Internal Security and Military Reorganization: The Rise of Paramilitaries in Developing Societies

Abstract

One of the most striking developments in the security structure of developing societies has been the rise of parallel military organizations (armed forces such as constabularies and militias outside the regular military and the police) concurrent with the "third wave" of democratization. This study develops a theory of why certain instruments of coercion (paramilitaries) emerge concurrently with democratization and at the cost of existing institutions (regular militaries). It argues that paramilitary growth represents a political-military innovation that emerges from the circumstances of state formation and the necessity for regime protection. However, this need is manifested differently and with varying consequences across regime-types. The propositions are tested by examining paramilitary growth in China, Iran, Russia, Indonesia, India, and Colombia. The study finds that democratic regimes register the largest paramilitary growth, followed by transitioning societies, and finally by authoritarian regimes. Paramilitary growth in authoritarian regimes indicates decentralization that could lead political liberalization. Democratizing regimes seek paramilitary expansion to reassert political and popular control over armed forces. In democratic societies, extended paramilitary growth could lead to erosion in the state's monopoly over the use of force. The research contributes to democratic theory, civil-military relations, political institutions, and conflict management, and provides policy prescriptions for dealing with paramilitaries as part of humanitarian and military interventions and postconflict reconstruction of the security sector.