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Title:Coordinating Compromise: Information Manipulation and Bicameral Bargaining in the European Union
Author(s):Pemstein, Daniel B.
Director of Research:Bernhard, William T.
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Bernhard, William T.
Doctoral Committee Member(s):Gaines, Brian J.; Pahre, Robert D.; Sulkin, Tracy E.
Department / Program:Political Science
Discipline:Political Science
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Subject(s):European Union
Information Asymmetry
Legislative Influence
Abstract:The European Union relies on a complicated—some would say arcane—set of institutions and legislative rules to develop public policy that affects millions of Europeans. Actors within these institutions must effectively navigate this convoluted institutional structure in order to legislate. Crucially, government ministers in the Council of the European Union and members of the European Parliament seek to forge bicameral bargains in a complex information environment. This study examines how European politicians construct such compromises and explores how political elites coordinate around particular proposals when crafting policy. It highlights the ways in which European lawmakers manage and share information to encourage—and hamper—legislative coordination, and emphasizes the role that the European Commission—the Union’s bureaucratic arm—plays in transmitting information between lawmakers, modulating legislative efficiency.
Issue Date:2011-01-21
Rights Information:Copyright 2010 Daniel B. Pemstein
Date Available in IDEALS:2011-01-21
Date Deposited:2010-12

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