and funtion of the military have been manipulated by disciplinary power will be quickly and loudly denounced by most. The traditional theory has effaced this manipulation. It seems obvious that we do not live under an authoritarian regime that enforces martial law; rather, we have a liberal democratic state that has insured "civilian control" of the military. Or do we? Of course, it is basic to our Constitutional form of government, the laws of the nation and our historical traditions that the military be under the control of the civilian sector. And although multitudes of texts have covered the role of the military in terms of "civilian control", this concept has never actually been satisfactorily defined.

"Presumably, civilian control has something to do with the relative power of civilian and military groups. Presumably, also, civilian control is achieved to the extent to which the power of military groups is reduced. Consequently, the basic problem in defining civilian control is: How can military power be minimized?"2 This question remains valid under a structuralist perspective. The approach that is required is essentially the same but

in order to answer this question we must recognize the diffusion that accompanies disciplinary power. In other words, how can military influence be restricted?

Under the traditional paradigm, Huntington suggests there are two broad answers to this question. There is "subjective civilian control", which maximizes the power of particular civilian groups in relation with the military; and "objective civilian control", which maximizes military professionalism. He argues that the only way to maintain true control over the socio-economic-political influence of the military is to isolate, segregate, and professionalize the officer corps. "Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state."3

"Subjective civilian control achieves its ends by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state." It occurs when a particular interest or group gains power in or over the military. "Consequently, subjective civilian control involves the power relations among civilian groups."4 For example, when one group uses the slogan of civilian control as a means to enhance its power at the expense of other civilian groups. Therefore, it is necessary to determine which, among the varied and conflicting interest groups, are in "control". Huntington claims, "Except for very recently in western society, civilian control has existed only in this subjective sense. Subjective civilian control is, indeed, the only form of civilian control possible in the absence of a professional officer corp. In its various historical manifestations, subjective civilian control has been identified with the maximization of the power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms."5

Huntington fears and opposes subjective civilian control and claims that objective civilian control *has been achieved* only since we have professionalized the military. However, the idea that a professional military, as defined by the traditional theory, can be politically neutral or provide for objective civilian control is ridiculous. In reality, nothing is further from the truth. It is obvious that in contemporary society, the military as an institution *must be* involved in State politics. Yet Huntington claims we have attained objective control. Theoretically, objective civilian control should have decreased military political influence. We find this is not the case; but even if military power had been restricted by professionalism in the traditional terms of the state, this trend increased military influence at the level of disciplinary power. Indeed, the military and the civilian sector have interpenetrated each other at this structural level. The discourse of professionalism simply effaces the true operation of power. The traditional theory fails to recognize, is unable to perceive, the forms of power which have in fact taken "control".

According to Huntington, objective control is diametrically opposed to subjective control. Again, power relations are viewed in terms of the state, but he discusses several precautions that are needed for an analysis of civil-military relations. The discourse of civilian control maintains that there is only one form of objective control while subjective forms are numerous. Moreover, "the antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military becomes progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. Subjective civilian control, on the other hand,

presupposes this involvement. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere."6

Huntington is correct in asserting that only one true form of objective civilian control exists. However, objectivity must take into account the new form of power and recognize its functions. Subjective civilian control is achieved on all levels through the domination of one individual or group by another individual or group. These interests control via disciplinary power and legitimate their control by normalization. In truth, this is occurring today and we have not attained objective civilian control as Huntington suggested. We need to gain "objective" control to resist subjective forms of control. Unfortunately, if domination exists, even in a limited and isolated professional force, someone is in "control". The paradox of *who* is to determine objectivity remains an open question. It becomes a question of whether we: (a) alter the current situation to reduce domination and interpenetration; or, (b) completely overthrow the institutional system attempting to eliminate domination. In the latter, we seek a utopian future through revolution; in the former, we seek practical means for exposing and limiting the effects of disciplinary power. Moreover, the latter requires the dismantling of the nation-state which is impossible in contemporary society; while the former sustains the edifice of the sovereign as long as forms of domination exist. Unfortunately we are trapped in methods of reform while disciplinary interpenetrations are exposed and diminished.

With this in mind, we now direct the focus of this discussion on the interpenetrations which have accompanied the development of a professional military. The military

has progressively become "civilianized" and at the same time society has become more "militaristic" in terms of organization and ideology. We will conclude that a highly isolated and professionalized military is indeed worthwhile; but for different reasons than the traditional theory propose. In order to have a truely professionalized military force that is objectively controlled we must expose and reverse these interpenetrations of the civilian *primary community* and the military *secondary community*. We must examine the historical development of the contemporary military and then develop a professional military force in terms of a structuralist perspective.

Janowitz suggests that in studying the development of a professional military we must develop an appropriate historical perspective. He claims that fundamental changes have occurred in the military structure since the turn of the century when the long term trend was towards the "mass army" (or mass armed force). According to Janowitz, the "military of the United States...underwent a continuous and consistent transformation, accelerated during World War I and World War II and arrested to varying degrees during peacetime. The introduction of modern technology and large-scale managerial techniques produced the 'mass army' and led to the concept and reality of total war....Total War is a pre-nuclear notion. It refers to the development of mobilization plans during peacetime, (and) to comprehensive conversion of the civilian population in support of mass armies during war,....The distinction between the military forces and the civilian population is weakened; both become the subjects of military organization and the objects of attack, propaganda, and political warfare."7

This results in a convergence of the primary and secondary community in terms of organization and ideology.

"The *interpenetration* of the civilian and the military is required as more and more resources of the nation-state are used in preparing for and making war. It became appropriate to speak of the 'civilianisation' of the military profession and of the parallel extension of military forms into civilian social structure."8 However, Janowitz explains: "It is not possible to fix a terminal date for the historical period of the mass armed force since the end of its dominance is a long term and gradual process...." Yet, he claims that this trend toward civilianisation was. reduced with the sudden end of World War II when the nuclear age ushered in a trend toward smaller, fully professional, military forces "in being". Further, he claims it was eventually *eliminated* shortly after 1970. Throughout this time, even though we were involved in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, there was a basic transformation that involved "...the gradual movement away from a draft based armed force; thereby slowing, even, in some respects, reversing the 'civilianisation' trend. This is *not* to postulate a return to earlier forms of a highly self-contained and socially distinct military force; the requirements of technology, education, and political involvement make that impossible. But the end of the system of conscription will serve as the clearest index of the end of the mass-army format of the first half of the twentieth century."9

This point marks the inception of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) that currently exists. The Vietnam War was the major factor which influenced the final decisions to eliminate the draft. With an end to conscription, traditional theorists believed that the military's influence would diminish. With less manpower and less resources, they would naturally have less influence; the character of the professional would become dominant and

there would be less contact with civilian politics; and by
virtue of the political environment that existed there was
less likelihood of becoming involved in conflict.

If we examine the historical developments since the
origin of the AVF we will find that rather than diminished
political influence there has been a progressive trend
toward increased influence. This phenomenon is a result of
many factors including among other things: the
transformation of the military profession into a political
interest that was forced to enter the political and
legislative arena to receive appropriations and resources;
an increased reliance on the interdisciplinary sciences to
experiment with innovative programs, structures, and
technology within the military; and the interpenetrations
of the complex of social institutions in modern society.
On the cultural level, other factors influence the
public's opinion and image of the military's role. These
factors include: the population's increasing awareness of
the international political environment and possible
threats to national security that the news-media expose
and generate; the increased production of mass-media
images that take soldiers and war as their subject; the
increased need for the military to advertise in order to
compete with the corporate and educational institutions
for quality recruits; and finally, the trend toward
educational, occupational and technical training as
opposed to career-oriented recruitment.

It is extremely difficult to compartmentalize these
various and diverse sources of political influence. The
scope of this paper does not allow an expanded analysis of
these influences. Rather, the intent of delineating these
factors is to expose and emphasize the increased
interpenetration that has occurred between the primary and
secondary community. Therefore, it is not essential at

this time to determine the dominance of either the
military or the civilian community in these processes. Our
concern is instead to acknowledge that such
interpenetrations are operating. Huntington warned that
"(t)he one prime essential for any system of control is
the minimizing of military power."10 He suggested that the
trend toward professionalization would render it
politically neutral. The continued ideological convergence
of the primary and secondary community and the
proliferation and transference of disciplinary mechanisms
proves that the military is not politically "neutral" at
this time, nor can it ever be under a traditional paradigm

The discourse of professionalism suggests that by
emphasizing the functional role of the military as a
"profession", it can be "...more narrowly defined, more
intensely and exclusively pursued, and more clearly
isolated from other human activity than are most
occupations."11 This seperation has usually been discussed
in the traditional terms of "civil-military relations". In
his analysis of civil-military relations Huntington claims
that four rough indices exist by which to judge the
political influence of the military.

The first of these indices involves the group
affiliations of the military with other powerful groups or
individuals. The relationships that are developed with
other institutions and individuals asociated with those
institutions significantly determines the influence of the
military. These are the formal power relations that occur,
for example, between the structures of the military with
the corporate-industrial complex, educational systems, and
government administration. This formal arena of power
relations has been most thoroughly discussed and
researched by military scholars. This is a result of the
traditional perspective which is most concerned with

power structures at the level of the nation-state. Even
though the issues debated are complex, it is relatively
easy to approach power relations at this level.

Much more difficult to approach with a traditionalist
perspective are informal power relations. The limits of
traditional theory become problematic when researching
this second index. Yet, Huntington acknowledges the
existence of informal influence. This index involves
military control over economic and human resources. He
explains: "the larger the proportion of the national
product devoted to military purposes, and the larger the
number of individuals serving with the armed forces in
either a civilian or military capacity, the greater the
influence of the (military institution)."12

Third, Huntington asserts that an index must be
developed to analyze the hierarchical interpenetration of
military thinkers into non-military power structures.
"Military influence is increased if members of the officer
corps (military) assume positions of authority in
non-military power structures." The extent to which this
interpenetration occurs is determined by the number of
individuals from the military who enter corporate,
educational, or governmental structures once discharged.
Also, the amount of influence is determined by the
importance or authority of their position in the
decision-making systems within the institution. However,
Huntington suggests conversely, military influence is
decreased if non-military individuals penetrate positions
within the formal military structure.

Finally, "the prestige and popularity of the officer
corps (military)...in public opinion and the attitudes of
broad sections or categoric groups in society towards the
military obviously are key elements in determining
military influence."13 This fourth index is the least
researched because of the difficulty in judging the
influence of such sources.

At the point where the traditional theory becomes limited in its analysis of these last three indices of informal influence, the heuristic value of a structuralist or post-structuralist perspective become invaluable. Although the traditionalists acknowledge the existence of these informal influences they ignore their importance or simply mention them as abstract features. In the future we need to incorporate this new perspective on military influence into the traditional theory and begin to produce research that exposes the nature of power that is operating beyond the level of the state. At the individual level of normalisation we can discuss the unique or functional aspect of the military in terms of the "military mind". We must operationalise this traditional term into a structuralist perspective by examining the historical use of the concept.

Huntington claimed that "(t)he continuing objective performance of the professional function gives rise to a...professional 'mind'. The military mind, in this sense, consists of values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function." Included are the inferred expectations and behavioral standards which accompany the responsibility of the expert in the management of violence in providing security for the state.14 Huntington cites Clausewitz, the renouned military scholar, who described the military view of human nature. Clausewitz suggests that the man of the military ethic is in essence the man of Hobbes. Characterized by "Conservative Realism" and decidedly pessimistic, the core of the military mind sees the inevitability of armed conflict based on the imperfection of human nature. This traditional approach attempts to design a single persona to animate the spirit of the

military mind. It is this Hobbesian conception of a single will that Foucault is wary of; instead our analysis must describe the "production" of the individual who is subjected to this normalization.

The essence of the military mind is an amalgamation of seperate individualities. However, in a society of normalization that individuality is effaced. Duncan supports the assertion that the military mind has a unique aspect. He explains: "Because the military man's values differ from those of the civilian community, his approach to problems and his thinking are different from the civilian's."15 But for Duncan, there is no distinction between the enlisted mind and the professional officer's mind. Huntington and Janowitz would argue that the essence of the military mind is only characteristic of the professional officer. Duncan seems to suggest that any individual who is subjected to the domination of the military becomes normalized toward a military mind. Even those who are discharged or retire do not escape the socialization the military has produced. "They may have hated the...service...(b)ut they did not rebel, they comprimised, adjusting to the military ways and accepting the military's standards, and learning, if only to survive, how to think in military terms."16

Even though most of the millions of men who have been trained to kill have never been ordered to kill they were processed into accepting the military's values, "becoming participants in the military reward-punishment system, accepting and carrying out the military's solution to problems. They learned to understand military thinking and thought in those terms...In short, military reorganization 'took'. It matters little that they may have detested those (terms) because, as planned, they did everything that the military expected of them. Each year thousands

become part of the counter-community; each year thousands return to the civilian community."17 Duncan warned: "The saturation of the civilian community by men accustomed to thinking in military terms has been so pervasive that we have lost the essentials for absolute civilian control. Within the United States today, for all practical purposes, there is no seperation of the communities and no difference in thinking. We have, in fact, military thinking in civilian clothing."18

This is an extreme statement that Duncan associated with the effects of universal military service. However, this trend did not end with the elimination of the draft. The fears of the traditionalists has been fully realized as military personnel have reentered the civilian community to take positions in corporations, education, and government; bringing with them their military values and military thinking. As well, veterans continue to influence the political future by electing governments that strengthen the military establishment and support defense spending.

The cultural effect of normalization must also be analysed. A cyclical process is occurring between the primary community and the secondary community as military personnel are socialized and then returned to the civilian community to influence culture, which influences future recruits. Of course, it is extremely difficult to determine the role of veterans in this process. It becomes problematic when attempting to determine the amount of influence the military has on culture or the influence of culture on the military. The image of the military in mass-media is indicative of the interpenetration of military values into the civilian community and vice versa. The trends in cinema, television, news, literature, print, art, cartoons and even toys that take the military,

war and soldiers as their subjects must be systematically
described and analyzed within this new perspective. "The
growing volume of such productions is in itself
significant; and it must be remembered that antimilitary
propaganda is as important here as work which glorifies
the army and wars, since both are part of the dialogue
between the military and civilian worlds, and of their
mutual conception of each other. A particular area to be
considered within this general field is that of
recruitment propaganda,....How was the military life
presented to potential civilian recruits? How effective
was such advertising?"19

Again, it is problematic to attempt to
compartmentalize these sources. The effects of mass-media
in this process of normalization are beyond the scope of
this paper. However, the political influence of mass-media
representations of the military, and their role in the
normalization of military values, is a recent phenomenon
that must be explored in the future. Clearly, the
mass-media have replaced the family as the primary source
of socialization and therefore influence perceptions of
military culture. "Mass media represent the conformist
beliefs, opinions, and values held by an inferred majority
of the viewer population, and in so doing reinforce
conformity still further. In this respect, of interest is
the content and effect of media stereotyping."20 The image
of the military, its officers, soldiers, culture, and war
are produced within a complex arena of mediated reality.
The heuristic value of a structuralist perspective has
begun to influence the study of mass media. Although
Foucault has not studied media influences, several
contemporary structuralists and post-structuralists have
begun to do so. The most prominent theorists in this
movement are Roland Barthes (criticism) and Claude

Levi-Strauss (anthropology). Also influential in the enterprise are Louis Althusser, Jaques Lacan and Jaques Derrida. American theorists can be found in a journal called _Cultural Critique_, an interdisciplinary discourse that was useful in preparing for this paper. This journal is recommended for further reference into mass media representations of the military.

On a general level, we do know that "(i)n popular culture, the United States Army has been actor, object, and image. The service has altered specific cultural habits and affected the legal sanctions within which those habits may be exercised. Similarly, major media and specific artists have used the Army (military) as an important vehicle through which to express their own social and political opinions, thus also changing the culture as a whole. The Army (military) also has been an object for imitation, by civilian _sub-groups_ who have appropriated elements of Army style."21 This appropriation has been both physical and symbolic.

The extension of military values into the civilian community must be analyzed at the level of structural organization. An entire history can be produced for _"paramilitary"_ organizations that took the military structure as their model. The term paramilitary is meant to refer to any institution or group that utilizes characteristically military organization. For example, the development of the Boy Scouts, or the Salvation Army, which use uniforms, salutes, mottos, etc., are clearly exchanges from the military culture. Also the exchange of techniques between the military and other institutions such as industry, education, medicine, journalism, and the police must be put into historical perspective. These exchanges have created the panoptic complex of societal institutions that Foucault described. The transference and

proliferation of disciplinary techniques between institutions is dangerous in both directions. Indeed, the current trend has been progressively moving toward increased technical, administrative and theoretical interdependence which results in a society of normalization.

All of this is digression that offers future avenues for research. Unfortunately, a paper is not able to expand upon these interpenetrations. The power relations that these interpenetrations create are clearly not in the sphere of state politics. Instead they are indicative of a system of global domination created through a complex of institutional mechanisms of which the military is a dominant part. It is essential that we resist this convergence of the civilian community with the military community. Our very survival depends on it because power, in its latent form, has been manipulated and has altered the definition and structure of the military. The true role of the military is indeed the defense of the nation from aggression, but the military function must not exceed that definition. "The Utopian situation would be complete elimination of the military." Unfortunately, that is not possible in contemporary international society. Duncan suggests instead that "...the military must be removed from every facet of society and its role in the schema of things must be reduced to the original one: to protect the people from attack...."22

FOOTNOTES

Section 4: Interpenetrations

1. Donald Duncan, _The New Legions_, p. 105

2. Samuel P. Huntington, _The Soldier and the State_, p. 80

3. Huntington, _The Soldier and the State_, p. 83

4. Huntington, ibid., p. 80

5. ibid., p. 81

6. ibid., p. 83

7. Morris Janowitz, _The Professional Soldier_, p. viii.

8. Janowitz, _The Professional Soldier_, p. viii. (italics mine)

9. Janowitz, ibid., pp. ix-x. (italics mine)

10. Huntington, _The Soldier and the State_, p. 84

11. Huntington, ibid., p. 59

12. ibid., p. 58 (italics mine)

13. ibid., p. 59

14. ibid., pp. 60-1

15. Duncan, _The New Legions_, p. 105

16. Duncan, ibid., p. 94

17. ibid., p. 106

18. ibid.

19. Stephen Wilson, "For a Socio-Historical Approach to the Study of Western Military Culture", _Armed Forces & Society, an Interdisciplinary Journal_, Vol. 6, Number 4, Summer 1980, Eds. Morris Janowitz and David Segal, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, pp. 543-5

20. _Key Concepts in Communication_, Eds. John Fiske, Tim O'Sullivan, John Hartley and Penny Saunders, Chaucer Press, 1983, pp. 47-8

21. Donald J. Mrozek, "The Army and Popular Culture", The
    United States Army, In Peacetime, Essays in Honor of
    the Bicentennial, 1775-1975, Eds. Robin Higham and
    Carol Brandt, Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian
    Publishing, 1975, p. 129

22. Duncan, The New Legions, p. 256

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