Files in this item

FilesDescriptionFormat

application/pdf

application/pdf3290322.pdf (2MB)Restricted to U of Illinois
(no description provided)PDF

Description

Title:Essays on Public Choice
Author(s):Mirhosseini, Mohammad Reza
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Mattia Polborn
Department / Program:Economics
Discipline:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Economics, Theory
Abstract:In the third paper we consider a society that has to decide on the wage that it offers for an elected official, who provides a public service for the citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and opportunity cost. They observe the wage, decide whether to enter as candidates, and if they do, how hard to campaign for winning the election. A higher wage makes more able candidates to enter, while both able and inept candidates campaign harder for the office. We analyze the optimal remuneration for the officials that maximizes ordinary citizens' expected utility.
Issue Date:2007
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:65 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85584
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI3290322
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2007


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Item Statistics