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Title:An Examination of the Stability of Cooperation in an Ongoing Collective Action: The Case of Nonpoint Source Pollution in Lake Pittsfield
Author(s):Algozin, Kenneth Alan
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Nelson, Charles H.
Department / Program:Agricultural Economics
Discipline:Agricultural Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Subject(s):Economics, Agricultural
Abstract:This results suggest that without additional incentives, farmers are likely to abandon their voluntary agreement and resume their use of atrazine within the watershed. It is then demonstrated how a combination of policy instruments can be used to alter the underlying game configuration of the collective action problem, resulting in cooperative outcomes. An ambient-based penalty, when used in conjunction with a subsidy payment, is shown to produce divergent incentive structures that shift the classification of the collective action away from a coordination problem with two equilibria to a mixed configuration containing several different game structures and many possible equilibria. The analysis concludes with an example confirming that joint cooperation is not a prerequisite to the realization of a socially desirable outcome.
Issue Date:1999
Description:199 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999.
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI9952950
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:1999

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