| Title: | Trade credit |
| Author(s): | Zare, Meysam |
| Director of Research: | Bernhardt, Mark D |
| Doctoral Committee Chair(s): | Bernhardt, Mark D |
| Doctoral Committee Member(s): | Krasa, Stefan; Parente, Stephen L; Kahn, Charles M |
| Department / Program: | Economics |
| Discipline: | Economics |
| Degree Granting Institution: | University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign |
| Degree: | Ph.D. |
| Genre: | Dissertation |
| Subject(s): | Stationary Equilibrium,
Dynamic Contract,
Trade Credit |
| Abstract: | This dissertation develops a new tractable solution method to calculate the set of equilibrium outcomes for a broad variety of dynamic economic models. These outcomes---players' payoffs in repeated games, continuation values of agents in recursive contracts, or the set of stationary distributions in recursive competitive equilibria---are given by the fixed-points of a class of set-valued contraction mapping operators.
I then use the method to analyze a dynamic model of trade credit. This model features a principal/seller of an intermediate good who repeatedly sells on credit and lacks collateral to a cash-constrained buyer/agent who receives new history dependent private information each period and takes private and public actions, including, possibly, defaulting on his debt. |
| Issue Date: | 2019-12-06 |
| Type: | Text |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2142/106492 |
| Rights Information: | Copyright 2019 Meysam Zare |
| Date Available in IDEALS: | 2020-03-02 |
| Date Deposited: | 2019-12 |
ZARE-DISSERTATION-2019.pdf (2MB)