SOCIOLINGUISTIC EFFECTS OF MOBILITY: IRANIAN AZERBAIJANIS IN THE U.S.

BY

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DISSERTATION

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To my mom and dad,

the loveliest captives of Discourse

ABSRACT

This dissertation investigates the sociolinguistic effects of mobility. I mainly focus on three analytic dimensions of language use: (a) migration discourses; (b) language ideological discourses; and (c) sociolinguistic grammars, and claim that these three dimensions collectively present a conceptual understanding of a sociolinguistics of mobility and migration. The empirical data motivating my analytic framework come from Iranian Azerbaijanis in the U.S.

Scholarship on the sociolinguistics of mobility appears to favor *unpredictability* with respect to the sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration – i.e. a rather chaotic situation brought about by the mobility of people and of linguistic resources in a 'superdiverse' globalizing world in which patterns of language use are unpredictable. This study attempts to determine *what* sociolinguistic behaviors change as a result of migration and *why*, and whether or not some sociolinguistic effects of mobility are indeed *predictable.*

I follow an ethnographically-grounded discourse analytic approach in which I incorporate knowledge of social, cultural, and situational factors obtained through observational and interview data along with detailed transcriptions of interactions to reach a better understanding of the discursive practices of the community under study. To do so, a total of 25 hours of audio-recordings were collected over the past 4 years in two different contexts: Iran and the U.S.

In chapter 5, I illustrate that past migration trajectory and current migration status affect migrants' (re)-construction of spatiotemporal representations of the ideal life, using Bakhtin's (1981) notion of *chronotope*. In particular, through comparing the educational migrants with those of the U.S. Green Card lottery winners from Iran, I argue that there are discursively realized differences in how these two groups construct chronotopic images of the ideal life. Moreover, I argue that migration discourse does not necessarily deal with a 'remove' from

homeland, as characterized by Eisenlohr (2006) and Dick (2010); it can also deal with future-oriented desires for a better life in the host country. More specifically, I show how, due to the social, political, and economic issues the educational migrants experienced in Iran before migration as well as the bureaucratic restrictions around them after migration, which deprive them of, for instance, the ability to leave the U.S. to visit their families, their discourses tend to revolve more around hopes for a better future. I argue that such future positionings highlight a different aspect of migration discourse: the generation of chronotopic images of a 'life beyond' (Dick, 2010) which renders temporal future topically more prominent (Agha, 2007a) than spatiality. Moreover, scholars of language and migration discuss how the development in new technologies intensifies interconnectedness between the home and host countries (Vertovec, 1999; Blommaert, 2010; De Fina & Perrino, 2013; Lo & Park, 2017); however, this study argues that while technology facilitates *connection* to the homeland, it also brings feelings of *disconnection*. This is because the decontextualized information migrants receive from the homeland via new media (1) reminds them of their lack of access to physical presence *there* and (2) leads to the reconstruction of the image of the homeland which disrupts the image they already have, and hence cause them to feel disconnected.

In chapter 6, I argue that acts of ethnolinguistic identification are chronotopically organized (Blommaert & De Fina, 2017). That is, it is the dialogical nature of various (and sometimes conflicting) large-scale and small-scale chronotopes that informs participants' understandings of ethnolinguistic identity and guides their discursive processes of (de)authenticating certain identities. I illustrate how the spatiotemporal configurations in which interactions take place make certain chronotopes more salient, and that these more salient chronotopes are invoked by participants, organizing their discourses. Additionally, I illustrate

how the participants have a chronotopic understanding of appropriate language choices. That is, given the participants' experiences interacting with certain types of people in certain time-space frames, they have developed a chronotopic image of appropriate linguistic behaviors. This image then guides not only their own multilingual practices in similar chronotopic contexts, but is also used as a lens through which they evaluate others' linguistic practices. I specifically show how personhood becomes salient when the participants invoke certain people or types of people while evaluating acceptability of certain multilingual practices.

In chapter 7, I provide a comparative-theoretic account of code-switching in Azeri- Farsi-English multilingual communities in the U.S. and Iran using Bhatt and Bolonyai's (2011) optimality-theoretic framework for the analysis of inter-community variation. The salient differences between the grammars of these communities, I claim, reside in the relative 'value' each community places on the two relational constraints: POWER and SOLIDARITY. Specifically, in the diaspora context, SOLIDARITY outranks POWER, but in the indigenous context POWER outranks SOLIDARITY. I argue that this ranking difference between the two sociolinguistic grammars pertains to the practices that offer the *profit of distinction* (Bourdieu, 1991): in the diaspora context it is the *solidarity function*, accomplished by switching to Azeri and/or avoiding POWER switches, whereas in the indigenous context it is the *differentiation function*, in terms of status/power, accomplished through switching to English/Farsi.

Overall, I argue that a better understanding of the sociolinguistic effects of mobility requires a study of both macro-discursive practices of position-taking and micro-discursive practices dealing with patterns of multilingual language use. Taking into account the migration narratives of this community, we see how being in minority is a salient factor in how the participants position themselves relative to home and host countries. Specifically, their narratives

reveal their longings for collective identities, as evident in their discursive constructions of *us* and/or elicitations of alignments from others to highlight their shared transnational identities. Similarly, such feelings of being in minority are revealed in their language-ideological discourses in that, in terms of language choice, they prefer the relatively more local language that is shared by the interlocutors. Finally, in terms of their multilingual practices, we see how the relative value of solidarity *vis-à-vis* power is enhanced in diasporic contexts, which is in line with their overall desires for constructing collective transnational identities.

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"این همه پیچ
این همه گذر
این همه چراغ
این همه علامت
و همچنان استواری به وفادار ماندن به راهم
خودم
هدفم
و به تو!
وفایی که مرا و تو را به سوی هدف راه می نماید"

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview

In this dissertation, I investigate the sociolinguistic effects of mobility; focusing, mainly, on migration, along three analytic dimensions of language use: (a) migration discourses; (b) language ideological discourses; and (c) sociolinguistic grammars. These three dimensions, I claim, collectively present a conceptual understanding of a sociolinguistics of mobility qua migration. The conceptual-analytic framework of a sociolinguistics of mobility that I offer in this dissertation is illustrated in Figure 1. [1]

The empirical data motivating my analytic framework come from Iranian Azerbaijanis in the U.S. The main research questions I investigate are (1) what do Iranian Azerbaijanis' diaspora discourses reveal about the effects of mobility; specifically, how do they discursively negotiate their social positionings relative to home and host countries?; (2) how do mobility and migration affect these social actors' language ideologies; specifically, what do their metapragmatic comments reveal about their ideologies regarding appropriate patterns of language use as well as their positionings relative to language and identity?; and (3) what do

[1] Different parts of this dissertation have been published or accepted for publication by the following publishers:

- "Optimal choices: Azeri multilingualism in indigenous and diaspora contexts". Farzad Karimzad. *International Journal of Bilingualism,* Advance Online Publication, by SAGE Publications Ltd .doi: 10.1177/1367006916651733. Copyright © 2016 Farzad Karimzad. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1367006916651733
- "Life here beyond now: Chronotopes of the ideal life among Iranian transnationals". Farzad Karimzad. *Journal of Sociolinguistics, Vol. 20, Issue 5,* Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josl.12211/abstract
- "Language Ideologies and the Politics of Language: Azerbaijanis in Iran". Farzad Karimzad. To appear in Madina Djuraeva, & Francois V. Tochon (Eds.), *Language Policy or the Politics of Language: Re-imagining the Role of Language in a Neoliberal Society.* Blue Mounds, WI: Deep University Press.
- "'No, we don't mix languages': Ideological power and the chronotopic organization of ethnolinguistic identities". Farzad Karimzad & Lydia Catedral. To appear in *Language in Society,* Cambridge University Press.

their patterns of language use reveal about the effects of migration on their sociolinguistic grammar (of multilingual language use)?



Figure 1: The analytic scales of sociolinguistics of mobility

To be precise, the model shown in Figure 1 engages a study of the sociolinguistic effects of mobility through a macro-discursive analysis of diaspora narratives—how they discursively negotiate their social positionings and how they simultaneously orient to the two 'centers', i.e. the 'sending society' and the 'receiving societies'—down to the micro-discursive analysis of change, as, for instance, in the architecture of their diaspora grammar of language use. The shifts in orientations, changes in language ideologies, and adjustments in grammatical design, all serve the logic of the sociolinguistics of mobility in the specific ways that I explore in this dissertation. The orientation to *here* and *there*, for instance, can be studied through an analysis of the speakers' metapragmatic comments on what they consider as appropriate –language ideological—use of language(s) – i.e. following the sociolinguistic grammar of the community--

here-and-now compared to *there-and-then* with respect to patterns of language use. Such an integrated sociolinguistic analysis of the macro and micro aspects of migration can, I argue, yield an understanding of whether, and to what extent, these social actors believe they follow particular conventions for multilingual language use, whether, and to what extent, they notice any changes in the patterns after their migration, and whether, and to what extent, are some aspects of such change more salient than the others. In other words, the narratives of migration—of loss, longing, and belonging—reveal new, recalibrated indexical systems of language ideologies, those that restructure linguistic choices, ultimately affecting the grammar of bilingual language use.

1.2. Iranian Azerbaijanis

Iranian Azerbaijanis or Iranian Turks are the largest minority group in Iran, mostly inhabiting northwestern provinces. Their mother tongue is Azerbaijani or Azeri which is a Turkic language spoken primarily in the Republic of Azerbaijan and northwestern Iran. After Persian (Farsi), which is said to be the first language of over 50% of Iranians, Azerbaijani is the mother tongue of approximately 24% of the total population of Iran (Bani-Shoraka, 2005). While Persian, as the single official language of Iran, is dominantly used in education, mass media, administration, etc., Azerbaijani does not have a particular status in Iran and its use is mainly restricted to informal domains (Bani-Shoraka, 2005).

Socio-historically, Iranian Azerbaijanis have been subjected to linguistic and ethnic subordination. Not only has Azeri-accented Farsi been an object of ridicule among non-Azerbaijanis, but Azerbaijanis (referred to as Turks in this context) are also portrayed as less intelligent and foolish in some Iranian cultural productions such as jokes (Salehi & Sepehri,

2013). Although they are usually characterized by non-Azerbaijanis as ‘mere jokes’ and one should have ‘the capacity to take them as jokes’, it is inevitable that the reproduction of ethnic jokes or other cultural productions in daily interactions constructs social ‘realities’ about a group of people (in this case Iranian Azerbaijanis), which can be transferred to ‘non-jocular’ contexts as well (see Naghdipour, 2014). On the other hand, Azerbaijani language and its promotion have been politically sensitive topics, similar to the two other major minoritized languages, Kurdish and Baluchi (Bani-Shoraka, 2002; Jahani, 2002; Sheyholislami, 2012). This is mainly because (1) the language policy of Iran has revolved around the promotion of Persian as the language that secures national unity, and (2) the dominant discourses around maintaining and promoting Azerbaijani language are associated with nationalist separatist groups who threaten the unity of the nation -- despite the fact that the majority of Iranian Azerbaijanis may demand their ‘language rights’ without necessarily aligning themselves with separatist ideologies. As a result, though sporadic promises have been made by politicians to revitalize Azerbaijani language rights in recent years, they have almost never been realized due to the political sensitivity of this topic.

1.3. Significance of Research

The significance of this study lies in its theoretical, empirical, and methodological implications.

Theoretically, this research has implications for the sociolinguistics of mobility, sociolinguistics of minoritized groups, and sociolinguistics of change, as well as how multilingualism works. Specifically, while scholarship on the sociolinguistics of mobility appears to favor *unpredictability* with respect to the sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration – i.e. a rather chaotic situation brought about by the mobility of people and of linguistic resources in a ‘superdiverse’ globalizing world in which patterns of language use are unpredictable -- this study attempts to determine *what* sociolinguistic behaviors change as a

result of migration and why, and whether or not some sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration are indeed *predictable.* By focusing on a community which is a minoritized group in the indigenous context, Iran, this study has implications for the sociolinguistics of minority groups: How a minoritized group responds to subordination *vis-à-vis* the dominant language at home, and reconcile and renegotiate their status as a minority group in its displaced, diasporic context. Furthermore, this research has implications for how multilingualism works among dislocated minority groups. Specifically, drawing on previous studies modeling patterns of multilingual language use, this study aims to provide a model that incorporates both the idea of community grammars structuring these patterns—in the indigenous contexts and the diaspora contexts—and the role of individual agency.

On an empirical level, the focus of this study is on Iranian Azerbaijanis, an understudied population. The significance of studying this population is in the fact that the Iranian Azerbaijanis are an ethno-linguistic minoritized group in Iran and are associated with different ethnic and linguistic subordination; therefore, studying their language ideologies and attitudes before and after migration would reveal whether minority groups become more 'minoritized', i.e. 'double minoritization', upon displacement, or their local minority becomes less significant – since the group minoritizing them, i.e. Persians, are themselves a minority group in diaspora – and what becomes more salient is their diasporic minority.

Methodologically, this research uses different tools coming from the fields of sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology to study the sociolinguistic effects of mobility. Specifically, this study argues that studying the sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration requires focusing on different levels, i.e. from understanding a broader level of migration discourses to examining the narrower level of patterns of language use, using different tools to

triangulate data in order to capture sociolinguistically significant generalizations of the interconnected issues of minority, mobility, and multilingualism. To do so, I use a variety of methodological tools from chronotopic analysis and deictic analysis to optimality-theoretic analysis, and call for less field-specific bias regarding sociolinguistic methodologies within the broader field of socio-cultural linguistics, and more methodological triangulation so as to shed more light on the sociolinguistic behaviors of social actors. That is, by employing multiple methodologies, we are able to observe the multiple levels at which mobility impacts language use. Understanding the effects of mobility at multiple levels is key to understanding the experience of diaspora populations more comprehensively.

1.4. Research Questions

In order to investigate the sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration, I will focus on the following three main research questions:

1) How does mobility impact social actors' migration discourses?

> 1.1. What do their narratives —of loss, longing, and belonging— reveal about the sociolinguistic effects of migration?
>
> 1.2. How do these migrants discursively negotiate their social positionings and orient themselves to the 'sending society' [Iran] and the 'receiving society' [the US]?
>
> 1.3. Do their past migration trajectory and current migration status affect how they orient themselves to *here* and *there*?

2) How does mobility impact social actors' language ideologies?

> 2.1. What do their metapragmatic comments reveal about the effects of migration on their language choice as well as their positionings relative to language and identity?

2.2. To what extent are these social actors aware of the effects of mobility and migration on their patterns of language use?

2.3. What patterns of language use do they consider appropriate (i.e. following the conventions of the community)? What are the important factors guiding their positionings relative to appropriate patterns of multilingual language use?

3) How does mobility impact social actors' sociolinguistic grammar of multilingual language use?

3.1. How do Iranian Azerbaijani speakers' patterns of code-switching between Azeri, Farsi, and English change as a result of migration?

3.2. What accounts for the change in their patterns of code-switching?

3.3. To what extent the change in their sociolinguistic grammar can be accounted for through the potential changes in their language ideologies investigated in RQ2 and their broader social positionings investigated in RQ1?

1.5. Organization of Dissertation

The following outlines how the remainder of the dissertation is organized:

Chapter 2: Background

The background chapter discusses the sociopolitical and historical circumstances around Azerbaijani language and identity in Iran. It discusses the language policies and the politics of language in contemporary Iran, focusing on how these policies along with some other factors have led to diverse language ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

This chapter provides an overview of how transnationalism has shifted the focus of study within language and migration scholarship. It focuses on how current scholarship investigates the link between home and host countries in the study of mobile populations' social positionings relative to these two centers. Moreover, I provide an overview of the study of multilingual language use focusing specifically on code-switching, discussing how the study of the sociolinguistic effects of mobility on patterns of multilingual language use is methodologically feasible. Finally, I will discuss how the current study goes beyond what previous research has shown.

Chapter 4: Methodology

In this chapter, I describe of the methods employed in this study. I particularly provide a description of the data collection, transcription, coding, and analysis procedures as well as the biographical information about the participants gained through my ethnophraphic work.

Chapter 5: Migration Discourses

The first analysis chapter concerns Iranian Azerbaijanis' migration discourses, focusing particlularly on their future-oriented and past-oriented discourses.I use a number of relatively long excerpts to illustrate how, given their subjective experiences, Iranian Azerbaijanis in the U.S. negotiate their yearnings for an ideal future in the host country as well as their past-oriented longings, belongings, and loss.

Chapter 6: Language-ideological Discourses

In the second analysis chapter, I focus on the participants' language-ideological discourses. In particular, I present excerpts to show how the participants position themselves relative to issues

of language and identity, illustrating how the histories they bring along affect how they identify themselves. I then focus on their metapragmatic comments on how their multilingual language use has changed as a result of migration and also on what they consider appropriate language choice in diasporic contexts.

Chapter 7: Sociolinguistic Grammars

In this chapter, I provide a comparative analysis of Iranian Azerbaijanis' patterns of multilingual language use in indigenous and diasporic contexts. Specifically, I present data to illustrate the variation between Iranian Azerbaijanis' patterns of code-switching in Iran and the U.S., showing how these patterns change after migration as a result of the changes in their language ideologies.

Chapter 8: Conclusions

In the final chapter, I will discuss the overall findings of this study and how they shed light on our understandings of the sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration. I will then discuss the theoretical implications of this study for a broader theory of sociolinguistics of mobility, particularly, in light of the previous research. Finally, I will present the limitations of this study followed by the potential future research directions.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

2.1. Overview

In this chapter, I discuss the sociopolitical and historical circumstances around Azerbaijani language and identity in Iran. In particular, I discuss how the language policies in Iran have affected Azerbaijani language and its speakers' language ideologies. I will (1) provide an overview of language policies and the politics of language in Iran in the contemporary neoliberal era; (2) discuss how these policies along with some other factors have led to diverse language ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis; and finally (3) discuss the challenges faced by Azerbaijani people regarding their language and identity as well as the challenges Iranian government is encountering with respect to minority language rights and national unity. [2]

2.2. Anti-Western Ideologies, Neoliberalism, and the Language Policy in Iran

2.2.1. Anti-Western Rhetoric

Since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, the political, economic, and social discourses of the Iranian regime have revolved around anti-Western ideologies (KhosraviNik, 2015; Pesaran, 2008). As a result, Western values and ideologies have been dispreferred, and the government has attempted to distance itself from the West by discouraging any overt affiliation of its policies with Western values and ideologies-- regardless of their nature. Such an anti-Western rhetoric has specifically been prominent in the areas of education and culture to highlight the necessity of resisting against the so-called 'cultural invasion' of the West (Fazeli, 2006). For instance, in

[2] A large part of this chapter will appear as a chapter entitled "Language Ideologies and the Politics of Language: Azerbaijanis in Iran". In Madina Djuraeva, & Francois V. Tochon (Eds.), Language Policy or the Politics of Language: Re-imagining the Role of Language in a Neoliberal Society. Blue Mounds, WI: Deep University Press.

2009, the Supreme Leader of Iran called for *Islamization of Humanities Courses* in universities in order to defend against what he referred to as the 'soft war', i.e. the flow of Western ideologies, theories, and values across the Iranian society (see Price, 2012). A similar concern has existed among the Islamic Republic conservatives about the role of English Language Teaching (ELT) in spreading Western values. In the past two decades, the tendency to learn and speak English among Iranians has increased dramatically as a result of globalization. The desire to learn English and benefit from the economic and symbolic profits (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) it offers has led to an overwhelming rise in the number of private language schools in Iran. This growth, however, has less been a result of systematic policies to privatize foreign language instruction, and instead -- given the old-fashioned and ineffective language instruction methods and materials in the public educational system -- it has more been an inevitable response to the demand of the market (Hayati & Mashhadi, 2010). This has in fact created a dilemma for the Iranian regime. On the one hand, the Islamic regime of Iran wants to be a part of the global market and knows that competitiveness in the era of neoliberal globalization requires learning and using the global language in business and education (Piller & Cho, 2013; Piller, 2015). On the other hand, its biggest concern is that the spread of English would in turn result in the spread of Western values across the country. In order to strike a balance, the Iranian government has attempted to monitor the private institutions by regulating their business licenses and imposing censorship on the cultural content of the textbooks. In some cases (e.g., in the city of Tabriz, the largest Azeri speaking city), it has even gone further and has gotten involved in the teacher selection process of the private schools through interviewing the teachers especially about their religious and ideological beliefs, which is a common recruitment procedure in public institutions. The concern about the spread of Western values through English is evident in the Supreme

Leader's recent criticism of English Language Teaching in Iran. In a speech in early May 2016, Ayatollah Khamenei criticized the promotion of English, maintaining that encouraging children to learn English instead of Persian would promote foreign culture among the youth in Iran.

2.2.2. Persian as the Unifying Factor

The role of Persian language in this regard is indeed interesting. While one of the reasons for the promotion of Persian by the Islamic regime seems to be resisting against Western influence in the Iranian society, for the Persian nationalists, promoting Persian is a way to highlight their *Persianness* and differentiate themselves from the Islamic identity favored by the regime (for an overview of the history of Persian nationalism see Kia, 1998; see also KhosraviNik & Zia, 2014). The point on which these people with two extreme ideologies agree is the role of Persian in securing national unity, which is guided by the Western 'one nation-one language' ideology (Sheyholislami, 2012). In fact, while in many cases the dominant (Persian-speaking) majority in Iran may position themselves differently from the domestic or foreign policies of the Islamic Republic, in the case of the role of Persian language in unifying the nation, they seem to be in full support of the policies of the government. Such an approach, regardless of its Islamic, nationalistic, or patriotic motivations, has led to the consideration of multilingualism as a threat to the national unity and in turn has made it difficult for ethno-linguistic minorities to demand their language rights.

The first systematic attempts to establish Persian as the language unifying the ethno-linguistically heterogeneous Iran date back to 1930s when Reza Khan (1925-1941), the first ruler of the Pahlavi Monarchy, was in power (Bani-Shoraka, 2005). Being inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's (1881-1938) nationalistic policies in Turkey, Reza Khan's purpose was to turn "the loosely integrated state into a highly centralized regime" (Sheyholislami, 2012, p. 27). It was at

that time that Persian became the only language of administration, mass media, and education and all non-Persians were required to learn Persian, as the dominant language of the nation (Hassanpour, 1992; Bani-Shoraka, 2002). It was also during 1930s that systematic efforts were made to purify Persian, especially from Arabic words, and coin new Persian words to save it from the 'contaminating' foreign linguistic elements (Kia, 1998). As a result of Reza Khan's nation-building process and the fear of political separatism, any language rights demand from the minority groups was considered to be prompted by political rather than linguistic motivations, thus making it a matter of national unity and security (Bani-Shoraka, 2002). The assimilationist policies of Reza Khan were continued by his successor, Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979), during whose reign, the language rights demands by the ethno-linguistic minorities were also neglected (Sheyholislami, 2012).

Although the current assimilationist policies in Iran are in fact a continuation of the policies established during Pahlavi Monarchy, the constitution of the Islamic Republic comparatively demonstrates some degree of leniency regarding the use of minority languages. In particular, it acknowledges the existence of diverse regional languages and allows their use in the press and mass media. However, it is important to note how, and to what extent, these policies have been implemented so as to have a better understanding whether or not they have succeeded. Article 15 of the Constitution reads:

> The official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and

mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.[3]

Article 15 explicitly introduces Persian as the official language of the country, requiring all official documents and correspondence to be in this language. As a result, although it does not forbid the use of minority languages, what happens in reality is that the speakers of the minority languages do not get the opportunity to experience formal contexts (e.g., written language) in their mother tongue. In addition, as Sheyholislami (2012) points out, while this article does not specify the medium of instruction in schools, it can be inferred that since textbooks are required to be in Persian, instruction must also be in Persian. In the case of Azerbaijanis, the implementation of this policy has led to the development of certain interactional conventions among the Azerbaijani students and teachers, especially in the primary and secondary schools, where they code-switch between Azerbaijani and Persian depending on the interactional roles they are occupying. That is, instruction-related interactions such as lecturing and question-answers are done in Persian and non-instructional interactions are usually done in Azerbaijani. Such voicing shifts (Bakhtin, 1981) illustrate that the students and teachers are primarily animating two different interactional roles in school contexts, i.e., 'character' role versus 'interlocutor' role, indexed through their language choices (cf. Koven, 2002, 2007).

Although the acknowledgement of some of the language rights of the minority groups in the post-Revolutionary Iran can be characterized as a more 'relaxed', 'flexible', and 'nuanced' policy compared to pre-Revolution era (Haddadian-Moghaddam & Meylaerts, 2015; Hayati & Mashhadi 2010), there are issues with its implementation and success. First of all, the

[3] Source : http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-2.html (Accessed 6/30/2016)

constitution only specifies teaching of the *literatures* of the local languages without further clarifying whether or not the languages themselves could be taught. That said, only recently, in August 2016, did the government announce that the universities in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces would offer programs in Azerbaijani and Kurdish language and literature. While this is indeed a positive move by the government, its effectiveness is subject to careful evaluation in the future. On the other hand, despite the fact that the establishment of provincial television and radio channels in local languages can also be considered a positive action, they have not been received positively by their audiences. Sheyholislami (2012) maintains that the language use in the state-mediated Kurdish radio and television programs is not welcomed by most Kurdish scholars who claim that Kurdish language is deliberately being harmed. Zeinalabedini's (2014) study on the attitudes of the Azerbaijanis located in Tabriz toward the language use in the local radio and television programs also shows a similar dissatisfaction. What the participants in her study particularly point out is that the dialect used in the media differ from how they actually speak. In fact, the common attitude toward the language used in the local media is that the speakers mix Azerbaijani with Persian extensively; some even (jocularly) maintain that only the verbs are in Azerbaijani in their speech. From common people's perspective, those who mix Persian with Azerbaijani on the media are mostly 'pretentious', i.e., they switch to the prestige code to index power and higher social status (Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2011), which might be true to some extent. However, the linguistic practices observed on the local media may have other explanations as well. As mentioned earlier, as a result of the Iranian language policies, Azerbaijani speakers have always been exposed to formal situations in Persian, be them through the dominant media or school textbooks. Thus, it is inevitable that, if one experiences, for instance, the latest political news, sports events, weather forecast, etc., in Persian, they would

mainly recall Persian structures and words when it comes to speaking. In fact, those who criticize such linguistic practices for being 'pretentious' may also construct similar patterns when they are put in similar formal situations. All in all, while the relatively lenient policies of the Islamic Republic toward minority languages, compared to the pre-Revolutionary era, should be acknowledged, what is evident is that they still need to be revisited so as to meet the current demands of the minority groups.

In the following sections, I will discuss how the current language policies and the politics of language in Iran along with some other factors have affected the language ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis. I will then conclude by outlining the challenges faced by the Iranian regime regarding its language policies in the neoliberal globalized world as well as the challenges encountered by the Azerbaijani varieties spoken in Iran and how the potential solutions proposed by some can also be problematic.

2.3. Language Ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis

One of the consequences of the Iranian language policy, which emphasizes the use of Persian in all formal domains, is that the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran does not have a standard form. Although the dialect spoken in Tabriz has traditionally been recognized as the standard form of the Iranian Azerbaijani (Doerfer, 1998) --probably due to its socio-historical and political importance in the country -- it has not yet been standardized. On the other hand, the technological developments in recent years have granted Iranian Azerbaijanis access to satellite television programs, especially Turkish programs, which also plays an important role in this regard. Bani-Shoraka (2003) considers access to the Turkish satellite broadcasts as one of the factors that has led to what she calls the *revitalization* of Azerbaijani language and identity. That said, the attractiveness of these programs along with the picture being depicted in them of a

modernized Turkey has, in fact, resulted in the emergence of Turkish as a new prestige language among Azerbaijanis. Mirvahedi (2012) argues that people's exposure to Turkish through these programs and their interest in learning it, as a language that can bring about socio-economic values for them, pose a new challenge for the maintenance of the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran. He specifically argues that Azerbaijani children's preference to watch Persian and Turkish programs, and their reluctance to watch the state-mediated provincial channel make maintaining their mother tongue extremely difficult. In addition, I argue that the satellite programs broadcast by Turkey (and the Republic of Azerbaijan) have also had some other language-ideological effects resulting in what I call *self-subordination*. That is, the idea that the variety of Turkic language *they* are speaking is 'stronger', 'purer' and more 'authentic' than *ours*—since ours has been influenced by Persian – leads to devaluing their own language and linguistic practices and elevating the value of Turkish (or North Azerbaijani) as *the* norm. Such self-subordination is motivated by the ideology that there is a single 'pure' form of Turkic languages, and that the variety *they* speak is closer to it. This idea of self-subordination will be relevant when I analyze some of the examples in chapter 6. These factors, i.e., language policies in Iran and their social, political, and linguistic consequences, the influence of the Turkic-speaking neighboring countries, and the myth of 'authenticity', have led to a variety of language ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis, some of which will be discussed below.

2.3.1. The 'Correctness' Ideology

One of the language ideologies among Iranian Azerbaijanis concerns the notion of 'correctness'. It is motivated by two main ideas: (1) monolingualism is the norm; and (2) there is a 'correct' form of the language that should be used, especially in writing (a prescriptivist view). In particular, the main concerns for the proponents of this ideology are to, firstly, use the language

as monolongually as possible, and secondly, make sure that the diachronic and synchronic changes (especially phonological changes) do not 'harm' their language. For instance, the word for 'is not' in North Azerbaijani and Turkish are *dəyil* and *değil*, respectively. Given the similarities in the articulatory properties of /l/ and /r/, this word has diachronically been reanalyzed as *dæyir* in many Iranian Azerbaijani dialects including Tabrizi Azerbaijani (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming; See also Karimzad, Shosted, & Peymani, 2015). Having compared this word with its Turkish and North Azerbaijani counterparts, those who attempt to use Azerbaijani 'correctly' conclude that *dæyil* should be the 'correct' form of this word. However, the question that needs to be answered is, since all languages go through different changes throughout history, how far should one go back in order to find the 'correct' form? For instance, if we take into consideration the Proto-Turkic form of this word, which is **degül*, we realize that it has also gone through some other changes apart from the change in the final consonant in these varieties. In fact, if we go even further back, we see that the Proto-Altaic form of this word, i.e. **tagi*, does not specify the final consonant; or in Mongolian language family, another sub-family of Altaic languages, the Proto form is**deɣüren,* with an 'r' instead of 'l'.[4] Hence, we see that languages undergo natural evolution throughout the history, and trying to determine the 'correct' form of a language seems to be nothing but a vain attempt.

The other concern for the proponents of 'correctness' is the linguistic practices of Azerbaijanis on Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC). Although the idea that CMC is ruining languages is not restricted to this community, the case of Azerbaijani appears to be

[4] Source :http://starling.rinet.ru/cgi-bin/etymology.cgi?single=1&basename=%2Fdata%2Falt%2Fturcet&text_number=1601&root=config (Accessed 6/30/2016)

different in this regard. In fact, given the language policy of Iran which has established Persian as the language of education, administration and mass media, CMC might be the only venue for Iranian Azerbaijanis to use the written form of their language (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming). Thus, it is believed that the use of vernacular forms, which enjoy different phonological alternations, on CMC would cause Azerbaijani speakers to forget the 'correct' form of their language. For instance, in Tabrizi and some other dialects, there is a phonological process called *Compensatory Lengthening*. In Compensatory Lengthening, one segment, e.g. a syllable, is deleted and instead a nearby segment is lengthened (Hayes, 1989). To illustrate, *ɟ͡ɟæliræm* meaning 'I am coming' alternates with *ɟ͡ɟæːræm,* in which the second syllable -*li*- is deleted and the vowel *æ* is lengthened (Karimzad, Shosted, & Peymani, 2015). While the speakers of the dialects that have such phonological alternations would indeed use both forms interchangeably, it is not clear to what extent the concerns put forward by the proponents of the 'correctness' ideology are valid. In fact, the prescription of certain linguistic forms as *the* 'correct' ones would homogenize different varieties of Azerbaijani in the long run and thus would result in the disappearance of the unique linguistic properties of these dialects, some of which outlined in Karimzad, Shosted, and Peymani (2015) and Karimzad (2014).

2.3.2. The 'Pureness' Ideology

The other observed language ideology among Azerbaijanis is linguistic purism. According to Thomas (1991), purism is "an aspect of the codification, cultivation and planning of standard languages" (p. 12). This ideology aims at preserving the form of a language by getting rid of undesirable foreign elements (Brunstad, 2003). Karimzad and Sibgatullina (forthcoming) propose that purification be considered as identity work and 'foreignness' as a *socio-political* construction rather than a mere result of *linguistic* differences. That is, purification is a result of

practices of *distinction* (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) in which the linguistic elements associated with the language of *them* are replaced by the features associated with the language of *us*. These purification attempts, they argue, then result in a 'purer' or 'more authentic' identity (perceived by the purists) rather than a 'purer' language. Given the hegemonic power of Persian in Iran and the language policies that revolve around what Sheyholislami (2012, p. 21) characterizes as "Persianization of non-Persian peoples" as well as the historical ethno-linguistic subordination of Iranian Azerbaijanis, the linguistic features present in Azerbaijani that are associated with Persian are considered as contaminating foreign elements that need to be replaced. Thus, the purification practices among Azerbaijani purists can be better characterized as acts of *de-Persianization* (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming). I make a distinction between 'purism' and 'correctness' in the sense that, unlike the former, the latter is less concerned about ridding of *any* Persian influence and, in fact, the proponents of 'correctness' ideology may often use established Persian loanwords, while the purists would attempt to replace them with their Turkish or North Azerbaijani equivalents. Thus, 'correctness' does not necessarily pertain to nationalist purist ideology, yet 'pureness' often entails 'correctness'.

Let us consider an example from Karimzad and Sibgatullina (forthcoming) that illustrates how purism ideologies are linguistically practiced. In the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran, the common word for the English 'photo' or 'picture' is *æhs* (or *ækis* in some dialects) which is borrowed from the Persian word *æks* <عکس>. Etymologically, this word comes from the Arabic *ʿakasa* <عَكَسَ> which means 'to reverse/reflect/mirror'. Since /ks/ consonant cluster does not occur in the Iranian Azerbaijani, its pronunciation has been nativized (through consonant replacement or vowel insertion) so as to comply with the phonotactics of the language. The purists usually substitute *æhs* or *ækis* with *şəkil*, *foto*, or *fotoğraf*. The word *şəkil* is a common

North Azerbaijani word meaning ‘image, picture’ which etymologically comes from the Arabic word *šakl* < شَكْل > which means ‘shape, form’. This word is used in Iranian Azerbaijani and Persian (pronounced as /šekl/) to also mean ‘shape or form’. The other words that are used to substitute *æhs* or *ækis* are the North Azerbaijani *foto* and the Turkish *fotoğraf,* which are taken from the English word *photo(graph)*. While none of these words are etymologically Turkic, it is their association with North Azerbaijani and Turkish that makes them sound more ‘Turkic’ thus more ‘authentic’. The words associated with Persian, on the other hand, reveal the influence of *them* on *our* language and hence index ‘inauthenticity’ and ‘impurity’ (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming).

Karimzad and Sibgatullina (forthcoming) argue that such linguistic practices triggered by purism ideology can be better understood in terms of Bucholtz and Hall’s (2004a, 2004b, 2005) processes of *distinction* and *adequation*, which deal with how sameness and difference are discursively constructed and negotiated. In particular, the purists seem to be replacing the words associated with Persian with the ones associated with Turkish and North Azerbaijani, regardless of their etymological roots, so as to differentiate themselves from '*Persianness*' and highlight their similarities with other Turkic groups. Hence, these practices of de-Persianization may not contribute to an etymologically ‘pure’ Azerbaijani, yet what they actually do is authenticate a perceived ‘purer’ ethnolinguistic identity. However, the attitudes toward such linguistic practices vary among Iranian Azerbaijanis. There are those who praise purification attempts assuming that such ways of speaking ‘purely’ and ‘strongly’ can help maintain their language, despite the fact that they themselves may not follow the same patterns. On the other hand, others *denaturalize* (Bucholtz & Hall, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) such discursively constructed identities and argue that

this is not how Azerbaijanis actually speak and thus these identities are artificial (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming).

2.3.4. Speak-your-own-language Ideology

The final ideology I focus on among the relatively diverse language ideologies held by Iranian Azerbaijanis is what I refer to as *speak-your-own-language* ideology. This ideology concerns the preference for a more natural and less monitored use of language. Although monolingualism is still the norm, code-switching is acceptable as long as it is unmarked (Myers-Scotton, 1993) and follows the sociolinguistic grammar of bilingual language use in their community (Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2011). That is, to the same extent that extensive code-mixing with Persian is not acceptable, the 'purified' versions of the language that incorporate North Azerbaijani or Turkish linguistic features are also considered inappropriate. The interesting fact is that the advocates of this ideology can be said to constitute the majority of Iranian Azerbaijanis, yet they are the least vocal group. This is in part because, as mentioned earlier, the extremely politicized discussion of Azerbaijani language and identity in Iran is often associated with nationalist separatist ideologies. Such an association not only does not weaken the nationalist ideology, but in practice, by not allowing any alternative middle-ground discourses to emerge and/or gain power, it empowers the nationalist ideology as the only dominant discourse. As a result, the nationalists who usually identify themselves as 'identity seekers' claim an exclusive authority regarding what 'correct' Azerbaijani is and what constitutes Azerbaijani identity. Their exclusionist rhetoric and their criticisms of alternative definitions of Azerbaijani language and identity make those who disagree with them be reluctant to voice their ideas. Yet, it is usually when someone challenges the nationalist, purist ideologies and practices that *speak-your-own-language* proponents voice their ideas by aligning positively with the criticisms. I will illustrate, in chapter 6, how such an

ideological force behind nationalistic discourses leads to certain interactional patterns. As illustrated in the following example from Karimzad and Sibgatullina (forthcoming), purist ideologies are sometimes explicitly denaturalized by the proponants of *speak-your-own-language* ideology. More specifically, this Facebook post by an Azerbaijani user sarcastically criticizes those who use North Azerbaijani words and structures on Facebook, challenging the authenticity of the identities constructed through these linguistic practices (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming). Although, as mentioned earlier, the nationalist, purist ideologies are dominant because of their authoritative discourses, the *speak-your-own-language* ideology can potentially gain power if it is given the chance to be exposed to Azerbaijani speakers.

آنا دیلی!

منیم عزیز دوستوم، آنا دیلی گوجَنیپ پکه پکه لوغتلر ایستیخراج اِلییپ او اَل بو اَلده یازماخ دییر! آنا دیلینه یازماخ چوخ ساده دی!

آنان سنی هانسی لوغتلرینن دانیشدیریپ، دیل آشمیسان، سنین آنا دیلیندی!

همانلاری ایشلَت، زورا توشمه، چپیه چالماغا آلقیش دماغینان اصالت اَله گلمز!

طرف منه گلیپ دییر "منه بِله گلیر کی..."! "ایندیسه قلی بَی گلَر."اولان اوز دیلیوی دانیش دا! کوچه باجادا نجه دانیشیسان بوردادا همانی دانیش! به نیه فیسبوکدا اوزووی گوزدن سالیسان؟

‘Mother tongue!

My dear friend! Mother tongue is not about trying hard to extract ‘big’ words from here and there and using them in writing. Writing in mother tongue is very simple.

Through whatever words your mom has talked to you and you learned to speak, it is your mother tongue. Use the same [words]. Do not put yourself under pressure. Using ‘alqış’ (‘applaud’ in North Azerbaijani) instead of ‘chæpih’ (‘clap’ in Iranian Azerbaijani) does not bring about authenticity. Some guy was telling me, “mənə belə gəlir ki…”! (‘It occurs to me that…’ North Azerbaijani structure) “indisi Quli bəy gələr” (‘Now Mr. Quli will come.’ In North Azerbaijani). Boy, speak your own language. Whatever language you

speak out there (outside internet), use the same language here [on Facebook]. Why are you making a fool out of yourself on Facebook?'

2.4. Summary

Neoliberalism has confronted the Iranian regime with a dilemma regarding its language policies, specifically the role of English as the global language. On the one hand, Iranian regime wants to be a part of the global market, which in turn makes learning and using the global language a necessity. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic has always been concerned about the expansion of Western values and ideologies in the Iranian society, and the promotion of English has been regarded as one of the ways such values would spread. As a compromise, the government has been involved in monitoring and regulating English courses and textbooks so as to mitigate the influence of Western culture across the country. Apart from that, the language policies in the ethnolinguistically diverse Iran still revolves around promoting Persian as the language that unifies the country. The idea that a shared language can unify a nation, however, has proven to be a mere myth. In fact, what can guarantee unity in multilingual communities is that the minority groups can have a feeling of being included and respected. While the Iranian regime has accepted the importance of English in the current neoliberal globalized world, despite its dominant anti-Western rhetoric, a similar approach needs to be taken *vis-à-vis* minority languages. Specifically, politicization of the language rights demands of minority communities with the fear of separatism not only does not weaken separatist ideologies, but in fact strengthens them. In other words, association of any discussion of minority language rights with separatism does not allow alternative discourses of Azerbaijani language and identity – which do not necessarily align with separatist ideas-- to emerge, leading to the dominance of nationalist,

separatist discourses. The recent establishment of university programs in Azerbaijani and Kurdish languages and literatures can be considered an unprecedented positive move by the Iranian government to give minority language speakers a sense of inclusion; however, their effectiveness is subject to further investigation.

The Iranian language policies, on the other hand, have resulted in the generation of diverse ideologies among Azerbaijanis, as the largest minority group in Iran. The common concern for these ideologies can be said to be maintaining their mother tongue; yet the definition of mother tongue appears to vary among them. The proposed solution is usually the establishment of a language academy to standardize Azerbaijani language. However, there are different problems associated with standardization. First of all, although the discourse of standardization usually revolves around the idea that the use of a standard language offers linguistic and cultural unity and is an index of group membership, it is simultaneously used as a strategy of control, leading to social inequality through excluding 'substandard' varieties and identities (Paffy, 2007). In the case of Iranian Azerbaijani, the diversity of dialects would make the selection of a single variety as the norm a difficult task, since the selection of any of them as the standard variety would subordinate other dialects. On the other hand, the experience of Basque standardization, for example, has proven that reconstructing a language which is not necessarily attached to any dialects/territories would also be problematic because it would be considered 'unnatural' and 'artificial' by its speakers (Ortega et al., 2014, 2015; Rodriguez–Ordoñez, 2016; see also Haulde & Zuazo, 2007). Finally, while standardization involves prescription of a form of language as the norm, the question of 'who has the authority to prescribe?' is indeed unanswered. This is why Cameron (1995) calls for a shift from asking

"should we prescribe?" to the questions of "who prescribes for whom, what they prescribe, how and for what purposes" (p. 11).

It is evident that the politics of language in Iran has posed different challenges for both the Iranian regime and the Azerbaijani minority group, especially in the era of neoliberalism and globalization. In particular, the Iranian regime should revisit the notion of *national unity* and determine if the assimilationist policies can still function as a unifying factor, or a different approach based on respecting and including minority language rights could serve as a more effective alternative. Iranian Azerbaijanis are also encountering different major challenges. These challenges concern the questions of what constitutes their identity, how they define mother tongue, and how they want to maintain it. Specifically, on the one hand, they are faced with the hegemonic power of Persian, and on the other hand, they are encountering the nationalist, purists ideologies that attempt to 'police' their linguistic behaviors (Blommaert et al., 2009), and, given the chance, could potentially turn into another hegemony. In addition, the emergence of Turkish as a new power language that can offer socio-economic profits confronts Azerbaijani language and identity with another challenge (Mirvahedi, 2012). This issue becomes more complicated when the neoliberal mentality that speaking Turkish can facilitate migration to Turkey in pursuit of jobs or higher education blends with the ideology that Turkish is a more 'authentic' and 'pure' Turkic language than Azerbaijani, leading to important questions among Iranian Azerbaijanis about their language and identity. I argue that a part of the problem is that the Azerbaijani spoken in Iran has rarely been approached linguistically and sociolinguistically, and instead, it has been discussed more by those with political motivations. Coping with the current challenges more effectively requires more scholarly debates among the experts of language, culture, and identity so as to render the issue of Azerbaijani language rights into a less politicized topic. The

alternative views language scholars can bring to the discussion would help mitigate the current political tensions around Azerbaijani language and identity, and would also offer other perspectives on what mother tongue is and how it can be maintained.

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. Overview

In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature on language, mobility, and migration. In section 3.2, I discuss transnational approaches to the study of mobile populations' discursive practices. Then, I review the scholarly work on multilingualism in section 3.3, focusing on how different traditions have studied code-switching, and then I introduce the framework I use in my analysis of patterns of code-switching.

3.2. Transnationalism and the Sociolinguistics of Mobility

Transnationalism has led scholars of migration to go beyond their focus on either 'sending' or 'receiving' societies and, instead, study how 'immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement' (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc, 1994, p. 7). Following these scholars (e.g. Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc, 1992; Kearney, 1995; Vertovec, 1999), scholarship on language and migration has also adopted more transnational approaches to the study of migrants' sociolinguistic behaviors in recent years (e.g. Blommaert, 2010; Dick, 2010; Duranti, 1997; Gal, 2006; Koven, 2004, 2007, 2013a, 2013b; Lo & Kim, 2011; Mendoza-Denton, 2008). Such a shift of focus goes hand in hand with an increased scholarly attention to the mobility of people, discourses, cultural products, and information that sustains these links (Appadurai, 1996). Work within the humanistic social sciences has attempted to uncover the relationship between mobility at large, and the subjective experiences of individuals in this contemporary era of globalization. Appadurai (1996, p. 3), for instance, has argued that the mobility of both people and media have

profound impacts on 'the work of the imagination' which he argues is 'a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity'. Within the literature on language and migration, scholars have attempted to empirically illustrate the structure of this subjective imagination as evident in the configuration of linguistic and discursive elements, and to trace the impact of mobility on these structures (cf. Lo & Park, 2017).

Scholars have focused on how migrants use linguistic and semiotic resources to simultaneously orient to and/or construct images of different centers and sociolinguistic contexts (e.g. Blommaert, 2010; Dick, 2010; Koven, 2013; Park, 2017; Vigouroux, 2017). For example, Park (2017) demonstrates how Korean mobile populations use discourses informed by their individual histories to construct images of an uncertain future. Bolonyai (in press), on the other hand, shows how migrants use claims of belonging in both the host and home countries in order to contest the nativist images of those in the host country who associate their 'foreign accents' with non-nativeness. Eisenlohr (2006) discusses the ways in which those in diaspora use narratives in order to construct an 'imagined homeland' from which they have been removed. Building on Eisenlohr's work, Dick (2010) draws attention to a different aspect of migration discourse, which pertains to the creation of images of a 'life beyond'. More specifically, through an analysis of the spoken discourses of the non-migrants in the Mexican city of Uriangato, Dick maintains that the migration discourses of the members of this community employ aspects of what Eisenlohr characterizes as a minimized remove from homeland; however, she argues that, unlike what Eisenlohr puts forward, migration discourse does not always involve a desire for an 'imagined homeland'. It can also, she argues, involve construction of a desire for an imagined life 'beyond here' which 'links life in one existing place and time (Uriangato) to an imagination of life in another existing place and time (the United States)' (2010, p. 281). Such a desire is

generated when ‘speakers (re) create [an] imaginative sociology, thus, mapping themselves into it – a practice that makes them into locally recognizable kinds of people, with particular dreams, life paths, and material surrounds’ (Dick, 2010, p. 277). What I will add to Eisenlohr and Dick’s discussions is a different facet of migration discourse that does not have to do with a minimized remove from homeland and instead pertains to an ideal future in the host country: longing for an ‘imagined life here beyond now’. That is, in their migration discourses, Iranian Azerbaijani educational migrants create images of an ideal life in which they still stay here in the U.S. but are experiencing a better position than what they are in now. In this imaginative sociology, they have found a job after graduation, freed themselves from the bureaucratic restrictions around their migration, secured their residency in the U.S., and improved the quality of their lives socio-economically.

In analyzing the *work of the imagination*, many of the abovementioned scholars have found Bakhtin’s (1981) notion of chronotope particularly useful. This is because it captures the fact that the imagination relevant to discursive self-positioning in transnationalism is always and simultaneously spatial, temporal and characterological in nature (cf. Agha, 2007). The notion of chronotope was first introduced by Bakhtin (1981) to describe how space and time are integrated in the novelistic discourse: ‘Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, [and] becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history’ (p. 84). The chronotope has been adapted by linguistic anthropologists to study a more general case of cultural chronotope: ‘A semiotic representation of time and place peopled by certain social types’ (Agha 2007a, p. 321). Although the chronotope deals with complex intertwined spatiotemporal relationships, Agha (2007a, p. 324) also points out that in some chronotopic representations, one fragment of the chronotope becomes ‘topically prominent’, as

in the case of 'history' which is mostly considered to be about time, while it also involves people populating places. In this dissertation, I will show how participants' subjective experiences determine what receives topical prominence in their discourses.

In a recent work, Blommaert (2017) suggests using the notion of chronotope in order to capture the complexity and dynamic nature of the multiple contexts brought about by contemporary mobility. In arguing for the use of chronotope as a more theoretically informed notion of context, he points out the ways in which context should be understood as ideologically and morally loaded images of time, place and people. He particularly argues that 'notions of context are built on, and invoke, imaginations of the social world and of the place of social actors and activities therein' (2017, p. 95).

Practices of position-taking in migration discourse have also been discussed using Michael Silverstein's (1993) notion of calibration in order to account for how people connect a current speech event to other space-time frames. Calibration concerns different ways through which speakers construct 'indexical relationships between sign-events' (Eisenlohr, 2006, p. 262) making the current sign-event 'interpretable as related to a prior event' (Dick, 2010, p. 281). Construction of such links can be accomplished in different ways. Sometimes, the current speech event is related to a specific event involving particular people at a given time and place (Koven, 2015). This is what Silverstein (1993) refers to as 'reportive calibration'. These indexical relationships can also be constructed by linking the current interaction to a separate 'timeless' realm to present general truths (Koven, 2015), known as 'nomic calibration' (Silverstein, 1993). In this dissertation, I use this notion to illustrate how the participants use nomic calibration to present general truths about *here* and *there* and to frame their individual concerns and anxieties in a generic/collective fashion, hence highlight the sharedness of these concerns. I also show how

shifts from nomic to reportive calibration, i.e. shifting from generic to specific, help participants elicit alignment by presenting themselves or others in the conversation as a part of the general truth (Agha 2007b; Dick 2010; Koven 2016).

The study of language, mobility, and migration, however, has not been restricted to the study of acts of position taking through discursive practices. Recent sociolinguistic studies have also highlighted the importance of studying the impact of mobility on patterns of language use (e.g. Blommaert, 2010; Blommaert & Rampton, 2011; Jacquemet, 2005, 2009; Rubdy & Alsagoff, 2013). Blommaert (2010) maintains that, as a result of globalization, traditional approaches to sociolinguistics should be replaced by more modern approaches which take into account the sociolinguistics of mobile resources. More specifically, he argues that mobility, of people and of linguistic resources, may result in unexpected and less predictable patterns of value and language use:

> We now see that the mobility of people also involves the mobility of linguistic and sociolinguistic resources, that 'sedentary' or 'territorialized' patterns of language use are complemented by 'translocal' or 'deterritorialized' forms of language use, and that the combination of both often accounts for unexpected sociolinguistic effects. (pp. 4-5)

Blommaert (2010) holds that the ability to analyze such patterns requires a new paradigm, i.e. sociolinguistics of mobility, which focuses on 'language-in-motion' rather than 'language-in-place' and deals with intersecting resources rather than 'linguistically defined objects' (p. 5). Hall (2014) argues that neoliberal globalization leads to *hypersubjectivity* among transnational migrants. By hypersubjectivity she refers to the feelings of anxiety and instability transnational migrants may experience since the indexicalities of their linguistic resources shift as a result of being disconnected from their chronotopic roots.

In this dissertation, I attempt to bring together both macro-discursive and micro-discursive approaches by focusing on the sociolinguistic effects of mobility and migration not only on migrants' discourses but also on their patterns of language use. The study of the latter would be methodologically feasible through an analysis of patterns of code-switching, which can be better understood as mobilization by social actors of resources of their verbal repertoire in the construction of (indexical) meaning. That is, code-switching, as a common characteristic of bilingual/multilingual language use, is considered to be 'patterned and predictable' (Blom & Gumperz, 1972, p. 409), and thus a comparative analysis of its patterns in indigenous and diaspora contexts can shed more light on the impact of migration on multilingual language use.

3.3. Multilingual Language Use

Multilingualism and multilingual language use have been studied through focusing on patterns of code-switching (hereafter CS). Blom and Gumperz's (1972) study of CS between dialects of Norwegian can be said to be the starting point for the recent systematic research on CS and its communicative intentions in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology. Unlike previous studies (e.g. Weinreich, 1953) that considered CS as a consequence of *interference* and lack of competence, Blom and Gumperz's work elevated the status of CS to "a type of *skilled performance*" [emphasis in the original], to borrow Myers-Scotton's words (1993a, p. 47). Adopting an ethnographic and linguistic approach in their study, Blom and Gumperz argued that CS among local people in their study was "patterned and predictable" (p. 409). They further differentiated between *situational code-switching* and *metaphorical code-switching*, arguing that while the former represents changes in settings, participants, etc., the latter represents changes in topics. Despite later criticisms, this distinction was adopted by many researchers at the time, which initiated a new era in the study of social motivations of CS.

Acknowledging the difficulty of analyzing CS in terms of metaphorical and situational distinctions, Gumperz in his 1982 book *Discourse Strategies* focused on what he called *conversational code-switching.*[5] Conversational CS, according to Gumperz, is "the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two different grammatical systems or subsystems" (p. 59). These grammatical systems in bilingual situations along with ethnic boundaries, he argued, "constitute a resource in as much as they enable us to convey messages that only those who share our background and are thus likely to be sympathetic can understand" (p. 98). He maintained that the speakers sharing the codes must also share the principles of interpretation and highlighted that conversational analysis is the key to their identification:

> Since speakers do understand each other and can agree on what is being accomplished in particular settings, there must be some sharing of codes and principles of interpretation, but this takes the form of taken for granted, tacit presuppositions which are best recovered through indirect conversational analysis. (p. 75)

Based on his analysis of different speech communities, Gumperz proposed six CS functions in conversations: *quotation, addressee specification, interjection, reiteration, message qualification,* and *personalization vs. objectivization.*[6] These functions are similar to what he

[5] Gumperz admitted that except for diaglossic situations, where there are noticeable associations between the linguistic forms and the settings and/or participants, the analysis of CS in terms of metaphorical and situational CS was a difficult task. However, despite the change in terminology, he appeared to be dealing mostly with metaphorical CS when he was using the term conversational CS.

[6] Gumperz acknowledged that specifying this function in descriptive terms is difficult. He thus related this contrast- in rather unclear ways- to things such as: "the distinction between talk about action and talk as action, the degree of speaker involvement in, or distance from, a message, whether a statement reflects personal opinion or knowledge, whether it refers to specific instances or has the authority of generally known fact." (p. 80)

later in his book refers to as *contextualization cues* by highlighting the similarities between CS and monolingual choices:

> Code switching signals contextual information equivalent to what in monolingual settings is conveyed through prosody or other syntactic or lexical processes. It generates the presuppositions in terms of which the content of what is said is decoded. (p. 98)

Myers-Scotton (1993a), however, argues that although labeling CS as a *contextualization cue* may be useful, it does not provide any explanation for it. Nevertheless, despite this criticism along with her other criticisms of Gumperz's work (e.g. the distinction between metaphorical and situational CS), she acknowledges the contributions of this model to the study of CS and identifies the following as its important premises: 1) Small group interactions are the proper research site and naturally occurring data are the object of study; 2) The social meanings of language use are a function of situated contexts; and 3) the use of linguistic choices as a strategy adds intentional meaning to an utterance (p. 56). Gumperz's work on CS has given rise to mainly two different approaches to the study of CS: Socio-functional and Conversation-analytic perspectives.

3.3.1. Socio-functional Approach

Within sociocultural linguistics-- "the broad interdisciplinary field concerned with the intersection of language, culture, and society" (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 586)-- CS is understood as a tool for indexing macro-social factors such as identity, ethnicity, and social class (Gumperz, 1982; Heller, 1992, 1995; Myers-Scotton, 1993a; Rampton, 1995). The primary focus of these studies is the *symbolic meaning* of CS, i.e. code-choices as indices of, for instance, dominance, authority, and solidarity.

Myers-Scotton's (1993a) *Markedness Model* is regarded as one of the most influential models within the socio-cultural approaches to CS. The underlying idea of this model is that code-choices index certain Rights-and-Obligation sets (RO sets)- i.e. have certain social roles- and "that speakers have a sense of markedness regarding available linguistic codes for any interpretation, but choose their codes based on the persona and/or relation with others which they wish to have in place" (p. 75). In other words, language users are rational actors who have a continuum of less marked to more marked code choices at their disposal to choose from so as to achieve certain goals. The unmarked code is the safest or the most expected choice, while the marked code is not expected in an interaction. Language users "assess the potential costs and rewards of all alternative choices, and make their decisions, typically unconsciously" (p. 75).

Monica Heller's study on the relationship of linguistic choices and identity is another example of sociocultural approach to CS. Heller (1992, 1995) focuses on how *symbolic domination* (Bourdieu, 1977) is wielded and/or resisted/redefined through linguistic choices. Based on her ethnographic studies in Quebec and Ontario, she argues that CS can be used as a means of exercising or resisting power; i.e. dominant groups use the linguistic choices they have in their verbal repertoire to sustain their symbolic dominance, whereas minority groups might use CS as a strategy to resist such dominance.

Socio-functional models of CS, however, have been subject to different criticisms, esp. for being 'analyst-oriented' (Li, 2002). That is, the extent to which the symbolic meanings assigned to switches are indeed intended and/or perceived by the interlocutors is the main issue socio-functional approaches to CS are facing (Stroud, 1992). The question, according to these critics, is not *what* bilinguals are/may be doing through CS-- the focus of socio-functional

models-- but rather *how* "the meaning of code-switching is constructed in interaction", which is said to be the primary goal of conversation-analytic models (Li, 2002, p. 167).

3.3.2. Conversation-analytic Approach

Conversation-analytic (CA) approach to CS is built upon Gumperz's (1982) notion of *contextualization cue.* It is primarily concerned with the *conversational* functions of CS rather than its *social* functions. The focus of this model, as mentioned earlier, is to determine how meaning of CS is constructed in the sequential development of an interaction (Auer, 1995; Li, 2002). Therefore, it concentrates on "detailed, turn-by-turn analysis of language choices" (Li, 2002, p. 167); and unlike socio-functional models, it "limits the external analyst's interpretational leeway because it relates his or her interpretation back to the members' mutual understanding of their utterances as manifest in their behavior" (Auer, 1984, p. 6). Contrary to socio-cultural approaches, which are concerned with 'brought along' meanings of CS (Auer, 1992), the proponents of CA approach are interested in how "[m]eaning emerges as a consequence of bilingual participants' contextualization work and thus is 'brought about' by speakers through the very act of code-switching" (Li, 2002, p. 167).

The critics of CA approach maintain that this approach overemphasizes detailed transcription techniques and fails to account for the social factors that motivate CS (Myers-Scotton, 1999; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai, 2001). According to Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai (2001), CA approach pays little attention to *who* the participants involved in a given interaction *are* and "neglects key aspects of the tacit knowledge that speakers have developed through their very conversations" (p. 5). This knowledge, they argue, not only includes *how* interactions are sequentially developed- which is CA's primary focus- but also the social meanings that particular code choices convey and not the others. The most recent attempt to account for both

'*how* CS is developed in interactions' and '*what* indexical meanings it conveys' and to bridge the gap between the socio-functional and conversation-analytic approaches is made by Bhatt and Bolonyai (2011), whose framework is discussed in detail in the following section.

3.3.3. Sociolinguistic Grammars of Multilingual Language Use

Bhatt and Bolonyai's model attempts to integrate the socio-functional and conversation-analytic perspectives to offer a principled account of code-switching, following the insights of Optimality Theory (hereafter, OT; Prince & Smolensky, 2004). In their model, Bhatt and Bolonyai (hereafter, B&B) propose five general sociolinguistic principles/constraints, the interaction and optimal satisfaction of which yield the observed patterns of CS. Following the logic of OT, they hypothesize "that a 'particular' bilingual grammar is a set of hierarchically ranked conflicting universal constraints" (p. 535). In this model, the principles/constraints are universal, but their hierarchical ranking can vary within different communities, i.e. the different rankings of the constraints in different communities account for the variation in their respective grammars of bilingual language use. This optimality-theoretic insight of sociolinguistic-grammatical variation is what I will examine closely in chapter 7 to answer (i) in what specific ways is the sociolinguistic grammar of the diaspora community different from the sociolinguistic grammar of indigenous community, and (ii) what accounts for the difference in the sociolinguistic grammars of the Azeri community in two different contexts. These research questions are empirically motivated by several recent studies that show that sociolinguistic grammars of local, indigenous communities vary systematically from those of displaced, transplanted communities (cf. Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2011; Cramer, 2015; Evensen, 2014; Karimzad, 2014; Lee, 2015; Stillwell, 2014). These studies have revealed a particular pattern in the sociolinguistic grammars of bilingual/multilingual communities with respect to the relative

'value' each community places on the two relational constraints POWER and SOLIDARITY. More specifically, in the studies conducted in diaspora, [e.g., Hungarian-English community in the U.S. (Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2011); Spanish-English community in the U.S. (Evensen, 2014); Azeri-Farsi-English community in the U.S. (Karimzad, 2014); and Korean-English community in the U.S. (Lee, 2015)], SOLIDARITY appears to have relatively more 'value' *vis-à-vis* POWER in these communities, i.e., SOLIDARITY outranks POWER in their sociolinguistic grammars. However, in indigenous contexts, [e.g., Kashmiri-Hindi-English community in India (Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2011); and Catalan-Spanish community in Spain (Stillwell, 2014)], POWER outranks SOLIDARITY. Also, Cramer (2015) applies the B&B model to a bidialectal rural community in North Carolina, and the findings also exhibit a similar pattern to the indigenous contexts. These studies suggest that there might be systematic differences between diaspora and indigenous contexts; however, drawing robust generalizations regarding the impact of mobility and displacement on the sociolinguistic behaviors of bilingual/multilinguals requires comparable data coming from similar speakers living in these two contexts. Filling this gap is one of the purposes of this dissertation.

B&B model uses five general principles/constraints which are generalizations of various functions assigned to CS in previous studies. These principles encompass different views which have attempted to explain the functions of and motivations for CS, majorly socio-functional and conversation-analytic models. B&B claim that their model can be applied universally in all speech communities to account for the output form selected amongst the potential candidates to convey the optimal socio-pragmatic meaning, given the five socio-cognitive constraints. The universal principles/constraints proposed by B&B are the *Principle of Interpretive Faithfulness* (FAITH); the *Principle of Symbolic Domination* (POWER); the *Principle of Social Concurrence*

(SOLIDARITY); the *Principle of Face Management* (FACE); and the *Principle of Perspective Taking* (PERSPECTIVE).

According to B&B, the *Principle of Interpretive Faithfulness* (FAITH) concerns the fact that social actors switch to another language to convey their intended meaning more economically and faithfully. The *Principle of Symbolic Domination* (POWER) refers to social actors' "switch to the language that is best positioned to index or construct power, status, authority, social distance, and/or difference between self and other(s)" (p. 528). Social actors' switch to the language that enables them to create solidarity, intimacy, and affiliation is defined under the *Principle of Social Concurrence* (SOLIDARITY). *The Principle of Face Management* (FACE) is at work when social actors switch to a different language so as to "maximize effective maintenance of 'face' or public image of self in relation to others" (p. 531). This contains how social actors codeswitch to manage their interpersonal relations with respect to their own face needs or those of others. Finally, the *Principle of Perspective Taking* (PERSPECTIVE) focuses on the discursive aspects of CS and posits that "actors switch to a language that is best positioned to signal what is assumed to be currently salient point of view and socio-cognitive orientation in discourse" (p. 533).

The focus in B&B's approach is on functional CS, i.e., the switches that perform certain social and/or interactional functions. Language users are considered rational actors who have a continuum of less marked to more marked code choices at their disposal to choose from so as to achieve certain goals (Myers-Scotton, 1993a). Language users "assess the potential costs and rewards of all alternative choices, and make their decisions, typically unconsciously" (Myers-Scotton, 1993a, p. 75). The knowledge of the unmarked code(s) of speakers and/or conversations plays a crucial role in the coding and analysis process using B&B model.

The computation process of the optimal output within B&B's optimality-theoretic framework is done through functions GEN (Generator), EVAL (Evaluator), and CON (Constraints). As illustrated in Figure 2, the linguistic items from two (or more) lexicons (e.g., lexicons of Language X and Language Y) provide the input for function GEN. [7] This function mixes the linguistic elements and generates a potential set of output candidates [e.g., minimally *Candidate1* (monolingual choice) and *Candidate2* (code-mixed choice)]. These candidates are then evaluated by function EVAL, which consists of a set of community-specific ranking of the universal constraints on CS provided by function CON. That is, function CON provides function EVAL with the universal constraints, and function EVAL evaluates the candidates based on the relative ranking of the constraints in a particular community (e.g., X-Y bilingual community). Finally, function EVAL, via a process of computational derivation (shown in Tableaux), selects the optimal output amongst all the potential competing candidates generated by function GEN. For instance, in a given context, if function GEN generates *Candidate1* monolingually in Language X, the SOLIDARITY code, and *Candidate2* bilingually (the code-mixed choice), which helps convey the meaning more faithfully in this context; and if the community specific ranking of function EVAL specifies that FAITH outranks SOLIDARITY in this bilingual community, function EVAL will then select *Candidate2* as the optimal surface output to satisfy the higher-ranked constraint FAITH at the expense of violating the lower-ranked constraint SOLIDARITY. As illustrated in Tableau 1, the evaluation process of the two candidates begins algorithmically from left to right, moving from the most dominant constraint to the least dominant constraint. *Candidate1* violates the higher-ranked constraint FAITH, which is

[7] The two (or more) lexicons do not necessary have to be lexicons of two different languages, as Cramer (2015) shows this framework can also be used to model dialect shifting.

considered fatal (indicated with *!). *Candidate2*, on the other hand, violates the lower-ranked constraint SOLIDARITY, yet satisfies the higher-ranked constraint FAITH. The violation of the lower-ranked constraint SOLIDARITY is not lethal and thus the output of this constraint does not change the optimal candidate, which is shown by the shaded area. As a result, *Candidate2* is selected as the optimal output form--indicated by ☞ -- and *Candidate1* is considered as 'sub-optimal'.

Figure 2. An Optimality-theoretic model of bilingual grammar.[8]



Tableau 1. FAITH & SOLID Interaction: FAITH>>SOLID

Candidates	**FACE**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**FAITH**	**SOLID**
a. *Candidate1*				*!	
☞ b. *Candidate2*					*

[8] Lex(L1) and Lex(L2) = Lexicon of a language; GEN= Generator function; a, b, c, … = competing input candidates; EVAL= evaluator function; CON = set of universal constraints on code-switching (Bhatt & Bolonyai, 2011, p. 537).

Given the potential conflict between the five universal constraints and their violability, as illustrated in the example above, B&B maintain "that a 'particular' bilingual grammar is a set of hierarchically ranked conflicting universal constraints" (p. 535). They provide empirical instances of Kashmiri-Hindi-English and Hungarian-English CS to demonstrate that the optimal grammar in each of these bilingual/multilingual communities ranks these universal constraints differently. They argue that such difference in rankings of the universal constraints accounts for the inter-community variability in patterns of CS. B&B's study then provides a methodological framework for the analysis of the variation in patterns of CS in different communities which will be explained in detail in the methodology chapter.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

4.1. Overview

In order to address the research questions explored in this dissertation, I collected audio-recordings of naturally-occurring conversations in two different contexts: indigenous context, i.e. Iran, and diasporic context, i.e. the United States. A total of 43 Iranian Azerbaijanis participated in this study, 17 of whom were recorded in Iran and 26 of whom were recorded in the U.S. In this chapter, I will give a broader description of the participants and the settings in which they were recorded, followed by a description of the transcription, coding, and analysis procedures. A more detailed description of the participants and the contexts of the recordings will be provided prior to specific excerpts in the analysis chapters.

4.2. Data

4.2.1. Audio-recordings

A total of 25 hours of audio-recordings were collected over the past 4 years. As a member of the community, I was present during all of the recordings interacting naturally with the participants. Given the familiarity of the participants with me, I was considered more of an insider friend than an outsider researcher. Hence, my participation in the conversations as a member of the community not only did not reduce, but in fact promoted the naturalness of the interactions. The recordings in the indigenous context took place at different friendly gatherings in Tabriz, the largest Azeri-speaking city in Iran. The recordings of the diaspora community were done in three different regions in the US: communities in the mid-west, the east coast, and the west coast. For transcription, I adapted the conventions of Conversation Analysis (Atkinson & Heritage, 2006).

4.2.2. Participants

Given the purpose of this dissertation, I divided the data into two categories. Category 1 concerns only the recordings that took place in the U.S., which was used to investigate Research Questions 1 and 2 analyzed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. Category 2 includes all of the recordings that took place in Iran along with a portion of the data from the diaspora context, all of which were used to investigate Research Question 3. This is because, given the comparative nature of Research Question 3 explored in Chapter 7, the participants in Category 2 were selected in a way that the two communities under study would be comparable with respect to age, gender and social status, and the only meaningful difference between the two communities would be the context, i.e. diasporic versus indigenous. More specifically, it is the experience of mobility and migration of the participants of the diaspora community that distinguishes them from those of the indigenous community.

4.2.2.1. Category 1: Migrant Discourses

The data in Category 2 were used to analyze Iranian Azerbaijani migrants' narratives and metapragmatic comments. A total of 26 participants were recorded (21 males and 5 females). The majority of the participants (23 participants) were in their late twenties or early thirties and belonged to the recent wave of Iranian migrants who had arrived in the U.S. in the past decade. Among them, 18 participants were educational migrants on student visas and 5 participants had won the U.S. Diversity Visa lottery.[9] Three of the participants in Category 1 were in their forties or fifties and had lived in the U.S. for over 20 years. In addition to the Iranian Azerbaijani

[9] The difference between their migration trajectories will become relevant when I analyze their future-oriented discourses. A more detailed description of their migration paths and statuses will be provided prior to the analysis in chapter 5.

participants, two visiting scholars from the Republic of Azerbaijan were also recorded. Their conversations with the Iranian Azerbaijanis reveals certain interactional patterns, which will be explored in chapter 6. The recordings took place in informal gatherings at bars, cafes, and home settings.

4.2.2.2. Category 2: Multilingual Language Use

The conversations of the participants in Category 2 were used to study the variation in patterns of multilingual language use among members of the diasporic and indigenous communities. The participants in the indigenous context were 17 speakers—10 males and 7 females. Their ages ranged from 20 to 29, and they were either university students or university graduates who were working or preparing to apply for graduate school either in Iran or abroad at the time of recording. Twelve speakers (10 males and 2 females) from the diaspora community were included in Corpus 2. All of the participants from the diaspora community were Azeri-Farsi-English multilinguals who had migrated to the U.S. within the past five years. Similar to the indigenous community, they were all in their 20s and were either students or university graduates working/seeking jobs. They were all recorded in different groups at different times, depending on their familiarity with each other. That is, the members of each group who were recorded were already friends and no member had *statusful power* (Myers-Scotton, 1988) over the others. Statusful power, according Myers-Scotton, refers to the degree to which a participant has control over the other participant(s). The importance of avoiding the inclusion of such participants in this study is in the fact that a participant with a statusful power may affect the power dynamics of the conversations and thus impact the sociolinguistic behaviors of the participants. The recordings took place during friendly gatherings in restaurants, cafes, parks and home settings.

4.3. Data Analysis

Throughout this dissertation, I follow an ethnographically grounded discourse-analytic approach. That is, I incorporate knowledge of social, cultural, and situational factors obtained through ethnographic observations into analysis of detailed transcriptions of interactions to reach an understanding of the discursive practices of the community under study.

4.3.1. Category 1: Migrant Discourses

In analyzing the linguistic data in chapters 5 and 6, which deal with the participants' migration and language-ideological discourses, I pay particular attention to the discursive moves through which participants align and disalign with one another. I specifically focus on language practices such as the use of pronouns and other deictics, language choice, etc., as well as metapragmatic commentary on language and identity.

4.3.2. Category 2: Multilingual Language Use

The data that deal with the participants' patterns of multilingual language use, which are analyzed in chapter 7, were coded following B&B framework. More specifically, I coded the data for the following:

- The unmarked/preferred language of the interlocutors (Myers-Scotton, 1993a)
- The unmarked code of the conversation
- The type of switch, i.e., intra-sentential vs. inter-sentential
- The language from which the switch occurred, i.e., the Matrix language (Myers-Scotton, 1993b)
- The language to which the switch occurred

- The constraints interaction and satisfaction: which of the five principles/constraints proposed by B&B was being satisfied, i.e., the function of the switch, and which constraint(s) was/were being violated

The coding of the data was done based on the ethnographic and contextual information as well as the definitions of the principles proposed by B&B. More specifically, the unmarked code of a particular participant was determined based on the language used by him/her during the majority of the conversation. Similarly, the unmarked code of a conversation was determined based on the use of a particular language by the interlocutors during the majority of the interaction. Moreover, the matrix language was considered to be the one within which the switch was embedded. The type of the switch was determined based on whether the switch was a complete sentence or a phrase/word within the matrix language. Finally, based on the contextual and ethnographic information and my perspective as a member of the community, the most prominent social and/or conversational function (B&B's five socio-pragmatic principles) a particular switch performed was considered as the constraint being satisfied; and the particular function a non-switch would have performed in the same context-- i.e., which of the 5 principles would have been satisfied if the switch had not occurred and the utterance was monolingual-- was/were coded as the violated constraint(s).

Following the coding process, an OT analysis was carried out in order to determine the optimal sociolinguistic grammars of the two communities. As mentioned earlier, within B&B framework, optimal sociolinguistic grammar of bilingual/multilingual language use is understood in terms of the hierarchical ranking of a set of universal meta-principals of CS; which are (1) violable, and (2) in potential conflict with each other. At the beginning stage of the OT analysis, these constraints are assumed to be unranked with respect to each other. However, in a given

linguistic data of CS, the interaction of relevant constraints are compared; and if (a) constraint(s) is/are violated, it is/they are demoted *vis-à-vis* the constraint that is satisfied. Such data-driven analysis continues until a particular ranking pattern emerges. If the CS data do not reveal the interaction of any particular constraints, these constraints are left unranked with respect to each other. The final hierarchical ranking is considered to be the optimal sociolinguistic grammar of that particular community.

4.4. Discussion

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the data collection and analysis procedures. The data collection process was designed to provide information about the three different levels of linguistic/discursive practices that are explored in this dissertation. Also, being a member of the community under study helped me record as much natural unguided conversations as possible. The data in Category 1 were used to analyze the migrants' positionings relative to home and host countries as well as their language ideological discourses. The data in Category 2 were analyzed to determine the potential variation in patterns of code-switching among members of the diaspora and indigenous communities. The data relevant to each of the analytical domains explored in this dissertation will be presented in the following three analysis chapters.

CHAPTER 5

MIGRATION DISCOURSES

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I provide data to investigate how Iranian Azerbaijani migrants orient themselves to home and host countries. In section 5.2, I analyze their future-oriented discourses about ideal life. I will show how their past migration histories and present concerns affect how they discursively construct images of the ideal life. In section 5.3, I analyze how they discursively negotiate their longings, belongings, and loss. Overall, I will argue that the participants' immediate concerns and anxieties -- what Hall (2014) refers to as *hypersubjectivity* -- determines what becomes topically more prominent in their discourses, thus affecting how they position themselves relative to the home and host countries.

5.2. Future-oriented Discourses

In this section, I demonstrate how past migration trajectory and current migration status affect participants' (re)-construction of spatiotemporal representations of the ideal life. [10] Focusing specifically on the Iranian Azerbaijani educational migrants, I contrast their individual longings, concerns, and anxieties caused by their relatively difficult migration trajectory and uncertain migration status after graduation with those of the U.S. Green Card lottery winners from Iran. I argue that there are discursively realized differences in how these two groups characterize the spatiotemporal nature of what they understand to be the ideal life. I use the notions of

[10] A more elaborate discussion of this section can be found in
"Life here beyond now: Chronotopes of the ideal life among Iranian transnationals". Farzad Karimzad. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, Vol. 20, Issue 5, Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/josl.12211/abstract

chronotope (Agha, 2007a; Bakhtin, 1981; Blommaert, 2015; Silverstein, 2005) and *calibration* (Silverstein, 1993) to understand how the participants invoke semiotized representations of space and time in their migration discourses, and how these spatiotemporal representations are linked to other sign-events.

5.2.1. Background

In this section, I provide background information on the recent Iranian students' migration trajectories before and migration status after arriving in the United States. Iranian immigration to the U.S. consists of two major waves: pre-revolution and post-revolution (Bozorgmehr & Moeini Meybodi, 2016). Immigrants from the first wave (1950-1977) were mainly students who were seeking higher education temporarily to suit the demand for skilled labor in Iran during that era (Bozorgmehr & Sabagh, 1988). The second wave (1978 to present) is related to the increase in the population of the Iranian immigrants in the U.S. following Iran's 1978 revolution (Bozorgmehr & Moeini Meybodi, 2016). A recent report by Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA 2014) describes the era following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as a third wave, during which the number of immigrant and refugee visas issued for Iranians has decreased. Contrarily, in recent years the number of Iranian students (mostly graduate) in the U.S. has had a constant upward trend.[11] A report by the Washington Institute shows that the number of the Iranian students in the U.S. doubled between 2008 and 2012 reaching 8,700 following the political and economic crises in Iran.[12] According to the Institute of International Education, this figure was over 10,000 during the 2013-14 academic year, which was a 17%

[11] Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/education/10students.html (last accessed 2/29/2016)
[12] Source: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/infographic-iranian-students-in-the-united-states (last accessed 2/29/2016)

increase from the previous year.[13] While recent scholarship (e.g. Ansari, 2013; Bozorgmehr & Douglas, 2011; Bozorgmehr & Moeini Meybodi, 2016; Daha, 2011) has mostly focused on Iranian Americans (especially the second generation), this new wave of Iranian educational migrants, require equitable attention – especially with respect to their migration trajectories before and transnational experiences after arriving in the U.S. I attempt to address this gap by focusing on the effects of their migration trajectories on how they negotiate their social positionings relative to images of the ideal life.

The cultural chronotopes about the U.S. are distributed unevenly in Iran. Among the young educated generations, the most dominant image of the U.S. is that of a *modernist chronotope* (Dick, 2010), i.e., the United States as the land of socio-economic progress. Although such an image is not what the Iranian state media portray, through learning English as a foreign language and access to Internet and satellite TV programs in the past 15 years, the young educated Iranians have been exposed to discourses which differ from the dominant state-created discourses about the west. For older and less educated non-migrant Iranians who have mostly been influenced by the state media, however, the dominant chronotope is similar to how Dick (2010) characterizes it for the non-migrants in the Mexican city of Uriangato: Making progress at the expense of losing morality. For the educational migrants, the price for making progress is not about losing morality, but is more about being distant from family and friends.

It is crucial to note that the path Iranian students take to get to the U.S. is relatively long, difficult, and stressful. Since the Hostage Crisis (1979-81), the United States has not had an Embassy or Consulate in Iran. Therefore, Iranian students are required to go to a neighboring

[13] Source: http://fusion.net/story/54666/did-you-know-that-iranian-students-cant-attend-some-u-s-colleges/ (last accessed 2/29/2016)

country, specifically Turkey, Armenia, or the United Arab Emirates, to apply for student visas in the U.S. consular sections.[14] In the majority of cases, Iranians' visa applications require further 'administrative processing', which is said to be resolved in 60 days but may take longer.[15] As a result, applicants usually have to take two different trips to the consular sections in a third party country; once for the interview, and once for receiving their visas after being 'cleared'. This procedure is very stressful for student visa applicants, based on my ethnographic observations. Before and after their interviews, they usually share/read about their/others' experiences on online forums and find recommendations on which consular section to choose, how to dress, what documents to have, how to *flip the script*-- i.e. to say what the officer wants to hear (Carr, 2011, p. 191)-- etc.[16] I will argue that this long, stressful and bureaucratic procedure impacts Iranian students' diasporic lives and discourses about their ideals.

It is not only past migration trajectories that can impact migrants' diasporic discourses; their present migration status after arriving in the host country can also play a significant role in this regard. After arriving in the U.S., Iranian students experience a different situation with respect to the length and validity of their visas compared to their fellow international students. Before 2011, Iranian students were only granted single-entry visas, meaning that upon leaving the U.S., they were required to apply for new visas. In May 2011, Secretary Clinton announced new visa regulations for Iranian students allowing them to receive two-year multiple-entry visas.[17] Such restrictions on the length and validity of visas have a great influence on the lives of Iranian students in the U.S. Both those with single-entry visas and those with expired multiple-

[14] Source: https://usvisa-info.com/en-ir/selfservice/ss_country_welcome (last accessed 2/29/2016)
[15] Source: http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/general/administrative-processing-information.html (last accessed 2/29/2016)
[16] The most popular forum is http://www.applyabroad.org/
[17] Source: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164025.htm (last accessed 2/29/2016)

entry visas refrain from leaving the U.S. in the majority of cases, in order to avoid losing their visas, which in turn means that they do not get the opportunity to see their family and friends in Iran for extended periods of time. This does not mean, however, that they overstay their visas. Restrictions only apply to their re-entry to the U.S. and their stay in the country with an expired visa is legal as long as they have valid status as a student (referred to as a valid I-20). A student with a single-entry visa told me that he had not visited Iran in the past 8 years since he had been afraid that he might not get a new visa or the 'administrative processing' might take longer than expected and thus affect his studies. This is a shared concern which comes up frequently in discourses about problems in the U.S. faced by Iranian educational migrants. In a recent online petition signed by over 1,300 Iranian students, they summarize how U.S. student visa policies toward Iranians affect their lives and request that they, similar to the other international students, be granted multiple-entry visas.[18] One of the signers of this petition explains how these bureaucratic restrictions impact Iranian students' diasporic lives. S/he specifically outlines what s/he has gone through since s/he has arrived in the U.S. as a student:

> *I have not seen my family for 7 years. Please consider how hard it may be for anyone to experience such dilemma when you have to choose between your life and responsibilities and your family. I am not talking about regular life limitation. I am talking about not being able to visit my family for years during which I lost my dad and my mom has developed dementia and I couldn't be there. This seems to me as a bureaucratic obstacle that can be addressed if there is a will. Please consider our plight when deciding.*

[18] Source: http://www.thepetitionsite.com/714/072/264/multiple-entry-visa-for-iranian-students/ (last accessed 2/29/2016)

It is evident that although studying in the U.S. is considered an achievement for Iranian educational migrants, it is also associated with personal loss. Given their rather difficult path before and after moving to the U.S., Iranians with student visas usually discuss how those who win the U.S. Diversity Visa (DV) lottery *'have it easy'*. The DV lottery is a program through which every year 50,000 permanent resident visas are issued to people from countries with a low rate of immigration to the U.S. In 2015, around 10% (4,992) of the Green Card lottery winners were Iranians.[19] Although these 'lucky' winners have a relatively easier path before arriving in the U.S. and do not worry about legally securing their residence or traveling in and out of the country, given the randomness of the selections and diverse financial and educational backgrounds of these Green Card lottery winners, they may encounter problems finding jobs, getting admitted to universities, getting financial aid for their studies, and may not be able to afford to stay in the United States. It is the difference between the problems faced by educational migrants and DV lottery winners from Iran and how these differences affect their social positionings regarding ideals that is of interest in this section.

One of the main concerns for the Iranian students during their studies is the future of their migration. Therefore, they follow and share with each other the news about different possibilities for securing their stay in the U.S. after graduation. This desire to stay in the U.S. long term is in fact the opposite of what Park and Lo (2012) characterize as a new trend in migration in South Korea: short-term educational migration to increase the odds of winning the competition in the South Korean job market. For Iranians, the new trend can be best characterized as 'educational migration with the hope of a long-term stay'. This is because, on the one hand, their life

[19] Source: http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/diversity-visa/dv-2015-selected-entrants.html (last accessed 2/29/2016)

experiences in Iran were affected by different social, political, and economic issues. In particular, the final years of their life in Iran coincided with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency (2005-2013) whose foreign and domestic policies led to severe damages in the Iranian economy and society (Amuzagar, 2013). Most importantly, the international sanctions imposed on Iran as a result of Ahmadinejad's nuclear activity policies crippled the Iranian economy over the course of his tenure in office (Bastani, 2014). Also, the political and social restrictions on the Iranian youth, especially university students, increased during this period. These pressures specifically intensified after Ahmadinejad's controversial re-election in 2009, which resulted in a remarkable increase in the rate of Iranian 'brain drain', i.e., emigration of skilled and educated individuals (Chaichian, 2012). Such social, political, and economic pressures experienced by the Iranian students before their migration thus make it difficult for them to agree on a certain period of their life as the ideal past, though some may characterize pre-Ahmadinejad era -- especially during Mohammad Khatami's presidency (1997-2005)-- as relatively better days. On the other hand, the above-mentioned bureaucratic procedures and restrictions around them before and after their arrival in the U.S. make their current situation less than ideal as well. As a result, they seek their ideals in the future of their migration.

5.2.2. Data Analysis

5.2.2.1. Context

The following two excerpts are taken from several recordings of unguided casual conversations between 5 male Iranian Azerbaijanis and me in New York City.[20] The participants were all in

[20] I acknowledge that since my recorded data in this section mainly involve interactions among males, I cannot illustrate the discursive practices of the female Iranian migrants. However, my goal is not to claim that the patterns observed in this analysis occur all the time. Instead, I aim to understand how the different chronotopes of the ideal life are revealed in this particular interaction, given the participants' different migration histories.

their late twenties and early thirties when the recordings were taking place and had arrived in the U.S. during the past 5 years. Three of the participants (all names are pseudonyms) , Mehdi, Salar, and Kamran, had won U.S. Green Cards through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV) a few years before and were U.S. residents; Aref and I (Farzad) were 'nonresident aliens' on student (F1) visas; and Peyman's status had recently changed from F1 to H-1B (temporary work permit). Socio-economically, the participants came from middle class families and were well-educated. In particular, at the time of the recordings, Salar and Peyman had finished their graduate studies and were working; Mehdi was in a Ph.D. program and was also working part time; Kamran was working part time and had just been admitted to a graduate program; and Aref was about to graduate and was looking for a job in order be able to stay in the U.S. Aref and I, who knew each other before coming to the U.S., had the opportunity to meet these four participants when we were visiting a mutual friend in NYC, who was not present in the conversations presented here. Although the participants all had developed a very close relationship from the very beginning of their encounter and kept bantering back and forth throughout the interactions, the issue of their residency statuses had not come up yet, and the two very active participants of the conversations presented here, i.e. Aref and Mehdi, were not aware of each other's statuses. This topic, however, came up later in the same conversation. Since the majority of the newer generations of Iranian migrants in the U.S., as explained in section 5.2.1, are either graduate students or Green Card winners, the data turned out to be useful to investigate the impact of different migration trajectories on discursive practices.

Prior to the following excerpts, Kamran had been talking about how he hated paying so much in taxes in the U.S. and was explaining how in Iran he had not had to do so. Aref was drawing Kamran's attention to the fact that he also needed to consider what he could do with his

net income *here* [in the U.S.] compared to his net income *there* [in Iran]. They continued discussing how the inflation rate had tripled in the past few years in Iran and how life had become more difficult. The following excerpts, which follow from this same discussion, revolve around convincing others that the chronotopes they are invoking present more valid accounts of the realities of life *here* and *there*.

5.2.2.2. Chronotopic Images of Success

In this section, I argue that the degree of 'sharedness' with respect to past migration trajectories and current migration status affects how similarly or differently migrants negotiate their transnationals positionings. Here, I show how the participants with similar migration experiences construct/co-construct similar spatiotemporal representations of success, and those with different experiences question the validity of such chronotopic visualizations. A close deictic analysis shows how comparative imaginations of *here* and *there* are constructed, and how the participants calibrate their talk and map themselves into these constructed societies.

Excerpt 1:

1. Kamran: a: odzurdi. (2.0) indi Iran-da:↑=	**1. K:** You're right.(2.0) Now in Iran↑=
2. Farzad: =bülüsæn? Farghi budu ki sæn burda:↑ (2.0) fæghæt ællæshisæn ki: bidana ish tapasan ki: sheyin [ola gharanti	**2. F:** =You know? The difference is that here↑(2.0), you only try to find a job to have a thing, [a guarantee
3. Aref: [gharanti olusan da, zindagannighın gharanti olur	**3. A:** [You get guaranteed, your life gets guaranteed.
4. Farzad: sæn ish tapasan, hæm mashının yer-be-yer olar, hæm evin.	**4. F:** If you find a job, your car (problem) is solved, so is your home.

Excerpt 1 (cont.):

5. Mehdi: axi zindægannıx mashın ev dæyir fæghæt=	**5. M:** But, life is not just car and home.=
6. Farzad: = yo: mænzur (1.0)	**6. F:** = No, I mean (1.0)
7. Aref: mali ba:bætdæn bax[anda	**7. A:** When we look at it from a financial perspective.
8. Farzad: [ma:li ba:bætdæn, [yani sæn	**8. F:** From a financial perspective, it [means you
9. Mehdi: [elæ mali ba:bætdæn baxandada(.) ginædæ mashınınan pul dæ:=	**9. M:** [even when looking at it from a financial perspective, it is not only car and money=
10. Aref: =niyæ? a: sænin mashının ola, evin ola, hæzineye zindægannighıvi veræsæn, z-zindægannıghınnan næmænæ istisæn? ish næ- næyæ ishlisæn?=	**10. A:** =Why? If you have a car, a house, and can pay for your living expenses, what do you want from life? Why do you work?
11. Mehdi: =maddi desæn bæli da odzurdi=	**11. M:** =If you are talking from a materialistic perspective, yes, that's right.=
12. Farzad: =o-obirsi zatdarınan ishim yoxdi. Mn-mæn diyiræm ki a: mæn orda ishli:ræm va mæniki burda ishliræm birbirinæn mughayisæ eliræm.mn-mæniki orda ishli:dim 8 il orda ishlædim mæ:m ælimæ bidana mashın toxdamadi. (2.0) bu:sæn? (2.0) ya orda istiasæn ev alasan(.)	**12. F:** =I am not talking about other stuff. I am saying that the "I" that works there and the "I" that works here, I compare with each other. The "I" that worked there, I worked 8 years there and couldn't even buy a car. (2.0) you know? (2.0) or you want to buy a house

Excerpt 1 (cont.):

næmænædi gæræh(1.0) got veræsæn, onnan sora, i:- axirdæ bi 20 milyonun vam verædzaxdi, 20 dærsædinæn,=	there, (.) I don't know (1.0) you should bust your ass and after that, in the end they give you a 20 million (Toman) loan with a 20% (interest rate).=
13. Mehdi: =vermæzlær onuda bilævæ [((inaudible))	**13. M:** =They don't even give that to you. [((inaudible))
14. Farzad: [o: da=	**14. F:** [That (is the point)=
15. Aref: =bu:sæn? Izdivadz eliænin æyæ istæsæ mashini ola, ya gæræh mühüm badzadan tsixa, ya mühüm badziæ ghoya. Oz bashına ma-(shın) ev alammaz. ra-rahati buduba.(1.0) vallah. (2.0) sæn (.) götu:da achasa:n↑ ((exhaling smoke))	**15. A:** =You know? If those who get married want to have a car, either he should have come out of an important hole, or he is sticking into an important hole. He can't buy a car or a house on his own. This is the easiest. (1.0) believe me. (2.0) even if you (.) bust your ass↑ ((exhaling smoke))
16. Mehdi: o gha:p diræm da xanivadævæ da. æyæ vaghæ:n bülüsan ki a: pulun var orda særmayæghuzari eliæjaxsan, eshæh-jan pul tsıxaldasan, (3.0) [ghazan behesht kimin yasharsan haji	**16. M:** That depends, as I say, on your family. If you really know that you have money there and you can make investments and you can earn shit-load of money, (3.0) [you earn and live like heaven (a boss) dude
17. Farzad: [orda ((inaudible)) pulun olsa (1.0) pulun olsa bali=	**17. F:** [There, if you have money, if you have money, yes=

Excerpt 1 (cont.):

18. Mehdi: æraghıvi itsærsæn, sihmaghıvi sikærsæn, evin dæ olar, mashınında olar [behtærin mashınnar	**18. M:** You can drink liquor, get laid, have your own house, also you'll have a car [the best cars
19. Aref: [axi pulun olsa, hesh ishlæmax lazim dæyir, orda tæværrümünæn sæn eshæh-jan pul ghazanasan. Hes-Hets ish görmæ ba, yer al-ver ela. Hets ish görmæ.	**19. A:** [but if you have money, there's no need to work, there you can earn shitload of money with the inflation. Don't do anything, just deal real estate. Don't do anything else.

The main chronotope of (financial) success *here* [in the U.S.] invoked in this example concerns the idea that *here* one can make a decent living on his/her own upon finding a job, while success *there* [in Iran] requires coming from an economically affluent family. The representation of such an image of a successful life is made possible through 'chronotopic contrast' (Agha, 2007a, p. 322). That is, in order for a chronotope of success *here* to be constructed, a contrastive chronotope is created to depict an image of lack of success *there*. To illustrate, in lines 2 and 4, using the generic 'you' which marks the invoked chronotope as a general truth, I compare the concerns of (young) people *here* with those of the people *there* saying that the main concern of young people *here* is finding a job. In line 3, Aref aligns with my point by co-constructing the same chronotope in a nomically calibrated fashion (Silverstein, 1993; Dick, 2010; Koven, 2016) saying that *here* 'you' guarantee 'your' life once you find a job (*gharanti olu**san** da, zindagannigh**ın** gharanti olur/* 'you get guaranteed. Your life gets guaranteed'). Through his choice of deictics, he links the current interaction to a 'timeless' realm to present a generalized claim about life *here* (Agha, 2007b).

A similar pattern can be observed in line 15 when Aref picks up from where I left off in line 12. More specifically, after I compare the financial situation *here* and *there* using both generic and individual 'I' (*mæn*), saying how difficult it is for people like 'us' to buy a house or a car *there*, Aref continues to co-construct the chronotope of (financial) success *there* in line 15. He uses different deictic expressions in his (re)-creation of such a spatiotemporal portrayal. He first uses the generic deictic 'they' referring to 'those who get married *there*' which is subsequently narrowed down to males when he uses the metaphor *ya gæræh mühüm badzadan tsixa, ya mühüm badziæ ghoya/*'he should have come out of an important hole (vagina), or he is sticking into an important hole (He is either born in a rich family or married into one)'. Having constructed a particular image of how one might be financially successful *there*, Aref uses the generic deictic 'he' saying that "**he** cannot buy a car or a car on his own" (*öz bashina mashın ya ev alam**maz** ba*). He then switches to generic 'you' in the same line (***san** götu: dæ atsasan/* 'Even if **you** bust your ass'). The shift in deictics from 'they' to 'he' helps Aref bring in a particular cultural reality of the Iranian community in which men are responsible for providing the financial resources for the family. Here, he is also referring back to the already-constructed chronotope of progress in the U.S. in that *here* you can be successful financially on your own—'a self-made man'-- but *there* you cannot do it alone. The deictic 'you' used at the end of this line, on the other hand, can be said to have both individual and generic functions and is thus 'double-voiced' (Bakhtin, 1981). This, as we will also see in the next excerpt, appears to be a discursive strategy used by Aref to 'invite alignment' (Koven, 2016; Stivers, 2008) through 'involving the audience' (O'Connor, 1994) and presenting his interlocutor as a part of the 'norm' (Gerhardt & Savasir, 1986).

Unlike Aref, who is on a student visa, Mehdi has won a U.S. Green Card and is a U.S. resident. Thus, he neither shares with Aref the same route before arriving in the U.S., nor does he have the same restrictions regarding traveling in and out of the U.S. or staying in the U.S. after graduation. I argue that it is such varying histories and concerns that lead to Mehdi's disalignment with the chronotopes presented in the interaction. The disalignment strategy he uses in this example challenges the entire chronotope presented as a general truth. For instance, in line 5, after Aref and I collaboratively construct the chronotope of financial success as affording to buy a house and a car, Mehdi challenges the idea by saying *axi zindægannıx mashın ev dæyir fæghæt/* 'But, life is not just car and home'. He uses the same strategy in line 9 (*elæ mali babætdæn baxandada ginædæ mashınınan pul dæ:/* 'Even when looking at it from a financial perspective, it is not only car and money') after Aref and I reformulate what is meant. However, after Aref reconstructs the idea in line 10 by posing a question directly to him using the double-voiced 'you' (Why? If **you** have a car, a house, **you** can pay for your cost of living, what do **you** want from life? Why do **you** work?), Mehdi aligns with the idea emphasizing that he agrees with it from a 'materialistic perspective'. Aref's use of 'you' here is similar to the discussion I presented earlier (line 15) about how he attempts to elicit positive alignment by presenting the interlocutor(s) as a part of the general truth being portrayed, which unlike the previous example appears to be successful here. The relationship between their unshared migration experiences and their chronotopic representations of success, I argue, reveals that defining the heterogeneity of diasporic communities merely in terms of language, class, gender, religion, race, and generation (see McLeod, 2000, p. 207) would not be sufficient to highlight the dynamic nature of such communities.

It should be noted that my involvement in this interaction was part of the natural conversation and was not used to lead the conversation, nor was it to consciously elicit certain discursive patterns. Specifically, when I launched the discussion of the chronotopes of success, I was in fact building upon the contrastive chronotopic images of *here* versus *there* created by Kamran and Aref prior to this excerpt when, as mentioned earlier, they were comparing taxes and revenues in the two countries. The argument I present in line 12, in particular, illustrates my own view as a member of the community rather than an outsider researcher, which leads to the participants' joint orientation to the chronotopes I put forward. It is inevitable that, given the similarities of my migration path with that of Aref's, I share similar concerns with him as an Iranian educational migrant myself, and thus the chronotopes I present elicit more positive alignment from him than from Mehdi. Yet, these discursive patterns were not determined a priori, but instead were revealed when I was revisiting the data, which were originally collected to investigate the participants' patterns of multilingual language use. Hence, although I acknowledge my role in bringing up the main chronotopes analyzed in this section, what is important is how they were picked up, co-constructed, and responded to by the other participants, given their similar or different histories.

5.2.2.3. Immediate Concerns and 'hypersubjectivity'

In this section, I illustrate how migrants might present their immediate concerns and anxieties as 'timeless' truths and highlight the sharedness of such concerns. As Arnold (2015, pp. 14-15) points out in her study of Salvadorian migrant women's narratives, opting for generic and collective rather than individual framings helps distance oneself from the descriptions being presented and highlight shared experiences of a group. Similarly, in this example, the same

discursive practice is used to discuss individual concerns and anxieties. This extract is the continuation of the conversation presented in Excerpt 1.

Excerpt 2:

1. Aref: Vali xob buranın da özi:n shærayiti var da:. Bura:n tæhlı: var, dost yox, a:shna yox [nemidanam **connection-**ın yox	**1. A:** But (living) here has its own circumstances. Here, there is loneliness, no friends, no acquaintances, [I don't know, you have no **connections**
2. Mehdi:[gærdæsh ghalıp sænin ozüvæ ba: ↑ hærnædzür dedim da ghalip özüvæ da=	**2. M:** [Brother, it depends on yourself ↑ However (you consider it), as I said, it depends on yourself=
(…)	(…)
3. Aref: ghalıb, ghalıb özü:væ: ghæbul eliræm.=	**3. A:** I accept that it depends- depends on yourself.=
4. Mehdi: =Bü:sæn næmænædi? ((cough)) ghalıb sæn lizzætin næmænæ-dæn alısan. Biri var ki a: mæsælæn [pul ghazanır, ev, mashının zadın da alır↑ di:r a: istiræm tæk olam	**4. M:** =You know what? ((cough)) It depends on what you enjoy. There might be one who, for example, [earns his money, buys his house, car and stuff↑ he says I want to be alone
5. Aref: [lizzæt, lizzæt bæhsi dæyir, ayri söz diræm bilævæ. ayri söz diræm bilævæ.(1.0)sænin indi bida: bi ish göræsæn(1.0) Iranda, 3 nafar(1.0) ya ba-vasetæ ya bi-vasetæ adamın var o ishi görmagha.=	**5. A:** [It's not the matter of pleasure, I am talking about something else. I'm talking about something else. (1.0) you now want to get something done (1.0) In Iran, you have 3 people, with or without mediation, to get it done for you=
6. Mehdi: =hæn=	**6. M:** =yeah=

Excerpt 2 (cont.):

7. Aref: =Yaxdzi? sæn lap denæ ki lap idztima:i adamsan (.) lap behtærin **connection**-narın var, (1.0) ehh, bu, (.) bülür da mænnæn bætær götæ-barmax hesh özüm görmæmishæm, 2ni sayındzan ge:p dost ollam birinæn, Væli (1.0) bida: mæsælæki vardi:, sæn orda o **connection**-nari ((lighting cigarette)) dær teyye 10 il, 15 il dzürlæmisæn=	**7. A:** =all right? Say you are the most sociable person, (.) you have the best **connections**, (1.0) uhh, he knows, I have not seen a more outgoing person than myself, count to 2 and I go and make friends with someone, but (1.0) the problem is that, there, you've made those **connections** ((lighting cigarette)) during 10 years, 15 years=
8. Mehdi: =bæ:=	**8. M:** =yeah=
9. Aref: =sæn burdaki biz bu halætdæ galmishix bashliax ta o hæddæ yetisha:x, (.) özüdæ hesh dzürlænmaz (.) Bexatere inki **connection**-nar (.) sænnan mædræsæ doslarınnan oyüz buyüzdæn, doslarda (.) [yoxumuzdi da [((inaudible))	**9. A:** =Here, we have come like this, if we start to get to that level (.) (the connections) can't be built (.) since the **connections** have been your school friends from different places, friends (.) [we don't have [((inaudible))
10. Mehdi: [fa:mili olur tsoxtær(1.0)	**10. M:** [they are mostly family/relatives
11. Aref: famil olur, dost olur,(.) o dzürlænip gælip bu-bu mærhæliædza:n, sændæ burda heshvax o ye- o babætdærdæn istiæsan diæsæn, hæn (.) sæn burda (1.0) öz ayan-öz ælin öz bashındi.	**11. A:** They're relatives, friends, They've been built and come to this level, and you never here- from that perspective if you talk, yes (.) here (1.0) you are on your own.

Here, Aref shifts the topic away from the chronotopes of the ideal life to another aspect of reality *here* in the U.S., i.e. the downsides. In particular, he presents 'being able to be on your own *here*

unlike *there,* which was previously put forward as an advantage of living *here,* more as a drawback. For instance, in line 1, he presents the downsides of life *here* by saying that *bura:n tæhli: var, dost yox, ashna yox, nemidanæm* ***connection****-ın yox/* 'Here, there is loneliness, no friends, no acquaintances, I don't know, you have no connections'. In doing so, he avoids discussing this as only a personal, individual concern, (e.g., 'I am lonely, I have no friends, acquaintances, and connections') and instead, he presents the idea as a general truth. By avoiding individual framing and presenting his concerns nomically, he is emphasizing the shared aspects of their collective experiences *here*; however, even though 'loneliness' and 'having no friends' might be shared with others as well, 'having connections' might not be a shared concern-- at least at this stage of the others' lives. In fact, as the conversation unfolds, it appears that even by 'having friends', he is mostly referring to 'those who help one get things done' rather than 'someone with whom one has an affectionate bond'. At this time, what appears to be the most salient concern for him is 'having connections' to be able to get a job and secure his stay in the U.S. and his frustration, which is a consequence of his anxieties about the future of his migration, is evident in how he dominates the conversation.

Among all the ideas he presents nomically as the disadvantages of living *here*– i.e., being lonely and having no friends, acquaintances, and connections—the one that he continues to mention in his following turns is 'having connections'. In line 5, as a response to Mehdi's comment *ghalıp sæn lizzætin næmænæ-dæn alısan/* 'It depends on what you enjoy', Aref clarifies what he means by presenting another general truth about *there.* In order to present this hypothetical situation, he uses 'you' and 'now' to bring *there-and-then* to *here-and-now*. The use of 'you' accompanied by 'now' (***san****in indi/***you** now) in line 5 can be said to be functioning as both generic and individual deictic, making it both nomically and reportively calibrated.

Furthermore, in line 7, he switches from the generic 'you' (***sæn*** *lap denæ ki lap idztima:i adamsan/* 'Say **you** are the most sociable person') to the individual 'I' (***mæn****næn bætær götæ-barmax hesh özüm dæ görmæmishæm*/ '**I** have not seen a more outgoing person than myself') to present a general truth about himself; however, he switches back to 'you' toward the end of this line (***san*** *orda o connection-nari dær teyye 10 il, 15 il dzürlæmisan*/ 'there **you**'ve made those connections during 10 years, 15 years'). Here, the use of 'you', as argued by O'Connor (1994), helps involve the audience, while the individual framing using 'I' helps illustrate him as an example of someone who cannot be successful in making connections despite having the general qualities. Similarly, in line 9, Aref uses different forms of deictics (we→you→we). The use of 'we' can be said to refer to the interlocutors in the present participation framework (Agha, 2007a), or generically to all those who have migrated from Iran to the U.S. Such a discursive practice, as discussed earlier, can be regarded as a strategy to invite the interlocutor(s) to align with the chronotopic image that is being constructed, by presenting them as a part of the general truth. This proves to be a successful strategy, since Mehdi who appeared to be disaligning with what Aref was presenting previously, aligns with Aref in 10 by co-constructing the image along with him. In fact, collective/generic framings helps participants foreground their shared experiences as migrants– in this case probably their shared 'loneliness'—and underemphasize individual subjectivity by distancing themselves from the speech event (Arnold 2015; O'Connor 1994).

This example also demonstrates a different strategy Mehdi uses to disalign with the (re)-constructed chronotopes: challenging their generality and bringing 'personhood' (Agha, 2005) into the discussion. For instance, in line 2, Mehdi responds by saying *ghærdæsh ghalıb sænin özüvæ ba: hærnædzur, dedim da ghalıb özüvæ da/* 'Brother, it depends on yourself, however

(you consider it), as I said, it depends on yourself'. By saying that 'it depends on yourself', Mehdi is limiting the generality of Aref's claim by restricting it to specific types of people. He further explains this in line 4 when he says *ghalıb sæn lizzætin næmænæ-dæn alısan. Biri var ki a: mæsælæn pul ghazanır, ev, mashının zadın da alır di:r a: istiræm tæk olam/* 'It depends on what you enjoy. There might be one who, for example, earns his money, buys his house, car and stuff, he says I want to be alone'. This is in fact a counterexample that Mehdi provides to disalign with Aref's point. In other words, in order to constrain the genericness of Aref's claim, Mehdi gives an example of a particular type of person who may have the qualities Aref is presenting as a general truth about success, but who still enjoys a different kind of life.

5.2.3. Interim Discussion

Aref's invocation of the chronotopes of success *here* and lack of success *there* and then his evaluative presentation of the cons of living *here* and the pros of living *there* give us insight into the role of his individual concerns and desires in the (re)-construction of these spatiotemporal representations. As mentioned earlier, at the time of recording, Aref was a student with a 'non-resident alien' status, and since he was about to graduate, he was searching for a job in order to be able to stay in the U.S. This immediate concern—which is not shared with the other interlocutors—is evident in his discourse of success *here* and *there*. His desire to stay in the U.S. and fear of an imagined return, which is associated with 'backwardness', on the one hand, and his frustration about not having connections to help him find a job on the other hand, impact the types of chronotopes he invokes. He, therefore, presents his current ideals and concerns in the form of general, 'timeless' truths. Such generic framings help him distance himself from what he is describing and also emphasize the sharedness of those experiences (Arnold, 2015; O'Connor, 1994). Mehdi, on the other hand, does not share the same anxieties and concerns due to his

relatively different migration path and status. Thus, he disaligns with the chronotopes of success invoked by Aref through challenging their validity and generality. These examples illustrate how migrants' past experiences as well as present anxieties—what Hall (2014) calls *hypersubjectivity*—emerge in their discourses of *here* and *there.* I argued that the differences in their positionings are due to their different experiences with institutional and bureaucratic procedures. In particular, I pointed out that the restrictions imposed by the U.S. immigration laws and policies on Iranian students affect their diasporic lives and discourses. While previous scholarship has mostly focused on the communicative performances occurring in the bureaucratic encounters of minority communities and asylum seekers, I have presented how immigration bureaucracy can impact migrants' social positionings with respect to chronotopes of success and ideal life.

The patterns observed in Aref's discourse reveal a new trend in migration among the Iranian educational migrants in the United States. On the one hand, their life experiences *there* were affected by different social, political, and economic issues, which make it difficult for them to agree on a certain period of their life as the ideal past. On the other hand, the bureaucratic procedures and restrictions around them before and after arriving in the U.S. deprive them of opportunities such as leaving the U.S. to visit their family and/or attend conferences and thus make their current situation less than ideal as well. As a result, they generate desires of an imagined ideal life here beyond now, i.e. a 'then' that is of the future (cf. Dick, 2010; Harkness, 2013; Rosa, 2016). That is, the chronotopic representations of the ideal life for them involves staying *here* in the U.S. as the land of opportunities but having a different situation than *now,* in terms of migration and socio-economic statuses. It can, in fact, be said that the chronotopes of success *here* and lack of success *there* 'brought about' by the non-resident Iranian students in

conversations are prompted by this large-scale cultural chronotope they 'bring along', which has to do with their aspiration to stay in the United States and have a better future. This ideal future is one where they have found a job and secured their stay in the U.S., have no fear of leaving the U.S. and not being able to re-enter due to the restrictions on their visas, and as a result, can visit their family and friends in Iran freely without any constraints. Being away from their loved ones is what they claim to be the highest price they pay in pursuit of a better life; thus, being able to visit them without any restrictions would indeed give them the chance to get a partial 'refund'.

This analysis highlights a different facet of 'life beyond' put forward by Dick (2010). Dick's study involves nonmigrants' discourses of U.S.-bound migration and imaginings of a life beyond *homeland*. The present study, on the other hand, concerns migrants' desires for an ideal life beyond *now*, which does not pertain to a remove from homeland, but instead deals more with a desire for a better future in the receiving society. Even though this ideal future is indeed spatially located in the U.S. and without its spatial component would not be ideal anymore, such future positionings, affected by the migrants' present longings and concerns, make the temporal fragment of their chronotopes topically more prominent (Agha, 2007a) than spatiality. I tried to add nuance to the discussion of migration discourse by highlighting the role of individual agency (Blommaert, 2015) in rendering the temporal or spatial dimensions of the chronotope more salient.

5.3. Longing, Belonging, and Loss

In this section, I similarly argue that migrants' individual desires, yearnings, and anxieties can, in fact, determine what receives topical salience in their migration discourses. I will specifically focus on the narratives of another male Iranian Azerbaijani educational migrant, I call Erfan. Erfan has had a similar migration path to that of Aref's, and at times, he also creates forward-

looking desires for an ideal future life in the host country. However, given his immediate desires at the time of the ongoing conversation, the interaction mainly revolves around his past-oriented discourses of longing, belonging, and loss. I will illustrate how Erfan discursively distances himself from those in the homeland and highlight his transnational identity particularly through invocation of new technologies. [21]

Scholars have argued that new technologies have intensified the interconnectedness between home and host countries, complicating the ways in which identities are constructed and negotiated by mobile populations (Vertovec, 1999; Blommaert, 2010; De Fina & Perrino, 2013; Lo & Park, 2017). It has also been argued that new technologies facilitate a mediated co-presence in which the line between being present and being absent is blurred (Licoppe & Smoreda, 2005, p. 321). I demonstrate that while technology facilitates and intensifies migrants' *connection* to the homeland, it is also associated with feelings of *disconnection*. This is because, as argued in Karimzad and Catedral (forthcoming), the information received through new technology is both *decontextualized* and *underspecified*. As a result, such technologically mediated connection makes migrants *aware* of some changes back home, yet it does not give them access to a fully *contextualized experience* of these changes. The underspecified and decontextualized nature of information from the homeland stands in contrast to migrants' prior unmediated experiences *there-and-then*. Therefore, receiving this information reminds them of both their lack of access to first-hand experiences of the homeland and their positions as migrants more broadly. This is also because technology disrupts the imagination of an

[21] The ideas presented in this section are developed more elaborately in Karimzad, Farzad & Catedral, Lydia (forthcoming). Mobile (dis)connection: New technology and rechronotopized images of the homeland.

unchanged homeland by confronting those abroad with images of a temporally present homeland – one with which it may be more difficult to adequate.

I will illustrate how Erfan specifically makes a distinction between 'being aware of' and 'feeling connected to' what is happening back home, which reveals the limits of the information received through technology. Moreover, the discursive link he creates between his constant contact with his family via new media and his feelings of disconnection points to the fact that rituals of contact can also be reminders of being removed. [22]

5.3.1. Context

Erfan and I had been friends for several years and the following conversations were recorded when I was visiting him in his new home in California. In these particular conversations, we are discussing the rise of the personal use of technology and social media amongst those in Iran, leading to further discussions about life *here* vs. *there*. Erfan, a multilingual speaker of Azeri, Persian, and English, is in his early thirties and came to the United States around 8 years ago to do his graduate studies. At the time of recording, he had finished his PhD and was a postdoctoral fellow at a well-known university in California. Erfan has not gone back to Iran since his arrival, given the restrictions on U.S. student visas for Iranians explained in 2.1. Specifically, since he held a single-entry visa, he had preferred not to leave the U.S., fearing that he might not be able to renew his visa and re-enter the country. Although Erfan had graduated, he was able to do his postdoc as part of the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program while still being on a student visa.[23]

[22] These ideas have been developed collaboratively with Lydia Catedral.
[23] Source: https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/students-and-employment/optional-practical-training (Last accessed: March 16, 2017).

At the time of recording, Erfan and I were sitting on the balcony and talking while having breakfast. Prior to Excerpt 3, Erfan was on the phone with his brother, I refer to as Ali, who was a graduate student in a different state in the U.S. at the time. They were discussing Iranians' new trend of using social media extensively. They were specifically talking about Telegram, the most popular social media platform in Iran.[24] Telegram makes possible both one-on-one and group instant messaging as well as photo and video sharing. This platform allows people to create different groups, from extended family groups to groups including high school friends or colleagues. In these groups, people usually have discussions, make plans for different events, share entertaining photos and videos, and keep up with the latest news. The use of such platforms has increased dramatically among both younger and older generations in recent years, during the time Erfan and his brother have been abroad. Having overheard Erfan's conversation with his brother, I asked Erfan a follow-up question as part of the natural conversation, which led to the following discussion.

5.3.2. *'I'm more connected…, but sometimes it is too much!'*

This example focuses on how the participant presents images of his parents', specifically his father's, changed life style. In this example, new technologies and their use are invoked not only as the means through which information about a changed home is available, but also as a big part of the change itself. The extensive use of social media platforms by Erfan's father is invoked to both highlight the facilitation of connection with family and, at the same time, underscore a

[24] Source: http://techrasa.com/2016/08/26/infographic-social-media-iran/ (Last accessed: March 16, 2017).

disconnection from the older generation's new lifestyle in Iran, with which Erfan and his brother find it hard to relate.

Excerpt 3:

1. F: Telegram-i næmænæ diyirdin?	**1. F:** What were you saying about Telegram?
2. E: Baba mænim bu qærdæshimin æslæn æ'sabi yoxdi ha. Babam a:hæng yollar. Ali ki æslæn yoxudi Telegram-i zadi. Bu ka:ræ döl. Bæ'd, yollar mænæ, mæsælæn sonnæti-dæn, Azari-dæn, '*lotfæn bæraye Ali hæm befrest*'. Mæn özüm qulaghasmıram [(hahaha) Ali-æ yolliæja:m. Gül, "bæraye Ali hæm befrest."	**2. E:** This brother of mine doesn't have tolerance at all. My dad sends (us) music. Ali doesn't have Telegram and stuff at all. He's not into this stuff. Then, he sends them to me, for example, traditional (Persian music) or Azeri ,'*please send them to Ali too*' ((bookish Persian)). I myself don't listen to them, [(hahaha) let alone send them to Ali. (sends a) Flower (image), '*send it to Ali too*' ((bookish Persian))
3. F: [(hahaha)	**3. F:** [(hahaha)
4. E: (0.2) 'janım bulari hæmkarlarımız yolliyipdi' (0.1) 'qoy görüm baxım' mæsælæn danıshıllar mænnæn birdæn **text** gælir, diræm ki 'axi sæfæ: ævæzlæmæki'. 'janım qoy görüm hæmkarlar næmænæ yolliyiplær'[(hahaha)	**4. E:** (0.2) 'My dear, my colleagues have sent them' (0.1) 'let me look at them', for instance, when they are talking to me, suddenly he receives a **text**, I say, 'Don't change the page'. 'My dear, let me see what my colleagues have sent' [(hahaha)
5. F: [(hahaha)	**5. F:** [(hahaha)
6. E: (0.3) ja:lib bir pædidædi. Billænæ shey aldıx yolladıx, (0.1) iPad ki mæsælæn, zæh vira bülælær rahat. Da olup sheylæri. Supa:næ	**6. E:** (0.3) It's an interesting phenomenon. We bought and sent them the thing, iPad, so that they, like, can call us easily. It has

Excerpt 3 (cont.):

bashında ævvæl shey, drr drr drr. Süp bi:seri, gejæ bi:seri (hahaha) özüdæ durbin burdadi [(hahaha)	become their thing. At breakfast, the first thing, drr drr drr ((onomatopoeia for (annoying) phone ring)), once in the morning, once at night (hahaha). And the camera is here [(hahaha) ((pointing to the fact that they hold the camera too close to themselves))
7. F: [(hahaha)	**7. F:** [(hahaha)
8. E: 'baba onu tut daliæ, qadayın alım' (hahaha). æslan chox ja:lıbdiki bular irtibat bærqærar eliæmmillær.	**8. E: '**Move it backward, my dear' (hahaha). It is so interesting how they cannot make a connection (adapt with the new technology).
(…)	(…)
9. F: Shey nejæ, mæsælæn Iranınan ki mæsælæn irtibatın bujur bærqærardi, (0.2) næjür his verir bilævæ mæsælæn, æz læhaz-e, mæsælæn ehsas elisæn ki væslsæn Iran-a?	**9. F:** what about the thing, for example now that you're in touch with Iran, (0.2) What kind of feeling does it give you, like, with respect to, like, do you think that you are connected to Iran?
10. E: choxtær væslæm. ævvældæ yadiyæn gælir næjür zæh vırırdıx? Shuma:ræ tuturdux, *'shomareye mored-e næzær ra (vared konid)'* 011 tuturdun, bæd 98. Yo, æz bu læhazlar ki chox færqlidi. Mæn indi vaqeæn bishtær dær ertebatam. Zindægannıxların jæryanında choxtæræm. Bajımınan choxtær danıshıram. Bulari xoshdi, væli bædæn bish æz ænda:zæ istifa:dæ olur.	**10. E:** I'm more connected. Do you remember how we used to make calls? We'd dial a number, '*(Dial) the intended number*', you dialed 011, then 98. In these respects, it is very different. I am really more in contact now. I am much more aware of the lives (there). I talk with my sister more. From this perspective, it is good, but then it is used too much.

Excerpt 3 (cont.):

11. F: Oranın axi, ora ja:libdi, mæsælæn mæn (0.4) ja:libi buduki, öyünnæri skype eli:ræm qærdæshiminæn (0.2) qærdæshimdi, balæjæ gızın tutup qujaghında, mænnæn danıshır 'æmu di' mæsælæn.	**11. F:** There though, it is interesting there, like, I (0.4) the interesting thing is that, the other day I was skyping with my brother (0.2), it is my brother holding his little daughter on his lap, talking to me, 'It's uncle', for example.
12. E: görmiyipsæn?	**12. E:** Haven't you seen (her)?
13. F: mæn buni görmæmishæm. Obirsin görmüshæm. Bæ'd, dalıda görmüshæm (0.2) babam tilfununandi bela. (0.3) bidana æjib his verir.	**13. F:** I haven't seen this one. I've seen the other one. Then, behind them I saw my dad looking at his cell phone like this (0.3) it gives you a strange feeling.
14. E: Ja:lib hesdi, hæyæ. Mænim babam da ojur olup. Mænim mama:m yox væli babam hæmkarlarinan (0.2) hamkarlar da hammısi **retired.** Hamkarlar hammısi [(hahaha) jok yollullar. 'qoy bilæyæn oxiyim', 'yox istæmæz'.	**14. E:** It's an interesting feeling, yeah. My dad has become like that too. Not my mom but my dad, like his colleagues (0.2) and the colleagues are all **retired.** The colleagues, all, [(hahaha) send jokes. 'let me read them to you', 'No, I don't want'.
15. F: [(hahaha)	**15. F:** [(hahaha)

In this example, I illustrate how Erfan maintains that new technology has facilitated his connection with his family, and how this connection simultaneously provides a new image of his father that disrupts the image he already had. In response to my question regarding how he feels about being connected to Iran, he states *choxtær væslæm. ævvældæ yadiyæn gælir næjür zæh vırırdıx? Shuma:ræ tuturdux, 'shomareye mored-e næzær ra (vared konid)' 011 tuturdun, bæd 98. Yo, æz bu læhazlar ki chox færqlidi. Mæn indi vaqeæn bishtær dær ertebatam.*

Zindægannıxların jæryanında choxtærəm. Bajımınan choxtær danıshıram. Bulari xoshdi, væli bædæn bish æz ænda:zæ istifa:dæ olur.'I'm more connected. Do you remember how we used to make calls? We'd dial a number, 'Dial the intended number', you dialed 011, then 98. In these respects, it is very different. I am really more in contact now. I am much more aware of the lives (there). I talk with my sister more. From this perspective, it is good, but then it is used too much' (line 10). He presents the improved situation by comparing the situation now to the time prior to the development of social media platforms when he had to use international phone cards to call his family. Moreover, he specifically points to his constant contact with his sister. What makes the contact with his sister more salient is the fact that she is the only family member Erfan has not seen since he left Iran, while his brother lives in the U.S. and his parents have visited him in the U.S. twice in the past years. This change in the convenience of technology is so salient that although it makes him 'more aware of the lives (there)', he also characterizes the constant connection as 'too much'. This is evident in line 6 when he maintains that ever since he and his brother bought iPads for their parents, they call too often: *Billænæ shey aldıx yolladıx, (0.1) iPad ki mæsælæn, zæh vira bülælær rahat. Da olup sheylæri. Supa:næ bashında ævvæl shey, drr drr drr. Süp bi:seri, gejæ bi:seri* 'We bought and sent them the thing, iPad, so that they can, for instance, call us easily. It has become their thing. At breakfast, the first thing, drr drr drr ((onomatopoeia for (annoying) phone ring)), once in the morning, once at night'. Throughout the longer conversation, he also referred to this new trend as 'over-socialization' that is 'unnecessary', further pointing to the drastic change in his migrant experience of being in touch with those at home.

While the changes in technology have made it easier for him to be in contact with his family, the information Erfan receives through the very same technology distorts the image he

had of home. More specifically, these new media allow him to observe his dad's changed lifestyle with regards to technology - an image that conflicts with his memories of his family. From lines 2 to 8, he presents a specific image of his dad's use of social media, discussing how he shares music or pictures with him, and how he and his colleagues keep in touch through social media. Erfan specifically constructs this image by shifting between the interlocutor, narrator, and character voices (Koven, 2002, 2007). Interestingly, when he is discussing what his father writes to him in line 2, he quotes him by switching from Azeri to Persian (*lotfæn bæraye Ali hæm befrest* 'please send them to Ali too'). This switch points to the associations of writing with formality and formality with Persian. In particular, since the medium of education, bureaucratic correspondence, etc., in Iran is Persian, writing in any form entails formality for older generations. Thus, they usually write in formal Persian on social media as well. In line 4, however, when Erfan is presenting an imaginative conversation with his dad while they are video-calling and not instant messaging, the language he uses in character voice is Azeri (*janım qoy görüm hæmkarlar næmænæ yolliyiplær* 'My dear, let me see what my colleagues have sent'). This narrated conversation highlights that his father's use of social media is so extensive that he even switches between applications while video-calling with Erfan to 'see what his colleagues have sent', which makes Erfan complain: *axi sæfæ: ævæzlæmæki* 'don't change the page'.

Although Erfan is mostly talking about his father, the *them* that he constructs appears to apply generally to the generation of parents. This is evident in how he refers to *their* use of social media as 'an interesting phenomenon' (line 6) while also maintaining that *they* are struggling to adapt themselves to new technology (line 8). Such positionings related to the older generations' use of technology may not necessarily be a consequence of migration and may also be brought

about in younger non-migrants' discourses. However, the fact that Erfan and other migrants who left Iran before the emergence of this new trend (e.g. his brother and me) have not witnessed it synchronically makes the information about the parents' technology use 'new information' that impacts their earlier chronotopic images of their parents' lives. The impact of this new information is a reconstructed image of their parents' lives, one that is difficult for them to relate to and that reminds them of their absence from home, making it relevant to their migration experience. The sharedness of these experiences for certain migrants is evident in the joint laughter present throughout this conversation between Erfan and the first author as well as Erfan's characterization of how frustrated his brother is about this new phenomenon (line 2), and Erfan's alignment with my comment about the feeling I get from my father's use of social media (line 14).

5.3.3. *'You'd get the feeling…in the street'*

The following example is the continuation of the previous conversation, as Erfan and I are getting ready to go out. As I will illustrate, the connection facilitated by new technology does not necessarily decrease Erfan's feelings of being a migrant. This example also shows that although new technology makes it possible for Erfan to be virtually present at home, such mediated co-presence does not lessen the longings for physical presence at home.

Excerpt 4:

1. E: Burda rahatsan, chox rahatsan. Müshkülün yoxdi. væli bir elemanlari var, xa:tiræ zatdar, millætin, oki mæsælæn danıshmıllar sænin diliyæn ((water running)).	**1. E:** Here, You're comfortable. You're very comfortable. You don't have any problems. But there are some elements, memories and stuff, your people, the fact that, for instance

Excerpt 4 (cont.):

Mæsælæn bæyram mænæ mæsælæn hæmishæ böyüh **example** di.	they don't speak your language ((water running)). For instance, Nowruz for me, for instance, is always a big **example**.
2. F: uhum	**2. F:** uhum
3. E: Mæsælæn Esfand, sæn næ ha:li olurdun Iranda? ((water running)) burda o yoxdi. Do:reye Christmas-dæ dæ, **you don't have the same feeling.** Væ budi ki mæn choxtær ehsa:s-e **disconnection** eli:ræm. Yani buki hæmishæ, biliræm ki **immigrant**-am. **I don't belong here**.	**3. E:** For example, Esfand (the last month of the Iranian calendar), How would you feel in Iran? ((water running)). It doesn't exist here. During Christmas time, **you don't have the same feeling.** This is why I feel more **disconnected**. It means that always, I know that I am an **immigrant. I don't belong here**.
4. F: ora næjür?	**4. F:** what about there?
5. E: Hara?	**5. E:** where?
6. F: Irana.	**6. F:** Iran
7. E: Iranda d[a:	**7. E:** In Iran al[so
8. F: [oni istiræm diæmki, sorushamki, indi ki mæsælæn irtibatın choxdi, næqqædæ ehsa:[se (væsl olmax eli:sæn)	**8. F:** [I wanna say that, I'm asking that, now that for example you are more connected, how much do you fe[el (connected)
9. E: [yox da, o ertebat mænæ o hessi montæqel eliæmmir ba o **extension** (0.1) Esfand olurdi, hol'o væladaydım mæn, hæmishæ. Yadıma gælir ki mæsælæn hæmishæ xoshhalıdım (0.1) mæsælæn, 15 e Esfand-dæn oyana æslæn havalar ævæz olurdi, bilisæn hærnæmænæ, bæyramın hessin xiavanda tuturdun. Burda yoxdi. Bilisæn bæyramdi. chox væxlær dæki æslæn	**9. E:** [No, that connection doesn't give me that feeling to the same extent (0.1). When it was Esfand, I would always be anxious. I remember that like I was happy all the time (0.1) for example, from the 15th of Esfand on, the weather would change, you know, everything, you'd get the feeling of Nowruz in the street. That doesn't exist here. You know it is

Excerpt 4 (cont.):

ta:rixlæridæ bülmüsæn nævaxdi. Mænim bajımın tævællüdüdi, hesh bülmüræm dünænidi ya büyündi. Iran-da ossaydin, færq elærdi ((brushing his teeth)).Yani, besuræt-e æxba:ri hærnæmænæni alisan. **Engaged** dörsæn æslæn da:stanınan. Bu, bu æziæt elir mæni.	Nowruz. Most of the time you don't even know the dates. It is my sister's birthday, I don't know if it was yesterday or it is today. If you were in Iran, It would be different. ((brushing his teeth)). I mean, you learn about everything as if it is a news report. You are not **engaged** with the story whatsoever. This, this bothers me.
(…)	(…)
10. E: Vaqeæn **obviously** hæm Iraniæm (0.3) bi: jænbeha'i æz Amrika'i varımdi, væli næ **full** Iraniæm, næ **full** Amrika'i. Bir shey væsætdeyæm. Sizlærinæn bizlær mæsælæn ba:hæm, yani bizlær ba:hæm ertebatımız, yani biz özümüzi behtær düshünürıx. Væli chox **minority**-dayıx. Væ **obviously** özünæ göræ bir **culture** di (0.2) væli xob **recognized** döli æslæn be hich onvan. Yani æslæn hæmishæ ehsas eli:sæn ki dær va:qe væsætdæsæn (0.2) yani demillær ki sænin **culture-**in var. Diyillær *sæn æz inja rande æz unja manda-* san.	**10. E:** Actually I am **obviously** both Iranian (0.3) and I also have some American characteristics, but I am neither **fully** Iranian nor **fully** American. I am something in the middle. You guys and us together, I mean our connection with each other, I mean, we understand ourselves better. But we are so much in **minority**. And **obviously** it is a **culture** in and of itself, (0.2) but, well, it is not **recognized** whatsoever. I mean you always feel that you are in fact somewhere in the middle (0.2) I mean they don't say that you have a **culture**, they say you *have fallen between the cracks*.
11. F: hmm	**11. F:** hmm
12. E: Sikimxia:ri bæhsdi (0.2) ((sighs)) æfordæ-konændæ bæhsdi.	**12. E:** It is a fucked-up topic (0.2) ((sighs)) It is a depressing topic.

In Excerpt 4, Erfan constructs chronotopic images of *here-and-now* and *there-and-then* to discuss his longings, belongings, and loss. He specifically presents arguments to support how he feels disconnected from both home and host countries and to highlight his transnational identity. In line 1, he maintains that *Burda rahatsan, chox rahatsan. Müshkülün yoxdi* 'Here, You're comfortable. You're very comfortable. You don't have any problems'. Then, he lists the elements that make life different/difficult here: *vœli bir elemanlari var, xa:tiræ zatdar, millœtin, oki mæsœlæn danıshmıllar sœnin diliyœn* 'But there are some elements, memories and stuff, your people, the fact that, for instance they don't speak your language'. He further exemplifies how the feelings one would get during the last weeks of the year leading to Nowruz, the Iranian new year, do not exist *here* in the U.S. and how Christmas time does not give him 'the same feeling'. As a result, he 'feels disconnected' from *here* and is reminded that he is an 'immigrant' and does not 'belong here' (line 3).

Although his reference to 'people' and 'language' in line 1 points to more dominant categories of national and linguistic identity, he also touches on his less dominant transnational identity later in the conversation. In line 10, he identifies himself as both Iranian and American, while maintaining that he does not fully embody the characteristics of either identity category. He places his identity in a liminal, third space (Bhabha, 1994) characterizing it as 'something in the middle'. He then underscores this transnational identity by including the first author and other fellow Iranian migrants in a shared *us*, maintaining that *biz özümüzi behtær düshünürıx. Vœli chox minority-dayıx* 'we understand ourselves better. But we are so much in minority'. The construction of *us* here is then followed by a construction of *them*. In particular, while Erfan characterizes this 'middle space' as something that is 'obviously…a culture in and of itself', he also maintains that 'it is not recognized (by them) whatsoever': *yani demil**lær** ki sœnin culture-in*

*var. Diyil**lær** sæn æz inja rande æz unja manda-san* '**they** don't say that you have a culture, **they** say you have fallen between the cracks'. Using the deictic *they* towards the end of line 10, which can be said to refer to both American and Iranian non-migrants -- or anyone who has not experienced migration—Erfan differentiates his transnational identity from that of non-migrants and further points out that 'we are somewhere in the middle'. This 'third space' identity Erfan identifies himself with is evident not only in his construction of *us* vs. *them* as well as his meta-commentary, but also in his pattern of code-switching (Bhatt, 2008). That is, unlike the instances in which he talks about *there-and-then* where he mostly uses Azeri, he code-switches to English extensively when he is discussing his transnational identity and his life *here-and-now.* In line 12 he characterizes the relevant issues by saying *Sikimxia:ri bæhsdi ((sighs)) æfordæ-konændæ bæhsdi.* 'It is a fucked-up topic ((sighs)) It is a depressing topic.' The strong language he uses and the sigh points to the intensity with which Erfan experiences his 'third space' positioning.

Apart from highlighting transnational identities and how they are not recognized, Erfan also points to another important issue regarding new technologies and their impact on migrant experiences in his narrative. This issue concerns the fact that although social media facilitates connection to home, this mediated co-presence does not reduce yearnings for physical presence (c.f. Urry, 2002). In line 9, in response to my question, Erfan maintains that this mediated connection 'doesn't give (him) that feeling to the same extent', which pertains to the feeling of being physically present. He returns to the example he gave in line 3 about how he used to feel during the last month of the year (Esfand) prior to the Iranian New Year, emphasizing the importance of physical presence in getting the true feeling of Nowruz: *Esfand olurdi, hol'o væladaydım mæn, hæmishæ. Yadıma gælir ki mæsælæn hæmishæ xoshhalıdım (0.1) mæsælæn, 15 e Esfand-dæn oyana æslæn havalar ævæz olurdi, bilisæn hærnæmænæ, bæyramın hessin*

xiavanda tuturdun. 'When it was Esfand, I would always be anxious. I remember that like I was happy all the time (0.1) for example, from the 15th of Esfand on, the weather would change, you know, everything, you'd get the feeling of Nowruz in the street'. He then contrasts his experience *here-and-now* with the experience *there-and-then* by making a distinction between 'being aware of something' and 'feeling something'. That is, while physical presence 'in the street' *there* gave the 'feeling' of Nowruz, the mediated connection to home only helps one 'know it is Nowruz'. He further explains this distinction giving another example: *chox væxlær dæki æslæn ta:rixlæridæ bülmüscæn nævaxdi. Mænim bajımın tævællüdüdi, hesh bülmüræm dünænidi ya büyündi. Iran-da ossaydin, færq elærdi* 'Most of the time you don't even know the dates. It is my sister's birthday, I don't know if it was yesterday or it is today. If you were in Iran, It would be different'. His lack of knowledge about when exactly his sister's birthday is may be due to differences between the calendars *here* and *there*, as well as the differences in time zones. Thus, this example again demonstrates how knowledge of what is happening with his family is disconnected from experiencing these events due to his spatiotemporal remove.

Towards the end of his turn in 9, he characterizes the information received by migrants through new technology about *there* as 'a news report', saying 'you are not engaged with the story whatsoever'. It is evident that, though social media makes it easier for migrants to receive more information about home, lack of physical presence and engagement leads to feelings of disconnection. Migrants receive decontextualized 'highlights' of the life *there* which then they use to 'update' the images they have from their past experiences. In the case of Erfan's observations of his father's new technology use, we see him reconstructing an image of life at home that combines his memories of his father with the new information he has received - resulting in a 'humorous' and 'strange' image of 'life at home'. Additionally, the information he

gets through new technology helps him 'know about' but not 'feel' the life at home, similar to news reports. Then the disrupted image of *there* along with the identity differences between him and the Americans *here* locates his identity 'somewhere in the middle'. Although he acknowledges that this middle space is 'a culture in and of itself', the power inherent in the ideologies related to ethnonational and ethnolinguistic identities leads to his characterization of transnational identities as 'fallen between the cracks'.

5.3.4. *'We've always been in minority'*

The example in Excerpt 5 is the final part of my conversation with Erfan, which takes place in his car. As we were leaving his house, Erfan mentioned something about how those from Tehran-- the capital of Iran which is associated with the dominant Persian-speaking population-- who are living abroad have an advantage compared to *us.* In line 1, I asked him to explain what he meant.

Excerpt 5:

1. Farzad: Tehrannilar næazærivæ næmænæ?	**1. F:** What were you saying about Tehranis?
2. Erfan: Tehrannilar xob chox bishtær bu **culture**-lara yaxıntærdilær ta biz (1.0) **culture**-e shæhrneshini. Choxtær **westernized** oluplar bizæ göræ.	**2. E:** Tehranis are much closer to these **cultures** than us (1.0), the urban life **culture**. They have become more **westernized** compared to us.
3. Farzad: Axi mæsælæn sæn Champaigni næmænæ shæhrneshini (hesab eliyisæn)?	**3. F:** But, how are you (considering) living in Champaign as urban lifestyle?
4. Erfan: mæ'mulæn zæbannari bizdæn behtæridi.	**4. E:** Their English was better than us.
5. Farzad: Tehranniların zæbani?	**5. F:** Tehranis' English?
6. Erfan: hmm	**6. E:** Yeah

Excerpt 5 (cont.):

7. Farzad: fikr elæmiræm. ((ambulance siren sound))	**7. F:** I don't think so. ((ambulance siren sound))
8. Erfan: Education babætinnæn da. Hala sæn mæsælæn Tæbrizlisæn shayæd aztær buni his eliæasan. Böyüh shæhrdæn gælipsæn.	**8. E:** In terms of **education.** Maybe because you are from Tabriz, you get this feeling less. You've come from a big city.
9. Farzad: Væli xob bidana ayri mæsælæ vardi ki, hæman bæhse aqalliyæt-æksæriæt da. Olar Iranda=	**9. F:** But there is this other issue, the same discussion of minority-majority. In Iran, they=
10. Erfan: =Aksæriyætdeydilær=	**10. E:** =They were in majority=
11. Farzad: =Aksæriyætdeydilær. ona göræ shayæd bilælærinæ chætin gælæ. Amma biz elæ=	**11. F:** =They were in majoriy. That is why it might be more difficult for them (to be in minority). But we=
12. Erfan: =Hæmmæshæ sikiplær bizi, hæmmæshæ. Hær kilasınan baxasan biz aqælliyætdæydix (4.0) æz næzær e **education** e **family** baxasan. Hala bülmüræm sænin xa:nivadævi. æz næzær e ma:li baxasan (1.0) zæbani baxasan.	**12. E:** =We have always been fucked over, always. In terms of any class category, we were in minority (4.0). In terms of the **education** of the **family**. I don't know about your family though. In terms of financial status (1.0) in terms of language.

In this example, I illustrate how migrants' past experiences of being minoritized are invoked to highlight the differences between their present diasporic lives. The *us* Erfan was constructing in the previous example included all the Iranian migrants in the U.S. regardless of their ethnicities, which was used to differentiate their transnational identities from those of non-migrants. However, in this example, he differentiates *us* from those Iranian migrants who have come from

the capital city of Tehran to discuss how, given their past experiences, they have had a relatively easier path with respect to adapting themselves to the life in the West.

In line 2, in particular, he maintains that *Tehrannilar xob chox bishtær bu culture-lara yaxıntærdilær ta **biz**, culture-e shæhrneshini. Choxtær westernized olup**lar biz**æ göræ* 'Tehranis are much closer to these cultures than **us**, the urban life culture. **They** have become more westernized compared to **us**'. Once I disalign with him in lines 3 and 7, he attemps to narrow down the generality of his claim. In particular, he links his idea of 'they have become more westernized' and 'their English was better' than *us* to the quality of education they received in Tehran (line 8). What Erfan is referring to is the fact that since better quality education, jobs, etc. is centralized in Tehran, Tehranis get better opportunities to live a more 'westernized' lifestyle.Then he further hedges his claim by excluding me: *Hala sæn mæsælæn Tæbrizlisæn shayæd aztær buni his eliæasan. Böyüh shæhrdæn gælipsæn* 'Maybe because you are from Tabriz, you get this feeling less. You've come from a big city'. In lines 9 and 11, I bring up Erfan's previous discussion to highlight how being in minority/majority can also be at work. Erfan aligns positively with my point by co-constructing the idea in line 10 and further illustrating it in line 12. He specifically constructs a *we*, which can refer to the non-Tehranis with similar socio-economic backgrounds, to underscore how *we* have always been in minority: *Hæmmæshæ sikiplær bizi, hæmmæshæ. Hær kilasınan baxasan biz aqælliyætdæydix.æz næzær e education e family baxasan. Hala bülmüræm sænin xa:nivadævi. æz næzær e ma:li baxasan, zæbani baxasan* 'We have always been fucked over, always. In terms of any class category, we were in minority. In terms of the education of the family. I don't know about your family though. In terms of financial status in terms of language'. It is clear that he is not just pointing to being

ethnolinguistically marginalized, but he is also identifying himself with other minority social categories, one of which happens to be related to ethnicity and language.

Considering the overall narrative and the arguments Erfan provides to explain his stance, we notice that establishing solidarity and elicitating positive alignment appear to be of great salience for him. While in the previous example the *us* he was constructing referred to all Iranian migrants with similar histories to highlight his transnational identity, he further excludes the dominant Persian-speaking Iranian migrants from the *us* in order to argue that given the relative privileges they had in Iran in terms of, for instance, access to quality education and a more westernized lifestyle, they are better prepared to adapt themselves to the life in the U.S. On the other hand, *we* have always had a relatively more difficult life because we have been in minority --both in Iran and in the U.S.

5.4. Discussion

In this chapter, I have illustrated how Iranian Azerbaijani migrants in the U.S. position themselves with respect to their home and host countries. In section 5.2, I focused on their future-oriented discourses illustrating how they discursively construct chronotopic images of the ideal life in the host country. Specifically, I illustrated how Aref's longings for a better future in the U.S. was revealed in his constructions of the images of success in the U.S. and lack of success in Iran. In section 5.3, on the other hand, I focused on how Iranian Azerbaijani migrants negotiate their past-oriented longings. I specifically illustrated how Erfan, given his immediate concerns at the time of the recording, made a distinction between 'being aware of' and 'feeling connected to' what is happening back home so as to negotiate his longings for an unmediated physical presence at home, which is not accessible through the mediated connection facilitated

by new technology. I also demonstrated how he distanced his identity from that of the non-migrants in Iran and the U.S. to situate his transnational identity 'somewhere in the middle'.

I argue that position taking in migration discourse is, to a great extent, informed by migrants' immediate concerns and anxieties. That is, in response to the context of the ongoing conversation, certain chronotopes emerge as salient, and among these chronotopes the ones that match with the migrants' immediate anxieties are then used as a lens through which they position themselves relative to the home and host countries. In other words, migrants' immediate concerns and anxieties determine what chronotopic representation they invoke in the interaction, and these 'brought about' representations are in turn informed by the chronotopes, or 'chunks of history' (Blommaert, 2015), they have brought along. We saw in the data how Aref was initially constructing chronotopic images of success in the U.S. and lack of success in Iran arguing that in the former, one could be successful on his/her own regardless of, for example, having been born in an affluent family. Then, given the fact that he needed help to find a job and stay in the U.S., the very same idea of 'being on your own' and 'not having connections' was evaluated as a downside of living in the U.S. In Erfan's case, we noticed that although he had a similar migration trajectory to that of Aref's, at the time of the recording he was frustrated about not being able to have first-hand experience of the homeland, which led to his positive evaluation of life *there-and-then*, as evident, for instance, in how he characterized his past experiences of Nowruz when he was very happy.

CHAPTER 6

LANGUAGE-IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I present data to answer the second main research question explored in this dissertation. In particular, I provide an analysis of Iranian Azerbaijani migrants' discourses to investigate the effects of mobility and migration on their language ideologies. In section 6.2, I focus on how they position themselves with respect to the relationship between language and ethnic identity. In section 6.3, I analyze their metapragmatic comments on what counts as appropriate multilingual language use in diasporic contexts as well as what they perceive to have been the effects of migration on their patterns of language use.

6.2. Language and Ethnolinguistic Identity

In this section, I analyze Iranian Azerbaijani migrants' metapragmatic discourses about language and ethnolinguistic identity through engagement with Bakhtin's (1981) notion of chronotope. [25] I build on previous work that discusses the multilayered dialogic nature of chronotopes and their deployment within discourse (Bakhtin, 1981; Wirtz, 2016; Blommaert & De Fina, 2017) and illustrate how chronotopes structure the linguistic and metapragmatic practices related to ethnic and linguistic identity. I specifically draw on Blommaert and De Fina's (2017) claim that identities are chronotopically organized, i.e. certain acts of identification are governed by specific spatiotemporal configurations. While their data only focused on how the immediate context affects language choice, I provide an analysis of how the immediate chronotopic context

[25] A more elaborate discussion of the arguments presented in this section can be found in:
"'No, we don't mix languages': Ideological power and the chronotopic organization of ethnolinguistic identities". Farzad Karimzad & Lydia Catedral. To appear *in Language in Society*, Cambridge University Press.

along with interacting large- and small-scale chronotopes results in particular linguistic and metapragmatic outputs.

6.2.1. Context

The conversations in the following excerpts were recorded at a dinner party hosted by an Iranian Azerbaijani university professor in a college town in the U.S. The professor and his wife are known in this town for gathering Azerbaijanis at their place once or twice a year. Although Persian, American, and guests from other nationalities are also invited, these dinner parties are generally understood as gatherings of Azerbaijanis. This time, in addition to the host and his wife, there were four Iranian Azerbaijani male graduate students including me, two male visiting students from the Republic of Azerbaijan, three women, two of whom were half Persian-half Azerbaijani, and one American woman who had come with her Iranian Azerbaijani boyfriend. Most of the guests were comfortable communicating in both Persian and Azeri, but the visiting students from the Republic of Azerbaijan did not speak Persian and the half Persian-half Azerbaijani women were much more comfortable communicating in Persian. While Persian, as the shared language amongst Iranians, is the unmarked language choice in most other gatherings, the immediate chronotopic context of this gathering required that Azeri be the dominant language of the conversation. While prior experience at these types of gatherings had helped some of the guests bring along an image of what linguistic behaviors were expected, for others, it was totally new and brought about in the very first interactions. The excerpts I focus on was part of a larger conversation that resulted from one of these initial interactions when the half Azerbaijani women, Tina and Zahra, were introduced to the men from the Republic of Azerbaijan, Alim and Rashid. When Zahra was greeting Rashid, she first greeted him in Azeri, aligning with the expected linguistic behavior, but once she found it hard to further communicate

in Azeri, she switched to Persian. Given the fact that her dominant language was Persian, this would have been an acceptable switch if she was interacting with another Iranian Azerbaijani. However, since Rashid did not speak Persian, he reacted: "We do not have Persian here. We are all Turks". This led to very explicit discussions about language and identity among those present. The resulting conversations were dominated by four of the participants: the hosting professor (Behzad), one of the visiting students from the Republic of Azerbaijan (Rashid), and two of the male Iranian Azerbaijani graduate students (Farhad and Majid). As we shall see, these interactions were triggered by two conflicting chronotopes which led to different alignment and disalignment patterns.

6.2.2. *'But now, things have changed!'*

In this section, I illustrate how the participants' 'brought along' chronotopes interact with the chronotopes they 'bring about' in their conversation about Azerbaijani people and language. In particular, I show how Behzad and Farhad's shared histories as Iranian Azerbaijani elites result in the construction of relatively more realistic chronotopic images of the situation of Azerbaijani language and identity in Iran, emphasizing its multi-layered complexity.

Prior to Excerpt 6, Rashid was questioning why the government does not allow education *in* and *of* Azeri language, given the large number of Turks in Iran. He specifically claimed this number to be 35 million, which is a number promoted by the nationalist discourses and is hard to validate. Taking this number at face value, Behzad and Farhad draw Rashid's attention to the complexity of implementing Azeri schools in Iran due to the history of Persian as the dominant language of education as well as the past and present sociopolitical issues. They were specifically pointing to the challenges faced by both minority language users and the Iranian regime in this regard. On the one hand, they were referring to the fact that, since the medium of

instruction in Iran is Persian, the children who do not learn Persian encounter problems once they enter school. As a result, some parents speak Persian rather than Azeri to their children as they are growing up. On the other hand, they were pointing out that, given the fact that there are other ethnolinguistic minorities such as Kurds, Baluchis, and Turkmens in Iran, their rights need to be considered as well if there should be any policy changes, which in turn further complicates operationalizing any potential new policies. With all that being said, as illustrated in the following example, Behzad and Farhad highlight how the situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran has improved compared to the past. It should be noted that, the common words for *Azerbaijani people* and *Azerbaijani language* in their language are *Türk* and *Türki* ('Tork' and 'Torki' in Persian) respectively. As I will illustrate in the examples, the use of these very words has resulted in the construction of certain chronotopes about their language and identity; therefore, I have kept them unchanged throughout the English translations.

Excerpt 6:

1. Behzad: Qabaxja, xælq utanırdi, Azerbaijanni utanırdi hætta dilindæ danıshsın. Da indi utanmır hesh, choxda ghudrætinæn danıshır=	**1. B:** Previously, people would be embarrassed, Azerbaijanis would be embarrassed to even speak their language. But now, they are not only not embarrassed, but they speak (their language) more strongly=
2. Farhad: =Dæqiqæn, mæsælæn [man	**2. F:** =exactly, for example [I
3. Behzad: [han	**3. B:** [yeah
4. Farhad: Bæyax oni istirdim diæm, mæn özüm ushax olan zaman, bizim baba mamanımız bizinæn Farsi-ja danıshardılar, yaxji? ælbættæ sora tez dæyishildi ha, mæn mædræsia girmax hæman, mænnæn babamınan mamam bashladılar Türki	**4. F:** I wanted to say the same thing, when I was a kid, our mom and dad spoke Farsi to us, right? But then, it changed, as soon as I entered school, my mom and dad started to speak Türki with me, so that our Türki gets (better). But, there's a thing. Now there are

Excerpt 6 (cont.):

danıshalar, Türkümüz zad ola da (.) amma birzat var. Indi bir iddæ ushaxlardan var ki Türkdülær, dædæ nænælæridæ Türk di amma æslæn Türki danısha bülmüllær=	kids who are Türks, their parents are Türks, but they cannot speak Türki.
5. Behzad: =Ojurdi=	**5. B:** =That's right=
6. Rashid: Bu Xanım mæsælæn Türki danısha bülmür da, o væziyætinæn.	**6. Rashid:** This lady, for example, cannot speak Türki, under these circumstances.
7. Behzad: Kim xanım? Yo, danıshar, niyæ:?	**7. B:** Which lady? No, she speaks, why not?
8. Farhad: Bidæ bax, farq elir harda bo:yæsæn. (0.5) Amma indi o ævæzlæshipdi kollæn. ælan, mæsælæn gechæn 5 ildæ, bizim öz familimizdæ, hærnæmænæ ushax dünyiya galipdi, hammısına Türki ad qoyuplar. Kullæn yani=	**8. F:** Also, Look! It depends on where you grow up. (0.5) But now it has changed completely. Now, for example, in the past 5 years, in our extended family, for every baby that has been born, they have chosen Türki names. It means=
9. Rashid: =Türki ad qoyuplar? Shükür! Shükür!	**9. R:** = They have chosen Türki names? Thank God! Thank God!
10. Behzad: ævæz oluri. [Yavash Yavash ævæz olur.	**10. B:** It is changing.[Little by little it is changing.
11. Farhad: [ælbættæ birazda mahva:riæ xatirdi Iranda. Mahva:ræ olanda hammi Türki zatdara baxardıx. Ushaxlar indi Farsi-dan qabax Türki orgæshillær, chünki dædæ nænælær gündæ sübdæn axshama Türkiyænin shæbækælærinæ baxillar, biol ona xa:tir mæsælæn a:h ushaxlarda orda böyüllær	**11. F:** [Of course, it is partially because of satellite TV. When there is satellite TV, we'd watch Türki (Turkish) programs. Kids now learn Türki before Farsi, because parents watch Turkish channels from morning till night, so because of that, for instance, uh, kids grow up there and you see,

Excerpt 6 (cont.):

görüsæn mæsælæn rævæn zat danıshıllar, Istanbuli Türküsi danıshıllar ushaxlar, Farsi-nı da örgæshillær yani. (0.2) Yani ma:hvaræ birjür müsbæt tæ'siri vardi da mæsælæn Iranın Türklærinin færhængindæ.	for example, they speak Istanbuli Türki fluently. They learn Farsi as well. (0.2) So, satellite TV somehow has a positive effect on the culture of the Iranian Türks.

The main chronotope that is being constructed in this example concerns the current situation of the Azerbaijanis in Iran, which is evaluated as 'better' compared to the past. In order to present this 'chronotopic contrast' (Agha, 2007a, p. 322), Behzad refers to a point of time in Iran in which, given their ethnolinguistic subordination, Azerbaijanis were reluctant to identify themselves as Azerbaijanis so as to avoid being mocked (line 1). However, he maintains that not only are they not embarrassed to speak their language now, but they are also proud of it. Farhad aligns positively with Behzad in lines 2 and 4 co-constructing the image of a changed situation. In line 4, he presents his own childhood experience as an example of how things have changed (*mæn özüm ushax olan zaman, bizim baba mamanımız bizinæn Farsi-ja danıshardılar, yaxji? ælbættæ sora tez dæyishildi ha, mæn mædræsia girmax hæman, mænnæn babamınan mamam bashladılar Türki danıshalar, Türkümüz zad ola da* 'When I was a kid, our mom and dad spoke Farsi to us, right? But then, it changed, as soon as I entered school, my mom and dad started to speak Türki with me, so that our Türki gets (better)). He is in fact referring to the conscious decision some Azerbaijani parents have had to make regarding the language with which they would want to speak to their children. Those who would choose to speak Farsi mainly base their arguments on two reasons: (1) they would not want their kids to have problem understanding the

school materials, given the fact that the education in Iran is through the medium of Farsi; and (2) they would not want their children's Farsi to be accented, resulting in them being mocked.

Towards the end of his turn in 4, Farhad brings about another chronotope -- with which Behzad aligns positively in line 5-- in which being *Türk* but not being able to speak *Türki* is criticized: *amma birzat var. Indi bir iddæ ushaxlardan var ki Türkdülær, dædæ nænælæridæ Türk di amma æslæn Türki danısha bülmüllær* ('But, there's a thing. Now there are kids who are Türks, their parents are Türks, but they cannot speak Türki'). Though by bringing this idea up, he is contradicting himself in terms of how the situation has improved, the invocation of this chronotope is an attempt by Farhad to present a more realistic image of the situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran. In line 6, Rashid uses Zahra as an example of those *Türks* that cannot speak *Türki*, referring back to their first encounter in which, given her preference for Farsi, Zahra switched to Farsi as she found it difficult to continue communicating in Azeri. However, finding this a face threat to Zahra, Behzad disalign with Rashid's point in line 7. This also causes Farhad to retreat from his earlier generic claim and, in another attempt to present a more realistic picture of the situation, he argues that it also "depends on where you grow up." (line 8). He then returns to the main theme of the discussion in the same turn and presents another example of how things have improved in recent years: "But now it has changed completely. Now, for example, in the past 5 years, in our extended family, for every baby that has been born, they have chosen Türki names". Farhad's reference to the new trend among Azerbaijanis regarding choosing names of Turkic roots for their babies elicits a positive reaction from Rashid in line 9 where he thanks God for that.

In line 11, Farhad partially associates this "positive change" with Iranian Azerbaijanis' tendency to watch the satellite TV programs broadcast from the Republic of Turkey, which has

increased dramatically in recent years. In doing so, however, he draws on a large-scale chronotope that pertains to the idea that there is a single people as the Turks and a single 'Turkic' language, and that Azeri is a variety of this language. This is particularly a very common idea among the nationalists (and the purists), who even consider the varieties spoken in Turkey or the Republic of Azerbaijan closer to this 'authentic' language, while the varieties spoken in Iran are contaminated by Farsi (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming). Though Farhad does not affiliate himself with nationalistic discourses, the way he is framing his argument proves that he is drawing on this chronotope. This might be in part due to the very words *Türk* and *Türki* that are used to refer to Azerbaijani people and language. In fact, Iranian Azerbaijanis usually refer to Turkish and North Azerbaijani languages as *Istanbuli* and *Bakı Türkusi* – the *Türki* of Istanbul and Baku. As a result, Farhad regards children's exposure to Turkish and hence learning to speak it yet another example of how the situation of *Türki* has improved, regardless of the striking differences between Turkish and Azeri: "Of course, it is partially because of satellite TV. When there is satellite TV, we'd watch *Türki* (Turkish) programs. Kids now learn *Türki* before Farsi, because parents watch Turkish channels from morning till night, so because of that, for instance, uh, kids grow up there and you see, for example, they speak Istanbul *Türki* fluently. They learn Farsi as well. (0.2). So, satellite TV somehow has a positive effect on the culture of the Iranian Turks". Although he is partially right about how this new trend has resulted in what Bani-Shoraka (2003) calls the *revitalization* of Azerbaijani language and identity, children's exposure to Turkish TV programs has been argued to be a new threat to Azeri language. Mirvahedi (2012), in particular, regards children's tendency to watch Turkish programs and learning Turkish language a new challenge, making it difficult to maintain the Iranian Azerbaijani. I also argued in chapter 2 that Iranian Azerbaijanis' exposure to these satellite TV programs has resulted in

self-subordination among some people, i.e. "the idea that the variety of Turkic language *they* are speaking is 'stronger', 'purer' and more 'authentic' than *ours*—since ours has been influenced by Persian – lead[ing] to devaluing their own language and linguistic practices and elevating the value of Turkish (or North Azerbaijani) as *the* norm".

This excerpt exemplifies the interaction of various chronotopes in how these participants position themselves relative to mother tongue and ethnolinguistic identity. In particular, it illustrates how Behzad and Farhad, the elite members of the Iranian Azerbaijani community, bring in different factors influencing the situation of Iranian Azerbaijanis in an attempt to discuss the complexity of the issue and present a more realistic image.

6.2.3. *'There's no hostility between Turks and Persians'*

In the following, once again multiple contrasting chronotopes are brought along and result in different positionings relative to issues of language and identity. I specifically show how contrasting chronotopes lead to different definitions of authentic linguistic practices and ethnic identities for Azerbaijanis in Iran. In particular, I show how Rashid brings along a rather nationalistic chronotope, which leads to his negative evaluation of Azerbaijanis in Iran, who he assesses as not complying with the more rigid standards he expects for Azeri ethnolinguistic identity. On the other hand, Behzad, Majid and Farhad's shared histories as Iranian Azerbaijani elites result in the construction of relatively more flexible chronotopic images of Azeri ethnolinguistic identity, allowing them to defend the situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran as a natural and realistic consequence of different sociopolitical and historical factors. Proponents of nationalistic ideology have claimed sole authority in defining ethnolinguistic identity for Azerbaijanis in Iran and are further empowered by the fact that these ideologies align with the notion of the ideal monolingual speaker in the ethnically homogeneous nation-state. As a result,

the chronotope brought along by Rashid is relatively more powerful than the chronotope brought along by Behzad, Majid and Farhad, leading to differences in their discourses and interactional patterns.

As the conversation unfolds, Farhad notices that Rashid's criticisms of Iranian Azerbaijanis are based in a nationalistic chronotope, and therefore assumes that he also imagines that there is conflict between Azeris and Persians. The following excerpt begins with his statement of this assumption.

Excerpt 7:

1. Farid: Bidana da mæsælæ mænim zehnimæ gælir. Bidæn man ehsas eliræm siz fikr elisiz Iranda chox faslarinan türklarin arasinda düshmænchılıx var. Ojür dæyir va:qeæn. Yani mæsælæn, bülüsæn næjür diyim bilæyæn, mæn shæxsæn özüm heshvax oni ehsas elæmæmishæm. Demirama:, olup ha. Iranda bir dana mütæ:ssifa:næ bir sheyki var mütæ:ssifa:næ chox jok diællær Tühlærin ba:ræasindæ. Amma düshmænchılıx dæyiri. Bülmüræm næjür diæm ba:	**1. F:** There is one issue that comes to my mind. I feel like you think there is a lot of hostility between Türks and Persians in Iran. It is not really like that. So, for example, you know, how should I tell you, I've personally never felt like that. I'm not saying it has not happened. In Iran, there is one problem unfortunately, and that is they unfortunately tell many jokes about Türks. But it is not hostility. I don't know how to explain.
(...)	(...)
2. Rashid: Hæ. Næ fikirlæshisæn? Deyisæn ki bir problem görmüræm, sænja niæ yoxdi?	**2. R:** Yeah, what do you think? You say you see no problem, why do you think so?
3. Majid: Axi niæ gæræh ola?	**3. M:** But, why should there be?
4. Farid: niæ gæræh ola?	**4. F:** why should there be?
5. Rashid: niæ yoxdu?	**5. R:** Why isn't there?
6. Majid: Axi niæ gæræh ola?	**6. M:** But why should there be?

Excerpt 7 (cont.):

7. Rashid: Farsınan türkün arasında o problem yoxdu. O olsa sizja problem, onda no:lar?	**7. R:** There is no problem between Persians and Türks. If there is (a problem), what do you think would happen?
8. Majid: Axi bilmiyæm, væxti yoxdi man diæmmaram nolar=	**8. M:** I don't know but when there isn't (such a thing), I can't say what would happen.
9. Rashid: onda Iran daghılar! ((inaudible)) bilæxæræ ojür saxlır ki qoy bashın [qaldırmasın da.	**9. R:** In that case, Iran would collapse! ((inaudible)) So, it (the system) keeps it like this so that people [don't raise their heads (become aware)
10. Majid: [bidana bishey, bishey ki vardi, dær moredi inke faslar tühlæræ jok jürliyeylær. bir mæsælæsi, eeeehhh, mænim næzærimæ buki istiyælær vaqeæn mæsxæræ eliælær, dæyir=	**10. M:** [one thing, there is one thing about why Persians make jokes about Türks. One issue uh, in my opinion, is that it is not that they really want to mock (Turks).
11. Rashid: =næ?	**11. R:** What? ((can't understand the word Majid uses for 'to mock'))
12. Majid: mæsælæn istiælær mæsxæræ eliælær dæyir. Türküsi næmænæ olar onun?	**12. M:** For example, it is not that they want to mock. What is it (the word for 'to mock') in Türki?
13. Rashid: Sæn türksæn da?	**13. R:** You are a Türk, right?
14. Majid: Türkæm, amma xob (0.3), bax birsheylær vardi, birseri sheylær *natural* di, tæbi'i ittifaq tüshür. æz jümleye o (0.1) dilin qarıshmasi obirsi dillærinæn. Bizim dilimiz qarıshıp Farsınan, Farsi qarıshıp æræbinæn, bu mænim ælimdæ dö:r, bu sænin ælindæ dæyi. Sænin dilin shayæd qarısha rusunan. Rusun bæzi kælæmælærin shayæd istifa:dæ eliæsæn.	**14. M:** I'm a Türk, but well (0.3), look, there is something, some things are *natural*, they happen naturally. For instance (0.1) the mixing of languages. Our language has been mixed with Farsi, Farsi's been mixed with Arabic. This isn't in my hands, it is not in your hands. Your language might have been mixed with Russian. You might be using some Russian words.

Excerpt 7 (cont.):

15. Rashid: Yo!	**15. R:** No!
16. Majid: olmeyipdi? sæn shanslısan. Bizim ki bujur olupdi. Dillær eliæ büleylær *mix* oleylær. Sænin ælindæ dæyi, mænim ælimdæ dæyi. Mæn ushaxlıxdan ojür boyümüshæm, væ oni orgæshmishæm, mæsælæn (.)ælan hansi kælæmæni dedim siz bülmædiz?	**16. M:** It has not happened (to your language)? You've been lucky then. Ours has turned out to be like this. Languages can be *mixed*. It is not in your hands, it's not in my hands. I have been raised like this, and have learned it like this, for example (.) Now, what word did I use that you didn't know?
17. Farid: Mæsxæræ [elæmax	**17. F:** To [mock
18. Majid: [mæsxæræ elæmæh. Bizæ bu farsıdan gælipdi.mæ-<u>mænim</u> günahım dæyir, mæn gæræh oni jürliæm dæyir. Onu qoy qıragha.	**18. M:** [To mock. It has come to us from Farsi. It is not <u>my</u> fault. It is not that I should fix it. Put this aside.
19. Rashid: Ahan.	**19. R:** Gotcha.
20. Majid: pæs indi mænki sænnæn danısha biliyæm, hær *level*dæ, bu özi yerindæ qha:bele ehteramdi. Næ mæn sæni mæsxæræ eliræm, næ sæn mæni. Farsi da ojürdi. Ellæti odi ki indi farslar jok jürleylær mænim dalimjan, türkün diliynæn, ellæti o dæyi ki istillær vaqeæn mæsxæræ eliælær (0.1) bir ellæti oduki, ehh, *exposure* deyirix da ingilisidæ, ki *exposed* olmamıshıx bizlær iranda türklær, faslar, xa:rij æz, ælæn amrika da gör nechæ melliætdær gæleylær? indiæjan görmüsæn biri obirsinin ingilisi danıshmaghın mæsxæræ eliæ? Yox! Chün hammının læhjæsi var benoee (0.1). *Exposed* oluplar, görüplær. Ænva:e melliyætdærdæn gæliplær,	**20. M:** So, now that I can speak with you, in whatever *level*, it is respectable anyway. I don't mock you, nor do you. It is the same case with Farsi. The reason is that now they make jokes about me, about the Türks' language, the reason is not that they really want to mock (0.1) one reason is that, uhh, we call it *exposure* in English, that we've not been *exposed* in Iran, the Türks, the Persians, beyond our, now in America, see how many different nationalities have come? Have you seen an instance in which someone mocks the other's English? No! Because everyone has an accent to some extent (0.1). They have been *exposed*, they have seen. They come

Excerpt 7 (cont.):

türk olupdi, eeh, hær yerdæn vardi. Odi ki æslæn bæhse zæban, olara dil, bir mæsælæ dæyir ki istiyælær… Amma irankimi keshværdæ, Fars olarımısh, væ ona göræ alay læhjæ görmeyiplær. Chün millæt görmeyip, færhæng görmeyip, qæbul eliæ bilmeyipdi.	from different nationalities, they are Türks, uhh, they are from everywhere. So, for them, language is not an issue to want to (make fun of someone). But, in a country like Iran, they have been the Persians, and because of that they have not seen other accents, and cannot accept them.
21. Rashid: axı türk az dæyilki, biri var desæki azdi, axı gör bu næqædædi ((inaudible))	**21. R:** But, the Türks are not few, if it's said that they are few, but see how many they are ((inaudible))
22. Majid: Indi sænin müshkülün vardi öz keshværindæ alay dillærinæn?	**22. M:** Now, do you have a problem in your country with other languages?
23. Rashid: Nejæ?	**23. R:** How so?
24. Majid: Ö-öz kishværindæ, azærbaijanda, obirsi alay dillærinæn müshkülüz ki yoxdi sizin? Harda sæn indi o müshküli görüsæn? Biryerdæ görüpsæn o müshküli? (0.2)sænæ-sænæ o törænmiyipki alay yerdæ sænæ mæsælæn biri diæ ki læhjön var? ya alay dildæ mæsælæn=	**24. M:** In your country, in Azerbaijan, you do not have any problems with other languages, do you? Where do you see this problem? Have you seen this problem somewhere? (0.2) This has not happened to you that in a different place, for instance, someone tells you that you have an accent? Or in another language=
25. Rashid: =Yox, bizdæ ojür mæsælæ yoxdi.	**25. R:** =No, there isn't such a problem among us.
(…)	(…)
26. Farid: Bæhse læhjæsi var ha filan, Majid düz diyir, illæti buduki Iranda chox adam var, mæsælæn sæn færzæn 50 il bunnan qabax Tehran da hammi bir læhjeynæn danıshardi, yaxji? Tühlær ævvældæ gedændæ Tehrana,	**26. F:** The discussion of 'he has an accent' and stuff, Majid is right, the reason is that in Iran there are many people, suppose 50 years ago in Tehran, everyone spoke with a similar accent, right? When first the Türks went to

Excerpt 7 (cont.):

choxi ka:rgæridilær, mæsælæn gedirdilær æsha: ishlær görürdülær. Hammısınında türki læhjælæri varıdi. Türki læhjæ tehrannıların zehnindæ olmushdi, bu zat, musavi ba buki sænin savadın olmiæ, xob? æsha: adam olasan. Amma bu chox dæyishilipdi, ælan sæn get Tehrana, Tehranın yarısi tühdi Tehranin, yani Tehran, Istanbuldan sora, dünyada ikiminji shæhrdi ki chox türki danıshan jæmiæti var.	Tehran, the majority of them were workers doing low-class jobs. All of them had Türki accents. In Tehranis' minds, the Türki accent had become this, equated with (the idea) that you are illiterate, right? Being a low-class person. But this has changed a lot. Now, go to Tehran, half of Tehran's population is the Türks. So, After Istanbul, Tehran has the second largest Türki-speaking population in the world.

In line 1, Farhad attempts to refute the idea that there is hostility between Azerbaijanis and Persians because he anticipates Rashid's potential assumption of conflict between the two groups. He brings along the elitist chronotope to highlight the fact that he has not witnessed such a thing. However, he does point to the historical subordination of the Azerbaijanis as manifest through jokes, which he differentiates from hostility: *Iranda bir dana mütæ:ssifa:næ bir sheyki var mütæ:ssifa:næ chox jok diællær Tühlærin ba:ræasindæ. Amma düshmænchılıx dæyiri. Bülmüræm næjür diæm ba:* 'In Iran, there is one problem unfortunately, and that is they unfortunately tell many jokes about Türks. But it is not hostility. I don't know how to explain'. Rashid, however, brings about a different chronotope through which he articulates the conspiracy theoretic claim that such lack of hostility is maintained by the Iranian system in order to prevent itself from collapsing as a result of interethnic conflict: *onda Iran daghılar! bilæxæræ ojür saxlır ki qoy bashın qaldırmasın da.* 'In that case, Iran would collapse! So, it (the system) keeps it like this so that people don't raise their heads (become aware)'.

In line 10, Majid attempts to provide a reason why Persians tell jokes about Azeris, asserting that the purpose of these jokes is not to mock. In doing so, he uses the verb *masxara elamax* ('to mock') which is an established Persian borrowing in Iranian Azeri that is not shared with North Azerbaijani; hence, Rashid does not understand it. This leads to a series of interactional exchanges from lines 11 to 19, digressing from the topic of jokes and engaging in metapragmatic commentary about how languages work. In order to justify his use of a borrowed word, Majid claims that language mixing is natural: "Look, there is something, some things are *natural*, they happen naturally. For instance, the mixing of languages. Our language has been mixed with Farsi, Farsi's been mixed with Arabic. This isn't in my hands, it is not in your hands. Your language might have been mixed with Russian. You might be using some Russian words". Having explained how the contact between Azeri and Farsi or Farsi and Arabic has resulted in language mixing, Majid attempts to elicit positive alignment from Rashid towards the end of his turn, expecting that Rashid would accept that North Azerbaijani has been influenced by Russian, given its historical contact with the Russian language. However, Rashid straightforwardly disaligns with him in line 15.

Majid finally manages to return to his point about why Persians make jokes about Turks in line 20. Connecting this phenomenon to Persians' lack of 'exposure' to other accents in Iran, he illustrates that since in a country like the U.S. people are exposed more to other nationalities, Americans do not make fun of other accents. However, in Iran, "they have not seen other accents, and cannot accept them" (line 20). It is evident that in his example of the situation in the U.S., Majid is drawing on his own elitist experience of interacting mostly with his fellows in academia, and thus ignores the fact that ethnolinguistic subordination occurs in other contexts in the U.S. In order to make his point about the generality of such practices, Majid once again

attempts to elicit alignment from Rashid in lines 22 and 24, assuming that such subordination also exists in the context of the Republic of Azerbaijan: "In your country, in Azerbaijan, you do not have any problems with other languages, do you? Where do you see this problem? Have you seen this problem somewhere? This has not happened to you that in a different place, for instance, someone tells you that you have an accent?". Rashid yet again refuses to align with Majid's point: "No, there isn't such a problem among us". In line 26, Farhad aligns positively with Majid's point about why Persians mock Azeri-accented Farsi. In doing so, he constructs a chronotopic image of certain Azerbaijani social types that Persians were exposed to in Tehran fifty years ago, maintaining that since the first Azerbaijani immigrants to Tehran came from working class families, they started associating the Türki accent with lower class people and hence made jokes about them. Towards the end of his turn in 26, he returns to his previous point, contrasting the past situation of Turks in Iran from that of the present, emphasizing that things have gotten better.

This excerpt illustrates how Rashid, Farhad, and Majid employ contrasting chronotopes when they are positioning themselves with respect to language and identity. Rashid's refusal to acknowledge the influence of Russian on North Azerbaijani or the existence of socially dominant groups that might linguistically subordinate other groups in the Republic of Azerbaijan reveals the nationalistic chronotope he has brought along, which pertains to a unified nation in which the language has not been influenced by other languages, and it has not been used as a way of subordinating certain social groups. Also, his claim that mocking accents "is not a problem among *us*" is in line with his overarching position throughout the conversation in which he differentiates *us* from *you*, i.e. *you* have let the system manipulate *you* and the Persians mock *you*, and *you* have let *your* language be influenced, while *we* do not have these problems. On the

other hand, Farhad and Majid are engaging with different chronotopes in their language-ideological orientations. While denying the existence of hostility between Persians and Azerbaijanis, they attempt to provide broader social explanations for the current situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran, motivated by the chunks of history they have brought along. The chronotopes they invoke regarding Persians come from their experiences as students attending prestigious universities both in Tehran, Iran, and in the U.S. These experiences are different from the experiences of the working class families living in Tehran to whom Farhad was referring, which is indicative of their rather elitist perspective. In addition, what Majid discusses in terms of how languages work is in part a *re-entextualization* of his previous interactions with me over a period of four years, a recalibrated chronotope taken away from previous encounters and brought about in the current interaction.

Farhad and Majid attempt to present a more complex image of the situation in their metapragmatic comments compared to Rashid's rather nationalistically biased perspective. However, it is evident that their discourses are organized through the interaction of various small-scale and large-scale chronotopes, some of which are in fact shared with Rashid. As argued in Karimzad and Catedral (2017), those chronotopes which are more powerful are also more accessible, and it is an understanding and employment of these powerful and accessible chronotopes that is shared across the three speakers. In this case, there are two powerful chronotopes at play. The first relates to the link between ethnonational identification and the ideal monolingual speaker. Although Majid attempts to justify the naturalness of language mixing, he still defers to this more powerful chronotope in the following instances. First, when Majid realizes that Rashid did not understand the word he used for 'to mock', he asks the others to help find a better word in line 11. The way he frames his question, "what is it (the word for 'to

mock') in Türki?", illustrates that Majid assumes that there should be a *Türki* word that he does not know, reinforcing the idea of the existence of a pure Turkic language. This leads to Rashid questioning his '*Türkness'* in line 13 (*Sæn türksæn da?* 'You are a Türk, right?'), again reinforcing the notion that ethnic Turks should speak pure Türki. Similarly, when Rashid claims that there is no mixing between Azeri and Russian in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Majid responds by attributing this lack of mixing to 'luck'. The invocation of luck here positively evaluates non-mixing and further points to the power associated with the chronotope related to the ideal time-space frame in which people speak monolingually.

The second powerful chronotope at play in the conversation relates to notions of a single Turkic people and Turkic language, and to the idea that Azeri is a variety of this larger Turkic language. The fact that Iranian Azerbaijanis usually refer to Turkish and North Azerbaijani languages as *Istanbuli* and *Bakı Türkusi* – the *Türki* of Istanbul and Baku -- reinforces this chronotope. We see this in the data towards the end of line 26 where in his attempt to present the improved situation of Iranian Azerbaijanis in Tehran, Farhad refers to Istanbul and Tehran as the two cities with the largest Türki-speaking populations, ignoring the striking differences between the Azeri and Turkish. In the previous excerpt, we also saw how Farhad attributed the improved situation of Azeri in Iran to the Turkish TV programs that had become popular among Iranian Azerbaijanis: "Of course, it is partially because of satellite TV. When there is satellite TV, we'd watch *Türki* (Turkish) programs. Kids now learn *Türki* before Farsi, because parents watch Turkish channels from morning till night, so because of that, for instance, uh, kids grow up there and you see, for example, they speak Istanbul *Türki* fluently. They learn Farsi as well. So, satellite TV somehow has a positive effect on the culture of the Iranian Turks".

Returning to the idea that more powerful chronotopes are more accessible and require less explanation, we see that both claims regarding pure and unmixed language and the idea of a single Türki language are relatively unmarked, unquestioned and shared across the participants. We see this, for instance, in the fact that the Iranian Azerbaijanis go to great lengths in the excerpt to explain what has caused the mixing of Azeri and Persian and the subordination of Azeri relative to Persian. In contrast, Rashid only answers "No" without explanation when asked if there is mixing between Azeri and Russian, and responds simply "No, there isn't such a problem among us" in response to the question about the subordination of certain social groups in the Republic of Azerbaijan. His relatively short answers point to the fact that monolingualism and images of a homogeneous nation (however imaginary) do not require the same explanation and justification that language mixing and social inequality between ethnic groups require. This in turn is indicative of the relative power of the chronotopes of monolingualism and the nation-state.

6.3. Metapragmatics of Multilingualism

In this section, I demonstrate the participants' metapragmatic comments on how their migration to the U.S. has changed their language use. The participants' comments specifically touched on three different areas: (1) the effects of migration on their language proficiency (2) their ideas about language choice, especially what they consider as appropriate language choice, and (3) their comments on appropriate forms of code-switching.

6.3.1. Context

The examples presented in this section were recorded at a friendly home gathering in a college town in the U.S. There were three female Iranian Azerbaijani participants present: Zahra, Negin

and Sara. Both Zahra and Negin come from half Persian, half Azeri families. However, Zahra was born and raised in a Farsi-speaking city and her preferred language was Farsi, and had mainly spoken Azeri to her mom; while Negin had grown up in Tabriz, an Azeri-speaking city, and Azeri was her preferred language. Both of them had come to the U.S. in the past two years. Sara, on the other hand, is in her early fifties, and had moved to the U.S. around 18 years ago. She has a daughter who is a multilingual speaker of Azeri, Farsi, and English, but since she has mainly grown up in the U.S., she is more comfortable with English, a fact that is invoked in the examples. Prior to these excerpts, they were talking about how certain old Azeri expressions could not be translated to other languages since they would lose their nuances, and how some people are good at using these expressions in the right contexts. Taking this opportunity, I tried to elicit their ideas about how they thought their language practices had changed after moving to the U.S.

6.3.2. *'My Turkish has declined'*

This example shows how the participants characterize the impact of their migration on their relative proficiency in the languages they speak. I demonstrate how, given their relatively different histories and language preferences, they have experienced different effects of migration on their language proficiency.

Excerpt 8:

1. Farzad: Xob hala siz fikr eli:siz ki, qoy bidana jiddi (soal sorushum), dær ra:staye sözlæriz. **2. Sara:** OK?	**1. F:** So, now what do you think, let me ask a serious question, in line with what you were saying. **2. S:** OK?

Excerpt 8 (cont.):

3. Farzad: Amrikia gælænnæn, danıshmaghız mæsælæn næjür ævæz olupdi?	**3. F:** Since you have moved to America, how has your speaking changed?
4. Negin: Türki?	**4. N:** Türki?
5. Farzad: hæ-hær, kullæn danısh[maghızın modeli	**5. F:** An-Any, the way [you speak in general.
6. Negin: [Türküm rævannashıpdi kullæn gündæ min dæfæ doslarımınan danıshıram ((hahaha))	**6. N:** [My Türki has improved, I speak with my friends a thousand times every day ((hahaha))
7. Zahra: [Mæn kollæn qarıshdırmısham, *mæn torkim zæeeftær shode=*	**7. Z:** [I have totally mixed (everything) up, *my Torki has become weaker=*
8. Negin: =Mænim torkie estanbolum kollæn suqut eliyipdi.	**8. N: =**my Istanbul Türki (Turkish) has declined completely.
9. Sara: Dordan?	**9. S:** Really?
10. Negin: Suqut ha:. Yani bax mæn Tabrizdæ, gör nechæ sahat telvisiona baxardım, yani æslæn [Iran yanmazdiki bizdæ.	**10. N:** Total decline. Look when I was in Tabriz, I'd watch so many hours of (Turkish) TV, [Iranian (TV) wouldn't be on in your home at all.
11. Sara: [((inaudible))	**11. S:** [((inaudible))
12. Negin: O gün bidana Türkiyæli gælmishdi, mæn æslæn gördüm tapammiram [kælæmæni	**12. N:** The other day, a Turkish person came (to the store), I realized I couldn't find the [words at all.
13. Sara: [dordan?=	**13. S:** [Really?=
14. Negin: =mæn [danıshammadım	**14. N:** I [couldn't speak (Turkish)
15. Zahra: [*bæarmigærde kheili zud, væli be næzæræm chænd ruz tul mikeshe.*	**15. Z:** [*It (your Turkish) will come back very soon, but I think it takes a few days.*
16. Sara: *Are=*	**16. S:** *Yeah=*
17. Negin:=mæn Türkiyiyæ gedændæ, hekkæs bülmæzdi biz Iranniyix=	**17. N: =**When I went to Turkey, nobody would realize that we were Iranian=
18. Sara: =Dordan?=	**18. S:** =Really?=

Excerpt 8 (cont.):

19. Negin: =Elæ qæshæh danıshardıx ki, dodan inanmazdılar biz Irannan gælmishıx. Diændæ tæ'æjüb elærdilær, "axi hardan orgæshmisæn?". Diændæki tilvisionnan inanmazdılar. Chün bülmüllær biz birbela oların seriallarına zadına bazıx. O gün o oghlan gælmishdi, taza da:nishju var, tez tez gælær, chün adın yazar sifa:rish vernædæ görræm, mæn æslæn tapammırdım kælæmæ.	**19. N: =**We'd speak (Turkish) so well that they wouldn't really believe that we'd come from Iran. When we said that, they'd be surprised, "but how have you learned it?". When I said from the television, they wouldn't believe me. Because they don't know that we are so much interested in their TV series. The other day when that guy came, because he writes his name on the order I see (that he's Turkish), I couldn't find the words at all.
(…)	(…)
20. Zahra: *Estefade nækoni chiz mishe dige. Væli chænd ruz vaqt bezari bærmigærde=*	**20. Z:** *If you don't use it, it'd be like this. But if you spend a few days on it, it'll come back=*
21. Negin: *=Væli mæn dus nædaræm yadæm bere, chon ye zæbun e* [*qæshænge jodast*	**21. N:** *=But I don't like to forget it, because it is a* [*separate beautiful language.*
22. Zahra: [*yadet nemire. Bebin mæni ke æslæn bælæd nistæm væqti miræm Torkie, bæde 2,3 ruz mesle una kæm kæm hærf mizænæm. yæni to hæm hichvæqt yadet nemire. Bebin mæn, mænæm migæm fæqæt vase chænd ruz o chænd sa'æte, chon mæn hæmishe* [*tu khune hærf mizænæm*	**22. Z:** [*You won't forget it. Look, I don't know Turkish but when I go to Turkey, after 2 or 3 days, I speak like them little by little. I mean you'd never forget it. Look, I'm saying that it is only for a few days and few hours, because* [*I always speak it at home*
23. Negin: [mæn Türkie buram chox færq elæmiyipdi. Ingilisim yaxjilaship, bujur dæyirdi mæsælæn. Ehh, Farsi da ki, mæn mæsælæn babamınan Farsi danısharam da evdæ=	**23. N:** [I- my Türkie of here (Azeri) hasn't changed much. My English has improved, it was not like this. Uhh, in terms of Farsi, I, for example, speak Farsi with my dad at home=
24. Farzad: =niyæ?	**24. F: =**Why?

Excerpt 8 (cont.):

25. Negin: babam kollæn orda chün olupdi, ona göræ evdæ hæmmæshæ babamınan Farsi danısharıx mamamınan Türki. Hmm hæmandi mænæ, mæn fæqæt istanbulum xæræblashıpdi.	**25. N:** My dad has been born and raised there (Tehran), because of that we always speak Farsi to my dad and Türki to my mom. Hmm, it is the same for me, only my Istanbuli (my Turkish) has worsened.

Once I posed the question about the effects of migration on their language use in lines 1 and 3, they firstly considered it as a question of proficiency. In line 6, Negin makes a jocular comment about how her Azeri has improved: *Türküm rævannashıpdi kullæn gündæ min dæfæ doslarımınan danıshıram* 'My Türki has improved, I speak with my friends a thousand times every day'. This is in fact referring to the fact that the dominant chronotope of life in the U.S. among non-migrant Iranians has long been associated the idea that since one mainly uses English, they are expected to lose some degree of proficiency in their mother tongue. This was mainly true before the advancement of the new technologies since the older generations of migrants would initially be less fluent in their first languages after living abroad for a long time. However, with the new media, migrants are constantly in touch with their family and friends and Negin's comment points to the fact that not only has she not lost her proficiency in her first language, but she has improved it, given her constant contact with her friends.

The rest of the conversation in this example concerns how Negin and Zahra discuss the different languages in which they think they have lost proficiency. The conversation mainly revolves around how Negin's proficiency in Turkish has declined: *Mænim torkie estanbolum kollæn suqut eliyipdi* 'My Istanbul Türki (Turkish) has declined completely.' (line 8). She explains how *there* in Tabriz, she used to watch Turkish TV channels all the time (line 10) and how that was the reason why she had become so proficient in Turkish that would surprise

Turkish people during her visits there: *Elæ qæshæh danıshardıx ki, dodan inanmazdılar biz Irannan gælmishıx. Diændæ tæ'æjüb elærdilær, "axi hardan orgæshmisæn?". Diændæki tilvisionnan inanmazdılar. Chün bülmüllær biz birbela oların seriallarına zadına bazıx* 'We'd speak (Turkish) so well that they wouldn't really believe that we'd come from Iran. When we said that, they'd be surprised, "but how have you learned it?". When I said from the television, they wouldn't believe me. Because they don't know that we are so much interested in their TV series' (line 19). Interestingly, while in the previous section I argued how some people consider Turkish and Azeri as varieties of a single ideal 'Turkic' language, Negin considers Turkish as a separate language that she does not want to lose proficiency in: *Væli mæn dus nædaræm yadæm bere, chon ye zæbun e qæshænge jodast* 'But I don't like to forget it, because it is a separate beautiful language' (line 21). For Zahra, however, the situation is different. Specifically, since her preferred language is Farsi and she only spoke Azeri at home with her mom, she has not had the opportunity to speak Azeri much after her migration (line 7). The reason for this will come up a few times in the rest of the conversation that is presented in the following excerpts.

6.3.3. *'I can't speak Farsi with my uncle. It would be ridiculous.'*

In this section, I focus on the participants' meta-commentaries on language choice. I will argue that social actors have a chronotopic understanding of appropriate language choices. In particular, I will show how personhood becomes a determining factor in how the participants sanction certain language choices as acceptable and normal in certain time-space configurations.

Excerpt 9:

1. Zahra: *Mæn ye moshkeli ke daram ba hær, rahættærin zæbanam ke xob Farsie, chon adæt kærdæm, mædrese ræftæm, hærjaee*	**1. Z:** *A problem that I have with any, so the language I am most comfortable with is Farsi, because I am used to it, it was used in school,*

Excerpt 9 (cont.):

ræftæm ghæribe didæm bahash Farsi hærf zædæm.	*everywhere I went, every stranger I saw, I spoke Farsi with them.*
2. Sara: *Are*	**2. S:** *Yeah*
3. Zahra: *Væli xob mæsælæn Torkio ya mæsælæn Ingilisiro, pishe Irania nemitunam Ingilisi hærf bezænæm, eh ba mamanæm hærf mizænæm bayæd Torki hærf bezænæm, yæni ba un shæxsi ke hæmishe rahæt budæm, væli kollæn chon tu Iran fæqæt beyne Farsio Torki **switch** mishod xeyli rahæt bedune inke fek konæm **switch** mikærdæm, ælan fek mikonæm **switch** mikonæm, yæni sækht shode yekæm, beyne 3 ta sækht shode.*	**3. Z:** *But, well, for instance, I cannot speak Torki or English among Iranians, uh, when I am speaking with my mom, I should speak Torki, I mean depending on the person I have always been comfortable (speaking a certain language), but because in Iran the **switch** was only between Farsi and Torki, I could **switch** without thinking, but now I think and **switch,** I mean it has become more difficult, among 3 (languages) it's become more difficult.*
4. Negin: *khob sækhte, tedad e zæban ziad shode dige.*	**4. N:** *It's difficult, the number of languages has increased.*
5. Zahra: *Torkiæm ke dige kheili kæm hærf mizænæm akhe. Væli mæsælæn ye moshkeli ke daræm, mæn joloye Irania nemitunæm Ingilisi hærf bezænæm, nemidunæm chera=*	**5. Z:** *I am speaking Torki a lot less now. But, for instance, a problem that I have is that I cannot speak English in the presence of Iranians, I don't know why=*
6. Negin: *=Un ke tæbieeye bæzi moghe ha=*	**6. N:** *=That is natural sometimes=*
7. Zahra: *=Qæblæn fek mikærdæm khejalæt keshidæn e, væli khejalæt keshidænæm nist. æslæn nemiad, nemitunæm hærf bezænæm. Mæsælæn pishe ye Iraniæm, zehnæm kollæn Farsie. Yæni kheili, yæni khodæm motævæjjeh shodæm ke hættæ mæsælæn læhjæm ævæz mishe væghti ye Irani kenaræme væ daræm Ingilisi hærf mizænæm ba ye Amricayi. Læhjæm ævæz mishe.*	**7. Z:** *=Previously, I used to think that it is because of being shy, but it is not about being shy either. It wouldn't flow, I cannot speak. For example, when I am with an Iranian, my mind is totally Farsi. Like, very much, I mean I have noticed that even my accent changes when an Iranian is next to me and I'm speaking English with an American. My accent changes.*
8. Farzad: Hmmm	**8. F:** Hmmm

Excerpt 9 (cont.):

9. Sara: *Khob ino mæsælæn Tork-zæbana, chiza bayæd bedunæn dige, bæra hæmin ma væqti mirim Tehran, ye Tork mibinim, Tork mishim. Yaæni nemitunim Farsi ba Tork mæsælæn hærf bezænim. Miduni? Bæd mæsælæn migæn "chera Torki, æveæz kærdin be Torki?" Baba nemitunæm dige nemishe. Mæn* ***ex-husband****-æm Fars-zæban bud, mæsælæn yeho yeki zæng mizæd mæn be Torki hærf mizædæm, "khob Farsi hærf bezæn dige mæn nemifæhmæm, ehteram nemizari be mæn", næ nemishe, mæn ba ye Tork-zæban nemitunæm Farsi hærf bezænæm. Ye juri mishæm.*	**9. S:** *So this is something for instance Torki-speaking people, the things (probably Persians) should know, it's because of this that when we go to Tehran and see a Tork, we become a Tork. We cannot speak Farsi with a Tork. Do you know? Then, for example they say "why Torki, why did you switch to Torki?". I cannot (speak Farsi), it doesn't work. My* ***ex-husband*** *was a Farsi speaker, for example when someone called and I talked in Torki, (he said)"Well, speak Farsi, I cannot understand, you do not respect me", no I cannot, I cannot speak Farsi with a Torki speaker. I'd feel strange.*
10. Zahra: *Adæm ehsase rahæti (nemikone), hæmun hessi ke mæn be Torki daræm dige=*	**10. Z:** *One wouldn't feel comfortable. The same feeling that I have towards Torki=*
11. Sara: *=Khususæn ba famil, mæn ba daeim nemitunæm ke khob Farsi hærf bezænæm, mæskhære mishe.*	**11. S: =***Especially with family, well I can't speak Farsi with my uncle. It would be ridiculous.*
12. Zahra: *Ye omre, are=*	**12. Z:** *For years, yeah=*
13. Negin: *=Mæn ba babam nemitunæm Torki hærf bezænæm.=*	**13. N: =***I cannot speak Torki with my dad.=*
14. Zahra: *=Mænæm* [*ba babam nemitunæm*	**14. Z: =** *I cannot either* [*with my dad*
15. Sara: [Xob sæn ojur adæt elæmisæn da.=	**15. S:** [So you have gotten used to it that way=
16. Negin: =Vallah heshvax yadıma gælmir mæn babamınan Türki danısham=	**16. N: =**I can't remember if I ever spoke with my dad in Türki=
17. Sara: =mæn mæsælæn, bajımın mæsælæn ærinæn shayæd rahat Farsi rahat danısham, niyæ chün oda Tehranda olup da=	**17. S:** For example, with my brother in law, I might be comfortable to speak Farsi, because he's been born and raised in Tehran=

Excerpt 9 (cont.):

18. Negin: Mæsælæn mæn Nushininæn Fa:s danısham, næmænæ olar?	**18. N:** For example, how strange would it be if I spoke Farsi to Nushin (her sister)? (rhetorical question)
19. Sara: Hæman. Mæn gælim birdæn a:janımınan Fa:s danıshım, axi olmazki: æslæn mæsxæræ olar. Adætdi da, bu mæsælæn "mænæ diærdi ehtiram qoymursuz. Mæn düshünmüræm", axi da olmaz ki.	**19. S:** Exactly. Suppose I spoke Farsi with my father. It's not possible, it'd be ridiculous. It is a habit, he would say "you're not respecting me, I cannot understand", but it wouldn't work that way.
20. Zahra: *Are kheili bæde. ye edde fek mikonæn kelas gozashtæne, kheilia intori fek mikonæn, væli vaqeæn hæmine, chon mæsælæn mæn khodæm shækhsæn, Torki æslæn vase mæn formal nist,* [*chon fæqæt ba mamanæm hærf zædæm*	**20. Z:** *Yeah, it's very bad. Some people think it is about showing off, many think like this, but it's really like this, because for me personally Torki isn't formal at all,* [*because I have spoken it only with my mom.*
21. Sara: [*Næ mæsælæn inja hæm, ba Farsa Farsi mæsælæn hærf mizæni, Ingilisi mæsælæn nemituni hærf bezæni, hala ægær ye dust pesær ya shohær e Amricaee dashte bashi, unvæqt* ((hahaha))	**21. S:** [*No, for instance, with Persians, you'd speak Farsi, you cannot speak English to them for instance. Now if you had an American boyfriend or husband, then* ((hahaha))
22. Negin: Oh, onda da Negin Farsi danıshmiæjax, Türki danıshmiæjax, goræjaxsız zæh vırıpdi Sam-ınan [((hahaha))	**22. N:** Oh, then Negin wouldn't speak Farsi, wouldn't speak Turki, you'd she's called Sam (and is speaking English only) [((hahaha))
23. Sara: [((hahaha)) olupduda kamilæn Amricali	**23. S:** [((hahaha)) She's become totally American
24. Zahra: *Væli mæn in moshkelo kheili ba zæbane Ingilisi daræm, ke mæn væqti ye adæm, yeki ke Farse kenaræme=*	**24. Z:** *But I have this problem mostly with English, that when a person, a person who's Persian is next to me=*
25. Sara: *=Rahættæri dige=*	**25: S:** *=You're more comfortable=*
26. Zahra: *=æslæn daræm ba ye Amricaee hærf mizænæma=*	**26. Z: =***I'm talking about when I'm speaking with an American***=**

Excerpt 9 (cont.):

27. Sara: *=Ahan=* **28. Zahra:** *=væli ye Fars bashe kenaræm nemitunæm, OK nistæm æslæn.*	**27. S: =***I see***=** **28. Z: =***but when a Persian is next to me, I can't, I am not OK with it at all.*

The topic of language choice comes up when Zahra explicitly mentions how difficult it is for her to speak a language other than Farsi when she is around Iranians: *Væli xob mæsælæn Torkio ya mæsælæn Ingilisiro, pishe Irania nemitunam Ingilisi hærf bezænæm* 'But, well, for instance, I cannot speak Torki or English among Iranians' (line 3). Prior to this line, she frames this as a problem in line 1: *Mæn ye moshkeli ke daram ba hær, rahættærin zæbanam ke xob Farsie, chon adæt kærdæm, mædrese ræftæm, hærjaee ræftæm ghæribe didæm bahash Farsi hærf zædæm* 'A problem that I have with any, so the language I am most comfortable with is Farsi, because I am used to it, it was used in school, everywhere I went, every stranger I saw, I spoke Farsi with them'. She is specifically referring to her preferred language and how she has experienced interaction with fellow Iranians mostly in Farsi. She explicitly brings about personhood as the main factor for her when she is choosing what language to use: *ba mamanæm hærf mizænæm bayæd Torki hærf bezænæm, yæni ba un <u>sh</u>æ<u>xsi</u> ke hæmishe rahæt budæm* 'when I am speaking with my mom, I should speak Torki, I mean depending on the person I have always been comfortable (speaking a certain language)'. This 'problem' appears to be a very important concern for her since she reiterates it several times throughout this conversation. Although Zahra somehow answered her own question about why she cannot speak English in front of Iranians, she still keeps trying to find the answer, which she appears not to be sure about: *Qæblæn fek mikærdæm khejalæt keshidæn e, væli khejalæt keshidænæm nist. æslæn nemiad, nemitunæm hærf bezænæm. Mæsælæn pishe ye Iraniæm, zehnæm kollæn Farsie. Yæni kheili, yæni khodæm motævæjjeh shodæm ke hættæ mæsælæn læhjæm ævæz mishe væghti ye Irani kenaræme væ*

daræm Ingilisi hærf mizænæm ba ye Amricayi. Læhjæm ævæz mishe 'Previously, I used to think that it is because of being shy, but it is not about being shy either. It wouldn't flow, I cannot speak. For example, when I am with an Iranian, my mind is totally Farsi. Like, very much, I mean I have noticed that even my accent changes when an Iranian is next to me and I'm speaking English with an American. My accent changes' (line 7). The fact that 'her mind is totally Farsi' when she is around Iranians reveals that she has a chronotopic image of acceptable linguistic behavior with certain types of people in certain time-space frames.

Sara align positively with Zahra's comment on the importance of *who* you are talking to in determining the language choice. She, for instance, gives other examples of how the person she is interacting with determines her language choice, which touches on two cultural realities *here* in the U.S. and *there* in Iran. The first example concerns how those who go from Azeri speaking cities to Tehran, a majorly Farsi-speaking city, speak Azeri if they encounter fellow Azerbaijanis: *bæra hæmin ma væqti mirim Tehran, ye Tork mibinim, Tork mishim. Yaæni nemitunim Farsi ba Tork mæsælæn hærf bezænim.* 'It's because of this that when we go to Tehran and see a Tork, we become a Tork. We cannot speak Farsi with a Tork' (line 9). The second example she gives mainly concerns the interactions in diasporic contexts: *Bæd mæsælæn migæn "chera Torki, ævæz kærdin be Torki?" Baba nemitunæm dige nemishe. Mæn ex-husband-æm Fars-zæban bud, mæsælæn yeho yeki zæng mizæd mæn be Torki hærf mizædæm, "khob Farsi hærf bezæn dige mæn nemifæhmæm, ehteram nemizari be mæn", næ nemishe, mæn ba ye Tork-zæban nemitunæm Farsi hærf bezænæm. Ye juri mishæm.* 'Then, for example they say "why Torki, why did you switch to Torki?". I cannot (speak Farsi), it doesn't work. My ex-husband was a Farsi speaker, for example when someone called and I talked in Torki, (he said) "Well, speak Farsi, I cannot understand, you do not respect me", no I cannot, I cannot speak

Farsi with a Torki speaker. I'd feel strange'. What she is referring to is a very common criticism directed at Azerbaijanis by non-Azerbaijanis in diasporic contexts where Azerbaijanis subconsciously speak Azeri when they are addressing their fellow Azerbaijanis.

We see in the data, however, that this is in fact a scalar phenomenon in that the same people might subconsciously speak Farsi to their fellow Iranians among non-Iranians. That is, if we associate Azeri, Farsi, and English with local, national, and global scales, we notice that in diasporic contexts the preference is given to the relatively more local language that is shared. As we see in the rest of the conversation, the participants give specific examples of people with whom speaking certain languages is acceptable. For instance, Sara maintains that she cannot speak any language other than Azeri with relatives, giving an example of how 'ridiculous' it would sound if she spoke Farsi to her uncle (line 11) or her father (line 19). Then, she gives another example showing how Farsi would be an appropriate choice when she is talking to her brother in-law "because he's been born and raised in Tehran" (line 17). We will see in the next excerpt that she even goes beyond Azeri and Farsi when it comes to interacting with her daughter, with whom she speaks mostly in English, given that she has grown up in the U.S. Similarly, Negin gives an example of how she cannot speak Azeri to her father, since as mentioned earlier he had grown up in a Farsi-speaking city (lines 13 and 16) and how speaking Farsi to her sister would be strange (line 18). Apart from their metapragmatic comments, we can also see in their linguistic practices how they are in fact following the conventions they are discussing. Specifically, while apart from Zahra, whose preferred language is Farsi, the others prefer Azeri, we notice how the participants are aligning with each other's unmarked codes (especially with Zahra's) and switch back and forth between Azeri and Farsi, depending on who they are mainly addressing.

The participants' metapragmatic comments reveal that based on their previous experiences interacting with certain people or types of people, they have developed a chronotopic image of how interaction with them works. This unmarked image then guides their language choices in different contexts and, as we will see in the next example, is also used as a lens through which they evaluate others' linguistic behaviors. We realize that although the participants are also implicitly referring to the importance of spatiotemporal frames in their language choices, what appears to be topically more salient is personhood. Also, while they are invoking personhood as the reason why they prefer certain language choices in certain chronotopic contexts, they still seem not to be confident about why alternative choices would not be appropriate as evident in their subjective evaluations of these sociolinguistic behaviors. That is, it appears that once the linguistic behavior in a given context disrupts the chronotopic image they have brought along, it becomes marked and is then subjectively evaluated as 'weird', 'strange', and 'ridiculous'.

6.3.4. '*It wouldn't feel right to me, it'd be fake.*'

While the previous excerpt revealed their ideas about language choice, the following example illustrates what they consider as appropriate code-switch and also how they evaluate others' multilingual practices. I will illustrate that the switches that highlight their shared experiences in the diasporic context are regarded as acceptable while the switches that are considered as a way of distancing oneself from the other interlocutors are evaluated negatively.

Excerpt 10:

1. Farzad: Shey, dillærin arasında **switch** elæmax?	**1. F:** Like, what about **switch**ing between the languages?

Excerpt 10 (cont.):

2. Zahra: *Mæn **switch** kærdænæm kheili zæeef shode.*	**2. Z:** *My **switch**ing has weakened a lot.*
3. Farzad: [*Zæeef shode yæni chi?*	**3. F:** [*What do you mean by 'has worsened'?*
4. Negin: [Mæsælæn indi burda bir næfær olsun ayri dilæ?	**4. N:** [For example, supposing there was a person here with a different language?
5. Farzad: Yox. Sæn mæsælæn danıshanda, xob bæ:zæn chö:ræsæn Farsiæ, bæzæn chö:ræsæn Ingilisiæ=	**5. F:** No. For example, when you are talking, sometimes you switch to Farsi, sometimes you switch to English=
6. Negin: =Yo, mæn Zahra'nan danıshanda mæsælæn heshvax ayri dil danıshmaram.	**6. N:** =No, when I am talking to Zahra, for instance, I never speak another language.
7. Zahra: *Na, mæn=*	**7. Z:** *No, I=*
8. Negin: =Ya sænnæn danıshanda görmüsæn hesh Farsi danısham?	**8. N:** =Or when I am talking to you, have you ever seen me speaking Farsi?
9. Farzad: Ojür yoxki, mæsælæn niyæ gæræh chö:ræsæn bæzi vaxlar Farsiæ ya [Ingilisiæ?	**9. F:** Not like that, for example, why should you sometimes switch to Farsi or [English?
10. Negin: [bæraye inke tapmıram. Mæsælæn Inglisi, eh=	**10. N:** [because I cannot find (the word). For example English, eh=
11. Sara: =Hæn da, mændæ da, mæsælæn bæzi væxlær Ingilisisi rahættar di.	**11. S: =** Yeah, I do too, for example sometimes, it is easier in English.
12. Farzad: Hmmm	**12. F:** Hmmm
13. Sara: Mæsælæn Ingilisi dæ bu '**already**' chox zatdi, rahat di. Irani, Türküdæ ya Farsi da yoxdi '**already**', yox?	**13. S:** For instance, in English **'already'** is very, like, easy. In Iranian Türki or Farsi, '**already**' doesn't exist, right?
14. Farzad: Hmmm	**14. F:** Hmmm
(…)	(…)

Excerpt 10 (cont.):

15. Farzad: Mæsælæn siz uhhh Tühlærin arasında, hæman o ki diyir Irannıların arasında Ingilisi danıshammıram, Tühlærin arasında (.) mæsælæn Farsi danıshanda næjür olasız?	**15. F:** For instance, you uhhh among the Turks, similar to what she was saying that among Iranians I cannot speak English, among the Turks (.) for example, how would you feel about speaking Farsi?
16. Negin: Hammi Türk ola [man	**16. N:** Everyone is Turk, [I
17. Farzad: [hæn da	**17. F:** [Yeah
18. Sara: [Adam zad olur da birjür olur da, yapıshmır ki adama.	**18. S:** [One would feel like, feels weird, it just wouldn't feel quite right to one.
19. Farzad: Niyæ?	**19. F:** Why?
20. Sara: Yapıshmır da.	**20. S:** it just wouldn't feel quite right
21. Negin: Adam ehsas elir hammi pis baxır bilæsinæ.	**21. N:** One would feel everyone is giving them a bad look.
22. Sara: Yo, mæn özgiæ göræ yox. özüm mæsælæn yapıshmır ba bilæmæ, elæbir **fake** di, elæbir yalannan di mæsælæn. öz dilimi danıshanda düshünüræm tæræfi choxtær, amma Farsi danıshanda **fake** di da mæsælæn sharayitæ göræ.	**22. S:** No, it's not about others. I myself, for example, it wouldn't feel right to me, it'd be **fake**, it'd be ingenuine. When I'm speaking my own language, I understand the other person better, but when I'm speaking Farsi, it'd be fake, given the circumstances.
23. Farzad: Indi mæsælæn, burda 3-4 næfær dæ ayri adam vardi, ehh (0.1) bir næfær=	**23. F:** Now suppose, there were 3-4 other people here, uhh, one person=
24. Sara: =Fa:sdi=	**24. S: =**is Persian**=**
25. Farzad: =Yo Fa:s da dæyir, ya FFF-Farsi ni næzær dæ alın, Fa:s-Tühdülær, ya mæsælæn fæqæt Tühdülær, birnæfær, hammi Tühdi, bir næfær mæsælæn Farsi danıshır. siz kimin yox haa ki ayri yerdæ bö:yæ, ya uhh mæsælæn hammi Fa:s di, hammi Fars, Irannidi, va bir næfær Ingilisi danıshır,	**25. F: =**No, not Persian, or yeah let's consider Farsi, they are Persians or Turks, or they are only Turks, one person, everyone is Turk, one person speaks Farsi for example. Not like you (Zahra) that have grown up in a different (Farsi-speaking) place, or for example, everyone is Iranian, and one person is

Excerpt 10 (cont.):

mæsælæn hey Ingilisi danıshır, hey Ingilisi danıshır, onda mæsælæn=	speaking English, keeps speaking English, keeps speaking English, then for example=
26. Zahra: =Farsi bilir Ingilisi danıshır ?ya=	**26. Z:** S/he knows Farsi and speaks English? or=
27. Farzad: =Farsi bülüri=	**27. F: =**Knows Farsi=
28. Negin: =Onda diæræm özün görsædir.	**28. N: =**Then I'd say s/he is showing off.
29. Farzad: Farsi bülür, næ hiss=	**29. F:** S/he knows Farsi, what feeling=
30. Sara: O dussuzlanır da=	**30. S:** S/he is being 'flavorless' (any behavior that doesn't feel right)
31. Negin: hæn, ya næmænæ [dilivi danısh da	**31. N:** Yeah, so what [speak your own language
32. Farzad: [Dussuslanır?	**32. F:** [Being 'flavorless'?
33. Zahra: [*Are*	**33. Z:** [*Yeah*
34. Sara: [Hæn	**34. S:** [Yeah
35. Negin: Hæn, [næyæ shitdænisæn?	**35. N:** Yeah, [why are you making a fool out of yourself?
36. Zahra: [*Væli dær vaqe næbayæd injuri fek konim. shayæd un unjuri rahættære*	**36. Z:** [*but in fact, we shouldn't think like that. Maybe s/he is more comfortable that way*
37. Negin: *Akhe ke chi?* ((inaudible))	**37. N:** *But so what?* ((inaudible))
38. Sara: *Væqti tu jæme Iranie dige chera Ingilisi* ((inaudible))	**38. S:** *When it's an Iranian gathering, why English* ((inaudible))
39. Negin: Væli indi burda mæsælæn hammi Tühdi, mæn [Fa:s danıshım sizinæn?	**39. N:** But now suppose everyone is Türk here and then [I speak Farsi with you? (rhetorical)
40. Zahra: [*mæn væli æslæn nemitunæm. Kheili inja ælan moshkel daræm. Mæn tu jæmi ke mæsælæn ye edde Irani bashæn, ye Amricaee mehmun biad nemitunæm=*	**40. Z:** [*But I cannot at all. I have too much problem (with that) here. In Iranian gatherings in which there are some Iranians, if there's an American guest, I cannot=*

Excerpt 10 (cont.):

41. Sara: *=Ya mæsælæn mesle Shahla bashe ke inja bozorg shode bærash Ingilisi kheili rahættære dige.*	**41. S: =** *Or suppose someone is like Shahla (her daughter) who's grown up here, for her English is more comfortable.*
42. Zahra: [*Are*	**42. Z:** [*Yeah*
43. Negin: [O ayri. Onun hæqqi var.	**43. N:** [That's different. She has the right (it is understandable in her situation)
44. Sara: [*un ba mæn ke mæsælæn hærf mizæne, Ingilisie, kheili væqta Ingilisi hærf mizæne væli mæsælæn chiz, ehhh, mesle ma ha bashe tu* ***adulthood*** *biad Amrica, bekhad beyne hæme Ingilisi hærf bezæne un* dussuzlux *mishe dige.*	**44. S:** [*When she's talking to me, for instance, it's English, she speaks English to me most of the time but suppose, like, someone has come to America like us in their* ***adulthood,*** *and wants to speak English among everyone, that would be* 'being flavorless'.

While I was trying to elicit their ideas about appropriate code-switching, they initially kept talking about language choice (lines 1 to 8), similar to what I illustrated in the previous example. However, once I clarify what I mean in line 9, they explain under what circumstances they would code-switch. In line 10, Negin maintains that she would switch to, for example, English when she 'cannot find words'. Sara, on the other hand, relates it to how sometimes 'it is easier' to say something in English than Azeri (line 11). She then gives an example of an English word that does not exist in Azeri or Farsi, the use of which makes it easier to communicate: *Mæsælæn Ingilisi dæ bu 'already' chox zatdi, rahat di. Irani, Türküdæ ya Farsi da yoxdi 'already', yox?* 'For instance, in English 'already' is very, like, easy. In Iranian, Türki or Farsi, 'already' doesn't exist, right?' (line 13). The switches of this kind, as Bhatt and Bolonyai (2011) argue, are meant to convey the meaning as faithfully and economically as possible and are regarded as FAITH switches. Based on the participants' comments, as well as my broader ethnographic study,

FAITH switches are regarded as the most frequent and most acceptable type of switch. Interestingly, what FAITH switches do, along with conveying the meaning more economically and faithfully, is highlight the sharedness of their experiences as transnational migrants. That is, given the fact that they experience a variety of contexts in English (e.g. academic life), switching to English while talking about these contexts not only faithfully conveys the meaning, but also has a solidarity function underscoring their shared diasporic experiences.

In the rest of this conversation, we see how the chronotopic image they have brought along --regarding what language choice is appropriate in interacting with what types of people-- is used as a lens through which the participants evaluate others' sociolinguistic behaviors. Specifically, in response to the hypothetical situation I present in line 25 regarding someone speaking Farsi when everyone is Azeri, Sara maintains that *Adam zad olur da birjür olur da, yapıshmır ki adama* 'One would feel like, feels weird, it just wouldn't feel quite right to one' (line 18). While Negin attempts to justify this 'weirdness' by referring to how others might evaluate someone negatively (line 21), Sara disaligns with her in line 22 considering it as being less about the others' judgement: *Yo, mæn özgiæ göræ yox. özüm mæsælæn yapıshmır ba bilæmæ, elæbir fake di, elæbir yalannan di mæsælæn. öz dilimi danıshanda düshünüræm tæræfi choxtær, amma Farsi danıshanda fake di da mæsælæn sharayitæ göræ* 'No, it's not about others. I myself, for example, it wouldn't feel right to me, it'd be fake, it'd be ingenuine. When I'm speaking my own language, I understand the other person better, but when I'm speaking Farsi, it'd be fake, given the circumstances'. The ideas of a sociolinguistic behavior 'not feeling right' or being 'fake' and 'ingenuine', as characterized by Sara, point to the 'realities' she has been socialized into and has brought along, in which certain behaviors are unmarked, 'real' and

'genuine' and deviating from these conventions renders them to marked, unacceptable types of behavior.

This example further illustrates how the participants' understanding of these sociolinguistic norms is scalar. That is, as I argued in the previous example, the participants prefer to use the more relatively local language that is shared among them. Having realized their preferences with respect to Azeri and Farsi, I tried to elicit their ideas about the choice between Farsi and English towards the end of my turn in 25. In response to my question about how they would feel if some Iranian person kept speaking English where everyone is Iranian, the participants gave similar answers. In line 28, Negin negatively evaluated such linguistic behavior as a 'show off'. Sara similarly characterized it as *dussuzlanmax*, an expression which literally means 'being saltless/flavorless' and is used to refer to any behavior that is uncalled for and does not feel right. The other participants align positively with Sara's point in lines 33 and 35. In lines 36 and 40, Zahra attempts to argue that although she herself cannot speak English among Iranians and she agrees with the other participants, they should not judge those who are 'more comfortable that way'. Negin disalign with her in line 39 maintaining how strange it would be if she spoke a language other than Azeri if everyone present was Azerbaijani. In lines 41 and 44, Sara gives the example of her daughter to argue how speaking English would be acceptable if one has grown up in the U.S., which elicits positive alignment from both Negin and Zahra: *mæsælæn mesle Shahla bashe ke inja bozorg shode bærash Ingilisi kheili rahættære dige… un ba mæn ke mæsælæn hærf mizæne, Ingilisie, kheili væqta Ingilisi hærf mizæne væli mæsælæn chiz, ehhh, mesle ma ha bashe tu adulthood biad Amrica, bekhad beyne hæme Ingilisi hærf bezæne un dussuzlux mishe dige* 'Suppose someone is like Shahla (her daughter) who's grown up here, for her English is more comfortable… When she's talking to me, for instance, it's English,

she speaks English to me most of the time but suppose, like, someone has come to America like us in their adulthood, and wants to speak English among everyone, that would be 'being flavorless''. As we see, Sara invokes the spatiotemporal conditions in which one has grown up to legitimate or de-legitimate their linguistic behaviors, which further reveals that, though personhood appears to be topically more prominent, understandings of appropriateness with respect to multilingual practices are chronotopic in nature.

6.4. Discussion

In this chapter, I presented data to illustrate the Iranian Azerbaijani migrants' language-ideological discourses. Focusing on the participants' metapragmatic comments on language and identity in section 6.2, I demonstrated how acts of ethnolinguistic identification are chronotopically organized. In other words, I showed how participants' understandings of ethnolinguistic identity are informed by the interaction of various macroscopic and microscopic chronotopes. These chronotopic understandings in turn guide their discursive processes of authenticating or de-authenticating certain identities. I argued that the chronotopes organizing ethnolinguistic identification differ from one another in terms of their power, depending on the ideological force behind them. I illustrated, for instance, that although some participants consider language mixing a natural outcome of language contact, due to the authority of certain ideologies related to linguistic purism and the monolingualism of the nation-state, language mixing is ultimately evaluated in a negative manner. I also demonstrated that the power differentials between chronotopes result in specific linguistic patterns, in which less powerful chronotopes are explained more since they are less accessible, and are also articulated with less epistemological certainty because they are less dominant.

In section 6.3, I analyzed the participants' metapragmatic comments on appropriate multilingual practices. Similar to the previous section, I argued that the participants have a chronotopic understanding of appropriate language choices. That is, the participants have developed a chronotopic image of acceptable linguistic behavior while interacting with certain types of people in certain time-space frames, which is used as a lens through which they evaluate multilingual practices. The fact that the participants invoke certain people or types of people while evaluating appropriateness of certain multilingual practices reveals that personhood, in particular, becomes topically more salient in their evaluative discourses. Moreover, I argued that in diasporic contexts the participants have a scalar understanding of language choices in such a way that the preference is given to the relatively more local language that is shared. That is, in a given context, if Azeri is the shared language of all interlocutors, the use of Farsi is considered unacceptable –unless it is the unmarked choice for someone—and if Farsi is the shared language, then the use of English is negatively evaluated.

Such preference for a relatively more local language is in line with my overall argument in this dissertation that, given the fact that these migrants are in minority in the U.S., they are constantly seeking a collective in-group identity. In the data presented in section 6.2, for instance, we saw that the participants felt the need to defend both their Iranianness and Turkicness when they were criticized by one of the participants from the Republic of Azerbaijan. Similarly, when Zahra's Azeri was criticized by the same participant, the Iranian Azerbaijani participants defended her language practices through invoking the spatiotemporal situation in which she had grown up. In the data in section 6.3, we also saw that the participants aligned not only with each other's metapragmatic comments on multilingual practices but also with each other's unmarked language choices. Finally, with respect to the use of English, we saw that the

participants regarded FAITH switches as the most acceptable types of switch since sometimes ‘they cannot find certain words’ or ‘it is easier ’ in English. I argued that, along with its linguistic function, FAITH switches to English also have a solidarity function in that they highlight the migrants’ shared transnational experiences.

CHAPTER 7

SOCIOLINGUISTIC GRAMMARS

7.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the third main research question that I explore in this dissertation, which deals with the impact of migration on Iranian Azerbaijanis' multilingual practices. I specifically present a comparative-theoretic account of the patterns of linguistic choices, focusing on code-switching, in Azeri multilingual communities in the U.S. and Iran. I aim to examine how the members of this community navigate and negotiate their linguistic resources—Azeri, Farsi, English—locally (indigenous [Iranian] contexts) and non-locally (diasporic [U.S.] contexts). The starting point of such an inquiry is to determine whether, and to what extent, the sociolinguistic grammars of this community in diaspora and indigenous contexts vary, in terms of the patterns of code-switching. To do so, I follow B&B's optimality-theoretic framework, which was explained in detail in chapters 3 and 4. [26]

The two communities under study are similar in terms of age, gender, and social class, and the main difference between them is the experience of migration of the diaspora community, which is not shared with the members of the indigenous community. Thus, the use of the term *community* throughout this chapter is more in line with the notion of *community of practice* (Bucholtz, 1999; Eckert, 2006)— selecting only those participants from diaspora and indigenous populations "who engage on an ongoing basis in some common endeavor" and who have "shared experience over time, and a commitment to shared understanding" (Eckert, 2006, p. 683).

[26] A large part of this chapter has been published in
Karimzad, F. (2016). Optimal choices: Azeri multilingualism in indigenous and diaspora contexts. *International Journal of Bilingualism*. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1177/1367006916651733.

7.2. Sociolinguistic Grammar of Indigenous Community

In this section, I present data to determine the sociolinguistic grammar of Iranian Azerbaijani community in the indigenous context.

Excerpt 11: POWER >> SOLID

In this example, three participants are present: Ali; Tina, Ali's wife; and Reza. The participants are all in their late twenties and know each other since their undergraduate studies. They are all multilingual speakers of Azeri, Farsi, and English. The unmarked code for the conversation is Azeri; however, Tina, who speaks Azeri to Reza and the investigator, speaks Farsi to her husband from time to time since Farsi is the preferred code for romance.[27] Ali, Reza, and the investigator are close friends and are having a reunion after several years and are catching up. Tina and Ali are talking about the fact that, after all these years, Ali still remembers the investigator's phone number since he used to make jokes about how "catchy and good" his phone number was.[28] Line 1 is the last turn Tina had before Ali, Reza, and the investigator took the floor. Their conversation comes to an end in line 2 after approximately 9 minutes. The speakers in this excerpt are Tina (T), Ali (A), and the investigator (I). The switches that are of interest are shown using →.[29]

[27] Many young Azeri men and women prefer to speak Farsi to their girlfriends/boyfriends or spouses since they consider it to be more 'romantic'. The common attitude by these speakers towards Azeri is that it is 'rougher' than Farsi. However, the reason for this is probably the fact that Azeri speakers in Iran are almost never exposed to the discourse of love & romance through Azeri since the language of media & movies is Farsi (see also Excerpt 19 for an example).
[28] In Iran, the phone numbers that have a particular pattern (e.g., a particular digit is repeated several times) are popular and in some cases people may pay more money to have a "catchy" number.
[29] See Appendix for the transcription conventions.

Excerpt 11:

1. T: Hesh babasının shumaræsin hifz dæyir ba.	**1. T:** He doesn't even know his father's
((Approximately 9 minutes later))	phone number by heart.
2. A: Pæs belæ.	**2. A:** So, that's it.
((Signals the end of the conversation))	((Signals the end of the conversation))
3. I: belæ!	**3. I:** That's it.
4. →T: *mæn æge mozaheme jæm'e dustitunæm*	**4. T: →** *If I am disturbing your friendly*
[*bedune* [*tarof pashæm beræm.*	*gathering, feel free to ask me to leave.*
5. A: [*golæm,* [*in che hærfie, næ baba:*	**5. A:** *honey, why are you saying this?*
6. I: [yox baba!	**6. I:** Not at all!
7. T: *Ehsas mikonæm injuri* [*moæzzæbin.*	**7. T:** *I feel you are uncomfortable.*
8. A: [*næ:, khahesh*	**8. A:** *No, you are welcome.*
miko[*næm*	
9. I: [Niyæ?	**9. I:** Why?
10. T: ha: Ali belæ rahat danıshar ödzürsi	**10. T:** Ali usually speaks so comfortably
sizinæn. Indi elæbir ki…	with you. Now it seems like…

The switch that is of interest in this excerpt takes place in line 4. Tina, who was speaking Azeri--the solidarity code and the unmarked code of the conversation-- in the previous turns (line 1) switches to Farsi in line 4. As she mentions, she feels that her husband and his friends are not speaking comfortably at her presence. I argue that by switching from the solidarity code to Farsi, the 'they code' (Gumperz, 1982), she is maximizing her social distance from the others. This act

of switching to a different code to index distance from others is defined within the POWER constraint in B&B model. Thus, as illustrated in Tableau 2, the switch to Farsi in (b) satisfies POWER, a higher-ranked constraint, and violates SOLID. Once she is convinced by the interlocutors that her presence is welcomed, she switches back to the solidarity code in line 10.

Tableau 2. Interaction of SOLID and POWER (POWER>>SOLID)[30]

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**SOLID**
a. mæn æyæ dzæmizæ muzahimæm ta:rufsuz durum gedim.				*!	
☞ b. *mæn æge mozaheme jæm'e dustitunæm bedune tarof pashæm beræm.*					*
c. **If I am disturbing your friendly gathering, feel free to ask me to leave.**					*

In some cases, the computation of the optimal choice might lead to two (or more) candidates that all satisfy the higher-ranked constraint and thus are potential output forms, as illustrated in Tableau 2 by candidates (b) and (c). These candidates have a gradient relationship with each other, which concerns the relative value of the codes *vis-à-vis* a particular constraint. For instance, as mentioned earlier, English has relatively more symbolic power than Farsi even though they both are considered to index power. In such cases, optimization by itself fails to select the ultimate output form. I argue that along with optimization a *rationalization process* is also at work in which the speakers, as rational actors, do a cost-benefit analysis before they select a *more expensive* or *less expensive* choice, depending on the outcome they are seeking to achieve (cf. Coleman & Fararo, 1992; Elster, 1994; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai, 2001).

[30] Technically, there might be more monolingual and multilingual potential surface form candidates; however, given the purpose of this study, I have only included one potential surface form candidate from each of the languages to illustrate how optimization works in these multilingual communities.

Excerpt 12: PERSP >> SOLID

In this excerpt, Reza (R), Arash (A), and Mehdi (M) are explaining to the investigator--who had been away for some years--how things have changed in their hometown. They are talking about some new cafés that have been established in the past years where young men and women hang out. They are saying that these cafés have turned into a go-to place for some people who pretend to be 'intellectuals'. However, since seeing unmarried young men and women hanging out freely is not tolerated by the Iranian Islamic system, they say that the police has sometimes raided these cafés and has arrested the young men and women there.

Excerpt 12:

1. R: ælbættæ gechæn ay tökülmüshdülær cafæ nostalgy-æ da (.) diyir tutdular hammisin dayandirdilar duvarın sheyinda film → götürürdülær, diyirdilar *"bæchehatun hærumzade mishæn, khodetunam hærumzade'in"* næm næmænæ (.) Diyir kötæyinæn doldurdular vænin itsinæ apardılar.	**1. R:** Last month, however, (the police) is said to have raided Café Nostalgia, and arrested them all. They have lined them (the young men and women) up against → the wall, filmed them saying that *"your kids will be bastards. You are bastards too"* blah blah blah. They were beaten to get into the (police) van and were taken (into custody).
2. A: ælbættæa bu cafælær taza gheshr yaraldipdi iranda: roshænfikrlær.	**2. A:** Of course, these cafés have generated a new population in Iran: 'the enlightened thinkers'.
3. M: Roshæn-fikr yox, roshæn-**fucker**. (hahaha)	**3. M:** Not enlightened thinker, enlightened-**fucker.** (hahaha)
4. A: hædæf kollan qızdi. Væsilæ færq elir!	**4. A:** The end is always the girls, the means differ!

In excerpt 12, Reza starts out his narrative in Azeri, the preferred code of the conversation. However, when he is quoting what the police officer was saying; he switches to Farsi, the code used by the quotee. This switch from the 'narrator' voice to the 'character' voice (Koven, 2012) is said to be maximizing perspectivity in B&B model and is referred to as a PERSPECTIVE switch. As illustrated in Tableau 3, the only candidate that could enable the speaker to maximize perspectivity is (b), while candidates (a) and (c) are unable to perform this function since they would fail to bring in the voice of the police officer. The switch to Farsi in (b) thus satisfies the higher-ranked constraint PERSP at the expense of violating SOLID. This yields the following emerging hierarchy in which PERSP and POWER are ranked higher than SOLID, yet are unranked with respect to each other:

{PERSP, POWER}>>SOLID.

Tableau 3. Interaction of SOLID and PERSP (PERSP>>SOLID)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**SOLID**
a. ushaxlarız hæramzada oladzax.			*!	*	
☞ b. *bæchehatun hærumzade mishæn.*					*
c. **Your kids will be bastards.**			*!		*

Excerpt 13: FAITH >> SOLID

In this extract, four participants are having lunch with the investigator at a restaurant. While waiting for the food, Mona starts asking the investigator some questions about her Master's thesis, which is a comparative rhetoric study (written in English). She is pointing out that when she was writing her proposal, she was too ambitious and included many different factors to be

analyzed. Now, however, she says she does not know how to handle it. The speakers are Mona (M), Negar (N), and the investigator (I).

Excerpt 13:

1. M: Bæ:shli:na mæn hey soal sorushuram.	**1. M:** Sorry if I am asking too many questions.
2. I: Xa:sh eliræm!	**2. I:** No worries!
3. N: *Soalat e shœr'in* olmush olsa sorusha bulæsæan. ((Jocularly))	**3. N:** You can ask him *any religious questions* you have. ((Jocularly))
4. M: → Soalatım da, **discourse feature**-læri istæmishæm, **Iranian and American** da (.) Bidæ **similarities and difference**-lærini(.) **Vocabulary**-lærin(.) **cultural factor** zat(.) qızıshmıshdım hærzat yazmıshdım(.) **Pragmatic feature**-lærin zadın da yazmısham!	**4. M:** In my (research) questions, I have → tried to (determine) the **discourse features**, (comparing) **Iranian and American** (newspaper ads). Also, their **similarities and differences**, their **vocabularies**, the **cultural factors** and stuff. I was carried away, I have included everything. I have mentioned **pragmatic features** and stuff as well.

Mona begins her turn in line 1 in the expected code of the conversation, Azeri. Yet, in line 4 she switches to English intra-sententially and uses the expression *discourse feature*. She continues to do such intra-sentential switches to English until the end of her turn. The common point about the English words she uses is that they are specific terms which all belong to the technical jargon of linguistic research. The use of these terms and expressions appear to be the most economical

way for her to convey her message. Switching to the language that enables the speaker to maximize informativity and helps convey the intended conceptual meaning in the most economical and faithful way is discussed under the *Principle of Faithfulness* (FAITH) in B&B model. Unlike candidate (c) in Tableau 4, candidates (a) and (b) are unable to satisfy FAITH, which is higher in ranking compared to SOLID. The hierarchical ranking that emerges by the end of this stage of the analysis is {FAITH, PERSP, POWER}>>SOLID, where the three constraints FAITH, PERSP, and POWER are unranked *vis-à-vis* each other but are ranked higher than SOLID.

Tableau 4. Interaction of SOLID and FAITH (FAITH>>SOLID)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**SOLID**
a. *vijegihaye goftoman*		*!			*
b. danıshıx xususiyyati		*!		*	
☞ c. **discourse features**					*

Excerpt 14: FAITH >> PERSP

In this excerpt, the investigator and three friends are having a friendly gathering. Suffering from allergies, the investigator asks for tissues to blow his nose. Since it is not customary to blow nose in front of others in the Iranian culture, he apologizes saying that he would have to do it in the 'American way'. The speakers in this extract are Farid (F), Peyman (P), and the investigator (I).

Excerpt 14:

1. I: Dæsmalın vardi ? **2. P:** hm.	**1. I:** Do you have tissues? **2. P:** Yeah.

Excerpt 14 (cont.):

3. I: (3.4) Hæssasiyæt hæmlæ elædi (2.0) yasha (4.0) A mæn biraz amrica'i eliæja:m da, Bæ:shliyin.	**3. I:** Allergies attacked me. Thanks. Guys, I will be a little "American", I apologize.
4. F: da færhænjin tsönüp da. A Farzad, **blow → your nose**(.) [**in public**(2.0) özüdæ **quietly**. ((Jocularly))	**4. F:** Your culture has changed. Mr. Farzad, →(to) **blow your nose in public** (and to do it) **quietly** at that. ((Jocularly))
5. I: [**in public** (3.5) (hahaha)	**5. I: in public** (hahaha)
6. F: o **acceptable** di (.) **Loudly** olanda biraz…	**6. F:** That is **acceptable**. When it is done **loudly**, it is a little bit (unacceptable)…

Starting his turn in Azeri, the solidarity code, Farid switches to English in line 4. This switch indexes that he is aware of the 'American way' mentioned by the investigator in the previous line. That is, by switching to English and talking about the American culture, Farid, an EFL instructor, is highlighting his awareness of this cultural difference; something that is usually touched upon in EFL books/by EFL teachers in Iran. This shift in *footing* (Goffman, 1979) – taking an American cultural stance -- is thus analyzed as a PERSPECTIVE switch. However, in the same turn, within the PERSPECTIVE switch, Farid switches back to Azeri and uses the expression *özüdæ*. This common expression has a particular function in Azeri and is used to introduce more information, add emphasis, or add a condition to what is already said. The closest translation of this expression can be the English *at that*, meaning 'in addition'. However, no English word appears to be successful in conveying this meaning more faithfully and

economically. Thus, the switch to Azeri [candidate (b) in Tableau 5] satisfies FAITH but violates both POWER and PERSP. As a result, FAITH is not considered unranked with respect to PERSP and POWER at this step of the analysis anymore, giving rise to the following emerging hierarchical ranking: FAITH>>{PERSP, POWER}>>SOLID.

Tableau 5. Interaction of FAITH and PERSP (FAITH>>PERSP)[31]

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**SOLID**
a. *khodeshæm*		*!	*	*	*
☞ b. özüdæ.			*	*	
c. **at that/ in addition.**		*!			*

Excerpt 15: PERSP >> POWER

In this extract, Reza (R) and the investigator (I) are talking to Majid (M)—in a teasing manner--about the fact that as a married man, he should not chase after girls. Majid is trying to justify his actions by referring to it as a need, which is a natural thing to do. However, this argument does not sound convincing to his friends, who have apparently cornered him.

Excerpt 15:

1. I: Todzihin næmænædi?	**1. I:** What is your justification?
2. M: næmæniyæ?	**2. M:** For what?
3. I: Bu ishivæ! Mæsælæn niyæ evli ola ola bu ishi görüsæn?	**3. I:** For what you are doing! So, why are you doing this while you are married?

[31] As mentioned earlier, there is a gradient relationship between Farsi and English *vis-à-vis* Azeri in a sense that, despite the fact that they are both power codes, Farsi carries less symbolic power than English. That is why in the case where the switch is from Azeri, the Farsi candidate is marked as violating SOLID. However, when the switch is from English to Farsi or Azeri, the Farsi candidate is not only marked for its violation of SOLID, but it is also analyzed as violating POWER, given its relatively less symbolic power compared to English.

Excerpt 15 (cont.):

4. M: Axi adama niyaz di da.	**4. M:** But it is a need for human beings.
5. R: (hahaha) niyaz evdædi da.	**5. R:** (hahaha) The need is at home. ((referring to one's own wife))
6. M: → The more amdzɪx, **the better**!	**6. M: → The more** pussies, **the better**! ((This conversation comes to an end))

The unmarked code of this conversation is Azeri. However, realizing that his friends are not aligning with his argument and finding himself rather cornered, Majid switches to English, the POWER code, in line 6 seeking to distance himself from them. Yet, within this switch, he switches back to Azeri and uses the word *amdzɪx* meaning 'vagina'. This is a very strong taboo word in Azeri, the use of which is associated with the discourse of certain groups of people whose perspective to women is socially dispreferred. Young men may use the expression *amdzɪx-œsiri* meaning 'captive of vagina' to refer to someone whose life is primarily devoted to chasing after women. Therefore, this switch enables Majid to bring in the voice of the typical people who use this word and jocularly position himself with respect to the other interlocutors as a person who cannot help chasing after women; and thus it is analyzed as a PERSPECTIVE switch. One may question why this is not analyzed as a FAITH switch; however, I would argue that, since the word *amdzɪx* does not *per se* convey a particular cultural nuance, it is not considered as a FAITH switch. Instead, it is the typical people who use this word and their voice that are being brought into this conversation through employing this switch. By doing so, Majid is distancing himself from them-- in a jocular fashion-- by positioning himself away from the interlocutors and aligning with the perspective of the people who would typically use this word. This, in fact, helps him not only distance himself from the other interlocutors, but also enable

him to mitigate the seriousness of topic. This conversation comes to an end at the end of line 6, which is probably what Majid was hoping for. The switch back to the solidarity code may be said to violate the higher-ranked constraint POWER, as illustrated in Tableau 6. Yet, as mentioned above, the function this switch is carrying out is not that of SOLID, but instead, it is satisfying the PERSP constraint, which reveals to be ranked higher than POWER in the grammar of this community. That leaves candidate (b) as the only optimal candidate and gives us evidence for the following hierarchical ranking: FAITH>>PERSP>>POWER>>SOLID.

Tableau 6. Interaction of PERSP and POWER (PERSP>>POWER)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**SOLID**
a. *kos*			*!	*	*
☞ b. amdzɪx				*	
c. **pussy**			*!		*

Excerpt 16: FACE >> FAITH

The final excerpt in this section of the analysis concerns the interaction of FACE and FAITH. In this example, Mina (M) and her female friends are talking about the fact that Sahand (a male friend) has gained weight. Specifically, pointing to his chest, they are saying that he has developed 'man boobs'. Sahand disagrees by saying that they are muscles and not fat. To convince them, he invites Mina to touch his chest to verify that his breasts are hard.

Excerpt 16:

1. M: Yo, yo, æslæn æzoliyæ zada oxshamır, qæshæh top[olların ((inaudible))	**1. M:** No, no, it doesn't look like muscle at all. Exactly (it looks like) that of fat people.
2. S: [æl vırsan göræsæn æzolædi.	**2. S:** If you touch them, you'll see they're muscles.
3. M: æl vırmaram (1.0) maymax ! ((angry tone))	**3. M:** I won't touch them, idiot! ((angry tone))
4. S: (1.0) gæ æl vır gör æzolædi. ((touching his chest))	**4. S:** Come and touch them, you'll see they're muscles. ((touching his chest))
5. M: → (3.0) **Not attracted at all**!	**5. M:** → **Not attracted at all**!
6. S: hæn?	**6. S:** What?
7. M: Not attracted at all! You can do that in your privacy!	**7. M: Not attracted at all! You can do that in your privacy!**

Mina starts out her turn in Azeri, the preferred code of the conversation. In line 2, Sahand invites her to touch his chest to make sure that it is hard and muscular. Given the fact that it is not socially appropriate for a woman to touch a man's body in public, regardless of how close they are, Mina finds this offer face-threatening. She reacts by a change in her tone and calling him an idiot in line 3. However, once Sahand reiterates his face-threatening invite in line 4 while touching his chest, she switches to English in line 5 to restate that she would not touch his chest. She could have used much more common expressions in Azeri to convey this message more faithfully & economically and thus observe FAITH. For instance, the Azeri expressions *lazim*

elæmiyipdi or *istæmæz* ‘it is not necessary’ are more appropriate/expected socio-pragmatically in such contexts in which a request needs to be refused authoritatively/angrily. Yet, she opts to switch to English, the POWER code, to increase her social distance with him and restore her social image. Such switches are analyzed as FACE work within B&B model. The fact that Sahand requests clarification in line 6, and Mina repeats what she had already said expanding on it in line 7 also provides evidence that the switch in line 5 did not convey her intention faithfully and thus violated FAITH. As demonstrated in Tableau 7, having both candidates (b) and (c) at her disposal to perform this function; the speaker opts to switch to English [candidate (c)], which indexes the most symbolic power, the *most expensive* choice. By doing so, the speaker satisfies FACE at the expense of violating FAITH, leading us to the conclusion that FACE ranks higher than FAITH in this community. The interaction of these two constraints in this part of the analysis reveals the final hierarchical ranking, i.e. the optimal sociolinguistic grammar of this community: FACE>>FAITH>>PERSP>>POWER>>SOLID

Tableau 7. Interaction of FACE and FAITH (FACE>>FAITH)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**POWER**	**SOLID**
a. istæmæz	*!				
b. *Nemikhad*		*			*
☞ c. **Not attracted at all.**		*			*

7.3. Sociolinguistic Grammar of Diaspora Community

Following the analysis of the sociolinguistic grammar of the indigenous community, a similar analysis is presented in this section focusing on patterns of CS in the diaspora community, i.e. Azeri-Farsi-English multilinguals in the United States.

Excerpt 17: SOLID >> POWER

There are three participants in this excerpt. Salar (S) and his friends, Farid and the investigator, have arrived in New York City after a long drive the day before. Farid has just introduced Salar and the investigator to his cousin Reza (R). Having grown up in Tehran, Reza's unmarked code is Farsi while the others' preferred code is Azeri. The topic of the conversation is Salar and his friends' long road trip to NYC.

Excerpt 17:

1. R: *eyne Florida-e dige, ma hæm 3,4 e sob rah oftadim, ye kælle umædim dige (.) vay næstadim.*	**1. R:** *It's like a Florida trip, we left at 3 or 4 a.m. and drove nonstop, didn't stop.*
2. S: biz axi odzur *ye kalle* gælmırdıx(.) biz [ela	**2. S:** we didn't drive that *nonstop*. We were
3. R→ [dolana dolana gælirdiz	**3. R:→** You were enjoying the road.
4. F: Bu iki dæyqædæn bir saxlırdi (.) *shash*lanırdi. (hahaha)	**4. F:** He was stopping every 2 minute to pee. (hahaha)
5. S: (2.0) mænim koliyælærim ishæ tüshmüshdi (.) biyol (1.0) ba: neyniyim eybela su itsirdıx.	**5. S:** My kidneys were working too much, so, well what should I have done? We were drinking so much water.
6. R: Hala, Tæbriz dæ næxæbær?	**6. R:** So, what's going on in Tabriz ((their hometown))?

The switch that is of interest in this excerpt occurs in line 3, in which Reza, whose preferred code is Farsi, switches to Azeri. By doing so, he is aligning with the unmarked code of the other

interlocutors and indexing in-group identity. Such utilization of CS as a way of indexing similarity and identity affiliation between self and the other(s) is discussed under the *Principle of Social Concurrence* (SOLIDARITY). Thus, amongst the three candidates shown in Tableau 8, the only candidate that satisfies the higher-ranked constraint SOLID is (b). This piece of data instantiates that when POWER and SOLID are in conflict, it is SOLID that is satisfied, i.e. SOLID>>POWER.

Tableau 8. Interaction of SOLID and POWER (SOLID>>POWER)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**SOLID**	**POWER**
a. *Dashtin az rah lezzæt mibordin dige.*				*!	
☞ b. dolana dolana gælirdiz					*
c. **You were enjoying the road.**				*!	

Excerpt 18: FAITH >> SOLID

This excerpt concerns the interaction of FAITH and SOLID. The participants are two graduate students: Payam (P) and Ehsan (E). Payam is talking to Ehsan and the investigator about an Iranian girl studying at their university whom he thinks is very beautiful. In order to convince the other interlocutors that she really is beautiful, he narrates a story:

Excerpt 18:

1. P: Agha mæn, getsæn termi:di, bidana tsini vardi, bidana kilasda hæmkilasımızıdı (.) oghlan(.) sora, birseri *khosh o besh* elædıx, tanıdıx (.) dza:m(eæ-miz)	**1. P:** It was last semester, there was this Chinese guy, we were classmates in one class. A boy, then, once we *greeted*, we recognized each other,

Excerpt 18 (cont.):

→**community**-mız xırdadi, ela sizinkinæ tay nejæ(.) sora birseri gördüm dedi ki, irani san da? dedim hæn, nedzæ? dedi mæn bidana **Stat Department** da ya **Crop Science Department** da, birdana **course** götümüshæm, bir **TA**-imiz var Irani di 2.	→our **community** is small, like yours, then, once I saw him and he said, you're Iranian, right? I said Yes, why? He said in **Department of Statistics** or **Crop Science Department,** I have taken a **course**, we have a **TA** who is Iranian.
2. E: xo:b?	**2. E:** So? ((backchannel))
3. P: Dedi bir qiz di (1.0) dedi oqæ::d göytsæh di(.) bizæ dedi ha, oqæ::d göytsæhdi.	**3. P:** It's a girl. He said, she is sooo beautiful. He told us, she's sooo beautiful.

Payam starts his narrative in Azeri, the unmarked language of all the interlocutors, and then switches to English intra-sententially and uses the word *community*. The incomplete utterance of *dza:meœ*, meaning 'society/community' and then the self-repair – understood in terms of PERSP-- through switching to English indicates that the speaker is aware that the Azeri word-- which is borrowed from Arabic through Farsi-- cannot convey the same meaning as 'community' in this context. That is, the Azeri (or Farsi) word connotes a broader meaning of the word *community* than what Majid has in his mind, since he is referring to a particular 'community of practice' (e.g. the community of the electrical engineering graduate students in a particular university). Therefore, he notices that amongst all the potential choices he has, illustrated in Tableau 9, the Azeri word would not be the optimal candidate for him to achieve his goal. Thus, in order to convey this conceptual meaning in the most economical and faithful way, he switches

to English --a FAITH switch. The switch to English, therefore, satisfies FAITH, which is ranked relatively higher, and violates the lower-ranked SOLID. This example provides clue for the following ranking: FAITH>>SOLID>>POWER

Tableau 9. Interaction of SOLID and FAITH (FAITH>>SOLID)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**SOLID**	**POWER**
a. *ejtema'*		*!			
b. dza:meæ		*!			*
☞ c. **community**				*	

Excerpt 19: PERSP >> SOLID

Salar (S) and the investigator have been visiting NYC and staying at Ali (A) and Farid's (F) home for almost a week. Salar was already talking about going back home on Tuesday since he needed to move into a new apartment on Friday. Ali and Farid were trying to convince him to stay for one more week telling him that he could ask his roommate to do the moving for him. However, Salar insisted on his earlier plans and turned them down. At this point, Salar starts texting back and forth with someone and does not pay attention to what they are saying anymore. Ali and Farid start teasing him by guessing what he is writing in the texts assuming that he is texting a girl.

Excerpt 19:

1. A: Sms vırır ishiz olmasın. **2. F:** Sms-læsh sæn.	**1. A:** He's texting, don't disturb him **2. F:** You send your texts.

Excerpt 19 (cont.):

3. A: → *"æzizæm? Chetori golæm?*" indi diyir. *"Delæm vasæt ye zærre shode*."	**3. A:** →*"My dear? How are you, baby?"*, he is writing now. *"I miss you so much".*
4. F: *"Golæm, goh khordæm mæno bebækhsh."*	**4. F:** *"My dear, I ate shit* (my bad! I regret my mistake) *forgive me".*
5. A: (1.0) *"Seshænbe miyam".* (hahaha)	**5. A:** *"I'm coming back on Tuesday."* (hahaha)
6. S: O <u>poxi</u> göti oxi! ((puts his cell phone down- angry tone))	**6. S:** Take it and read that shit (my messages). ((puts his cell phone down- angry tone))

In line 3, Ali who was speaking Azeri earlier, switches to Farsi to hypothetically quote what Salar is writing in his texts, which is what Farid also does in line 4. As mentioned earlier in a footnote, many Azeri young men and women speak to their girlfriends/boyfriends in Farsi since they consider it more 'romantic'. Therefore, these shifts in footing (Goffman, 1981)—which are done through the animation of the voice (Bakhtin, 1981) of this particular type of people-- index a cultural reality regarding how romantic relationships work in this community. Such shifts in footing and voicing are analyzed as PERSP switches in B&B model. In this example, the Farsi candidate, Tableau 10 (a), contributes to the maximization of perspectivity while the other possible candidates, (b) and (c), do not. This switch then violates the lower-ranked SOLID but satisfies PERSP, which outranks SOLID. At the end of this stage of the analysis, the hierarchical ranking that has emerged is {PERSP, FAITH}>>SOLID>>POWER

Tableau 10.Interaction of SOLID and PERSP (PERSP>>SOLID)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**SOLID**	**POWER**
a. *æzizæm? Chetori golæm?*				*	
b. æzizim?nedzæsæn gülüm?			*!		*
c. **My dear? How are you, baby?**			*!	*	

Excerpt 20: FAITH >> PERSP

Arash (A) and Farid (F) are talking about different schools in the US and their admission requirements. Arash was telling a story about an Iranian boy who was crazy about getting into Harvard University and had spent 5 years of his life preparing the admission requirements to enter the Finance Program there. However, despite all his efforts, his application was rejected. Farid thinks that getting into Harvard would be possible by either donating money to the school or having a parent with a high social status. He narrates someone's opinion from an online forum about the requirements for getting admitted to Harvard.

Excerpt 20:

1. F: O qævvati ki istir Harvad da oxiyæ (.) 5 il dæ zæhmæt qoyur, o **donation** i elæsæ onnan yaxdzidi. Yazmıshdi (.) shærayiti dæqiqæn budzur yazmıshdi ki "**To get inside Harvard, two questions: First,**	**1. F:** That asshole who wants to study in Harvard, and devotes 5 years to it, if he makes a **donation** (to the university), it is much better than that. It (a website) had written about the

Excerpt 20 (cont.):

→ **are you the son of** filan behman, mæsælæn senatorların birinin ushaghısan? **If the answer for that question is Yes, don't read the rest. Second,** yazmıshdi ki, "**If your father recently dona**[**ted**	requirements (for getting admitted to Harvard) as follows: **To get into Harvard, two questions, first, are** → **you the son of** this or that person, for instance, you are the child of one of the senators? **If the answer for that question is Yes, don't read the rest. Second**, it was written that, **if your father recently donated**…
2. A: [Harda yazmishdi?	**2. A:** Where was this written?

Speaking Azeri, his unmarked choice, Farid switches to English to quote what some person thinks about the requirements for entering Harvard. The function of this switch is similar to the example in the previous excerpt; i.e. a change in voicing to maximize perspectivity. However, within the PERSP switch, he switched back to Azeri and used the expression *filan behman* [candidate (b) in Tableau 11].[32] This expression—which roughly means 'this or that, this person or that person' and to some extent connotes both the English *blah blah blah* and *so and so*—is not only used when one does not want to get into details about what or who, but it is also used as a filler in story-telling. The closest English equivalents, however, fail to capture all of the functions of *filan behman* and do not carry the same cultural nuance. This is because certain

[32] Azeri and Farsi share this expression with slightly different pronunciations.

discourse conventions of story-telling as a genre are extremely culture specific and may not correspond directly to those of other languages and cultures. Such switches to convey culture-specific nuances are analyzed as FAITH switches within the B&B model. Although the switch back to the solidarity code in this extract violates PERSP, which outranks SOLID, the motivation for this switch is not to satisfy SOLID but rather to satisfy the higher-ranked constraint FAITH. By the end of this part of the analysis, the ranking that has been developed is FAITH>>PERSP >>SOLID>>POWER.

Tableau 11. Interaction of FAITH and PERSP (FAITH>>PERSP)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**SOLID**	**POWER**
a. *felan bæhman/bisar*			*	*	
☞ b. filan behman			*		*
c. **Blah blah blah**		*!		*	

Excerpt 21: FACE >> FAITH

The final excerpt for the diaspora community illustrates the interaction of FAITH and FACE. Payam and Ehsan are talking about what they find attractive in girls. Ehsan (E) is a very 'polite' person and usually avoids using taboo words. His friends would sometimes joke with him about how he does not know any swear words. Given his 'politeness', Ehsan appears not to be comfortable discussing this issue.

Excerpt 21:

1. E: mænæ fæqæt o estayl e (.) bejoz (.) *bejoz ghiyafeye zaheri* va bujur sheylær, bæzi va:x qızlar æyæ chox xoshgil olanda ha,hesh, mænæ hesh, mænæ chox jazzabiyat-dæn tüshüllæ (.) chün va:qeæn shayæd zehnim dærk elir ki o **is way beyond your class**. Hærdæn bæ:zi sheylær mænæ, ayri zatdar mænæ, sheydi, → halæt'e **arousing**-i vardi.	**1. E:** For me the style, except, except the appearance and stuff like that (are important), sometimes if the girls are too beautiful, for me, for me, they lose their attractiveness because maybe my mind actually understands that she **is way beyond your class**. Sometimes, some things for me, some other things → **arouse** me.

The switch that is of interest in this section occurs at the end of Ehsan's turn. Ehsan starts talking about this issue in Azeri, his unmarked code. However, finding explicit expression of his ideas face-threatening, he switches to English intra-sententially and uses the word *arousing*, candidate (c) in Tableau 12. The use of this word *per se*, nevertheless, may not be a politeness strategy for native speakers of English and may even sound bizarre. In addition, it creates some ambiguity and vagueness regarding what he intends to communicate, which in Gricean terms would be a violation of Manner Maxim (Grice, 1975) and within the B&B framework, it is considered as a violation of FAITH. I argue that, regardless of the function of the word for the native speakers, and how faithfully it conveys the meaning, Ehsan is considering switching to a language other than the solidary code while talking about taboo concepts as a strategy to mitigate face-threatening acts.. Hence, this switch from the 'we code' to a relatively distant code to save face satisfies FACE at the expense of the violation of FAITH. Taking into account the interaction of these two constraints, the final hierarchical ranking, i.e. the optimal sociolinguistic grammar of

the diaspora community, can be concluded to be

FACE>>FAITH>>PERSP>>SOLID>>POWER.

Tableau 12. Interaction of FACE and FAITH (FACE>>FAITH)

Candidates	**FACE**	**FAITH**	**PERSP**	**SOLID**	**POWER**
a. *tæhrik konande*	*!			*	
b. tæhrik elian	*!				*
c. **arousing**		*		*	

7.4. Discussion

The results of the analyses revealed the following grammars for the two communities:

The grammar of the indigenous community: FACE>>FAITH>>PERSP>>**POWER>>SOLID**

The grammar of the diaspora community: FACE>>FAITH>>PERSP>>**SOLID>>POWER**

The data revealed no instances violating these rankings in any of the communities, i.e. when particular constraints were in conflict, the higher-ranked constraints were satisfied all the time. As predicted by B&B, the variation in the sociolinguistic grammars of these two communities is revealed to be a function of how they rank the five meta-sociolinguistic constraints differently. More specifically, the analysis provides evidence that the grammars of the two communities are overwhelmingly similar, in terms of interaction of FAITH, FACE, and PERSPECTIVE; and, descriptively, the only salient difference between them has to do with the relative 'value' each community places on the two relational constraints: POWER and SOLIDARITY. The results of this study showed that POWER in the indigenous context has relatively more value than SOLIDARITY, while for the Azeri-Farsi-English multilinguals who have migrated to diaspora, it is SOLIDARITY that has relatively more value.

The results of this analysis are in fact similar to the findings of B&B and other recent studies which have adopted this optimality-theoretic model focusing on different communities. That is, as mentioned earlier, in the studies conducted in diaspora, SOLIDARITY outranks POWER, whereas in indigenous contexts, POWER has been reported to have a relatively a higher value than SOLIDARITY. The difference, however, is that, unlike the findings of this study, the analyses in none of the above-mentioned studies focusing on bilingual/multilingual communities nor Cramer's (2015) study of CS in a *bi-dialectal* community using B&B model have revealed a total domination order with respect to the ranking of the constraints.

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

8.1. Overview

In this chapter, I present the conclusions of the analyses carried out in this dissertation. First, I outline the main results of the study followed by its major implications and contributions. Then, I address the limitations of the study and present a proposal for future research.

8.2. Discussion of Results

In this section, I provide an overview of the results of this study as well as possible explanations for the results. Similar to the organization of the dissertation, I start with the results of the analysis of the participants' migration narratives. Then, I will focus on the results of the analysis presented in chapter 6 regarding their metapragmatic comments. Finally, I will discuss the results of the analysis of the migrants' patterns of multilingual language use.

8.2.1. Migration Discourses

The analysis of the Iranian Azerbaijani migrants' narratives revealed that past migration trajectory and current migration status affect their (re)-construction of spatiotemporal representations of the ideal life. Comparing the educational migrants with those of the U.S. Green Card lottery winners from Iran, I argue that there are discursively realized differences in how these two groups construct chronotopic images of the ideal life. I also argue that in their discourses of the ideal future, their ethnolinguistic identity as Iranian Azerbaijanis becomes less salient. Instead, their shared *Iranianness* with other Iranian ethnic groups, rather than their unshared *Turkicness*, becomes more prominent since they are all treated more or less equally as Iranian citizens by the U.S. immigration laws and policies.

Differences in participants' migration trajectories, as I explained in chapter 5, are due to different experiences with institutional and bureaucratic processes. While previous sociolinguistic studies have focused on the communicative performances occurring in the bureaucratic encounters of minority communities and asylum seekers (e.g. Blommaert, 2001; Gumperz, 1982; Haviland, 2003; Jacquemet, 2000, 2009; Maryns, 2014), I discussed how bureaucratic procedures and restrictions around Iranian educational migrants in the U.S. affect their social positionings relative to concepts of success, progress, and ideal life. In particular, the data presented in chapter 5 showed how a non-resident Iranian Azerbaijani student, I called Aref, (re)-constructed imaginations of the ideal life through presenting contrastive chronotopes of 'success' *here* [in the U.S.] and 'lack of success' *there* [in Iran]. I also illustrated how he presented his immediate concerns as general truths and inviteed alignment (Koven, 2016; Stivers, 2008) from the other interlocutors; and how Mehdi, a U.S. permanent resident, disaligned with the chronotopes invoked by Aref.

The patterns observed in the migration discourse of Aref, in fact, reveal a new trend among Iranian youth: educational migration with the hope of a long-term stay (cf. Park & Lo, 2012). More specifically, drawing on the idea of 'multiplicity of chronotopes' which highlights the dialogical interaction of various chronotopes in forming imagination (Bakhtin, 1981; Wirtz, 2016), I argue that the chronotopes of success *here* and lack of success *there* 'brought about' by Aref and other non-resident Iranian students are prompted by a large-scale *cultural chronotope* (Agha, 2007a), which pertains to their aspiration to stay in the U.S. This migration chronotope is less about a remove from the homeland – as, for instance, in the cases of *longing for an imagined homeland* (Eisenlohr, 2006), *returning to roots* (Wessendorf, 2007), *an imagined life beyond here* (Dick, 2010), etc. – and more about desires for an ideal future in the host country. Due to

the social, political, and economic issues these educational migrants experienced in Iran before migration as well as the bureaucratic restrictions around them after migration, which deprive them of, for instance, the ability to leave the U.S. to visit their families, their discourses tend to revolve more around hopes for a better future. This better future is one in which they are still here in the U.S. but are in a better position than now with respect to their residency and socio-economic statuses, and when and where they can have a taste of the 'American dream'. Such future positionings highlight a different aspect of migration discourse: the generation of chronotopic images of a 'life beyond' (Dick, 2010) which renders temporal future topically more prominent (Agha, 2007a) than spatiality at this juncture. This is because 'being here' is already fulfilled and is not a concern for them at the present time, and what remains is being in a better position than their current situation, which is what they pursue in the future.

In section 5.3, on the other hand, I focused on how the participants negotiate their past-oriented longings. In particular, I demonstrated how Erfan made a distinction between 'being aware of' and 'feeling connected to' what is happening back home so as to negotiate his longings for an unmediated physical presence at home, which is not accessible through the mediated connection facilitated by new technology. I argue that while technology facilitates *connection* to the homeland, it also brings feelings of *disconnection*. In part because the information migrants receive via new technology is decontextualized and underspecified, it reminds them of their lack of access to unmediated experiences of the homeland. Furthermore, migrants combine this underspecified information with their existing images of the homeland to reconstruct a chronotopic understanding of life *there-and-now*. The updated image may conflict with images of an 'unchanged homeland', reminding migrants of what has changed since they left and making them feel disconnected. It may also operate as a lens through which migrants disalign

with those in the homeland, further highlighting their migrant identities, as evident in how Erfan distanced his identity from that of the non-migrants in Iran and the U.S. to situate his transnational identity 'somewhere in the middle'.

The results of the analyses show that position taking in migration discourse is in part informed by migrants' immediate concerns and anxieties. Hall (2014) refers to such feelings of anxiety and instability experienced by transnational migrants as *hypersubjectivity.* However, she mainly discusses this notion in regards to the shifts in indexical relations as a result of the mobility of linguistic resources. I argue that such subjectivity can not only be traced in migrants' linguistic practices and their understandings of the indexical potentials of their linguistic resources, but also in their broader social positionings relative to the home and host countries. Moreover, although I agree with Hall's (2014) point that neoliberal globalization "has transformed subjectivity into a property of the *individual* instead of *collective,* shifting the responsibility of survival to projects of self-making instead of social institutions" (p. 263; emphasis added), I argue that migrants still seek some sort of collectivity with respect to their individual concerns. That is, being aware of their individual responsibilities of survival, migrants also discursively construct collective *us* and pursue positive alignment from those who share similar anxieties. For instance, in the conversations explored in chapter 5, we saw how the participants invoked 'being in minority' *here* to discuss the challenges they are facing in the diasporic context. In addition, we noticed, for example, how Aref presented his immediate concerns as general truths and sought alignment from the other participants. I argue that by calibrating his positions nomically rather than reportively, he attempted to highlight the sharedness of those concerns with the other interlocutors. We also noticed similar longings for a sense of 'communal capital' (cf. Bourdieu's (1986) notion of *social capital*) in how Erfan

constructed a collective *us* which was differentiated from *them* to highlight his transnational identity and then reformulated its reference as the conversation unfolded. The data also reveal that, given the sharedness of the diasporic concerns and anxieties among Iranians with different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, the issues related to ethnolinguistic differences become less salient in their broader social positionings.

8.2.2. Language-Ideological Discourses

The analysis in chapter 6 revealed that acts of ethnolinguistic identification are chronotopically organized (Blommaert & De Fina, 2017). That is, it is the dialogical nature of various (and sometimes conflicting) large-scale and small-scale chronotopes that informs participants' understandings of ethnolinguistic identity and guides their discursive processes of (de)authenticating certain identities. Similar to what I argued in chapter 5, I showed that the spatiotemporal configurations in which interactions take place make certain chronotopes more salient, and that these more salient chronotopes are invoked by participants, organizing their discourses. We saw that the participants' implicit shared knowledge of the fact that dinner parties at this professor's house are typically for Azerbaijani migrants to gather together along with the immediate context of the interactions informed which chronotopes they invoked. While Rashid was invoking a more nationalistic chronotope about Azerbaijani language and identity, Behzad, Farhad, and Majid's shared histories as Iranian Azerbaijani elites led to their (re)-construction of different chronotopic images regarding the situation of Azerbaijani language and identity in Iran.

The chronotopes we observed within their conversations, do not only differ in terms of the time and place they refer to, whether they are macroscopic or microscopic, or whether they are brought along or brought about, but they also differ in terms of their power. For instance, in the Azeri example, we see that Majid draws on different chronotopes than Rashid regarding

language mixing and the relationship between language and ethnicity. More specifically, Majid sees language mixing as permissible, considering it a natural outcome of language contact; however, given the authority and normativity of certain ideologies related to linguistic purism and the monolingualism of the nation-state, he aligns with Rashid's negative attitude towards language mixing when he says that the Azeris in Azerbaijan are "lucky" that their language has not been mixed with Russian. As noted in the analysis, the power differentials between chronotopes result in specific linguistic patterns. Most notably, because less powerful chronotopes are less accessible they require more explanation, but because they are less dominant they are also articulated with less epistemological certainty (for a detailed discussion, see Karimzad & Catedral, 2017).

In addition, the data reveal that the participants' understandings of acceptable language choices are both chronotopic and scalar. That is, they have developed a chronotopic image of what counts as acceptable linguistic behavior in their interactions with certain types of people in certain time-space frames. This image is then used as a guide for their own multilingual practices as well as a lens through which they evaluate others' multilingual language use. On the other hand, the participants give preference to the shared language that is relatively more local, meaning that if in a given context, the participants all speak Azeri, the use of Farsi is considered unacceptable, and if Farsi is the shared language, then using English is considered inappropriate. The fact that the participants prefer a relatively more local language agrees with the overarching argument in this dissertation that being in minority in the diasporic contexts leads migrants to seek a sort of collective identity. The data presented in section 6.2 revealed that the participants defended both their Iranian and Azerbaijani identities in response to Rashid's constant criticisms. In the same manner, the participants defended Zahra's Azerbaijani identity, regardless of her

preference for Farsi, by invoking the spatiotemporal situation in which she had been born and raised. Such longings for collectiveness were also evident in the participants' positive alignment with each other's comments and preferred language choices in section 6.3.

8.2.3. Sociolinguistic Grammars

The results of the analysis in chapter 7 reveal that despite overwhelming similarities in Azeri communities in the U.S. and Iran with respect to patterns of CS, the difference in their sociolinguistic grammars is significant, resulting from the interaction of SOLIDARTY and POWER. More specifically, the only salient difference between the two communities pertains to the relative 'value' each community places on the two relational constraints: POWER and SOLIDARITY. That is, in the diaspora context, SOLIDARITY outranks POWER, but in the indigenous context POWER outranks SOLIDARITY. Such effect of mobility of people and of linguistic resources on the multilingual language use, revealed by the analysis done in this dissertation, appears to be also noticeable for Ehsan, one of the members of the diaspora community:

> *"There [in Iran] when people switched to English, there were 2 reasons, the first reason was that ummmm technical things, there were no equivalents… that is the case here [the U.S.] too. Eh, the other reason was that, you know, it is not a really good reason but, well, unfortunately, it was the case in Iran and I cannot neglect it. Many of the people who spoke English, at least people around me, you'd see sometimes that their goal was to show off and sound classy. Eh, but here, here it seems that our understandings have changed completely. And the words we want to use have changed too."*

In his narrative about why he codeswitches, this member of the Azeri-Farsi-English community in diaspora touches upon how mobility has impacted his language choice. Specifically, he highlights the function of CS to index *prestige* – or what we refer to as POWER-- in the indigenous context, which changes upon moving to diaspora. It is evident that even though the members of these communities may not be *consciously* aware of all the functions of CS and the conventions for their use-- i.e. what this study has found about the grammars of language use in these two communities-- they are partially aware of the most salient differences.

I argue that the variation in the two community grammars -- *vis-à-vis* POWER and SOLIDARITY -- has to do with the particular practice that offers the *profit of distinction* (Bourdieu, 1991). *Distinction*, for Bourdieu, concerns enhancing "one's symbolic position within a field", and a profit of distinction is his/her attempt "to be noticed, validated, respected, [and/or] admired" (Albright & Luke, 2008, p. 41). The profit of distinction can be secured when the speakers "are able to exploit the system of differences to their advantage" through the *linguistic capital* they possess (Bourdieu, 1991, p.18). I argue that in indigenous contexts, the type of practice that secures the profit of distinction is the '*differentiation function'*, in terms of status/power, which is accomplished through switching to English or Farsi. This is because in the indigenous context, the solidarity code, Azeri, is the unmarked language of the majority in Azeri-speaking regions, and thus the linguistic resources that provide such sense of *markedness* are the languages that offer symbolic power, i.e. English and Farsi. However, given the fact that in diaspora context this community is in minority and the power code(s) do not offer a sense of markedness, the profit of distinction in this community is gained through solidarity. That is, in the diaspora community, it is the *solidarity function* (indexing in-group identity)-- accomplished

through switching to Azeri or avoiding POWER switches-- that offers the profit of distinction. [33] Such attempt to gain 'communal capital' can be said to be a sociolinguistic strategy by these multilinguals to break their marginality in diaspora. Safran (1991) claims that the members of diasporic communities have a belief that they would never be accepted as a member of the host country and thus develop their own cultural and social needs; they may therefore get involved in certain communal activities that are mostly enabled by solidarity. I argue that prominence of solidarity is not only reinforced by communal activities in diasporic communities, but it is also evident in their intra-community patterns of language use. The migrants' longings for certain collective identity were also revealed in their migration narratives and language-ideological discourses, explored in chapters 5 and 6.

8.3. Implications and Contributions

The results of this study have implications for the sociolinguistics of mobility and the sociolinguistics of globalization. First and foremost, in the model I present in this dissertation, I argue that a better understanding of the sociolinguistic effects of mobility requires a study of both macro-discursive practices of position-taking and micro-discursive practices dealing with patterns of multilingual language use. Taking into account the migration narratives of this community, we see how being in minority is a salient factor in how the participants position themselves relative to home and host countries. Specifically, their narratives reveal their longings for collective identities, as evident in their discursive constructions of *us* and/or elicitations of alignments from others to highlight their shared transnational identities. Similarly, such feelings of being in minority are revealed in their language-idealogical discourses in that, in terms of

[33] The 'differentiation' and 'solidarity' functions referred to here as the strategies that secure *profit of distinction* are similar to what Bucholtz & Hall (2005) discuss in their work under *distinction* and *adequation* respectively.

language choice, they prefer the relatively more local language that is shared by the interlocutors. Finally, in terms of their linguistic practices, we see how the relative value of solidarity *vis-à-vis* power is enhanced in diasporic contexts, which is in line with their overall desires for constructing collective transnational identities.

Regarding migration discourses, this study reveals that migration discourse does not necessarily deal with a 'remove' from homeland, as characterized by Eisenlohr (2006) and Dick (2010); it can also deal with future-oriented desires for a better life in the host country. Specifically, I argued that migrants' past migration histories and current anxieties determine what receives topical prominence (Agha, 2007a) in their discourses. I also built on Hall's (2014) notion of *hypersubjectivity* -- which mainly concerns the shifts in the indexicalities of migrants' linguistic resources that lead to feelings of anxiety-- to discuss how migrants' individual concerns and anxieties affect their broader positionings relative to home and host countries. In addition, scholars of language and migration discuss how the development in new technologies intensifies interconnectedness between the home and host countries (Vertovec, 1999; Blommaert, 2010; De Fina & Perrino, 2013; Lo & Park, 2017); however, this study argues that while technology facilitates *connection* to the homeland, it also brings feelings of *disconnection*. This is because the decontextualized information migrants receive from the homeland via new media (1) reminds them of their lack of access to physical presence *there* and (2) leads to the reconstruction of the image of the homeland which disrupts the image they already have, and hence cause them to feel disconnected. In addition, following Blommaert and De Fina (2017) and Blommaert (2017), I argue that Bakhtin's (1981) notion of chronotope is a useful tool to capture the complexities in the study of how mobile populations discursively construct and negotiate identities.

This study also has implications for the understanding of the impact of mobility on language use. Blommaert (2010) argues that mobility, of people and of linguistic resources, may result in unexpected patterns of language use. This unexpectedness, according to Blommaert, is due to the fact that such mobility brings about 'translocal' and 'deterritorialized' patterns of language use which displaces 'sedentary' and 'territorialized' patterns (pp. 4-5). Despite such complexities, I argue that some aspects of language use are indeed predictable even in the globalizing context of migration, displacement, and dislocation. That is, linguistic behaviors of the diasporic communities illustrated in this study-- i.e. the enhancement of the value of solidarity *vis-à-vis* power as a result of migration-- can be regarded as a sociolinguistic strategy, similar to the other diasporic communal activities, to break marginality and gain communal capital in diaspora. As I illustrated, the salience of solidarity and collective identity were not only revealed in the participants' patterns of code-switching, but were also evident in their language-ideological discourses and broader social positionings.

On an empirical level, this dissertation has implications for the sociolinguistic study of minority groups.Given the fact that Iranian Azerbaijanis are a minority group in Iran and are ethnolinguistically subordinated, studying their linguistic and discursive practices reveals that, in diasporic context, their local minority becomes less salient and instead, their diasporic minority becomes prominent. This is because (i) Iranians are more or less treated similarly by the American people and government regardless of their ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, (ii) their diasporic concerns and anxieties are shared with all Iranians with different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, and (iii) they interact mostly with well-educated elite non-Azerbaijani Iranians, most of whom oppose ethnolinguistic subordination.

This study also has implications for B&B's framework for the study of sociolinguistic grammars of code-switching. In particular, although B&B's optimality-theoretic framework managed to account for the majority of the CS data, there were instances in which optimization *per se* could not fully predict the attested output. That is, there were instances in which the computation of the optimal output led to more than one optimal candidate (see Tableaux 2 & 7 in chapter 7) and failed to select a single—attested-- optimal output. I hypothesized that the reason for this resides in the gradient relationship among the codes; i.e., for instance, English and Farsi are both POWER codes relative to Azeri, yet the former carries more symbolic power than the latter. Such gradient relationship between the codes indexing symbolic power results in more than one optimal output in the switches that are motivated by POWER and/or FACE constraints. I argue that there is a rationalization process at work --along with the optimization process-- in which the speakers, as rational actors, carry out cost-benefit analysis in terms of their individual wants, desires, and beliefs (cf. Coleman & Fararo 1992; Elster 1994; Myers-Scotton & Bolonyai 2001) prior to selecting a more expensive or less expensive choice. Once rationalization is added to the theoretical architecture of B&B's OT-framework, the data receive a straightforward account. Specifically, incorporating rationalization into this model (1) resolves the problem of code gradience ;(2) accounts for the instances in which the speakers opt not to follow the sociolinguistic grammar of the community, and thus accounts for intra-community variation in patterns of CS; and (3) integrates both the idea of community grammars structuring the patterns of multilingual language use and the role of individual agency.

8.4. Limitations

Although I attempted to conduct a comprehensive study of the linguistic and discursive practices of this community which has implications for a variety of fields within sociolinguistics, there are also a number of limitations that I address in this section.

First of all, the majority of my participants were educational migrants. While focusing on these participants revealed certain interesting discursive and interactional patterns, this study would have benefited if more participants who had won U.S. Green Card took part in this study. This is because, given their different migration path, they have different concerns and anxieties and focusing on their discourses would have definitely shed light on some other aspects of migration discourse.

In addition, the majority of the participants had moved to the U.S. in the past decade. Focusing on these participants was significant since they had experienced the recent social and political circumstances in Iran and the study of their discursive practices shed light on the sociolinguistic effects of mobility. However, having participants belonging to older generations of Iranian migrants would have allowed me to study the cross-generational differences in their discursive practices.

The demographics of male and female participants were also skewed. I had limited access to female Iranian Azerbaijanis in the U.S. and did not manage to recruit equal number of them for my study. As a result, I could only partially show their discursive practices. However, though their number was low, the female participants contributed a lot to this dissertation, be it through their linguistic and metapragmatic practices or triggering discussions that were then followed up by the male participants.

8.5. Future Research

Given the limitations that I addressed in the previous section, I aim to expand this research by collecting data from other groups of Iranian migrants in the U.S. Specifically, I will focus on Green Card lottery winners to see how their different trajectories affect their social positionings. In particular, I have observed that many of the Green Card winners who had a decent life back in Iran struggle with, for instance, entering universities or finding jobs in the U.S., which would in fact affect their migration narratives. Moreover, I plan to focus also on older generations of displaced Iranian migrants who have not been able to go back to Iran since their arrival in the U.S. It would be interesting to compare their images of the homeland with more recent migrants, and also study how the arrival of new migrants as well as the advancements in technology has affected their images of the homeland. It will also be interesting to compare their patterns of language use with the recent migrants to determine cross-generational differences. Finally, I would like to study Persian-speaking migrants' discourses concerning language and identity as well as their stances on ethnolinguistic subordination. Since Persian speakers are in majority in Iran, their experiences of being in minority in diaspora might be different from those belonging to minority groups in Iran, and it would be interesting to investigate their discourses as well.

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APPENDIX: Transcription Conventions

Regular font:	Azeri
Italics	Farsi
Bold	English
Underline	emphatic stress
(…)	intervening material has been omitted
(.)	brief pause
(hahaha)	laughter
(())	transcriber comment
( )	English translation within brackets is added by the author for clarification
[	speaker overlap
=	contiguous utterances
,	utterance signaling more to come
.	utterance final intonation
:	lengthening of preceding sound
↑	rising intonation
↓	falling intonation
➔	Indicates where the switch of interest occurs