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Title:Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees and Asymmetric Information in the Grocery Supply Chain
Author(s):DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Randall Westgren
Department / Program:Agricultural Economics
Discipline:Agricultural Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Subject(s):Economics, Agricultural
Abstract:Mechanism design framework and two moments of the product demand distribution are utilized to eliminate mean-variance dominated products and separate non-dominated products by their demand distributions. Model results suggest that accurately designed menus of contracts including retail prices, slotting allowances, failure fees (or success rebates) and sales targets can separate products by their demand distributions and alleviate asymmetric information problems. Adverse selection problems can be reduced by utilizing such mechanisms to align incentives for retailers and manufacturers when shelving new product introductions.
Issue Date:2000
Description:159 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000.
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI9955606
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2000

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