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Title:Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies
Author(s):Kim, Deuk-Won
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Department / Program:Economics
Discipline:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Economics, Theory
Abstract:This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively.
Issue Date:2008
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:41 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85592
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI3337819
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2008


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