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Title:Essays on Environmental Taxes, Tax Evasion and Public Goods Supply in the Presence of Imperfect Competition
Author(s):Fernandez Felices, Diego Javier
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Gahvari, Firouz
Department / Program:Economics
Discipline:Economics
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree:Ph.D.
Genre:Dissertation
Subject(s):Economics, Finance
Abstract:We present here three essays dealing with general equilibrium economies and the role of taxation under imperfect competition. These three economies share the fact that at least one of their industries operate under imperfect competition, but each is concerned with a particular problem which has been studied extensively under perfect competitive assumptions. In the first chapter we study the optimal provision of public goods financed by distortionary taxes when there is a monopolistic sector in the economy. In the chapter, we assume that another market failure is present in the economy through the existence of a production externality generated by the imperfectly competitive sector. The problem of interest is that of second-best taxation of externalities in the presence of imperfect competition. The last chapter assumes that all the firms in the economy, either perfectly or imperfectly competitive, have the opportunity of concealing a fraction of their sales in order to (illegally) reduce the amount paid in taxes. We reconsider the problem of optimal commodity taxation under tax evasion when some sectors of the economy are imperfectly competitive.
Issue Date:2000
Type:Text
Language:English
Description:161 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000.
URI:http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85674
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI9989990
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-25
Date Deposited:2000


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