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 Title: Rationalizability and Monotonicity in Large Auctions With Noise Traders Author(s): Lee, Soonho Doctoral Committee Chair(s): Cho, In-Koo Department / Program: Economics Discipline: Economics Degree Granting Institution: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Degree: Ph.D. Genre: Dissertation Subject(s): Economics, Theory Abstract: For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. Thus, we are only interested in the models with replicated players where limit trading models are well defined. We show that in those restricted models, the set of interim rationalizable bidding strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the auctions in the limit. Issue Date: 2006 Type: Text Language: English Description: 58 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85573 Other Identifier(s): (MiAaPQ)AAI3242914 Date Available in IDEALS: 2015-09-25 Date Deposited: 2006
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