Title: | Trade credit |
Author(s): | Zare, Meysam |
Director of Research: | Bernhardt, Mark D |
Doctoral Committee Chair(s): | Bernhardt, Mark D |
Doctoral Committee Member(s): | Krasa, Stefan; Parente, Stephen L; Kahn, Charles M |
Department / Program: | Economics |
Discipline: | Economics |
Degree Granting Institution: | University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign |
Degree: | Ph.D. |
Genre: | Dissertation |
Subject(s): | Stationary Equilibrium,
Dynamic Contract,
Trade Credit |
Abstract: | This dissertation develops a new tractable solution method to calculate the set of equilibrium outcomes for a broad variety of dynamic economic models. These outcomes---players' payoffs in repeated games, continuation values of agents in recursive contracts, or the set of stationary distributions in recursive competitive equilibria---are given by the fixed-points of a class of set-valued contraction mapping operators.
I then use the method to analyze a dynamic model of trade credit. This model features a principal/seller of an intermediate good who repeatedly sells on credit and lacks collateral to a cash-constrained buyer/agent who receives new history dependent private information each period and takes private and public actions, including, possibly, defaulting on his debt. |
Issue Date: | 2019-12-06 |
Type: | Text |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2142/106492 |
Rights Information: | Copyright 2019 Meysam Zare |
Date Available in IDEALS: | 2020-03-02 |
Date Deposited: | 2019-12 |