Inter -Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition. The Case of South Asia

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the interactions of armed groups that challenge the sovereignty of a state and raises the question: under what conditions do rebel groups cooperate or compete with each other? It deviates from the standard explorations into political, economic and social factors that affect the onset, duration and termination of internal conflicts. These analyses often treat internal conflicts, such as insurgencies and civil wars, solely as an interaction between two actors - a rebel group and the government forces. A closer look, however, reveals that many internal conflicts involve more than one rebel group. These groups compete for resources, recognition, and recruits; in the process groups merge, disband, splinter or are eliminated. Therefore the interactions of rebel groups merit attention. I develop a typology of rebel groups as well as a typology of the interactions among them. Next, using game theory I model the strategic decision-making involved in establishing cooperative relations. I argue that, in the absence of an enforceable agreement, groups are more likely to cooperate with other groups that can make a credible commitment. The model indicates that groups are most likely to forge cooperative relations when the government undertakes large-scale counter-insurgency operations. Also groups are more likely to establish cooperative relations with other groups that have symmetrical goals and resource endowments. Case studies from Sri Lanka, Kashmir and Assam confirm the model's implications.