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Title:Dependable Cyber-Physical Systems through Control Flow Monitoring
Author(s):Van Der Woude, Joel
Contributor(s):Sha, Lui
Subject(s):security
cyber-physical systems
embedded systems
control flow
Abstract:Stuxnet, a computer virus found in Iranian nuclear facilities, proved the feasibility of an attack on an industrial control system. Similar attacks on critical infrastructure such as the power grid or clean water supply could have enormous economic and political consequences. In the interest of preventing future attacks on cyber-physical systems, we investigate methods of prevention. We explore the benefits of making architecture-level changes to the microprocessor as well as leveraging the constraints of many embedded systems in order to prevent binary code injection. Our approach utilizes control flow monitoring to ensure correct behavior of the system. By monitoring the control flow, we are able to detect an attack on the cyber-physical system and gracefully fail by switching to a trusted Simplex controller. Our control flow checking mechanism is a stand-alone hardware module implemented with hooks into the pipeline of a LEON3 processor. Our approach avoids incurring high overheads present in software-based approaches, due to the parallel execution of our hardware module. We show that it is possible to detect injected malicious code in such a way that allows us to transition to a trusted Simplex controller in the event of an attack.
Issue Date:2013-05
Genre:Other
Type:Text
Language:English
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/47623
Publication Status:unpublished
Peer Reviewed:not peer reviewed
Date Available in IDEALS:2014-03-19


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