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|Title:||The politics of verification and the control of nuclear tests, 1945-1980|
|Author(s):||Gallagher, Nancy Woodworth|
|Doctoral Committee Chair(s):||Kolodziej, Edward A.|
|Department / Program:||Political Science|
|Degree Granting Institution:||University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign|
|Subject(s):||Political Science, International Law and Relations|
|Abstract:||This dissertation addresses two questions: (1) why has agreement been reached on verification regimes to support some arms control accords but not others; and (2) what determines the extent to which verification arrangements promote stable cooperation.
Previous approaches to verification theory and policy are inadequate because they treat the politics of verification as derivative rather than recognizing that evaluating cooperation is a political problem in its own right.
This dissertation develops an alternative framework for analysis by examining the politics of verification at two levels. The logical politics of verification are shaped by the structure of the problem of evaluating cooperation under semi-anarchical conditions. The practical politics of verification are driven by players' attempts to use verification arguments to promote their desired security outcome. This framework is systematically applied to test ban verification politics from the earliest proposals for international control of atomic energy through the Reagan Administration announcement that a Comprehensive Test Ban was not a U.S. priority, even if one could be satisfactorily verified.
The historical material shows that agreements on verification regimes are reached when key domestic and international players desire an arms control accord and believe that workable verification will not have intolerable costs. Failure to reach agreement occurs for two reasons. First, the superpowers traditionally employ adversarial forms of verification that exacerbate pressures for unilateral gain in an arms control regime through cheating or spying. Since the way verification decisions are made changes perceptions, incentives and abilities for cooperation, it is very difficult to design stable adversarial verification regimes. Second, players who do not want significant arms control exacerbate the structural difficulties of designing mutually acceptable verification regimes in order to block or minimize cooperation.
For the politics of verification to major arms control agreements, current conceptions of verification must be broadened to provide appropriate reassurance as well as deterrence of violations, and to incorporate more joint verification decision-making. Clearer understanding of how verification is itself a political problem, and how players manipulate it to promote other goals is necessary if the politics of verification are to support rather than undermine the development of stable cooperation.
|Rights Information:||Copyright 1990 Gallagher, Nancy Woodworth|
|Date Available in IDEALS:||2011-05-07|
|Identifier in Online Catalog:||AAI9114242|