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Title:Trade credit
Author(s):Zare, Meysam
Director of Research:Bernhardt, Mark D
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Bernhardt, Mark D
Doctoral Committee Member(s):Krasa, Stefan; Parente, Stephen L; Kahn, Charles M
Department / Program:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Subject(s):Stationary Equilibrium, Dynamic Contract, Trade Credit
Abstract:This dissertation develops a new tractable solution method to calculate the set of equilibrium outcomes for a broad variety of dynamic economic models. These outcomes---players' payoffs in repeated games, continuation values of agents in recursive contracts, or the set of stationary distributions in recursive competitive equilibria---are given by the fixed-points of a class of set-valued contraction mapping operators. I then use the method to analyze a dynamic model of trade credit. This model features a principal/seller of an intermediate good who repeatedly sells on credit and lacks collateral to a cash-constrained buyer/agent who receives new history dependent private information each period and takes private and public actions, including, possibly, defaulting on his debt.
Issue Date:2019-12-06
Rights Information:Copyright 2019 Meysam Zare
Date Available in IDEALS:2020-03-02
Date Deposited:2019-12

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