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|Title:||Empirical Essays on Auctions of Brazilian Treasury Securities|
|Author(s):||Silva, Anderson Caputo|
|Doctoral Committee Chair(s):||Kahn, Charles M.|
|Department / Program:||Finance|
|Degree Granting Institution:||University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign|
|Abstract:||Chapter 3 is motivated by the unusual institutional feature that in Brazil auctions of government securities are carried out by two different entities, the Central Bank (CB) and the National Treasury Secretariat (NTS). This chapter examines demand and profitability in the two sets of auctions and find that bidders pay a premium on securities in periods of interest rate volatility. We find that despite an apparent preference for CB instruments, there is no evidence of differences in profitability between auctions of the two institutions.|
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001.
|Date Available in IDEALS:||2015-09-28|