Eidos and Facticity in Husserl's Phenomenology of Judgment

Abstract

The study concludes that Husserl's attempt, as well as Heidegger's, falls short. Husserl's fails because in both his "static" and "genetic" analyses of judgment he is compelled to cite an irremediably factical element as a transcendental explanatory factor, "pure matter" in the former case and the "absolute now" in the latter. Heidegger's account fails insofar as: (1) he accounts for the satisfaction of objectively warranted judgment's general necessary conditions in Dasein's Being in what amount to a priori, eidetic terms; and (2) he makes a necessary condition an irremediably non-eidetic factor, namely Dasein's pre-understanding of Being's general meaning. Despite their outward differences, then, both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies in their analyses of judgment fail for the ways in which eidos and facticity become related to one another.