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|Title:||Essays on differential information economies|
|Doctoral Committee Chair(s):||Yannelis, Nicholas C.|
|Department / Program:||Economics|
|Degree Granting Institution:||University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign|
|Abstract:||In the first essay, we analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation. A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is individually rational, Pareto optimal, coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.
In the second essay, we introduce several efficiency notions depending upon what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and how agents share their information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.
|Rights Information:||Copyright 1996 Hahn, Guangsug|
|Date Available in IDEALS:||2011-05-07|
|Identifier in Online Catalog:||AAI9625141|