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A Comparison of Nietzsche and Lawrence: 
Their Various Stylistic Techniques 
as they apply to their Philosophical Systems

by

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Study of Style

Disclaimer

Introduction to Analysis of Christianity

Discussion of the Man Jesus:
   Nietzsche
   Lawrence

"The Hammer Speaks"

Discussion of the Manifestation of Christianity
The fundamental problem of an undertaking such as this stems from the fact that both Lawrence's and Nietzsche's systems are so complex, so intricately designed that no one simple notion may be taken out of the whole and analyzed, without, of course, one feeling as if something crucial were being overlooked. That is to say that each notion is both a means to and an end of some other particular facet of the complete vision. Consequently, I shall use this as a disclaimer for the fact that I do intend at many different points to hone in on the subtleties, rather than attack the systems head on at every moment.

I believe it is necessary first to discuss the actual mediums used to convey the "visions" of the two artists. I emphasize artist because I feel that while Nietzsche is often viewed simply as a philosopher, he is indeed an artist of the highest degree. He lacks the purely academic, dry systematic approach of the classic philosophers. One would not classify him as a "rigorous" scholar—rather, his intensity, his passion and pure artistic vision is betrayed by his frequent long-windedness, his slight unscholarly manner, and (indeed!) his reliance on expletives. At times, he tends to contradict himself, tends to get so caught up in the fervor of the moment that his particular thoughts change slightly over the course of time. Yet, it must always be remembered that his system is a developing system, based on essential assumptions which bear somewhat more plentiful
In his own exposure to the material grown greater.

The same may be said for Lawrence. He, too, may be seen
to be a "maturing" artist, in that while he, at all times,
was concerned about certain general topics, it is my belief
that his earlier work, such as *Song and Lovers*, was more a
catharsis of his own psychological "issues" wherein he freed
himself of his own neuroses so that he could begin grappling
with the implications of the universal "condition" of
humanity. It was in this novel, however, that he laid the
groundwork for what would develop into the highly problematic
dichotomy of mind and body, spirit and flesh, which serves as
a primary characteristic of his work in the later novels.

Intrinsically, both are artists who mature with the
increasing developments of their particular systems. In
accordance with their philosophical notions, both use their
creative tendencies as a means towards destruction of the old
"truths". In a sense, both view art as the "creative
transformation of the world as we find it" (Nietzsche: Birth
of Tragedy); indeed, they transfigure the mirror image of
humanity with the intent both to expose and to promote the
world around us.

I believe that the particular styles require a certain
amount of analysis, for, as aforementioned, the styles are
merely a manifestation of the philosophical system each is
attempting to convey. I fear that I will not be capable of
discussing Nietzsche’s stylistics without, at times,
appearing to be glowing and fawning over his works. For, it
seems to be that Nietzsche is a wonderfully gifted, creative
genius. He possesses a unique mastery of such varied
techniques—aphorisms, polemics, poetry, narrative, etc.—
each of which he utilizes in accordance with the central
unifying "system." Each technique manifests in some fashion
a fundamental concept of such a system. In a sense, it
appears to me that Nietzsche is continuously in the process
of a polemical debate, and he manipulates each specific style
as a further "weapon" of the argument.

For instance, Zarathustra appears to be highly
problematic in its general structure. That is to say that it
seems almost contradictory, superficially, that he should
choose to write in quite a prophetic tone. Indeed, he rails
against the horrors of Christianity as a constraining of the
human-all-too-human, a prisoner of the noble man. Why, then,
should he choose to set Zarathustra in the apparent cloak of
the new messiah? To be certain, he is no way promoting a new
Christ-figure; perhaps he is simply offering a new angle on
the dogmatic approach to all so-called "religions," to all
"Truths." Indeed, by placing the familiar sounding words in
the mouth of Zarathustra, that is in having him speak in the
same prophetic tone of the New Testament, Nietzsche
illustrates some of the most profound destruction of that
encountered within all his works. His task is a revaluation
of values, a complete annihilation of that dogmatism which we
hold so dear. How else should he convey this to us, we
glorifiers of the absolute? He must put it into our
When I came to men I found them sitting on an old
conceit: the conceit that they have long known what is
good and evil for man...
Behold, here is a new tablet; but where are my brothers
to carry it down with me to the valley and into hearts
of flesh?
Thus my great love of the farthest demands it: do not
spare your neighbor! Man is something that must be
overcome...
He who cannot command himself should obey. And many can
command themselves, but much is still lacking before
they can also obey themselves. [Third Part: On Old And
New Tablets]

When we are reading this passage, we cannot help but hear the
phrase "Love thy neighbor" beckoning to us. Nietzsche
recognizes this critical influence which even such a basic
Christian notion has placed upon us, and thus, attempts to
counter this by speaking with his own voice in a highly
allusory manner. To be sure, this is what he intends to do,
to disrupt the angle, the focus, from which we choose to view
our own world, and thus to put it in his terms--terms which
we cannot help but recognize. I shall return to the actual
context of Zarathustra later in this thesis, making
particular reference to the allegorical basis of this
philosophical novel.

There is a certain undefinable characteristic of some of
Nietzsche's work. Indeed, a lyricism, a musicality of sorts
pervades some of the passages. Yet, within this artistry,
Nietzsche is able to convey his message quite clearly and
Nietzsche has a powerful sense of the concise. That is to say that he has a wonderful ability to paraphrase his own system in a passage with the most poignant intensity—to quote Richard Schacht, he has the ability to sum up large portions of his system within a series of extremely "pregnant" phrases. What I'd like most to emphasize is the...
sheer lyrical, musical quality of his words—a quality to which, although I'm making use of the translated works, Walter Kaufmann has been able to remain loyal in his conveyance of the true spirit of Nietzsche. Perhaps it is his mesmerizing lyricism which has been responsible for the vast misinterpretations, as well as blatant distortions, of Nietzsche's system. One may allow oneself to become so caught up in the passion of his words, in the essential fervor of his phrases, that one does not let oneself become familiar with that which lies beyond the fiery mass. To be certain, I believe that there exists something instinctual within all of us that responds to the mere sound of Nietzsche's words; yet, the true reader of Nietzsche must understand that there is a creative purpose underneath the seemingly purely destructive implications of his philosophy—Nietzsche wields both a sword and a trowel—he seeks to destroy first so that he may create.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that Nietzsche also wore the cloak of polemicist, so that his true intentions could not be hidden from the unsearching eye within a disguise of lyricism. Perhaps some of his most colorful polemicism occurs within the Antichrist, in which Nietzsche rails against the despicable nature of Christianity:

That everyone as an "immortal soul" has equal rank with everyone else, that in the totality of living beings the "salvation" of every single individual may claim eternal significance, that little prigs and three-quarter-madmen may have the conceit that the laws of nature are constantly broken for their sakes—such an intensification of every kind of selfishness into the infinite, into the impertinent, cannot be branded with
too much contempt, and yet Christianity owes its triumph to this miserable flattery of personal vanity: it was precisely all the failures, all the rebellious-minded, all the less favored, the whole scum and refuse of humanity who were thus won over to it. The "salvation of the soul"—in plain language: "the world revolves around me." [AC: sect. 43]

This particular passage leaves virtually nothing to the imagination! Once again, I must reiterate that Nietzsche's stylistic strength appears to rest in his sense of poignancy; in each particular technique which he chooses to employ, his writing appears to maintain this one central characteristic—Nietzsche has such a fine mastery of his language that he may direct such in accordance with his own practical purposes. His words have such a finished quality, such a smoothness, that he never seems to be searching for the proper vocabulary—his literary wealth lies at his fingertips so that even when he writes something such as this:

Not fear; rather that we no longer have anything left to fear in man; that the maggot "man" is swarming in the foreground; that the "tame man," the hopelessly mediocre and insipid man, has already learned to feel himself as the goal and zenith, as the meaning of history, as "higher man"—that he has indeed a certain right to feel thus, insofar as he feels himself elevated above the surfeit of ill-constituted, sickly, weary and exhausted people of which Europe is beginning to stink today, as something at least relatively well-constituted, at least still capable of living, at least affirming life. [GM: First essay: sect. 12]

the thoughts appear so clearly formulated—the logic so impeccable, that it is difficult to disprove on anything but an emotional level.

As aforementioned, one most likely would not consider Nietzsche to dwell within the realm of the "rigorous" thinker. That is, one would not categorize him as
following in the tradition of Kant, Acquinas, Aristotle and the like because of the fact that Nietzsche simply is not working within the framework of a purely systematic approach towards philosophy. Perhaps much of this may be attributed to his earlier work in philology—indeed, much of this linguistic approach may be seen within his works, especially On the Genealogy of Morals. His work is not on the same order as many of the classic philosophers, thus, at times, it appears that he is not valued to the same extent—Nietzsche has some very loyal followers (and some who, quite sadly, believed themselves to be followers), yet he does not have the same general appeal as many other philosophers. He does not set up his system point-by-point and work in a highly structured manner to defend or attack each point. Rather, his works constitute a whole, completed body, each work tending to elaborate upon one central line of his thinking, a line which ultimately comes into play in the total experience of Nietzsche's vision. He can play at the rigorous thinker, however, and he does, at times, utilize this particular technique to familiarize the reader with his general notions—as well as mock those of us who cannot come to any understanding of his work without such an outline format. For instance, in Twilight of the Idols, he acquaints the reader with "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable:"

The History of an Error

1. The true world—attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. (The oldest form
of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.")

2. The true world--unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents"). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible--it becomes female, it becomes Christian.)

3. The true world--unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it--a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Konigsbergian.)

4. The true world--unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us? (Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.)

5. The "true" world--an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating--an idea which has become useless and superfluous--consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.)

6. The true world--we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of longest error; high point of humanity: INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.)

In six fairly brief statements, Nietzsche gives us the history of the Christian view of real/apparent dichotomy, through to the abolishing of such an erroneous notion. Interestingly, while systematized to a certain extent, it also is highly theatrical--the parenthetical remarks come out sounding like stage directions. Indeed, this is his recipe for the revaluation process--a process which he formally begins in his next work, The Antichrist. Nietzsche is forcibly attempting to refocus our attention upon the world in which we live; he wishes to change the angle, the perspective from which we view this world, to remove from such a view the Christian dogmatism with which we are so heavily burdened. Once again, in this particular passage, it
seems to me that he is taking that which is known to us, that which is familiar, and shifting it in such a way that we must learn to question that which we have previously taken as sacred. By placing such an account of "history" in our rigid structure of the outline, or even a simple list for that matter, Nietzsche has conveyed to us that such rigidity is relative—that any "absolute" historical case may be broken down into its component parts, into beginning and end, such parts only constituting a temporal notion in the eternal flux. In constructing this outline in a slightly theatrical manner, Nietzsche forces his audience to engage in a "suspension of disbelief" thereby injecting his words with credibility.

This would not begin to be a complete discussion of style if I did not mention Nietzsche's use of poetry and aphorisms (and, indeed, it can never truly be complete owing to his truly vast technique). I tend to classify these as a manifestation of "the arrows of longing for the other shore" [Zarathustra]. That is to say that each poem and aphorism is like a stinging dart encompassing the biting and triumphant tone of Nietzsche within its small frame. In the "Maxims and Arrows" section of Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche poses the reader with some pertinent questions such as: "'All truth is simple.' Is that not doubly a lie?" and "What? Is man merely a mistake of God's? Or God merely a mistake of man's?" He also relates to us some parables, some lessons which must be learned through the acceptance of his
When stepped on, a worm doubles up. That is clever. In that way he lessens the probability of being stepped on again. In the language of morality: humility.

Whether we immoralists are harming virtue? Just as little as anarchists harm princes. Only since the latter are shot at do they again sit securely on their thrones. Moral: morality must be shot at.

It seems to me that Nietzsche desires to include that bit of self-conscious allegorism incorporated in the vast majority of his works. By that I mean that he is highly aware of the symbolic meaning of his words at all times—he distinctly separates "moral" from his lesson so that we shall not miss the point of his words. Consequently, his reliance on the parable, on the allegory, is quite significant. Several of these such allegories I shall return to in the discussion of his philosophy (such as that of the madman in The Gay Science, and the metamorphases section in Zarathustra).

I tend to think that his aphorisms work in the same instructive—and by this I refer to Nietzsche's specific view of instruction as incorporating both the prescriptive and the descriptive—manner. Perhaps due to the extreme poignancy of such dart-like phrases, they shall serve to be wonderful illustrations of the more artistic bent of Nietzsche's philosophy. Although, I do believe that such aphorisms serve to be some of the most directly misunderstood pieces of Nietzsche’s work—for, his readers may tend to take these bits and pieces randomly out of the completed system, and thus, use individual key phrases to serve their own
particular needs (i.e. Hitler).

I'd like to briefly mention that Nietzsche was also a poet, a musician, a lyricist, and thus, not removed from the purely artistic world. In his prelude of rhymes to The Gay Science, Nietzsche incorporates the truly poetic with the highly philosophical—indeed, quite in the same vein as his aphorisms:

Request

The minds of others I know well;
But who I am, I cannot tell;
My eye is much too close to me,
I am not what I saw and see,
It would be quite a benefit
If only I could sometimes sit
Farther away; but my foes are
Too distant; close friends, still too far;
Between my friends and me, the middle

A poem such as this is highly interesting, for, it contradicts that which I said previously about the fable-like quality of Nietzsche's writing. It seems to me that much of the purely poetic, musical writings of Nietzsche do contain more of the mysterious, hidden qualities of the system which Nietzsche constructs. That is to say that he does wish each and every reader to garner a measure of personal meaning from his words, to "guess his riddle." In this sense, the symbolic meaning is not so clearly portrayed, but rather hidden somewhat by the purely lyrical. One may look at Nietzsche as the "educator" which he so exults in his work "Schopenhauer as Educator." Those who are truly the best teachers are those who inspire one to learn and, more importantly, to go beyond that which is simply taught, so
that one can enhance and affirm both the quality of one's own life, as well as the social realm in which one lives—i.e., the prototypical education of the Übermenschen. I believe that this is the method which Nietzsche utilizes in his poetry, and so too in his other techniques—he is poignant and dogmatic in the sense that he wishes to inspire true contemplation, productive contemplation, rather than to generate mindless, obedient followers. In the appendix of songs to *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche explains his vision in these terms, expressing the aforementioned notion of autonomy as guided by himself:

**Toward New Seas**

That way is my will; I trust  
In my mind and in my grip.  
Without plan, into the vast  
Open sea I head my ship.

All is shining, new and newer,  
Upon space and time sleeps noon;  
Only your eye—monstrously,  
Stares at me, infinity!

To summarize this portion of the thesis, I'd like to state that Nietzsche's various uses of style are virtually boundless, indeed almost portraying the infinite which he seeks. Nehamas aptly calls Nietzsche's "the most multifarious art of style" in his *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*. I believe that this is a direct assertion on Nietzsche's part to maintain relativity, movement, dynamics, in an area that might easily fall victim to tedium and stiffness. To be certain, Nietzsche is promoting such relativity, is encouraging one to never become fixated,
stagnated, in one particular mode of thinking, but rather, one should view his world as a system of relations, as a constantly changing phenomenon which knows no bounds of various angles and foci from which it may be discovered.

* * * * *

Lawrence's style is by no means simple, either. Although he is more purely the literary artist, his various mediums range from the poetic to the polemic, quite like Nietzsche, and very often, there is only a shade of distinction between two such extremes. Like Nietzsche, the vast majority of Lawrence's work does not stray from the essential metaphysical vision which he constructs throughout the course of his body of works. That is to say that he is primarily concerned with particular questions concerning the European world in the aftermath of that which has come to be known in Nietzschean terms as the "death-of-God." Each particular work centers itself in this framework and tends to exemplify one specific consequence of the essential metaphysics of the system. Thus, we see Lawrence grappling specifically with the degenerate nature of Christianity in works such as *The Plumed Serpent* and "The Man Who Died," as we also see him tackle the microcosm of diseased industrialism such as that viewed in *The Rainbow, Sons and Lovers*, and *Women in Love*.

In Lawrence's vision, it is extremely difficult to differentiate each particular component. That is to say that each piece is so intricately linked with each other piece
that it is virtually impossible to address one portion of the chain of events, while leaving the others untouched. I believe Lawrence’s greatest works to be those which address the system as a whole, rather than attempting to dismantle the puzzle before it has been completely formulated. For instance, I tend to lean towards Women in Love as his chef d’oeuvre; this work is profoundly comprehensive, while not allowing itself to become bogged down in any one aspect of the system.

Yet, such a comprehensiveness is highly problematic, for each component must be explained in its own terms to the fullest possible extent before the metaphysical system as a whole may be comprehended. Perhaps this is why Lawrence’s use of the short story is so laudable. To a great extent, Lawrence’s short stories serve much the same function as do Nietzsche’s aphorisms—each one is a slice of the vision, incorporating the elements of the system, yet also possessing a sharper impact, a poignancy which Lawrence seemed to be not quite capable of sustaining throughout his longer novels. It appears, thus, that the intensity of the short stories is much greater than that of the novels—sometimes, one can pinpoint the comic elements which Lawrence places in his novels with which he breathes a certain amount of life and vivacity into them. The short stories, however, always seem to me to be of a more surreal nature. The “fascination with the abomination” seems to me to be more generally present in these stories, perhaps because the personalities are not so
familiar that the neuroses, the disease which Lawrence often portrays is so much more heightened in and of itself, because they may not be explained away in terms of the intrinsic nature of the character (characters which are familiarized to us within the framework of the novel). For example, in The "Horse-Dealer’s Daughter," the characters are not so realistically enhanced that we may look at them truthfully as familiar to us (as perhaps we may with Ursula and Birkin). For this reason, the neurotic conflict encountered within this particular passage, although one expressed countless times in his novels, becomes so much more the focus. The characters are for all purposes faceless, but the eternal conflict remains:

Her hands were drawing him, drawing him down to her. He was afraid, even a little horrified. For he had, really, no intention of loving her. Yet, her hands were drawing him towards her. He put out his hand quickly to steady himself, and grasped her bare shoulder. A flame seemed to burn the hand that grasped her soft shoulder. He had no intention of loving her: his whole will was against his yielding. It was horrible. And yet, wonderful was the touch of her shoulders, beautiful the shining of her face. Was she perhaps mad? He had a horror of yielding to her. Yet something in him ached also.

This passage betrays the poetic lyricism which pervades Lawrence’s works. A measure of Lawrence’s fondness for repetition of language is evident here, as too is his loyalty to the visceral. He is by no means a condenser of the flesh, but rather, he employs the most vivid imagery so that the immediacy of the consummation of the flesh may be made known. It is almost as if he incorporates these dual techniques so that he may lull his audience into perceiving his depicted
incident in the most instinctual manner. That is to say that the repetition serves almost as the method by which he hypnotizes the audience into a state of pure regression into the primal essence; Lawrence's words speak to and from the blood, as it were—when he removes our inhibitions, we may feel comfortable in our dwelling at this level.

I believe that somehow Lawrence touches the purely instinctual recesses of his audience within his short stories. Indeed, there is something contained within them which allow them to become more intuitively felt—whereas the novels tend to draw from the more intellectual implications of the metaphysics. This is interesting, for, as previously mentioned, both the novels and the short stories are drawing from the same source—the same fundamental vision. Something like "The Women Who Rode Away" or "The Princess" appears to give a more definitive statement of theme than a novel which is formulated along the same general path, namely, The Plumed Serpent. In "The Princess" the theme of the obliteration of the mental soul in the consummation of the flesh—a theme which is expressed in each of Lawrence's works—is expressed as such:

And he was warm, but with a terrible animal warmth that seemed to annihilate her. He panted like an animal with desire. And she was given over to this thing.
She had never, never wanted to be given over to this, but she had willed that it should happen to her. And, according to her will, she lay and let it happen. But she never wanted it. She never wanted to be thus assailed and handled, and mauled. She wanted to keep herself to herself.

"This thing" is the primal faction of the individual,
the body which is so neglected in the concentration upon the spiritual realm—this is that which is expressed in the sacrifice of the woman in "The Woman Who Rode Away." This religion of the blood, the sanctity of the primal is that which Lawrence attempts to exemplify in The Plumed Serpent. Stylistically, however, I believe this is not quite achieved, for the audience, while influenced heavily by the expressionistic, vivid landscape and poetry of the novel, never quite gains a sense of comprehension of the true system which Lawrence presents. The novel proves to be too cumbersome to be purely instinctual—a type of literary sensory overload results which is not the case in the short stories which cover virtually identical material.

Essentially, Lawrence is a poet who maintains a very identifiable voice, a distinctive honesty which cannot be squelched within conventional literary devices. His voice is very much present in all that he writes—one may even go so far as to say that he projects himself within one of the characters of each major work that he creates (Birkin, Don Ramon, Oliver Mellors, Paul Morel, etc.), although it may also be said that each of his characters are necessarily undefinable. Consequently, I'd like to maintain that a central element of Lawrence's "style," if it must be pigeonholed as such, is this evident self-consciousness—at all moments Lawrence is aware of his works qua works, such works acting as a creative mouthpiece for his vision. Perhaps this heightened awareness of purpose may force the
novels into a realm of mere contrivance. For instance, at times within his novels Lawrence tends to drop out of the so-called "creative" mode altogether, using his characters as a voice which is distinctly his own. Birkin comes to mind as one such character:

"You are merely making words," he said. "Knowledge is everything to you. Even your animalism, you want it in your head. You don't want to be an animal, you want to observe your own animal functions, to get a mental thrill out of them. It is all purely secondary—and more decadent than the most hide-bound intellectualism. What is it but the worst and last form of intellectualism, this love of yours for passion and the animal instincts? Passion and the instincts—you want them hard enough, but through your head, in your consciousness. It all takes place in your head, under that skull of yours..."

At certain times throughout his novels, one may have the impression that the dialogue digresses into something akin to the Socratic debates of Plato. That is to say that suddenly the physical setting, the plot line, becomes secondary, and even quite insignificant, to the polemical framework. One is momentarily lifted out of the dramatic world of fiction and forcibly made to see the symbolic implications of the novel.

I might even venture so far as to say that Lawrence is, to a very great extent, self-consciously Nietzschean. His emphasis upon "decadent intellectualism" in the aforementioned passage, as well as his obsession with the will to power as manifested within almost all of his works, can not be overlooked as pure coincidence. Thus, it would seem fitting that Lawrence did dabble in, and wonderfully mastered, the art of polemics. I believe that his "Studies in Classic American Literature" is the best
example of such a technique. Lawrence bounds to the forefront in this work, expresses himself with such wit and audacity, that one marvels at times at the striking similarity between himself and Nietzsche. In his essay on Benjamin Franklin, Lawrence is simply ruthless! Describing Franklin as the neat, tidy man who succeeded in mechanizing, as well as moralizing, American humanity, Lawrence rails about the effects of such:

All this Americanizing and mechanizing has been for the purpose of overthrowing the past. And now look at America, tangled in her own barbed wire, and mastered by her own machines. Absolutely got down by her own barbed wire of shalt-nots, and shut up fast in her own "productive" machines like millions of squirrels running in millions of cages. It is just a farce.

Now is your chance, Europe. Now let Hell loose and get your own back, and paddle your own canoe on a new sea, while clever America lies on her muck-heaps of gold, strangled in her own barbed wire of shalt-not ideals and shalt-not moralisms.

And, in his essay on Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, he writes something that sounds as if were directly out of The AntiChrist, haranguing against the contempt of the body which results from the construction of an absolute form of spirituality, the placing of a transcendent force by which our primal nature shall be squelched:

America soon plucked the bird of the spirit. America soon killed the belief in the spirit. But not the practice. The practice continued with a sarcastic vehemence. America, with a perfect inner contempt for the spirit and the consciousness of man, practices the same spirituality and universal love and knowing all the time, incessantly, like a drug habit. And inwardly gives not a fig for it. Only for the sensation. The pretty-pretty sensation of love, loving all the world. And the nice fluttering aeroplane sensation of knowing, knowing, knowing. The the prettiest of all sensations, the sensation of UNDERSTANDING. Oh, what a lot they understand, the darlings! So good at the trick, they
are. Just a trick of self-conceit.

This idea of the "drug habit" is something which turns up quite often in Lawrence's works, and once again, seems to come straight from Nietzsche in his expression of the Dionysian mode of existence. The notion of the narcotic effect of the absolute, the dogmatism of the transcendent upon man is something which inspires the raillery which Lawrence makes use of as a literary device. Indeed, for Lawrence anger and contempt are frequently channelled into the creative impulses viewed within his many poetic works. In his purely polemical writings, this anger does not appear to be diffused through any particular source, and thus becomes the essential instrument of his expression.

I should not neglect to mention that Lawrence also wrote what may be termed as "rigorous" systematic philosophy. This may be illustrated within his essay "Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious." In the section of this essay titled "The Lover and The Beloved," Lawrence seeks to define the psychological foundations for the love conflict which he explores within his works. Interestingly, although this would seem to be the most methodical of his works, it maintains that element of poetic lyricism which is present in all his writings:

A soul cannot come into its own through that love alone which is unison. If it stress the one mode, the sympathetic mode, beyond a certain point, it breaks its own integrity, and corruption sets in in the living organism. On both planes of love, upper and lower, the two modes must act complementary to one another, the sympathetic and the separatist. It is the absolute failure to see this that has torn the modern world into two halves, the one half warring for the voluntary, objective, separatist control, the other for the pure
sympathetic. The individual psyche divided against itself divides the world against itself, and an unthinkable progress of calamity ensues unless there be a reconciliation.

This is the description of the basic conflict of love which manifests itself within the mind/body dichotomy. The prescription is that which Lawrenceformulates through his novels, his short stories, his poems, in such a manner that his metaphysical vision rests ultimately in the reconciliation of such a conflict. Unlike Nietzsche, Lawrence aims at the fusion of the separate natures of male and female as the means to a new creation in the cycle of birth and decay. Like Nietzsche, he does remain in this descriptive/prescriptive mode while undertaking (while not quite a revaluation) such a construction within destruction. That is to say that he constantly jumps from the role of visionary, to that of misanthrope, never fully holding man quia man in contempt, but rather, that which man has made of himself, while seeking to replace such with a more affirmative state.

Consequently, through the use of his poetics, Lawrence creates several metaphorical objects, all-encompassing symbols which serve to express this metaphysical vision--most pertinently, the fusion which is crucial to the new creation. For instance, the "star-equilibrium" of Women In Love, the "morning star" of The Plumed Serpent, become essential leitmotives within the fictional world of industrialized, mechanized, absolutized decay which Lawrence composes. Indeed, this world is a world of symbols, of allegory--quite
like Nietzsche—which constitute the fabric of the system. Something like the "sea anemone," a symbol which Lawrence utilizes within a great many of his works, from Sons and Lovers to The Plumed Serpent, as well as in several of his short stories, becomes a device which encompasses the metaphysical language of the entire system. For example, in "The Fox" Lawrence expresses the notion of the symbol, in only slightly different terms, in terms of the "sea weed," yet maintains the substance behind the symbol, defining, in a sense, his terms so that we may come to view his as a new language:

No, he wouldn't let her exert her love towards him. No, she had to be passive, to acquiesce, and to be submerged under the surface of love. She had to be like the seaweeds she saw as she peered down from the boat, swaying forever delicately under water, with all their delicate fibrils put tenderly out upon the flood, sensitive, utterly sensitive and receptive within the shadowy sea, and never, never rising and looking forth above water while they lived. Never. Never looking forth from the water until they died, only then washing, corpses, upon the surface. But while they lived, always submerged, always beneath the wave. Beneath the wave they might have powerful roots, stronger than iron; they might be tenacious and dangerous in their soft waving within the flood. Beneath the water they might be stronger, more indestructible than resistant oak trees are on land. But it was always under-water, always under-water. And she, being a woman, must be like that.

I must make some mention of Lawrence's poetry. For, as with Nietzsche's aphorisms, Lawrence's poems appear to serve as microcosms of the entire metaphysical vision. Each one expresses in a certain measure the whole of the system, yet manages to encapsulate within relatively few lines the vision, manages to capture the spirit of the ideology in its
most striking, vivid clarity. For instance, the poem "Sea-Weed," from "Pansies," expresses the symbol of the female psyche in its simplest terms:

Sea-Weed sways and sways and swirls
as if swaying were its form of stillness;
and if it flushes against fierce rock
it slips over as shadows do, without hurting itself.

And, within the poem "Thought," one of my personal favorites, Lawrence manages to express the prescription for the reconciliation of debilitating consciousness of the mental realm with a more life-enhancing, affirmative pursuit of knowledge as a relative measure within the dynamic life-process:

Thought, I love thought,
But not the juggling and twisting of already existent ideas,
I despise that self-important game.
Thought is the welling up of unknown life into consciousness,
Thought is the testing of statements on the touchstone of the conscience,
Thought is gazing on to the face of life, and reading what can be read,
Thought is pondering over experience, and coming to a conclusion,
Thought is not a trick, or an exercise, or a set of dodges,
Thought is a man in his wholeness wholly attending.

In summary of this portion of the thesis, I'd like to state that Lawrence's style is a direct reflection of his metaphysical vision. At times, his honesty betrays even himself, and he is shown to be of the true artistic fiber. That is to say that his passion is uncontrolled, is not confined by any dogmatic regulations of literary device. His work, at all times, whether polemical or literary, is of a lyrical potency which allows itself to be felt, quite often,
on a purely instinctual level. Perhaps, at times, his philosophical vision becomes too great to be cloaked in the purely artistic, and it is at these times that the sheer fictitious quality of the work fails. Yet, his work constitutes an entire body of ideology which is at once so visionary and artistic that one of the two elements is occasionally subverted by the other. Lawrence's work is the breathing personification of his vision—one which is as relativistic as the many various styles which he chooses to incorporate into the expression of his metaphysics.
Before I begin my analysis of the content of both Nietzsche's and Lawrence's works, there are several disclaimers more which I should make. The Nietzsche which I choose to deal with is the mature, comprehensive Nietzsche as revealed in the body of works which arise from the fifth book of The Gay Science and those which follow. I admit that in focusing on this particular set of works I am being less than completely truthful to the nature of Nietzsche's system as a developing system. But, for my purposes, the overall content of his philosophy may be illustrated by the selected works, and to concentrate upon the apparently contradictory nature of his earlier works would serve only to remove the focus from that which I find to be most important in Nietzsche's system. To be certain, his earlier works paved the way for his later, more comprehensive ones, however, it is through the later works that I feel the overall ideology may be understood.

I should also like to make the claim that this discussion of Nietzsche and Lawrence will be focused on specific, central notions which are prevalent in both systems, yet shall by no means be viewed as a complete discussion. Someday I hope to do a more all-encompassing analysis of the two systems, but for now, the topics which I address are fragments of the whole. Indeed, the revaluation undertaken by both men is so vast and exhaustive that I shall not have the wherewithal to discuss it here in its entirety. However, I hope that this fragmentary analysis shall provide
a basis for the research that I plan to do later, and to encapsulate some of the most central notions of both systems.
Christianity, as the outgrowth of the Judeo-Socratic absolutism, is one of the major concerns for both Nietzsche and Lawrence. The destructive quality of Christianity as an institution which glorifies the mind while it chooses to extinguish all remnants of the body, which exalts the weak while enslaving the noble, is that which falls under scrutiny, indeed attack, in the revaluation processes set forth by both men. To be certain, in both systems, Christianity is hostile to life, to the life process, and a discussion of such shall prove to be an indication of the central nature which it serves in the understanding of both philosophies. While this discussion can be in no way conclusive, for it is only one mere faction of both incredibly comprehensive systems, it will serve as a sort of summation of the fundamental characteristics of each ideology.

Perhaps if we use the madman section in the fourth book of The Gay Science as a representation of the overall view of that which Nietzsche hopes to accomplish within his revaluation, as our point of departure towards an understanding of what Nietzsche considers to be the anti-life nature of Christianity, we can begin to see precisely what the task is that Nietzsche has undertaken:

The greatest weight.-- What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and
sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"

Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and everything, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? [341]

Perhaps this can (and should!) be used as a test for how we may live our lives in the healthiest manner. That is to say that if we can affirm our existence, with all the pain, with all its components, both positive and negative, to the point that we shall choose life over and above all denials of life, we have somehow found a life-enhancing path which is bound up with the notion of the eternal recurrence. Yet, Christianity, in all its various manifestations, Protestantism being the worst, has made the choice to fear the demon who speaks, to shun the prospect of an affirmation of the here-and-now, in favor of the exaltation of the divine. If we keep constantly in mind the test of the demon, and use it as a check for how we live our lives, we can only come to the conclusion that Christianity does not promote a form of life which allows one a feeling of vitality in the face of this question. The task is thus: to decipher the roots of distortion undergone in the formation of the Christian
religion, and to show how in such a formation process, somehow the zest for life disappeared, and the contempt for the all-too-human surfaced.

* * * * * *

I think it would prove interesting to discuss the treatment of Jesus himself given by Lawrence and Nietzsche. For, such a treatment differs quite a bit and is, in my opinion, quite unexpected.

In The Antichrist Nietzsche addresses Jesus the man in a manner which is remarkably tender in contrast to the rather vehement nature which pervades his most colorful diatribe. It must be kept in mind that Nietzsche makes a clear distinction between Jesus the man and the Christ figure; that which I am addressing in this section is his treatment of Jesus—I shall turn to his beliefs about the Christ figure in the next section. Jesus was "wrong" only in that he was misunderstood; indeed his preachings, although evidence of a certain form of decadence (in a sense an outgrowth of the Epicurean philosophy), were somewhat life-affirming, dictating ever-so-softly a path, a life to live in which we are all the son-of-God—he was in no way presumptuous in thinking that he was the single "son," and he did not set up a hierarchy, generating out from himself which described the "saved" and the "evil." Rather, he denoted "son-of-God" as the term for the psychological state of such an embracing of life. Nietzsche asserts:

[The faith to which Jesus clings] is not angry, does not reproach, does not resist; it does not bring "the
sword"—it simply does not foresee how it might one day separate... Nor does this faith formulate itself: it lives, it resists all formulas... Using the expression somewhat tolerantly, one could call Jesus a "free spirit"—he does not care for anything solid: the word kills, all that is solid kills. The concept, the experience of "life" in the only way he knows it, resists any kind of word, formula, law, faith, dogma. He speaks only of the innermost: "life" or "truth" or "light" is his word for the innermost—all the rest, the whole of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, has for him only the value of a sign, a simile. [32]

I find it highly intriguing that Nietzsche interposes this symbolic language into the preachings of Jesus. For, with this addition, the words, the intent of Jesus' sermons, take on a completely different light, one which I find to be almost akin to that process in which Nietzsche finds himself to be engaged. The assertion that Jesus employs a symbolic language to represent workings of the mind and body, that he does not attempt to forge an absolute which does not correspond to such workings, is one which lends quite a measure of credence to Nietzsche's own works. The use of allegory, of symbolism, is by no means in the Platonic tradition of forms, but rather, is one composed of those human characteristics, one which expresses the relative quality of our world, in a manner that a positing of transcendent prototypes could in no way capture.

Perhaps we are being asked to view Zarathustra in this manner. Perhaps this is why the child becomes the result of the final metamorphosis. For, finality as a transcendent concept is vehemently denounced in the context of Nietzsche's system. Yet, in the symbolic overtones of the novel, the language is distorted so that we might come to grasp the
allegorical implications without painting ourselves into a semantic corner. In illustration of this, I would like to quote the passage of the third metamorphosis (indeed, this entire section is perhaps the greatest allegorical summation of Nietzsche's system, expressing the process which must have undergone in the revaluation):

But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do? Why must the preying lion still become a child? The innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world. [Pt. I: Speeches]

Primarily I'd like to assert, of the measure of kinship that I see Nietzsche to be taking with Jesus, that the problem of the vast misunderstanding is one which rests in that of language itself. Nietzsche expresses his sentiment in "Wagner in Bayreuth" that "man can no longer make his misery known unto others by means of language; hence he cannot really express himself any longer" [pg. 133]. Thus, in the utter breakdown of language, a system of communication, formulated essentially in the symbolic language of the Dionysian, breaks through to the surface. This language speaks from the very heart of man, bursts forth from the essential primordial unity, and hence is a language denoting the very cyclical nature of the universe, indeed, the eternal flux. But, somehow, the distortion of that which has been spoken from such depths, reveals itself ultimately in the surfacing of the human-all-too-human; and, it is more precisely the diseased manifestation of humanity which
translates this primal language into that which corresponds to the absolute which it has long ago posited in the nihilistic escape from that abyss which it calls "life."

On this subject, Nietzsche asserts:

If I understand anything at all about this great symbolist, it is that he accepted only inner realities as realities, as "truths"—that he understood the rest, everything natural, temporal, spatial, historical, only as signs, as occasions for parables. [AC: 34]

These parables, rooted not in unquestionable reality, were taken to be such, and the language of mysticism, of revelation and miracles was exchanged for the primordial language from which they grew. For, above all, Jesus was prescribing a new way of life, this "faith" of which he spoke was merely an illustration of how one may find that "path" towards health. This health sprung from the body—"body am I, and soul"—in the revelation that the "God" of which he spoke is in all of us, that we cannot hope to find such a God in the denunciation of the body. In this passage Nietzsche expresses Jesus' truly noble deed, his deed of "love" and acceptance of the life process:

This "bringer of glad tidings" died as he had lived, as he had taught—not to "redeem men" but to show how one must live. This practice is his legacy to mankind: his behavior before the judges, before the catchpots, before the accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn—his behavior on the cross. He does not resist, he does not defend his right, he takes no step which might ward off the worst; on the contrary, he provokes it. And he begs, he suffers, he loves with those, in those, who do him evil. Not to resist, not to be angry, not to hold responsible—but to resist not even the evil one—to love him. [AC: 35]

Truly, the Jesus portrayed by Nietzsche appeared to manifest the qualities of the noble master; his "love thy enemy" was a
prescription for such nobility of character, one which was indeed tainted and perverted in the teachings of the church. Nietzsche even goes so far as to say that "there was only one true Christian, and he died on the cross," meaning that all which is inherently Christian was in no way passed on to Jesus' followers, for, the moment in which his death was consummated, it was itself misunderstood, thought to be an action of entirely contrary intent. With the postulation of the "Resurrection" all that Jesus himself preached became null and void. The "kingdom of God" was taken to be that transcendent absolute realm which may only be reached in death; Jesus' intended kingdom was truly that which manifested itself in our inner being, a psychological mindset which promotes health and the affirmation of the here-and-now. Nietzsche reveals that:

The "kingdom of God" is nothing that one expects; it has no yesterday and no day after tomorrow, it will not come in "a thousand years"—it is an experience of the heart; it is everywhere, it is nowhere. (The Antichrist 34)

Admittedly, I have not touched upon the complexities of Nietzsche's treatment of Jesus. I have expressed more the noble qualities which Nietzsche found to be prevalent within his character, yet, it should be understood that Jesus is not meant to be deified but rather, that the history of diseased Christianity should not be attributed to its founder. For, as aforementioned, the Christianity which is practiced in our world is seen by Nietzsche to be a complete bastardization of Jesus' teachings. No, Jesus should not be viewed as a hero, but rather, he should be understood.
I shall return to the vast misunderstandings of Jesus revealed in the modern practice of Christianity in a later section of this thesis. But now I would like to discuss Lawrence's views on the Christ figure.

In his short novel, The Man Who Died, Lawrence postulates a hypothetical situation in which Christ returns immediately from the cross. The Christ portrayed here is quite different from the Jesus described by Nietzsche. Indeed, to be quite honest, it is extremely difficult to understand whether Lawrence is treating the allegorical Christ figure or the man Jesus as the subject of his work. Unlike Nietzsche, Lawrence does not appear to make a clear distinction between the two personalities, thus, it is quite a bit more difficult to decipher his meaning. That said, the personality treated by Lawrence is a man filled with sorrow, even disgust, for that which he had preached:

He had risen without desire, without even the desire to live, empty save for the overwhelming disillusion that lay like nausea where his life had been. Yet perhaps, deeper even than disillusion, was a desireless resoluteness, deeper even than consciousness. [pg. 169]

His teachings are not of the symbolic nature expressed by Nietzsche, but rather are quite literal (Lawrence idiosyncratically uses the term "allegorical" to illustrate the content of Christ's words--allegorical appearing to mean objective, transcendent, whereas "symbolic" refers to a hearkening back to the primal unity), indeed promoting a "kingdom of God" which was that transcendent absolute in
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> He had risen without desire, without even the desire to live, empty save for the all-overwhelming disillusion that lay like nausea where his life had been. Yet perhaps, deeper even than disillusion, was a desolate resoluteness, deeper even than consciousness. [pg. 169]

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which his followers believed. His words are those which speak of the denunciation of the body in favor of the soul; his "way" was not an affirmation of the life process, but rather, a means to escape such. Truly, he was not misunderstood, as much as he was understood all too well. Interestingly, in Lawrence's mind, Judas becomes somewhat of a hero, in that he recognized the anti-life, anti-flesh content of Christ's teachings:

I wanted to be greater than the limits of my hands and feet, so I brought betrayal on myself. And I know I wronged Judas, my poor Judas. For I have died, and now I know my own limits. Now I can live without striving to sway others any more. For my reach ends in my finger-tips, and my stride is no longer than the ends of my toes. Yet I would embrace multitudes, I who have never truly embraced even one. But Judas and the high priests saved me from my own salvation, and soon I can turn to my destiny like a bather in the sea at dawn, who has just come down to the shore alone. [pg. 174]

A further illustration of this can be seen in Apocalypse:

Judas had to betray Jesus to the powers that be, because of the denial and subterfuge inherent in Jesus's teaching. Jesus took up the position of the pure individual, even with his disciples. He did not really mix with them, or even really work or act with them. He was alone all the time. He puzzled them utterly, and in some part of them, he let them down. He refused to be their physical power-lord. The power-homage in a man like Judas felt itself betrayed. So it betrayed back again: with a kiss. [pg. 18]

In his introduction to Apocalypse, Richard Aldington states that "The Man Who Died is a rejection of Christ the teacher, though not of Christ the lover... the mistake of Jesus was not in loving but in trying to influence men with a doctrine of love." [pg. xx-xxi] Indeed, Lawrence is staunchly in favor of a manner of living based on love--perhaps based entirely on love. Thus, when Christ attempts to formulate
such a manner, all the while emphasizing the fundamental individuality of humanity, he is illustrating the denial of the primal unity. He is denying the essentially collective nature of mankind—glorifying the "principium individualism"—one which is bound up intimately in the primordial unification. Consequently, in the very preaching of love, the love itself becomes a lie, for it is something which must be instinctively encountered, and cannot be dogmatized.

A love which is founded in the union of the distinct female and male, in the fusion of the "marriage of opposites," becomes the means of "salvation" in Lawrence's system. As this particular notion is the most characteristic point of Lawrence's departure from Nietzsche's own system, perhaps this may account for the differences of opinion on the subject of Christ. However, I do believe that to some extent Lawrence is somewhat contradictory in his feelings on Christ. For, as in Nietzsche's description of Jesus, it seems to me that the question lies fundamentally within the problem of language itself. For, language is by no means a satisfactory representation of those concepts which language attempts to exemplify. That is to say that language is a barrier, is immediately tainted as that which is the first venturing out of primal unity. Lawrence himself finds this to be quite a burden, for the system which he promotes is necessarily not a system of formulae, yet it becomes such in the linguistic relation itself. Admittedly, Lawrence does
his very best to attempt to get past this fundamental problem; perhaps his characteristic use of repetition, of poetic lyricism is founded in such an attempt. He wishes his words to speak from a level beyond, or indeed beneath that level of verbal communication, so he creates his own symbolic language of sorts in order to achieve this hearkening back to primordial unification.

Thus, as he has encountered and battled this problem of language himself, it would seem that Lawrence would more compassionately understand the burden placed upon Christ. For, Christ was attempting to express something—namely love—which perhaps cannot be expressed by virtue of its very intangible nature. And Lawrence himself is guilty of such an expression; indeed, we all are guilty, for we are not equipped with any other means but language. Perhaps the fault of Christ must therefore rest in the content of his doctrine. Simply put, Christ denied that such a "marriage of opposites" was possible. Fusion could never occur, because it had not been achieved within the essential core of man.

Perhaps there exists something fundamentally contrary in Lawrence's expression of love, for such love thrives only in the fusion. The definition of "love" (ironically we must break such a concept into its component parts in order for it to be understood—the ever-recurring problem of semantics once again!) in Christ's system is of a far more Platonic nature, in Lawrence's eyes. Whereas, for Lawrence love is sensual, stirred within the blood and maintained within the
body alone--any attempt to fix love in an absolute realm is to destroy pure love and to replace it with a diseased fragment, a mere skeleton of passionate existence.

To be quite honest, I find Lawrence's conception of Christ to be quite a bit more complex than Nietzsche's. For, it appears that in many ways, Lawrence found Christ to be of noble character, that is to say, that he promoted a means in which men could maintain their own nobility due to their individuality. However, by denying the collective self, as well as denying the will to power as the fundamental disposition of man, and promoting such individuality, Christ's teachings would serve to foster an environment, which is necessarily collective, and thus, necessarily weakened by virtue of its illusory belief in its individuality. Lawrence fumes of this distortion of Christ's words:

Jesus taught the escape and liberation into unselfish, brotherly love: a feeling that only the strong can know. And this, sure enough, at once brought the community of the weak into triumphant being; and the will of the community of Christians was anti-social, almost anti-human, revealing from the start a frenzied desire for the end of the world, the destruction of humanity altogether; and then, when this did not come, a grim determination to destroy all mastery, all lordship, and all human splendor out of the world, leaving only the community of saints as the final negation of power, and the final power. [Apocalypse: pg. 19]

As in Nietzsche's view, it is also Lawrence's contention that Christ should not be held responsible for the vast misinterpretation and distortion of his teachings. However, I believe that in Lawrence's opinion, Christ is far more responsible. His teachings were far too conducive to such a
slave mentality, they were far too inaccessible in their
truth to a weak mass; to be certain, his preachings were
something that could be realized only by the noble, yet even
in the realization, there would be something fundamentally
lacking. The sense of communion is not founded in its primal
basis, but rests as a communion under God, a communion of
equal individuals. The sense of isolation pervasive in
Christ's teachings illustrates a profound denial of the
collective quality implicit in the primordial unity, and thus
is evidence of a certain deleteriousness; as there can be no
true affirmation of the life process resulting from such a
denial, this manner of living is essentially harmful to life.

Perhaps if Christ could have interwoven his doctrine of
love with an equally sacred doctrine of the marriage of
opposites, of a blood religion glorifying such commingling,
Lawrence would have been more receptive to his teachings.
Indeed, it appears to me that this is the point which he
attempts to make in the second part of The Man Who Died. In
this portion of the story, Christ is metaphorically reborn,
awakened from the numbing sense of disillusionment which he
had felt previous to his encountering the priestess. In the
consummation, in the touch felt between them, Christ is
symbolically converted to the new religion, the religion of
the blood born out of the celebration of the eternal flux and
man's intimate connection with such. Christ achieves the
"star-equilibrium" in his fusion with the priestess--a fusion
which necessarily maintains and revels in the distinctness of
the essential male and female:

He had come back to life, but not the same life that he had left, the life of little people and the little day. Re-born, he was in the other life, the greater day of the human consciousness. And he was alone and apart from the little day, and out of contact with the daily people. Not yet had he accepted the irrevocable no one touches me which separates the re-born from the vulgar. The separation was absolute, as yet here at the temple he felt peace, the hard, bright pagan peace with hostility of slaves beneath. [pg. 194]

I believe, with the utilization of the biblical phrase, no one touches me, that Lawrence commits something of a contradiction, or at the very least, fails to make clear his intentions for using such a phrase. For, why should such a state of isolation, indeed that state which Lawrence appears to assign to the unrisen Christ, be that which has not yet been achieved within the sanctity of the new blood religion promoted at the close of The Man Who Died? In some sense, this puzzling notion set forth in the above mentioned passage may point to an uneasiness within Lawrence himself to reconcile the apparent democratization inherent within Christ's teachings with the individuation process which underlies the words of the man Jesus. That is to say that to some extent it appears as if Lawrence attaches a social program to the teachings of Christ which is necessarily contradictory to the doctrine of nobility which is evident within the teachings of Jesus.

Perhaps Lawrence is not far enough removed from the Christian mindset to consciously and continuously make the distinction between the words of Jesus and the allegorical implications of Jesus as the Christ figure. Nietzsche does
quite clearly and concisely make this distinction; for him, thus, there is no problem in recognizing the noble aristocracy which he finds to be prevalent in the words of Jesus, all the while denouncing the democratic leveling process which occurs in the name of the Christ figure. And indeed, Nietzsche is quite decidedly a proponent of a hierarchical social system—an aristocracy, or at the very least an oligarchy, is a system in which the noble few are permitted to rise. Perhaps, too, Nietzsche's clear distinction is his own manner of rationalizing a kinship which he apparently feels with the man who is taken to be the founder of the most deleterious mindset of humanity.

However, I do believe that it eventually comes down to this: Lawrence wishes quite desperately that humanity be reconciled with the primordial unity from which it grew. Thus, he does seem to promote a collective system of government, perhaps socialism, in which man may come to realize his intimate connection with other men and the life process. However, Lawrence also recognizes within himself a certain propensity towards elitism, towards nobility of character which is governed by the fundamental disposition of the will to power (I find this to be most evident in Birkin's character, as well as in Don Ramon). I believe that it is this inherent disparity within his own character that keeps Lawrence from recognizing that which he so dismissively relates within the problematic Christ figure. Perhaps, Lawrence is so entrenched within the Christian dogma that he
forces himself to believe in the democratization inherent in Christ's teachings, all the while attributing to Christ himself the desire to individuate men. Perhaps, this so-called collective social program which Lawrence seems to lean towards is primarily an insulation from the will to power, an inclination which terrifies even the staunchest atheists.

The Christ figure which he fails to distinguish from the man Jesus becomes evidence of a certain projection of guilt; in a sense, Lawrence attempts to make amends for his own susceptibility to the Christian mindset by attributing to Christ that which he apparently seeks to avoid, namely, the individuation which he finds to be a necessary component of the will to power.

If Lawrence is to be thought of as a self-conscious Nietzschean (which I believe he is), then this fear of the will to power as a divisive force between men is unfounded. For, while Nietzsche asserts that "all meaning is will to power, all relative meaning resolves itself into it" [Will to Power, sect. 590] and that "the really fundamental instinct of life... aims at the expansion of power" [Gay Science, sect. 349], he is not saying that the accumulation of such power shall serve to thrust man from out of the primal unity. Rather, the will to power is somehow bound up with the notion of the human-all-too-human; in making the aforementioned assertion of the fundamental disposition of man, Nietzsche is engaging in an Aristotelian presentation of reality—indeed, this is what he has seen to be "true" by observing the
relative components of life. The will to power cannot, therefore, be escaped, for it will necessarily manifest itself in some form or another. By recognizing this characteristic of mankind, Nietzsche simply channels the will to power in such a way that it becomes affirmative to life. By exposing the source of Christianity as a distorted manifestation of the all-too-human will to power, Nietzsche explains Christianity as a purely human phenomenon which may therefore be overcome by recognizing the human tendencies which construct it.

Thus, in his seeming uneasiness towards the will to power, Lawrence falls short of taking his discussion of Christ to its logical conclusion. Once again, perhaps this is due to a problem of language, or perhaps to a true distaste for that which Lawrence felt Christ to be promoting. In any case, while the treatment of Jesus is quite different with regards to Nietzsche and Lawrence, both men had virtually identical feelings about the outgrowth of Christianity, and, if I understand Lawrence correctly, about the allegorical Christ figure himself. That is to say that that which Jesus the man was taken to represent posthumously was that very Judeo-Socratic idealism which has served to de-humanize man to the point of nihilistic decadence.

* * * * *
"Why so hard?" the kitchen coal once said to the diamond. "After all, are we not close kin?"

Why so soft? O my brothers, thus I ask you: are you not after all my brothers?

Why so soft, so pliant and yielding? Why is there so much denial, self-denial, in your hearts? So little destiny in your eyes?

And if you do not want to be destinies and inexorable ones, how can you one day triumph with me?

And if your hardness does not wish to flash and cut and cut through, how can you one day create with me?

For all creators are hard. And it must seem blessedness to you to impress your hand on millennia as on wax.

Blessedness to write on the will of millennia as on bronze--harder than bronze, nobler than bronze. Only the noblest is altogether hard.

This new tablet, o my brothers, I place over you: become hard!

Zarathustra, III, p. 326
from Twilight of the Idols
In the segment "The Hammer Speaks," Nietzsche expresses quite vividly his task of the revaluation of all values. It is placed at the very close of *Twilight of the Idols*, wherein he begins his somewhat systematic approach to the shattering of all absolutes, and directly before he launches his harangue against the specific, most deleterious absolute of Christianity in *The Antichrist*. His attack of Christianity is an element which, when analyzed, becomes an integral component to the comprehension of Nietzsche's vision, for, it is essentially contrary to life, to all which promotes the life process; it is a constant "No-saying" to man as a being capable of becoming ennobled through his relation to the eternal flux. And, by means of this reliance on the continuous "No," the weak are glorified while the strong are subordinated by the diseased will of such a weak mass.

Fundamentally, Christianity denies man as an end in and of himself, postulating a transcendent absolute which may be encountered only by the negation of the truly human (to be certain, man is also a bridge, for he must be overcome; however, the only means by which he may be overcome is by his recognition of his own nature as an end, meaning that there should be no upward-looking in the denial of man's power). Indeed, Christianity is the promotion of a harmful lie—a lie which generates the religious practice of nihilism.

In order to fully understand the pervasively diseased nature of Christianity, it is crucial to analyze the roots out of which it grew, paying particular attention to the
human qualities which are recurrent throughout the formation process. The one root which I have chosen to specify as the most significant is that of the master/slave relation. I believe that this particular phenomenon is the most highly illustrative of the distortion of Christianity which rests on an almost purely psychological foundation. As it is the so-called "slave revolt" which is ultimately responsible for the triumph of Christian morality, it is that which I find to be most interesting—it is a revolt based upon fear—and it is upon such that I wish to concentrate. In his On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes the slave mentality which has enslaved the noble as a mindset born out of resentment and of a desperate wish to turn the tables so that the "power" lay within the grasp of the weak:

The slave revolt in morality begins when resentment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye—this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of resentment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction. [I, sect. 10]

It is this reactive property which classifies the slave morality, a morality which can, and indeed has, manifested itself in forms other than that of Christianity. To be certain, any morality which concerns itself primarily with a turning-outward, in the postulation of an absolute to combat
the apparent terror of "the abyss," the life process, is an expression of the slave tendency. Thus, all forms of decadence (i.e., nihilism, utilitarianism, hedonism) are denials of life, are essentially slave moralities, in that they attempt to ameliorate existence by means of a harmful lie (as opposed to the "expedient lie" offered by means of art alone), namely, that this life on earth, the only life which we may come to know, is insignificant, unredeemable, that it should be either cast off, or fit into a series of neat formulae, with the intent only of avoiding pain, a necessary component of the life process. All these manifestations are merely coping mechanisms, reactions against a posited "evil" world. Not one is truly creative, not one seeks to affirm or enhance existence, but rather each finds its own measure of strength in the prescription, indeed the narcotic, it offers to numb true vivacity.

Consequently, in the juxtaposition of power from the noble to the weak, the will to power, as the fundamental disposition of man, is irretrievably tainted. For, this will relies now on the will to power over those who had previously held such power. It is out of spite and revenge that this power becomes fixed. Whereas previously, in the noble morality, that which constituted "good" was that which served to make the noble stronger, essentially that which promoted life and the healthy expression of the will to power, and all that which was contrary to this expression was "bad," as it stifled such strength, now a postulation of "evil" arose as
that which served to subordinate the weak, and "good" was only that which remained in their own diseased realm. The justification for this became God, removing all responsibility from those who created such a figure, while simultaneously condemning those who fell outside this realm of "creators," namely the noble masters. To God was assigned this new set of rules, this new dogmatism which preached, which celebrated weakness--there was now a transcendent absolute which defied all human intervention; the will to power was symbolically stripped from man himself and thrust into the hands of God wherein such a will was used specifically for the purposes of His creators. "He who cannot command himself should obey. And many can command themselves, but much is still lacking before they can obey themselves" [Zarathustra, III pg. 311] The weak fully recognize their inability to command, thus they place their newly found power in a transcendent entity by which they may themselves feel overpowered.

The reactive quality of Christianity, which I must clarify, is truly the legacy of Judaic tradition, is that which Lawrence felt himself strongly drawn to explore. In The Plumed Serpent, Christianity serves as the backdrop out of which a new blood religion shall emerge. Indeed, such a blood religion, a celebration of the "phallic mystery," is also a reaction of sorts; however, it is a reaction of vehemence against the sickly, anemic Christianity which is truly bloodless. Lawrence asserts of the reactive nature of
Christianity, of the victimising quality of such an institution:

Oh, if there is one thing men need to learn, but the Mexican Indians especially, it is to collect each man his own soul together deep inside him, and to abide by it. The Church, instead of helping men to this, pushes them more and more into a soft, emotional helplessness, with the unpleasant sensual gratification of feeling themselves victims, victimised, victimised, but at the same time with the lurking sardonic consciousness that in the end a victim is stronger than the victimiser. In the end, the victims pull down their victimiser, like a pack of hyenas on an unwary lion. They know it. Cursed are the falsely meek, for they are inheriting the earth. [pg. 303]

The emphasis on being victimised is a strong point of agreement between Nietzsche and Lawrence. For, the weak must feel themselves to be victimised in order to grasp hold of power in such a distorted manner, and it is their own wretchedness in which the weak revel. Rather than attempt to better themselves, they insulate themselves by means of their wretchedness, and remain in the squalor of their own diseased will, wishing only to drag the noble into the murky depths along with them.

However, it is not only the fault of the slave triumph in morality by which Christianity has conquered man. Indeed, it is the desire to grasp hold of power which may not be gained by noble means, coupled with the will to know, to fixate the universe, the outgrowth of the Apollinian mode of contemplation of the abyss, that has spread Christianity so far and wide. Such a desire for formulation is born out of the mere preservation instinct of man; the will to preserve the species, rather than affirm it, at all costs,
disallows further evolution, further growth of man. To be certain, as aforementioned, man is an end, yet he is also a bridge, and mere preservation serves only to retain him in his incompleteness. In the assertion that man must be overcome, Nietzsche sets forth the notion that morality must strip itself of all mere preservatory instincts, and thus that the new morality, if there is to be such, shall be born out of the recognition, as well as the re-channelling of the human-all-too-human tendency towards such preservation. This new morality shall be founded upon the recognition of man as a bridge, and shall rely on the super-human quality of affirmation and enhancement of the life process, allowing free movement for the evolution of the Ubermensch. Nietzsche explains of this psychological need in man to formulate his surroundings which is eventually manifested in Christianity:

To derive something unknown from something familiar relieves, comforts, and satisfies, besides giving a feeling of power. With the unknown, one is confronted with danger, discomfort, and care; the first instinct is to abolish these painful states. First principle: any explanation is better than none. [TI pg. 497]

Hence, the justification of Christianity is largely due to its ameliorating qualities. Thus, there do exist aspects which are, in fact, somewhat positive. For Christianity is the great morality of the masses, for the most part, and does serve a purpose for this group. Nietzsche states of the advantages of the Christian hypothesis:

1. It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away.

2. It served the advocates of God insofar as it
conceded to the world, in spite of suffering and evil, the character of perfection—including "freedom": evil appeared full of meaning.

3. It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus adequate knowledge precisely regarding what is most important.

4. It prevented man from despising himself as a man, from taking sides against life; from despairing of knowledge; it was a means of preservation.

In sum: morality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism. [Will To Power: sect. 1]

However, it must be understood that while Christianity may have served a measure of purpose, it is truly only a temporary triumph over nihilism. In pledging loyalty to Christianity, man allowed himself to become deluded, to renounce any responsibility of searching for meaning in this world, to place himself in the hands of his own omnipotent creation, to incarcerate himself in a prison of imperatives. Necessarily, Christianity would be forced to expose its truly nihilistic framework, to slide over into pure and utter nihilism—"nihilism harbours in the heart of Christian morals" [WP: sect. 1]—once the lie proved too cumbersome to continue. And, it is the very recognition of the temporality to which Christianity must submit, that both Nietzsche and Lawrence wish to promote. Both men agree that the time has sorely come for the creation of new gods, that in the wake of the destruction of the Christian God hypothesis, some measure of creativity must emerge, so that man is not left to flounder blindly in the ruins of the old lie. Nietzsche fumes:

That the strong races of northern Europe did not reject
And, to mirror this, in *Women in Love*, Lawrence uses Birkin as the mouthpiece for the same call for creativity:

I think the people who say they want a new religion are the last to accept anything new. They want novelty right enough. But to stare straight at this life that we've brought upon ourselves, and reject it, absolutely smash up the old idols of themselves, that they'll never do. You've got very badly to want to get rid of the old, before anything new will appear—even in the self. [pg. 195]

In this call for creativity, for the smashing up of the old tablets, the old doctrines of "thou-shalt's" "shalt-not's" so prevalent in the Christian morality, both Nietzsche and Lawrence are actually calling for a hearkening back to the primal unity, from which they may draw their source for further creation. It is in the unique combination of a backward-looking with a forward-reaching that man may once again assume a position in the universe which recognizes his relative presence in the eternal flux. In *The Plumed Serpent*, Lawrence expresses this process of creativity as such through the voice of Don Ramon:

This is a thing which must be done. There must be manifestations. We must change back to the vision of
the living cosmos; we must. The oldest Pan is in us, and he will not be denied. In cold blood and in hot blood both, we must make the change. That is how man is made. I accept the must from the oldest Pan in my soul, and from the newest me. Once a man gathers his whole soul together and arrives at a conclusion, the time of alternatives has gone. I must. No more than that. I am the First Man of Quetzalcoatl. I am Quetzalcoatl himself, if you like. A manifestation, as well as a man. I accept myself entire, and proceed to make destiny. Why, what else can I do? [345]

To which Kate inwardly replies, "A strange sort of categorical imperative!" And, in asserting so, she is correct. It is indeed an imperative of sorts, however, it is speaking from the voice of the "Holy Ghost" inside man, a voice which, in the distortion of Jesus’ teachings, has become virtually silent.

In Nietzsche's view Jesus preached the glorification of a similar "Holy Ghost," a voice from within which grew out of the depths of primal unity, and which lit a path towards a healthy manner of existence. It is for this reason that the extent to which his words have been tainted becomes so despicable, and indeed, quite ironic to a point:

If one were to look for signs that an ironical divinity has its fingers in the great play of the world, one would find no small support in the tremendous question mark called Christianity. Mankind lies on its knees before the opposite of that which was the origin, the meaning, the right of the evaenger; in the concept of "church" it has pronounced holy precisely what the "bringer of glad tidings" felt to be beneath and behind himself—one would look in vain for a greater example of world-historical-irony... the history of Christianity, beginning with the death on the cross, is the history of the misunderstanding, growing cruder with every step, of an original symbolism. [AC: sects: 36-37]

The original symbolism has become subverted, in Lawrence's terms, into the allegorical content of
Christianity best exemplified in the apocalyptic "Book of Revelations." The earliest Christians took that symbolism, which spoke in the true Dionysian mode of hearkening back to the primal unity (although, as aforementioned, it is questionable as to whether Lawrence actually believes this), and drew from it merely an allegorical language, a language which postulated a transcendent absolute—the "symbols" which they chose to incorporate into their belief system were merely those which had no fundamental basis in the reality of the eternal flux. Rather, they became representations of a "real" world which would serve to govern our merely "apparent" one here on earth, while at the same time mischievously indicating the new code of "good and evil" which would serve to glorify the weak while silencing the strong. Illustrative of this point is Nietzsche's argument that:

The destiny of Christianity lies in the necessity that its faith had to become as diseased, as base and vulgar, as the needs it was meant to satisfy were diseased, base and vulgar. In the church, finally, diseased barbarism itself gains power—the church, this embodiment of mortal hostility against all integrity, against all elevation of the soul, against all discipline of the spirit, against all frank and gracious humanity. Christian values—noble values: only we, we spirits who have become free, have restored this contrast of values, the greatest that there is! [AC: sect. 37]

Thus, in positing of such Christian values, particularly those values of charity and pity in which the weak are justified in remaining wretched, the anti-natural, diseased character of Christianity results. Where once Jesus had promoted the life process as the collective attainment of the
"kingdom of God," where he once celebrated the soul only as 
"a word for something about the body" [Zarathustra II: pg. 
116], where he once danced and turned the water into wine, he 
now has been taken as the allegorical figure of decadence, of 
contempt and disdain for the life process. He has served as 
the scapegoat for that institution which has been permitted 
to sap all animation from existence—he has become the 
prototypical vampire, the glorifier of anemia, the bloodless 
manifestation of the diseased will to power. In The Plumed 
Serpent, Don Cipriano rails against Carlota for her loyalty 
and participation in such a celebration of death:

With your beggars bowl of charity you have stolen their 
oil and wine as well. It is good for you to steal from 
them no more, you stale virgin, you spinster, you born 
widow, you weeping mother, you impeccable wife, you just 
woman. You stole the very sunshine out of the sky and 
the sap out of the earth. Because back again, what did 
you pour? Only the water of dead dilution into the 
mixing bowl of life, you thief. Oh die!—die!—die! 
Die and be a thousand times dead! Do nothing but 
utterly die! [381]

Essentially, in the lie of Christianity, man has lost 
his sense of the eternal cyclical power of nature, he has 
lost his feeling of communion with the primal unity, he has 
lost the sense of power that comes from a healthy celebration 
of the natural, physical tie between man and the universe, 
from which he sprung—"we have lost the cosmos, by coming out 
of responsive connection with it, and this is our chief 
tragedy" [Apocalypse, pg. 27]. Nietzsche reveals of this lie:

Ultimately, it is a matter of the end to which one lies: 
That "holy" ends are lacking in Christianity is my 
objection to its means. Only bad ends: poisoning, 
slander, negation of life, contempt for the body, the 
degradation and self-violation of man through the
Simply put, in order for man to feel once again noble, once again a man, Christianity as an institution, as a psychological framework, as a distorted entity of its initial origin, must be cast off, overcome, so that creation, affirmation of the life process, can begin again. Both Nietzsche and Lawrence have recipes for the healthy institution of the reevaluative process, recipes which differ in their content. Nietzsche, it would seem, would venture towards a society of a healthy herd morality, out of which the rising of the Ubermensch, the quintessential noble master, shall be conducive to the continuous enhancement of the life process. For Lawrence, the "salvation" of mankind rests in the blood union of the eternal male and female, a fusion which may not occur until society strips itself of its "barbed-wire moral enclosure" [Studies, pg. 27] represented by Christianity and the scars which such morality has left upon the Western world. For both men, the affirmation and enhancement of the life process rests in the re-surfacing of the human qualities, of the natural qualities which were forced below into the depths of man in the postulation of a transcendent absolute which betrayed a disgust for man himself. Indeed, the time has long ago come for the creation of new "truths"—truths which speak not of an absolute but which rest in the eternal truth of the life process. Such
truths may only be created in the destruction of the old. "The Hammer Speaks," and, blow by blow, it shall stop only when that which is essentially harmful to life has been shattered and a new means of affirmation may arise triumphant.
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