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Title:Essays on Multi-Object Auctions
Author(s):Chakraborty, Indranil
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans; Charles Kahn
Department / Program:Economics
Discipline:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Economics, Finance
Abstract:The second chapter considers an auctioneer faced with a decision as whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction rule there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. In this situation both Vickrey auction and first-price auction yield the same expected revenue and the analysis is unchanged across revenue equivalent auction rules.
Issue Date:1997
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:88 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85610
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI9737068
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:1997


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