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|Title:||Firm Strategy and Research and Development: A Game Theoretic Approach|
|Author(s):||Duffus, Lu Ann Mcclernan|
|Department / Program:||Economics|
|Degree Granting Institution:||University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign|
|Abstract:||The research and development decision pivots on many important variables--some beyond the control of the decision maker. One of these variables is the presence or absence of patent protection. The possibility of imitation adds additional uncertainty into the decision. The riskiness of the project may have an impact on the way that this uncertainty is resolved.
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider a firm's research and development decision when patent protection, if it exists at all, is weak or ineffective. If one firm successfully innovates, a rival firm may imitate, although the imitation will be costly and the probability of imitation (within a finite planning horizon) is less than one. Of interest is the impact of imitation on the rate of expenditure on research and development and the risk implications for a risk neutral firm. A two firm differential game is used as the vehicle for firm interaction. Both dynamic programming and calculus of variations are used to investigate the firm's optimal research and development decision.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1986.
|Date Available in IDEALS:||2014-12-16|