Credit-Output Interlinked Contracts: The Relationships Between Traders and Farmers

Sotomayor, Narda Lizette
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Title:Credit-Output Interlinked Contracts: The Relationships Between Traders and Farmers
Author(s):Sotomayor, Narda Lizette
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Nelson, Charles H.
Department / Program:Agricultural Economics
Discipline:Agricultural Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Economics, Finance
Abstract:Within the repeated game framework, changes in the length of the review period, the farmer's probability of success, the reservation utilities of the parties, and their risk aversion are analyzed. In general, these changes affect the system of incentives designed to promote contract compliance, and therefore, the behavior of the parties and the conditions of the contracts.
Issue Date:1998
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:127 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/83026
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI9912383
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:1998


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