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Title:Rationalizability and Monotonicity in Large Auctions With Noise Traders
Author(s):Lee, Soonho
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Cho, In-Koo
Department / Program:Economics
Discipline:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Economics, Theory
Abstract:For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. Thus, we are only interested in the models with replicated players where limit trading models are well defined. We show that in those restricted models, the set of interim rationalizable bidding strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the auctions in the limit.
Issue Date:2006
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:58 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85573
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI3242914
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2006


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