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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

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INITIATION, IDENTIFICATION, INTENSIFICATION:

SENATOR WAYNE MORSE'S RHETORIC AGAINST THE VIETNAM WAR

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Senator Wayne L. Morse of Oregon stood on the floor of the Senate shortly after the Tet Offensive on January 21, 1968 and proclaimed, "I have never adopted the fallacious policy 'My country, right or wrong.' When our country is wrong, we have the patriotic duty to right the wrong, not to perpetuate it."\(^1\) This sentiment echoed the feelings of many Americans on the war in Vietnam. Morse was a representative of the anti-war movement that characterized much of the 1960s, and which eventually resulted in the American withdrawal from that conflict in the early 1970s. The Senator was different from the vast majority of the dissenters in that he and Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska were among the original protesters of the war. Morse was especially unique, however, in that he devoted a great deal of time and energy to denouncing the American effort in Vietnam. Thus, by studying his anti-war rhetoric, one may analyze many of the subsidiary efforts of the most important rhetorical activity in foreign policy since the Second World War.

Morse's arguments underwent a great deal of revision as the United States government became more committed to the war and as his opinions became more popular. In this respect, his discourse was dynamic, for it continually adapted to fit the changing situations and controversies that accompanied the development of
the anti-war movement. This paper will analyze the sweep of
Morse's rhetoric and consider how his speeches changed in accordance
with changes in United States policy and in the sentiment of the
American audience.

A useful critical approach in analyzing this changing dis-
course, is the historical movement theory advocated by Professor
Leland M. Griffin of Northwestern University. Griffin defines an
historical movement as beginning "when, at some time in the past:
1. men have become dissatisfied with some aspect of their environ-
ment; 2. they desire change--social, economic, political, religious,
intellectual, or otherwise--and desiring change, they make efforts
to alter their environment; 3. eventually, their efforts result
in some degree of success or failure; the desired change is or is
not, effected; and we may say that the historical movement has
come to its termination."²

Rather than fixing the rhetoric at a certain period of time,
Griffin argues that the discourse in an historical movement cannot
be fixed, for it is dynamic. Thus, he prefers to analyze the
discourse that marked the movement, rather than focusing on a few
specific speeches. Griffin explains, "In the term historical
movement, then, movement is for us the significant word; and in
particular, that part of the connotative baggage of the word which
implies change, conveys the quality of dynamism. . . ."³

Due to the fluid nature of the rhetoric, the discourse is
best considered in terms of its different phases. Griffin main-
tains that each rhetorical movement "has its inception, its development, and its consummation." By paying particular attention to the different phases in which the speeches fall, the changes that occur as the movement progresses can be noted. Before the inception period, however, the fundamental ideas or attitudes of the movement are developed. These factors are "the key terms and equations of the movement. With these terms and equations the study of the movement begins." The speaker formulates the initial justification for the protest.

The inception period follows the labelling of the major ideas. In this period, the initial rhetoric of the movement arises. Griffin divides this period into three phases, each with different attributes that parallel the development of the movement. In the first phase, the rhetorician initiates the movement. The speaker creates misunderstanding in that s/he hopes to create a sense of indecision toward the firmly held beliefs in favor of the present policy. The goal of the advocate is to "produce doubt, and to promote indecision and the sense of division." The second objective of the initiation phase is to provoke conflict. At this early stage, the speaker seeks to create and designate an opponent in order to demonstrate that a true conflict exists. The rhetorician accomplishes this goal by infusing "the 'priests' of the existing order with attitudes to rejection and Guilt toward the movement; attitudes that will impel them to the act of opposition..." In generating conflict, the speaker
attempts to persuade those who typically oppose present policies to reject the current procedures. This objective is accomplished by instilling those undecided people "with attitudes of rejection toward the hierarchy--which is to say, with impiety, and with the Guilt that goes with impiety." 8 The initiation phase of the inception period, then is complete when the rhetorician obtains his/her first supporters, defines the conflict and its components, and creates a sense of doubt toward the disputed policy.

For the purposes of this study, the second phase of the inception period will be called the "identification phase." Griffin maintains, "It is a time for the identification of destination and devils, the 'Mecca' of the movement, and the 'evil principles' it opposes." 9 The speaker attempts to gain more support for his/her cause by identifying two distinct bodies in the conflict. The rhetorician primarily seeks to persuade the uncommitted that "by attitude they are of the movement, and by reason and justice ought to be in it..." 10 The speaker depicts the movement "as the opponent of the counter-movement, which speaks for the state of Corruption, constitutes a Saving Rebellion--a striving for salvation, perfection, the 'good.'" 11 Thus, the undecided people may be swayed by the fact that they are identified with the higher goals of the movement. The speaker also identifies the counter-movement as embodying evil in order to persuade those who are the weaker members of the establishment. In addition to emphasizing the meritorious aspects of the movement, the speaker instills a sense
of guilt in these people. The guilt that they experience stems solely from their affiliation with the counter-movement. In this strategy, therefore, the rhetor attempts to "move the converted--through 'pity, fear, and the like emotions'--to rise up and cry No to the counter movement, to move them to the purgative act that will purify their 'faulty living,' enable them to transform their 'natural condition,' transcend their Guilt--'to shift their coordinates,' 'acquire a new "perspective,"' 'see around the corner,' and hence 'prophesy.'"² In persuading members of the counter-movement, the rhetorician emphasizes the cleansing nature of the movement. Briefly, in the identification phase of the inception period, the speaker attempts to convert people by indicating the higher qualities of the movement and by motivating members of the establishment to repent and to purify themselves by joining the fight for the just cause.

The final stage of the inception period is an intensification of the previous two phases, and thus, this label seems appropriate. As indecision toward present policy increases, the language of this phase is marked by stronger and more definitive statements that are used to reinforce the supporters of the movement and to draw more people to the cause. With the solidarity of the movement becoming more obvious, the old order declines and gives way to the new. Griffin explains that "as ineffective appeals are abandoned, new modes of argument adopted, available channels of communication subject to increasingly intensified use, and ever
broader publics addressed, as the power of the 'priests' wavers and wanes, and the ranks of the aggressor rhetors grow ever greater, maintain solidarity, merger—the movement comes to its moment of crisis.13 The intensification phase of the inception period is characterized by its more forceful rhetoric as the crucial moment that will test the viability of the movement approaches. Thus, in the inception period, the speaker attempts to gain support for the movement by changing his/her rhetoric in response to the shift in the environment.

Griffin labels the second major period in his theory the crisis period. This period is typically triggered by a catastrophic event resulting from the present policy. Following the critical event, a decision must be made concerning the cause. Thus, the crisis period is a time of "collective catharsis, purgation, the resolution of public tensions. It is the time of expression of a determinative public judgment; the time of the death of allegiance to a former system of authority—the time of negation, rejection, 'the rebel snapping of the continuity.'14 If the decision has been made to abandon present efforts, Griffin argues, the new policy is immediately implemented. "So the old gods go, new arrive. The counter-movement yield dominion to the movement. Men are endowed with a new condition or 'substance'—with a new identity, a new unity, a new motive."15

The final aspect of Griffin's approach is the consummation period. In this period, agreement pervades for the people feel
that the proper and just procedures have been adopted. "[1] It is a time of Redemption: men have been purged of absurdity and injustice; and having been purged, they desire to remain so. Reason and justice now reign. Men agree on meaning, value, and desire, as they are charged with attitudes of benevolence. . . ."16 The rhetoric of this time period is extremely positive in affirming the new policy—"[i] It is a rhetoric of praise, edification, prayer, petition, and partnership for men accept the new 'mystery,' the new communication between classes."17 At this point, the movement has formed a complete circle in that public order and allegiance to policies is restored as the chaotic nature of dissent vanishes.

Griffin's theory is useful in analyzing Morse's anti-war rhetoric because it accounts for the change in his approach and his arguments. With regard to the Vietnam war, the anti-war movement had its inception period beginning with the Gulf of Tonkin controversy in August, 1964, when the United States made a formal commitment to participate in the war in Southeast Asia. The crisis period was triggered by the Tet Offensive in late January, 1968, when the Americans realized that the war effort would not accomplish its goals. And finally, the consummation period began with the withdrawal of American troops.

This approach is also fitting in that it analyzes rhetoric in a chronological fashion. Because Morse's protest efforts occurred during a very brief period of time (a little over four years), a chronological approach would reveal small nuances and
changes that developed in the arguments. An analysis of the sweep of arguments within a chronological framework will reveal "the crystallization of fundamental issues, the successive emergence of argument, appeal, counter-argument and counter-appeal, and the sanctions invoked by rhetoricians of both sides." 18

Finally, this theory is useful because it affords one the opportunity to consider the movement from a very narrow perspective. By focusing on a single aspect of the movement, Griffin maintains that one may analyze the arguments "with scholarly accuracy and completeness." 19 Thus, an analysis of the anti-war movement by considering Wayne Morse's rhetoric may lend insight into the development and refinement of our understanding of that movement. Morse became one of the first to advocate a withdrawal from Vietnam when he voted against the resolution which permitted the President to commit American troops to South Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin incident. During the next four years, until his defeat in the 1968 senatorial elections, he was extremely active rhetorically in his denunciation of the United States' involvement in Southeast Asia. Thus, Griffin's historical movement theory creates a framework that would reveal Morse's tactics and arguments in persuading the United States to withdraw from Vietnam.

Like all theories, however, Griffin's approach does not apply perfectly to Morse's discourse. Initially, the Senator's rhetoric only evolved during the inception period and a portion of the crisis period. Following his defeat in his bid for re-election
to the Senate in 1968, he stopped espousing his viewpoints on Vietnam, even though the anti-war movement progressed through the consummation period. This analysis, therefore, will basically deal with the inception period of the anti-war movement, which is the facet in which Morse participated most extensively.

Secondly, certain components of the inception period that Griffin maintains exist did not appear in the Senator's rhetoric. Perhaps some elements are missing because Morse was only a small facet of the movement, and thus, other speakers may have fulfilled these requirements. For example, Morse did not advocate absolute rejection of the government, or the hierarchy, as Griffin calls it, which is what he stipulates must occur in the initiation of the inception period. This burden is fulfilled, however, by the youthful protesters who fought for an alternative governing body.

Finally, due to the excessive number of arguments that the Senator advanced, an additional organizing structure is necessary. Many arguments can be traced by following Griffin's three periods of a movement, but in order to organise these contentions, an extra framework is essential. The general arguments are best viewed by labelling them roughly as: 1. the goals of the war effort that Morse argued could not be attained, 2. the disadvantages of American involvement and 3. the alternative policies that he considered in pondering the participation of the United States in the war in Vietnam.
FOOTNOTES

1Wayne L. Morse, "Personal Statement by Senator Morse on Secretary of Defense McNamara's Appearance Before the Committee on Foreign Relations," Congressional Record (February 21, 1968), p. 3815.


3Ibid.

4Ibid.


6Ibid.

7Ibid.

8Ibid.

9Ibid., p. 462.

10Ibid., p. 464.

11Ibid.

12Ibid.

13Ibid., p. 466.

14Ibid.

15Ibid., p. 467.

16Ibid., p. 467.

17Ibid., p. 468.

18Griffin, Quarterly Journal of Speech, pp. 184-188.

19Ibid.
CHAPTER II:
GOALS

Senator Wayne L. Morse was one of the primary forces behind the initiation of the anti-war movement which eventually rocked the country in the late 1960s. Although not as extreme as the arguments of many of his fellow dissenters, many of Morse's statements shocked and appalled the American people, for he challenged the revered office of the Presidency of the United States and forwarded the notion that the government erred in making a military judgment. From August, 1964 until mid-1968, he gave many speeches in the Senate opposing United States action in Vietnam. His arguments in support of this initially unpopular position focused upon three main ideas: that United States action was not achieving and would never attain its objectives, that many disastrous consequences would occur as a result of this intervention and that alternative approaches to the problem existed.

During the period of August 2-4, 1964, three North Vietnamese P.T.-boats allegedly attacked the U.S.S. Maddox in Tonkin Gulf. Following this act, the United States bombed various inland locations in North Vietnam. President Lyndon Baines Johnson approached the Senate on August 5, 1964 in order to obtain the passage of a resolution calling for the establishment of Presidential power to "repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression.\textsuperscript{1} Although few opposed the President's request, Morse began his quest to remove American troops from Vietnam. The reasons for the resolution, Johnson claimed, were to preserve the American image, to decrease or prevent Communist infiltration into South Vietnam and to give the South Vietnamese more freedom. Morse argued that United States military action in Vietnam would not meet those goals.

Initially, Morse maintained that American intervention would not protect the American image, but would, in fact, taint it. In opposing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the Senator argued that the United States felt that it could intervene in any conflict and exert its will, where in reality, it did not have the right to do so. He pointed out that Adlai Stevenson, then Ambassador to the United Nations, supported this idea of American supremacy when he explained on the floor of the Senate: "We have said to our potential enemies, 'We are going to do what we want to do and you can like it or not.' Not so many weeks ago Adlai Stevenson lent his lips in the Security Council to say, in effect--in my judgment to his historic discredit, and it would have been better if he had resigned as Ambassador--as the representative of the United States at the United Nations that the United States was going to do what it wanted to do in Asia, and they could like it or not."\textsuperscript{2} This form of argument is indicative of the initiation phase of the inception period of the anti-war movement in that it generated a sense of misunderstanding toward the role of the United States in foreign
affairs and it tended to create a conflict. The American people had come to believe that they had the right to intervene in the various disputes around the world. Morse’s statement denied this fundamental belief, and thus, may have caused those not completely dedicated to this perspective to wonder if the Senator’s statement was not, in fact, true. The argument reinforced their uncertainty and perhaps served to create a sense of indecision. This contention also promoted conflict because it may have caused those who supported the Johnson Administration’s policy to become defensive of their belief in America’s right to intervene. Morse’s argument probably had the effect of compelling the pro-war segment of American society to deny the statement, and therefore, to become the opposition to the movement.

In January, 1965, with the United States military commitment obvious, Morse altered his argument slightly as the movement entered into the identification phase of the inception period. Rather than claiming that the United States had no right to take military action, he maintained that those who fought for prestige "are in fact warmongers. They are the ones who wish to rationalize and alibi the unjustifiable killing of more and more American boys." The war did not bolster the American image. As the United States was committing more troops to Vietnam, a few people became unsure of the policy. His argument probably served to sway more Americans to his side, which is the effect of this phase of the inception period. The Americans who were unsure of the policy may
have been persuaded to support the movement because it offered them the opportunity to be part of the opposition, which implied being a peacemaker, and therefore, good. The claim may have also caused people who supported the Administration, identified by Morse as being the "evil warmongers," to change their loyalty so that they could be cleansed. They were allied with a group that supported the war—even promoted it. By changing their allegiance so that they opposed the war, they would purge themselves and would also become peacemakers.

In 1966 and 1967, the bombing of North Vietnam increased, as did the number of casualties that the Americans suffered. Johnson escalated the war by committing even more American troops. Morse at this point changed his argument about American prestige as the movement reached the intensification phase. He claimed that the war was, in fact, harming the American image. Rather than being peaceful people, Americans were really attempting to be policemen of the world—a position which denied national sovereignty, a highly valued ideal in the United States. He initially wondered "what our citizens would think and do if some country other than our own had proclaimed itself as policeman 'with the world to guard,' as did our President a few days ago. Suppose South Vietnam appointed itself policeman to the world, or China or Brazil?" As time went on, however, and more Americans supported Morse's viewpoint, the argument became more extreme. Rather than merely pondering the issue, he adamantly proclaimed: "We cannot continue
to take the position that we intend to respond [to international problems] on the basis of a determination to be the military policeman of the world, to impose our military will and might on the world. . . ."

The contention clearly marked the intensification of the inception period. His statements were much more intense and definitive, which paralleled the increasing anger within the nation toward the American policy. The undesirable image of America that Morse claimed the Administration promoted may have lead to the rejection of the Administration's policy by some of its supporters.

Following the 1968 Tet Offensive, Morse's claims were even more severe in response to the President's goal of protecting the American image. Not only was the United States trying to police the world, but it was also unjustly "picking on" a small nation. He drew the image of a powerful nation with "[t]he greatest military power on earth, the greatest firepower on earth, the greatest Navy, the greatest Air Force, the greatest ground force—we just had to show this little upstart, North Vietnam, that we were going to knock out some of their patrol boat bases." Because of this unfair action, the Senator felt compelled to tell his colleagues, "It is not difficult, when you are the big boy on the playground, to whip the little boy on the playground. But you know what you are called when you do; and that is what we are being called in many places in the world today." Thus, the American military action in Southeast Asia was actually hurting the American image.
rather than bolstering it, Morse claimed, for people all over the world perceived of the United States as being a bully. The movement thus moved into its crisis period, as the rhetoric indicates. When the Tet Offensive proved that the war would not be won with ease as the Administration officials had maintained, and when Americans realized that the war was actually harming the American image, people abandoned their support of the Vietnam policy. With this change in attitude, allegiance to the government declined. Morse by himself may not have caused the change in allegiance, but his discourse reflects the rhetoric of the crisis period.

The second goal that the Senator argued could not be met was a containment of Communism. The Johnson Administration continually urged the American citizens to support the war against the spread of Communism. Early forms of this argument were that if Americans did not save Southeast Asia, then the Communists would take over increasing portions of territory. The importance of defeating Communism was stressed. Morse maintained from the beginning that "I yield to no other Senator, or to anyone else in this country in my opposition to communism and all that communism stands for." His allegiance to that struggle did not extend, however, to American military efforts in Vietnam as a method of stopping Communism. In speaking against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution
During the initiation of the inception period, he questioned the use of that argument as a justification for the war. He complained during those debates, "We try to force every issue into that context of freedom versus communism. That is one of our great mistakes in Asia. There is much communism there, and much totalitarianism in other forms. We say we are opposing communism there, but that does not mean we are advancing freedom, because we are not."\(^9\) His argument became more forceful when he claimed that freedom, in fact, would be denied in a military confrontation between the two ideologies. For "if the hope of anyone is that the struggle between freedom and communism can be settled by war, and that course is followed, both freedom and communism will lose, for there will be no victory in that war."\(^10\) By questioning the desirability of fighting Communism, Morse attempted to undermine a strongly held belief in America's responsibility to fight Communism. Morse may have caused some people to analyze the basis for this belief, and therefore, generated a sense of indecision toward the policy. Moreover, this stand may have also engendered a conflict because the anti-Communists in the nation would perhaps oppose his arguments, thus establishing two sides to the issue.

As the anti-war movement entered into the identification phase and as the fighting in Vietnam increased, the Senator again evaluated the efficacy of American action in reducing Communist infiltration. On January 6, 1965, Morse informed the Senate that American intervention was actually creating Communists, rather
than reducing their numbers. He told the Senate, "We are making more Communists around the world by the unilateral action of the United States in South Vietnam than we have any reasonable hope of defeating in South Vietnam. The use of the jungle law of military force by the United States will have Communists around the world, not reduce their number."\textsuperscript{11} The reason the United States helped to create Communists was that by establishing military dictatorships, such as the one that the United States created in South Vietnam, America forced people toward Communism as a way of escaping the control of a dictator. For "the type of military aid we supply in most places in the world creates military oligarchies and military dictatorships which, in turn, play right into the hands of Communists."\textsuperscript{12} By portraying the anti-war movement as being the true opposition to Communism, Morse attempted to establish the movement as supporting the correct policy. This approach may have been very appealing to those who were not totally convinced that the American policy was the best solution to the problem. Morse implied that the only way to prevent the spread of Communism in Asia was for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam. Therefore, the policy which best met the goal of fighting Communism, and thus, was the "good" policy, was that which was advocated by the movement.

As 1965 progressed, Morse's argument changed. With more results coming in concerning the success of the "American venture, the Senator stressed the fact that the Communist takeover of territory had increased. He claimed that the spread of Communist
influence was obvious "because the Communists controlled little or none of South Vietnam when we started helping here, and now they control perhaps half its people and territory." As a result of this takeover, they had succeeded in furthering their influence. Morse may have aimed the argument at the people who supported the war effort. He implied that the war had promoted Communism, and therefore, the pro-war faction represented an evil viewpoint. By pointing out the failure of their policy in achieving its goals, Morse seemed to indict the Johnson Administration and its supporters for being, in a sense, guilty. He made allusions to the notion that the only way to relieve these guilty feelings was to abandon support of the war.

In late 1965, Morse altered his position a bit more. At this time, he attacked the justification for the government's goal of containment by maintaining that it was not realistic. "I, too, would like to wishfully think the communists off the earth. I, too, would like to go to sleep some night and wake up in the morning and have a dream come true during the night that there are no more communists. However, they happen to be an ugly reality. We are not going to wishfully think them out of existence. We are never going to be able to shoot them out of existence, for the more shooting we do, the more communists we make." This naivete on the part of the Administration, Morse argued, had "increased the number of Communists in the world by the millions." By roughly quantifying the problem and by pointing out the
ridiculous assumption on which the goal was based, Morse intensified his argument. The effect of Morse's contention was probably to persuade some of the undecided people to denounce the war and to support the viewpoint of the movement in order to prove that they were rational and just in their opposition to Communism. The pro-war forces, on the other hand, may have felt guilty for supporting such a ridiculous and unsuccessful policy, and therefore, would seek a way to purge themselves.

In 1966, the argument concerning Communism underwent various changes as the intensification phase began. The tone of his contentions was more volatile and accusing. On February 25, 1966, the Senator even ventured to maintain that although he deplored Communism, he felt that they also possessed sovereign rights. He informed the Senate, "I shall share the deprecation of everything Communism stands for; all that is shared by any member of the Senate, but those Communist nations have the same sovereign rights as the United States or any other nation." He may have contributed to the sense of solidarity of the movement and also might have swayed more people by isolating the movement's goals to include justice and the upholding of rights. His arguments were more persuasive during the intensification phase as they focused on values that were important to Americans.

Following the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi on April 12, 1966, Morse further changed his stance. Not only was the United States in his view not containing Communism, but Americans were
really denying the progress that theoretically accompanies democracy. For by establishing military dictatorships, the United States, according to Morse, merely subsidized the poor Southeast Asian nations in "their old, semifeudal ways of doing things," whereas Communism may improve their position. Morse thus implied that the supporters of the movement were justified in their opposition to the Vietnam war because they respected sovereign rights, but also because they supported the furthering of progress for all nations.

The Johnson Administration intensified the bombing of North Vietnam in 1967. In response to the escalation of the war that the bombers and additional troops provided, many Americans took to the streets to protest the administration's policy. On August 22, 1967, the Senator took a more practical approach to the issue of Communism. He maintained initially that the costs of the program to fight Communism were very high, and asked the American people that in combating Communism, they "take a look at what effect this growing posture--now at the rate of $70.2 billion per year--will have on world opinion. It is going to continue to cost us the support of hundreds of millions of people in the underdeveloped areas of the world, and many developed areas, but especially in the underdeveloped areas, whose minds must be won over to the cause of freedom." He then considered the benefits of the American mission to save the world from Communism and reiterated the fact that the American policy was actually creating Communists. This balancing approach was appropriate for the intensification phase of the inception period. By demonstrating
in a highly rational manner the undesirability of the effort, Morse used a sound argument to counter one that was highly emotional. He attempted to persuade more people to reject the Administration's policy by using more forceful arguments.

This argument opposing the goal of fighting Communism did not appear in his rhetoric of the crisis period, however. The Senator may have ignored the argument because he felt that it had become obvious that war would not reduce the spread of Communism. Whatever his reason for dropping the contention, Morse adapted this argument in response to the goal of fighting Communism to the specific events of the war, and therefore, attempted to maintain and increase support for his point of view.

The final goal that Morse claimed could not be reached was that United States action in Southeast Asia would not guarantee freedom for the people of South Vietnam. Shortly before the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, Morse insisted that the United States was not furthering the cause of freedom, but rather was controlling South Vietnam, and therefore, effectively denied freedom. For "[w]e are not even pursuing freedom. We are maintaining a military dictatorship over the people of South Vietnam, headed by an American puppet to whom we give the orders and who moves only under our orders." 20 In one of his Gulf of Tonkin addresses given in the Senate on August 5, 1964, he denied American effectiveness by suggesting that the United States was not even fighting for
freedom. The goal of the American military, in Morse's view, was simply to prevent "General Khanh from being overthrown; that is all. We are defending a clique of military generals and their merchant friends who live well in Saigon, and who need a constantly increasing American military force to protect their privileged position." By claiming in a general manner that the United States was not even trying to protect freedom, Morse, in the initiation phase, probably created a feeling of uncertainty toward the policy and helped to establish the conflict concerning the war. America had always entered military confrontations with the expressed purpose of preserving liberty and freedom. By denying that the military sought to promote freedom, Morse might have instilled a sense of doubt as to the motives of the Administration. The Senator also helped to create his opposition as governmental officials attempted to deny the allegations.

With the escalation of the war, Morse had the opportunity to reflect upon the American impact in the war. In light of the developments in the war, he came to the opinion that the war did not guarantee freedom for the South Vietnamese. His arguments in this vein became stronger and more vehement as the movement entered the identification phase. He claimed, once again, that America was not supporting freedom in South Vietnam, but rather was fighting only to preserve a dictatorship. Where the simple fact that Americans were supporting a dictatorship may have been sufficient to persuade some people in 1964, Morse must have felt
compelled to demonstrate that the United States' policy represented evil for it supported an undesirable dictatorship that was truly "corrupt to the core, puppet by puppet." In July, 1965, he illustrated his point by claiming that the American-established dictatorship "is an even worse, more horrendous, and more shocking dictatorship than that of the puppets who preceded him. Here we have the building up of sandbag walls against which by says he will shoot as many as 10,000, and without a trial. That is the kind of freedom we are supporting with American blood in South Vietnam." This shocking revelation marked the identification stage where Griffin maintains that conversion and catharsis occur. By depicting the movement, rather than the Administration, as opposing corruption and mass killings, he, along with other members of the anti-war movement, probably persuaded some people who were uncertain about the American policy to denounce the Vietnam war. He implied that the anti-war movement opposed the promotion of terrorist tactics and corruption, and therefore, was good. Moreover, by depicting the pro-war segment of society as supporting—even promoting—these acts, Morse insinuated that they represented evil. This realization may have instilled guilty feelings in some of the people who supported governmental policy. In order to demonstrate that they abhored such actions, they may have abandoned their active support of the war.
As the anti-war movement increased in intensity, Morse's arguments with respect to promoting freedom also became more forceful. Following the initiation of the bombing of North Vietnam by American B-52 bombers, a re-examination of American goals was necessary. Morse continued to claim that, in spite of the escalation of the war effort, the United States was not preserving freedom. On May 5, 1966, a month after the first of the bombing raids, he contended that the policy was not providing freedom, but rather was only protecting a corrupt dictatorship that was thwarting American goals. For it "has no appreciation for the meaning of the word 'freedom' and could not care less."²⁴ To illustrate his point, Morse discussed the recent elections in South Vietnam, in which only certain pre-screened candidates were permitted to run for office. On the floor of the Senate on May 16, 1966, he maintained that South Vietnamese elections were as unfair as those of the Communists, for "by the time only Government candidates are allowed to run for seats, what kind of 'election' do you have?"²⁵ The American people, therefore, by supporting the Vietnam war were, in Morse's view, upholding unfair elections, and thus, were not establishing freedom in Southeast Asia.

Morse also argued that American support was merely preserving a corrupt junta so that it could impose its "bloody rule upon the helpless people of the South."²⁶ The United States action virtually guaranteed that atrocities would continue in South Vietnam, not liberty. Because the American effort could not
guarantee freedom and, in fact, promoted a denial of liberty and immense suffering for countless South Vietnamese, the United States was not only wasting its time, but it was exacerbating the situation. This series of arguments reflected the intensification phase of the inception period. The contentions are more specific and more intense. As Morse implied that the American policy resulted in a great deal of suffering and corruption, his argument concerning freedom became more forceful. Many of the ideas that Morse presented were representative of the intensification phase during which the movement also became more solidified. Although Morse did not singlehandedly unify the anti-war movement, his statements are indicative of the intensity that the anti-war rhetoric had attained. These arguments, along with those of others, probably provided a unified attack on the Vietnam policy.

This particular argument is not mentioned in the rhetoric of the crisis period. Perhaps Morse realized that after the Tet Offensive, and especially with the My Lai massacre in March, 1968, many Americans felt that the United States was neither pursuing nor attaining freedom. Morse denied the final goal of the Administration's war effort by demonstrating that freedom could not be achieved through a military confrontation between Communist and democratic forces. Briefly, as part of his persuasive tactics, Morse refuted the Johnson Administration's goals in fighting the war in Vietnam. By arguing that these goals could not be met with military action, Morse attempted to refute the
the major premise for the justification of the war. The arguments that the Senator used to deny the effectiveness of the policy became stronger as the anti-war movement grew and as the United States escalated the war. Thus, Morse, in his opposition to the war, attempted to fulfill his burden of responding to the many factors surrounding the war in Vietnam.
FOOTNOTES

1 Congressional Record (August 6, 1964), p. 3825. Hereafter cited as CR.


3 Wayne L. Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1965), p. 111.


5 Wayne L. Morse, Congressional Digest (October, 1968), p. 246.

6 Morse, CR (February 21, 1968), p. 3316.

7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1965), p. 113.


15 Ibid.

16 Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1966), p. 124.

17 Morse, Congressional Digest (August-September, 1966), p. 212.

18 Morse, Congressional Digest (October, 1968), p. 248.

19 See notes 11 on page 18, 12 on page 18, 13 on page 19 and 15 on page 19.


22 Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15470.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.
CHAPTER III:
CONSEQUENCES

Like any person who attempts to gain support for a new policy, Morse could not simply argue that the Administration's goals could not be met. In order to overcome this problem, the Senator discussed several disadvantages resulting from the American effort, and therefore, claimed that the policy should be abandoned. As in his denunciation of the goals, his arguments concerning the undesirable side effects changed with developments in the movement and the American policy in Vietnam. He isolated three undesirable consequences to the American policy in Vietnam: it violated the United Nations Charter, it would destroy relationships with other countries, and it would bring about World War III.

Morse's contention that American action violated the United Nations Charter was a very complex and technical argument because it was deeply embedded in international law. An interesting side note to this contention is that he de-emphasized it as the war progressed. During his early speeches, he devoted roughly one half of his speaking time to this argument, but by 1968, he barely even mentioned it. This phasing out of a major argument may have occurred for two different reasons. Initially, the contention, due to its legal nature, was not a highly emotional one and thus, was ideal for the early stages of the inception
period. Because it is very practical and rational, this approach would have probably, by its very nature, created a sense of indecision as to the legality of the war in Vietnam. Those uncertain feelings might have led to a conflict as some people agreed on the undesirability of the policy and others defended it. This viewpoint is also beneficial in that its non-emotional nature would not tend to alienate people, which was especially important during the initiation phase when the anti-war movement's position was established and when its initial support was obtained. The second reason for the change in emphasis was that as the movement began to develop, Morse perhaps realized that other arguments were much more effective, and therefore, he de-emphasized the obligations to the United Nations. As the movement intensified, the more emotional and striking arguments were emphasized perhaps because of their ability to motivate people to act. Whatever the reason, Morse most likely acted in response to the changing situation that surrounded him.

In spite of its decline in importance, the argument concerning the United Nations was his most developed attack on the Johnson Administration's policy. In arguing against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution during the initiation phase, Morse insisted that in order to obtain peace, the United States ought to work within the parameters of international law. For "the only hope for the establishment of a permanent peace in the world is to practice our oft-repeated American professing that we believe in the
substitution of the rule of law for the jungle law of military force as a means of settling disputes which threaten the peace of the world."¹

Morse discussed the fact that the 1954 Geneva Accords denied any nation the right to act unilaterally in a military confrontation in South Vietnam, and therefore, action by the United Nations was warranted. Morse first quoted Article 16 of the Geneva Accords, which outlawed the committing of troops or of advisers to Vietnam. "[T]he introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited."² Article 17 denied the right to provide materials: "[T]he introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines, and jet weapons and armored vehicles is prohibited."³ Finally, Article 18 proclaimed that "the establishment of new military bases is prohibited through Vietnam territory."⁴ According to Morse, these laws represented the body of laws that were applicable to the conflict in Vietnam.

Within the Gulf of Tonkin address of August 5, 1964, Morse cited specific violations by the United States of the Geneva Accords. He insisted that America had violated Article 16 because "the only foreign troops that have been in South Vietnam in any numbers have been American troops."⁵ Moreover, the United States had violated Articles 17 and 19 because, "We assisted not only with
material, but he advised on war plans, and our military presence in South Vietnam served as an ever-present strong back-stop to the South Vietnamese." The Senator maintained that insofar as the United States had violated international law, it should have sought a legal remedy to the Vietnam dispute by seeking arbitration by the United Nations.

In July, 1964, Morse argued that the United States should have brought this conflict before the United Nations because the United States was guilty of violating the international law within the Geneva Accords. He insisted that the United Nations had jurisdiction over the dispute when he stated, "Whoever fights a war without taking the matter to the United Nations is in violation of the Charter, whether the party started the fighting or not." He also argued that if the Americans failed to utilize the proper legal procedures, other nations might invoke these legal sanctions against the United States, which would be problematic. He claimed that this unfortunate occurrence would probably happen when he stated, "How long we can proceed on this manner in Laos and Vietnam is anyone's guess. But if we wait for another country to invoke Article 35, we can be sure it will not be on grounds and under conditions most favorable to the United States." This line of argument was designed to create doubt in the minds of the people as to whether the American policy was the correct one. Even the most adamant supporter of the war may have wondered about the policy if s/he felt that the action by the United States may
have been illegal. Because of the tremendous emphasis on law and order in this country, the Senator probably caused some people to believe less strongly in the war effort.

The second approach that Morse took during the initiation phase of the inception period was to establish a conflict. The goal of this stage was to create the image of a conflict that existed between two clearly defined sides. He might have accomplished this task within his speeches opposing the Gulf of Tonkin resolution where he turned to the specific facts of the incidents that had occurred a few days earlier in the Tonkin Gulf. Morse maintained that the United States was justified in firing upon the North Vietnamese P.T.-boats during the attack on the Maddox for "[w]e were completely engaged in acts of self-defense. We had every right to respond with force."9 He felt that a different course of action should have been followed, however, after the raid. "After the second attack in defense of our ships in which we engaged, unless we expect to be charged with engaging in acts of aggression, we should have immediately laid our case under the United Nations Charter before the Security Council of the United Nations."10 For if the matter had been taken immediately to the United Nations, Morse felt that "there is no question that we had North Vietnam dead to rights in any charge we might bring before the United Nations."11 The United States, however, adopted a different policy. Rather than seeking the aid of international law, the Americans bombed inland locations in North Vietnam.
By taking this action which "escalated the war into North Vietnam," the United States was "guilty of an act of aggression." The Senator revealed the impact of the United States' course of action with respect to the Tonkin Gulf incident. He insisted that Americans were no longer innocent, but rather had assumed the role of being the provocateurs of the incident, for by "the fact that the ships were that close while the bombing took place is bound to be interpreted as a provocation, and also must be considered when we look at the matter of the reaction to it as an extenuating fact."  

After discussing the nature of the American actions in the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Morse emphasized the need for action by the United Nations by delineating the consequences of avoiding neutral arbitration. He maintained that the moral position of the United States as a world leader would be undermined if Americans did not abide by the rule of international law. If the United States ignored international law, he suggested that other nations would feel compelled to follow this example. He contended, "Our moral position, which we claim as leader of the free world, will be undermined and our capacity for calling others to account for breaches of the peace will be seriously compromised." Morse argued that "to say out of one side of one's mouth, 'We only want peace,' but to say from the other side of the mouth, 'But we are justified in committing acts of war.'" was a hypocritical stance which would undermine American
influence in the world.

In addition to decreasing United States influence, ignoring the United Nations Charter with respect to the Vietnam conflict would establish an attitude of indifference toward the United Nations, according to Morse. The senator rejected the "Fight now, negotiate later" premise that he felt was implicit in the Senate resolution, for "it would jeopardize the continuation of existing procedures for the peaceful settlement through negotiations of disputes which threaten the peace of the world."16 According to Morse, in selectively applying the Charter, the United States would reduce the Charter, as well as other international sanctions, to "just a scrap of paper."17 Briefly, ignoring international law would, in Morse's view, destroy that carefully constructed system of safeguards and would undermine the United States' moral position of world leader.

These arguments of the initiation phase may have had the effect of promoting conflict. Insofar as the Senator depicted the strongly supported American position as not only being illegal, but dangerous to the United States and the world, those Senators who supported the resolution may have been inclined to defend their position in light of Morse's attack, thus establishing the members of the opposition. The serious consequences of the policy that he cited probably caused some people to reject the present policy. Those who cherished the strong American role in international affairs, but who were not supportive of the Admini-
stratification, might have agreed with him that the war policy should be rejected because the policy violated international agreements.

With the advent of 1965, Morse's rhetoric concerning the United Nations became more persuasive and less technical. The alteration in discourse reflected a change in objectives, for his goal during the identification phase was to increase opposition toward the war in Vietnam, rather than merely framing the position of the anti-war movement. His speeches attempted to convert people to his viewpoint and to provide a cathartic effect, which are the two goals that Griffin discusses. Primarily, the Senator sought to persuade the undecided members of American society to oppose the war by identifying the side of the conflict that represented the truth as being the anti-war movement. In taking up this burden, Morse offered arguments that were more straight-forward and obvious. On January 6, 1965, he re-established his main premise when he reminded the Senate that the United States should have submitted to arbitration by the United Nations. American policy in Southeast Asia, however, violated the Charter because the United States did not seek assistance from the United Nations. He offered the simple question on May 6, 1965 on the floor of the Senate, "Have we forgotten the dark days of this Republic when, on the floor of the Senate, we voted to confirm or ratify that Charter, by which we pledge to the world that we stood for the substitution of the rule of law for the jungle law of military power? We stand in violation of that pledge." For
the undecided people in the United States, this basic argument might have been sufficient to persuade them to abandon active support of the war, for in opposing the war, Morse implied that they would support a policy that advocated a solution through legal means. Given the fact that Americans firmly believed in legal remedies to disputes, he used these values as the basis of his opposition to the war in order to hopefully convince them that they should reject the Administration's Vietnam policy.

Morse also addressed this segment of society by offering further justification for taking the matter before the United Nations. He maintained that the United States should have gone before the Security Council because America did not possess sufficient strength to solve this conflict, or others like it, unilaterally. He insisted, "We must face up to our limitations. We have neither the manpower nor the resources to meet every threat around the world. We must insist that the threats must be met on a multilateral basis, on a United Nations basis, and not on an American solo basis." 20 He also justified arbitration by the United Nations in responding to arguments that his opponents offered with respect to unilateral action by the United States. The pro-war forces contended that because North Vietnam was not a member of the United Nations, the United Nations had no right to act on this matter. Morse felt that this viewpoint was absurd because the Charter "does not provide that the United Nations signatories shall ignore a war because some nation that is making
war is not a member of the United Nations."

Secondly, the Johnson Administration claimed that arbitration should not be sought because the American people would not support such a policy. The Senator, however, pointed out, "Increasing numbers of voices in the Congress, and increasing tens of thousands of voices across America are urging that our country resort to the United Nations and fulfill its obligations as a member of the United Nations, rather than continue to act in defiance of its obligations under the United Nations." This rationale for seeking action by the United Nations in Vietnam might have been sufficient to carry the unsure people. By depicting the movement as being the only law-abiding alternative and by demonstrating its desirability, Morse portrayed the anti-war movement as clearly upholding the right course of action, which was what these individuals would seek. In capitalizing on desirable legal methods that most people already accepted, he identified the movement as representing the ideal solution, and thus, probably persuaded some of the uncommitted people to reject the Administration's policy.

The main thrust of Morse's arguments in the identification phase of the inception period was aimed at the people who sided with the Johnson Administration. In his attempt to win them over, the Senator tried to instill a sense of guilt in them by depicting the pro-war segment of American society as condoning illegal solutions. He may have accomplished this goal with a variety of
arguments. Initially, he contended that the Vietnam war violated many international laws and then specified what violations had occurred. Primarily, the Senator claimed that United States action in Vietnam violated the duty to report all armed conflicts to the United Nations. He stated on January 6, 1965, "I believe the time has come for us to try, at least, to be law abiding and to keep our commitments under the United Nations Charter." By casting the United States in the role of seeking illegal means, he could have generated guilty feelings within the citizens who supported the Administration.

He also specified what the proper governmental procedure were in stating that the President had a duty to take the matter before the United Nations. The Senator maintained that "there is a clear duty on the part of this Republic, through its Commander in Chief, to lay the threat to the peace of the world in Asia before the Security Council without further delay." He challenged the President to take this necessary action and to finally stand "behind the framework of the Constitution and the framework of the United Nations Charter." Morse implied that the President, in supporting the wrong policy, had also committed several illegal offenses. By claiming that the President was, in a sense, guilty, Morse might have caused some people who supported the Johnson Administration's policy to also feel remorseful because of their allegiance to the President. The arguments have also alienated some people, however, in that they
In fact, I feel that President Johnson was an "evil" man. Johnson's authority was still quite strong in May, 1965, and thus, many citizens might have merely ignored Morse's contention. He did not strictly uphold the responsibility here of instilling guilt and offering the movement as a form of salvation, for he may have never felt that he had an obligation to passify the people in order to attain their support. In many respects, he was a maverick, and therefore, did not adopt the more common suasive approaches. Moreover, because he was only a small part of the anti-war movement, the Senator might have felt that the other members could designate the policy as embodying evil. Thus, in identifying the President as upholding illegal action, he did point to a "devil," as frequently occurs in the identification phase of the inception period, but the sense of guilt that Griffin maintains that the pro-war faction should have felt, may not have been generated by his rhetoric.

He finally contended that simply because other nations were guilty of ignoring international law did not justify similar action on the part of the United States. He insisted, "The fact that the Geneva Accords are being violated by Red China, North Vietnam, and other nations does not justify the United States taking law into its own hands...."26 He implied that the United States ought to be able to transcend such behavior by acting within existing laws, which was the position of the anti-war movement. By attempting to instill a sense of guilt
in the Administration and its supporters, the Senator might have gained support for the opposition to the war because it offered the just and legal solution to the conflict.

The second way that he attempted to reach the pro-war forces was by arguing that both the United States and the Communists should be brought before the United Nations. He maintained, "The United States must be brought to the bar of international justice, along with the Communists, and the United States and Communists must have the law laid down to them, and the other nations of the world must make it perfectly clear to the United States and to the Communists that this war must stop. . . ."

Intrinsic to the idea of bringing the United States before an international court was the notion that the United States was indeed guilty of certain grievous crimes and ought to have been punished. Morse attempted to identify the United States as being a criminal, and therefore, evil, in trying to instill a sense of guilt in the minds of those who supported the war. He implied that unless the Johnson Administration's supporters abandoned their allegiance to the policy, they would exact punishment for the crimes that they had committed by supporting a war that was wrong. By opposing the war, however, Morse indicated that they may be spared the punishment for supporting an illegal course of action. Moreover, this argument may have insinuated to the American people that the United States was as guilty as the Communist nations of committing war crimes. By aligning the
United States with the Communist nations, Morse might have exacerbated the guilt of the United States in the eyes of many Americans, for they had always thought of themselves as representing good, whereas Communism embodied evil. Morse extended this idea by maintaining that the American actions with respect to the United Nations were actually far worse than those of the Communists. He told his fellow Senators in January, 1965, "The sad fact is that the United States, one than any other nation in the world—and sad to say but true, more than Russia—is undermining the United Nations by its course of action in South Vietnam."28 This contention probably had the effect of causing some Americans to reevaluate the Johnson Administration's policy. He may have injected some people with feelings of guilt because he presented them as being as evil as the Communists. By portraying the opposition as rising above the action advocated by the United States government, as well as that of the Communist nations, Morse attempted to depict the movement as embodying a good policy. This representation may have lead to the abandonment of the Administration's policy by some of the American citizens.

The final argument that Morse presented to sway the pro-war segment was that unilateral action by the United States had many undesirable consequences. The first disadvantage of this policy that Morse considered was that international law would decay if the United States did not seek arbitration by the United Nations. Other nations, according to Morse, would perceive the
United States as being hypocritical because "our actions not only in South Vietnam but in carrying the war into North Vietnam cut straight across the exhortations we have preached to others to observe and respect the rule of law in relations with other nations." The Senator stressed, as he did in 1964 during the initiation of the inception period, that chaos would ensue if Americans did not work through proper legal channels. He reminded the American people that if the United States ignored international law, a total breakdown of law and order would follow. A related idea that he suggested was that the United States would lose valuable support from other nations if neutral arbitration was not sought because of the "total separation of the policy we follow ourselves from the policy we recommend to others. . . ." Aside from stressing the damage done to international relations, the Senator maintained that the United States would go down in history as being a people who were not law-abiding. He felt that America was writing "a black page in history, which future generations will read, that we did not resort to the substitution of the rule of law for the jungle law of military might when this threat to peace reared its ugly head." During the identification phase, the American people were very concerned about the image that the country presented, as the Administration's argument concerning American prestige discussed in the previous chapter indicates. By tainting that image for years to come, as Morse claimed would happen, the pro-war faction may have committed
a horrendous act in the eyes of many Americans. He implied that that crime, in addition to the burden that the Administration imposed on the entire world, made pro-war movement guilty of "high crimes." The anti-war movement, on the other hand, offered those who sought to reject the policy an opportunity to purge themselves of these sins.

With the escalation of the war and the increasing number of anti-war protesters, the anti-war movement entered the intensification stage of the inception period. Morse's goal during this phase was to attempt to increase the opposition to the war to an even greater extent. In responding to that challenge, the Senator intensified the tone of his arguments. Rather than merely pointing out the problems of avoiding arbitration by the United Nations, Morse demanded that the government take the matter before the Security Council. These demands took many different forms. Initially, he demanded that the United States seek neutral arbitration because it had no right to be in Southeast Asia. He suggested to his colleagues, "We talk as though we have a right to establish on a permanent basis, a government in South Vietnam sympathetic to the United States. My answer is that that is not our business. My answer is that it happens to be the business of the United Nations or, under the canopy of the United Nations, the business of the Geneva Conference." The language of his statement was much stronger than during the initiation and identification phases insofar as he focused on the specific
rights that the United States possessed regarding international disputes.

He also challenged the United States to seek arbitration to prove that it wanted peace, when he stated, "I think it is important that we follow the framework of international law procedure which is available to us, so that there cannot be the slightest question of a doubt in the minds of anyone that the United States does seek a peaceful solution to the problem under the rules of international law." Thus, if Americans were even going to offer the facade of being a peace-loving people, they should seek neutral arbitration.

Morse also responded to critics who maintained that the Security Council might not have heard the case. He argues that Americans should have demanded that the United Nations take jurisdiction over the dispute. He claimed that "We should have filed a resolution calling upon the Security Council to take jurisdiction over the war. Then we should have insisted upon our right to have the resolution considered by the Security Council." Finally, he challenged the President to take the necessary action of bringing the conflict to the United Nations for arbitration. On December 15, 1967, a month before the devastating Tet Offensive, he discussed the President's actions with respect to the United Nations and asked, "Where has our President been as far as his absenteeism is concerned in respect to the United
Nations? He should have been up there speaking before the Security Council and the General Assembly working out specific proposals."36 He implied that Johnson had been neglecting his duties as President in not pursuing this course of action. Johnson did make a short visit to the United Nations, which Morse called "a face-saving resolution on the part of the administration."37 He claimed that the only reason the President went to the United Nations was because "[t]he heat was too hot for the Johnson administration not at least to make some gesture toward the Security Council. So it did file a resolution, but has not carried out its responsibilities by insisting upon action on the resolution."38 With his challenges to the Administration, he made additional requirements of the President by demanding that he alone should take the responsibility for ensuring adjudication by the United Nations. The demands that the Senator made indicated an unwillingness to compromise on the issue any longer. Also, his challenges defined his position more clearly, and thus, became more forceful.

Morse also refined his argument concerning the undesirable effects of a lack of arbitration. Primarily, Morse contended on May 15, 1967 that the image of the American people would be marred because of "our failure" to capitalize on "this great, historic opportunity and duty"39 to follow the guidelines of international law, and therefore, to set an example for the world. This abdication of responsibility in the Senator's view, would haunt Americans for years to come.
Secondly, Morse chose to once again focus on the hypocritical stance of the Johnson Administration because the argument portrayed the government in such an unfavorable light. He implied that because the Administration was so hypocritical, it surely was not following the correct policy with respect to this war. On December 15, 1967, Morse enhanced the drama of the controversy when he pondered the approaching Christmas day, "and the good thoughts that will be in the hearts of many, I think also of the hypocrisy of talking about peace on earth and good will toward men. I think of the inhumanity of the United States in Southeast Asia. It should shock our spiritual values." In order to attempt to sway more people to his viewpoint, Morse argued in very strong terms that the Administration's policy should be rejected because of the undesirable consequences that stemmed from a lack of arbitration by the United Nations. Thus, the intensification phase of the inception period contained very direct arguments that pinpointed the problem in strong terms. Once again, Morse may have provided arguments in favor of arbitration by the United Nations in a more cogent fashion in an attempt to unify the anti-war movement. The effect of this endeavor is not entirely clear, however, in that he was not the primary spokesperson for the opposition to the war.

Following the Tet Offensive in January, 1968, many people became disenchanted with the Johnson Administration's policy. The anti-war movement, therefore, reached its crisis period as
the change in policy that the anti-war movement advocated became more acceptable. Morse continued his fight for a solution by the United Nations. A few short weeks after the Tet Offensive, on February 21, 1968, he once again justified his idea for arbitration on the basis of a mistake made by the United States government. He contended that the United States was as guilty of violating the Geneva Accords as the Communist nations, thus again emphasizing the fact that the United States war effort was as unjustifiable as that of the Communists. He extended on this idea, however, and stated that simply because the Communists did not respect legal obligations did not justify unilateral intervention by the United States. In fact, according to Morse, "we have outdone them by sending in over 525,000 American troops to engage in an illegal war, an undeclared war, a war we do not dare to declare." He then exacerbated the guilt of the Administration by isolating each American violation of the Geneva Accords. He explained, "We never had the right to put a single [soldier] there, under international law. We have violated the Geneva treaty time and time again, for every soldier we have ever put there, for every tank we have ever put there, for every airplane we have ever sent there." By pointing out the guilt of the Administration, which became more apparent with the Tet Offensive, Morse was probably able to decrease allegiance to the war policy and to perhaps persuade the American people that the matter should be taken before the Security Council.
On April 30, 1968, with the idea of neutral arbitration more respected, Morse altered the argument once again. He adapted to the change in sentiment in the United States by discussing what the obligations of the United States would have been if the matter came before the United Nations, rather than simply justifying arbitration. He advised the American people that if the United Nations "asks us to bring our troops home, we do that provided that they will take the necessary steps under the procedure of the Charter to enforce the peace, to separate the combatants, to provide for orderly government, to supervise and police the people until finally peace takes root and grows and blossoms into an answer to the great cry that all humanity is raising: 'Peace on earth; good will to men.'"43 He shifted his approach with this phase of the crisis period. He may have realized that his ideas had the support of many people and decided to focus on American obligations with respect to the actual arbitration. His remark was indicative of the changing order, for he no longer needed to convince people to oppose the policy, but rather felt that he had to elucidate what an alternative policy would entail.

This whole line of argumentation may seem futile in light of the fact that the United States never brought the matter before the Security Council. The contention concerning arbitration by the United Nations is very important, however, for three reasons. Initially, a legalistic and rational approach was necessary during the early phases of the inception period in order to formulate
the movement and yet not alienate people. Therefore, Morse was able to draw upon this contention to aid in the establishment of the credibility of the movement. Secondly, the argument may have instilled a sense of doubt as to the honesty of the Administration because it implied that the government was taking an illegal course of action, thus making the anti-war movement seem to be a superior alternative. And finally, the argument dealing with neutral arbitration is a good example of a contention that changed and developed as the movement grew and as the circumstances surrounding the disputed policy changed.

Morse also argued that the war in Vietnam would cause many nations to detest the United States, and that this destruction of foreign relationships was totally undesirable. During the initiation phase of the inception period, Morse spoke out in his Gulf of Tonkin addresses and maintained that the people of Southeast Asia did not favor foreign domination of their territory. As he explained, "The day of the Westerner is finished in Asia, just as much as in Africa. And it no longer matters whether the Westerner is French, Dutch, British or American. The pressure will always be against us and against our front in South Vietnam." Moreover, he contended that the effort in Vietnam would be futile if the resolution passed because any government that the United States established would be unstable due to a lack of popular support. The Senator pointed out that when the
United States entered the war in 1954, it tried "to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again when we tried to establish an American foothold in southeast Asia out of the destruction of European colonialism. Five and one half billion dollars worth of aid to South Vietnam, 18,000 American 'advisers,' and now the threat of war with China has not put Humpty-Dumpty back together--and never will." In addition to being incapable of establishing a lasting government, Morse maintained that after the many military battles that would accompany the war, "we shall end with the same job to perform: namely, establishing peace but in a war-cracked world, if we survive." Thus, according to Morse, the American intervention that the resolution mandated would be ineffective in establishing a democracy and in maintaining peace.

If the United States became involved in Vietnam, the Senator feared that relations with Asian nations would be destroyed. He argued that Asians, like Americans, valued their sovereignty, and therefore, detested intrusions of the sort that the resolution proposed. He claimed, "The result will be that the yellow race will hate us more than it hates us already. If the yellow race has not made clear to the white man that Asia is his fort, I do not know what the white man has to learn by way of an additional lesson." This line of argumentation probably served to help to create indecision toward the Johnson Administration's policy and to
establish a conflict. The American people had repeatedly been told that the United States would realize victory in a short period of time in Vietnam. Morse, on the other hand, maintained that the effort would be highly unsuccessful. Those Americans who questioned American policy on a variety of issues, as he frequently did, may have listened to this argument and felt that the Senator could be portraying the consequences of the conflict in a very realistic manner. Moreover, some of the people who supported the resolution may have felt the need to refute his contentions, thus taking on the responsibilities of being the opposition to the anti-war movement.

Morse also attempted to instill a sense of indecision in the American citizens by implying that the United States should respect the sovereign rights of other nations. For many years, Americans had intervened in any conflict that they felt would further American values. Moreover, many people could not understand why the Asians would not be eternally grateful for action on the part of the United States. They felt that the South Vietnamese would certainly appreciate the establishment of a democratic government. This is not to say that the Senator alone generated this uncertainty, but that he may have contributed to it. The Administration was again forced into the position of the opposition as it was called upon to justify military involvement in light of the attitudes of the other nations opposing United States intervention.
In the identification phase, Morse altered his comments slightly as the government released the initial war statistics. He argued primarily that the American effort was futile. Rather than simply contending that America could not support a government in South Vietnam, he argued that a government could be maintained only if the United States remained in Asia forever. For if America withdrew, that government would fall. On May 6, 1965, Morse told the Senate, "... our attempt to dominate the kind of government that reigns in Saigon is going to require eternal, perpetual war."48

As the United States took an increasingly major military role in the war in 1965, Morse changed his argument further. After perceiving no notable success with the commitment of more American troops, the Senator concluded that the Asians may have been indeed stronger than government officials indicated. Thus, on October 19, 1965, he claimed that American efforts were not productive because the Asians would refuse to allow an American victory. He stated on the floor of the Senate, "The underdeveloped areas of the world, with their mass of ignorant, illiterate people, with their youngsters and, in many instances, their starving people, with their diseased children, and with their longevity of 30 to 35 years do not intend to permit the United States to shoot its way into dominion and domination over any segment of Asia."49 The upshot of this problem was that "...
will show that after all the military victories which we shall win, and after that time has passed we shall still have to occupy, occupy, and continue to occupy areas of Asia.\(^{50}\)

These arguments may have been attractive to those who were unsure about the American involvement, for Morse identified an alternative viewpoint with which they could have supported a "good" course of action. Because, as he indicated, the United States might be involved in the war for many years, the futility of the effort probably became apparent, and thus, they may have abandoned their support of the Administration's policy in order to avoid upholding a counterproductive policy.

The second contention that Morse offered was that American relations with Asia would be ruined only for a futile effort. On January 6, 1965, he developed the argument more fully and first discussed the ramifications of the ill-will that the Asians would harbor against Americans. He claimed, "We will inherit as a legacy for generations of Americans yet to come the undying hatred of the yellow man. He will hate us for hundreds of years."\(^{51}\) This hatred would affect not the present generations, but future Americans. He made an appeal to withdraw for the sake of American children, for "\([\text{w}e\text{ have the responsibility in our time to lay out courses of action that will not produce the type of holocaust that will bring about for millions of American boys and girls the hatred of many people of the world that will be incurred if we continue to pursue our course of action in South Vietnam.}\]\(^{52}\) This argument may have had the effect of persuading
some members of the pro-war forces to abandon their active support of the war. Morse, in placing responsibility for harming the future Americans on those who advocated intervention, may have created guilty feelings within these people. By rejecting the policy, as he advocated, they would have been liberated from that awesome responsibility.

Following the first attacks on Americans posts in Vietnam by the North Vietnamese, Morse refined his argument. On May 6, 1965, he claimed that not only did the Asians detest American involvement, but action by the United States was "a failure because it has served only to suck us in deeper and deeper, to cause our conspicuous presence as the only white western participant in the war to become more and more obvious to all Asians and because it is unifying the people of Asia against the United States and not with us." 53

In June, 23,000 more men were committed to combat in South Vietnam. 54 This action caused Morse to fear that "no 'victory' is in sight, and no ultimate victory will ever be won," 55 for he recognized the futility of the war effort. The Senator intensified his argument by contending that the American children would not only be hated by the Asians, but would also be in "utter danger in Asia, for Asians, no matter how many decades it will take, will make it perfectly clear to the United States and to the Western powers that they will not be allowed to dominate an acre of Asia." 56 With this argument, Morse once again identified those
who supported the war as embodying evil, for they jeopardized the safety of future Americans. A sense of guilt which most likely accompanied the knowledge of the consequence of the policy may have caused some to reject the Johnson administration's policy in order to avoid wreaking danger upon the children of America.

In the intensification phase, Morse crystallized his position perhaps to attempt to help unify the movement. His idea concerning the futility of the policy gave way to an argument which discussed only the nature of the hatred of the Asians. He most likely changed his emphasis because the latter was much more striking and intense than the former, and therefore, more appealing to during this phase the war had become an emotional issue for many Americans, and a forceful argument may have been necessary to cause more people to abandon their support of the policy. Nevertheless, the Senator did argue on January 17, 1967, as the North Vietnamese were being showered with American bombs, "Generations of Americans will be born and die before America is eventually driven out of Asia." In May of that year, following another step-up in American involvement in order to meet the challenge of the North Vietnamese, Morse wondered if the United States had sufficient power to meet the North Vietnamese effort when he claimed, "We would have to police the country with hundreds of thousands of American troops for decades to come. Eventually, we would be driven out." Morse's appeal was more clear and was also much more dramatic as he almost exaggerated his claims.
The argument may have drawn the attention of some people and caused them to reject the policy because the emotional level of the contention may have matched the level of emotion that they felt toward the war.

The idea that the United States would be hated by Asians was also the primary focus of Morse's argument during the intensification phase of the inception period of the anti-war movement. He intensified the contention as new developments arose. On May 6, 1966, when he maintained that millions of people in the world actually detected the United States, he finally specified the reasons for these feelings. He informed the Senate, "The trouble with Americans these days is that we do not recognize the fact that we are bitterly hated by millions of people in many places of the world, for they see all the difference between our verbal statements and our actions and condemn us for a growing hypocrisy, of which we are guilty." 59

On October 11, 1966, Morse returned to the idea that the Administration was truly hurting future Americans by provoking the wrath of the Asian people. He warned the American people that the war jeopardized the safety of America's children. 60 For the Administration to imperil the future Americans by participating in a futile war was irresponsible, in the Senator's view.

Finally, on May 15, 1967, he maintained that due to United States intervention, the future wrath of the Asians would be so
great that they would eventually defeat the Americans and force them from Southeast Asia. He felt that if the Americans forced Vietnam to become two separate countries, all of Asia would fight against the United States because they would sympathize with North Vietnam. 61 By focusing on the danger to future Americans, Morse fulfilled his goal of the intensification phase. He may have been able to sway more people to his viewpoint because they would want to avoid imposing such a problem upon another generation. He also crystallized his position around the idea of protecting American children. This emotional appeal, along with others of different anti-war spokespersons, may have been sufficient to persuade more American citizens to abandon the pro-war movement.

The Tet Offensive demonstrated the superior military position and the willingness to sacrifice on the part of the North Vietnamese with respect to the Vietnam war. At that point, it seemed that if the United States sufficiently provoked the North Vietnamese, it could expect to encounter similar military actions in the future. Thus, following Tet, the Senator attempted to further decrease allegiance to the Administration's policy. He capitalized on the dramatic incident by combining all of the arguments, therefore implying that incidents like the Tet Offensive might be typical in the future. He maintained, "We can always get a surrender, if we continue to kill enough people and destroy enough property. But that will not bring peace. It will bring a truce, but we would not be able to bring any troops home from
there. They will have to be left there to enforce the truce, while Asians dig in deeper and deeper, in hatred of the United States and our venture, until eventually they drive us out."\(^{62}\) In arguing that the action of the United States in Vietnam was undesirable, Morse changed his argument to fit the given situation in order to gain more support for his position.

The final consequence of American action in Southeast Asia, Morse argued, was that it might lead to a major war—or World War III. In the initiation phase of this contention, he maintained that the real goal of the military was to contain the Communist nations so that they would "cease their support of the rebels in South Vietnam."\(^{63}\) The Senator pointed out in his August 5th Gulf of Tonkin address that China would not be easily threatened, and therefore, would most likely fight. He urged the Senate to "face the realization of the desperado that we are dealing with in Red China. This despicable Communist leader has demonstrated time and time again, as was demonstrated in the Korean war, that he places no value on human life. Only in the past two or three years headlines blazed forth the statement that the Communist leader of Red China has said in effect that in case of war with Western imperialism they could sacrifice 400 million people and have a stronger China at the end."\(^{64}\) Moreover, if Americans continued to provoke China, "we may find ourselves in a full
scale war in Asia that can bog us down for a quarter of a century or longer, with terrific financial costs, a terrible loss of American lives and mass slaughter of the victims of our bombs. Morse maintained that the losses and costs to the United States that stemmed from such an involvement did not warrant the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. This argument may have had the effect of creating indecision toward the Vietnam policy and of establishing a conflict. Some Americans may have doubted the desirability of such a course of action in light of its devastating effects. Moreover, the emergence of a conflict may have become apparent as Morse challenged the Administration's goal of containing China. The people supporting the war may have felt the need to defend the policy as being desirable following Morse's indictments, and thus, would form the opposition.

In the initiation phase, the Senator helped to establish the conflict and to generate indecision by maintaining that action by the United States would lead to a larger war. In the identification phase, Morse shifted his position in order to gain more support for the movement. Beginning in 1965, he contended that the Administration did not seek to contain China, but rather to fight the Chinese. These official felt, according to the Senator, that the United States "must prepare the way for a bombing of nuclear installations in Red China." In fact, he maintained, "I am satisfied that the plans are already prepared and the
logistics are already on paper, ready to move a minimum of
300,000 troops into Asia, if China starts to move." 67 He argued
that this policy was extremely unwise, however, because other
Communist nations would act against the United States when "we
make the move that leaves what they feel is no choice but to make
war against us, they will move their battalions, they will move
their air power, they will fire their missiles." 68

Morse claimed that when other nations acted, a major war
would begin. He more clearly defined the results of this war
than he did in 1964. On January 6, 1965, he informed the Senate
that the type of war that would occur would be a "nuclear war.
Neither the United States nor any other country would be a victor
in such a war." 69 Thus, the war would hurt all involved. In
May he argued that this nuclear war would not even further American
interests. If the war occurred, he asked, "Will China
disappear? Will communism in Asia disappear with her? No. The
result will be more Chinese influence and probably Communist
influence than before." 70 Finally, in July, following the
commitment of more American soldiers, Morse complained that "hour
by hour, day by day, week by week, the United States is leading
mankind to the abyss of a third world war as a result of our
outlawry in southeast Asia." 71 The nuclear war would not only
eliminate the Communist and democratic forces, but would also
destroy mankind.
These contentions were clearly indicative of the identification stage of the inception period for they designated the good and the evil members of the controversy, in an attempt to persuade more people to abandon their efforts on behalf of war effort. In contending that the Administration deliberately planned to involve the United States in a major war with very high costs, Morse condemned the pro-war segment of society of jeopardizing American and international safety and probably instilled a sense of guilt within their less committed members. In order to cleanse themselves of the intent to kill millions of people, they would move to support the anti-war movement by rejecting the Administration's policy. Moreover, by pointing out the atrocities that would accompany a major war, those who were unsure of the policy would follow the movement. Where Morse depicted the Administration as causing war, and therefore, as being evil, the anti-war movement was portrayed as peace-loving, and thus, good. These people may have denounced their allegiance to the pro-war faction in order to side with righteous individuals. In essence, the Senator, although not a primary force behind the anti-war movement, may have swayed some people by discussing the likelihood of the United States causing a major, and costly, war.

In the intensification phase, Morse shifted again in his approach to this argument as the American military increased the role of the United States in Southeast Asia. He no longer discussed the intent on the part of the Administration, but rather
chose to emphasize the result of that action. Moreover, in crystallizing his position, he capitalized on the growing fears in the minds of many Americans that even more young American men would be killed.

On February 25, 1966, following heavy American casualties with the bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong area, Morse reiterated that not only was the Johnson Administration causing a larger war, but was, in fact, imperiling all of mankind by risking World War III with its policy in Vietnam.72 On October 11, 1966, the Senator might have augmented the fears of the nation by claiming that this war would directly affect Americans, for World War III would involve the Soviet Union, also, and "it would not be fought in Asia, but it would be fought in New York City and in Chicago and in Portland and in Moscow and in Leningrad and around the world."73 As the anti-war movement gained more support, Morse probably felt that in order to sway more people, he ought to further intensify his argument in order to make the threat of a major war seem more real. Therefore, he claimed that World War III and all of its atrocities would occur in a "matter of time" and that Americans may even "put it down on the calendar" when it would begin.74 The Senator became even more responsive to the rising number of protesters as the war progressed. The dissenters opposed the high number of casualties that Americans suffered in Vietnam. Therefore, Morse pointed out in December, 1967 that the casualties would be even greater if World War III
followed the Vietnam war. He maintained that the American commitment in that war would begin "in 30 to 36 months [following the outbreak of that war and] you will have to have three million American boys" in active combat. The risks and the harm, as Morse presented them, became worse as the United States made a greater commitment to South Vietnam. He emphasized the risk in his attempt to persuade more people to reject the Johnson Administration's policy. Most likely, some allegiance to the Administration declined as the Senator portrayed these officials as supporting the idea of mass killing in World War III.

The Tet Offensive demonstrated the real possibility of the casualties that Morse discussed. The United States was indeed in a dangerous position following that attack by the North Vietnamese. The Senator, therefore, worked to decrease dedication to the policy by arguing that the notion of containing China was ludicrous and by once again emphasizing the ensuing problems. In contending that the United States should not have sought to contain China, Morse's arguments were much more bold. He capitalized on the apparent weakness of the United States that the Tet Offensive illustrated by arguing that the United States had no right to try to contain China. He proclaimed, "Who are we to take it upon ourselves, on a unilateral basis, to say to the world, 'We propose to militarily contain China, no matter at whose expense?'" This idea might have further weakened the Administration's position in that Morse pointed out that the United States was
no longer in a position where it could exert such military authority.

During the crisis period, he continued to reiterate the idea that the escalation of the war by the United States would lead to World War III. During this period, however, he discussed in much more graphic terms the impact of a nuclear war. He predicted, "Human beings will die thousands of miles away from the dropping of the bombs, with the passage of time, as the winds take their fallout to the farflung places of the world." By dwelling on the effects of the bombs on individuals, the Senator brought the argument down to a more personal level, and therefore, may have persuaded more people to abandon their support of the Vietnam policy. As the citizens' fears increased following the Tet Offensive, Morse may have swayed more people by graphically illustrating the consequences of the war to each of them. Thus, in the crisis period, Morse denied the fact that the United States had a right to contain China, and discussed the undesirability of such a course of action. In so doing, he reinforced the notion that the United States' policy would cause a major war in which people of all nations would be hurt. Morse maintained that the Vietnam war was disadvantageous because it would cause a larger war, it would destroy relationships with other nations and because the policy violated the United Nations Charter.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid., p. 3820.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 3818.


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 3823.


18 See footnote 7 on p. 33 and footnote 10 on p. 34.

Morse, "United States is Leading Mankind to the Abyss of a Third World War," CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15468.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 15469.

Wayne L. Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1965), p. 113.

Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15470.

Morse, CR (May 6, 1965), p. 9768.

Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1965), p. 113.

Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15467.

Morse, Congressional Digest. (April 1, 1965), p. 111.

Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15466.

See footnotes 16 and 17 on p. 36.

Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15467.

Ibid., p. 15466.

Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1966), p. 125.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Morse, "Personal Statement by Senator Morse on Secretary of Defense McNamara's Appearance Before the Committee on Foreign Relations," CR (February 21, 1968), p. 3815.
Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 3820.

Morse, CR (August 6, 1964), p. 3825.


Ibid.

Morse, Congressional Digest (January 6, 1965), p. 115.

Ibid.


Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15467.

Ibid.


See footnotes 51 and 52 on p. 55 and footnote 56 on p. 56.

See footnote 53 on p. 56.

Morse, CR (February 21, 1968), p. 3915.
64 Morse, CR (August 5, 1964), p. 3771.
67 Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15473.
68 Ibid., p. 15468.
70 Morse, CR (May 6, 1965), p. 9765.
71 Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15466.
72 See footnotes 69 and 70 on p. 62.
73 Morse, CR (October 11, 1966), p. 26016.
75 Morse, CR (December 15, 1967), p. 37116.
77 Ibid.
CHAPTER IV:
ALTERNATIVES

The Senator frequently addressed the issue of responsibility — who should take the necessary action to end the war in Vietnam. The issues of the legality of the President's action in guaranteeing the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 and his future actions with respect to Vietnam, and what factions in the United States should act to stop American action were stressed throughout his anti-war rhetoric.

Morse often pondered the correctness of Johnson’s escalation of the war by committing more American troops from 1964 to 1968. During the Gulf of Tonkin debates in August, 1964, he stressed the notion that the President did not possess any constitutional authority to commit troops to the conflict in Vietnam. The vast majority of his arguments during the initiation phase of the inception period were of a constitutional nature. Shortly before the incident in Tonkin Gulf, Morse claimed that involvement by the United States should not have been increased because the power to commit troops rested solely with the Congress, not with the President. He reminded his fellow Senators, "Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the power to declare war is vested in the Congress. No President has the legal authority under the Constitution to send American boys to their death on a battlefield in the absence of a declaration of war."¹ In addition to being

¹
unable to commit troops, the President, according to Morse, could not even spend money on the conflict. He explained, "It is an elementary principle of constitutional law that the Executive branch of government cannot spend taxpayers' money in the field of foreign policy, or for any other purpose except when the appropriation is passed by law." Thus, any action by the President would violate the Constitution unless he received Congressional approval of that plan, which the Gulf of Tonkin resolution did not grant to him.

At this early phase of the inception period, the Senator wanted to make sure that his stand did not alienate the American people, and thus, he assured the members of the Portland City Club on July 17, 1964, "Let there be no doubt as to what the position of your Senator will be in case, God forbid, war is declared. Then we must unite for a successful prosecution of that war, and after its military victory—if one is attained—try again to substitute ploughshares of reason for the swords of military might in the settlement of disputes which threaten the peace of the world." He was very careful to draw the distinction between an action which was undertaken by the President alone and a legally declared war.

Morse's goal during the initiation phase was to gain some initial support for his cause by arguing from a legal point of view. He did not establish his opposition, however, because the conflict had not begun as of yet.
During the Gulf of Tonkin debates, however, the rhetoric of the Senator became more volatile in that his language was of a more accusing tone. He argued initially that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, because of its sanction of unlimited Presidential action, was "a predated declaration of war." Because the resolution was not a formal declaration of war, Morse felt that the President did not possess the right to commit troops with the passage of the resolution.

Secondly, the Senator opposed the resolution because it granted the President a great deal of discretion in handling military conflicts. According to Morse, "[T]his resolution, no matter what semantics are used, spells out the ugly words: 'Undated declaration of war power to be vested in the President of the United States.'" He specified in what way this discretion would manifest itself. In regard to the number of troops to be sent, he claimed that the resolution "does not say that [the President] is limited in regard to sending of ground forces. It does not limit that authority." As a result, the resolution granted to the President the authority to escalate the war to whatever extent he pleased without formally declaring war. Thus, the Senator argued that the resolution was not in accordance with constitutional requirements.

Morse focused on the constitutional aspects of the Vietnam conflict in order to gain initial support for his point of view. If he merely lashed out at the President, people would have
dismissed his arguments. Moreover, by claiming that the resolution was unconstitutional, Morse designated his opponents, and thus created a conflict.

During the identification phase of the inception period, Morse's rhetoric became more forceful as he tried to persuade more people to reject the government's policy. He no longer depended solely on the constitutional argument concerning the President's war policy, but rather developed a more complete attack. In 1965, he maintained that he would "continue to vote against giving the President any vote of confidence for what I think is his inexcusable course of action involving us in the war in South Vietnam in absence of a declaration of war." 7

The Senator discussed initially the question of whether the President possessed the necessary power to engage the United States in the war in Vietnam. He claimed that the President could not act without Congress unless imminent danger existed, thus refining his argument as to why the President's action was unconstitutional. Morse explained, "The President has no constitutional right to make war in the absence of a declaration, except to meet an immediate emergency in self-defense and then only in self-defense, and only for the limited period of time that it takes him to get to Congress to present the facts by way of a recommendation of a declaration of war." 8 Because Congressional input was necessary in all decisions concerning war, Morse insisted that the President's actions were unconstitutional.
Moreover, by the power granted to the President by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the President, according to Morse, had used his discretion to expand the war. On May 6, 1965, the Senator pointed out, "Last August, many Senators performed a rather pathetic exercise of explaining that their votes for the resolution should not be construed to support an expansion of the war, or of bombing North Vietnam, or of United States troops fighting in Asia. Within eight months, all those things had come to pass, and the administration needed only to cite the Vietnam resolution as the source of its authority to expand the war in any way it saw fit." Thus, in Morse's view, Congress had effectively delegated its power to the President.

The Senator maintained that this change in powers was rather ironic. While Congress had granted the President more discretion with respect to foreign affairs, the President had refused to allow the other facets of American government to operate properly. Morse insisted that Johnson did not permit the other branches to fully exercise their delegated powers because he feared that his actions would have been checked. He contended, "I only regret that while the President invokes the name of freedom to justify what he has decided to do there [in Vietnam], he is unwilling to see the free institutions of the Government he heads operate as they are intended to operate." 10

Within this line of argumentation, Morse identified the good policy as being that which rejected the war effort. By
demonstrating that constitutional safeguards were being ignored by the Administration and that the anti-war movement, by denouncing unconstitutional action, supported these constitutional protections Morse may have been able to convince the uncommitted people to abandon their active support of the pro-war movement so that they could uphold the side that followed the path of law and order.

The Senator also challenged the President to ask the Congress for a declaration of war, and therefore, to work within the legal means of the Constitution. In May, 1965, he informed the Senate, "I say again sadly to my President today, 'when are you going to get back within the Constitution and come to Congress to recommend war against North Vietnam?'"11 For he maintained "that the clear constitutional duty is for him either to stop making war or come to Congress and ask for a declaration of war. Then let the Members of Congress stand up and be counted as to their position under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution."12

He felt, however, that Johnson would never ask for a declaration of war, for such a request would jeopardize his position as President of the United States, and America's position with respect to international affairs. Initially, the Senator argued that if the President asked for a declaration of war, he would "arouse such a negative reaction in this country that the American people would repudiate him."13 Morse claimed that the President would be repudiated because many people in the United States opposed the war in Vietnam. The Senator explained, "A proposal
for a declaration of war would arouse the American people at the grassroots of this Republic, and the President would soon find such a division among our people that there would be a serious question as to whether that war would meet with the approval of the people."\(^14\)

In October, 1965, Morse pointed out yet another reason why the President would not request a declaration of war. He felt that such a declaration would drastically alter important international relationships, for "[o]ther countries would have to deal with us as a combatant. That would cause great changes in the relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth in North Vietnam, and between the United States and Canada in North Vietnam."\(^15\)

This series of argument identified the segment of society that supported evil. As Morse challenged the pro-war faction to act within constitutional boundaries, these officials and their supporters may have felt that they were, in fact, supporting an unconstitutional war. This realization may have caused them to feel that war should be declared. Morse, however, also maintained that a declaration of war was undesirable for the American people would act against it, and it would harm international relations. He implied that the pro-war segment was guilty of violating the Constitution. The weaker members of the Administration’s movement may have felt the need to purge themselves by denouncing illegal action. This could be accomplished by joining the anti-war movement,
for it advocated that the United States should not participate in the conflict in any capacity.

An interesting idea to note is that through 1965, i.e., the initiation phase of the inception period, the Senator was very careful not to malign the President. He attacked and challenged the President's actions, but never denounced Johnson as he did the military in the intensification phase. On July 1, 1965, he even claimed, "My criticisms of the President and his handling of the war indicate no lack of support for him, in that I want to join him in carrying out the intentions of peace which flow from his heart. My criticisms are criticisms that flow from a basic difference of opinion with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and his other war advisers."

A possible reason why he never lashed out at the President is that such an action would only hurt his position. Even up until 1968, many people regarded the Office of the Presidency as sacred. Many never really lost faith in the President until the Watergate incident. Therefore, if Morse had attacked Johnson in the manner that he discussed a variety of other people, he would have ruined his own credibility.

In the intensification stage of the inception period, Morse's argument became much stronger and more forceful. He once again addressed the point of the undeclared war and challenged the Administration to ask Congress for a declaration of war, but sadly realized that the President would never take such an action.
Because the war was not declared, Morse labelled it "a Presidential war" because Congress had no input in the decision-making activities concerning American action in the Vietnam war. He reminded the Senate on August 31, 1966, "I shall continue to disagree with my President in regard to his warmaking policies, his Presidential war—for it is a Presidential war, never having been declared under the constitutional processes of our Constitution." Morse effectively transferred all responsibility for this war to the Executive Branch. He, along with other people who denounced the war, supplied the anti-war movement with good reason for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam.

Because the Administration was solely responsible for the war, the Senator contended that it was actually killing many American boys. When accused of "letting down the boys" in a debate in the Senate, Morse fired back, "...those who are seeking to follow the Administration's course of action in southeast Asia will have to assume the responsibility for the letting of the blood of many of those boys..." thus shifting the responsibility back to the Administration. He accused the government of being guilty of sending these "men in the flower of their manhood, with all of life before them, from this country into South Vietnam, to be killed in a war in a country where we had no right to go in the first place and in which we cannot justify, on moral or legal grounds, continuing to stay." Thus, the
idea of responsibility developed into a more important and volatile issue. Morse used the argument to portray the Administration as not only avoiding the Constitution, but as also committing terrible crimes, such as destroying young American men.

The Senator then discussed the notion of which specific portion of the Executive Branch was guilty of killing American soldiers. He concluded on May 16, 1966 that the Vietnam war was the fault of the military, rather than the President. He could easily accuse the military of such a crime without alienating people because of its waning popularity. The President, however, was still highly respected. Therefore, Morse shifted blame from the President to the Pentagon and the State Department.

Morse presented the image of the President as being a man who possessed good intentions, but was being manipulated by the dishonest military. He claimed, "The control over American foreign policy has passed to the Pentagon, and the Pentagon is maneuvering this President and his country ever closer to war with China." which would inevitably lead to World War III, as was discussed in the previous chapter. He felt that this control was obvious because the President "gives every evidence of total adherence to the advice of his military leaders who believe armed force is the best answer to everything and who are bent on war with China. . . ."23 In shifting responsibility from the President to the military, Morse could continue to fight
against the Administration, yet would not alienate the people who would be offended by an attack on the President.

After transferring responsibility for the war, the Senator delineated what "crimes" the Pentagon and the State Department had committed. Primarily, he argued that because the military controlled foreign policy to an increasingly greater extent, it would destroy the freedom of many Americans. "If we let this American military go unchecked as Secretary [of Defense] McNamara is letting it go, I say to the American people, 'Watch out for your freedom. For you can have a democracy semantically, but you can lose your freedom with a military establishment taking over the direction of American foreign policy.'"24 In essence, the military may have tried to deny freedom to American citizens once it had finished usurping the power over foreign affairs. Secondly, Morse maintained that because the American military promoted the war, peace would never be obtained through them. He felt that "the most dangerous force to the threat of peace in the world at this moment happens to be the American military."25

Finally, he asked the President to take necessary action in order to put the military back in its proper place. He felt that the appropriate course of action would involve "an Executive order that ought to be issued forthwith, and that is that the Pentagon, with its uniforms, stay out of the field of foreign policy, as our Constitution dictates."26 Morse, therefore,
depicted a huge military machine with evil intentions that had manipulated the President, thus causing the war in Vietnam and jeopardizing peace and freedom throughout the world. Although this line of argumentation is reminiscent of the "devils" of the identification phase, Morse most likely used the contention to crystallize his position. With the focal point of his argument being the military establishment, Morse refined his stance and offered the anti-war movement an evil force against which they could fight. Also, as casualties mounted as a result of a military activity, the Pentagon and the State Department became the obvious causes of these deaths.

In 1967, Morse shifted his contentions slightly and focused more on the idea of executive supremacy. On January 17, 1967, he once again argued that the military had "performed a great disservice to a great man, who is the President of the United States, but who is not an international law scholar. . . ." by influencing his policy with respect to Vietnam. Because of the power that the military possessed, it "is the greatest threat to the peace of the world." The Senator's main points concerning responsibility for the war dealt with the type of government that ran the United States. He maintained that the checks and balances of the American government had eroded, telling the American people from the floor of the Senate that: "You have lost your checks and balances to the degree that you permit the Office of the Presidency to go unchecked."
I say to the American people, you have an administration that even tells you that if the Tonkin Gulf resolution were rescinded, the President could continue to do what he wants in Vietnam and elsewhere in the field of foreign policy."29 Because of the increase in Presidential power, Morse felt that the trend should be stopped. Therefore, he refused to "cast a vote which, in my judgment, is a vote for a further buildup of a policy in a government now that is proof of a government by executive supremacy in which Congress has been subordinated to the White House."30

He drew a picture of a government that was completely operated by the Executive Branch. This group of people, therefore, were solely responsible for the deaths and atrocities that occurred in Vietnam. The contention gained more force with the American people, for Morse depicted the entire form of American government eroding as the checks and balances of the Constitution became impotent. He contended that this erosion might affect future domestic problems, and therefore, this usurpation of power by the Executive Branch may have set a precedent. This appeal may have been attractive to some people because he suggested that the American people were losing valuable weapons to fight against the misuse of power. In order to regain some of the control, some people may have begun to actively oppose the war.

Following the Tet Offensive in January, 1968, Morse again pondered the role of the Presidency in the war in Vietnam. On
February 21, 1968, roughly three weeks after the first Tet Offensive, Morse capitalized on the uncertain American position. Because, as he realized, the American people had suddenly become unsure of their own strength, and the government's policy had been proven unworkable, the Senator boldly stated, "[O]ur government will think a long time before it declares war." 31 At this point he could proclaim in a fairly confident manner that the Administration made an obvious mistake with respect to the war in Vietnam.

Within this argument, Morse recognized the change in order and policies. He almost seemed simply to note the passing of the old order as he made this semi-victorious remark. Secondly, he noted the change in policy following the President's decision to de-escalate the war. He pointed out on April 30, 1968, "[I]n the President for the first time shifted to the premise of de-escalation--not as far as we think he should have gone, not as far as I think we must go, but at least I was the beginning of a proposal for de-escalation, which is a major change in the foreign policy proposals of the President." 32 In this instance, he seemed to note the change in policy that followed the Tet Offensive. His comment was a reflection of what occurred during the crisis period--a reduction in the support of the Administration and an increase in the opposition to the war in Vietnam. Briefly, Morse discussed the issue of governmental responsibility for the
Vietnam war throughout his anti-war rhetoric, and rejected the possibility of the Executive Branch being capable of solving the conflict. The arguments and contentions that he advanced changed as the dispositions of the people varied and as the anti-war movement developed.

The final plea that Morse presented was for either the Congress or the American people to take the necessary action to end the American involvement in Southeast Asia. Because the President could not, or would not, take the appropriate measures, the Senator called upon others to fulfill that responsibility. In his addresses to the Senate concerning the Gulf of Tonkin resolution during the initiation phase of the inception period, he claimed that the legislators had two obligations that they ought to meet in regard to the Vietnam war. Primarily, he contended that the Senate should formally reject the resolution, and therefore, ensure that the United States did not become involved in the conflict. He advised his colleagues, "Congress has no constitutional power to grant such authority to the President of the United States." Thus, he placed primary responsibility on the Senate to prevent American intervention in light of the President's disposition toward the war.

Secondly, he maintained that the Senators also had a responsibility to educate the American people on the nature and the
extent of the war in Vietnam. He informed his fellow Senators that "the primary obligation a Senator owes to the people of his state and the nation is to find out, as best he can, what the facts are in connection with an issue..." Moreover, he felt that once the American people possessed the facts, they would repudiate the pro-war elements within the government. He contended that "once the American people come to understand the facts involved in the ill-fated military operations in Asia, they will hold to an accounting those Members of Congress who abdicate their responsibilities in the field of foreign policy." He also warned the government that if American involvement in Vietnam was increased, "the administration responsible for it will be rejected and repudiated by the American people." According to Morse, if the Congress abdicated its responsibilities by committing the United States to this war, the American people, when provided with the facts, would act against the Congress and the President. This prediction eventually became fact when Johnson realised that his policy in Vietnam had sufficiently jeopardized his position in the 1968 campaign, and therefore chose to end his bid for a second term.

This line of reasoning was indicative of the inception period of the anti-war movement. In stressing the idea that governmental officials had certain responsibilities to the people, the Senator may have persuaded some people of the desirability of avoiding the war. For if in committing the United States to
Vietnam the Congress did not fulfill the obligations that were stipulated when taking the oath of office, then some people may have seen the war as being invalid. Also, by implying that some officials were neglecting their duties, the argument probably had the effect of forcing some elected officials to justify their actions, and therefore, to form the opposition.

During the identification phase of the inception period, Morse changed his emphasis. He sought to identify the devils that opposed the anti-war movement. Rather than insisting that Congress take action, he recommended that the American citizens play a larger role. In spite of this change, he continued to recognize the fact that the Congress possessed the major influence in changing the Administration's policy.

Morse maintained in 1965 and 1966 that Congress had the responsibility to stop the war once it had begun. He argued that Congress could indeed have an impact upon the policy because the Administration was dependent upon the Congress for a vote of confidence. He contended, "Senators can talk all they like about supplying our soldiers. But the President plainly and clearly stated--as I pointed out last night--that the money is not needed. What is needed by the White House is another affirmation of our support."37 He insisted that Congress, in fact, had an obligation to the people to end the war, for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was unconstitutional. He explained again that the President
could not act without Congressional consent. Moreover, he maintained that Congress ought to act, for "unless this Congress checks the President, I fear that future generations of Americans are going to be fighting and paying for wars in Asia indefinitely." The Senator delineated the costs of the war in Vietnam by discussing Congress' original intentions in passing the resolution. He argued that although Congress had not intended to grant the President unlimited discretion, he actually possessed a great deal of authority due to the passage of the resolution. He pointed out instances where this discretion had manifested itself in an undesirable manner. For example, he claimed, "Many voices made clear that they did not intend the resolution to be used to put an American land army on the continent of Asia, nor to advance the war into North Vietnam. Yet since then many thousands of American troops have been landed in Asia." Moreover, on October 1, 1966, he complained that the Congress had missed other opportunities to check the President, such as "if this Congress had exercised the check of the purse strings which is set out in the Constitution, and which is within the constitutional power of the Congress, President Johnson would have had to change his foreign policy; he would have had to stop escalating the war." Morse urged the Senate to strike down the Administration's policy on behalf of the American people. At this time he felt
that the people could not act on their own, for, as he contended, "[T]he American people have only one instrument that can prevent a misguided, misadvised, misinformed President from committing an incredible blunder—a blunder that will destroy all the confidence in America that has been built up since World War II. That instrument is the Senate of the United States."

Within this argument, which was aimed for the Congress, the Senator could have persuaded some of his colleagues to abandon their support of the President's Vietnam Policy. Senators Frank Church and George McGovern, for example, were swayed during this phase. The argument by its very nature identified evil intentions on the part of the pro-war faction, for Morse maintained that the Senate had abdicated its sworn responsibilities to the people by allowing the war to continue. Some Senators may have changed their stances on the war issue in light of Morse's indictment. Those less committed members of the pro-war movement may have felt that it was more important to fulfill their constitutional obligations than to continue to support the war effort.

The second argument that he presented in the identification phase concerned the role of the American people in ending the war. He maintained, initially, that the Administration also had a duty to provide the American people with "the facts." He felt that "when the American people get the facts—and this administration has not started to give the American people the facts
about the war in South Vietnam—when they get the facts, in my judgment, an overwhelming majority of the American people will repudiate the administration's policy." He claimed that the war would end because "the good sense and judgment of the American people will recognize that we are alone in this war in Asia..." and they would seek to end it. He also urged those Americans who were informed on the war to protest the policy, for "[t]he wisdom and intelligence of the American people are their last and ultimate check against their own disaster." 

The Senator, secondly, described the impact of informing the American people of the nature of the war in Vietnam. He argued that the President would be hurt and predicted that if the President continued in this course of action, the people would stop him. He explained, "The President of the United States will feel that check [of the American people] for years unless he stops leading America into this unnecessary and unjustifiable war in Asia." If the people were forced to check the Administration, Morse believed that its reputation would be marred. When its term was over, "it will go out of office the most discredited Administration in all the history of this Republic." 

The Senator also discussed the impact of the people's check on those members of the Congress who did not attempt to end the war. The effect on Congress would also be felt when the people exercised their right to vote. He maintained, "I believe the repudiation will start at the ballot box in 1966, and con-
tinue at the ballot box in 1968.\textsuperscript{48} In short, members of Congress would lose their positions. The implication of these contentions was that the people would act out against their own government because it supported such an evil policy. In portraying this course of action as embodying evil, the Senator might have instilled feelings of guilt in those who supported the war, for they upheld an unfavorable policy. He offered these people the opportunity to purge themselves of their guilt by supporting the anti-war movement, which advocated the fulfillment of official responsibilities.

Finally, Morse introduced a new contention, which he emphasised during the remainder of the inception period and the crisis period. He argued that many people actually opposed the Administration's policy. On July 1, 1965, he insisted that in his struggle against the war policy, that he was "anything but lonely or discouraged, because there are millions of Americans who stand with me. . . ."\textsuperscript{49} In October of the same year, he specified from which segments of society his support stemmed. He maintained that he had the overall support of the people and explained discrepancies in public opinion polls by claiming, ". . . even the polls, with their slanted and weighted consideration in favor of the administration's position, show a close division in this country in regard to public opinion vis-à-vis the administration's policy in South Vietnam."\textsuperscript{50} Among the young
men who fought in Vietnam, he argued, "Thousands of our soldiers want to know what they are doing in South Vietnam." Finally, he insisted that he had the support of "millions of Americans" across the land, for "[t]here is not a Senator who does not have thousands of constituents who agree with the Senator from Alaska [Gruening] and the Senator from Oregon." Thus, he stressed the idea that the protesters were not a small fraction of American society, but, in fact, constituted a very large group of people.

In late 1965, he altered the argument slightly and claimed that the number of people supporting the anti-war movement was increasing and would continue to grow. He warned the government, "[t]he longer the war in Vietnam fails to produce peace, the more these methods of dissent will be used by the American people, no matter how much the Federal authorities try in the meantime to discredit opposition." He, in fact, even urged the people to take action by protesting the war. He justified protest by telling them, "[The means of protest] should be used by an American people that wishes to abide by the rule of law. They should be used by people who believe their Government should itself abide by the Constitution of the United States, which permits war to be pursued only upon a declaration of war by Congress, and by people who believe that the United States must take the lead in furthering, not destroying, the rule of law in relations among nations." He argued that protest was a
desirable action, for "America needs to hear the tramp, tramp, tramp of marching feet, in community after community, across the length and breadth of this land, in protest against the administration's unconstitutional and illegal war in South Vietnam."55

In claiming widespread support for the movement, Morse attempted to make his position seem more credible. For if many Americans opposed the Administration's policy, the anti-war movement must have represented the right course of action because the citizens' judgment, according to Morse, was typically correct. The argument may have served to convert many people to his way of thinking for more Americans may have rejected the policy in order to be in agreement with the popular and wise side of the controversy. Moreover, in claiming that Americans who supported international law and the Constitution should protest the war, he probably caused some people to feel that they, being responsible citizens, had an obligation to oppose the war. He also implied that because these people were unsure of the policy, and because they upheld the law and the Constitution, they were already a part of the anti-war movement; they should simply become active members.

During the intensification phase of the inception period, Morse made his arguments more forcefully and shifted his contention slightly concerning responsibility. As it became apparent in 1966 and 1967 that neither the Administration nor the Congress
would end the war, the Senator began to seek a different form of relief. He urged the American people to take the primary role in ending the war in Vietnam. He argued in this stage that the people of the United States must end the war because "Congress has refused. The people will have to have it out with the administration at the ballot box."56 On May 16, 1966, he asked the American people to "show that they want the President to stop, with their ballots, by defeating those who continue to vote to send American boys to Vietnam to support a bowl of jelly."57 On January 17, 1967, he appealed to American and therefore became more forceful as he called on the citizens "in the name of our spiritual values, in the name of our historic ideals, and in the name of the rights of humanity that they use their ballots to end the war."58

Following the Congressional elections of 1966, he noted the success of this anti-war policy by citing the fact that many anti-war candidates had been elected—in some cases by sissable margins. He reminded the American people that he had promised to "campaign for Democratic candidates for Congress in other States who shared my point of view on foreign policy, and that I did. A considerable number of them were elected; and with very few exceptions, all of them received at least 25 to 48% of the vote."59 Thus, Morse asked the people to take matters into their own hands and pointed out the success that would accompany such an endeavor. Additionally, in indicating the
success of the anti-war movement, he pointed out the viability of the dissenters, which may have caused more people to abandon their support of the war.

The Senator also took the opportunity during the intensification phase to address his supporters. On October 20, 1966, he noted the increasing number of dissidents among the members of the Senate when he maintained that "the concern over Vietnam in the Senate has grown markedly from what it was only a year ago." He commended them for their courage to transfer allegiance when he stated, "The senior Senator from Oregon has been joined in the Senate by an increasing number of his colleagues who are now talking on the floor of the Senate as well as in the cloakrooms. As I have said in the last three and one half years, if I could only have on the floor of the Senate the support I have in the cloakrooms, we might have stayed this unfortunate course of action of our country in the field of foreign policy many, many months ago." Thus, he reinforced the "doves" in the Senate in their opposition to the war and reminded them that their positions were popular and justified.

The Senator also addressed the remainder of the anti-war movement. He encouraged them to continue in their fight against the policy in spite of severe denunciations by the Administration. Morse indicted the Administration for "a propaganda job [that] is being done by this administration, through its State Department
and through its Defense Department, that must be stopped.  He urged the protesters not to be discouraged, however, because these actions would not further the Administration's cause, but would only hurt it. He pointed out, "here there is a meeting of a community group, or a service club convention, or where various bodies of Americans coming together to discuss foreign policy, the brass shows up. The brass comes in, in the form of colonels and generals, to discuss foreign policy under the pretext of military policy at the grassroots of America.... Can anyone think that is not having a psychological effect? Can anyone think that is not helping to cause a growing fear at the grassroots of America?" Moreover, he claimed that the Administration's fight against the protesters destroyed the unity of the nation, and he, therefore, implied that the dissenters were even more justified in opposing the Administration. The government's actions would not unify the country, for "unity will not be obtained by seeking to prevent dissent, and unity will not be obtained no matter what pressures, castigation, and abuse may be heaped upon the growing numbers in this country who are speaking out more and more in opposition to the President's policy in Vietnam." Thus, the increased opposition to the Johnson Administration's war policy was justified because it was actually hurting the American people.
The Tet Offensive supplied the movement with a glaring justification for its existence. When the shortcomings of the policy became obvious following this incident, the contentions by the anti-war movement appeared to be well-founded. Morse capitalized on this attitude as he urged more people to reject the Administration. He encouraged the people to continue to act by charging the Administration with a variety of serious offenses. On April 30, 1968, he maintained, "I do not care what segment of the American population you choose, you will find a growing demand on the part of increasing millions of Americans that this administration stop this war, stop killing American boys in Southeast Asia, stop killing tens of thousands of Vietnamese, stop poisoning and destroying their country, stop escalating the war, stop bringing us closer and closer to the precipice of a war with China..." 65 With this statement, he noted the beginning of the change in the political order. He implied that the old order, the government's policy on Vietnam, would be ousted by the people, for they would no longer tolerate that position. The Senator was finally able to confidently await change, for, as he advised the Administration, it "will be wise if it takes note of this growing point of view in this country, because there now is no longer any question about what has happened to public opinion in this Republic." 66 Morse urged the people to take
action in order to end the war in Vietnam. He discussed these means as alternatives to the Administration's policy on the war in Vietnam.
1. Wayne L. Morse, United States Foreign Policy in Asia: The Toll of War with China," Vital Speeches (July 17, 1964), p. 77.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 681.


6. Ibid., p. 3825.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 9764.

11. Ibid., p. 9763.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


17. See footnotes 11, 12, 13 and 14, pp. 75-76.
18 Morse, Congressional Digest (October, 1966), p. 238.
19 Ibid.
20 Morse, Congressional Digest (April, 1966), p. 1067.
22 Ibid., p. 10666.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 10667.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
28 Morse, Congressional Digest (October, 1968), p. 246.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 240.
31 Morse, "Personal Statement by Senator Morse on Secretary of Defense McNamara's Appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations," CR (February 21, 1968), p. 3815.
33 Morse, CR (August 6, 1964), p. 3828.
34 Morse, Vital Speeches (September 1, 1964), pp. 678-79.
37 Morse, CR (May 6, 1965), p. 9763.
38 See footnote 33, p. 84.
40 Ibid., p. 9763.
41 Morse, CR (October 20, 1966), p. 28082.
42 Morse, CR (May 6, 1965), p. 9763.
44 Ibid., p. 77.
45 Morse, CR (May 6, 1965), pp. 9765-66.
46 Ibid., p. 9764.
49 Morse, CR (July 1, 1965), p. 15472.
51 Morse, CR (May 6, 1965), p. 9767.
52 Ibid., p. 9768.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 74.
57 Ibid., p. 10670.
59 Ibid., p. 670.
60 Morse, CR (October 20, 1966), p. 28081.
61 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
By studying the anti-war rhetoric of Senator Morse, several important ideas emerge, the most important of which is the value of the Senator to the anti-war movement. Although he was not an integral part of the movement, his discourse reflects the progress of the anti-war movement and one can see the impact it had on the change in governmental policy with respect to the war in Southeast Asia. Primarily, his speeches demonstrate the initial difficulty that the anti-war spokespersons had to confront in persuading people to oppose the war. By the mere fact that he had to be careful in selecting his arguments and that he advanced a wide variety of contentions, it is apparent that he was searching for a position that the American people would accept. At a later stage in the development of the anti-war movement, he was able to focus on specific arguments and ideas. At those late phases, he most likely recognized that the audience's sentiments were similar to his own. Thus, Morse's accurate reflection of the anti-war movement becomes his rhetoric illustrates the circumspect nature of the political environment.

Morse's discourse also demonstrates the dynamic quality of the anti-war rhetoric. His arguments begin, evolve and become refined and more specific as the movement develops and becomes
more important to the American people. This dynamic quality is what characterizes the rhetoric of an historical movement and sets it apart from the other public discourse. The speeches of the Senator are valuable because they elucidate this characteristic of the anti-war movement.

Morse was also important to the movement because he probably helped to induce the change in attitude in the American people which eventually lead to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. Although he was admittedly not a leader of the anti-war movement, his rhetoric may have had a subliminal effect on the American people. The Senator was always very outspoken—particularly on the issue of the Vietnam war. To many people, his ideas seemed very extreme, for afterall, few would have ever even insinuated that the President was embarking on an illegal course of action in 1964. Although people may have reacted negatively toward him due to his viewpoint, they may have eventually been persuaded to reject the policy of the Administration. Morse’s stance on the issue was the exact opposition of that of the vast majority of the American people at most points in time. Thus, when less extreme protesters (Robert F. Kennedy, for example) offered reasons to abandon the policy, the American people may have accepted this alternative as a compromise. In short, Morse’s rhetoric was valuable because he probably contributed to the change in sentiment on the Vietnam war.
The study of his rhetoric also discloses some interesting ideas with respect to Griffin's historical movement theory. Initially, his discourse demonstrates that Griffin's model does not apply perfectly to a given body of speeches. Some components of the various phases that Griffin offers never appeared in Morse's speeches. A glaring example occurs during the identification phase of the inception period. Griffin argues that a movement's rhetoric has a cathartic effect because it identifies "the devils," thus causing some people to feel guilty and to seek a way to purge themselves of their sin. The Senator very rarely attempted to instill a sense of guilt in these people. Although he pointed to the supporters of the war and claimed that they were evil, he never really urged them to repent by joining the anti-war movement. This was most likely true because he was not really affiliated with the movement and he probably realized that most Americans would not support a movement among whose leaders were Communists, anarchists, and youthful "hippies." Moreover, the Senator never really attempted to unify the opposition of the war. He frequently departed from the common devices utilized by the anti-war movement during the identification phase. His style and substance were unique and they often were incomparable, in the eyes of the protagonists.

The model also does not apply perfectly because each of the components of the different periods were not present in all of
the arguments. As the contentions developed, Morse tended to ignore certain facets that he had previously presented. Thus, the device of attempting to convert the uncommitted Americans during the identification phase of the inception period, for example, appeared in some arguments, but not in others, perhaps because he felt that it was important to stress other ideas. Briefly, Griffin's theory does not apply perfectly to Morse's rhetoric. His model most likely would never perfectly fit any body of discourse because he fails to take into account the speaker's role in selecting and emphasizing certain arguments.

Morse's rhetoric also reveals an erroneous assumption that Griffin makes. Griffin maintains that when the procedures that he cites are followed, a change in policy will occur. Thus, if a given speaker presents speeches in accordance with the three phases of the inception period, the crisis period and the consummation period, a change in attitude will follow which will lead to the desired alternative. The assumption that he makes is that the speaker has a large influence on the people. In Morse's case, he was not terribly important to the vast majority of the American people. Although his anti-war discourse was important, it did not serve to simultaneously sway the people. Moreover, Griffin assumes that when certain components are in the discourse, the people will change their attitudes in the desired manner. This prediction seems rather naive, for one can never be certain
of how a line of argumentation will affect an audience, because their attitudes are sufficiently complicated to thwart an accurate prediction.

Although the Senator's anti-war rhetoric elucidates some shortcomings within Griffin's theory, it also demonstrates a major strength. The organizing framework that Griffin offers was apparent throughout Morse's speeches. His arguments did cover the inception period and a portion of the crisis period, which were the only periods in which he participated. Thus, Griffin's contention that the discourse of an historical movement invariably follows this pattern is borne out by the Senator's speeches. This is an important contribution on Griffin's part because by pinning down a dynamic body of discourse, one may note the fine nuances that exist within the rhetoric. It is these subtleties which combine together to make the rhetoric of the historical movement something that is truly alive.


----------. *Congressional Digest*, May, 1965, pp. 174-76.


----------. *Congressional Digest*, April, 1966, pp. 123-25.

----------. *Congressional Digest*, August-September, 1966, pp. 208-12.

----------. *Congressional Digest*, October, 1966, pp. 234-35.


----------. *Congressional Digest*, October, 1968, pp. 246-50.