Files in this item

FilesDescriptionFormat

application/pdf

application/pdf3070283.pdf (5MB)Restricted to U of Illinois
(no description provided)PDF

Description

Title:The Use of Noncooperative Games to Determine Strategic Bidding in Centralized Electricity Markets
Author(s):Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Overbye, Thomas J.
Department / Program:Electrical Engineering
Discipline:Electrical Engineering
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Engineering, Electronics and Electrical
Abstract:However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality.
Issue Date:2002
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:124 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/80786
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI3070283
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2002


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Item Statistics