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Title:Topics in the Design of Political and Economic Mechanisms
Author(s):Bugarin, Mauricio Soares
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Williams, Steven R.
Department / Program:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Subject(s):Political Science, General
Abstract:Finally, the third essay analyzes conditions for the convexifiability of an agent's utility $u(a)$ viewed a function of his type. The study shows that if the set of types A is an m-dimensional rectangle, $m\ge1,$ then u can be assumed convex in a without loss of generality. In particular, in any unidimensional model where A is convex and compact, u is essentially convex. Furthermore, if A is a compact, strictly convex set and its boundary $\partial A$ is a level set of a nonsingular function, the study derives conditions on A and u ensuring that there exists a change of variables H such that $B=H\sp{-1}(A)$ is a convex set and the function $U=u\circ H:B\to\IR$ is strictly convex.
Issue Date:1997
Description:77 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997.
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI9812541
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:1997

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