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Title:Ambient Air Pollution and the Allocation of Environmental Enforcement Effort
Author(s):Rabassa, Mariano J.
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Brozović, Nicholas
Department / Program:Agricultural and Consumer Economics
Discipline:Agricultural and Consumer Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Sociology, Criminology and Penology
Abstract:In this dissertation, I show that transboundary pollution and penalties for noncompliance generate incentives for strategic behavior by state enforcement agencies: laxness in enforcement of polluting plants with higher potential to generate spillovers in the former and precautionary behavior which leads to non-monotonic enforcement in the latter. These findings help to explain, in part, why inspection rates are lower in heavily polluted areas than in areas with ambient pollution concentrations closer to the nonattainment threshold.
Issue Date:2008
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:153 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/83001
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI3314868
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2008


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