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Description
Title: | The effects of contract framing on misconduct |
Author(s): | Nichol, Jennifer Eve |
Director of Research: | Chen, Clara |
Doctoral Committee Chair(s): | Chen, Clara |
Doctoral Committee Member(s): | Peecher, Mark; Autrey, Romana; Mahoney, Joseph |
Department / Program: | Accountancy |
Discipline: | Accountancy |
Degree Granting Institution: | University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign |
Degree: | Ph.D. |
Genre: | Dissertation |
Subject(s): | Contract framing
Misreporting |
Abstract: | This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. |
Issue Date: | 2015-04-16 |
Type: | Text |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2142/78388 |
Rights Information: | Copyright 2015 Jennifer Nichol |
Date Available in IDEALS: | 2015-07-22 |
Date Deposited: | May 2015 |
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
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Dissertations and Theses - Accountancy
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Graduate Dissertations and Theses at Illinois
Graduate Theses and Dissertations at Illinois