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 Title: Topics in the Design of Political and Economic Mechanisms Author(s): Bugarin, Mauricio Soares Doctoral Committee Chair(s): Williams, Steven R. Department / Program: Economics Discipline: Economics Degree Granting Institution: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Degree: Ph.D. Genre: Dissertation Subject(s): Political Science, General Abstract: Finally, the third essay analyzes conditions for the convexifiability of an agent's utility $u(a)$ viewed a function of his type. The study shows that if the set of types A is an m-dimensional rectangle, $m\ge1,$ then u can be assumed convex in a without loss of generality. In particular, in any unidimensional model where A is convex and compact, u is essentially convex. Furthermore, if A is a compact, strictly convex set and its boundary $\partial A$ is a level set of a nonsingular function, the study derives conditions on A and u ensuring that there exists a change of variables H such that $B=H\sp{-1}(A)$ is a convex set and the function $U=u\circ H:B\to\IR$ is strictly convex. Issue Date: 1997 Type: Text Language: English Description: 77 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85618 Other Identifier(s): (MiAaPQ)AAI9812541 Date Available in IDEALS: 2015-09-25 Date Deposited: 1997
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