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Title:Three Essays on Managerial Compensation
Author(s):Ahn, Ji-Young
Doctoral Committee Chair(s):Craig Olson
Department / Program:Human Resources and Industrial Relations
Discipline:Human Resources and Industrial Relations
Degree Granting Institution:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Subject(s):Business Administration, Management
Abstract:The third chapter examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. I find that target pay levels are set on "long-run" past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Such effects are more pronounced for the firms with weaker external corporate governance. Overall, the findings here indicate that a pay-for-contemporaneous-only-performance relationship significantly understates the incentive effects of CEO pay.
Issue Date:2008
Description:139 p.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008.
Other Identifier(s):(MiAaPQ)AAI3337681
Date Available in IDEALS:2015-09-28
Date Deposited:2008

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