THE MEDIUM MATTERS:
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND BEHAVIOR IN LATIN AMERICA

BY

AMANDA BETH CRONKHITE

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018

Urbana, Illinois

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Scott Althaus, Chair
Professor Damarys Canache
Associate Professor Carol Leff
Associate Professor Matthew Winters

Abstract

Political communication scholars have long been interested in why people seek out the media content they do. Media choice is a complex decision influenced by a multitude of factors; and linking media consumption and behavior is difficult in regions without detailed information about individual media diets and consumption patterns. Yet those same areas are where scholars know the least about the link between media and political engagement. This dissertation endeavors to fill that void in research, using a method more efficient than traditional content analysis. With a focus on Latin America, my study is one of the few large-N comparative studies of media and politics within comparative politics.

I posit that the public uses media reputation, the accumulation of years of interactions between the press and government, as a cue about the independence of any medium. I contend that media reputation, earned over time, acts as a signal about how close a media entity is to government, thereby guiding consumers interested in news outside the mainstream toward media that promote ideas that challenge the status quo. I expect that consumers of media that criticize the status quo will be more likely to engage in activities to change the status quo.

To show this, I draw on the work of others across a variety of disciplines—including history, communications, anthropology, economics, sociology, media studies, journalism studies, area studies and ethnography—to categorize how media in different countries are both similar and different in reputation or relationship with government. I present a detailed classification scheme for institutional status quo bias that acts as a work-around for some of the language and scope problems associated with content

analysis, which is most commonly used to link media consumption and political behavior.

I then look for associations between consumption of different media and political behavior. Using data from the World Values Survey, AmericasBarometer and original data collected for this dissertation, I show that more frequent consumption of media with less status quo bias is associated with increased political participation. This is especially true for consumption of Internet news in Latin America.

To Gonzo, el amor de mis amores

And to my parents, who took out so many loans so your little girl could go to school

Acknowledgments

This has been a long road. And there are more people to thank that I will remember. So, please forgive me if your name is not here. First and foremost, to my family, by blood, by marriage and by choice, I would not have gotten this far without the Reardons, Cronkhites and Casars.

Second, thank you to those who make data available to graduate students, including the World Values Survey administrators, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University). I owe a special thanks to José Luis Galvez and the team at Equipos Mori, who gave me the chance to collect original data in Bolivia.

Obviously, I thank my committee. I benefitted from a chair who encouraged his graduate students to challenge his ideas. As a result, I am better versed in both how to engage ideas constructively and how to disagree in academia. Thank you, Scott, for helping me become a better analyst. Damarys, Matt and Carol, thank you for encouraging my doing something super weird for a comparavist! I also thank Brenda Stamm and Sheila Roberts, as well as the Cline Center for Advanced Social Research and the Schroeder Graduate Fellowship Program.

I have benefitted from a strong collection of female supporters at both UR and UIUC. #WomenAlsoKnowStuff exists because being a woman in politics or political science is still rare. So, thank you Christie, Tara, Audrey, Ashlea and others. I owe a lifetime debt to two in particular: Leslie Caughell and Wenshuo “Nini” “Natalia” Zhang.

Finally, to my eternal cheerleader and the person who helps me slow down and remember to breathe, my husband, Gonzalo Bolivar, te quiero con todo mi corazón.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 1

Outline for the dissertation........ 11

Chapter 2: THEORY 15

Chapter 3: FIRST QUANTITATIVE TEST 36

Reputation as Proxy 37
Collecting and Coding Data 44
Example 52
Final Classification Scheme 58
Research Design and Data 62
Findings 102
Discussion 131

Chapter 4: SECOND QUANTITATIVE TEST 139

Research Design and Data 142
Findings 167
Discussion 180

Chapter 5: THIRD QUANTITATIVE TEST 187

Background 189
Research Design and Data 196
Findings 206
Discussion 213

Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 216

Extensions 226

REFERENCES 229

APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 292

APPENDIX B: JUSTIFICATION FOR MODELING DECISIONS IN CHAPTER 5 313

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

Edmund Burke first used the "Fourth Estate" as a slur when referring to the media. Since then, however, the term has evolved to encompass the press's role as a watchdog, a check on government and the defender of the people's rights (Hirst 2013). The codification of the free press can be traced to Sweden in 1766 (Cunningham 2018); and there is wide consensus that freedom of the press matters for good governance, as articulated by the third and forty-fourth Presidents of the United States and a Nobel Laureate:

> "The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." — Thomas Jefferson[1]

> "Journalists give all of us as citizens the chance to know the truth about our countries, ourselves, our governments …That makes us better, it makes us stronger, it gives voice to the voiceless, it exposes injustice, and holds leaders like me accountable." — Barack Obama[2]

> "A critical, independent and investigative press is the lifeblood of any democracy. The press must be free from state interference. It must have the economic strength to stand up to the blandishments of government officials. It must have sufficient independence from vested interests to be bold and inquiring without fear or favor. It must enjoy the protection of

---

[1] The full quote is: "The people are the only censors of their governors: and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles of their institution. To punish these errors too severely would be to suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their affairs thro' the channel of the public papers, & to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers & be capable of reading them." http://oll.libertyfund.org/quote/302 (December 29, 2016)

[2] The full quote, from CBS News in 2015 is: "Journalists give all of us as citizens the chance to know the truth about our countries, ourselves, our governments …That makes us better, it makes us stronger, it gives voice to the voiceless, it exposes injustice, and holds leaders like me accountable … Unfortunately, in too many places around the world, a free press is under attack by governments that want to avoid the truth … Journalists are harassed, sometimes even killed, independent outlets are shut down, dissent is silence, and freedom of expression is stifled." http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-press-freedom-vital-to-democracy/ (April 7, 2017)

> the constitution, so that it can protect our rights as citizens. — Nelson Mandela[3]

The importance of the press is not limited to democracies. In Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 2013, 64% of the adult population still read a newspaper (WAN-IFRA 2014). Even in China, where the Committee to Protect Journalists says the government has the tightest hold over the media,[4] the concept of or a belief in the superiority of a free press exists.[5] No matter what form of government, the news is how citizens find out about what is going on in their country and the world.

"The Fourth Estate," both in its original usage as well as how it is currently interpreted by scholars, implies media independence. In general terms, that means the absence of control by external forces (Karppinen and Moe 2016, 106). UNESCO explains media independence as dual-faceted:

> "Evaluations of media independence can be categorised around two significant and distinct components. The first element concerns the role of regulatory authorities as to whether they ensure editorial independence or not… The second element is about resistance to political and commercial interference in the autonomy of the media sector. This entails the presence and strength of actors who fight for editorial independence and integrity" (2017, 3).

But media independence need not be the norm. The media may be subservient to the government or choose to collude with it. Alternately, the media may only protect those persons and groups with sufficient power to influence the media (Donohue, Tichenor and Olien 1995). These different possible roles for the media –as watchdog, lapdog or guard dog (Donohue, Tichenor and Olien 1995) – would beget very different outcomes in the content of news. After all, a press acting as a government lapdog may be perceived

---

[3] http://allafrica.com/stories/201805040316.html (June 6, 2018)
[4] https://cpj.org/blog/2018/01/press-oppressor-awards-trump-fake-news-fakies.php (June 6, 2018)
[5] See West (2014) for an overview of freedom of the press in Asia

by citizens as spreading propaganda, or the press that only presents the views of those in power as oligarchic. In such instances, the credibility of those sources could be undermined in the minds of citizens, leading to some media having reputations as less critical of those in power even when real political or social injustices exist.

The work of the press is not always an easy or safe job.[6] Even where the press's official role is somewhat codified, as it was in Brazil in the last century (de Albuquerque 2005), governments use both carrots and sticks to induce favorable coverage (Waisbord 2000, 2015). The interplay between governments and news institutions (Cook 1998, 2006; Sparrow 2006; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Wolfsfeld 2004) likely shapes an outlet's public reputation with regard to media propensity to criticize government.

What the public observes about the relationship between the government and the media may sometimes give the impression of state-media collusion, as depicted on Facebook[7] in February 2017 (Figure 1.1):

[6] The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RWB) both exist because shining a light on government corruption, malfeasance or scandal comes with risk. As of June 6, according to RWB, 30 journalists have already been killed in 2018 and 170 are imprisoned Those numbers increase to 39 and 320 if other media workers are added. Most have been killed in Afghanistan, but six of those deaths occurred in Latin America. Egypt leads the pack for imprisonments with 26. Eritrea, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Bangladesh follow, accounting for another 38. In Latin America, only Venezuela and Cuba currently have journalists in prison (two each). https://rsf.org/en/barometer (June 6, 2018)

[7] By the group Mexicambios Recargado https://www.facebook.com/395138617502587/photos/a.395181947498254.1073741828.395138617502587/408134019536380/?type=3&theater (June 5, 2018)

Figure 1.1: Mexican political cartoon (2017)

Source: Mexicambios Recargado

In this image, the Mexican media (TV Azteca, Televisa) is depicted as working alongside the political parties (PRI, PAN) and international conglomerates (Coca-Cola, TelMex, Wal-Mart) to stymie progress, justice, economic well-being and change. In other words, the cartoon presents the media as enforcers of the status quo, boulders that plug the possibility of change.

In other instances, the media and state may be seen as being at odds with one another. Figure 1.2 presents a response to a tweet from Bolivian President Juan “Evo” Morales Ayma:

Figure 1.2: Tweet and response about Bolivian government spending on media (20170504)

Source: Twitter (@raulpenaranda1)

Though it may be strange for some in well-functioning democracies to imagine a head of state blatantly threatening the press publicly, journalist Peñaranda points out that Morales does exactly this in this tweet.[8] More importantly, Morales' tweet exposes one of the methods that governments use to exert soft control over the media: advertising funds. Political scientist Ian Bremmer illustrates the pervasiveness of this mechanism of control in a 2017 tweet in Figure 1.3:

[8] Translation: "Press in which the government does not publish are those that lie, insult, defame and discredit the authorities. Do they do it for the money?" (Translation confirmed by Branko Marinkovic, personal correspondence, June 1, 2018)

Figure 1.3: Tweet about government spending on advertising in Africa (20170427)



Source: Twitter (@ianbremmer)

Overt censorship seems inefficient relative to strangling news organizations' funding, which, as these two tweets show, can be fairly easily accomplished in many parts of the world. To return to the Mexican political cartoon, media seen as being in bed with government are not likely to be perceived as independent, much less critical.

Drawing heavily from economics, this dissertation considers reputation as the dynamic result of scores of years of interactions, the details of which most of the population are unaware. As a function of their history of interaction, different types of media may have differential willingness and ability to criticize the government. This willingness or ability to challenge the government or status quo would ultimately be reflected in the stances the press takes and in the information it presents or conceals. Citizens understand these constraints, and they may select media or assess the believability of its content differently based on the reputations that develop as a result of these constraints. The differences in selection or believability of content may then be reflected in political behavior, even potentially dangerous behavior such as political protest.

In this dissertation, I apply comparative methodology to the study of news media to link news and political engagement to half the countries in the Western Hemisphere with a method less reliant on translation or content analysis. Both the approach and the geography are novel within political communication. In line with Hallin and Mancini (2004), I look at how government and media are aligned, disaggregated cross-nationally at the level of the media platform: newspaper, television, radio, Internet. Specifically, I argue that the modern relationship between government and news depends on each medium's unique historic relationship with government and the different pressures felt by actors working in each medium.

I revisit Newton (1999), who found that an association exists between media platform and mobilization, from a comparative perspective. While he posited that it was the content of the news, not its form, which was important to stimulating or depressing participation, form was a reasonable proxy for content in his study.[9] I expect the same here. After categorizing different media as being more or less aligned with the status quo in each country, I look for associations between different kinds of media and political behavior. After all, the political import of news expressed in the quotes earlier in this chapter is not about the existence of the news media, but about how the news media stimulates or stymies citizen participation.

---

[9] Newton's study related directly to media malaise theory – the idea that increased exposure to news that is all bad or negative begets cynicism, distrust and lack of faith in politics and politicians (1999, 578). In that way, we tackle different questions. But his analysis compares users of broadsheet (hard news) papers with readers of tabloid (soft or sensationalists) news readers and television news viewers. He confronts scholars who have argued that there is no hope for mobilization from television:

> "If it is form that counts most, then there is little hope for the modern mass media, especially television, which is doomed by its very nature to have a corrupting influence. If it is content that matters, then there is room for both good and bad in each type of mass media and, therefore, for different kinds of effects caused by the same type of media" (Newton 1999, 580).

But he uses form as a proxy for depth or seriousness of content, similar to what I do in forthcoming pages.

I take an institutionalist approach to show that there exists a relationship between political participation and consumption of media perceived as not aligned with government. This relationship can be observed in some countries with radio, but it is most obvious among consumers of Internet news. This association exists above and beyond traditional demographic markers, political interest or ideology. I show that in most countries, understanding the types of relationships that may exist between government and media and then how these different relationships may impact consumers will explain more about political participation than analyses that do not include media.

My dissertation presents a generalizable, cross-national approach to advance knowledge about the association between news consumption and political behavior by accounting for the institutional history of news organizations and the resulting systematic differences in content. I present a method more resource-efficient for expanding the study of political communication and behavior across linguistic and national boundaries.

Methodologically, I take a different approach to connecting media and behavior than most scholars of political communication. The modal approach is content analysis or experiments. Both have their strong suits: the former shows what the news actually reports and measures what information is actually available to those interested in politics in the real world. The latter allows us to know, with a greater degree of certainty, how information affects people's political engagement. However, language and scope limit their utility. Both are resource-intensive, which means they cannot be large in scope, nor can they look across much time. Research for both is also often done at the individual level, meaning that though researchers know a lot about the impact of news

on people, that understanding is somewhat disconnected from political context. The analysis of citizen behavior is all but divorced from the political opportunity structures[10] in which those individuals live. And the context of politics, across both space and time, matters. Comparative political scientists have shown that political repertoires[11] are bounded by the realities of each country. In other words, options available to people in country A may not be available in country B; but purely atomized analysis may not capture that.

I treat media as a comparative institution like any other, be it a central bank or a police force or a legislature. I draw on the work of others across a variety of disciplines—including history, communications, anthropology, economics, sociology, media studies, journalism studies, area studies and ethnography—to categorize how media in different countries are both similar and different. Unlike most scholars of political communication, especially Hallin and Mancini and those who have followed them, I categorize media at a lower level—here, platform—using a method that could also be applied at other levels as well, for example different media outlets within the same country. This method of analysis also acts as a work-around for some of the language and scope problems discussed earlier with regard to the modal approaches.

[10] "Political opportunities can be defined broadly as '*consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements*' (Tarrow 1996: 54, emphasis in original). More specifically, they refer to those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have to mobilize effectively… Four main dimensions of political opportunity have been stressed in the literature (McAdam 1996): (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression" (Giugni 2009, 361).

[11] "A repertoire of contention comprises what people know they can do when they want to oppose a public decision they consider unjust or threatening" (Della Porta 2013)

In terms of a substantive contribution, my dissertation is one of the few studies to look at multiple media platforms across an entire continent. Most cross-national studies look at one platform (e.g., Iyengar et al 2010) or at news consumption in general (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2009) and those rare studies that investigate multiple platforms usually do so in only a few countries (e.g., Curran et al 2009). This is also one of the few comparative political communication studies that includes an analysis of radio, which is still an important news medium in much of the world.[12]

This dissertation also expands the geography covered by political communication. There are very few researchers working on issues related to media in Latin America, even fewer in English, the *lingua franca* of Western scholarship. "The wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel" (Sartori 1970, 1035). Testing ideas developed largely in the United States and Europe on Latin America is one way to see if existing theories extend to other regions or not.

Finally, examining the connection between media and behavior in the comparative context represents an attempt at reconciling disparate literatures on comparative behavior and comparative political communications. Charles Berger, a former president of the International Communication Association (ICA), commented in an interview that, for much of its existence, ICA had been international in name only (Mehen 2012, 1494). Similarly, Gurevitch and Blumer called for the internationalization

[12] To give a few examples, despite 43 million Twitter followers (as of June 2018) and his own YouTube channel, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi thinks radio essential to his political success (Economic Times 2014) and gives a monthly radio address (Adhikary 2015a) broadcast simultaneously on all 413 stations of All India Radio (BBC 2015), reaching 99.19% of the country's 1.3 billion people (NDTV.com 2015). In earthquake-stricken Nepal, the local government prioritized supplying electricity to community radio stations after earthquakes, as radio was the sole reliable news source in areas hardest hit (Adhikary 2015b).

of political communication in a series of books and articles over the past 40 years (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, Gurevitch and Blumler 1990, Gurevitch 2004). Yet a staggering amount of "comparative" political communication research is limited to Europe, often to one-country studies (Esser and Pfetsch 2004, Thussu 2009, Hallin and Mancini 2004). There are, of course, exceptions (e.g., Voltmer 2006, Hallin and Mancini 2012) and the field of comparative political communication is expanding, but cross-national research in the developing world is still lacking.

Political communication also remains largely detached from studies of comparative political behavior and even more so from studies of comparative institutions. This may be an artifact of any one or many of several factors: comparative political science has not traditionally included much about media; cross-national research requires language skills not all scholars have; data on media content is sparse outside of industrial democracies; methods in political communication have often focused on the content of individuals' media consumption, which is resource-intensive to track; and variation in news consumption by country undoubtedly explains less variation in behavior than structural, economic or cultural differences between countries. But, as the world continues to globalize and the digital divide between the Global North and Global South closes, those previous impediments become more important to overcome, if scholars truly want to understand the role of media in developing countries.

Outline for the dissertation

In the next chapter, I present my general theory. I argue that consumers use reputation—which the public observes but about which it is not fully informed—as a

means to guide them toward media that either reinforces or challenges the status quo. A medium's path-dependent reputation, earned over time, is sticky.[13] Because some segments of the media are more dependent than others on government for their well-being, this limits their ability to criticize the government. By extension, their readers, viewers or listeners are exposed to less change-oriented political information and, I argue, are therefore less likely to engage in change-oriented political activities.

The third, fourth, and fifth chapters test this theory empirically. In Chapter Three, I detail the process by which I categorized media across the region. I describe all steps in this process and discuss the categorization of Mexican media in depth as an example. I then use data from the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) to examine how media consumption impacts petitioning, boycotting, demonstrating and striking. Results show that the importance of news consumption is not the same for considering political action as for actually engaging in it.[14] Consumption of news from the Internet has a bigger impact on all forms of engagement than consuming news via television, newspaper or radio. However, there are no uniform effects across countries or across time.

In Chapter Four, I use data from three waves of the AmericasBarometer to expand the analysis to more of Latin America and focus on one activity: protest. I examine where news consumption is associated with having protested. I find little relationship overall between the reputation of most media and consumers' protesting, except in consumption of radio. Radio does register a relationship with protest, as it is

[13] "Institutions are conservative with respect to change" (Taggart 2011). They are "sticky," to use Fukuyama's (2011) term: i.e., risk-averse, change-resistant.
[14] In other words, the decision between saying one would "never" do something and "might" do so is substantively different than the transition from "might" consider doing something to actually doing it.

positively and significantly associated with protesting in one-third of the countries in the region. That said, looking at up to three points in time for some countries, only in one country for one media platform is the impact of any media duplicated between survey waves. That inconsistency over time limits the inferences I can draw for most countries, as a significant finding at one point in time should carry no more weight than an insignificant finding for the same medium in the same country at another point in time.

In Chapter Five, I present an extreme test of the theory. Most scholarship on political communication has been developed in the United States and Europe. I exploit an opportunity to field a new survey in a country unlike those areas: Bolivia. Using original data collected for this dissertation, I investigate whether media choice and vote choice might be linked in the hemisphere's least developed Iberian nation. For the 2014 presidential election and surprisingly for a country with a strong history of community radio, news consumption, even when disaggregated by platform, mattered little for vote choice. Given the paucity of research on media and politics in the world's poorest countries, even a non-finding here adds to the body of knowledge about media and politics in the Global South.

The sixth chapter concludes by examining the substantive implications from my three quantitative analyses.[15] Overall, I find further support, in line with existing literature, that there is something special about consuming news on the Internet for participation. This supports my expectation that media that developed absent or contrary to government influence are associated with increased political behavior

[15] There are also two appendices: the first details how each media platform in each country was coded; and the second is justification for modeling decisions in Chapter Five.

among the consumers of that media. I also find, across the board largely, that television news consumption does not matter for participation in Latin America. I show that different media in the same country are associated with different forms of political engagement; and that the same media platform in different countries can have different effects. Such nuance is currently missing from research looking at media, especially in the developing world, where merely overlaying theories and assumptions from industrialized democracies has been shown insufficient (de Albuquerque 2005).

The next chapter draws heavily from economics and sociology. I present a new mechanism to link the institution of media with news consumption and political behavior.

Chapter 2: THEORY

Political communication scholars have long been interested in why people seek out the media content they do. Media choice, though, is a complex decision influenced by a multitude of factors. We know that partisanship, for example, guides some decisions (Iyengar and Kahn 2009), while available options in the media diet and technological development guide others (Basil 1990).[16] We know that one medium rarely fully replaces another and that different mechanisms may be at work when decisions comparing different media platforms are made (Gaskins and Jerit 2012). Social scientists further know that such differences in media exposure and attentiveness affect a citizen's successive choices (Eveland, Hutchens and Shen 2009; Iyengar et al 1984; McCombs and Shaw 1972) and political knowledge (Aarts and Semetko 2003; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). New insight into what guides media selection, then, should be of interest to scholars of both political communication and political behavior.

This chapter introduces the theory in my dissertation. I draw from existing literature, which is largely based on television and newspapers in industrialized democracies, to showcase expectations and tie those back to institutional development. I then posit that different historical trajectories might yield different expectations. I contend that media reputation, earned over time, acts as a signal about how close a

[16] The term "media diet" describes how people address media: Our available choices determine our outcomes. In the late 1970s, an overwhelming majority of Americans watched the evening news on the three broadcast networks, but the introduction of cable television in the 1980s saw those numbers quickly decline (Webster 2006, Prior 2007). If given the choice between news and entertainment, most people choose entertainment (Prior 2007). The same is true with news. To use an example widely understandable, captive audiences in airports used to have to watch CNN (Davis 2017). Given the choice, the persons who made up those airport audiences may have all preferred other things. But their available media diet was limited to CNN. In many gyms, there are a variety of televisions showing a mix of news, sports, music and ads; and gym-goers can plug in their headphones to hear whatever channel they want, among those available choices.

media entity is to government,[17] thereby guiding consumers interested in news outside the mainstream toward media that promote ideas outside the status quo. Consumer decisions are manifested not just in media choice but also in increased participation in change-oriented political behaviors.

The struggle for power

To understand politics, we have to understand contention. All politics is, after all, a discussion about or struggle for recognition, rights, or some voice in decision-making (Machiavelli 1950, Marx 1973, Laswell 1936, Klandermans 1997). What represents contention and how citizens resolve contention have varied across space and time, but at the heart of political struggles is a disagreement between the status quo and those who benefit from it and those attempting to disrupt the status quo that does not benefit or sometimes even hurts them.[18]

In the modern age, the most common means of resolving contention is voting.[19] But it is by no means the only way. Social scientists have been looking at non-voting behavior such as contacting a representative or volunteering on a political campaign in comparative contexts for over forty years (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). After the civil rights revolution in the United States 1960s, the range of what was considered political engagement was amended to include unconventional or protest participation as well (Barnes, Kasse et al 1979). Voting may be an expression of a desire for change, and participation beyond voting is even more likely to be, as it is almost inherently change-

[17] I use the term "government" to signal the political class or elite, not any particular administration.
[18] "In every republic there are two parties, that of the nobles and that of the people; and all the laws that are favorable to liberty result from the opposition of these parties to each other" (Machiavelli 1950, 119)
[19] There are few countries in the world that do not hold at least some local elections (Lynch 2013, Tovrov 2011).

motivated (van Stekelenburg 2015).[20] For scholars of contentious politics, why people protest – a form of political performance – has been of particular interest (See van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013 for review).

People tend to act within an accepted repertoire of political behaviors (Tilly 1983). The available diet of political repertoires may vary by time or location; and there may be debate about whether aggregate engagement (which may take many forms) is increasing or decreasing (Putnam 2000, Dalton 2008, Dalton 2017); but there is some regularity in how citizens speak to their governments.

Most political participation requires more than one person and, therefore, require information, coordination and mobilization. People require sometimes only contact to participate in low-cost and/or low-risk activities, but much more information and nudging to participate in higher threshold activities (McAdam 1984 and Briet, Klandermans and Kroon 1987, both cited in Klandermans 1986, McAdam 1986). Simple issues, like where and when to assemble, are critical to any public political event (Valenzuela 2013, 925), and modern communications allow for more expedient negotiations among participants about what form any public protests should take (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Encouragement from acquaintances and via social networks has repeatedly been shown to be an important motivating factor in participation (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998, McClurg 2003, Opp and Gern 1993).

Not all information about politics is passed interpersonally. The news media is an important conduit of information as well, since most people will never interact with

[20] People of course express commitment to the status quo at times, but presumably only when the issue has become a topic of contention or matter on the public agenda (Schulz 2017).

their representatives or political campaigns directly (Lippmann 1922).[21] When given the choice, people tend to consume a media diet that aligns with pre-existing beliefs (Chaffee and Miyo 1983, Gaskins and Jerit 2012, Stroud 2008, Stroud 2010, Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009).[22] That choice is guided by what they know about the options in their available media diet.

Given the dual realities that information is important to spur any action and that people gravitate toward information they want to hear, access to information that challenges the status quo should, therefore, increase political participation in change-oriented events.[23] But exposure to such information will not depend on personal factors, but rather on the available media diet from which consumers choose. Consumers know what aligns with their existing beliefs, in part, because of the reputations of various media earned over time.[24]

---

[21] News media is not one thing. For the purposes of this dissertation, I limit discussion to news media that transmits political news, the type of media that would help someone learn about the goings-on of her country. Such news may follow a broadcast or niche business model and could, theoretically, be soft news. But I exempt non-political news, for example about sports, celebrities, health, etc. Variation in news is considered at the level of news media platform: newspapers, radio, television and Internet.

[22] That said, the available media diet may not be – likely is not – equal across space and time. News consumers must choose from available options before them. In some countries, that will be a partisan press, in others a publicly-funded television station with public service responsibilities, in others a market-oriented system in which news organizations struggle to stay alive. Most likely, media environments will be hybrid mixes. There is no guarantee that a citizen's preferred option will even exist in a given locale. For example, a progressive or liberal in the United States will be hard-pressed to find many talk radio options that mirror her political stances available to her without paying for satellite radio (Weinger 2013).

[23] This assumes the presence of an alternative press as well as consumers opting to partake of it.

[24] Once satisfied with an outlet, consumers may, of course, cease to search out further alternatives. That could mean that there exists new media one is not consuming that would better suit her preferences.

Media is an institution

> "Political science has never extended to the news media the lovingly detailed attention it has lavished on legislatures, parties, presidents, and prime ministers. Journalism is a constituent of political life that political science for the most part has neglected" (Schudson 2002, 249).

"Institutions are the rules of the game in a society… that shape human interaction" (North 1990, 3). Institutions[25] provide the context within which political decisions are made, effectively limiting what citizens consider possible and leading them to behave in predictably different ways in different institutional settings (Jackman 1987). Institutional variation has been correlated with systematic variation in turnout (Powell 1986), satisfaction or belief in democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997), and personal happiness or contentment (Frey and Stutzer 2000).[26]

Given that definition, media *is* an institution, despite the relatively small role it plays in political science. The media "has its own degree of autonomy, its own institutional values, which differ from the agendas of politicians" (Kaplan 2006, 176) and exhibits longevity. It has power[27] (van Dijk 1995).[28] It therefore fits the definition of an institution, despite not being codified[29] or bound by the same rules everywhere. The

---

[25] When codified institutions are considered formal. When accepted as normal but not written down, they are regarded as informal institutions. See Helme and Levitsky (2004) for an overview of informal institutions in political science.

[26] For examples of some of the institutions for which history has been shown to impact modern output, see Bates et al (1998). For examples in political economy, see the *Varieties of Capitalism* literature that grew out of Hall and Soskice (2001).

[27] Van Dijk defines "power" as: "Thus, social power here will be summarily defined as a social relation between groups or institutions, involving the control by a (more) powerful group or institution (and its 0members) of the actions and the minds of (the members) a less powerful group. Such power generally presupposes privileged access to socially valued resources, such as force, wealth, income, knowledge, or status" (1995, 10). Van Dijk (1989) separately notes though that there are many disagreements about the definition of power in various literatures.

[28] "For an analysis of the power of the media … in relation to other elite institutions, see Altheide (1985), Altschull (1984), Bagdikian (1983), Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter (1990), Paletz and Entman (1981), among many other studies" (van Dijk 1995, 30).

[29] To give another example, a recent political science textbook referred to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's fireside chats as an example of an "informal institution" in American politics (Kernell, Jacobson, Kousser & Vavreck 2016).

nickname given to the media across many countries – as the fourth estate[30] or fourth branch of government – provides further anecdotal evidence for media's being considered as an institution. Variation in the role news plays an institution may, therefore, be manifested in citizen behavior in a comparative context. Any such variation would depend on institutional development, addressed in the next section.

Institutions & reputation

Because contention is ultimately about challenges to the status quo, it is important to consider how the status quo came to be. Some scholars in political communication have already done this (Cook 1998, Schudson 1998, Sparrow 1999), though only for the United States and focusing on contemporary media. But, given the aforementioned definitions, since institutions condition or constrain the lives of the citizens living under them, different media configurations could beget markedly different patterns in behavior over long periods of time.

For this reason, comparative political science takes a much longer view of institutions, having come to the consensus in the literature that the current shape of any institution is the result of its development over time. Put another way, outcomes in the present are conditioned by previous decisions made, that is, the path that an institution

[30] "The term 'fourth estate' has been used to refer to the press since at least the early 1800s. The idea of the fourth estate has a long history, parallel with that of the democratization of political processes, with its origins in the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The origin of the term is attributed to the eighteenth-century English political philosopher and commentator on the Revolution, Edmund Burke, referring to the three sections of the French Estates-General, an assembly consisting of representatives from the clergy, the nobility, and the commoners (in practice, the bourgeoisie), whose gathering in 1789 is said to have paved the way for the French Revolution. [The term] has become shorthand to denote the role of the public media as a pillar on which the smooth functioning of a democratic society rests, together with the other three estates – legislative, executive, and judiciary. A free press is also a counterbalance to these powers, a watchdog guarding the public interest, and providing a forum for public debate – a public sphere – that underpins the processes of democracy" (Thussu 2008).

took to result in its current form (Levi 1997, Pierson 2000, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). An institutionalist approach acknowledges that local adaptation is almost inevitable, thus potentially leading seemingly initially similar institutions on divergent paths (March and Olson 2011).[31]

For news, this means that we cannot only look at the modern news as it is but must consider its evolution within any place and relative to other institutions. With regard to media, "an institutional approach suggests that the news media's political role may differ across media systems" (Allern and Blach-Ørsten 2011, 92).

In economics, reputation is the summation of any firm's past actions (Kreps and Wilson 1980, Rosenthal and Landau 1979, Fombrun 2012). The economic definition of the term comes quite close to the common usage (Noe 2012, 130).[32] To employ the most widely used definition, a reputation is an estimation of a thing (Mahon 2002) or signaling device imperfectly informed by the past used to estimate likely future behavior (Foreman, Whetten and Mackey 2012; Noe 2012).[33]

The formation of reputation plays out much like a repeated game in which an agent with limited information comes to understand another entity to *be* something (Cabral 2005, 3 emphasis in original). Whereas trust or legitimacy are reciprocal and

[31] "Once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow" (Levi 1997, 28).
[32] Focusing on institutions, reputation is the "public's cumulative judgements of firms over time" (Rindova et al 2005, 1036) or "a global impression which represents how a collective … perceive a firm" (Rindova et al 2005, 1033). Reputation is a screening strategy audiences employ (Weiglet and Camerer 1988) informed by an organization's "performance, actions, demographics, affiliations, and industry" (Lange, Lee and Dai 2011, 177).
[33] See Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006) for overview of the definitions of "reputation" in economic literature.

better informed (because the parties in any transaction have access to information about said transaction), reputation is observed from afar and Bayesian (Cabral 2005).[34] Central banks, parliaments, tribal councils or any other institutions[35] develop a reputation from past behavior that observers use as an indication of likely future behavior and as a screen or signal about trustworthiness or other traits.

Lange, Lee and Dai write that a positive reputation allows firms to charge higher prices, to get better applicants or workers, and even to improve their return on investment (ROI) (2011, 169). They further contend that "a good reputation may also lead perceivers to give organizations the benefit of the doubt when new negative information comes to light" (2011, 169). A positive reputation, therefore, has intrinsic value to a firm and, once earned, is resistant to change. Put in terms often used for institutions, reputation is sticky. Critical to reputation is this distinction: participants in any transaction work on building trust or legitimacy with each other; but observers, who do not observe the details of the transaction, must rely on reputation.

Media, government and the status quo

One critical factor in any media entity's reputation is its relationship with government. Two factors have been shown by scholars of political communication as generating a status quo bias among mainstream media:

---

[34] Cabral notes the distinction this way:
"• Trust. This is the situation 'when agents expect a particular agent to *do* something.' Typical models feature moral hazard. The essence of the mechanism is repetition and the possibility of 'punishing' off-the equilibrium actions.
"• Reputation: This is the situation 'when agents believe a particular agent to *be* something.' Typical models feature adverse selection. The essence of the mechanism is Bayesian updating and possibly signaling as well" (2005, 3, emphasis in original)
[35] International relations scholars have debated the utility of reputation in geopolitics, but many definitions are similar in focusing on a country's past diplomatic actions (Guisinger and Smith 2002).

1. Proximity to power means that elite stances are most likely to make news (Bennett); and
2. Objectivity is a defensive mechanism employed by journalists for self-protection (Tuchman 1972, 1978), but "effectively functioned as a subterfuge for advocacy for status quo policies and ideologies" (Waisbord 2009, 373)

To unpack these ideas, first, in general, journalists follow events (Sigal 1973). Put another way, elite ideas flow through the media to the people (Zaller 1992). The theories of indexing[36] (Bennett 1990), cascading activation[37] (Entman 2004) and the Politics-Media-Politics[38] model (Wolfsfeld 2004) all state that journalists' presentation of events grows out of official positions. In other words, "the news media mostly focus on what elites are saying and doing and they record it. If neither the government nor the opposition is talking about an issue, even an important issue, the news media will likewise, simply ignore it" (Wolfsfeld 2011, 10). Simply put, for much general news media, a head of state has a good chance of making news if she wants, but a person on the street clamoring for attention, even about an important topic[39], has much less chance.

---

[36] "Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to 'index' the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic ... 'other' (i.e., non-official) voices filling out the potential universe of news sources are included in news stories and editorials when those voices express opinions already emerging in official circles" (Bennett 1990, 106).

[37] Cascading activation holds that, while elites will dominate how news starts, media interpretations (frames) may impact how elites at different levels address a story as it evolves.

[38] The PMP model gives journalists a more active role in the evolution of the political process: "The role of the media in political processes can best be understood as a cycle in which variations in the political environment lead to variations in media conduct that, in turn, lead to further variations in the political environment" (Wolfsfeld 2013, 1)

[39] To employ two recent examples, Syria's civil war started in March 2011 ("Syrian civil war timeline" 2016), but the war has been largely out of the news except in cases of photos sparking human interest stories, specifically of one boy drowned on a beach (Bloch 2015) and another boy covered in dust following a bombing (Narayan 2016). The emotional impact of these images, the rarity of conversations about children in war, and the audiences' ability to relate as parents to children in danger combined rendered the stories newsworthy. But the issue then disappeared from news coverage in the United States and other places where the topic was not on the elite or public agenda.

This unintentional favoritism of elites becomes especially true in cases in which markets are deregulated or in which oligopolies control media. "The higher the degree of concentration the more the power in the market is shifted from the consumer to the producer" (McChesney 2003, 131). The positive externalities of mass media (Baker 2002) are one reason why ownership patterns have been of such concern to social scientists (e.g., Gilens and Hertzman 2000) – if elite voices are privileged, then elites in power have incentive to squash stories about themselves or which they deem negative to them or their interests.[40] And competition tends to foster better journalism (Coulson and Lacy 1996). But news organizations close to or dependent on government may downplay evidence that contradicts a government's narrative (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston 2006). The combination of privileging elite narratives and potentially downplaying discordant information about the government leads to a dominant or mainstream narrative that privileges the status quo (Waisbord 2000, Nichols and McChesney 2013).

Journalists may also unwittingly promote status quo values over change for other reasons. Journalists may support the status quo to promote stability in less consolidated democracies (El-Issawi 2016, 23). Everywhere, journalists are in the business of information and therefore rely on sources. Giving up a source – aka burning a source in the case of confidential sources – is costly (Rosen 2005). It affects a reporter's reputation and her ability to do her job in the future.[41] Since reporters cannot do their

[40] See Schwartz (2017) for a recent example of Murdoch-owned entities allegedly engaging in such framing manipulation.
[41] Contrary to popular belief, in many places, there is no legal protection for sources. In the United States, this has been the case since Branzburg v. Hayes was heard by the Supreme Courtin 1972. Journalists can be compelled to reveal sources if the government can "'convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.' In other words, it's a balance, and the government needs to have a good reason to force journalists to cough up their notes or

jobs without information, which comes from sources, reporters necessarily must protect those relationships, which means not publishing anything that might endanger sources or their willingness to keep talking with reporters.

This reality that journalists are human beings in need of a paycheck buttresses elite bias to induce mainstream media to favor the status quo. Tuchman (1972) referred to the idea of news objectivity as a "strategic ritual." Reporters working and advancing as journalists come to know what their editors and colleagues will consider "newsworthy." They also know they can get sued. So, reporters employ quotation marks as protections of their own objectivity and generally present at least two sides to an issue. This is not objectivity[42] though, as Tuchman details. Rather, it is self-protection[43] that keeps out many voices on the extreme.[44] It may even, as in the case of climate

---

sources. Because case law has not been particularly strong, many states have passed shield laws to provide further protections for journalists" ("Shield Law 101: Frequently Asked Questions"). A famous relatively recent case involved *New York Times* reporter Judith Miller, who was jailed for contempt of court for almost three months for refusing to release her source (Liptak 2005, Schmidt and VandeHei 2005). See Peters (2016) for more detail on the US situation. See Ponsford and Turvill (2015) and Ling (2015) for information about the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively, neither of which protects journalists' privilege.

[42] Tuchman does not condemn objectivity, per se, but rather points out that journalistic professionalism and industry norms are not the same as objectivity in the way the mass public might understand it. "Communications research has… thoroughly demolished the idea that news is or can be 'value free.' The canons of bland, 'objective' reporting are perfectly consistent with the selection of quotes and facts, the framing of interpretations, and the attribution of importance (through repeated front page headlines, for example), all so as to support or oppose a particular policy position … Curiously, however, many communications researchers tend to resist the possibility that the values conveyed in news stories might tend systematically to reflect the policy preferences of media organizations themselves. Scholars seem particularly skeptical of the idea that multiple news stories, written at different times by different (presumably independent) reporters, and based on different sources, could share a common political thrust, or that the 'wall of separation' between news and editorial departments could somehow be breached so that news stories would tend to mirror editorial views" (Page 1996, 21).

[43] There are also physical security issues that endanger many journalists. In the Americas, for example, "Corruption, impunity, cyber-surveillance and government violence – violations of freedom of information take many different forms in this vast region. Mexican, Honduran, Colomb-ian and Brazilian journalists sometimes pay with their lives for investigating drug trafficking or corruption. Cuban and Venezuelan journalists are under constant pressure from governments that use all possible means to censor independent media outlets. Journalists in the United States cannot freely cover stories linked to surveillance or espionage" (Reporters Without Borders 2017).

[44] Reliance on advertising-based business models led newspapers and network television to cater to mainstream or media consumers, under the guise of objectivity (Schudson and Tifft 2005).

change, a topic on which 97% of scientists agree exists, create a false dichotomy that distorts public discussion (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007).

Geography and deadlines also play roles in making a status quo narrative dominant. Reporters have to go where the news is; so many tend to cluster around police stations, campaigns, government offices, and other locales where they are likely to hear about news, known as beats (Tuchman 1978). Issue specialization – like a science "beat" – happens, but it does not generate the bulk of news reporting. This means that journalists' routines create an implicit bias against topics that are off of their normal radars (Cook 1998, 89).

In short, there is political, economic and sociological research that supports the idea that mass media will tend to support status quo ideas, albeit sometimes unintentionally. This is commonly referred to in the literature as status quo bias (Altheide 1984, Breed 1955, Reese and Ballinger 2001). A common example of status quo bias is whether news organizations frame protests as free speech or as disruptive. Similarly, framing hate speech as dangerous is quite different than framing it as a free speech. The tendency to treat protests as rare and/or disruptive and hate speech as dangerous is one manifestation of status quo bias in media.

It is important to point out that status quo bias does not equate to alignment with any particular administration, but rather with life continuing to function normally without disruption. As shown by the figures in the previous chapter and as will be detailed in the next chapter and in Appendix A, administrations on the left and right often employ the same types of pressures – carrots and sticks – with the media. Such economic pressures and the professionalization of journalism (Tuchman 1972, 1978), as well as long-established journalistic norms (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007) that would

seemingly be the product of path dependence, work together to limit the space within which most media operate. I use status quo bias in that sense in this dissertation.

The aforementioned research is based overwhelmingly on newspapers and television, two industries (in Western industrialized democracies) subject to government regulation, with high visibility, and with higher barriers to entry and overhead costs. News media entities experiencing different realities, such as being less reliant on elite sources or less subject to elite critiques, should have different relationships with government and, therefore, different reputations for their willingness to criticize the status quo.[45] Put another way, news media that did not co-evolve with government under similar circumstances might have earned very different reputations over time.

The links between media consumption and behavior

Existing scholarly literature is mixed about which media impact behavior, as well as why and how they do: Early political communication found no effects from media consumption, the "minimal effects" model (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954); but scholarship in the 1980 and 1990s found important, though, indirect effects. Namely, media tell people what to think about and shape how people think about politics (Erbring, Goldenberg Miller 1980; McLeod and McDonald 1985; Iyengar 1994; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982).

[45] The journal *Media History* dedicated a special issue (2001, volume 7:2) to case studies of alternative media, including the Black Panther newsletter and photojournalism that pushed boundaries.

Bakker and de Vreese (2011) find that Internet news consumption stimulates political engagement more than traditional media consumption (newspapers and television), but that all have some positive association with active or passive online or offline engagement. Other scholars find that Internet news consumption spurs discussion (Shah et al 2005)[46] or increases the likelihood of caring about the news (Salzman 2011[47]), which only then spurs engagement. In the past decade, the consensus in political communication literature is that news consumption via Internet stimulates political engagement[48], but the "why" and "how" remain much less clear. (See Gibson and Cantijoch 2013 for review.)

Norris & Inglehart (2009) provide the most detailed analysis of the relationship between mass media consumption and political participation – finding support for a positive atomized association between the two (meaning that overall, worldwide, at the individual level, there is a generally positive relationship between increased news consumption and increased participation – but point out that large-*n* analyses generally fail to account sufficiently for institutional variation when considering the correlations between freedom of the press and economic growth and freedom of the press and democratic attitudes (2009, 240). They also note the importance of testing whether or not there is a positive association between media consumption and various types of political and civic engagement in countries that are not industrialized democracies (2009, 243).[49]

---

[46] They employ an auto-regressive model allowing for greater inference about causality.
[47] Salzman (2011) uses political knowledge and news consumption to predict political interest, contrary to the abundance of literature that considers political interest to be a prerequisite for news consumption (Prior 2005, Strömbäck and Shehata 2010, Van Deth and Elff 2004).
[48] See Boulianne (2009) for meta-analysis showing this
[49] Norris and Inglehart call for expanding the territory over which media effects are tested, in part, because they find a greater association between news consumption and various types of engagement in

Increased news consumption across different media platforms, with the exception of consuming television news, is generally expected to increase civic and political participation, at least in industrialized democracies. Exposure both to more news and to more clearly political news content increases knowledge and propensity to participate, but especially among those already likely to vote (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006, Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster 2010). Some social scientists have also observed differences in participation by media platform but suggest such differences might be the result of an unobserved variable, such as content (Newton 1999, Molyneux 2017).

From an institutional perspective, these findings all assume the presence of a generally free press[50] and comparability of content or presentation across platforms. But there is no guarantee that the same media platforms in different countries are functionally equivalent. Distinguishing merely between the majoritarian and consensus models of democracy (Lipjhart 1999) would likely mask heterogeneity, as would distinguishing democracies from non-democracies (Przeworski et al 2000), as they are blunt, black-and-white distinctions. In just the examples in the articles cited so far in this chapter, there is a mix of presidential republics, parliamentary republics, constitutional monarchies, and a military junta. The countries also show variation in human development, from medium to very high (UNDP), and in the amount of freedoms enjoyed (Freedom House)[51]. In all the countries, there is at least some private

---

cosmopolitan (developed) countries than they do in parochial (traditional or still developing) countries (2009, 252); but their analyses do not account for government-level variation beyond dichotomous cosmopolitan/parochial coding (2009, 158).

[50] According to Freedom House, the US, Canada, and most of Western industrialized Europe qualify as "free" press, with only Italy scoring as "partly free" (Freedom House 2017).

[51] Denmark scores 98 out of a possible 100 on aggregate freedoms, whilst Vietnam scores 20.

media, but the countries range in ease of doing business from 3 to 187 out of 190 (World Bank).[52] A theory not reliant on freedom of the press or a modal institutional arrangement should be more applicable widely. A theory that could be used to interrogate the relationship between media and behavior at different levels of analysis – platforms, outlets, groupings – would be more useful.

How to disaggregate media

As stated previously, the news media is not a monolith. Scholars have noted a variety of differences: Publicly-funded news vs free-market businesses; so-called hard news vs soft news[53]; broadcasting vs narrowcasting[54] or niche marketing; and recently one-way news vs personalized or algorithmic ordering of headlines.[55] Different media also specialize in different types of news, with magazines, for example, forgoing breaking stories in favor of longer-form analysis. In multilingual, rural or tribal areas, radio stations broadcast translations of urban newspapers into indigenous or otherwise lesser-used languages, thereby expanding the reach of information to populations not initially served by that newspaper. Though the "elite press" that focuses on politics has been of most interest to scholars of political communication (Pool, Laswell & Lerner

[52] Venezuela is near the bottom of the ease of doing business list at 187 out of 189 (World Bank).
[53] Baum defines soft news as "as a set of story characteristics, including the absence of a public policy component, sensationalized presentation, human-interest themes, and emphasis on dramatic subject matter, such as crime and disaster" (2002, 92).
[54] Broadcasting is directed toward the masses, exemplified by 1960s network news; but narrowcasting involves targeting communiques to specific groups, for example talk radio or cable news in the United States (Lilleker 2006, 46-48).
[55] Google News Help section, for example, states the distinction between its "Editors' Picks" section, which has one order to it, and its "Suggested for you" section, based all past web activity, including that not related to news. https://support.google.com/news/answer/40213?hl=en (August 24, 2017). Forty-four percent of Americans used Facebook for some kind of news in 2015 (Matsa and Lu 2016). Facebook orders items based on a proprietary and regularly-altered algorithm that it does not share with the public, only noting that it prioritizes based on what the user should find most interesting (Oremus 2016).

1955), evidence suggests that the means of reporting and expectations between media platforms continue to differ widely (Reich 2016).

From a comparative institutional perspective though, those differences may not be the items of interest. What would matter more is whether the role that mass media regularly plays is comparable across borders, a concept known as functional equivalence. "Functional equivalence stresses the relevance of relationships instead of intrinsic properties of concepts … Functional equivalence refers to the requirement that concepts should be related to other concepts in other settings in more or less the same way. It is based on the notion that comparability … is an attribute of elements' relationships" (van Deth 2009, 91-91). In other words, what is the relationship of a medium with the political class and polity?

The classic example used to explain functional equivalence[56] is the Ministry of the Interior, often charged with policing, national security, elections, immigration, and relations with states. The US Department of the Interior has a similar name but very different role (land management) and is not comparable to other Interior ministries. Similarly, the Home Ministry in one country may fulfill the traditional roles of the Interior Ministry, despite a different name or appearance. Depending on the size of the country, the roles may be broken into different ministries that cumulatively would be compared with the singular Interior Ministry in another country.

[56] Political communication has employed the same term – functional equivalence – extensively in looking at media substitution. By that definition, "functional equivalence predicts, 'as new media come along that better serve a particular function, the use of the previously dominant medium that served that function declines' (Neuman, 2010, p. 12). Adding to that description, 'functional equivalence of news media is defined as providing the same gratifications and gratification opportunities and as providing the same types of content' (van der Wurff, 2010, p. 140). Taken together, this theory means that a new technology that serves the same functions as an older technology, only better, will dominate" (McIntyre 2014, 9). I use the term in the comparative institutional way.

In a review article, Wirth and Kolb summarized the importance and difficulty related to functional equivalence well when they said that "neither equivalence nor its absence can ever be presumed" when comparing communications institutions (2004, 88). I opt not to necessarily compare television in one country versus television in another, but rather to trace the histories of different media entities and classify them as aligned with or more distanced from government, thereby allowing for greater heterogeneity than merely comparing platforms would do. For example, scholars have argued that broadsheet newspapers in the United States serve much the same function as public television news in Scandinavia, with which public television news in the United States is not comparable (e.g., Curran et al 2007).

Status quo = pro-government

Functional equivalence is how status quo bias enters into the discussion of media and its role in society. If reputation is a signal to consumers, harkening back to consumer goods, then reputation interacts with the product being offered to determine purchase intention (Yoon, Guffey and Kijewski 1993). But consumers are only one market. Any organization also has a reputation with its investors or other stakeholders as well. And "the firm's reputation in one market is linked to its reputation in the other" (Noe 2012, 131).[57] To draw the analogy to news, if media are repute for being close to politicians (one of their markets), that could affect the media's reputation with its consumers (another market).[58]

---

[57] To give one example, until the mid-1970s, French radio and television "were controlled by the state and thus both in fact and in the eyes of the public and other journalists were more a part of the political field than of the journalistic field" (Benson 1999, 470).

[58] Or vice versa. Media repute as celebrity or gossip news – for example TMZ – are less likely to be taken seriously outside of those circles and therefore, in the case of politics, less likely be granted press

If proximity to power leads to lower likelihood to criticize the status quo, then less proximity to power could correlate with greater likelihood of criticizing the status quo. Thinking of the relative audience for news media, there may be a segment of the public interested in information outside the status quo. In terms of reputation, consumers interested in narratives (or "frames")[59] that challenge mainstream interpretation of events[60] would then gravitate toward media reputed that is less close to or more likely to criticize government or its versions of events.[61]

To summarize, people engage politically for many reasons, one of which is news consumption. But news is not monolithic. There is no guarantee that media that look alike – aka newspapers – fulfill the same role across borders. Media outlets' willingness to criticize government – its level of status quo bias – is one indication of its closeness to government and is observed by consumers, regardless of locale. Citizens use reputation as one signal of news content. If they are displeased with the status quo, they are more likely to consume news critical of the status quo. A measure utilizing reputation as a criterion may allow for better cross-national analysis.

Merely hearing news outside the status quo is not itself of political interest. This topic should be of interest to comparative political science because that news

---

credentials for political event, even though such outlets, like TMZ, may operate bureaus focusing on the political class (Newton-Small 2009).

[59] Framing is how news is contextualized (Entman 1991). "The way in which events are covered and presented to each audience can lead to a dominant perception emerging" (Lilleker 2006, 82).

[60] Gainous, Wagner and Abbott (2015) suggest that it is the greater availability of dissonant information on the Internet that begets the association they find between more frequent use of the Internet and negative attitudes, civil disobedience, and unconventional participation in East Asia. Gainous, Wagner and Gray (2016) found that social media use had a negative influence on citizen attitudes because ICT increases exposure to dissonant information.

[61] After all, few news consumers are aware of the actual ownership of various news outlets. But consumers are aware of the reputations those media entities earn. For an example of an analyst trying to connect media ownership to content output for a mass audience, see "Sinclair Broadcast Group."

consumption then impacts their propensity to participate politically. Citizens, understanding that a given media entity is reputed to produce content critical of the government or status quo, select platforms that conform to their own beliefs about changes necessary to the economic and political status quo. Individuals who prefer dominant media should be less likely to engage in anti-governmental activity of any kind, as their preferred content will reinforce the status quo (Herman and Chomsky 2002) or focus on less political news (Prior 2003). In hearing news outside of the status quo or mainstream, news consumers are relatively more likely to engage in change-oriented political behavior than consumers of news that reinforces the status quo.

Two hypotheses about the behavior of news consumers then emerge:

H1: People consuming media less aligned with the status quo will be more likely to engage in behaviors challenging the status quo
H2: People consuming media aligned with the status quo will be less likely to engage in behaviors challenging the status quo

Methodological notes

Bridging the existing divide between comparative politics and political communication requires looking outside the subset of countries largely addressed by comparative media scholarship. Political behavior scholars conducting research on post-Communist, Latin American and Pan-Asian areas have shown that assumptions and/or findings from industrialized democracies do not nearly overlay in other places.[62] Scholars have also found that issues highly salient in one locale may not be at all in a culturally-similar but nonetheless distinct area (e.g., Posner 2004). The greater the

[62] To give two examples: Compulsory voting, as is mandated in Australia and most of Latin America immediately changes the standard calculus of voting (Power and Roberts 2007); and where communal values override individual values, commonly used phrases such as "public opinion" take on different meaning (Cho 2000).

breadth of political engagement studied, the richer the picture becomes, but the more care that is needed at the outset to avoid problems of over-reaching (Mahoney 2000). Western, educated, industrialized, rich democracies (WEIRD) are not representative of most of the world's population, after all; and expectations about human behavior drawn from WEIRD countries do not hold when tested elsewhere (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010).

Most of the aforementioned research depends on content analysis or experiments. As political communication moves into areas in which content analysis is more difficult or, in some places, not feasible, political communication needs a way to theoretically explain the relationships between consumption and behavior that scholars might observe. After all, a void of high-quality data like surveys offered in advanced industrialized democracies does not mean there are not questions of scholarly interest that need asking.

This dissertation focuses on one reason for media consumption that might be particularly important in some areas of the world and offers a methodological work-around for content analysis. I offer a rigorous alternative utilizing available data that can engage with the question of how media consumption has an impact on behavior now while scholars wait for better quantitative data to catch up.

The next chapter of the dissertation engages with the question empirically. I detail the operationalization of the classification scheme that I employ to translate media history and journalism studies into codable characteristics that can be included in statistical analyses of behavior.

Chapter 3: FIRST QUANTITATIVE TEST

As discussed in the previous chapter, existing literature about the sociology of news suggests that news production gives greater weight to sources and perspectives from the economically or politically powerful. Because these sources have benefited from the status quo, they are also unlikely to signal to the public about problems within the status quo.

Some outlets do challenge the status quo.[63] However, these diverse voices do not exist equally across all media platforms.[64] The historical and institutional development of the platforms create space for, or inhibit, the ability to challenge the status quo. Media platforms develop reputations about their willingness to counter government or economic interests. These reputations provide one means by which consumers select from the available media diet in any locale.

I posited in the previous chapter that civic engagement increases among those who consume news from outlets reputed to be more likely to carry content challenging the existing order. The crux of that argument lies in connecting media reputation for non-mainstream views to the behavioral outcomes of each media platform's consumers. In this chapter, I employ a mix of data to link reputation to behavioral outcomes via a two-step process:

---

[63] One common example of this is news framing of a protest as a free speech issue or a public safety issue (Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997). For both the 2009 European elections and the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests, framing was significantly different, depending on the media platform (Schuck et al 2013; DeLuca, Lawson and Sun 2012). Even within the same platform, in large enough countries, there may be variations in framing; Fox News and MSNBC in the United States are a common example of this (e.g., Feldman et al 2012).

[64] Depending on the media system, there may either be internal or external diversity of voice. Media sometimes cater to a smaller segment of the audience, resulting in greater external diversity of voice but relatively less internal diversity of voice on any one channel (Bae 2000).

First, I associate the individual media platforms in each country with a specific reputation. Because there currently exists no classification system for reputation that looks directly at the historical interplay between media and government, I construct a categorization scheme to quantify reputation, an abstract concept. To accomplish this, I borrow from the study of other institutions[65], to classify the institutions of news media based on their historical interactions with government. This process ultimately results in a three-category classification scheme: news platforms in each country are categorized as either close to government (status quo-enforcing), far from government influence (status quo-disrupting), or there was insufficient information to have an expectation in either direction.

Second, I evaluate whether consumption of news via different media platforms is differently associated with different forms of political participation, as theorized in the previous chapter. I conduct data analysis on cross-country data available from the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey. Specifically, I investigate the association between media consumption and signing petitions, boycotting, peacefully demonstrating and protesting.

Reputation as Proxy

Bromley defines reputation "as the way key external stakeholder groups or other interested parties actually conceptualize the organization" (2000, 241). With respect to media organizations, reputation is the general impression that the public has of the

[65] See Bernhard (1998) for an example of categorization and characterization of central banks. See Przeworski et al (2000) and Elkins (2000) for differing perspectives on how to categorize democracies - and non-democracies.

interaction between the government and any medium.[66] Whether a medium seems subservient to the government is one indication of the probability that the medium may provide non-state views in its news coverage. Observers with incomplete information about how news is made and want to choose news that conforms to their expectations may use this impression as one shortcut when making decisions about which media to consume.[67]

The classification scheme separates media platforms into three orientations based on their historic interactions with government. Media can have a close (status quo-enforcing) or distant (potentially status quo-disrupting) relationship with government. A third category with a null coding was assigned to platforms for which insufficient or contradictory information was available from secondary sources. This is ultimately a conservative test, but therein a reasonable first step in an endeavor to bridge quantitative political communication with comparative politics without the resource and language requirements inherent in content analysis.

[66] Comparing outlets within any medium is common in high-choice media markets, including many industrialized democracies. But, as Prior (2007) showed, differences between outlets (TV channels) on one platform (broadcast television) pale in comparison to differences between the platforms of broadcast TV and cable news. Similar differences in content have been shown between newspapers and television news (e.g., Curran et al 2007). As such, especially in the United States, though differences between media outlets may be visible and salient to contemporary political conversation and a common focus for scholarly comparison, from a more global perspective, a higher level of analysis allows for macro-level cross-national comparison.

[67] This is not to discount the possibility of different outlets within the same platform having different reputations in some situations, especially in larger countries. Media specialists especially know, for example, that, in the US, CBS broadcast news carries more hard news than ABC; and both carry more centrist news than cable television news (See Stelter 2012 or Jurkkowitz et al 2013 for examples). There is little to suggest that, overall, the population in general makes such fine-grained distinctions. Since most of the world's population is not as fragmented as the audience in industrialized democracies – Burundi, for example, has four broadcast television stations – the media market segmentation that results from the availability of hundreds of channels and consistently reliable and relatively cheap access to news via the Internet is not the modal reality internationally.

Quantifying Abstract Concepts in the Literature

Political scientists have been systematically classifying political systems, regimes and entities cross-culturally since at least Almond (1956). Different organizations and projects employ different means to quantify abstract notions. There are over 180 different institutions that produce classification schemes regularly employed by journalists and scholars (Bush 2017[68]).[69] No system is ideal. All systems for coding abstract ideas or latent information are subject to some human error or interpretation and, therefore, criticism, particularly when a country's ranking is lowered.[70] Even content analysis, used widely in the study of media, is limited by language and

[68] For a summary of the article, see the *Washington Post*'s Monkey Cage blog: http://wapo.st/2izypFb (November 20, 2017)

[69] To give a few examples of how scholars working comparatively define and categorize abstract concepts:

- In media, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans Frontières 2016) ranks the danger to journalists worldwide. Their data derives from an online questionnaire that is distributed to journalists, lawyers and sociologists in 20 languages. The organization combines their answers with event counts of violence against journalists amassed via open source media and sources in different countries to produce a rating of the safety of engaging in journalism in a country. Violence against journalists is also coded by staff for its severity, such that physical violence against a reporter is weighted more than destruction of property. Any country can be scored low, even without violent acts, if personal freedoms are themselves scored low.
- In the realm of politics, the World Governance Indicators ranks the reliability of institutions and respect for law. On their website, the World Bank defines governance as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them." The idea of "governance" is disaggregated into six component parts (Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption), with scores assigned to each component. Their data is derived from a mixture of mass survey results and expert opinions in an unobserved components methodology (Kaufmann, Krayy and Mastruzzi 2010, 15).

  In contrast, Transparency International (TI), with its focus solely on corruption, averages scores from reputable institutions (including the Economist Intelligence Unit and World Economic Forum). TI contends that its method is more transparent and replicable than methods that rely on data only available to the institution preparing the report (Transparency International 2017).
- Most well known in political science, arguably, is Freedom House (FH), which advocates for the expansion of human rights and promotes the importance of functioning democratic institutions that protect the rights of all. They currently categorize "freedom" through a two-step process[69]: analysts first score countries based on publicly available information; and draft scores are then reviewed by FH management and regional experts, yielding a consensus score the institution presents are broadly reliable (Freedom House 2017b). FH separates its ranking on press freedom from its report on overall freedom.

[70] See Doubek (2017) or Gerstenfeld (2016) for examples.

resources, especially as collecting the full content of even text sources is a resource-intensive endeavor (Monroe and Schrodt 2008).

With regard to reputation, though much has been done on government reputation in economics (e.g., Brewster 2009, Cole and Kohoe 1997), I have not located any general classification scheme for institutional reputation. Though publicly available options such as Freedom House, Polity, and Reporters without Borders touch on media, none of these classification systems look directly at the historical interplay between media and government, instead focusing exclusively on their contemporary interactions.

While that perspective makes the classifications dynamic and able to adapt to events, it also detaches them from history, rendering them unhelpful to gauge the relationships between media and government over longer periods. The detachment from history effectively amounts to treating different news media platforms as if they had developed along the same path, but that assumption is not valid.

Existing measures also looked at state-media relations holistically, not disaggregating consistently between different media that might reinforce or challenge the status quo. Such groupings effectively hide existing differences between platforms before any analysis could be conducted. Additionally, existing measures largely ignore radio news,[71] the most reliable media platform even today in some areas and under

[71] Both Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders include attacks on radio journalists and pressure on radio stations and owners in their reports on security and openness, but more attention is paid to television and newspapers. In scholarship, studies involving radio in political science are rare. Pasel et al noted: “Radio news has been at most a side note in many studies of political participation, possibly because television has usurped the better part of the informative role of talk and news radio (Chaffee & Frank, 1996)” (2006, 119). Green-Pedersen and Stubager (2010) were able to exploit a unique reality in Denmark that radio news is a better predictor of television news coverage than newspaper content is for their study of legislative responsiveness to issues, as was Thesen (2012), but that was anomalous for the state of radio research in the field.

some conditions.[72] For both of these reasons, existing analyses seemed too general to get at the research question here.

Additionally, existing measures showed little variation within the region. Only Venezuela is listed as "not free" among Latin American countries for which survey data about both behavior and media options exists, with most of the hemisphere is listed as "free" by Freedom House (2017a). Polity IV scores the entire Western hemisphere as democratic, except for Cuba (autocracy), Ecuador (open anoncracy), Haiti (failed state), Suriname (open anocracy), and Venezuela (open anocracy).[73] This may be an artifact of the construction of the measures, which largely focus on differences between functioning democracies, fragile states and autocracies. After all, in Freedom House rankings, only Africa and Asia show notable within-continent variation, with most variation being between industrialized democracies and the rest of the world.[74] It was, therefore, necessary to devise a new means to categorize the closeness of press to government that would show variation not merely akin to level of development or violence.

Conceptualizing reputation

My categorization scheme uses Hallin and Mancini's idea of political parallelism[75] as a jumping off point to evaluate media as disaggregated into its

---

[72] See Adhikary (2015) for an example of the importance of radio following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal.
[73] Belize and French Guinea not rated
[74] Visual illustration of this at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (February 5, 2018)
[75] There is no one definition of political parallelism, as its use in political communication has changed somewhat in recent years. Mancini (2008) described it this way:

> "Seymour-Ure (1974) was the first scholar to speak of a 'parallelism' between parties and newspapers. In his view this refers to three main features: the ownership of the mass media by political parties, the editorial choices of the news organizations, and the party affiliation of the readers. Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1995) further developed this concept, slightly changing it… [to] include any

component platforms. I do this because political parallelism is the most common means of gauging state-media closeness in existing political communication literature. It functions as a good entrée, then, to looking at status quo-reinforcing or status quo-disrupting media without deviating fully from existing scholarship.

I specifically focus on how recurrent patterns of political parallelism might be observed because institutions and industries tend to develop habitual working patterns, including in journalism (Tuchman 1972, 1978; Schudson 2000). The pattern of interactions between the state and journalists is, therefore, a reflection of the internalization of past actions. That which is normalized becomes that which is expected. So, reputation derived from the past would be the public's expectation of media-state relations for the future.

Drawing from existing literature, especially Waisbord (2000, 2003, 2015), there are both political and economic factors that foster status quo bias. I, therefore, deemed the following factors to be theoretically important to document the relationship between government and media entities within countries[76]:

1. Revolving door between media executives and government;
2. Oligarchic control of the media industry;

> organizational connections to political parties, the stability and intensity of editorial commitments and presence or absence of legal restraints on the rights of the media to back individual parties' (65). Even in the absence of organizational links, party parallelism in Blumler and Gurevitch's view may include also all those situations in which a news organization backs in a more or less stable condition a political party, either because of a historical tradition or because of contingent decisions."

In 2016, Mancini further clarified:

> "There are differences between party press parallelism and political parallelism. Political parallelism indicates the degree to which media outlets tend to support and/or are linked to different cultures, ideas, and organizations that play some role within the political arena. Party press parallelism indicates some sort of organizational links, providing a tool for the party to organize its activity and to mobilize members. As numbers of party members have declined, readerships for party newspapers have also declined, and many parties have sold their newspapers to private entrepreneurs.... Party press parallelism has shifted toward what we define today as political parallelism. This is reflected by the alignment of newspapers along the lines of different ideological, political, and cultural views."

[76] More details about the manifestation of these characteristics are discussed in "Coding Criteria" below.

3. Government control over those running specific media entities (not necessarily journalists);
4. Clientelism;
5. Restricting the provision of materials essential to the production process, such as newsprint for newspapers;
6. Governments' revoking licensing or enacting legislation to censor, beyond merely technically having the right to do so;
7. Media established or founded in direct opposition to existing political leadership or state media; and
8. An environment that encourages self-censorship.

These criteria are more nuanced than a general press freedom score from Freedom House or Reporters Without Borders or similar rating organization would yield.

The decision to code at the level of the media platform allowed for better cross-national comparisons than country-level measures, but did not get into the weeds of market battles or press competition within any country. In other words, coding at the level of platform kept countries comparable, given differences in population, geographic expanse and market power. Size, expanse and human development are all frequently employed in comparative politics to account for variation that might be masked cross-nationally (omitted variable bias). As an illustration, Brazil has 68 times the population of neighboring Uruguay and 47 times more land area; however, literacy and per capita income are higher in Uruguay. Given these notable differences, comparing within platforms — such as newspaper circulation numbers or television market penetration — would not necessarily illuminate patterns in political behavior, as they would not be size- or development-appropriate comparisons.

Coding at the level of media platform also kept the coding focused on the proximity to government rather than drawing the discussion away toward other factors that might have a temporary impact on news media.[77] Additionally, coding at the level of media platform allowed for more disaggregation than publicly available systems that code at the level of media system or country, like Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012) or Freedom House, which both discuss the general media situation in any country.

Collecting and Coding Data

The research process to derive a feasible, replicable classification scheme involved two parts: first identifying possible sources of information about the historical relationship between governments and media platforms, and then looking for patterns within their contents. The sample is therefore a relevance sample,[78] albeit an extensive one.

It is not possible to know the full population of all relevant secondary sources for any country or for the region overall. Over the course of two years, I collected over 100 secondary sources about media history and media relations for the region as well as for individual countries. Many of the books and articles were scholarly publications from a variety of disciplines outside of political science, including history, communication,

---

[77] For example, the widely-known disdain for media conglomerate Clarin held by spouses and successive Presidents Kirchner and Fernandez during their 2003-2015 terms in Argentina does not itself undo decades of mutually beneficial relations between multiple administrations and newspapers and television news more generally. Coding at the outlet level, though appropriate for an analysis of modern Argentine media only, would not be an accurate characterization overall of the state-media relationship in country, relative to any other. (See Laborda 2010 for details on the dispute between the Kirchner-Fernandez administrations and *Clarín*.)

[78] A relevance sample is a sample returned based on directed search results (Krippendorff 2004). A common example would be a Boolean search based on a word stem or a search on Twitter using a hashtag. What is returned should be relevant, but it might miss items, for example on Twitter misspelled or similar-but-different hashtags.

journalism studies and even economics. Journalists or subject matter experts also authored some of the pieces, for example on ownership patterns. Many sources about the region as a whole were books with chapters, some peer-reviewed and others invited, on individual countries. The biggest impediment to obtaining information was that books were out of print or otherwise unavailable in both the United States and Mexico. Nonetheless, I feel confident in the validity of the sample, given its multilingual character, the nearly two years invested in data collection, and the extent of the searches I conducted.

News sources were essential to finding out about state interventions in media. Therefore, I also searched many non-academic sources, such as *The Economist* or *Columbia Journalism Review,* for information about media-state relations. I relied on professional organizations, such as Reporters without Borders, to provide context for how consistent the current representation of journalism was with the history of journalism in the country.

I drew from sources in multiple languages. Whenever possible, I used original language sources, preferring not to rely on translations, given the risk of inaccuracies (Temple and Young 2004, van Deth 1998, Jowell et al 2007). Further, local sources offered more details in many cases and, as On The Media has noted, are geographically closest and most likely to understand the nuances of a situation.[79] I rejected some sources that, though more detailed about media in any given country, did not seem sufficiently unbiased to have confidence in the analysis.

[79] On the Media is the journalism blog for WNYC public radio. Staff there have produced a number of consumer guides for how to read news, especially in difficult situations. For their breaking news guide, which is updated often, see https://www.wnyc.org/story/breaking-news-consumers-handbook-pdf/ (June 5, 2018).

I coded the four media platforms – newspaper, television, radio and Internet news – based on multiple accounts (whenever possible) of the longitudinal relationship between media platforms and government. I focused on specific references to each individual platform to get at the research question of interest. Specifically, as detailed in Appendix A, I annotated every instance of any author's account of a state pressure, incentive or restriction on news media activities. The variety of authors, sources and languages employed meant that there was not a codebook looking for specific events or words, but rather I searched for accounts of state-media relations generally.

Coding Criteria

The literature about political communication in industrialized democracies provides a starting point for categorizing state-media relationships. The first three criteria — the revolving door between business and government; oligarchic control of an industry; and government control over those running specific entities — are well-documented concerns of scholars of political science overall, not just political communication, for normative reasons (Baker 2007, Doyle 2002, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002). Relative to the press, these three criteria represent different means by which elite voices might be prioritized over other ideas, a critical component of the theory outlined in the previous chapter. After all, a politician becoming a television commentator is not itself dangerous to democracy; but a journalist working in politics and then going back to journalism could be. Even in arenas in which political alliances are assumed within the press (a tenet of Hallin and Mancini's original conception of political parallelism), the harder it is to tell where the press ends and the party begins, the more severe or extreme that parallelism would be.

Oligarchic control of media and government control of positions of power within media both potentially impact media output. Historians have catalogued countless instances of monopolies or oligarchies producing sub-par deliverables. Concentration of ownership is also an important concern of scholars of political communication (Baker 2002, 2007; Meier and Trappel 1998; Winseck 2008), with competition thought to make coverage more honest. And a government's having control of editorial decisions is a classic means of identifying media loyal to the state, even if supposedly independent.[80]

The next two criteria — concerns about clientelism and restricting items necessary to production — go to economics. One is a carrot, the other a stick, to use Waisbord's terminology (2001). Clientelism generally occurs when personal relationships are more important for functioning government than official channels. Clientelism was first introduced to the study of media systems by Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002). They argued the idea was relevant to the study of media in because it is pervasive, existing in some form in each country. Clientelism would be manifested in the state's giving extra incentives to preferred media potentially could be. This is not a measure of giving a favored entity a scoop but rather of economically propping up favored entities, for example with advertising dollars.

Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) thought clientelism especially important to consider in later- or lesser-consolidated democracies, such as in Eastern Europe or Latin America, where government channels may not be as clear, fixed or functional. Since most political communication research has occurred in and about industrialized democracies, their argument seems important to any geographic expansion of political

[80] See Mueni (2018) for an example from this year of such control in Kenya.

communication. It also provides a means of comparison well understood within comparative politics and contributes to that (separate) literature.[81]

Restricting items necessary to production is the other side of that equation. Effectively, this criterion is about a state's cutting off the economic lifeline of media as a means to induce subservience. This may involve tariffs or imports, for example on newsprint, but it could also be about restricting advertising or slowing bandwidth or any other economic measure that, while not legally censorship, is employed to keep media entities in line.

The sixth criterion — revoking licensing or enacting legislation to censor — is the classic approach to measuring censorship. Many countries regulate media, but they do so to different extents. Some have the ability to restrict media but opt not to, whilst other countries heavily regulate different media. Punishing individual journalists would also fall under this criterion.

The seventh coding item — media established or founded in direct opposition to existing political leadership or state media — was employed to account for the role of state media. The reality is that, in many places, the government was essential in establishing the infrastructure for different media. So, a private entity going around government to act as a counterweight to it is a strong historical signal of the proximity of government to media.

The final criterion — an environment that encourages self-censorship — is a reflection of the reality that, in many places, across the world, freedom of the press

[81]Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) position seven countries on a spectrum of clientelism in their article, for example, allowing for more nuanced cross-national comparison. Relative to clientelism within any country, Magaloni (2006) has written extensively about clientelism in Mexico, but about the dominant political party, not the media. Looking at relationships between the state and different media would add nuance to a discussion that treats the media as more monolithic than it in actuality is.

exists only in theory, despite laws on the books. This criterion also captures instances in which reporting may be unsafe and therefore inadvertently only promote status quo ideas, for example historically with various mafia and their contemporary counterparts, cartels or warlords.

I did not expect all factors to be present in all countries, quite the contrary. But the aforementioned criteria draw from both political communication and comparative politics, as well as economics, to consider holistically different incentives and pressures that might be present in a variety of different contexts. They are a reflection of different strands of research.

Coding Procedure

My classification system has three possible classifications: close to government (status quo), far from government (potentially disruptive) or a centered null category reflecting insufficient data to yield a directional expectation.[82] Absent clear exceptions, as discussed below, in general, each notation about a county was equally weighted. That is to say, each instance of any of the above criteria held equal weight, be it status quo-enforcing or disruptive, even though all items might not be documented in all countries. The coding is cumulative.

Generally, having catalogued all instances of the aforementioned criteria, I looked for a pattern over time with each of the four platforms in each country.[83] A single

[82] Were more sources available across the region or were I able, over time, to find enough sources about all countries to expand the coding to a five-point Likert scale (very close, leaning close, insufficient data/neutral, leaning far, very far), that would be preferable.
[83] Though Spanish-language newspapers have been published in the region since the late 18th-century, the timeline for broadcast news media goes back approximately a century. Extrapolating about history's impact on current institutional form does not, therefore, go so far back as to raise validity concerns. Most criticized for doing this in comparative politics in recent years was Putnam (1993) for his book on Italian

instance of government censorship is not, after all, indicative of a relationship that the public might observe as oppositional. Platforms were rarely coded as close to or distinct from government based on a single account, though there were cases for which that was justified. Specifically, I took scholars' having pointed out a distinct *relational* bifurcation as strong evidence of distance from any regime.

In none of those cases was there any lack of clarity. In cases where historians disagreed, I would not have used any single item as evidence of crossing a cutpoint and definitely being close to or distant from government. In the rare instances that my notes from sources contradicted each other – as happened in the case of how to code newspapers in Chile[84] – then I revisited the original sources, comparing details of the scholarship. If a source was clearly better sourced, the coding from that source was used. If they were approximately equivalent or drawing from different literatures, I coded the case as insufficient data.[85]

I opted to be conservative with coding. Unless I had sufficient documentation from secondary sources of an over-time relationship between government and the press, I defaulted to coding as "insufficient data." Any replication with additional information should therefore intensify, not dilute or weaken, categorizations. Full details for replication – including each source employed in the categorization of each country – can

---

social capital. (See O'Neill 1996 for review of the research and Putnam's critics.) This analysis goes back about a century and is largely focused on the post-WWII time period. As such, though historical and combining qualitative and quantitative measures, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of reducing multi-century evolution into a simple classification.

[84] Benavides et al (2009) presented newspapers as apolitical for not taking on the dictatorships, which is insufficient to code newspapers as aligned. Tironi and Sunkel (2000) noted the history of party ownership or affiliation with newspapers, even preceding the dictatorships, which suggested an oligarchic association, as had also been presented elsewhere (Montoya-Londaño 2014, 67). The documentation of oligarchy was used to justify the coding of newspapers as close to government, despite one source's claiming newspapers faced largely market pressures.

[85] I had decided early that countries for which there were no available reliable materials in the relevance sample would be dropped; but I was able to find at least one source for every former Iberian colony.

be found in Appendix A and is summarized in Table 3.1 of this chapter. The appendix also contains the complete list of sources used for each country.

Internet news reputation

Internet news developed and spread on a much faster timeline than the other platforms. The later development and decentralized organization of the early Internet produced fundamentally different news production norms than traditional news outlets. Instead of relying on beat reporting or connections, so-called citizen journalists[86] under democratic regimes could report what they chose. There was no indexing or reliance on elites, as happened historically with larger media, and no barriers on the amount of space any topic can occupy.[87] This lower barrier to entry for content production that results in potentially unlimited content.

Further, after initial defense funding from the United States[88], the World Wide Web and following iterations of the Internet developed in largely private hands, in many places absent clear regulation. OpenNet Initiative data from 2013 indicated that less than half of all countries engage in any kind of political filtering, with only 20 percent engaging in severe censorship.[89] Cuba is the only country in the Western Hemisphere

[86] Bulkley (2012) gives examples of how the raw materials from regular people's filming political events has changed journalism and documentary filmmaking.
[87] The size of the "news hole," be it in column inches for newspapers or minutes for segments for television news has traditionally been a limiting factor. Oxford dictionaries defines "news hole" as: "The area of a newspaper or magazine that is available for news stories, after deduction of the area taken by adverts, pictures, etc.; (hence) the amount of airtime available in a news programme, channel, etc., for news broadcasting."
[88] For a comprehensive explanation of the development of ARPANET into the modern Internet, see Flichy (2007).
[89] There is little information on much of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly at lower levels of development, with coverage instead concentrated in Asia, Europe, North America and the Middle East. For Latin America, the report includes information from Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.

that systematically filters Internet content (Kim et al ND). This suggests that, though Internet news might in some locales be censored like television was/is, in more places than not Internet has evolved with little oversight.

The Internet and social media also facilitate narrowcasting, not targeting any conservative median reader or viewer, which represents a fundamentally different business model than traditional media.[90] Internet news is fundamentally diffuse (Tewksbury 2005, Tewksbury and Rittenburg 2009) and, therefore, on balance, less likely to be aligned with or dependent on government or particularly promoting of any status quo, given its catering to niche audiences. There is also an increasing body of scholarly literature that suggests that there is something importantly different for participation about consuming news on the Internet, relative to more traditional, one-way news platforms.[91] For that reason, on this subset of countries, Internet news is always categorized in my coding scheme as not aligned with the status quo.[92]

Example

I demonstrate my classification scheme at work by discussing how the Mexican media were coded. I first summarize the history of press-government relations in modern Mexico and then translate that history into classifications:

---

[90] Merriam-Webster explains the difference between broadcasting and narrowcasting as follows:
Broadcasting: "the act of making widely known: the act of spreading abroad"
Narrowcasting: "message delivered to a small group, rather than large"
The latter came into use, unsurprisingly, as a response to the former. https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/broadcasting-and-narrowcasting (June 5, 2018)

[91] Kenski and Stroud (2006) and Bakker and de Vreese (2011) independently found that Internet use positively predicted political engagement, whilst traditional media did not, even when accounting for relative entertainment preference (Prior 2007). Online information does not differ from print content in many cases (Ghersetti 2014) but includes slightly (but not significantly) more mobilizing content (Hoffman 2006).

[92] In some places, for example China, where sites require licensing and/or face censorship, the preponderance of the evidence may come out differently.

Nearing the end of the last dictatorship in the first decade of the 20th century, the Mexican press called for political liberalization (Orme 1997). But from the 1930s until almost the end of the 20th century, Mexico's "perfect dictatorship"[93] of one-party rule limited the ability of any press to confront the government. Support for the post-revolutionary state, clientelism and intimidation limited both the ability and willingness of media (or any opposition force) taking on the ruling party (Orme 1997, Magaloni 2006). Pressure put on privately-owned news media is thought to elicit pro-government bias in news coverage, thereby impeding the development of democracy in authoritarian regimes and the consolidation of democracy in young democracies (Abbott 2011), as was Mexico in the middle 20th century.

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) that ruled Mexico for seven decades was a "gigantic, pork-barreling political machine" (Lawson 2002, 17). The party limited broadcasting concessions, for example, to political allies as rewards, but also as a means to guarantee favorable coverage (Lawson 2002, 25). Through both official and unofficial means, from 1929 through the 1990s, the PRI garnered effective control of the public agenda, self-censorship from the press on issues the government did not want covered and preferential election coverage (Lawson 2002, 48). "The culture of collusion was so great that the standard media business model depended not on circulation, but on government largesse," with the head of the Televisa network often only somewhat jokingly referred to as the Minister of Culture (O'Neil 2013, 80).

[93] Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa coined the term in 1990. At a conference on Latin democracies, Vargas Llosa was quoted as saying, "The perfect dictatorship is not communism. It is not the Soviet Union. It is not Fidel Castro. The perfect dictatorship is Mexico… It has all the characteristics of a dictatorship: permanence, not of one man, but of one party. A party that is untouchable" (translated from "Vargas Llosa: 'México es la dictadura perfecta'").

One experienced journalist put it this way:

> "The Mexican press censors itself. Outside observers who look for examples of direct government censorship, monopolization of the distribution of newsprint and limitless government power to suppress or publicize news and commentary fail to grasp the nature of the relationship between the government and media – a complex network of mutual benefits, commitments and favors, difficult to penetrate and even more difficult to reform" (Riva Palacio 1997, 22).

This system lasted through the 1980s, when mass media gradually gained more independence (Lawson 2002, 61). Print media was the first to gain some measure of distance or insulation from government, with the establishment of new magazines in the late 1970s. For radio this process occurred largely between 1985 and 1996, particularly after the devastating Mexico City earthquake when radio was necessarily the primary means of communication (Lawson 2002, 94). Television was the slowest to signal any independence from the PRI, receiving wide condemnation for its preferential PRI coverage in the 1988 election, especially relative to more balanced or critical radio coverage (Lawson 2002, 101).

And even after television news had begun to distance itself from the PRI, pressures remained. The Mexico City bureau chief for Miami-based Univisión, Bruno López, detailed his experiences working in Mexico in a 1997 book. López was in the unique position of working for an American press entity with the expectation that he would act as a watchdog; but Univisión's business relationship with Mexico's Televisa meant that his stories could also be aired in Mexico. He detailed multiple instances in which Televisa, still affiliated in many ways with the PRI oligarchy, cut or re-edited his pieces to reframe them in a pro-government way (López 1997, 91-95). López's unique circumstances – which allowed for a direct comparison of content aired within Mexico versus content aired outside of Mexico – allow social scientists a rare vantage point to

observe the unwritten but very much in-force pressures governments can exert on mass media.

The evolution of radio in Mexico was less clearly aligned with government. The introduction of radio technology played a critical role in the dictatorship and then revolution that preceded the PRI (Castro 2016). Analogized to the penny press that preceded the US and French revolutions, radio was the preferred means of communication for rebels in the 1920s and 1930s (Castro 2016, 8). For that reason, once the revolution ended and the PRI took power, the state had a strong interest in the communications medium.

As was the case with many geographically dispersed countries, radio was at first a means of national unification (Karush 2012, Hayes 2000). The reach of radio into more rural areas allowed for greater penetration of news about the country; and the first national radio station was founded within the Ministry of Education (Hayes 2000, 42). Then the exponential growth of radio in the second half of the twentieth century led to it being a largely local enterprise in Mexico — effectively narrowcasting (Hayes and McSherry 1997). That resulted in the regulations for radio laying the groundwork for television regulation but in the evolving medium itself slowly falling away from a nation-building endeavor to an apolitical commercial venture (Hayes 2000).

In other words, the similarity of radio regulations to those that would come to exist for television does not equate to the platforms' being treated similarly once regulations were in place. Rather, the more local nature of radio (pre-satellite era) means it would come to garner, almost definitionally, far less attention than television would. Nor does Mexico does have a strong history of community radio like some other countries in the region. The more commercial nature of radio ventures and the PRI's

paying less attention to it after initial regulations were put in place suggests less affiliation with the government than exhibited by television.

In the 21st century, there remain obstacles to Mexican press independence: price controls on staple goods, justified by social need, constrains the advertising budgets of the firms producing those items; electoral losses by the PRI have not reduced the party's dominance in the business world, which is still characterized as an oligarchy; and the executive retains control of broadcast rights, despite the establishment of a supposedly politically neutral broadcast authority (Lawson 2002, 175-176). All of these factors combine to render large, traditional mass media in Mexico (especially television) to be seen as supporting the government (or business status quo-preferring) forces – what Orme (1997) calls a "culture of collusion."[94]

Further, even years after the *dedazo*[95] process of selecting a president had ended and multi-party elections fed by primaries were held, the Mexican press – especially television – was still associated with the PRI regime (Lawson 2002, 7). A recent survey found that 93% of journalists surveyed[96] said that reporters knew what topics to avoid and 70% said that owners interfered with editorial decisions and content, specifically noting that "news organizations prefer to avoid subjects that affect government institutions or the political class" (Reyna 2017).[97] Widespread self-censorship is also a security matter in Mexico, as journalists face threats from both drug cartels and corrupt

---

[94] Mexicans in 2017 do nonetheless believe that the media has a positive influence on the country (Vice and Chwe 2017).
[95] "For decades, Mexican presidents were selected not according to rules in the Constitution, the electoral law, or party statutes, but rather via the *dedazo* ('big finger')—an unwritten code that gave the sitting president the right to choose his successor, specified the candidate pool, and prohibited potential candidates from openly seeking the job" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 725). The *dedazo* was one of the reasons that political scientists did not consider Mexico a true democracy for much of the 20th century.
[96] Relevance sample, mixed methods (focus groups, in-depth interviews and Internet-based surveys) (Reyna 2017)
[97] Translated from Spanish

politicians if they report on certain topics. The summary of the latest Reporters Without Borders report states:

> *Constant violence and fear*
> Land of the drug cartels, Mexico continues to be the Western Hemisphere's deadliest country for the media. When journalists cover subjects linked to organized crime or political corruption (especially at the local level), they immediately become targets and are often executed in cold blood. Most of these crimes go unpunished, with Mexico's pervasive corruption accounting for the impunity. Some elected officials are directly linked to organized crime. Ownership of the broadcast media is extremely concentrated, with two media groups owning almost all the TV channels (Reporters Without Borders 2017b).

These anecdotes lend credence to the idea that reputation is sticky and declaring journalistic independence from government influence may not change public perception of any entity.[98]

In summary, Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America in which to be a journalist,[99] not just in modern times but also historically (Hughes 2008, 147). Television especially is aligned with government, both during decades of one-party rule and in the recent years with two main parties (Gutierrez Rentaria 2009; Fox 1997, 37). Radio has no such history of government involvement (Fox 1997, 38). Newspapers are less obviously partisan than television but remain dependent on government advertising, rendering them subservient (Hughes 2008, 132). The word most often used to describe the relationship between the Mexican government and press is collusion, in

---

[98] Survey evidence confirming this would be optimal, but no such surveys exist. Fielding such a survey cross-nationally would likely require limiting questions to citizens' opinions about the biggest or most influential press in the country – the *New York Times* traditionally in the United States or *BBC* in the United Kingdome – thereby potentially skewing survey results *toward* the public's perceiving media as colluding with government. Further, in WVS 6, for example, there is only a 0.1052 correlation between media trust and total media consumption. (Correlations for trust in media and consumption of individual media platforms maxes out at 0.0840 for radio. Correlation for trust in media and total media consumption in Mexico was 0.0975.)

[99] Ranked 147 of out 180 by Reporters Without Borders in 2017, the lowest ranking for any Latin American country. (In the Western hemisphere, only Cuba ranked lower, at 173.)

large part because much political advertising in the press is presented as if it were news (Keenan 1997; Orme 1997), akin to native advertising or content marketing[100] in the United States.[101]

Having compiled the information about Mexico, preponderance of the evidence led me to code television and newspapers as aligned with the status quo. There was insufficient data to position radio either way, resulting in a null coding. Put another way, there were sufficient sources that clearly identified an ongoing symbiotic relationship between the Mexican government and television and newspapers, but no such accumulation of qualitative data that would lead to confidence classifying radio as either close or distant from government. Specifically, for Mexico, I had over 15 sources that contributed to the categorizations for the three traditional forms of media.[102]

Final Classification Scheme

There are 18 countries in Iberian Latin America for which I was able to find at least one source about the history of newspapers, radio and television for each country. For many of the smaller countries, there was insufficient directional data to derive classifications for media-government closeness, even when employing sources in multiple languages. For many medium-sized and larger countries, though, I was able to classify all four media platforms (newspaper, radio, television and Internet).

---

[100] Dictionary.com defines native advertising as: "advertising content on a website that conforms to the design and format of the site and is integrated into the site's usual content" (October 11, 2017). It is generally designed to be all-but-indistinguishable from news content.

[101] Orme notes that many press outlets could not survive economically without government ad buys. So "the government and many politicians buy space in the form of news bulletins promoting their activities or simply reprinting speeches. Of course, the newspapers never inform their readers that they are reading paid advertising rather than hard news" (1997, 22).

[102] This number discounts multiple sources from two scholars who focus on media in Mexico and Latin America: Chappell Lawson and Silvio Waisbord, respectively. Those two political scientists accounted for over 10 sources for the dissertation.

As was expected based on existing literature about industrialized democracies, television news was the most likely to show status quo bias : That industry, after all, has high barriers to entry, is highly regulated and largely caters to the median citizen. The most information was available about newspaper-government relations, presumably because that medium has the longest history of any in news. In many countries, it seemed that laws were written based on newspaper and television relationships with government.

Radio was the most likely traditional medium to have a history of showcasing a diversity of voices (aka non-status quo positions), presumably because of its relatively low barrier to entry and, thanks to geographic dispersion, lesser chance of monitoring or regulation. To reiterate, at least among this subset of democracies with adjectives, Internet was classified as always far from government.

Table 3.1: Reputation Coding in Latin America

Country	Newspaper	Television	Radio
Argentina	0	-	0
Bolivia	-	-	+
Brazil	0	-	0
Chile	-	0	0
Colombia	-	-	+
Costa Rica	0	0	0
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	+
Guatemala	-	-	0
Honduras	-	0	0
Mexico	-	-	0
Nicaragua	0	-	+
Panama	-	-	+
Paraguay	0	0	+
Peru	-	-	+
Uruguay	-	-	+
Venezuela	-	-	-

- = 4th Branch or status quo reinforcing (meaning no expected relative association with behavior)
0 = No expectation can be extrapolated from sources (as of Spring 2017)
+ = 4th Estate distinct from government or government watchdog (translating to an expected relative positive association with behavior)

Why Latin America?

This and the empirical chapters that follow test the theory outlined in Chapter Two in Latin America. Latin America is uniquely suited to research bringing together different subfields. Unlike other regions grouped together by Western scholars or artificially created or cherry-picked (e.g., Friedmann 2014, Waisbord 2015), the countries of Latin America share a common cultural and linguistic history. They gained independence largely around the same time, experienced dictatorships in similar waves, and have many of the same political institutions. All are presidential democracies

(Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005)[103] that share largely natural boundaries.[104] Institutionally, then, there is variation in current politics (such as the strength of democracy or political leaning of the administrations), but not so much in political norms or institutions, allowing for examination of the media as the "different" institution within a most similar design (Mill [1843] 2012; Przeworski and Teune 1970).[105]

Limiting to Latin America to the past few years also addresses both the Woods-Jordan[106] and Bonds-Ruth[107] problems (Elkins and Sides 2010), aka non-comparability across space or time. The concept of political participation is not stretched too far, nor is

[103] Venezuela scores lowest on Freedom House's aggregate scale at 35 as "partly free," and Bolivia's Evo Morales is threatening to ignore the constitution and remain in power when his current term is up (Oppenheimer 2017), but no Latin countries have yet been classified as not free or completely malfunctioning democracies.

[104] Unnatural boundaries, especially in Africa, have been shown to "magnif[y] the likelihood of civil wars, political instability, and secession attempts" (Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002, 1093). Natural boundaries are thought to correlate more with natural grouping and divisions of ethnic groups, clans, tribes, etc.

[105] Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan argue that Latin America is an especially fertile ground for testing theory because of its "important regional and temporal specificities" (2005, 57). It is both large enough to be allow for theory generation, but also potentially exceptional enough, relative to the industrialized or as yet undeveloped world, to test true theoretical generalizability. And, drawing from sociology, Latin America is ideal for looking at possible regional or contamination effects (Booth 1979, 50; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2005, 23) which one-country studies could not possibly consider.

[106] "The Woods-Jordan Problem: Non-equivalence across Space – Who is the better athlete: Tiger Woods or Michael Jordan? The *New York Times* (2008) ran a widely circulated online debate on the topic not long ago. The question has no straightforward answer because Woods and Jordan played different sports, and the talents needed to excel in one sport are less relevant in the other. Woods does not need a jump shot. Jordan does not need a flop shot. Some measures have this same problem: they do not travel well from one location to another. These dislocating effects arise from differences across contexts in language, custom, and culture—that is, shared meanings, norms, and values. Non-equivalence can emerge across countries, other jurisdictional units, ethnic groups, social classes, or any set of entities defined by cultural, political, or economic markers" (Elkins and Sides 2010, 1).

[107] "The Bonds-Ruth Problem: Non-equivalence across Time – Is Barry Bonds the best home run hitter in the history of Major League Baseball? Measured by the raw number of home runs, he is. But is it appropriate to compare Bonds' performance with that of players whose careers occurred years or even decades ago? Many things have changed in baseball since the era of Babe Ruth or even Hank Aaron: the size of ballparks, the quality of pitching, the composition of baseballs and bats, and the apparent prevalence of steroid use. In short, times have changed, and the question is whether they have changed so much as to render "number of career home runs" a misleading measure for comparing the prowess of hitters over the history of baseball … as data collection persists in the social science, the passage of time can change the meaning of constructs and the items used to measure them… As time passes, researchers may need to re-conceptualize the construct — e.g., 'What does it now mean to be X?' — and reconsider whether particular items tap that construct" (Elkins and Sides 2010, 3).

that of what constitutes mass media (Sartori 1971), and comparison is possible because of the limit of space and time. Therefore, Latin America is a reasonable first step in the testing of the theory without encountering other problems of measurement or implementation.

Research Design and Data

This chapter analyzes available data to determine whether platforms exhibit uniform associations with political participation activities or not. Having established directional expectations for the impact of historic relations with government on modern media content output, the next step in the analysis is to link that historically-influenced content to observable behavioral outcomes. I first examine available news sources and then examine differences in behavior. This next section details available data.

Data Sources

Cross-national analysis relies on comparability to achieve consistency across time and space. For the maximum time and space coverage, comparativists rely on the World Values Surveys (WVS) and the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS), both of which are compilations of national surveys with representative samples. The former will be described in detail and employed in this chapter, the latter in the next chapter.[108]

The World Values Survey (WVS) began as the European Values Survey in 1981. The survey is designed to measure cultural change. There have been six waves of surveys thus far, with the largest expansion in country coverage between 1995 and 2000: Wave 1

[108] I attempted to supplement WVS with privately available data, but there was little on Latin America. Media Tenor, for example, only had one report (from 2007 about Hugo Chavez) even somewhat related to media in the region.

(1981-1984), Wave 2 (1990-1994), Wave 3 (1995-1998), Wave 4 (1999-2004), Wave 5 (2005-2009), and Wave 6 (2010-2014). Data collection for wave 7 began in January 2017, with results expected to be made public in 2019 and subsequent waves every 5 years, according to the WVS website.

WVS is a random probability survey whenever possible and employs a quota or cluster system where random probability is problematic (Kittilson 2007). Teams in almost 100 countries each fund their own survey administration, with a common core questionnaire administered to almost 90 percent of the world population. Teams in each country retain the right to add or subtract questions. Organizers have administered the surveys to approximately 400,000 respondents so far. The other commonly known cross-national survey are the world Barometers, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Both WVS and the Barometers groupings exhibit positives and negatives for cross-national research: WVS focuses on values over engagement and has been designed to test and promote a specific idea, the human development sequence (following Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The barometers speak much more to political activities but the common questions are few worldwide, meaning they tend to promote analysis at the regional level (Bratton 2009, 1).[109] The questions about news consumption in WVS allow for better matching between news consumption and political endeavors than

[109] The surveys also differ greatly in coverage, with the AmericasBarometer covering the entire hemisphere only since 2010. Though WVS organizers claim to have a good balance of countries, they do not. In Wave 6, only five countries (out of 42) listed in 2014 as having low human development (Zimbabwe, Yemen, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Pakistan) by UNDP were included in the survey. The sample skews heavily toward those 49 countries listed that year as having very high human development. That said, not all GBS cover as wide a geography as the AmericasBarometer. South Asia, for example, is not covered at all, meaning this research question could not be asked in the world's largest democracy – India – without access to national surveys that presumably do not have similar root questionnaires.

would be available using the GBS for the region (the AmericasBarometer), which does not disaggregate its question about media consumption, asking instead only about general news usage.

WVS coverage of Latin America has expanded since its inception. Wave 1 included Argentina and Mexico. Brazil and Chile were added in Wave 2, while Wave 3 saw the most significant expansion of countries with the addition of Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (but not Brazil). Wave 4 shrank back down to five countries with Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela but expanded again in Wave 5 with Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Wave 6 duplicates the Wave 5 country list with two exceptions: the addition of Ecuador and removal of Guatemala.

Though Latin American data has been available for a limited subset of countries the survey's inception, Waves 5 and 6 are the only ones to include questions about media consumption. Most importantly, these surveys collect information on media consumption disaggregated by platform. Important for research in developing countries, survey questions asked about access to or use of the Internet for news, not technology ownership, as libraries or cyber cafés are still common features in many places where computer ownership and/or broadband connections are expensive (Economist 2008a, Gillwald 2017, C Williams 2016).

The question in both iterations of the survey was worded similarly, but the answer selection differed. In Wave 5, the answer choice was either yes (have used) or no (have not used):

> WVS 5: People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether *you used it last week* or *did not use it last week* to obtain information:
> V223. Daily newspaper
> V224. News broadcasts on radio or TV
> V228. Internet, Email

By contrast, Wave 6 provided choices on the frequency of consumption (from never to daily):

> WVS 6: People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information *daily*, *weekly*, *monthly*, *less than monthly* or *never*:
> V217. Daily newspaper
> V219. TV news
> V220. Radio news
> V222. Email
> V223. Internet

Non-response rates on questions in surveys in Latin American can be very high (Córdova 2009, Seligson 2005). For example, a question about protest in the 2008 AmericasBarometer had an 11.17% non-response rate across the countries surveyed (Moseley and Moreno 2010). Some surveys report overall non-response rates as low as 3% (Seligson 2004), but high question non-response rates are not surprising. The more international the survey – i.e., the more one attempts to include developing countries – the greater the risk of non-response, for both cultural and logistical reasons (Seligson 2005); and question non-response becomes a more concerning factor when tackling multi-variate analysis (Seligson 2005).

Dependent variables

The main outcome of interest for my dissertation is political engagement. Following Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), I define participation as "activity that is intended to or has the consequences of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action" (1995, 7). Verba and Nie (1972) first explicated that participation is more than voting, by including membership in seemingly non-political organizations as measure of participation. However, they limited their definition to active forms of participation (1972, 3), not including passive or generalized support for democracy that are sometimes taken as signs of regime support. Unconventional participation, such as demonstrations and protests that dominated the 1960s in the United States, was not part of their study.

Having gained independence mostly in the early 19th-century, the history of Latin America is speckled with *caudillos*[110] and oligarchs.[111] Twentieth century dictatorships across Latin America generally required citizens to vote, albeit in what would be better described as electoralism than proper democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991).[112] Many Latin American countries retained compulsory voting[113] after the fall of dictators, even making proof of voting a requirement to obtain other necessary documentation like

[110] "The Spanish term *caudillo* refers to a leader in Latin America. Its origins can be traced back to the colonial era with the system of *patrón* (patron) and *peon* (peon) on the haciendas of rural Latin America. The *caudillo* was seen as a local hero, or a strongman of the region. He required a *clienta*, or an armed band with a network of dependents, hence the connection to the *patrón* and *peon*. This was termed the mechanism of the *caudillo* system. The interactions in this network can be defined as informal and personal exchanges of resources between parties of unequal status. The system would grow into a pyramid scheme with the super-*patrón*, or the *caudillo*, on top" (Mitchell and Guerrero ND).
[111] See Garcia Calderon (1925) or Posada-Carbo (2000) for brief histories.
[112] See Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2015) for a detailed account of the reasons behind the fall of dictatorships.
[113] As of 2014, voting was compulsory in 22 countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nauru, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, and Uruguay (Santhanam 2014). Penalties for not voting vary (Frankal 2005).

passports (Figueiredo 1990), though enforcement of compulsory voting has declined somewhat in recent decades.[114] This history nonetheless begets little variation in survey results: While just over half of worldwide respondents (56%) report always voting in national elections, nearly four-fifths of Latin Americans (78%) respond affirmatively to the question[115] (WVS 6).[116]

Due to the limited variation in voting behavior, I focus on other mechanisms of political participation. Non-voting conventional participation is the contribution of time or money to a political cause (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). I focus on measures of civic engagement related to expressing a desire for political change (Norris and Inglehart 2009).[117] In the WVS survey, such non-voting participation is operationalized with four possibilities.[118] WVS 5 and 6 had similar questions, but WVS 6 added the option of joining strikes, which was not asked about in WVS5:

[114] Publicly available data (Electoral Commission 2006, accessed 03 March 2017) suggests variation as follows: Eleven countries (64.84% of the sample) might no longer be thought to have compulsory voting (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and four countries for which no information was available, suggesting the issue is not salient or applicable: Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay). Four countries (23.54%) retain compulsory voting but without penalties for not voting (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay). Three countries (11.62%) were continue to have strict compulsory voting rules (Bolivia, Brazil and Peru).

[115] Question V227

[116] There is some recent evidence that the region reports high turnout, regardless of compulsory status. Effects of the individual correlates of voting in the region (Maldonado 2011a) or the fact that Election Day is, in many places, a holiday (Lapidos 2008) may be masked by the compulsory nature of voting.

[117] The behaviors in this chapter all load onto the same factor in Norris and Inglehart's analysis (2009, 245-246). This is not to say that membership in civic and political organizations, which loads on another factor, is less important. But, as culture has been shown to influence how people treat membership in communities, I focus on actions involving some expression of voice, not just solidarity, as public voice should be less culturally bound than membership.

[118] Norris and Inglehart (2009) base their analyses on questions 90 through 94, which question if the respondent has "recently" done any of the aforementioned activities. That dramatically reduces the overall sample size though – from 10124 to 2290 for petitions, from 9983 to 445 for boycotts, from 10184 to 1467 for peaceful demonstrations, and from 8913 to 957 for strikes – rendering it less useful for regional analysis than it might be for worldwide analyses.

WVS5: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you *have done* any of these things, whether you *might do it* or *would never under any circumstances do it*:
V96. Signing a petition
V97. Joining in boycotts
V98. Attending peaceful demonstrations

WVS 6: Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you *have done* any of these things, whether you *might do it* or *would never under any circumstances do it.*
V85. Signing a petition
V86. Joining in boycotts
V87. Attending peaceful demonstrations
V88. Joining strikes[119]

For both surveys, I reversed the original WVS coding, so that never was 0, might do was 1, and have done was coded 2.

Obviously reliance on a single survey measure is less than ideal. Therefore, the aforementioned concepts are interpreted broadly, to account for minor cultural differences (Birch 2008, 310). Since any questionable reliability would, if anything, depress significance levels, using these single-question outcome variables amounts to a more strict test of hypotheses than any index would.[120]

As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, only signing a petition may be considered at all common. The median answer selection in both surveys for signing a petition and peacefully demonstrating was "might do," but "never" for boycotting and, in WVS, for joining strikes. In fact, three-quarters of respondents responded that they would never

[119] For both surveys, I opted not to use the question about "any other act of protest" (V99 in WVS5 and V89 in WVS6) because it is unclear. In other words, the question allows for each respondent to interpret what some other form of protest might be. The question also has a very low response rate. In WVS6, for example, only 6.8% responded affirmatively. And the question was not asked in Ecuador.
[120] Ordinal outcomes cannot be summed, of course. And, even were such statistically appropriate, it is unclear what summing "might sign a petition" and "might participate in a boycott" to a numerical 2 would actually mean.

participate in a boycott, and almost half of all respondents stated that they would never attend a peaceful demonstration. Because political activism is relatively more obvious and common[121] in Latin America than in other parts of the developing world (Ortiz et al 2013), suggesting these still quite low numbers might represent the upper end of any distribution of political activism worldwide.

Figure 3.1: Political engagement in percent (WVS5)



[121] Inglehart and Welzel note that public political activism – or protest – is most common in countries that promote self-expression values but in which citizens are experiencing disappointment, aka more developed countries (2005, 120). They note that disappointment in areas that do not prioritize self-expression values, aka more parochial societies, disappointment begets resignation, not activism.

Figure 3.2: Political engagement in percent (WVS6)



Overall, the region shows a general aversion to boycotting. Signing a petition is, by contrast, the most frequently reported method of non-voting participation in both waves 5 and 6 of WVS. Demonstrating and striking fall in between the two aforementioned extremes.

The crux of my argument is that historic variation in media relations should be manifested in modern day media consumption and participation. I therefore focus in this chapter on variation between countries for each of the aforementioned methods of political engagement and expect that consumers of news less aligned with government should participate more in change-oriented activities.

As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, there was significant variation between countries even for signing a petition, the most popular form of non-voting participation, with anywhere from 10% and 55% of respondents reported having signed a petition. The

modal response was “never” in Uruguay in both surveys, but was “might do” so in Argentina, Mexico and Peru in both surveys. The modal answer changed in Colombia, from “never” in WVS5 to “might do” in WVS6. Only in Chile and Ecuador did most of the population say they would never sign a petition. In Brazil in WVS5, more than half of the population had signed a petition, though the number was slightly below half in WVS6, bringing the median down to “might do” in WVS6 from “have done” in WVS5, though “have done” was the mode in both surveys. In summation, then, Ecuador and Brazil jump out as the most extreme cases of those unwilling and willing to sign petitions to participate.

Figure 3.3: Signing a petition (WVS5)



Figure 3.4: Signing a petition (WVS6)



That respondents were less willing to admit to even possibly joining a boycott[122] (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) is in line with concerns that consumer activism is an issue in the Global North that has not so far translated to the Global South (Griffiths 2011, Stolle and Micheletti 2013) since boycotts are historically less popular in Latin America than they have been in the United States, Canada, Japan and Europe (Klesner 2007).[123] Colombia is the only country in either WVS5 or WVS6 to register double-digit participation in

[122] The term "boycott" is more often used to describe parties' not participating in elections seen as unjust or unfair than it is to describe a boycott or buycott like in industrialized democracies.
[123] Inglehart noted that boycotts tended to be more popular in post-materialist nations among citizens scoring high on cognitive mobilization (1990, 361-362). Latin American nations all score as having traditional (not secular-rational) values and, though they exhibit self-expression (not survival) values, score blow the English-speaking and Protestant Europe groupings (WVS6 cultural map). Uruguay, Colombia and Mexico score highest on post-materialism in Latin America (Inglehart 2008).

boycotts. The modal response across the region was "never," consistent with expectations from a decade ago (Klesner 2007).[124]

Figure 3.5: Joining a boycott (WVS5)



[124] Recent experimental results from Brazil show a greater generalized willingness to participate in business or social boycotts than in labor boycotts (strikes) (Andrade Cruz 2017). Such willingness is not reflected in WVS5 or WVS6, but may be in WVS7 when it is eventually released.

Figure 3.6: Joining a boycott (WVS6)



Marches and assemblies as a form of protest are more common in Latin America than in other parts of the world (Ortiz et al 2013),[125] as evidenced by the fact that, except for Ecuador, having demonstrated at some point yields double-digit response across the region (Figures 3.7 and 3.8). The topic of protest will be tackled in depth in the next chapter, but the WVS data covering only 8 countries already show important variation by country, with between 5% and 17% of persons who have joined a strike, a more extreme form of protest, according to WVS6 (Figure 3.9). These numbers roughly resemble other findings from the region, in which protest has only been "normalized" in Bolivia and Argentina, with all other countries reporting less than 20 percent who have participated, with the median country around 10 percent (Moseley and Morena 2010).

[125] For reference to show that Latin America averages above the mean, in WVS6, on the whole sample, 12.5% of respondents said they had attended peaceful demonstrations at some point, but the range was large: 1.7% in China, 2.6% in Azerbaijan, and 3.6% in Japan versus 24.7% in Nigeria, 24.9% in Spain and 30.3% in Libya.

Within this sample, Ecuador is the outlier, with almost three-quarters never even considering protesting and only 7.4% reporting they had done so.

Figure 3.7: Attending peaceful demonstrations (WVS5)



Figure 3.8: Attending peaceful demonstrations (WVS6)



Figure 3.9: Joining strikes (WVS6)



Overall, there is great variation in participation rates, both by activity and by country. The disaggregated results for boycotts and strikes in WVS6 show that boycotts are especially unpopular as a means of political activism in Latin America. But, on all measures, cross-national differentiation is apparent, suggesting different mechanisms or pressures at work that merit further investigation.

Independent Variables

News media consumption links media reputation to behavior. I operationalize news consumption as frequency of consumption and use WVS's standard frequency measure of news consumption. The response choices for these questions were binary in WVS5 and ordinal in WVS6:

> WVS 5: People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether *you used it last week* or *did not use it last week* to obtain information:
> V223. Daily newspaper
> V224. News broadcasts on radio or TV
> V228. Internet, Email
>
> WVS 6: People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information *daily*, *weekly*, *monthly*, *less than monthly* or *never*:
> V217. Daily newspaper
> V219. TV news
> V220. Radio news
> V222. Email
> V223. Internet

I reversed the WVS5 coding, so that “never” was 0 and “used last week” 1. WVS6 coding was also reversed so that “not used last week” was 0, “less than monthly” was 1, “monthly” was coded 2, “weekly” 3 and “daily” was 4. The result was that an increase in number reflects an actual increase in frequency of use for responses on both scales.

The most important difference between the two questions is not the scaling. Rather, WVS 5 combined television and radio consumption into one question. This assumes an overlap of audience and/or purpose for the two media platforms, which I would contend problematic given that, in some countries, television and radio may fulfill different roles or have different relationships with their government.

Most Latin Americans consumes news – between 50% and 81% of people in each country – on a daily basis (Maldonado 2011b). Latin Americans consume more media than residents of any other region (Karaian 2015), but they vary in the platforms they use, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11.

Figure 3.10: News consumption (in percent) (WVS5)



Figure 3.11: News consumption (in percent) (WVS6)



Examining news consumption by country, television is the ubiquitous means to learn about current events, with around 90% of respondents in WVS5 saying they had used TV for news last week (Figure 3.12). That high usage held up through WVS6 (Figure 3.13), with the finer grain of detail in that survey showing that over 70% of respondents across the region in fact use television daily for news. This lack of variation may make it difficult to draw inferences about the relationship between television news consumption and political behavior.

Figure 3.12: Television news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS5)



Figure 3.13: Television news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS6)



WVS6 shows much more variation by country after radio was decoupled from television (Figure 3.14), with between 35% and 59% using radio for news daily, but also between 10% and 36% never using it. There is no consistent tendency visible. For example, countries showing the highest radio news consumption, Uruguay and Peru, are at very different levels of human development (54 and 87, respectively, according to the United Nations) and on different sides of the continent. Argentina and Chile are the most developed countries in region (45 and 40, respectively, according to the United Nations) and show very similar radio use news numbers, while sharing a border. Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and share borders but exhibit different radio news tendencies. Finally, the distribution for Brazil is bimodal, with its skew different than any of the countries in the sample, save Mexico.

This variation is important because radio is rarely considered as an explanatory variable in studies of behavior, which are dominated by studies from the industrialized world. Yet Stromback and Shehata (2010) show that political interest particularly drives consumption of radio news and public service broadcast television in Europe. And Sen (2003) finds that radio was important for Indonesian democratization, not merely because it was more economically and geographically accessible than other technologies, but in fact over and above that, since radio allows for multiple cultural narratives. Being able to extrapolate differences in this data offers a unique opportunity to compare radio to other media platforms and see if consumers behave similarly in areas where radio serves a potentially quite different purpose or demographic than it does in Europe or the United States.

Figure 3.14: Radio news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS5)



Newspapers have historically been luxury items in developing countries. Increases in wealth and prosperity tend to correlate with increases in newspaper readership, which has explained increased sales in the developing world in recent years (Economist 2008b). But, in this sample in Latin America at least, there is no consistent pattern. Readership in Chile and Peru during WVS5, for example, are very similar despite notable differences in development and literacy (Chojkier 2012). Disaggregation of possible responses in WVS6 shows more weekly use than daily newspaper readership across the region. Some of the greatest variation across space seems to be among those who never or almost never (less than monthly) read a newspaper – from about 11% in Peru and 17% in Ecuador versus over 60% in Uruguay.

Switching focus from across space to over time, weekly (or more) newspaper use seemingly declined in Uruguay and Mexico between WVS5 and WVS6, but the more

detailed question in WVS6 yielded higher reported (weekly or more) newspaper readership in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Readership in Chile remained steady between the two survey waves. Newspaper circulation fell 8.4% in 2016 and 12.10% since 2011 (World Press Trends 2017), suggesting that numbers in WVS7 may not be so robust. Despite worldwide declines in newspaper readership (Smith 2016), newspaper readership in Latin America was expected to grow over the past decade (Magro 2010). But surveys done in 2014 and 2016 by the Secretaria Especial de Comunicação Social in Brazil for example, found that over three-quarters and two-thirds, respectively, in all age groups reported never reading a printed newspaper (Statista NDc, Statistta NDd).

Figure 3.15: Newspaper use (in percent) by country (WVS5)



Figure 3.16: Newspaper use (in percent) by country (WVS5)



As shown in Figures 3.17 and 3.18, Internet is the least used media platform in Latin America. Even among this sample of countries relatively developed for Latin America, over two-thirds of respondents in the sample reported not having used the Internet for news last week in WVS5. By WVS6, anywhere from 33% in Chile to almost 60% in Uruguay still never used the Internet for news. Only in Chile in WVS6, in fact, was the number using Internet for news daily larger than the percentage never using the Internet for news. The most obvious pattern in the WVS6 data is that, across the sampled countries, the distribution is relatively bimodal, with respondents regularly using Internet for news or never doing so. This is intuitive in places where Internet access is more cost prohibitive than it is in industrialized democracies.

To put this data in context, in 2008, as data collection for in WVS5 was drawing to a close, only 26.5 percent of people overall were Internet users, a number that would

increase to only 43 percent overall by 2012 (UNDP).[126] In 2012, when WVS6 was in the field, only between 4 and 18 percent of Latin Americans used social media to express political views or learn about politics (Brunelle 2013).

That said, thinking across time, equally notable is the increase in Internet news consumption between Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014) five years later. Between 2010 and 2015, households online in Latin America nearly doubled (CEPAL 2016). There is still marked regional variation not captured by WVS 5 or WVS 6, as household Internet penetration remains below 15% in three countries[127] in the region (CEPAL 2016).

Figure 3.17: Internet news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS5)



[126] In 2012, 42.5 percent of Latins in the less developed countries were Internet users, suggesting a stark digital divide across the region, including in the higher income areas (UNDP).
[127] Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua (CEPAL 2016)

Figure 3.18: Internet news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS6)



Summary of regional media consumption

While television news consumption is ubiquitous across the region, consumption of news via the other media platforms was less ubiquitous. Though responses in WVS5, with the combined TV/radio question, were seemingly driven by television news consumption (extrapolating from WVS6), radio news consumption in WVS6 was still quite high, with at least weekly radio news consumption being the median response in every country except Brazil.

The distributions for regular radio and Internet news consumption in WVS6 are practically mirror images of each other, with 43 percent of respondents using radio daily for news and 49 percent never using Internet for news. Put another way, even in 2012, over 40% of the population used the radio daily for new and never used the Internet.

Despite receiving the bulk of scholarly attention, Internet news consumption was still relatively rare for news consumption in Latin America, while conversely, radio news consumption remains quite popular despite being mostly bypassed by scholars.

Consumption patterns vary widely by country. Uruguay, for example, despite having the highest literacy rate of the countries[128] (about 98.5% in 2015 according to the World Bank), shows the lowest average use of newspapers in both waves of the survey. Chile in WVS5 and Peru in WVS6 showed the highest average use of multiple media platforms. No immediate reason for why the countries would have dominated news consumption in each wave is apparent. Neither country was holding a major election while the survey was being administered[129] and, though 2006 was a World Cup year, neither country qualified. Chile and Peru are, of course, both within the Latin America section but nonetheless score quire differently on the Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Maps[130] for those successive waves.

[128] Latest available data put literacy at just over 97% in Argentina, just under 92% in Brazil, just over 96% in Chile, and just over 94% in both Mexico and Peru. Literacy was lowest in the region in El Salvador and Honduras, at approximately 85%.

[129] Survey years 2006 for Chile in WVS5 and 2012 for Peru in WVS6.

[130] Inglehart and Welzel's map rests on the idea that basic values are closely correlated and can be broken into two dimensions: traditional vs secular-rational values and survival vs self-expression values. "Each country is positioned according to its people's values and not its geographical location. To a large extent the two coincide, but the map measures cultural proximity, not geographical proximity. Thus, Australia, Canada, the U.S. and Great Britain are cultural neighbors, reflecting their relatively similar values, despite their geographical dispersion" (Inglehart and Welzel 2011, 4).

Other predictors

In high-choice media environments, political interest is an important predictor of news consumption (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2013).[131] WVS5 and WVS6 include the same question to gauge political interest:

> How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you: Very interested; Somewhat interested; Not very interested; Not at all interested[132]

I reversed the original WVS coding, so that "not at all interested" was 0, "not very interested" was 1, "somewhat interested" was coded 2, and "very interested" coded 3.

Across the Western Hemisphere, though interest in politics is highest in the United States and Canada, citizens in all countries average between "a little" and "some" political interest (Helms, Rosenjack, and Schultz 2016). By comparison, for all countries across both surveys, the median response in Latin America was "not very interested," as shown in Figures 3.19 and 3.20. The modal response though, for both surveys, was not at all interested. Interest in politics would seemingly drive news consumption less in Latin America than in other areas. But it should be included in analyses for maximal comparability with other regions.

---

[131] The relationship is "both casual and reciprocal" (Strömbäck and Shehata 2010, 592), but strongest for political news. As shown above, the WVS survey question about news asks about finding out what is going on in the country, likely reflecting exposure to more political news than to non-political news.

[132] Question v95 in WVS5 and V84 in WVS 6

Figure 3.19: Relative frequency of interest in politics (WVS5)



Figure 3.20: Relative frequency of interest in politics (WVS6)



Country-by-country, the general lack of interest in politics holds up. The modal response across the region was "not at all interested" or "somewhat interested" in politics, with one notable exception: Brazil in WVS5. The modal response at that point in that country was "somewhat interested," but was not replicated in WVS6. The survey

was fielded from November 1 to December 26, 2006. Brazil was knocked out of the World Cup in June 2006 and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was reelected in October 2006. There had been an outbreak of gang violence in May 2006 (*Economist* 2006b), but nothing so widespread later in the year. Peru also had elections in 2006, a few months before the survey was fielded there in December but shows no such anomaly. In fact, only in Brazil and Uruguay in WVS5 does the number "very" interested in politics reach double digits, a result not replicated in either country in WVS6, which calls into question how much weight should be attached to any findings about political interest in WVS5 if they are not replicated in analyses of data in WVS6.

Figure 3.21: Interest in politics by country (WVS5)



Figure 3.22: Interest in politics by country (WVS6)



Sex, education and income have repeatedly been shown to correlate with increased political participation (Brady, Verba and Scholzman 1995). Fifty-four percent of WVS5 and 53% of WVS6 Latin American respondents were female[133], slightly higher than the sex ratio worldwide (World Bank). Latin America exhibits a notable surplus female population beginning around age 15 to a greater extent than the rest of the world does (Diniz Alves, Cavenaghi and Martine 2013), which might explain the slightly higher female representation in the sample.

There is a 0.3899 correlation between education and income in WVS5 and 0.3023 in WVS6.[134] Because income questions on cross-national surveys have been criticized on validity grounds, especially with WVS (Donnelly and Pop-Eleches 2016), I

[133] Question v235 in WVS5 and V240 in WVS6
[134] Question v238 and v253 and V248 and V239 in WVS6

opted to only include education. A 2016 survey by the Secretaria Especial de Comunicação Social in Brazil and IBOPE Inteligência showed that differences in media platform choice became more apparent when education level was considered (Statista NDe). The WVS question for education offers a nine-point response scale, with the options listed in Table 3.2.[135] The scale is not exactly linear with regard to educational attainment, as it distinguishes between technical/vocational school and university, with incomplete university ranked higher than complete vocational school.[136]

Table 3.2: Relative frequency distribution of educational attainment

	WVS 5	WVS 6
No formal education	2.85	1.81
Incomplete primacy school	16.19	11.87
Complete primary school	15.55	13.82
Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type	13.99	9.16
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type	22.24	17.94
Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type	3.58	9.02
Complete secondary: university-preparatory type	7.27	15.84
Some university-level education, without degree	7.87	9.17
University-level education, with degree	10.45	11.36
n	7,458	10,218
Median	5	5

At the country level, median education was 4 in half the countries (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) and 5 in the other half (Mexico, Chile and Peru). Median education was highest (6) in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia and lowest (4) in Uruguay in WVS6.

[135] Question v238 in WVS5 and V248 in WVS6

[136] As a point of comparison, the AmericasBarometer question on education (ED in the 2014 root questionnaire) asks about years of schooling between 0 and 18. It scores post-secondary non-university schooling as equivalent to university non-degree but does not distinguish between types of secondary schools.

Age is an especially important correlate of Internet use (Pew Research Center 2015). For WVS 5, mean age was 41.04 (SD 16.63) with median 38. In WVS6, mean age was 41.05 (SD 16.54), with median 39. The range for both surveys was ages 18 to 97.[137]

There is significant variation by country (Table 3.3). The sample in Uruguay skews much older than in the rest of the region. Mexico and Peru have the lowest mean ages. The standard deviations are highest in Uruguay and Argentina in both surveys.

Table 3.3: Summary statistics for age

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	*n*
ARG (WVS5)	42.55	17.59	18	88	1002
ARG (WVS6)	43.17	17.61	18	92	1030
BRZ (WVS5)	39.96	15.68	18	84	1499
BRZ (WVS6)	42.82	16.37	18	98	1486
CHL (WVS5)	42.93	16.98	18	85	1000
CHL (WVS6)	43.89	16.29	18	85	1000
COL (WVS6)	40.41	15.79	18	82	1512
ECU (WVS6)	39.81	16.14	18	97	1202
MEX (WVS5)	39.69	15.72	18	87	1550
MEX (WVS6)	37.48	15.18	18	93	2000
PER (WVS5)	37.62	14.90	18	89	1500
PER (WVS6)	39.42	16.40	18	88	1210
URU (WVS5)	46.53	18.65	18	97	1000
URU (WVS6)	44.99	18.28	18	88	1000

Age is important to consider in the model, as the opportunities for having done anything increases almost definitionally with age. For that same reason, it is also potentially problematic. Therefore, all models will be run with and without age as a variable.[138] I further broke age into seven categories: below 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-

[137] Quantile breakdown was identical for both surveys, in fact, with age 27 at the 25th percentile and age 53 at the 75th.
[138] There is no reason to believe that the effect of age on participation would be parabolic, as the operationalization of the dependent variable is. Were the question worded to ask about binary participation in the past year, for example, the time constraints on those in middle age might limit responses. But that is not the case for the questions in WVS5 or WVS6.

69, 70-79, and 80 or above. This preserves the effect of age, broadly conceived, without the noise of a yearly measure.

Figure 3.23: Age distribution by country (WVS5)



Figure 3.24: Age distribution by country (WVS6)



Urbanization is also important as a correlate of Internet use[139] and potentially for the opportunity to participate in more political activities, as they are more likely in urban centers.[140] At approximately 80%, Latin America is more urbanized than Europe (USAID 2010). but has a much bigger digital divide than industrialized democracies. Computer penetration also outpaces Internet penetration (CEPAL 2006), which may be exacerbated in rural areas. For example, across seven Latin countries studied, living in a rural area was negatively associated with computer and Internet use (Grazzi and Vergara 2014, 340-341).[141]

[139] Galperin (2017) notes that supply-side determinants are only part of why people do not go online.
[140] Kawashima-Ginsberg and Sullivan (2017) note that many rural youth in the United States, for example, are systematically less exposed to opportunities for political learning or engagement.
[141] Results were significant in all countries except Mexico.

WVS5 and WVS6 both have the interviewer note the size of the town, from under 2,000 in habitants (coded 1) to larger than half a million (coded 8).[142] For both surveys, median city size was between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. In both surveys, over two-thirds of respondents reported living in the largest cities of over 100,000 residents. I therefore collapsed the coding into four items: below 20,000; 20,000 to 100,000; 100,000 to 500,000 (coded 7 in the original survey); and over 500,000.

Table 3.4: Urban-rural distribution (in percent)

	Under 20,000	20,000-100,000	100,000 – 500,000	500,000 or more
ARG (WVS5)	19.96	9.98	7.98	62.08
ARG (WVS6)	15.53	13.59	7.77	63.11
BRZ (WVS5)	16.67	26.67	26.67	30.00
BRZ (WVS6)	10.95	30.47	19.37	39.20
CHL (WVS5)	0	16.10	83.90	0
CHL (WVS6)	5.70	5.90	34.01	54.30
COL (WVS6)	4.76	33.33	23.81	38.10
ECU (WVS6)	2.41	27.95	52.75	16.89
MEX (WVS5)	33.85	14.62	21.54	30.00
MEX (WVS6)	42.38	32.06	7.30	18.27
PER (WVS6)[143]	37.36	19.59	40.50	2.56
URU (WVS5)	34.90	21.50	0	43.60
URU (WVS6)	14.60	30.97	0.14	54.30

The centralized responses from Chile in WVS5 (with no responses at either extreme) are strange, since the question was worded the same as the other surveys and there was no issue with non-response, as it was an interviewer-filled item. In 2002, the Chilean census estimated the population of the capital Santiago at around 5.5 million in

[142] Question V255 in WVS5 and V253 in WVS6. Full original coding: under 2000 (1); 2000 to 5000 (2); 5000 to 10,000 (3); 10,000 to 20,000 (4); 20,000 to 50,000 (5); 50,000 to 100,000 (6); 100,000 to 500,000 (7); 500,000 or more (8).

[143] Question not included for Peru in WVS5

habitants, or about one-third the population of the country, according to the World Bank.

Ideology is a means to study political leanings when party affiliation or vote choice may not be comparable in a cross-national context. Put another way, comparing party identification is normal for one-country studies, but party identification does not translate across borders[144] and may, in high turnover environments, be unreliable. For example, a quarter of Brazilian lower house members have changed parties since 2015 (Clavery, Holanda and Bramatti 2017; @bruceecurb 2017). WVS mentions this problem itself. In the root questionnaire for WVS5, question V233a included the following caveat:

> "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Christian Democrat, a Social Democrat, a supporter of some other party or don't you have any strong party loyalty?" [NOTE: This question is optional because it may not work in societies having a fragmented or unstable party system.]"

In such fragmented societies, the preferred alternative is to compare self-reported ideology. Further, ideology has become salient to Latin American electoral politics in the past two decades, as the "pink tide" of leftist candidates have swept into office (Remmer 2012; Seligson 2007). WVS5 and WVS6 both operationalized the concept with the same question:

> In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Code one number):
> Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right[145]

[144] WVS mentions this issue itself. In the root questionnaire for WVS5, for example, this question was included: "V233a. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Christian Democrat, a Social Democrat, a supporter of some other party or don't you have any strong party loyalty? [NOTE: This question is optional because it may not work in societies having a fragmented or unstable party system.]"
[145] Question V114 in WVS5 and V95 in WVS6

The median and mode for both WVS5 and WVS6 was 5.[146] At the country level, only Mexico (in both waves) and Colombia (in WVS6) had means not the center point, but rather at 6 (slightly right-leaning[147]).[148]

Including race or some measure of indigenous status or colorism would be appropriate. Both surveys have the interviewer code race,[149] but race or skin color is not included in the forthcoming models. The question (v256) was not asked in Argentina in either wave of the survey. More problematically, where it was asked, is not clearly scalable, nor was the question consistent:

For Ecuador and Chile in WVS6 and Mexico in both waves of the survey, the question included the following options, which tracks to studies of colorism: White, light brown, dark brown, Black, Indigenous, other. For other countries, the same choices were not included:

> Uruguay (both waves): Caucasian/White, Black, South Asian (Hindu, Pakistani), East Asian (Chinese, Japanese), Arabic/Central Asian, other
>
> Colombia: Indigenous, Afro-Colombiano, Gypsy, none

---

[146] Modal response at 32% of all respondents in both waves.

[147] The lack of left-leaning voices may be an artifact of the countries in WVS. There is also some evidence that the region is turning away from leftist leaders after years of economic stagnation or recession (Haynie 2017, Kraul 2016, Sharma 2016)

[148] Before beginning regression analysis, it is important to check for multicollinearity, lest sampling variance be so large as to be useless (Fox 2008, 331). The only high correlation is between education and Internet news consumption, at 0.4965 and 0.4798 in WVS5 and WVS6, respectively. The variable inflation factor (VIF) provides an index that measures how much the variance of a coefficient might be increased due to collinearity. An index of 2 would mean that the standard error, used to construct the confidence interval, were 1.44 times (the square root of 2), as large as it would be if the factors are uncorrelated. VIF on the samples show no problematic collinearity. Testing for VIF in:

- WVS5, none of the confidence intervals approach two, which would suggest collinearity: country (1.08), female (1.02), age (1.15), education (1.60), interest in politics (1.06), ideology (1.02), income (1.28), newspaper (1.20), TV/radio (1.05), Internet (1.42).
- WVS6, none of the confidence intervals approach two, which would suggest collinearity: country (1.05), female (1.03), age (1.20), income(1.17), education (1.44), ideology (1.01), interest in politics (1.06), newspaper (1.18), television (1.05), radio (1.09), Internet (1.48).

[149] V256 in WVS5 and V254 in WVS6

Additionally, there was in-country variation between survey waves:

> Brazil WVS5: White, Black, *Moreno* (dark) or *Pardo* (brown), Asian, Indigenous, other
>
> Brazil WVS6: White, Black, East Asian, Indigenous, Mixed race, other
>
> Peru WVS5: White, *Mestizo* (European-indigenous), Quechua, Aymara[150], Amazonian, Black
>
> Peru WVS6: White/European, Indigenous, Indigenous mixed, European-indigenous, Afro-indigenous, Asian-indigenous, Other foreign/ethnic origin, other

Arguably most problematically, in Chile in WVS5, the interviewer did not note ethnicity but the question was asked in a way to gauge self-identified race or ethnicity: "How would you describe yourself ethnically?"[151] Choices were as follows: Asian, Black, Indigenous, *Mestizo* (European-indigenous), *Mulato* (Afro-indigenous), White, Other. The methodological appendix for the survey notes that answers were then recoded as follows: Asian cases were dropped, Black remained the same, Indigenous and *Mulato* were combined with "other" cases, and White and *Mestizo* were combined as White. This reflects not only a potentially quite important judgement call – for example assuming that White Chileans and *Mestizo* Chileans are similar enough to be grouped together – but also removed almost all variation from the question, as White and Mestizo accounted for 881 of 1000 respondents.

For these various reasons, I have opted to exclude race/ethnicity/color from the cross-national analysis, as it could not be scaled by skin tone.

[150] Quecha and Aymara are specific indigenous ethnicities in country.
[151] Question S1 substituted for V256: ¿A qué raza se considera perteneciente Usted?

Regression Model

To test the importance of each individual medium on political participation, I constructed generalized ordered logit models for each country. My decision to do so was influenced by two factors. First, the limited number of countries available for analysis in the data render hierarchical linear modeling analysis (HLM) inappropriate.[152]

Second, because the response levels for the participation variables are ordered categories, ranging from "never" (0) to "have done" (2), the logical alternative was to use ordered logit regression. However, using ordered logit assumes proportional parallel lines or parallel regressions (Williams 2006), meaning that the values for the independent variables should stay constant regardless of whether the response level for the dependent variable changes from the lowest to the middle category or from the middle to the highest category. However, a Brant test (1990) demonstrated that this assumption did not hold for most of the countries in my sample across all forms of political engagement. Specifically, for petitioning in WVS5, for example, all countries except Brazil fail the Brant test by showing a significant p-value on a Chi-squared test. Four of six countries in WVS5 fail the Brant test for demonstrating, with regular ordered logit only appropriate in Brazil and Chile. In WVS6, for petitioning, all eight countries failed the Brant test; and seven of eight fail the Brant test for striking, with only Ecuador passing the test for that form of participation.

Generalized ordered logit regression relaxes the assumption of parallel lines without losing the ordering of the categories, as multinomial logit would have (R

[152] Significant variations at the country-level, such as for political participation as well as for media consumption, usually calls for analysis using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), but HLM usually requires having a minimum of 15 countries to yield unbiased results when the outcome of interest is at the individual level (Stegmueller 2013, 753). See Woltman et al (2012) for more on when HLM is appropriate to use.

Williams 2016).[153] Relaxing the assumption of proportionality also allows for testing if the variables are truly ordinal (Williams 2006).[154] For rare events, such as boycotting or strikes, committing to the decision to participate could be much different than changing one's mind from "never" doing something to "possibly" doing something.

Generalized ordered logit can be sensitive to over-specification. Specifically, overspecified models can yield negative predicted probabilities.[155] If few in number, negative predicted probabilities are not a problem. But, when numerous, negative predicted probabilities suggest a simpler model is preferable (R Williams 2016). In those cases for which generalized ordered logit is too sensitive, the recommendation is to use ordered logit, dropping the variables that violate the Brant test (R Williams 2016).[156] In this analysis, that variable was age. That might be somewhat attributable to question wording in WVS or to a respondent's becoming more comfortable with age saying she "might" or "has" participated. The results below report the most appropriate model for each possible political activity: generalized ordered logit for petitioning, regular ordered logit for boycotting, generalized ordered logit for peaceful demonstrations and ordered logit for joining a strike.

---

[153] Generalized ordered logit models "can be less restrictive than proportional odds models, whose assumptions are often violated, and more parsimonious than methods like multinomial logit that ignore the ordering of categories altogether" (Williams 2010, 1)

[154] Boes and Winkelmann (2004) use generalized ordered logit to show more nuance in the relationship between income and happiness than ordered logit would illustrate. Using generalized ordered logit, they find that the marginal probability of increased happiness attributable to income increases by more than 50% over findings employing regular ordered logit (2004, 20).

[155]This warning message appears: WARNING! X in-sample cases have an outcome with a predicted probability that is less than 0.

[156] Whole models can violate the parallel assumption, but that is often attributable to specific variables in the model. Stata reports failures for the overall model as well as its component parts, allowing one to discern which variables are throwing off any given model.

To test the importance of each individual medium, the equation for WVS5 is:

Type of Political participation = $\alpha + \beta_1$Gender + β_2Age + β_3**Education level** + β_4**Left**-Right Ideology + β_5City Size + β_6Political Interest + β_7**Frequency** of newspaper readership + β_8**Frequency of TV/radio news consumption**+ β_9Frequency of Internet news use + ε

To test the importance of each individual medium, the equation for WVS6 is:

Type of Political participation = $\alpha + \beta_1$Gender + β_2Age + β_3**Education level** + β_4**Left**-Right Ideology + β_5**City Size** + β_6Political Interest + β_7**Frequency** of newspaper readership + β_8**Frequency of TV news consumption**+ β_9Frequency of radio news consumption + β_{10}**Frequency of Internet news** use+ ε

The section below presents results. The next section will discuss implications of the statistical findings relative to theory presented in the previous chapter.

Findings

To begin extrapolating the relationship between news consumption and type of political participation, I first look at the least onerous type of activity: signing a petition.[157] Results of the generalized ordered logit for signing a petition are provided in Table 3.7.

[157] Using simple ordered logit, all countries except Chile in WVS6 show a violation of the parallel odds assumption, largely attributable to age. Grouping age into deciles solves the Brant problem only for Brazil in WVS5. Employing generalized ordered logit seems, therefore, preferable for petitioning.

Table 3.5: Generalized ordered logit model coefficients for petitioning by country in WVS5 and WVS6

	Argentina			
	WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	0.2566	0.3262	- 0.1109	0.2418
Age	- 0.0060	0.0003	- 0.0005	0.1010
Education	0.2681***	0.1988***	0.0915*	0.1187*
City Size	- 0.0839	0.3468***	0.1451*	0.0179
Left-right ideology	- 0.0661	- 0.1609**	- 0.1403**	- 0.1790***
Political Interest	0.5036***	0.3217**	0.5234**	0.4317***
News-paper use	- 0.0418	0.2945	0.0610	0.0442
TV news use	0.3750	0.1574	0.3850***	0.0697
Radio news use			0.0456	0.0025
Internet news use	0.2702	0.2184	0.1224*	0.2072***
n	636		760	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit model coefficients for petitioning by country in WVS5 and WVS6

	Brazil			
	WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.0013	- 0.1675	- 0.1356	- 0.0088
Age	- o.0140**	- 0.0063	- 0.0159**	- 0.0039
Education	0.2061***	0.1810***	0.0153***	0.1206***
City Size	0.2124**	0.3067***	- 0.0497	0.1497*
Left-right ideology	- 0.0517	- 0.0366	- 0.0082	- 0.0488*
Political Interest	0.4005***	0.2215***	0.3950***	0.3216***
News-paper use	- 0.1195	- 0.0295	- 0.0381	- 0.0445
TV news use	0.8441***	0.5266**	0.0821	0.2060**
Radio news use			- 0.0335	0.0126
Internet news use	0.1620	0.3385	- 0.0083	0.1087*
n	1324		1014	

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country in WVS5 and WVS6

	Chile				Colombia WV6	
	WVS5		WVS6			
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.0276	- 0.1347	- 0.1415	0.1703	0.0154	0.2314
Age	- 0.0033	0.0177*	0.0088	0.0216**	0.0083	0.0423***
Education	0.1628***	0.1942	0.0102	0.1395*	0.1965***	0.2151***
City Size	- 0.3528	- 0.2703	- 0.3602**	- 0.2867*	0.0551	- 0.0227
Left-right ideology	- 0.0755	-0.0742	- 0.1336**	- 0.1757***	0.0282	- 0.0410
Political Interest	0.5831***	0.5723***	0.4592***	0.4601***	0.4575***	0.3594***
News-paper use	0.2679	0.2025	- 0.0149	0.0882	0.1145*	0.0346
TV news use	- 0.8358*	0.2847	- 0.2431	- 0.0385**	0.0179	- 0.0264
Radio news use			- 0.0182	- 0.1830**	- 0.0235	- 0.0055
Internet news use	0.1037	0.3955	0.3128***	0.2891***	0.1841***	0.2232***
n	690		659		1206	

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country in WVS5 and WVS6

	Ecuador WVS6[158]		Mexico			
			WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	0.0320	0.2107	- 0.1478	- 0.8463	- 0.1277	0.0588
Age	- 0.0003	0.0131*	0.0007	0.3147***	- 0.0012	0.0301***
Education	0.0627	0.0993*	0.116***	0.1561***	0.1839***	0.2042***
City Size	0.4775***	0.3510**	- 0.0272	0.0114	- 0.1159*	- 0.0650
Left-right ideology	-0.0965***	- 0.0511	- 0.0109	- 0.0123	0.0138	- 0.0007
Political Interest	0.3258***	0.0594	0.5028***	0.6019***	0.3860***	0.3021***
News-paper use	- 0.1283*	0.0947	0.4192	0.0244	0.0589	0.0345
TV news use	-0.1471	0.0794	0.3545	0.0939	0.0742	0.0762
Radio news use	0.1227*	- 0.0041			- 0.0193	0.0010
Internet news use	0.1687***	0.0663	0.3904*	0.3180	0.1225**	0.1086**
n		1138		1251		1872

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[158] Three cases returned a negative predicted probability.

Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country in WVS5 and WVS6

	Peru			
	WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.1222	- 0.2344	- 0.2331	0.0635
Age	0.0010	0.0222***	0.0005	0.0219***
Education	0.1273***	0.2071***	0.0943*	0.0989*
City Size			- 0.1183	- 0.2060*
Left-right ideology	- 0.0359	- 0.0425	- 0.0208	- 0.0345
Political Interest	0.5701***	0.4647***	0.3877***	0.4967***
News-paper use	0.1208	0.0258	0.0153	- 0.1618
TV news use	0.0712	0.2446	0.1238	0.4153
Radio news use			- 0.1932***	- 0.1629*
Internet news use	- 0.1222	- 0.4569**	0.0320	0.0190
n	1083		924	

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country in WVS5 and WVS6

	Uruguay			
	WVS5		WVS6[159]	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	0.0328	0.0460	- 0.1912	0.1457
Age	- 0.0016	0.0121*	- 0.0035	0.0299***
Education	0.1243*	0.1830***	0.1691***	0.0981
City Size	0.0619	0.1559*	- 0.0430	- 0.1882*
Left-right ideology	- 0.0782*	- 0.1185**	- 0.0354	- 0.1398***
Political Interest	0.6278***	0.5743***	0.3064**	0.4423***
News-paper use	0.1119	0.3322	0.0885	0.0465
TV news use	0.6850*	0.6014	- 0.1669	0.0115
Radio news use			0.0394	- 0.0851
Internet news use	- 0.2277	- 0.0498	0.0100	0.2509***
n	848		580	

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[159] Nine cases returned a negative predicted probability.

Beginning by comparing within each wave, among the six countries in WVS5, only political interest and education were consistently significant for petitioning, with no media consumption variables at all consistently significant across the sample. Within WVS6, only Internet news consumption shows up regularly as a media predictor of petitioning, with political interest and education the most regular non-media predictors. The significance of the other media variables in WVS6 is sporadic.

Changing gears to look across space instead of time, only Internet news consumption performed in line with expectations, but only in WVS6. In WVS5, there was no relationship between petitioning and Internet news consumption. I did observe the relationship being significant, though in opposite directions, in two outlier countries for WVS5: for transitioning from the "would never" to either "might" or "have done" response levels in Mexico and for transitioning move from "would never" or "might" to "have done" in Peru. In Mexico, when all else is held constant, answering in the affirmative for Internet news consumption in the previous week results in a 47.8% increase in the odds of the respondent indicating that she might sign or had signed a petition. In Peru, however, answering in the affirmative for Internet news consumption resulted in a 46.7% decrease in the odds of the respondent indicating that he "has signed" as opposed to "might sign" or "would never" sign a petition. WVS5 was fielded in Mexico in late 2005 and in Peru in late 2006, at which time Internet penetration was only about 16% in both countries (Mexico Internet Association and Computer Industry Almanac cited by Internet World Statistics).[160] A large impact on a small portion of the population could have appeared as an outsized effect.

---

[160] Retrieved from Internet World Statistics country pages for Mexico and Peru (April 28, 2018).

For seven out of eight countries in WVS6, Internet news consumption had a consistently positive and significant relationship with petitioning. For Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, Internet news consumption was positive and significant for both cutpoints for petitioning ("would never" to "might do" or "have done" and "would never" or "might do" to "have done"). For Ecuador, Internet news consumption was significant for going from "would never" to "might" or "have done" and, in Uruguay, it was for the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done." In most cases, the significance represented an 11% to 25% change. The outlier was Chile, with an over 30% impact on both decision points.[161] Interestingly, in Peru, Internet news consumption was not significant for petitioning in WVS6, despite having been in WVS5.

There were very few instances in which newspaper readership was significant for petitioning in either waves: positive and significant in Colombia and negative and significant in Ecuador, in both cases for the move from "would never" to "might" or "have done" in WVS6. In Colombia, newspaper readership was associated with a 12% increase in likelihood for responding that one had petitioned; whilst in Ecuador the same was associated with a 12% decrease.[162]

For the combined TV/radio measure in WVS5, answering in the affirmative for TV/radio news consumption in the previous week almost doubles the odds for a respondent to move from "would never" or "might" to "have done" in Uruguay.[163] In Chile, someone who consumed TV/radio news in the previous week was almost 60% less

[161] Odds ratios in WVS6: Argentina 1.13026 and 1.2302; Brazil 1.1148 for the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done;" Chile 1.3673 and 1.3352; Colombia 1.2021 and 1.2501; ECU 1.1839 for the move from never to "might" or "have done; Mexico 1.1190 and 1.1148; and Uruguay 1.2852 for the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done."
[162] Odds ratio 1.1213 in Colombia and 0.8796 in Ecuador
[163] Odds ratio 1.9838

likely to report considering ("might do") or having signed a petition.[164] In Brazil, the impact of moving from "would never" to "might" or "have done" is much larger than the impact of moving from "would never" or "might" to "have done" – a 133% increase in the odds for the former versus a 69% increase in the odds for the latter.[165]

Disaggregated in WVS6, the importance of television and radio news consumption is easier to tease out. Television news consumption was positive and significant in Argentina and Brazil, and negative and significant in Chile. Specifically, a one-unit increase in television news consumption in Argentina was associated with a 46% higher probability of going from "would never" to might sign or "have done" and was associated with a 23% increase in Brazil in having gone from "would never" or "might" to "have done." Conversely, in Chile, respondents were 32% less likely to go from "would never" or "might do" to "have done" with a one-unit increase in the consumption of television news.

Relative to radio news consumption, findings are even more muddled. Radio news consumption was positive and associated with the move from "would never" to "might" or "have done" in Ecuador, as well as negative and significant with the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done" in Chile. In Peru, radio news consumption in WVS6 was negative and associated with both cutpoints. Specifically, in Peru, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption resulted in a 15-17% decrease in likelihood of petitioning.[166] In Chile, the same was associated with a 17% decrease,

---

[164] Odd radio 0.4335
[165] Odds ratios 2.3259 and 1.6931, respectively
[166] Odds ratios 0.8243 and 0.8501, respectively

whilst in Ecuador, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was related to a 13% increase in likelihood of moving from "never" to either response above that.[167]

In terms of other independent variables, not limited to those of interest with media, political interest had a significant and positive relationship with petitioning across all countries for both cutpoints, save one (the move from never or might to "have done" in Ecuador in WVS6). Education was also positive and significant for 24 out of 28 instances in this combined dataset, only insignificant for Chile (twice), Ecuador and Uruguay, at times. Ideology was insignificant more than it was significant; and even when it was, the relationship was not consistently positive or negative across countries. City size, rarely significant, was also inconsistently associated with petitioning, suggesting that the relationship between opportunities to sign petitions and urbanization may not be monotonic.

Finally, gender was at no point significant for any instance of petitioning; but age was significant in every instance of the survey in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru & Uruguay for moving from "would never" or "might do" to "have done."[168] However, in most instances, age had a small impact, with a one-year increase in age increasing the likelihood of having participated about 1.2% to 2.2%. The (relative) outlier was Mexico, where an older person was about 3% more likely to move from "would never" or "might do" to "have done," relative to petitioning.

Only in Brazil was age negative and significant, making it less likely one would move from "would never" to "might do" or "have done." Put another way, with an odds

---

[167] Odds ratio 1.1306 in Ecuador and 0.8328 in Chile

[168] Odds ratios as follows: Chile WVS5 1.017851, Mexico WVS5 1.031968, Peru WVS5 1.022438 and Uruguay WVS5 1.01219

ratio in WVS5 of 0.9861, an older person is less likely to have considered or signed a petition, or, a younger person is more likely.

Joining a boycott

With regard to the boycott participation model, the parallel lines assumption is violated only for Uruguay in WVS5; in WVS6, it is violated for five countries, with the ordered logit models only valid for Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. Though generalized ordered logit appear to be the most appropriate candidate, negative predicted probabilities appear in over half of the models.[169] More importantly, with generalized ordered logit, the number of negative predicated cases is substantial: 23 in Chile in WVS5, 29 in Colombia in WVS6 and 72 in Uruguay in WVS5. In other words, there was a non-trivial number of cases for which generalized ordered logit was inappropriate. Dropping age from the model resolves the parallel assumptions issue in almost all cases.[170] Therefore, I have excluded age as an explanatory variable in the ordered logit regression analysis on all countries for the propensity to boycott.

---

[169] Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in WVS5. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay in WVS6.
[170] Except for Uruguay in WVS5 and Chile and Ecuador in WVS6

Table 3.6: Ordered logit output for boycotting (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Argentina		Brazil		Chile		Colombia
	WVS5	WVS6	WVS5	WVS6	WVS5	WVS6[171]	WVS6
Female	- 0.2303	0.0101	- 0.2555*	- 0.5517***	- 0.2495	- 0.1293	- 0.0905
Education	0.1145*	0.0654	0.1317***	0.1355***	0.0877	- 0.0762	0.1563***
City Size	0.1499	0.0139	0.1512*	0.0731	0.1886	- 0.0201	- 0.1401*
Left-right ideology	- 0.1315*	- 0.1557**	- 0.0821**	- 0.0312	- 0.0937	- 0.1978***	- 0.0968***
Political Interest	0.3303**	0.2948**	0.2788***	0.4033***	0.2787**	0.4140***	0.3268***
News-paper use	0.3021	0.0210	0.0864	0.1007*	0.2793	- 0.1397	0.0859*
TV news use	- 0.4082	- 0.1620	0.5172*	- 0.1641*	- 0.4687	- 0.2431	0.1428
Radio news use		0.1547*		- 0.0421		0.0363	0.0453
Internet news use	0.0860	0.0694	0.4516**	0.0228	- 0.2195	0.2580***	0.1730***
n	624	751	1297	973	692	658	1215

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[171] Fails Brant test (Chi-square 0.000)

Table 3.6 (cont): Ordered logit output for boycotting (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Ecuador	Mexico		Peru		Uruguay	
	WVS6[172]	WVS5	WVS6	WVS5	WVS6	WVS5[173]	WVS6
Female	- 0.0586	- 0.4535**	- 0.3160*	- 0.1627	- 0.4375*	- 0.4867*	- 0.6705**
Education	- 0.0445	0.0501	0.0633*	0.0671	0.0630	0.0813	0.1209
City Size	0.5847***	- 0.1550	- 0.0500		0.0020	0.2358*	0.2126*
Left-right ideology	0.1033*	- 0.0371	0.0018	- 0.0975**	- 0.0632	- 0.1045	- 0.1307*
Political Interest	0.4113***	0.3886***	0.3516***	0.3138***	0.2537**	0.3439**	0.5551***
News-paper use	- 0.0012	0.0397	- 0.0795	0.0894	- 0.0793	0.5657*	0.0355
TV news use	- 0.2792*	- 0.0914	- 0.0937	- 0.3990	- 0.0902	- 0.0186	- 0.3230**
Radio news use	0.1988*		0.0247		- 0.0110		- 0.0975
Internet news use	0.1680*	0.3144	0.0825	0.3948**	0.1449**	0.3137	0.2045**
n	1138	1171	1829	1066	919	845	580

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[172] Fails Brant test (Chi-square 0.010)
[173] Fails Brant test (Chi-square 0.009)

Again, beginning looking within each wave (Table 3.8), the only consistent predictor in WVS5 was political interest, with no media variables regularly predictive in that iteration of the survey. In WVS6, along with media variables, both education and ideology become sporadically significant, but, again, no variable other than political interest appears as important everywhere.

Though Internet news consumption was widely significant for petitioning in WVS6, it was significant in only half of the cases for boycotting (Table 3.8). Among the six countries in both WVS5 and WVS6, only in Peru was Internet news consumption significant for participating via boycott. It was never significant in Argentina or Mexico in either survey wave.

Though always positive, the impact of Internet news consumption varied widely, and the impact was much larger in WVS5 than in WVS6. In WVS5, Internet news consumption was only significant for boycotting in Brazil and Peru, in both cases making it dramatically more likely that a person would boycott: a Peruvian respondent who had consumed Internet news in the past week was 48% more likely to report willingness to protest and a similar Brazilian respondent was 57% more likely. In WVS6, Internet news consumption was significant in five of the eight countries in the sample. A one-unit increase in Internet news consumption was associated with a 15.6% to 29% increase in propensity to boycott.[174]

Newspaper readership was rarely significant, just once in WVS5 and twice in WVS6. In Uruguay in WVS5 the impact was large: someone who consumed news via print the following week was 76.6% more likely to express a willingness to consider

[174] Odds ratios as follows: 1.1559 in Peru, 1.1829 in Ecuador, 1.1889 in Colombia, 1.2269 in Uruguay and 1.2943 in Chile.

boycotting or to actually do it. In Colombia and Brazil in WVS6, though, the impact was modest: a one-unit change in newspaper readership was associated with a 9% and 10.6% increase in the likelihood of expressing willingness to boycott.

Neither television news consumption nor radio news had consistent relationships with boycotting. The combined item in WVS5 (when the news consumption variable was binary) was significant only once, in Brazil where consumption of TV/radio news the previous week was associated with a 67.7% increase in willingness to boycott. Disaggregated in WVS6, television news consumption was negative and significant in Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay. In these countries, a one-unit increase in television news consumption was associated with a 15.2%, 24.4% and 27.6% decrease in likelihood of boycotting, respectively. Disaggregated radio news consumption was positive and significant twice, in Argentina and Ecuador. In Argentina, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 16.7% increase in the likelihood of boycotting, whilst in Ecuador that number was 22%. It is important to note that, from WVS5 to WVS6, the sign changes for significance in Brazil and, though both television and radio were significant for boycotting in WVS6, they were not when measured as a combined variable in WVS5 (possibly because of the different directions of the signs in WVS6).

The only control variable that consistently predicted likelihood of boycotting was political interest, which was positive and significant in every country in both waves. When significant — both survey waves in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, and additionally in Peru in WVS6 — being female rendered one less likely to join a boycott. Education was positive and significant in four of the eight countries, with a one-unit increase in

education corresponding to a 6% to 21% increase in likelihood to boycott.[175] City size was significant in four countries, but in different directions. Ideology was significant in all countries except Mexico in at least one survey wave, with being more left-leaning associated with higher willingness to boycott in all but Ecuador, where being more right-leaning associated with greater likelihood to boycott.

Interestingly, no media at all were significantly associated with boycotting in Mexico.

Demonstrating

In WVS5, the propensity to participate in a demonstration was the only question about any kind of public protest. In WVS6, that question was disaggregated into peaceful demonstrations and strikes. For both waves, ordered logit models failed the Brant test in all countries except Brazil and Chile in WVS5 and Brazil and Ecuador in WVS6, suggesting that the decision calculus for demonstrating is very different for transitioning from "would never" to "might do" than it is from "might do" to "have done."[176]

[175] Odds ratios 1.21 in Argentina in WVS5, 1.14 in Brazil for both survey waves, and 1.16 in Colombia and 1.06 in Mexico in WVS6

[176] Employing generalized ordered logit, very few cases yield negative predicted probabilities (4 cases in Uruguay in WVS5, 7 cases in Uruguay in WVS6, 1 case each in Chile and Ecuador in WVS6). Referring back to Williams (2016), with few cases of negative predicted probabilities, a researcher should continue with generalized ordered logit.

Table 3.7: Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Argentina			
	WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	0.2736	0.5505**	- 0.1801	0.2600
Age	- 0.0074	0.0045	- 0.0114*	0.0034
Education	0.2248***	0.2233***	0.0880*	0.2180***
City Size	- 0.0024	0.2370*	0.0677	- 0.0706
Left-right ideology	- 0.1326**	- 0.1834***	- 0.2219***	- 0.2054***
Political Interest	0.5235***	0.3991***	0.4356***	0.4634***
News-paper use	- 0.1567	- 0.0995	0.0258	0.0654
TV news use	0.2961	- 0.6426*	0.1659	- 0.1161
Radio news use			0.1212*	0.0977
Internet news use	0.2159	0.1368	0.1394**	0.0630
n	643		764	

* $p< 0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$

Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Brazil			
	WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.0191	0.0069	- 0.2560	- 0.1786
Age	- 0.0074	0.0033	- 0.0222***	- 0.0004
Education	0.2038***	0.1876***	0.1241***	0.1452***
City Size	- 0.0917	- 0.0562	- 0.0878	0.0092
Left-right ideology	-0.0688**	- 0.0387	- 0.0309	- 0.0501
Political Interest	0.4166***	0.4365***	0.4575***	0.3811***
News-paper use	- 0.0684	0.1273	0.0495	0.0435
TV news use	0.5013**	0.3397	0.0416	- 0.0147
Radio news use			0.0140	0.0789
Internet news use	0.0962	0.4042*	0.0240	0.1220
n		1321		1022

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Chile				Colombia WV6	
	WVS5		WVS6[177]			
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.0639	- 0.0956	- 0.2900	- 0.0785	- 0.2061	- 0.1847
Age	- 0.0118*	- 0.0058	- 0.0076	- 0.0060	- 0.0140**	0.0141*
Education	0.1213*	0.0657	0.0791	0.0974	0.1073***	0.2344***
City Size	- 0.0218	0.0002	- 0.2447*	0.1230	0.0272	- 0.1293
Left-right ideology	- 0.1242**	- 0.1560***	- 0.2487***	- 0.2967***	- 0.0305	- 0.1099***
Political Interest	0.6271***	0.5831***	0.6304***	0.4124***	0.5147***	0.5329***
News-paper use	0.0337	- 0.1865	- 0.1349	- 0.0821	0.0180	0.1800**
TV news use	- 0.1947	1.1880	- 0.0826	- 0.3034*	0.1992	0.2140
Radio news use			0.0782	- 0.0416	0.0016	0.0936
Internet news use	0.1805	0.5055*	0.3020***	0.2361*	0.1131*	0.1444**
n	690		666		1220	

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[177] One case returned a negative predicted probability.

Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Ecuador WVS6[178]		Mexico			
			WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.3963**	- 0.2333	- 0.1673	- 0.0353	- 0.3004**	- 0.2986
Age	- 0.0035	0.0071	0.0058	0.0371***	- 0.0020	0.0347***
Education	0.0857*	0.1717**	0.0760*	0.0789*	0.1046***	0.1695***
City Size	0.3044**	0.3699**	- 0.0841	0.0660	- 0.0489	0.0868
Left-right ideology	- 0.0094	0.0338	- 0.0595**	- 0.0206	- 0.0288	- 0.0604*
Political Interest	0.2710***	0.1492	0.5814***	0.5527***	0.3581***	0.4230***
News-paper use	- 0.0763	0.0894	- 0.1923	- 0.3759*	- 0.0367	0.0135
TV news use	- 0.0755	- 0.0865	0.1707	- 0.0739	0.0332	- 0.0608
Radio news use	0.0569	0.2229*			0.0407	0.0242
Internet news use	0.1065	0.0196	0.4813**	0.6040**	0.1025**	0.0197
n		1139		1260		1874

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[178] One case returned a negative predicted probability.

Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Peru			
	WVS5		WVS6	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.2666	- 0.1455	- 0.4084**	- 0.2493
Age	0.0060	0.0302***	- 0.1177*	0.0116
Education	0.1064**	0.2038***	0.0428	0.0937
City Size			- 0.2763***	- 0.2041*
Left-right ideology	- 0.0330	- 0.0670*	- 0.0504	- 0.0730
Political Interest	0.5458***	0.5475***	0.3941***	0.3869***
News-paper use	- 0.1404	0.1573	- 0.2040**	- 0.2037*
TV news use	0.3272	- 0.1280	0.1124	0.2116
Radio news use			- 0.0153	0.0837
Internet news use	0.4943**	0.0646	- 0.8001	- 0.0615
n		1091		939

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves

	Uruguay			
	WVS5[179]		WVS6[180]	
	Will never to might do	Might do to have done	Will never to might do	Might do to have done
Female	- 0.0677	0.0060	- 0.5220**	- 0.3909
Age	- 0.0083	0.0089	- 0.0095	0.0296***
Education	0.0808	0.0868	0.2047***	0.1209
City Size	0.1130	0.2024**	0.1761*	- 0.0161
Left-right ideology	- 0.1344***	- 0.2489***	- 0.1116**	- 0.2383***
Political Interest	0.5162***	0.6785***	0.3925***	0.5800***
News-paper use	0.1507	0.5987**	- 0.0354	- 0.1326
TV news use	0.4214	0.1121	- 0.3383**	- 0.0819
Radio news use			0.0560	- 0.0574
Internet news use	0.0174	0.0129	0.0142	0.2029*
n	848		586	

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

[179] Four cases returned a negative predicted probability.
[180] Seven cases returned a negative predicted probability.

Political interest and ideology were fairly consistent across the sample of six countries in WVS5, with education and Internet news consumption after that for many if not all the sample (Table 3.9). Within the eight countries in the sample in WVS6, neither ideology nor education was particularly repeated as a consistent predictor, with more media variables significant but varying based on the country.

For peaceful demonstrations, Internet news consumption was significantly associated with demonstrating in all countries except Ecuador in at least one WVS wave (Table 3.9). In all significant cases, the relationship was positive as expected, though the importance of Internet news consumption was equally divided between the two cutpoints. Interestingly, Internet news consumption was only significantly associated with one of four possible cutpoints (between the two survey waves) in Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. In Mexico, it was twice associated with the decision to move from "would never" to "might" or "have done" and once with the decision to move from "would never" or "might" to "have done." In Chile, Internet news consumption was significantly associated with moving from "would never" or "might" to "have done" in WVS5 and with both cutpoints in WVS6. Only for cutpoint 1 in Chile WVS6 did significance reach the 0.001 level.

The impact of Internet news consumption on demonstrating was much stronger in WVS5 than in WVS6. Having read news online last week was associated with no less than a 50% increased chance of expressing willingness to demonstrate in Brazil (for the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done"), and that effect was as high as 83% for the same move in Mexico.[181] In WVS6, the impact of a one-unit change in online

[181] Odds ratios 1.4981 for "would never" or "might" to "have done" in Brazil and 1.6577 for that same decision point in Chile, 1.6181 for "would never" to "might" or "have done" in Mexico and 1.8295 for the second cutpoint in that country, 1.6393 for "would never" to "might" or "have done" in Peru

news consumption was smaller but still notable, ranging from 10% to 26% when significant.[182] One datapoint in Chile was an outlier, with an odds ratio of 1.3525, meaning a one-unit change in Internet news consumption there was associated with a 35% increase in the probability of moving from "would never" to "might" or "have done."

Newspaper readership was only significant for demonstrating in four instances. It was positive in Colombia in WVS6 and in Uruguay in WVS5 for the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done." Newspaper readership was significant but negative for that move in Mexico in WVS5 and for both cutpoints in Peru in WVS6. Magnitude was relatively small: having read a newspaper the following week was associated with an increase of 11.9% probability of expressing willingness to demonstrate in Uruguay. A one-unit increase in newspaper readership was associated with a 19% increase in propensity to demonstrate in Colombia and that level decrease in Peru. The outlier was Mexico in WVS5, when having read a newspaper last week was associated with a 31.33% decrease in likelihood of expressing willingness to demonstrate.

The combination of TV/radio news was only significant in two countries in WVS5: negative in Argentina and positive in Brazil. Having consumed television or radio news last week made one almost half as likely to move from "would never" or "might" demonstrate to expressing that she "had done" so.[183] In Brazil, having consumed television or radio news last week was associated with a 65% increase in

[182] Odds ratios 1.1496 for "would never" to "might" or "have done" in Argentina, 1.2663 in Chile, 1.1079 in Mexico for that same move. In Uruguay, the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done" had an odds ratio of 1.2250 in Uruguay. In Colombia, the move from "would never" to "might" or "have done" had an odds ratio of 1.1969 and the move from "would never" or "might" to "have done" of 1.1554.
[183] Odds ratio 0.5259

propensity to move from “would never” to “might” or “have done” and with a 40% increase in the second cutpoint.

Even disaggregated, television and radio consumption was rarely statitistically significant for demonstrating, but there were a few instances: TV is negative in Chile and Uruguay in WVS6 and radio positive in Ecuador and Uruguay. The impact of a one-unit increase in television news resulted in a 29% decrease in propensity to move from “would never” to “might” or “have done” in Uruguay and a 26.2% decrease in likelihood of moving from “would never” or “might” to “have done” in Chile. In Ecuador, a one-unit increase in listening to radio news was associated with a 25% increased probability of moving from “would never” or “might” to “have done.” That same one-unit increase in radio news was associated with a 5.5% decrease at that cutpoint in Uruguay.

In terms of other variables, political interest was significant and positive in all countries in both waves, except for the decision to go from “would never” or “might” to “have done” in Ecuador. A one-unit increase in political interest was associated with at least a 50% increase in moving up the scale on boycotting in all cases, except the other cutpoint in Ecuador, where it was associated with a 30% increase. Age was significant in 11 of 28 decision points across the two waves of the survey, but in both directions, depending on the country. In Colombia, in fact, it was negative for “would never” to “might” or “have done” and positive for “would never” or “might” to “have done.” The magnitude for each was about 1.4%. City size also changed sign, depending on the country, significant and positive in Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay, but significant and negative in Chile and Peru. More left-leaning ideology was significant at least once in all countries except Ecuador. Finally, gender was rarely significant but negative when it was. The outlier was the move from “would never” or “might” to “have done” for

demonstrating in Argentina in WVS5, with females 31.5% more likely than males at that cutpoint.

Joining a strike

Finally, in WVS6, the likelihood of joining a strike was specifically disaggregated from more peaceful protest. All countries in the sample, save Chile, fail the Brant test. As such, generalized ordered logit was the next step in the analysis. But generalized ordered logit returned negative predicted probabilities in five of the eight Latin American countries in the WVS6 sample (five cases in Brazil, 12 in Chile, one each in Mexico and Peru, and 18 cases in Uruguay). Equal to what was done with boycotting therefore, age was dropped from the model and ordered logit run (Table 3.10).

Table 3.8: Ordered logit output for joining a strike (coefficients) by country for WVS6

	ARG	BRZ	CHL	COL	ECU	MEX	PER	URU
Female	- 0.0706	- 0.2523*	- 0.3962*	- 0.2169	- 0.3534*	- 0.4973***	- 0.4209**	- 0.4375*
Education	0.1232**	0.1033***	0.0761	0.1290***	0.0191	0.1077***	0.0001	0.1431**
City Size	- 0.0520	0.1423	- 0.3395**	- 0.1365	0.4038***	- 0.0887	- 0.2757***	0.0342
Left-right ideology	- 0.1703***	- 0.0577**	-0.2820***	- 0.0850**	0.0336	- 0.0377*	- 0.0632*	- 0.1611***
Political Interest	0.1569*	0.2593***	0.3359***	0.3515***	0.1389	0.3172***	0.4036***	0.4426***
News-paper use	0.0908	0.0359	- 0.0840	0.1404**	- 0.0451	0.0116	- 0.1407*	0.0090
TV news use	0.0760	0.0916	- 0.1109	0.0670	- 0.1066	0.0079	0.0437	- 0.0685
Radio news use	0.1313*	- 0.0578	0.0362	0.0049	0.0544	0.0454	- 0.0576	- 0.0126
Internet news use	0.1698***	0.0910*	0.2018***	0.1765***	0.1486**	0.1034**	0.0005	0.0663
n	756	1023	657	1222	1139	1880	943	591

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Internet news consumption is positive and significant in six of the eight countries, only not so in Peru and Uruguay. A one-unit increase in Internet news consumption was associated with in a 10% to 20% increase in likelihood of expressing willingness to strike.[184] Among traditional media, there are only three instances in which news consumption is significant: newspaper readership is positive and significant in Colombia, but negative in Peru. In both cases, a one-unit increase resulted in an approximately 14% change, higher in Colombia and lower in Peru. Radio listenership is positive and significant in Argentina, with a one-unit increase in radio news associated with a 14% increase in likelihood of joining a strike.

In fact, even political interest is not a consistent predictor of striking in this sample, as it is not significantly associated in Ecuador. Nor is ideology significant there, though being more left-leaning is significant in the other seven countries in the sample. Education is positive and significant in five of the countries, with being female negative and significant in six. In terms of magnitude, women were at least 30% less likely than men to express willingness to consider striking or do so.

Finally, city size was significant in three of the countries, but with different signs: negative in Chile and Peru, but positive in Ecuador. Magnitude varied: in Chile a one-unit increase in city size was associated with a 25% decrease in likelihood to strike, while that same change in Peru resulted in only a 6% decrease. In Ecuador, a one-unit increase in city size was associated with a 15% increase in propensity to strike.

[184] Odds ratios 1.1850 in ARG, 1.952 in Brazil, 1.2236 in Chile, 1.1931 in Colombia, 1.1602 in Ecuador and 1.1089 in Mexico

Discussion

Returning to the theory presented in the previous chapter, I expected that media entities perceived as more independent of the government would be more likely to challenge the status quo; and, consequently, consumers of those outlets would be more likely to behave in ways to challenge the status quo. Across the full sample, media was significant for political engagement on median 9 times (out of 39 for the six countries in both waves and out of 24 possible instances for Colombia and Ecuador). In no country were results exactly in line with expectations. The closest was in Mexico, where results were in line with expectations for newspaper, television and Internet news consumption, but where there was no expectation (but one significant finding) for radio news listenership. As in Mexico, at no point in Chile were findings against expectations. But, in the other six countries in this chapter, at least at one time, findings were against expectations (Table 3.11).

Specifically, findings met expectations as follows:

Internet news consumption: There was exactly one instance in which significant findings for Internet news consumption went against expectations. That was for petitioning in WVS5 in Peru.[185] In the other 27 instances of significance across other behaviors, consumption of Internet news was associated with increased participation challenging the status quo, as expected. Put another way, across the two waves of WVS, out of the 50 possible instances in which Internet news consumption might have been significant for behavior, results were in line with expectations in over half of those cases.

[185] For demonstrating, the sign was negative (but not significant) in Peru in WVS6.

Newspapers: For petitioning, findings were once in line with expectations and once against. For boycotting, of the three instances of newspaper significance, two were against expectations, and there was no expectation from literature for the third country. For demonstrating, findings were split – two countries in line with expectations and two against. Finally, for striking, findings were again split – once in line with expectations and once against. This sums to slightly more evidence against the theory presented in the previous chapter than for it, at least for newspaper readership.

Television and radio news, because of the combined measure in WVS5, are the toughest to connect to theory. Given the expectations laid out in Table 3.1, in which the expectations about challenging the status quo for television and radio news were different for two-thirds of the countries in the region (12 out of 18), interpreting the results of the TV/radio news consumption variable in WVS5 is difficult. For petitioning, findings from two countries ran contrary to results and there was no expectation for the third country in which TV/radio news consumption rose to significance. For boycotting, TV/radio in WVS5 was only significant (and positive) for Brazil, against expectations for television, but there was no directional expectation for radio in Brazil. The finding for demonstrating was similarly muddled: TV/radio was significant in both Argentina and Brazil (negative in the former but positive in the latter), but, in both countries, the expectation for television was to depress participation and there was no expectation for radio. That the findings were in different directions for those two countries further confuses any possible analysis.

One would hope that the disaggregation of television news from radio news in WVS6 would add some clarity. For television, for petitioning, two findings were against expectations (Argentina and Brazil), with another without any directional expectation

(Chile). For boycotting though, the three negative findings were all in line with expectations. For demonstrating, the negative finding was as expected in Uruguay but there was no directional expectation for Chile.

Finally, for radio news, for petitioning, findings in Ecuador and Peru are against expectations presented in Table 3.1. There was no directional expectation for Chile. For boycotting, the finding for Ecuador is against expectations; and there was no directional expectation for radio in Argentina. For demonstrating, findings for radio in Ecuador were against expectations. Finally, for striking, there was a positive association with radio in Argentina but no expectation from literature for that country. In short, for radio, expectations from literature largely did not hold.

Table 3.9: Summary table of media consumption significance for political engagement by country

	Argentina										
	Petition				Boycott		Demonstration				Strike
-	WVS5		WVS6		WVS5	WVS6	WVS5		WVS6		
	Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2			Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper											
TV news			+								
TV/radio								-			
Radio						+			+		+
Internet			+	+					+		+

	Brazil										
	Petition				Boycott		Demonstration				Strike
	WVS5		WVS6		WVS5	WVS6	WVS5		WVS6		
	Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2			Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper						+					
TV news				+		-					
TV/radio	+	+			+		+				
Radio											
Internet				+	+			+			+

	Chile										
	Petition				Boycott		Demonstration				Strike
	WVS5		WVS6		WVS5	WVS6	WVS5		WVS6		
	Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2			Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper											
TV news				-						-	
TV/radio	-							+			
Radio				-							
Internet			+	+		+		+	+	+	+

Red = against expectations, Yellow = unclear, Green = in line with expectations

Table 3.9 (cont): Summary table of media consumption significance for political engagement by country

	Mexico										
	Petition				Boycott		Demonstration				Strike
	WVS5		WVS6		WVS5	WVS6	WVS5		WVS6		
	Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2			Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper								-			
TV news				-							
TV/radio											
Radio				-							
Internet	+		+	+			+		+		+

	Peru										
	Petition				Boycott		Demonstration				Strike
	WVS5		WVS6		WVS5	WVS6	WVS5		WVS6		
	Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2			Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper									-	-	-
TV news											
TV/radio											
Radio			-	-							
Internet					+	+	+				

	Uruguay										
	Petition				Boycott		Demonstration				Strike
	WVS5		WVS6		WVS5	WVS6	WVS5		WVS6		
	Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2			Cut 1	Cut 2	Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper					+			+			
TV news						-			-		
TV/radio	+										
Radio											
Internet				+		+				+	

Red = against expectations, Yellow = unclear, Green = in line with expectations

Table 3.9(cont): Summary table of media consumption significance for political engagement by country

	Colombia					
	Petition		Boycott	Demonstration		Strike
	Cut 1	Cut 2		Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper	+		+		+	+
TV news						
Radio						
Internet	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Ecuador					
	Petition		Boycott	Demonstration		Strike
	Cut 1	Cut 2		Cut 1	Cut 2	
Newspaper	-					
TV news			-			
Radio	+		+		+	
Internet	+		+			

Red = against expectations, Yellow = unclear, Green = in line with expectations

The ambiguity (denoted in yellow) can be attributed to two issues: first, a lack of clear directional expectation from existing literature (as denoted by 0 in Table 3.1); and, second, the combination of the TV/radio measure, as the histories of those media platforms followed similar but nonetheless different tracts in many places. In fact, eight of the 14 instances of significance with ambiguity can be attributed to the combined TV/radio measure in WVS5.

In 35 of the 45 instances in which findings were in line with expectations, that finding can be attributed to the significance of Internet news consumption. That only five of those 35 instances occurred in WVS5 illustrates the increased prominence of online news consumption between the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey. The remainder of the expected findings relate to the depressed participation, in the aggregate, of heavier consumers of traditional media.

Results against expectations were clustered largely to identifiable irregularities between expectations and findings. The increased activity of newspaper readers in Colombia is surprising, with newspaper readership significant and positive for each activity at least once, despite being highly aligned with successive administrations. Similarly, the increased activity related to radio news consumption in Ecuador, significant for three out of four means of participation, is surprising. In both cases, revisiting the classification system, should new materials become available, seems more than appropriate. The other instances in which findings were contrary to expectations were sporadic: once each in WVS6 in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, and twice in WVS5 in Uruguay.

Comparing behaviors, media consumption was least noticeable for striking, the rarest of the types of participation included in the survey. Between countries, media had

the least measurable impact in Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. In Mexico especially, Internet news consumption was the only media platform at all associated with increased participation.

Conclusion

If anything, findings in this chapter show that news consumption is mostly positively associated with political engagement that challenges the status quo, but not in any clear way, even within each country. The fact that media was so rarely negatively associated with these four methods of political engagement lends support to the notion that greater consumption of political news likely does not depress political activity. The overwhelming importance of Internet news consumption in this sample, more than any traditional medium, suggests that the growing body of literature about the special importance of Internet news for political behavior is looking at the correct question. That said, the magnitude of impact of Internet news consumption was greater in WVS5 than in WVS6. This could mean that the impact of Internet news consumption will decrease further in the forthcoming WVS7, as worldwide online news consumption becomes more regularized.

This chapter was limited to the countries surveyed in WVS5 and WVS6. The next chapter includes countries at lower levels of development in Latin America and focuses in on the most rare but also most visible means of political engagement: protest.

Chapter 4: SECOND QUANTITATIVE TEST

The previous chapter examined how an individual's consumption of media with a reputation of more latitude to challenge the status quo might be associated with political engagement among those consuming it. Data analysis suggested limited support that media that developed under conditions making it easier to criticize the status quo related to people's willingness to petition, boycott, demonstrate and strike. These findings indicate that the medium most associated with overall political engagement is the Internet. Internet news consumption was associated with increases in propensity to petition, boycott, demonstrate, and strike in half of the cases tested. In contrast, consumption of media more aligned with the status quo, such as television and newspapers, exhibit little effect on these same behaviors.

However, the analyses undertaken in the last chapter explored the relationship between news consumption and political behavior in just eight countries. In this chapter, I extend that analysis by including more than double the number of countries within Latin America using a different dataset – the AmericasBarometer. This survey also includes measures at three points in time over a five-year span. If media reputation truly proxies for content and is related to political engagement, that should be visible at more than one point in time.

Though the AmericasBarometer provided an expanded breadth of countries, it also limited my analysis to respondent information on whether they had ever engaged in "protest" during the past year. This limit means that there is no inherent age bias, as someone age 30 has had a decade more to participate in a protest than someone age 20; and limiting the question to the past 12 months should minimize problems of recall. In

other words, this question wording should have higher validity than the question wording in WVS.

In the common parlance, protest encompasses boycotting, demonstrating, and striking.[186] Protest[187] is traditionally defined as a public display of displeasure or call for change (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 12). Marches and assemblies are, by far, the most common methods of protest (Ortiz et al 2013, 32-33). The definition of protest in this chapter, then, is more general than the definition of peaceful demonstration or strike in the previous chapter.[188] There are both advantages and disadvantages to this approach. It is arguably a more blunt measure, but it should also capture more of what respondents themselves consider to be protesting, which more specific terminology like "strike" might miss. Further, since measuring protest participation can be quite complex, a more general though more blunt measure may actually be more trustworthy. After all, respondents may not know if an activity in which they participated qualified as a boycott, demonstration or strike, but they know if they were protesting.

Multiple scholars during the previous decade, especially those looking at events in Europe, observed a consistently positive relationship between Internet news

---

[186] Clearly there are other actions that might also be considered protest, but marches, demonstrations and other means of making public claims are the most common (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, Ortiz et al 2013). See Quaranta (2015, ch 2) for an explanation of how different forms of protest can be conceptualized along one continuum.

[187] Unlike the World Values Survey (WVS), the AmericasBarometer does not disaggregate between participation in peaceful versus non-peaceful demonstrations. Also distinct from the previous chapter, the question in the AmericasBarometer is not about having ever protested, but only about the past year. Unlike the previous chapter, in which the question was worded to ask if a respondent had ever joined a demonstration or strike, the question in the AmericasBarometer limits the chronological scope of the question to within the past year. This limit is better for two reasons: (1) There is no inherent age bias, as someone age 30 has had a decade more to participate in a protest than someone age 20; and (2) limiting the question to the past 12 months should minimize problems of recall. In other words, this question wording should have higher validity than the question wording in WVS.

[188] Questions in the World Values Survey explicitly cue peaceful demonstrations (*manifestaciones pacíficas* in Spanish and *manifestações pacíficas* in Portguese) and strikes (*paro* in Spanish and *greves* in Portuguese).

consumption and propensity to protest (See Boulianne 2009, 2015 for review). Most posited that the positive relationship was due to some unique property of the Internet, but few studies have corroborated that assumption in areas with lower Internet penetration or that contain other media platforms that present information outside the status quo, as the Internet is widely acknowledged to do. I argue that, if heavy news consumption is associated with protest, then that relationship should be visible for any medium not associated with the status quo. What scholars have observed about news on the Internet and protest may be a remnant of the platform's explosive development outside of established channels in this subset of countries. Simply put, what we observe to be digital news's ability to criticize the status quo may not be specific to the Internet as a news medium.

Instead, as I argued in the previous chapter, the rapid and largely free spread of the Internet in Latin America means news on that platform may have greater latitude to criticize the status quo than traditional outlets that historically experienced greater regulation, such as newspapers and television.[189] I investigate whether persons who consume news from media platforms that developed with greater freedom from government regulation are more likely to have protested in the past year. Using data from the only three iterations of the AmericasBarometer that disaggregated media consumption (2004, 2006, 2008), I show that consumption of media most likely to criticize the status quo was associated with greater likelihood of protesting, even before the spread of Internet news consumption in the developing world.

[189] Boczkowski (2004, 2010) has argued that online news is, in the United States and Argentina, merely an extension of existing news structures. His analysis is at a different level of development, specifically the media outlet. Additionally, Bockowski and I tackle different questions: he looked at how technological advances impacted news-making. I look at how news reputation and consumption are associated with behavior.

Research Design and Data

In order to examine the relationship between consuming news on platforms with different historical development across Latin America, this chapter draws on data from the AmericasBarometer surveys. The AmericasBarometer is part of the Global Barometer Series (GBS), which covers 55 countries and almost half of the world's population. The Barometers employ a standard starter set of questions and similar research methodology.[190] The longest-running is EuroBarometer, which dates back to 1973.[191] The others are: EurAsianBarometer[192] (since 1989), AfroBarometer (1999), AsianBarometer[193] (2003), AmericasBarometer (2004) and ArabBarometer (2006). Exact timing of the surveys varies by region, but they are probability samples or stratified and often multi-lingual even within one nation, which is important in countries where the main language may be less prominent in rural areas or where regional languages dominate.

The AmericasBarometer is administered every other year by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)[194] and covers all of the Western Hemisphere except

---

[190] Country organizers generally add additional specialized, region- or country-specific questions as well, depending on the budget available to each organizer.

[191] Originating in France and run by the European Commission, the survey began with nine member states to gauge public opinion across the continent. Promoting public opinion was also aimed at helping continental integration by making it easier for citizens in one country to understand what citizens in another country felt, both about Europe and the world (European Commission 2008, 1).

[192] Founded to cover post-Communist Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia

[193] South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bagladesh and Nepal) only included in 2005

[194] Not all countries are covered by all iterations of the AmericasBarometer though. The first iteration in 2004, called the "Democracy Audit: Central American, Mexico and Colombia 2004," included only eight countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, México and Colombia). The 2006 survey expanded to also include Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela as well as four non-Iberian countries (Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad). In 2008, Argentina, the United States and Canada were included, completing coverage of the Iberian countries. Since 2010, only French- and English-speaking nations have been added, with 34 countries included in the 2016 release

Cuba.[195] The survey project is currently hosted by Vanderbilt using the following methodology:

> "Each country survey is implemented based on a national probability design. In some cases, oversamples are collected to allow precise analysis of opinion within sub-national regions. Survey participants are voting-age adults interviewed face to face in their households, except in Canada and the United States where the interviews are Web-based."[196]

All surveys were stratified samples but there was variation by country in how that stratification occurred. For example, in Colombia 2006 it was multi-stage[197] but in Mexico in that year both stratification and clustering were employed. Most surveys were unweighted, with a few exceptions, for example Ecuador, where people in the Amazon region were oversampled. Nicaragua in 2004 was probabilistic, clustered, multi-stage, with random selection at all stages.[198] All included both urban and rural areas, though some hard-to-reach areas are excluded, for example in Panama in 2004.[199] Margins of errors for all surveys were 2.1-3.1%.

Many of the technical information pages note that, while nationally representative, results at lower levels, such as region or state, would not be valid from the samples. In 2004 in the Dominican Republic, the technical information includes the detail that each face-to-face interview lasted approximately 45 minutes[200] and the technical information for Mexico in 2004 notes that the survey was in the field days after a corruption scandal came to light.[201] The only oddity was in Uruguay in 2006,

---

[195] The survey actually covers countries outside the Western Hemisphere as well: Albania, Israel, Madagascar.
[196] https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/methods-practices.php (June 6, 2018)
[197] There were six regions that were then broken into, first, municipalities, then census tracts, then sections and finally by block. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2006-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018)
[198] https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/nicaragua/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018)
[199] https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/panama/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018)
[200] https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/dr/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018)
[201] https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018)

which is listed as "self-weighted" such that the selection of the four strata "is proportional to their weight in the population."[202]

As is common in the study of Latin America,[203] I limit the analysis to those countries that countries share Iberian colonial histories (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), exempting former colonies of other countries.[204] The shared history, similar languages, and similar government structures among these countries create the conditions for a "most similar" research design (Mill 1843, Przeworski and Teune 1970).

Model

Unlike the previous chapter, in which participation was measured using the frequency of occurrence and analyzed using ordered logit regression analysis, surveys usually first ask about whether if a respondent has taken part in unconventional participation as a yes or no question. Therefore, my analysis uses binary logit regression models, with the full model specified below:

$$\text{Protested} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Gender} + \beta_2\text{Age} + \beta_3\text{Education} + \beta_4\text{Skin color} + \beta_5\text{Left-Right Ideology} + \beta_6\text{Urbanization} + \beta_7\text{Political Interest} + \beta_8\text{Frequency of newspaper readership} + \beta_9\text{Frequency of television news viewership} + \beta_{10}\text{Frequency of radio news listenership} + \beta_{11}\text{Frequency of Internet news consumption} + \varepsilon$$

[202] https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/uruguay/2006-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018)
[203] Recent examples of this limitation in political science include Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2011), Carlin and Love (2015), Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) and Seligson (2006).
[204] Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States

Hypotheses

In my classification of media platform reputations in the region (see Appendix A), at no time are newspapers or television classified as distanced from government or challenging the status quo.[205] Besides the new medium of Internet news, the only traditional medium classified as being not close to the government in Latin America is radio.[206] As such, extrapolating from my hypotheses in Chapter Two, I only expect to see that consumption of Internet or radio news are associated with an increased likelihood to protest.

H1: People who consume radio news with will be more likely to protest.[207]
H2: People who consume Internet news will be more likely to protest.

Response Variable

Protest, my response variable, is defined by Tilly and Tarrow (2007) as a public display of displeasure or call for change (12). Unlike the World Values Survey (WVS), the AmericasBarometer does not disaggregate between participation in peaceful versus non-peaceful demonstrations. Also distinct from the previous chapter, the question in the AmericasBarometer is not about having ever protested, but only about the past year. This limit is better for two reasons: (1) There is no inherent age bias, as someone age 30 has had a decade more to participate in a protest than someone age 20; and (2) limiting the question to the past 12 months should minimize problems of recall. In other words, this question wording should have higher validity than the question wording in WVS.

[205] This is not to say that the same does not exist, but not with sufficient historical information to justify a classification as such in this sample.
[206] In Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay
[207] When it is oppositional, not aligned with government

The wording of the question about protest in the AmericasBarometer has varied slightly over the years:

2004: Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or protest? Do you do it often, rarely or never?[208]

2006/2008: Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or protest? Sometimes, almost never or never?[209]
And now thinking about the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Sometimes, almost never or never?[210]

The Spanish-language questionnaire asks specifically about having participated in a *manifestación o protesta pública*. The Portuguese questionnaire asks about *manifestação ou protesto público*. The definition of protest in this chapter, then, is more general than the definition of peaceful demonstration or strike in the previous chapter.[211] I recoded survey responses to simply reflect having protested or not in the past year without regard to frequency.

Protest participation information is not available for some countries in 2004 and 2008, as shown in Table 4.1. The question was also never asked in Paraguay or in Argentina. Only in 2006 was the question about protest participation asked in all

---

[208] Question PROT1
[209] Question PROT1
[210] By 2010, when all Latin countries were included in the AmericasBarometer, the question had been rewritten to a binary choice:
2010/2012: In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Yes or no. If yes, then how many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in the last 12 months?
2014: In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Yes or no.
The 2012 survey even went on to ask about specific activities:
PROT7: And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest? Yes or no.
PROT6. In the last 12 months have you signed any petition? Yes or no.
PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut? Yes or no.
[211] Questions in the World Values Survey explicitly cue peaceful demonstrations (*manifestaciones pacíficas* in Spanish and *manifestações pacíficas* in Portguese) and strikes (*paro* in Spanish and *greves* in Portuguese).

remaining countries in the region. Forthcoming analyses are, therefore, limited to the countries in which relevant questions were asked.

Table 4.1: Relative frequency for having protested by country (in percent)

	2004		2006		2008	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Costa Rica	15.01	84.99	17.21	82.79	19.70	80.30
Colombia	25.71	74.29	19.14	80.86	22.39	77.61
Guatemala	10.69	89.31	11.80	88.20	13.68	86.32
Mexico	13.99	86.01	14.61	85.39	16.41	83.59
El Salvador	6.10	93.90	8.63	91.37		
Honduras	9.01	90.99	14.51	85.49		
Nicaragua	18.25	81.75	9.03	90.97		
Panama	20.12	79.88	18.77	81.23		
Brazil			14.86	85.14	18.55	81.45
Peru			28.62	71.38	31.95	68.05
Bolivia			38.70	61.30		
Chile			21.11	78.89		
Dominican Republic			15.16	84.84		
Ecuador			20.63	79.37		
Uruguay			25.81	74.19		
Venezuela			23.95	76.05		
n	12,023 out of 15,396		26, 786 out of 28,212		8,925 out of 29,917	

There are clear differences by country, with protest much less common in El Salvador and Honduras than for countries in the Andean region, such as in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru.[212] Bolivia in 2006 and Peru in 2008 are the only data points where more than 30% of the population admits to having protested. The Andean numbers may be anomalous, as the mid-2000s was the height of the Pink Tide,[213] when protests were

[212] For comparison, in 2006, Uruguay was the most stable country in the region, ranked 45 out of 194 for Political Stability Index. Chile was 65 and Argentina 101st. The lowest Latin country that year was Colombia at 186, with Venezuela slightly ahead at 167. Both El Salvador and Honduras and the aforementioned Andean countries fell between those, ranking 112 and 142 and 149, 151 and 153, respectively. So there is no clear line between government stability and likelihood of having protested.
[213] The pink tide refers to the election of multiple left-leaning leaders across the region in the early part of the century. They were referred to as pink to show that, though more left of the governments of the 1990s, the leaders were not as leftist as historically more hardline, "red" leftist movements (Allen 2008) and also distinct from the so-called red governments of Eastern Europe during the Cold War (de Santiago 2013). See also Beasley-Murray, Cameron and Hershberg (2009), Remmer (2012) or Seligson (2007) for overviews of the Pink Tide phenomenon.

especially common. El Salvador jumps out as the only country in the region with single-digit affirmative protest responses at more than one data point. These numbers suggest that, though arguably less common than other forms of political engagement, protest in the region is not an activity unique to fringe political actors (e.g., Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005).

Over the mid-2000s, there was an overall increase in protest activity across the region. Of the countries where the question about protest was asked in 2008, all registered double-digit affirmative responses, which was not the case in the previous surveys. Only in Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama did the proportion of people responding in the affirmative decrease between survey rounds, with the more than 9% drop in Nicaragua appearing especially anomalous. In all other countries, there is a clear upward trajectory for the percentage of population having protested between the survey's 2004 wave and its 2008 wave (Table 4.2). This is congruent with a worldwide trend of an increase in the reported number of protest events around the world in recent years (Caruso 2017, Stuster 2013, Carothers and Youngs 2015, de Jong 2017).[214]

Table 4.2: Year-on-year percentage change in reporting protest participation (from Table 4.1) for countries with one more than one data point (AmericasBarometer)

Honduras	+5.50
Costa Rica°	+4.69
Guatemala°	+2.99
El Salvador	+2.53
Mexico°	+2.42
Panama	-1.35
Colombia°	-3.32
Nicaragua	-9.22

° *indicates 2004-2008 increase, not just one survey cycle*

[214] See Rucht (2007) for a review across both time and space of the spread of protest in politics.

Total possible *n* in the sample is 73,525. Though only 47,734 respondents answered the question on protest participation, most of that reduction is attributable to the question not being asked in eight countries in 2004 and in ten countries in 2008.[215] Where the question *was* asked, non-response is minimal: less than one percent each year. There were no pockets of especially high non-response in any country in any year. The *n* above is not, therefore, reflective of non-response bias, but mostly an artefact of where the question was fielded and where it was not by survey administrators.

Further, Peru and Bolivia were strong outliers, registering much more protest activity than the rest of the region (Table 4.1). Their exclusion from the analysis should depress any aggregated findings. Analysis within countries, which is most important to linking media reputation and behavior when the country is the level of analysis, is not compromised. Analysis across time periods, especially 2006 to 2008, is limited by the exclusion of the question in the so many countries in the later survey year. So there is no way to know if findings would have held up, had the question been asked in more countries in 2008.

Explanatory variables

As in the previous chapter, the predictor of interest is media consumption by platforms. While more recent iterations of the AmericasBarometer only ask about total media consumption, iterations that were issued in the mid-2000s collected responses on media consumption that had been disaggregated by platform:

[215] In 2004, the survey was not fielded in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay or Venezuela. In 2008, the question about protest was not asked in Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay or Venezuela.

2004/2006/2008 question[216]:
How often do you (A1) listen to news on the radio? (A2) Watch news on television? (A3) Read the newspaper? (A4) Read news on the Internet? Every day, one or two times per week, rarely, never[217]

The scale ranged from zero for never to three for daily.[218] Descriptive statistics for each measure are below. It is important to note that only Mexico, Honduras and Panama in 2004 included an Internet news question.

Television

Table 4.3: Daily television news consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer)

	2004	2006	2008
Argentina			57.91
Bolivia		56.19	55.66
Brazil		74.38	76.54
Chile		76.07	74.72
Colombia	72.33	67.52	77.31
Costa Rica	71.67	74.07	81.26
Dominican Republic		56.90	62.82
Ecuador	67.07	71.85	67.78
El Salvador	61.04	61.31	65.27
Guatemala	43.88	47.39	45.93
Honduras	47.23	54.73	48.58
Mexico	63.43	58.77	61.79
Nicaragua	43.73	59.82	68.75
Panama	63.94	71.84	75.99
Paraguay		70.82	70.84
Peru		64.38	66.49
Uruguay		76.08	76.20
Venezuela		65.47	66.87

[216] Protest was measured in later iterations of the survey, but media platforms were not disaggregated then. It is therefore impossible to know how respondents got their news, only who overall consumed news more frequently than others.
[217] Original Spanish questionnaire: Con qué frecuencia…
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos
A4. Lee noticias vía Internet
Todos los días, Una o dos veces por semana, Rara vez, Nunca
[218] Descriptive statistics for 2014 show a mean of 3.39 out of 4 and a median of 4 out of 4, undoubtedly driven by daily television news consumption.

Table 4.3 shows that more than half the population consumes television news daily in every country at every data collection point. The exception is Guatemala, where daily use is around 45% across the timespan, and Honduras, where it hovers just slightly under 50%. Highest reported daily TV news use is in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, with around three-quarters of respondents using television for news daily in those areas. Only in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua do the number of respondents answering "never" using television for news reach double-digits.

Equally notable are the figures for those who never consume news on television (Table 4.4):

Table 4.4: Percent of respondents reporting never using television for news (AmericasBarometer)

	2004	2006	2008
Argentina			6.08
Bolivia		9.11	9.64
Brazil		2.22	2.47
Chile		1,91	1.83
Colombia	3.38	2.55	2.13
Costa Rica	3.40	3.33	3.41
Dominican Republic		7.72	7.84
Ecuador	3.10	1.92	2.21
El Salvador	9.88	7.69	6.13
Guatemala	24.50	14.73	14.18
Honduras	26.68	12.12	17.18
Mexico	4.31	3.60	4.42
Nicaragua	28.03	15.95	13.87
Panama	8.37	10.95	4.89
Paraguay		4.55	2.92
Peru		4.14	3.27
Uruguay		4.17	4.00
Venezuela		3.98	4.27

Only in the Central American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama does "never" using television for news reach double digits. In all other countries

in the region, the number is well below 10%, a testament to the ubiquity of TV news consumption, but also a possible reason for why media effects are so very hard to find.

Newspaper

Newspaper use within countries remains fairly constant across time, but there is great variation between countries (Table 4.5). Uruguay and Venezuela represent the extremes: daily use of 8% and 10% in 2006 and 2008 for the former, and 41% in each of those years for the latter. In all countries at all time points, approximately half of respondents (or more) said they "never" or "rarely" used a newspaper, with Venezuela (at 35%) as the sole exception.

Table 4.5: Daily newspaper consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer)

	2004	2006	2008
Argentina			21.95
Bolivia		7.07	6.22
Brazil		15.83	17.25
Chile		18.13	16.97
Colombia	9.76	7.33	10.13
Costa Rica	24.70	24.03	36.55
Dominican Republic		11.95	14.00
Ecuador	17.53	15.79	17.37
El Salvador	19.95	15.44	19.82
Guatemala	25.41	31.17	25.62
Honduras	16.28	13.31	18.75
Mexico	14.62	12.03	13.65
Nicaragua	9.38	10.75	10.74
Panama	24.68	32.86	30.72
Paraguay		11.85	9.02
Peru		21.58	22.99
Uruguay		8.34	9.95
Venezuela		41.83	40.74

Newspaper use is relatively rare across the region, in line with findings from other areas that newspapers are expensive, but were, at the time of the surveys, expected

to expand in use ("El diario en papel crecerá en los próximos cinco años," Magro 2010, Economist 2011). Only four countries – Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Venezuela – register more than one-quarter of the population reading newspapers daily. In Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay, the number of newspaper readers daily does not reach double digits, suggesting the lack of readership is not merely attributable to the rate of literacy or economic development.[219]

Radio

Radio news consumption also varied widely through the region but was fairly stable within countries across time (Table 4.6). While over half of respondents in each survey in Honduras and Uruguay used radio for news daily, half in Costa Rica never did. That said, the lowest daily use in the region approaches 20%, which is a substantial amount. Throughout the region, about half of respondents never or rarely used radio for news, and about half used radio for news either daily or weekly.

[219] Uruguay is an outlier in Latin America – highly peaceful, economically developed, with 98% literacy. Bolivia is very poor, with 85% adult literacy. Guatemala, where a quarter of the population reads newspapers daily, has one of the lowest adult literacy rates in the region at only 68% (UNESCO 2003). The distribution of who reads newspapers does not seem to fall linearly with either economics or literacy.

Table 4.6: Daily radio news consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer)

	2004	2006	2008
Argentina			44.61
Bolivia		40.11	32.49
Brazil		33.11	41.39
Chile		31.05	33.92
Colombia	37.32	31.19	34.13
Costa Rica	20.61	19.68	33.09
Dominican Republic		32.45	37.98
Ecuador	39.73	36.74	31.27
El Salvador	34.05	30.48	35.38
Guatemala	34.80	35.56	33.62
Honduras	53.77	54.20	56.38
Mexico	36.21	28.68	29.29
Nicaragua	43.71	50.74	37.85
Panama	41.17	39.01	35.33
Paraguay		48.67	38.88
Peru		47.00	44.23
Uruguay		58.00	56.47
Venezuela		34.44	34.56

Internet

Highest daily Internet news consumption in 2008 was in Uruguay, Chile, Brazil and Argentina (Table 4.7). This is entirely consistent with expectations about Internet penetration in richer, more-stable democracies. Lowest daily use was in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Paraguay. Almost 30% of respondents in Argentina used the Internet for news at least weekly in 2008, which is a strong outlier from the rest of the region. In most of the region, even in 2008, daily Internet use was under 10%. In some countries, like Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay, even weekly Internet news use was still under five percent, with "never" using the Internet for news still near 90% (Table 4.8).

Table 4.7: Daily Internet consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer)

	2004	2006	2008
Argentina			15.66
Bolivia		2.36	2.15
Brazil		7.11	11.07
Chile		8.31	9.26
Colombia		2.09	4.94
Costa Rica		2.41	3.76
Dominican Republic		1.92	3.98
Ecuador		0.55	2.37
El Salvador		2.03	3.49
Guatemala		1.02	1.84
Honduras	0.81	0.95	2.32
Mexico	1.43	2.65	2.89
Nicaragua		1.83	1.62
Panama	2.70	3.01	3.00
Paraguay		1.03	1.73
Peru		3.08	4.01
Uruguay		4.10	7.48
Venezuela		4.32	4.38

The most noticeable jump in Internet news consumption was in Honduras, the poorest of the three countries in which the Internet question was asked. However, the increase was not about increasing daily use. Rather, the more notable shift between 2004, 2006 and 2008 was a nearly 10% decrease in respondents who "never" used the Internet for news (Table 4.8). In other words, as access to the Internet expanded, people adopted it at least occasionally for news. This is a strong indicator that, despite the ubiquity of Internet news consumption among the monied middle class and elite in the developed world, the actual impact of digital news in the developing world may remain small, as consuming news via digital platforms remains the exception and not the rule.[220]

[220] As of 2018, Internet penetration in Latin America remains at 55% (Statista NDa), with much of that usage driven by Brazil and Mexico.

Table 4.8: Percent of the population who "never" use the Internet for news (AmericasBarometer)

	2004	2006	2008
Argentina			52.27
Bolivia		78.23	77.76
Brazil		74.05	70.09
Chile		77.11	68.75
Colombia		83.31	77.79
Costa Rica		88.10	86.59
Dominican Republic		90.55	85.47
Ecuador		90.84	81.26
El Salvador		87.38	84.41
Guatemala		91.44	86.20
Honduras	93.59	89.92	84.62
Mexico	84.76	85.94	83.16
Nicaragua		90.76	89.97
Panama	86.17	87.89	82.79
Paraguay		90.30	90.03
Peru		76.27	72.37
Uruguay		80.17	76.95
Venezuela		73.01	76.50

Finally, correlations between news consumption are quite low, generally below 0.30 with two exceptions, throughout the region. First, there was a small correlation (around 0.32) in some countries between newspaper readership and Internet news consumption.[221] The highest correlations were in Central America—specifically, in Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama—where the correlation between television and newspaper consumption was above 0.40.[222]

[221] In El Salvador in both 2006 and 2008 and in Argentina in 2008, that correlation, at 0.32. In Bolivia and Chile in both 2006 and 2008, that same relationship registered 0.38 and 0.35 correlations, respectively. In Brazil, newspaper and Internet news use correlated at 0.30 in 2006 and 0.38 in 2008, whereas in Colombia and the Dominican Republic in those years it was 0.30 and 0.33.
[222] 0.40 in 2004, 0.48 in 2006 and 0.41 in 2008 in Guatemala; 0.45 in 2004 and 0.59 in 2008 in Honduras; and 0.41 in 2004 and 2006 in Panama

Control variables

As in the previous chapter, sex, age, education, ideology, city size and political interest[223] remain salient to the analysis here. The interviewer noted the respondent's sex[224] , with women coded as 1 and men 0. For 2004-2008, 51.91% of respondents were female. Age[225] ranged from 16 to 99, because the minimum age of respondents was 18 in all countries except Brazil and Nicaragua, where it was 16. Maximum age ranged from 81 in Argentina to 99 in Mexico, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. The one outlier for that was Paraguay, where the oldest respondent was only 65. The median for all countries was between 33 and 38, except for Nicaragua (30), Chile (42), Uruguay (44).[226]

Educational achievement[227] was measured in number of years of schooling, ranging from zero years to 18+. The exception was Colombia, for which the maximum number of years was set at 17+. The scale on the root questionnaire (in both Spanish and English) treated post-secondary, but non-university education, as equivalent to early university education. Root questionnaires are always somewhat subject to variation. In 2014, for example, Mexico added the option of apprenticeship equivalent to late high school; and Peru and Panama did not include a technical post-secondary option. The scale is designed to be comparable cross-culturally.

[223] Not asked in 2004. So, analyses for that year are run without the variable.
[224] Q1
[225] Q2
[226] This is slightly higher than the median age for the countries, presumably an artefact of only adults being sampled. The median age for each country is: Argentina 31, Brazil 32, Colombia 30, Costa Rica 31, Dominican Republic 28, Ecuador 27, El Salvador 27, Guatemala 22, Honduras 23, Mexico 28, Nicaragua 25, Panama 29, Paraguay 28, Peru 28, Uruguay 35, Venezuela 28 (CIA World Factbook 2017 estimates).
[227] ED in 2014, EDU in previous versions

Overall, the median educational attainment (Table 4.9) was as low as the end of primary school (six year) in Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and as high completing high school (12 years) in Chile.[228] Eleven years of education (not quite finishing secondary school) was the most-repeated median.

Table 4.9: Education level by country (AmericasBarometer)

	2004		2006		2008	
	Mean (SD)	Median	Mean (SD)	Median	Mean (SD)	Median
Argentina					10.89 (4.06)	11
Bolivia			9.85 (5.24)	12	9.95 (4.89)	11
Brazil					7.29 (4.33)	7
Chile			10.46 (3.98)	12	10.48 (3.83)	12
Colombia	8.73 (4.26)	10	8.56 (4.39)	9	8.75 (4.28)	10
Costa Rica	8.27 (3.98)	7	8.80 (4.48)	8	8.16 (4.20)	8
Dominican Republic			7.76 (4.78)	7	7.32 (4.24)	6
Ecuador	9.74 (4.28)	10	10.08 (4.17)	11	10.17 (4.26)	11
El Salvador	7.38 (4.99)	7	7.91 (5.06)	9	8.40 (5.31)	9
Guatemala	5.76 (4.57)	6	6.52 (4.50)	6	6.01 (4.77)	6
Honduras	5.78 (4.21)	6	7.23 (4.16)	6	7.25 (4.32)	6
Mexico	8.22 (4.42)	9	8.57 (4.30)	9	8.27 (4.47)	9
Nicaragua	6.43 (4.81)	6	7.34 (4.23)	7	8.01 (4.75)	8
Panama	9.97 (4.45)	11	9.22 (4.39)	10	10.24 (3.97)	12
Paraguay			8.59 (4.54)	8	8.99 (4.47)	9
Peru			10.82 (4.09)	11	10.67 (4.23)	11
Uruguay			9.30 (4.09)	9	8.98 (3.87)	9
Venezuela			10.49 (4.44)	11	9.96 (3.63)	11

Political interest[229] ranged from "none" to "much." I recoded the variable such that none was zero, little was one, some was two and much was three. The median for all countries was "little," with the exception of Chile in 2008 and Guatemala in 2006, where the median was "none."

[228] There is a 0.35 correlation between education and newspaper readership and Internet news consumption. That is the highest correlation between any control variables.
[229] POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

Party membership or identification is an unreliable measure in Latin America.[230] As explained in the previous chapter, self-reported ideology is a means to study political leanings when party affiliation or vote choice may not be comparable in a cross-national context.[231] Ideology is also a strong and consistent predictor of voting in many areas of Latin American (Colomer 2005) (See Seligson 2007 for review). It is also preferable to party identification for cross-national analysis, when electoral systems are not the same (presidential versus parliamentary, for example) or during times of electoral volatility (such as the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America).

The AmericasBarometer measures ideology with a single question.[232] The wording has changed slightly over the years[233] but the meaning has remained consistent:

> 2004: In this card there's a one to ten scale that goes from left to right. Today, when people talk about politics they mention left wingers and right wingers, referring to people that sympathize with the left or the right. According to your sense of "left" and "right" in politics, where would you place yourself in this scale?
> Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
>
> 2006/2008: On this sheet there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Today, when we speak of political tendencies, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with

---

[230] Coppedge (1998) describes the situation bluntly: "Most Latin American party systems change so often and in so many respects that the 'typical' party system of each country can be described only in imprecise terms, if at all" (547).
[231] Argentina, for example, as of 2015, had over twenty identifiable political parties; Brazil had almost thirty; and Mexico had nine, to give a few examples (LANIC 2015).
[232] Question L1
[233] Wording actually changed again in 2010 and then in 2012:
2010: On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?
2012/2014: On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political tendency, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.
Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right

Scholars have found the unidimensional nature of questions like those above to not fully capture the nuanced nature of ideology, which may be multidimensional, an issue that has received a great deal of attention in American politics (Converse 1964, Achen 1975, Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder 2008, Feldman 1988). But this question is the best means available to gauge political predispositions across both time and space for the analysis in this chapter and, as noted above, demonstrates a consistent relationship with variables of political engagement and activity.

The median for ideology was five or six for all countries, with few exceptions. Since the scale is even-numbered, the exact middle would be 5.5, meaning that both 5 and 6 are fairly centrist positions. The exceptions were the Dominican Republic with median 8 (right of center) in 2006 and 2008, El Salvador with median 7 in 2004 and Honduras with median 7 in 2006.

Scholars hold that location plays a role in the evolution of contention (Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto 2008; Nicholls, Miller and Beaumont 2013; Rucht 2007; Sewell 2007). Put very simply, “the physical assembling of large numbers of people into limited spaces is an important feature of nearly all forms of contentious politics” (Sewell 2007, 58). That is certainly more political opportunity[234] for protest in cities than in rural

[234] Eisinger (1973) introduced the concept of political opportunity: “exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1457). See Meyer (2004) for review of literature on political opportunity and protest.

areas,[235] and scholars have suggested that urbanization itself is one reason for an increase in protests (e.g., Weiner 1967).[236]

For that reason, it seems important to consider geography in the analysis of protests. Urbanization is operationalized in a relative way in the 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys the interviewer noting whether the respondent lived in the capital city, a large, medium, or small city, or a rural area.[237] This captures more local or cultural nuance about what is relatively large or relatively rural than a simple population number would.[238] I recoded the measure so that rural was 0, small city 1, medium city 2, large city 3, and the national capital was 4. The modal answer in each country was either "rural" or "large city"/capital:

> Rural: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay
> Large city or capital: Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Dominica Republic

The exception was Colombia, where the mode was "small city." For countries where the mode was "rural area", the second most frequent answer was either capital city or large city.

---

[235] This is not to say there are not rural protests (See Reed 2008 for a review of rural protests in England since the 1980s, for example) – but rather that rural issues have traditionally been addressed in ways not involving protests (Woods 2003).

[236] In recent years, the geography of protest has been a topic of interest in sociology and geography, but less so in political science.

[237] Tamano

[238] Further, in an overwhelming number of countries in the region, the capital is the largest city (Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala). There are three instances of this being a possibly problematic measure: Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (as well as other cities) in Brazil are larger than the capital Brasilia. Guayaquil in Ecuador is slightly larger than the capital Quito, and Santa Cruz is larger than the Bolivia capital, La Paz. For Ecuador and Bolivia, the capital city is the second-largest city. Brasilia is the third-largest city in Brazil, with one-third the population of Rio and less than one-quarter the population of São Paulo. Since Brazil was not included in the earliest iterations of the survey, any introduced bias by employing the localized measure should be minimal.

Issues of racism[239] in Latin America are intertwined with matters of indigenous persecution in some countries and by the history of slavery in others (see Yasher 2015 for review). [240] In the Southern Cone countries[241], for example, the situation of indigenous persons is analogized to Native Americans: "not integrated into colonial society… [but also] not available to become exploited workers, not condemnable to forced labor for the colonists" (Quijano 2000, 562). The Brazilian government's official stance until 2001 was that racism was a myth, despite having one of the most color-stratified cultures in the world (Htun 2004). Ecuador treats all citizens as *mestizos* but that does not equate to racial egalitarianism (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 378).[242]

Yet, until recent decades, indigenous or ethnic status was not highly salient, making Latin America famously the exception to the rule about the importance of race (Jalali and Lispet 1992, 588; Madrid 2012, 1).[243] For example, in battles for land rights, peasants unions or farmers associations were more likely to focus on peasant or rural status, not necessarily indigenous status with which peasant or rural status was correlated (de la Peña 2005, 730, Yasher 1998, 1999). Ninety percent of Latin America's indigenous population is concentrated in five countries: Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru,

[239] Race and ethnicity are distinct topics, one biological and one cultural (bluntly) but few persons (or scholars) consistently make clear distinctions between the two, nor do scholars agree completely on where any line between the two should be. Analytically, they overlap quite a bit (Wade 1997, 18-21), and can also be intermingled with class or inequality (Hoffman and Centeno 2003). Is black a racial distinction but Indian ethnic? Or is race imposed by others and ethnicity self-declared? (Wade 1997, 23). By that definition, as this topic is addressed via survey questions, I would be focusing on ethnicity. But that would arguably impose intention upon multiple countries in which the word "ethnic" is not necessarily salient. For this reason, I focus on phenotype. I use the words ethnicity and race interchangeably.
[240] "In Latin America, the term *indígena* has been used by many social scientists and politicians, in contradistinction to other terms such as *indio* (Indian), tribesman, or ethnic group" (de la Peña 2005, 718).
[241] Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay
[242] For example, "in Ecuador, the appearance of a black beauty pageant winner caused a scandal (Rahier 1998)" (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 379).
[243] See Wade (1997) for a detailed analysis of how race and ethnicity have been viewed – and studied – in Latin America over time.

Ecuador and Mexico (Yasher 1998, 24). But, even there, supposedly indigenous revolutions or voting blocs did not highlight indigenous status or feature indigenous leaders (Madrid 2012, 1 FN1).

Yet ethnic or indigenous parties have flourished in recent years, even winning national elections in some of the countries with the highest self-declared[244] indigenous populations (van Cott 2005, Madrid 2012). No such political wave has yet happened for black Latin Americans (Hoffman and Centeno 2003).[245] Discussions about the Declaration of Indigenous Rights in the 1990s concurrent with backlash against privatization economic policies (neoliberalism) are partly credited with the topic's recent salience (de la Peña 2005).

The issue, then, is how to address race and ethnicity with a measure applicable across the region, since the recent elections of pro-indigenous parties shows that the issue may be one around which cleavages may beget protests. The question[246] – which was not asked at all in 2004 – in the merged AmericasBarometer dataset is:

> Do you consider yourself to be a white person, *mestizo* (white-mixed), indigenous, black, *mulato*[247] (black-mixed) or other? (If the person says Afro-anything, code as black.)

However, the issue is not so simple when we examine it. For example, some countries do not include "indigenous" as an option. The Bolivia 2006 questionnaire offers two different responses, each with its own numerical coding, both of which may be

[244] Race and ethnicity are not necessarily considered purely biological in Latin America (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 377). Nor is speaking an indigenous language a pre-requisite of claiming indigenous status in some cases. In Bolivia's 2001 census, for example, over 60 percent of the population self-declared as indigenous. That number fell to 48% in the 2012 census (Mallén 2013), suggesting some instability in the measure.
[245] Only in Venezuela do non-whites who do not identify as indigenous figure prominently in national politics (Sansone 1998 cited in Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 377).
[246] Etid
[247] Though commonly referring to mixed white and black ancestry in the United States, in Latin America, mulatto has been applied anyone of mixed African descent, be they part-white or part-native.

considered to stand in for indigenous status: *indigena* and *originaria*. The Peruvian questionnaire offers an extra "Asian" option. To give some more extreme examples, the Paraguayan questionnaire in 2014 included ten options for ethnicity, including four different ways to self-declare as an indigenous person, but without offering a general indigenous option. And the Brazilian 2014 questionnaire included "yellow" as an option. Any cross-national analysis including the measure would have to account for these differences in the surveys (across both country and year) and construct a measure appropriate to that researcher's question.

Researchers focusing on race and politics opt to consider skin tone in cross-national analysis where ethnicity, race or color might be important. Colorism is "the discrimination that privileges light-skinned people of color over their dark-skinned counterparts. Colorism is concerned with actual skin tone, as opposed to racial or ethnic identity" (Hunter 2007, 237).[248] It has a documented association with opportunity structures in many countries, often considered a lingering effect of colonialism and slavery (Hunter 2013, 248).[249] Simply put, darker skin tone is correlated with more discrimination.[250]

I opted to construct an ordinal four-item classification focused on colorism. After all, throughout the region, "white" is considered lighter than "mestizo," which is lighter

---

[248] The distinction is defined as: "While color is used in racial assignment and categorization, colorism refers to the tendency to make further preference judgments based on gradations of color and afrocentric features within race; thus, it captures the fact that darker-skinned, more afrocentric blacks undergo more extreme racial bias. Unlike racism, all people recognized as a belonging to a subordinated racial group do not face identical discrimination" (Weaver 2012, 163).
[249] The AmericasBarometer actually addressed this matter in 2010, employing a skin-color palette. There was a negative and significant relationship between darker skin tone and educational attainment across the region, with Guatemalans and Bolivians penalized even more than darker-skinned persons in other countries (Telles and Steele 2012).
[250] To give one example, Weaver (2012), for example, found that darker-skinned candidates are penalized more than lighter-skinned (but still "black") candidates when running for office. See Taylor (1996) for a sociological critique of how political science has treated race and ethnicity as measurable items.

than "indigenous," which in turn is lighter than "black" or "mulatto." This simplification and ordering also recognizes the reality of racism from indigenous persons to Afro-Latinos, as only three countries in the region (Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua) explicitly guarantee dark-skinned persons equal rights (Hooker 2005, 286).

Specifically, I combined the black and mulatto categories into one; and I aggregated all possible version of "indigenous" into one general "indigenous" category for each country. [251] Distributions for each year are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2:

Figure 4.1: Racial breakdown in the AmericasBarometer 2006 (in percent)



[251] Respondents who marked "other" were dropped but constituted less than 1% of total respondents.

Figure 4.2: Racial breakdown in the AmericasBarometer 2008 (in percent)



There were, of course, many differences by country. Whereas 71% in Argentina said they identified as white, that same number in Bolivia identified as *mestizo*. Five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay) had less than 1% declare as indigenous in either 2006 or 2008. The mode was, unsurprisingly, white or *mestizo* in every country. The Dominican Republic had the largest proportion of Blacks, about one-third of respondents in both waves; but Brazil, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela included more than 10% of respondents who identified as dark-skinned.

Lost n

As explained in the previous chapter, non-response on surveys is high in Latin America and the drop in *n* becomes especially noticeable in multivariate analysis (Córdova 2009, Seligson 2005), when the models are forced to drop respondents who

did not answer some of the survey items included in the analysis. Luckily, as explained above, the drop in *n* for the forthcoming analyses is largely attributable to questions not being asked in all countries in all years. Specifically, in eight countries in 2004 and ten countries in 2008 did not collect protest participation data from respondents, and, in 2004, on political interest or on race. The countries vary from very stable (Uruguay) to protest-heavy (Bolivia). The question wording did not change. And questions about specific types of protest were asked in the World Values Survey in countries where the question about protest was not asked, suggesting it was not a taboo topic.

Rather than limit the analysis to just 2006, when there was still no measure of race or political interest in Brazil, I have opted to examine all possible iterations of protest in the AmericasBarometer dataset when disaggregated media questions were included. That means that, for 2004, all analyses are run without race or political interest. I understand this means the models are not perfectly comparable across years. But, as explained in Chapter One, since so little analysis involving the news media and political behavior is done in developing countries in general and in Latin America specifically, I contend that imperfect models are a reasonable start.

Findings

Unlike the previous chapter, which considered each form of protest individually, as there is only one form of political engagement of interest here: protest. My analysis will first examine data by country within each survey wave (2004, 2006, 2008) to capture any regional trends (such as the Pink Tide). Then, after statistical results are presented, the analysis shifts to findings within each media platform and then within

each country. In countries where data for the dependent variable, protest, was available for multiple years, I compare those values within that country across time.

In the previous chapter, with just two survey waves and fewer countries, presenting results together was intended to be easier for reader comprehension. In this chapter, with so many countries included, some with just one datapoint and some with three, presenting by country first could seem very choppy.

2004

Table 4.10 presents findings from the analysis of protest in 2004, again done without a measure of race or political interest. To reiterate, only Mexico, Honduras and Panama in 2004 included an Internet news question.

Table 4.10: Logit output for having protested (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2004)

	Colombia	Costa Rica	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama
Female	- 0.0192 (0.1478)	- 0.3900 (0.2086)	- 0.3457 (0.2970)	-0.1381 (0.2093)	- 0.0660 (0.2678)	-0.1850 (0.2162)	- 0.5541** (0.1888)	- 0.0461* (0.1635)
Age	0.0048 (0.0056)	0.0044 (0.0067)	0.0165 (0.0095)	0.0107 (0.0072)	0.0101 (0.0088)	0.0138 (0.0032)	0.0042 (0.0065)	0.1563* (0.0052)
Education	0.1157*** (0.0206)	0.1605*** (0.0284)	0.0638 (0.0375)	0.0988*** (0.0248)	0.0561 (0.0343)	0.0439 (0.0280)	0.0972*** (0.0227)	0.1169*** (0.0222)
City Size	- 0.0738 (0.0681)	0.0391 (0.0668)	- 0.0256 (0.0953)	- 0.0149 (0.0701)	0.1364 (0.0928)	0.0968 (0.0774)	- 0.0899 (0.0723)	- 0.0308 (0.0348)
Left-right ideology	- 0.0440 (0.0293)	- 0.1220 (0.0433)	- 0.2343*** (0.0471)	0.0027 (0.0412)	0.0541 (0.0557)	- 0.1069* (0.0471)	- 0.0725* (0.0313)	0.1232* (0.0586)
News-paper use	0.2018* (0.0815)	0.1099 (0.1028)	0.0713 (0.1419)	0.1155 (0.1051)	0.0420 (0.1390)	0.2529* (0.1109)	0.1343 (0.0972)	0.0843 (0.0880)
TV news use	- 0.1278 (0.0969)	- 0.0689 (0.1478)	0.1840 (0.1860)	- 0.0825 (0.0959)	0.1966 (0.1374)	- 0.0240 (0.1635)	0.1143 (0.0934)	- 0.0635 (0.1054)
Radio news use	0.1660 (0.0648)	0.1509 (0.0838)	0.3228* (0.1297)	0.1605 (0.0937)	0.0017 (0.1304)	0.1774 (0.1083)	0.2196 (0.0858)	0.1581* (0.777)
Internet news use					0.3944 (0.2125)	0.0756 (0.1586)		0.0297 (0.1123)
n	1263	1014	1361	1151	969	1230	992	1313

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
AmericasBarometer 2004

Television news consumption was at no point significant for protest activity in the region. But newspaper readership and radio news listenership appeared positive and significant twice in models.[252] In those cases, increased news consumption, via newspaper or radio, registered a positive (direct) association with having protested. In Colombia, a one-unit increase in newspaper readership was associated with a 22% increase in likelihood of having protested; and the same one-unit increase in newspaper readership Mexico was associated with an almost 29% increase in likelihood of having protested.[253] A one-unit increase news consumption via radio was associated with a 17% increase in likelihood of having protested in Panama and with a 38% increase in El Salvador.[254] Only three countries included questions about Internet news consumption in 2004 and it was not statistically significant in any.

In 2004, absent a measure for interest in politics, the biggest predictor of having protested was education level, which was significant in five of the eight countries in the sample that year: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.[255] In most of those places, a one-unit increase in education was associated with a 10-12.5% increase in likelihood of having protested.[256] The outlier was Costa Rica, where a one-unit increase in education was associated with a 17% increase in likelihood of protesting.[257]

Ideology was also significant in five out of eight countries, but in different directions. A one-unit move to the left was significant in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico

[252] In Mexico, radio news consumption barely missed minimal significance in the positive direction, with a p-value of 0.101.
[253] Odds ratios 1.22357 and 1.2878, respectively
[254] Odds ratios 1.1713 and 1.3810, respectively
[255] The correlation between political interest and education was as low as 0.02 in some country-years and reached no higher than 0.26.
[256] Odds ratios: 1.1226 in Colombia, 1.1038 in Costa Rica, 1.1021 in Nicaragua and 1.1240 in Panama.
[257] Odds ratio 1.1741

and Nicaragua was associated with a 7-20% increase in likelihood for having protested.[258] But in Panama[259], a one-unit increase to the right was associated with a 13% increase in likelihood of reporting having protested in the 2004 survey.[260] Fourteen percent of respondents in Panama in 2004 reported ideology far to the right (10 out of 10 on the ideological scale); and about a quarter of the population self-described as 8 or above on that scale. Less than 10% of the population reported being far left (3 or less on the scale) in Panama in 2004. It seems Panama may be an odd outlier on ideology.

Being female reduced the likelihood of having protested in two places: Nicaragua and Panama. In those countries, women were 43% and 33% less likely to report having protested.[261] Age was only statistically significant in Panama, but a one-unit increase in age was not particularly meaningful, as it only translated to a one-percent increase in likelihood for having protested.[262] City size was at no point statistically significant.

2006

The sample of countries included in the 2006 AmericasBarometer doubled in size and the question about protest was asked in all countries except Paraguay (Table 4.11).

---

[258] Odds ratios 0.8852, 0.7911, 0.8986 and 0.9301 respectively

[259] I am unaware of any particular reason for this. The US State Department (2005) reports:

> "September 2003 protests… turned violent when construction workers led by [a] labor union attached police. In 2002, there were several public demonstrations, including a major public protest against corruption in Panama City. Several times during the year, rural groups protested against the presence of Panama Canal authorities in the watershed and potential expansion of the Canal. In August 2002, rioting broke out in Colon for two days, ostensibly to protest persistently high unemployment, halting commerce and causing minor property damage…
>
> "Two high-profile incidents in 2001 were triggered by the government's decision to allow bus owners to raise fares and by the delay in raising the minimum wage (which was raised in August 2003). The former led to weeklong riots that caused over 20 injuries, hundreds of arrests, and sporadic looting in the capital. Opposition to the proposed privatization of the state water utility in 1998 also led to vociferous, but generally nonviolent, protests." https://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2005/42100.htm (May 30, 2018)

[260] Odds ratio 1.1311

[261] Odds ratios 0.5746 and 0.6662, respectively

[262] Odds ratio 1.0157

Table 4.11: Logit output for protesting (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2006)

	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dom Rep	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala
Female	- 0.0604 (0.2084)	- 0.3728* (0.1695)	- 0.0505 (0.1793)	- 0.3880* (0.1876)	-0.6908*** (0.1867)	- 0.6947*** (0.1537)	- 0.6803* (0.2825)	0.0445 (0.2725)
Age	0.0031 (0.0068)	- 0.0055 (0.0057)	0.0115 (0.0065)	0.0105 (0.0060)	0.0210*** (0.0059)	- 0.0063 (0.0057)	0.0244** (0.0081)	0.0203* (0.0092)
Education		0.1468*** (0.0292)	0.0693** (0.0260)	0.1103*** (0.0223)	0.1047*** (0.0203)	0.0755*** (0.0219)	0.0413 (0.0326)	0.0620* (0.0316)
Skin darkness		0.0695 (0.1438)	0.1874 (0.0167)	- 0.0624 (0.0938)	0.0598 (0.0806)	0.1009 (0.1320)	- 0.1025 (0.0906)	0.2814 (0.2600)
City Size	0.1382 (0.0738)	0.1294 (0.0787)	0.0907 (0.0758)	0.0511 (0.0563)	- 0.1885*** (0.0571)	- 0.0503 (0.0502)	0.1066 (0.0906)	0.0474 (0.0851)
Left-right ideology	- 0.0515 (0.0451)	- 0.2136*** (0.0358)	- 0.1385*** (0.0361)	-0.1006* (0.0391)	- 0.0710* (0.0300)	- 0.0705* (0.0309)	- 0.2958*** (0.0524)	0.0298 (0.0684)
Political Interest		0.5192*** (0.0848)	0.4250*** (0.0904)	0.1138 (0.0900)	0.2346*** (0.0805)	0.3229*** (0.0793)	0.0355** (0.1224)	0.4932*** (0.1325)
News-paper use	0.2681** (0.1031)	0.1171 (0.0886)	0.1045 (0.1014)	0.0046 (0.0928)	0.0773 (0.0990)	0.1694* (0.0813)	0.1209 (0.1224)	0.1088 (0.1376)
TV news use	0.1602 (0.1782)	0.0274 (0.1343)	0.0227 (0.1243)	0.0451 (0.1352)	0.1030 (0.1024)	- 0.1303 (0.1156)	0.1042 (0.1776)	0.1079 (0.1460
Radio news use	0.0223 (0.0994)	0.1802* (0.0720)	0.1490 (0.0785)	- 0.0061 (0.0776)	(0.0947) (0.0795)	0.1503* (0.0715)	0.3762*** (0.1133)	0.2059 (0.1221)
Internet news use	0.3124*** (0.0997)	0.0464 (0.0870)	0.1573 (0.1204)	0.1401 (0.1232)	0.0062 (0.1501)	0.3238* (0.1301)	0.1998 (0.1625)	- 0.1666 (0.2604)
n	958	1314	1145	1086	1256	1829	1131	951

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
AmericasBarometer 2006

Table 4.11 (cont): Logit output for protesting (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2006)

	Honduras	Mexico	Nicaragua	Panama	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Female	- 0.5470** (0.1883)	- 0.1649 (0.2160)	- 0.5214* (0.2124)	- 0.5846** (0.1965)	- 0.3672* (0.1445)	- 0.2658 (0.1775)	- 0.0955 (0.1596)
Age	- 0.0005 (0.0073)	0.0229** (0.0080)	- 0.0025 (0.0070)	0.0135* (0.0068)	0.0183*** (0.0047)	0.0165** (0.005)	- 0.0046 (0.0065)
Education	0.0825** (0.0253)	0.0329 (0.0293)	0.0911** (0.0287)	0.1277*** (0.0258)	0.0722*** (0.0202)	0.1079*** (0.0248)	0.0621** (0.0205)
Skin darkness	0.1627 (0.1372)	0.1693 (0.1823)	0.0453 (0.1866)	0.1344 (0.0964)	0.0697 (0.1277)	0.0378 (0.1416)	0.1834* (0.0859)
City Size	0.0676 (0.0727)	0.0726 (0.0761)	0.0849 (0.0754)	0.1596* (0.0665)	- 0.0613 (0.0487)	0.2969*** (0.0748)	0.2643* (0.1280)
Left-right ideology	- 0.0379 (0.0340)	- 0.1905*** (0.0441)	- 0.0380 (0.0387)	0.2723 (0.1013)	- 0.1052** (0.0332)	- 0.3252*** (0.0433)	0.0372 (0.0254)
Political Interest	0.0957 (0.1018)	0.3569** (0.1199)	0.3102** (0.1017)	0.2723** (0.1013)	0.2309** (0.0772)	0.5788*** (0.0896)	0.5479*** (0.0254)
News-paper use	0.3226** (0.1082)	0.1410 (0.1141)	0.2563* (0.1061)	0.0935 (0.0926)	- 0.0819 (0.0805)	0.2448** (0.0929)	0.0129 (0.0890)
TV news use	0.1204 (0.1100)	- 0.0308 (0.1519)	- 0.2106 (0.1078)	- 0.0004 (0.1337)	0.0455 (0.0930)	- 0.2028 (0.1160)	0.1870 (0.1141)
Radio news use	- 0.0035 (0.0976)	0.0035 (0.1055)	0.1391 (0.0971)	0.1233 (0.0846)	0.2156** (0.0729)	- 0.0363 (0.0785)	0.1048 (0.0738)
Internet news use	- 0.0285 (0.1566)	0.3503 (0.1362)*	0.0425 (0.1540)	0.2174 (0.1222)	0.0815 (0.0920)	0.1170 (0.1084)	0.2400 (0.0945)
n	1292	1198	1376	1199	1313	1070	1243

* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
AmericasBarometer 2006

In 2006, as in 2004, television news consumption was not associated with protest participation in any country. Newspaper readership was statistically significant in five cases, each time in a positive direction. A one-unit increase in getting news via newspaper was associated with an 18% increase in protest activity in Ecuador, a 28% increase in Uruguay, 29% in Nicaragua, 30% in Brazil and 38% in Honduras.[263]

Radio registered a positive and statistically significant association in four cases. In Ecuador, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 16% increase in likelihood to report having a protested.[264] That same one-unit radio news consumption increase in Chile was associated with a 20% increase in protest propensity and with a 24% increase in Peru.[265] The largest increase was in El Salvador, where a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 46% increase in likelihood for having protested.[266]

Internet news consumption was statistically significant in four countries in 2006: Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. In each case, the effect was positive. The impact was notable. A one-unit increase in Internet news consumption was associated with a 27% - 42% increase in having protested.[267] That impact is approximately the same size as that of political interest across the region, which was significant in every country except Costa Rica and Honduras.

When statistically significant, the impact of political interest in all countries was large and in a positive direction. A one-unit increase in political interest was associated

[263] Odds ratios 1.1846, 1.2773, 1.2921, 1.3074 and 1.3808, respectively
[264] Odds ratio 1.1621
[265] Odds ratios 1.1974 and 1.2406, respectively
[266] Odds ratio 1.4567
[267] Odds ratios: 1.3667 in Brazil, 1.38236 in Ecuador, 1.4195 in Mexico and 1.271293 in Venezuela

with no less than 25% increase in reporting having protested.[268] Most effects were between 30% and 50%.[269] The outliers were El Salvador, Guatemala, Uruguay and Venezuela, where a one-unit increase in political interest was associated with a 60% to 80% increase in likelihood to have protested.[270] Median interest in politics in Guatemala ("none") was lower that year than in the rest of the sample ("little"), which might explain part of the outsized impact, but not so for the other three. Information about protest was only collected in Uruguay and Venezuela in 2006, meaning no within-country comparisons are possible. In both El Salvador and Guatemala, those responding in the affirmative about protesting had increased a little over one-percent year-on-year.

As expected, education was also a strong predictor of having protested, statistically significant in all country models, save El Salvador and Mexico. A one-unit increase in education was associated with an approximately 8% increase in reporting having protested.[271] In Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay, the impact was 15%.[272]

Respondents who self-reported more leftist ideology were more likely to report having protested. In Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru, a one-unit shift left was associated with an approximately 10% increase in likelihood of having protested.[273] In Chile and Mexico, a one-unit shift to the left was associated with an approximately 19% increase in likelihood of having protested.[274] In El Salvador and

---

[268] Lowest significant odds ratio 1.2597 in Peru
[269] Odds ratios: 1.3130 in Panama, 1.3637 in Nicaragua, 1.3812 in the Dominican Republic, 1.3835 in Colombia, 1.4289 in Mexico, 1.4852 in Ecuador, and 1.5296 in Chile
[270] Odds ratios: 1.6376 in El Salvador, 1.6806 in Guatemala, 1.7839 in Uruguay and 1.7297 in Venezuela
[271] Odds ratios: 1.0718 in Colombia, 1.1104 in the Dominican Republic, 1.0785 in Ecuador, 1.0640 in Honduras, 1.0954 in Nicaragua, 1.0749 in Peru, and 1.0641 in Venezuela
[272] Odds ratio: 1.1581 in Chile, 1.1166 in Costa Rica, 1.1362 in Panama, and 1.1139 in Uruguay
[273] Odds ratios 0.8707, 0.9043, 0.9314, 0.9319, and 0.9001, respectively
[274] Odds ratios 0.8076 and 0.8266, respectively

Uruguay, a one-unit shift to the left was associated with an approximately 27% increase in likelihood of having protested.[275]

In nine countries, being female was negative and statistically significant for a protesting. Women were between 30% and 50% less likely to protest than men.[276] Age was statistically significant in about half the countries but had little impact. A one-unit increase in age was associated with a 2% increase in likelihood of protesting.[277]

Though not statistically significant at all in 2004, city size was significant four times in 2006, but in different directions. A one-unit increase in city size was associated with an 19% decrease in likelihood of protesting in the Dominican Republic, but with a 17% increase in Panama.[278] In Uruguay and Venezuela, the impact was even larger, with a one-unit increase in city size associated with an over 30% increase in likelihood of having protested.[279] Having not been included in the previous model because the question was not asked in 2004, race/ethnicity/skin tone was statistically significant only once, in Venezuela, with a one-unit increase in skin darkness associated with a 20% increase in having protested.[280]

2008

The question about having protested was only asked in six countries in the 2008 survey: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru (Table 4.12).

---

[275] Odds ratios 0.7439 and 0.7223, respectively
[276] Odds ratios: 0.6888 in Chile, 0.6784 in Costa Rica, 0.5012 in the Dominican Republic, 0.499 in Ecuador, 0.5065 in El Salvador, 0.57867 in Honduras, 0.5937 in Nicaragua, 0.5573 in Panama, and 0.6927 in Peru
[277] Odds ratios: 1.0212 in the Dominican Republic, 1.0247 in El Salvador, 1.0205 in Guatemala, 1.0232 in Mexico, 1.0136 in Panama, 1.0185 in Peru and 1.0166 in Uruguay
[278] Odds ratios 0.8282 and 1.1730, respectively
[279] Odds ratios 1.3457 and 1.3025, respectively
[280] Odds ratio 1.201252

Table 4.12: Logit output for protesting (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2008)

	Brazil	Colombia	Costa Rica	Guatemala	Mexico	Peru
Female	- 0.1755 (0.1843)	- 0.3348* (0.1655)	- 0.2008 (0.1925)	- 0.0228 (0.2158)	0.0387 (0.1294)	- 0.1499 (0.1457)
Age	0.0085 (0.0063)	0.0021 (0.0063)	0.0110 (0.0060)	0.0026 (0.0073)	0.0228*** (0.0068)	0.0131** (0.0047)
Education	0.0425 (0.0254)	0.1503*** (0.0248)	0.1257*** (0.0226)	0.0751** (0.0278)	0.0281 (0.0266)	0.0726*** (0.0206)
Skin darkness	0.0762 (0.0918)	- 0.0586 (0.0961)	0.1777 (0.1061)	0.3368 (0.2281)	0.2039 (0.1466)	0.1107 (0.1309)
City Size	0.0935 (0.0705)	- 0.0281 (0.0714)	0.0369 (0.0556)	0.0330 (0.0772)	0.2660*** (0.0669)	- 0.0249 (0.0478)
Left-right ideology	- 0.0694 (0.0419)	- 0.0797* (0.0341)	- 0.1089** (0.0359)	- 0.0646 (0.0419)	- 0.1386*** (0.0398)	- 0.1934*** (0.0331)
Political Interest	0.4798*** (0.0979)	0.4652*** (0.0855)	0.3097*** (0.0929)	0.4883*** (0.1106)	0.5930*** (0.1074)	0.4385*** (0.0806)
News-paper use	0.2140* (0.0929)	- 0.0733 (0.0923)	0.0039 (0.0855)	0.0642 (0.1169)	- 0.0713 (0.0971)	- 0.0186 (0.0813)
TV news use	- 0.0716 (0.1390)	- 0.1511 (0.1317)	0.1019 (0.1450)	- 0.0128 (0.1160)	0.1265 (0.1340)	0.0755 (0.1035)
Radio news use	0.0545 (0.0851)	0.0840 (0.0708)	0.1222 (0.0767)	0.3200** (0.1129)	0.1951* (0.0882)	0.2897*** (0.0745)
Internet news use	0.1600 (0.0912)	0.2286* (0.0961)	- 0.0030 (0.1260)	- 0.3860* (0.1921)	0.0694 (0.1282)	0.1402 (0.0867)
n	1017	1184	1035	1007	1214	1270

* $p< 0.05$ ** $p<0.01$ *** $p<0.001$
AmericasBarometer 2008

As with the previous two survey years, television news consumption was at no point statistically significant for protest activity. Newspaper readership was only significant in Brazil, with a one-unit increase in consumption associated with a 24% increase in likelihood to report having protested.[281] Radio news listenership in 2008 was positive and significant for protesting in Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In Mexico, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 22% increase in protesting.[282] In Guatemala and Peru, that effect was over 33%.[283]

Most surprising relative to media in 2008, Internet news consumption was only significant for protesting in two of six countries, but in different directions: positive in Colombia, but negative in Guatemala. In Colombia, a one-unit increase in Internet news consumption was associated with a 26% increase in likelihood for having protested.[284] In Guatemala, that same one-unit increase in news consumption was associated with one-third less chance of reporting having protested.[285] In 2008, over 25% of Colombia's population used the Internet (Statista NDb) but only 8.3% of Guatemala's population did (World Bank).

Unsurprisingly, interest in politics had the biggest impact on a respondent's reporting protest participation, with a one-unit increase in political interest associated with no less than a 36% increase in likelihood of protesting.[286] Overall, a one-unit increase in political interest was associated with a 55-60% increase in likelihood of

[281] Odds ratio 1.2387
[282] Odds ratio 1.2155
[283] Odds ratios 1.3771 and 1.3360, respectively
[284] Odds ratio 1.2569
[285] Odds ratio 0.6798
[286] Odds ratio 1.3630 in Costa Rica

having protested.[287] Mexico was an outlier, with a one-unit increase in political interest associated with an over 80% increase in having protested.[288]

Education was significantly associated with protesting in four of six countries in 2008, always in the positive direction. A one-unit increase in education was associated with an 8% increase in likelihood of protesting in Guatemala and Peru, with an 11% increase in Costa Rica, and with a 16% increase in Colombia.[289] Being more left-leaning was also significant for protesting in four countries. A one-unit shift to the left was associated with about a 10% increase in likelihood of reporting having protested in the past.[290] The impact was larger in Peru, where a one-unit shift to the left was associated with an 18% increase in protesting.[291]

Gender was statistically significant for protesting only in Colombia in 2008, with woman about 30% less likely to report having protested than men.[292] Age was only statistically significant in Mexico and Peru, with a one-unit increase in age associated with a 1-2% increase in likelihood of reporting having protested.[293] City size was only statistically significant in Mexico, with a one-unit increase in city size associated with a 30% increase in having protested.[294] Skin color was nowhere statistically significant in this sample of countries in 2008.

[287] Odds ratios: 1.6157 in Brazil, 1.5924 in Colombia, 1.6296 in Guatemala, and 1.5504 I Peru
[288] Odds ratio 1.8094
[289] Odds ratios 1.0780, 1.0752, 1.1134, and 1.1622, respectively
[290] Odds ratios: 0.9234 in Colombia, 0.8968 in Costa Rica, and 0.8706 in Mexico
[291] Odds ratio 0.8241
[292] Odds ratio 0.7155
[293] Odds ratios 1.0230 and 1.0131, respectively
[294] Odds ratio 1.3047

Discussion

As detailed in Appendix A, there are different expectations for the impact of media platform reputation in each country. In terms of expectations relative to those classifications, results shown in Table 13 were quite mixed. First and foremost, in three countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela), no media consumption was at any point in the mid-2000s significant for protesting. Conversely, only in Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico in 2006 was more than one media platform significant at any given time. In every other instance, only one media platform was associated with protest behavior.

It seems that the link between media and protesting—which has become more obvious to scholars in the past few years thanks to the Internet—may have been fomenting before Internet news consumption became the norm in many places. But findings are too sporadic to draw strong conclusions. If media reputation were significant—especially arguably for community radio, for example—then these findings should be repeated over time, and they should be stronger in places with more balkanized or contrarian media.

In Table 4.13 a checkmark indicates significant findings in line with expectations. An x indicates significant findings against expectations. A question mark indicates significant and positive findings without a directional expectation. The dash indicates the one instance of significant and negative findings absent a directional expectation.

Table 4.13: Comparison with expectations

	Brazil			Chile			Colombia		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
TV									
Paper		?	?						
Radio					?				
Internet		√							√

Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations

	Costa Rica			Dominican Republic			Ecuador		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
TV									
Paper								x	
Radio								x	
Internet								√	

Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations

	El Salvador			Guatemala			Honduras		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
TV									
Paper								x	
Radio	√					?			
Internet						-			

Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations

	Mexico			Nicaragua			Panama		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
TV									
Paper		x			x				
Radio			?				√		
Internet		√							

Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations

	Peru			Uruguay			Venezuela		
	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008	2004	2006	2008
TV									
Paper					x				
Radio		√	√						
Internet									

Nowhere did I expect newspaper readership to have a positive impact on protesting – that is to say nowhere were newspaper classified as challenging the status quo – but newspaper readership was positive and significant in six countries: Mexico in 2004; Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay in 2006; and Brazil in both 2006 and 2008. This is against expectations for every place but Brazil, for which there was not expectation drawn from reputation (see Appendix A). I suspect that there may be more nuance in newspapers, even within any country, than be captured with the blunt measure available in this survey.

Radio news consumption was positive and significant in six countries: El Salvador and Panama in 2004; Chile and Ecuador in 2006; Guatemala and Mexico in 2008; and Peru in both 2006 and 2008. This conforms with expectations for El Salvador, Panama and Peru. There was no expectation for Chile, Guatemala or Mexico. For Ecuador, this positive association is against expectations, as radio in that country was categorized as status quo-reinforcing.

Finally, the Internet was only significant in five countries: positive and significant in Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico in 2006, and in Colombia in 2008; but the negative and significant finding for Guatemala in 2008 is against expectations. There were 8.3 Internet users per 100 in Guatemala in 2008 (World Bank); and about 90% of respondents in the survey used the Internet for news rarely or less. The negative association may be related to a lack of Internet penetration at all, much less for news consumption. Nonetheless, the Internet's having a negative relationship with protest is at odds with much of existing literature and may be anomalous.

Overall, results went against expectations as much as conformed to them. As in the previous chapter, the findings about newspapers are the most surprising. The

history of social movements would suggest that elites – especially young, affluent, educated men[295] – are most likely to spur democratic transitions.[296] That the young are least likely worldwide to get news via newspapers (Nielsen 2017) makes this finding even less intuitive. In Latin America overall, newspapers are less strongly affiliated with status quo or government positions than television is (which was at no point significant for protesting), but I did not have them classified as agents of change. Only in Brazil, where there was no expectation, was this finding repeated at more than one data point though, suggesting it may be anomalous.

Radio was categorized as critical of government in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Of those, there were only significant findings in three. The other three places where radio was significant were not categorized as having a directional expectation. And radio was not statistically significant for protest in places where I most expected it to be, such as Nicaragua. When and where radio was significant, daily radio news consumption was between 30 and 40%, neither very low or very high in the region. In fact, when radio was statistically significant, daily use was the

[295] "It is obvious that privileged class backgrounds provide leaders with financial resources, flexible schedules and social contacts often unavailable to the rank and file. These resources are important because social movements often champion the interests of resource-poor groups… A host of social movement activities – framing grievances and formulating ideologies, debating, interfacing with media, writing, orating, devising strategies and tactics, creatively synthesizing information gleaned from local, national, and international venues, dialoguing with internal and external elites, improvising and innovating, developing rationales for coalition building and channeling emotions – are primarily intellectual tasks… Formal education, especially at the university level, is the main avenue through which people acquire advanced reading, writing, speaking, and analytic skills, and colleges and universities are settings in which many individuals absorb new ideas from different cultures… This does not mean that all movement leaders hail from the privileged classes or receive higher education… Yet we believe that even for those who come from working and lower classes, educational capital is crucial." (Morris and Staggenborg 2004, 175)

[296] This is not to discount the role of women in social movements. But they historically have not been leaders of movements, except in rare cases (for women's rights or the abolition of slavery, for example). Many early leaders in the US civil rights movement were men, for example, because the path to leadership for that movement went largely through black churches, where over 99% of pastors were men (Morris and Staggenborg 2004, 176)

same as in places where radio news consumption was not significant. El Salvador is one country in which radio, historically, is quite contrarian or against the status quo, even explicitly employed by guerillas, whilst newspapers aligned with military dictatorships (Henriquez Consalvi 2010, Rockwell and Janus 2003); and the finding there was barely statistically significant. Perhaps with radio more detailed one-country studies are needed before it is appropriate to speculate about generalizable or universal tendencies, even at the individual level.

Changing the analysis from cross-national to within country, ten countries had data from at least two points in time about both about protest and media consumption: Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Of those, no media was ever significant for protesting in Costa Rica or Honduras. Only in Brazil was the significant relationship between newspaper consumption and protest participation replicated from 2006 to 2008. Though significant in 2004 in Colombia and Mexico and in 2006 in Nicaragua, the relationship for newspaper readership did not hold across survey iterations. A significant relationship between radio news consumption and protest participation remained constant over time for El Salvador (2004, 2006) and Peru (2006, 2008) but did not for Panama, Guatemala or Mexico, which registered radio as significant only once. The significance of the Internet was not duplicated in any country, with significance only found once in Brazil (2006), Mexico (2006), Colombia (2008) and Guatemala (2008).

In every place in which a media platform was statistically significant one year, it was not another year. That raises doubts about the importance of media reputation for challenging the status quo, as, without more data points to connect, any one-time relationship could be spurious. Minimally, it suggests that the media reputation is less

important than some other underlying factor. There were no particularly high correlations among the variables employed in this chapter. But inconsistent findings cross-national and within-country over time suggest a different mechanism at work.

That said, protest is exceptionally rare. Walgrave, Wouters and Ketelaars (2016) caution that survey data on protest behaviors may pose validity concerns because of the sensitive nature of the topic.[297] If protest participation were underreported, then that would make it harder to find any relationship. In addition, logistic regression notoriously underestimates the probability of predicting rare events (King and Zeng 2001), such as protest.[298] Since the method begets ballooned standard errors, any findings are notable.

Theoretically, the takeaway from this chapter is that, above and beyond demographics,[299] even without analytics, there may be ways to gauge who is more likely to protest—namely by identifying individuals who consume more Internet and radio news. But such findings would need to replicated across the continent at another point in time before making such a claim with any conviction.

Finally, nothing in the analysis for this chapter can speak to the direction of the relationship between media and protest. The path dependent relationship described in Chapter Two would suggest that media consumption would drive participation, but that need not be the case. For example, Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer (2013) contend that

[297] There is no reason to expect people would over- or under-report having protested.
[298] King and Zeng (2001) recommend statistical fixes to employ in the collection of rare event data. For a survey in which respondents answer yes or no, such fixes are not useful.
[299] Multiple scholars have noted that unconventional means of participation may reduce gender and age discrepancies observed in more conventional forms of participation (e.g., Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010; Dietlind, Stolle and Marc Hooghe 2011). In this sample, neither was a consistent predictor of protest activity. Without a conventional means of participation to compare with, it is impossible to know if gender is less relevant for protest than it might be for something else.

protests during the Arab Spring begot increased social media activity, not the reverse as many claimed. That said, since young people worldwide show higher levels of literacy and adoption of technology, these findings are likely conservative, with the importance of Internet news consumption especially potentially underrated.

Unfortunately, since 2008, AmericasBarometer has combined their media consumption questions to collect information only on frequency, not frequency by platform. Given the differing impact of media consumption on protest shown here, that is likely to the detriment of future scholarship. The previous chapter and this, as well as a wide range of studies from other disciplines, show that there may be something especially impactful about Internet news consumption for protest (Bennett and Segerberg 2013, Scheufele and Nisbet 2002, Shah, Kwak and Holbert 2001, Shah, McLeod and Yoon 2001, Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes 2014, Boulianne 2009, 2015 or Skoric, Zhu, Goh and Pang 2015, Tufekci and Wilson 2012, Valenzuela 2013, Kenski and Stroud 2006, Norris and Inglehart 2009, Abbott 2012, Valenzuela 2013, Gainous, Wagner and Abbot 2015, Ruijgrok 2016, Garrett 2006, Howard 2010). A combined media measure would miss that.

Having explored participation generally and protest specifically, the next chapter narrows the theory further, focusing on one country unlike those so far studied – Bolivia, the poorest country in Latin America – employing original data collected for this dissertation.

Chapter Five: THIRD QUANTITATIVE TEST

Though comparative coverage of the world has improved considerably in recent years, media data available for Latin America is still limited in scope (countries) as well as depth (topic). World Values Survey administers surveys only in the most developed of the Latin American countries, and while the AmericasBarometer collects data from all of Latin America, space limitations have limited its coverage of media usage in recent iterations to one question about total news consumption.[300] The convergence of these factors result in a dearth of information about the impact of media on Latin American countries that are lower developed.

I was given a unique opportunity to insert media consumption questions into a pre-electoral survey for the 2014 presidential campaign in Bolivia, the second poorest country in the hemisphere. Since voting is compulsory in most of Latin America, as explained previously, the media's impact on merely voting would be inconsequential. Additionally, for a multitude of reasons related to social desirability bias, asking after-the-fact about vote choice is not necessarily accurate. Asking who someone intends to vote for is more valid, especially close to the election. That provided me the opportunity to test if the reputation of media platforms might be associated with vote choice, in addition to its association with political behaviors outlined in previous chapters. This case study allows me to examine the association between media consumption of platforms that challenge the status quo and candidate preference in Bolivia's 2014 presidential election.

[300] Question GIO on the core questionnaire: About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never

The 2014 Bolivian election was the second under the 2009 constitution. Incumbent President Juan "Evo" Morales Ayma, leading the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) ticket, ran against 4 opponents from across the political spectrum: Fernando Vargas of the Green Party to his left, and to the right of Morales, centrist Juan Del Granado of the Movement Without Fear (MSM) party, conservative former President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga representing the Christian-Democratic PODEMOS party, and libertarian Democratic Unity (UD) party candidate Samuel Doria Medina.

The context of the 2014 Bolivian presidential election was one of regional, ethnic and societal tension. Bolivia is also unlike the Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic (WEIRD) countries in which most political communication and behavior theory has been formed and tested (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010). The polarized environment, coupled with the country's high poverty and uniquely strong history of counter-culture media, especially radio, make Bolivia a valuable test case for the importance of mass media consumption for political engagement. My analysis suggests that consumption of media reputed to be aligned with or supportive of certain candidates correlates with voting for those candidates. This complements the theory employed in the previous two chapters that reputation guides media consumption in part.

Like the previous chapter and unlike Chapter Three, media reputation and consumption seem to have little impact on candidate choice. The impact of anti-establishment media — radio and Internet — shows no clear pattern. Taken together, the scant findings from Bolivia suggest that, though news media consumption – and Internet news especially – has been shown to be positively associated with political engagement in the previous chapters, there may be much less of a relationship between

media consumption and vote choice, even for media not seen as aligned with governments.

Background

Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, second only to Haiti (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 89) and ranking 119 out of 188 countries on the 2015 Human Development Index (UNDP 2015).[301] It is considered a medium human development country, with only three Latin American countries ranked lower.[302] As an illustration in practical terms, thirty percent of homes in Bolivia did not have access to sanitation in in 2012 (INE 2012, 19).

One of only two landlocked countries in South America[303], Bolivia is situated in the middle of the continent, with a population estimated at just over 11 million in 2017 (INE). The country's three largest cities – La Paz/El Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba – help roughly map out the country's geographic divides: the largely indigenous Altiplano (high plain) in the west, the wealthier *mestizo* agricultural areas in the east, and the fertile coca growing lands in the middle.

Independent since 1825, military dictatorships or *juntas* ruled Bolivia for much of the middle of the 20th century, with the last falling in 1982 (Klein 2011). The restoration of valid elections did not coincide with the emergence of any dominant party. Coalition governments were the norm in Bolivia in the last decades of the 20th century, leading to policy enactments that surprised some observers (Klein 2011).

---

[301] Down from 113 in 2013
[302] Nicaragua 125, Guatemala 128 and Honduras 131
[303] The other being Paraguay

Bolivia's modern democratic trend began with the election of President Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1985.[304] Amidst hyperinflation above 20,000 percent (Chavez 1985), he broke with his own past policies and instituted economic liberalization in the late 1980s, adopting a program known as the Washington Consensus (Sachs 1987). That program of economic reform and privatization[305], which would later be known pejoratively as neoliberalism (Metcalf 2017), would be essential to the rise of indigenous and anti-establishment parties in the following years (Grissafi 2010).

The timing of Paz Estenssoro's dismantling of the Bolivian bureaucracy coincided with an increase in demand for a traditional Bolivia product: coca (Klein 2011, 247). At the same time that state bureaucracy was being disassembled, revenue was streaming into traditionally underserved coca-growing areas populated by the descendants of indigenous peoples[306], whose rights had been suppressed under military junta rule.

Though the fight for indigenous rights in Bolivia goes back to the early 1970s after the demise of the last military dictatorship, it was the confluence of privatization and growth of the coca trade in the 1980s brought the fight for indigenous rights to the forefront (Klein 2011, 248-263). Indigenous rights organizations gained their first seats in Bolivian politics in the early 1990s, when the societal effects of dismantling of the state employment apparatus were becoming apparent. Indigenous and workers' parties

---

[304] Paz Estenssoro has previously held the position from 1952–1956 and 1960–1964 before he was overthrown in a coup d'état and subsequently exiled.
[305] The ten tenets of the Washington consensus are: fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization, deregulation and property rights (Williamson 2004, 196)
[306] Grissafi (2010) makes the point that the residents of the coca-growing regions were not the original indigenous persons there, but largely rather transplants from other areas who still identify as indigenous.

confronted the traditional political establishment on the grounds of racism and economic malaise throughout the 1990s.

Though indicators of human development had been increasing for all Bolivians since educational and societal reforms began in the 1950s, the less indigenous part of Bolivia remained significantly richer and healthier (Klein 2011, 279). Though Bolivia's Gini coefficient has decreased in this century from a high of 61.6 in 2000, it still stood at 47.8 in 2014 (World Bank).[307] Many blame Washington consensus policies for enduring inequality (Rice 2011, 286).

The building strength of indigenous rights groups was first felt in the 2002 election, in which the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party under Juan "Evo" Morales Ayma and the Indian Pachakuti Movement (MIP) party under Felipe Quispe won one-third of the seats[308]. This begot a new political opposition from the western part of Bolivia, which had many fewer indigenous residents and generated much of the country's agricultural and natural gas exports (Klein 2011, 264).[309]

The ideological and political divide between the indigenous western highlands and mestizo eastern lowlands was further inflamed by the election of Morales as President in 2005. During the election campaign, Morales promised to nationalize the country's natural gas companies in 2006 and to rewrite the constitution (Zissis 2006, *Economist* 2006a) to expand indigenous rights and reshape government (Romero 2009,

[307] A Gini coefficient of zero represents perfect equality in which every resident earning an equal amount. A Gini coefficient of one represents a country in which one person holds all wealth, with everyone else earning nothing. "South Africa, Namibia and Haiti are among the most unequal countries in terms of income distribution … while Ukraine, Slovenia and Norway rank as the most equal nations" (Barr 2017).
[308] Quispe's party grew out of an explicitly anti-Western movement from the 1970s (Rice 2011, 290).
[309] For details on the "Media Luna" (half moon) backlash from the Eastern states, see Eaton (2007) or Bebbington and Bebbington (2010)

Taylor 2009) away from elites and more toward the needs of the poor and disenfranchised (*Economist* 2006a).[310]

The 2014 election was the second presidential election under the new 2009 constitution. By then regional tensions were running high ("New Bolivia constitution in force"). The 2009 constitution allowed presidential reelection for the first time in Bolivia, and the constitutional court did not count Morales' 2005 term against him, allowing him to run again in 2014 (Castillo and Carrasco 2013).

Bolivian media

Bolivia has a rich radio history (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 78). The first commercial station in the country began broadcasting in 1929 (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 95). The political import of radio can be traced back to the aftermath of the miners strikes of 1948, after which the miners' union founded its first network of 25 radio stations to spread its message in 1952 (Moreira Gomes 2011).[311] The overt political nature of Bolivian radio renders it quite unlike radio in other countries (O'Connor 1990, 102):

> "Lozada and Kuncar identify three roles played by the Bolivian miners' radio stations. In 'normal' times of democracy the radios link the miners' union and its members, and the everyday culture of the miners and *campesinos*. In times of emergency, when the country and the workers face a military coup, the stations form a network of resistance against the approaching armed forces, broadcast decisions made at public and organizational meetings, and allow union leaders and members, women, and students to offer advice, encouragement, or criticism. Finally, in times of military control, when the stations are closed, they are a focus of underground organizing, and the people demand their return to the airwaves (1, 14, 21, 25, 26)" (O'Connor 1990, 104).

[310] For more details on Bolivia's 2006-2007 Constituent Assembly see Guigale et al (2006) or de la Fuente Jeria (2010)

[311] There is some disagreement among historians about when the first radio station started, but it was no earlier than 1945 and no later than 1952 (O'Connor 1990).

Community radio[312] goes back decades and continues to grow in the 21st century. Radio Soberanía, run by the *cocalero*[313] union, promoted the causes and candidacy of now-President Juan "Evo" Morales (Ledebur 2002, 10) when he was the de facto opposition leader in the first years of this century. Radio Kawsachuan Coca ("long live coca"), another station promoting the coca industry, was built after Morales was elected to the office of the Presidency and occupies one of the largest buildings in Bolivia's third-largest metropolitan area, Cochabamba (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 287). As part of its Socialist agenda, the Venezuelan government under Hugo Chavez supported the establishment of new community radio stations in Bolivia (Waisbord 2013, 134) as part of Venezuela's support for Morales' socialist party.

As of 2015, there are over 40 radio stations with sufficiently large reach to be listed nationally (Grupo MediosMedios) and over 800 regional and local radio stations across the country (Freedom House 2007).[314] Seventy-four percent of homes own a radio, compared to 67 percent television ownership (INE 2012, 23). More people in Bolivia listen to radio in a day than read a newspaper in a month (Equipos Mori 2014).[315]

---

[312] UNESCO defines community broadcasting as "generally characterised by three principles:

- Independence: Not-for-profit in nature and independent of government and commercial forces.
- Governance: Owned and/or managed by the community, who participate in policy, programming and operations.
- Service: They focus on issues of local concern and represent the interests of all in the community"

[313] Defied by Oxford dictionaries as "one who dedicates him or herself to the growing of coca," the raw material for cocaine, but also a stimulant grown and chewed for centuries by workers in the mountain region between Bolivia and Peru (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 291).

[314] These are conservative numbers, as Torrico Villanueva places the number above 900 (2008, 34): "The total number of community radio stations in Latin America are around 10,000, with Peru having the largest proportion and Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil in second, third, and fourth place. If unlicensed stations are also taken into account, the overall numbers are much higher. Recent surveys by UNESCO, for example, show there are more than 10,000 community radio stations still waiting for licenses in Brazil alone" ("Statistics on Radio").

[315] Data from the *AmericasBarometer* survey reports similar readership/viewership/listenership (Salzman 2011a, Salzman 2011b).

Television and newspapers, on the other hand, are owned by the business oligarchy. The main newspaper in the capital, for example, was founded in 1903 with the express purpose of representing business interests (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 93). Commercial television was first licensed in 1984 (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 33), and like newspapers, most television news stations are owned by families with substantial business interests. Those families and the others in the *mestizo* and immigrant oligarchy (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, Torrico Villanueva 2008), such as the politically active Monaterio, Kuljis, Rivero, Doria Medina and Marinkovic families (Tabbie Saenz, personal correspondence, December 13, 2016) [316], controlled Bolivian politics through most of the 20th century.

The Santa Cruz media played a large part in the conservative, mainstream opposition to then-candidate Morales in his first election (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 38). In response to that coverage, Morales has attacked various newspapers and television outlets for lying and opposing his government, including before the 2014 election, even referring to one station as part of the oligarchy to reinforce public perceptions of their being against him and, by extension, for his more traditional opponents (Quintanilla 2014).

In the case of Bolivia in 2014 then, the incumbent was not just reputationally but actually associated with media and causes that challenged the traditional status quo. And opposition candidates (especially a media owner and former president) represented

[316] Corroborated by Branko Marinkovic (personal correspondence, December 12, 2016). The breakdown of ownership is: Monasterio owns *Unitel* (television), Klujis *Red Uno* (television), Rivero *El Deber* (newspaper Santa Cruz), Garafulic *Pagina 7* (newspaper La Paz), Duran *El Mundo* (newspaper La Paz), Canelas *Los Timpos* (newspaper Cochabamba), Marinkovic *El Dia* (newspaper La Paz). Additionally a Venezuelan businessman named Gil holds a large stake in the government television stations: *PAT*, *Cadena A* and *ATB*.

the more traditional elements of Bolivia's political and economic climate. In this case, the government candidate was the candidate changing the status quo, not the opposition.

Inequality

Bolivian inequality is reflected in its digital divide, which one scholar called "more of a gaping crevasse" than a mere divide (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 99). This inequality is reflected in both Internet and mobile technologies. From 2005 to 2013, cell phone use worldwide increased from 33.9 subscriptions per 100 people to 93.1 per 100. Though cellular penetration in Bolivia increased eleven fold, from nine to 98 per 100 people, during the same period, the vast majority of those are not smartphones (World Bank 2014).

In 2014, Bolivia ranks 95th in the world (out of 217) for total Internet use (CIA 2014), with only 9.4% of the national population living in homes with access to the Internet, and only the richest, most populous state reporting more than 10% home-based access (INE 2012, 23).[317] "Almost 80 percent of Internet users are concentrated in the three main urban cities" (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 36). Broadband is slow, expensive and sparse even in some secondary cities (Lancaster 2015), with just 1.2 broadband subscribers per thousand in 2008 (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 99).

[317] The average is under 7% nationally when Santa Cruz's 23% of the population and 15.8% Internet penetration is exempted from the calculation.

Research Design and Data

In Chapter Two, I theorize that consumers use the reputations of various media platforms as independent or affiliated with the political status quo as guidance for identifying media that align with their preferences; and that consumption of these different platforms affects political behavior. In the third chapter, I employed ordered and generalized ordered logit to draw a link between media consumption and four means of political participation in eight countries. In the previous chapter, I looked at the relationship between media consumption and protest across the region. In this chapter, I employ another form of logistic regression — multinomial logit — to examine the connection between media consumption and vote choice in the hemisphere's poorest Iberian-origin country.

As explained above, newspaper and television are owned by the business oligarchy in Bolivia, whilst radio has a history of taking on the government elites that have worked alongside that oligarchy. In Chapter 3 (and Appendix A), Bolivian media were categorized as follows: television and newspapers with reputations as less likely to present information outside the status quo; radio with a reputation as disrupting the status quo.

In other words, exposure to media associated with status quo policies might be less mobilizing than media associated with change. One way to extend that question to candidates is to investigate if media better situated to challenge the status quo are associated with support for politicians who promise change. In Bolivia in 2014, Morales and del Granado were two such politicians. Both led parties that grew out of the indigenous rights movements mentioned earlier. Quiroga, on the other hand, is a former

head of state and Doria Medina had served as a government minister in the 1990s. They are literally manifestations of Bolivia's traditional past.

To investigate the association between media platform and candidate preference, I employ data from an original survey administered by Equipos Mori, a prominent and respected survey and market research firm in South America, from July 17 – 28, 2014. The short survey, funded by a group of news stations, gauged pre-electoral sentiment and vote intent.[318] The survey polled 2009 voters eligible for the October 2014 election across the country's nine states. I duplicated questions from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, using the Spanish-language wording from neighboring Chile, to collect information on the respondents' preferred methods of news consumption, including frequency, primary means of getting news and trust/confidence in various media platforms. Those questions were:

- People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never (read out and code one answer for each): daily newspaper; printed magazines; TV news; Radio news; mobile phone; email; Internet; or talk with friends or colleagues[319]

- Could you please tell me, how do you principally inform yourself about what is going on in the country? (Do not read options, mark just one). Options: TV news; work colleagues; newspapers; radio; friends; neighbors; Church; Internet sites (excluding newspapers); community center; social networks; school; or family

- I'm next going to name various means of communication. For each one, could you please tell me how much confidence you have in it? (Newspapers, TV news, radio)

[318] The survey did not ask about non-voting political engagement.
[319] For this first question, survey administrators independently chose to modify the question to include "2 to 3 times per week" between daily and weekly. This change was not reported until the results were returned to me.

- Finally, drawing from WVS question 225, respondents were asked, “How often, if ever, do you use a personal computer?” and “How often, if ever, do you use a cell phone?” with never, occasionally and frequently as possible responses.

For the fourth question, the original World Values question includes “Don’t know what a computer is” as a possible response. Survey organizers found this implausible, and suggested the question be modified to include “don’t know how to use a computer/cell phone” and “don’t have access to a computer/cell phone” instead. Organizers fielded the stratified random sample survey face-to-face in cities with 20,000 registered voters or more.[320]

Voting is compulsory and enforced in Bolivia (Electoral Commission 2006, “Voto obligatorio y nuevo mapa electoral en Bolivia”), so looking merely at the likelihood of voting is uninformative. One must look at how a person intends to vote: Either for a given candidate[321] or for none of the choices (a blank ballot[322]), as shown in Figure 5.1.[323]

[320] The survey was designed in April and May 2014 with the intention of polling in cities of all sizes, including with less than 20,000 registered voters. During the actual July survey though, all respondents came from cities with 20,000 registered voters or above. To extrapolate out what this means: In the 2001 census, out of 326 cities polled, only 17 had a population of more than 50,000 residents and only 10 cities had populations above 100,000 (INE 2001). In 2012, 69% of the population was 15 or older (INE 2012). Assuming approximately two-thirds of the population of voting age, a city would need a population of 75,000 to have 50,000 registered voters. Equally, to have 20,000 voters, the population might be around 30,000. Effectively then, the Equipos Mori survey looks at cities from 30,000 to 75,000 residents, as well as capital cities in each state. The capital city is the most populous city in each state. Though not perfectly capturing opinions of the most rural residents, the distinction from 30,000 to 75,000 to the state capital should, nonetheless, capture the essence of any urban-rural divide.
[321] P9. Si este domingo fueran las elecciones para elegir PRESIDENTE DE BOLIVIA, ¿Por Cuál candidato UD votaría?
[322] Power and Garand (2007) reviews literature on causes of blank voting and then tests the three main themes in the literature against each other. They find support for all three causes: “socio-demographic factors (literacy, education, wealth), institutional factors (electoral system and ballot structure), and political factors (alienation and protest)” (2007, 32). They caution scholars to suggest one root cause for invalid voting, but do note that it is distinct from casting a valid or countable ballot.
[323] In the 2014 survey on which this paper is based, 10.3% of respondents stated a pre-electoral intention to cast a blank vote, significantly higher than the 2% of the population who actually did so in the October 2014 election (OEP 2014).

Figure 5.1: Vote choice in Bolivia



Political parties ally, break up and change names in Bolivia frequently[324], making party identification a less useful identifier in Bolivia than it would be in the United States or other democracies that support more stable party systems. That said, though party names may change, the players in Bolivian politics do not necessarily change. Of the candidates running for President in 2014, only one was a new candidate. The others were distributed across the ideological spectrum, including the incumbent, a former President and two candidates from the 2009 presidential election.[325]

To compensate for the lack of consistent party identifier, I ordered candidates based on their public stances: Green Party candidate Fernando Vargas Mosua is the farthest left candidate, with incumbent President Morales coded as left-leaning. La Paz mayor Juan del Granado is a centrist. Former President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga is right-leaning and (self-described) libertarian business owner Samuel Doria Medina far right.

[324] Rice refers to a "weakly institutionalized multiparty system" (2011, 284).
[325] Only three of those were mentioned by survey respondents and would eventually go onto capture notable vote percentages in the October 2014 election.

The Presidential incumbent, Evo Morales, enjoyed a substantial lead in a majority of states, garnering nearly four times as many responses as his nearest competitor (51.52% of responses versus Doria Medina's 13.94%). Even taken as a group, the other candidates did not enjoy more than one-third of the declared vote intention in any single state.

In a multi-candidate election, multinomial logistic regression is the optimal method, as, despite representing different points on the ideological spectrum, they are not perfectly orderable. That said, it can be difficult to interpret since all results are pairwise – in other words, the coefficients are all relative to the base category, usually the candidate receiving the largest vote-share. With three candidates, that would mean that multinomial logit would show two sets of coefficients: the first measuring the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of voting for candidate A as opposed to candidate C, the second set showing the effect of the variables on the probability of voting for candidate B as opposed to candidate C (Gold 2005, 529). With five candidates, using the incumbent as the base category, multinomial logit shows how each independent variable has an impact on a candidate's chance relative to Morales, but not relative to the other candidates in the race. Given Morales' strong incumbent advantage in 2014, binary logit will also be employed to gauge how the totality of the other candidates would perform against him. Analyses from both models will be presented in this chapter.

Independent variables

The predictor of interest is disaggregated media consumption. Following the World Values Survey, the questions in Bolivia asked about the consumption frequency

for a number of ways that respondent could have used to find out about politics and happenings in the country (Figure 5.2):

Figure 5.2: Frequency of news exposure by platform (in percent)



Television is, by far, the most used and most trusted platform. It is ubiquitous and widely accessed. The digital divide is notable, with social media accessed daily by only ten percent of the sample and never accessed by three-quarters of respondents.[326]

The breakdown between getting information via cell phone, Internet, social media or email assumes that respondents remember exactly via which format they receive political news. It also may be an artificial distinction, since some surveys have shown more people using Facebook than claim to use the Internet (Mirani 2015). All

[326] Speaking with friends – or political talk – is not the topic of this dissertation. So that category was dropped, as were magazines for consistency with other chapters.

show relatively rare usage and high correlations (Table 5.1) in this survey; so I opted to focus on Internet use alone in subsequent analyses.[327]

Table 5.1: Correlations between media platforms used for news

	Newspaper	TV	Radio	Cell phone	Internet	Social Media
Newspaper	***					
TV	0.2473	***				
Radio	0.0625	0.0126	***			
Cell phone	0.1690	0.0992	0.0020	***		
Internet	0.2968	0.1461	-0.0665	0.4998	***	
Social Media	0.2414	0.1245	-0.0638	0.7767	0.7767	***

The "average" consumer of each platform varies.[328] Women use radio and television more than men, who are more likely to consume news via newspapers and Internet. Newspaper readers are relatively older and less educated, which may be an artifact of younger, more educated persons having more access to Internet news than other demographics.[329] The average television viewer is more urban and slightly more educated than the average radio listener, even though only seven percent of the sample reports watching news on television less than at least once a week and over three-quarters do so daily.

Socio-economic status (SES) and education are strong predictors of conventional political participation, such as voting (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, Brady, Verba and Scholzman 1995). For that reason, as in the previous chapters, gender, age and education level are included as control variables in this analysis. Respondents in this

[327] Analyses were run using a combined digital index as well, with no notable changes. So only Internet was retained, for parsimony.
[328] Found using R package modeest to discern the modal response for each category.
[329] This is presumably a reflection of widespread illiteracy in the mid-20th century before education became more universal ("Illiteracy Rate Drops to Historic Lows in Bolivia").

survey were 50.82% female and 49.18% male. Respondent age ranged from 18 to 92.[330] The modal response on age, 25, approximates statistics published by the US government (CIA), but the mean and median of the sample (35 and 38.3, respectively) skew higher, as the sample is limited to eligible voters.

Education ranged from no formal schooling (1) to post-graduate work (10) (Figure 5.3). Both the mean and median were for completing high school (5).

Figure 5.3: Distribution of educational attainment



Rural residency[331] and poverty[332] are both correlated with access to fewer media options overall and increased radio news listenership, respectively (Salzman 2011a).

---

[330] The voting age is 18, though 16 has been repeatedly proposed ("Cómo se vota en los países del Mercosur").

[331] Question Estrato

[332] Income questions were omitted, as it was a short media-run survey. The closest question was a Likert-scale on the respondent's satisfaction with her personal economic situation. But the question is inherently temporal, not truly about wealth or general economic level, which is more what the literature addresses as a predictor of voting.

Bolivia's protests early in the 21st-century were also driven by *campesino* groups (Freedom House 2008). Accounting for residency, therefore, is important in the analysis of political choice. The distribution is shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Urban-rural divide (in percent)



Kasfir (1979) argued that membership in an ethnic[333] or indigenous group is not an inherently political predictor, as its salience varies.[334] However, indigenous status is highly salient in Bolivia and has intertwined with matters of society, economics and politics since the 1990s (McNeish 2006, Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014). The incumbent Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party has particularly courted indigenous voters in the past two decades and touted itself as representing Bolivia's indigenous majority (for review on the mixing of indigenous agendas with MAS activities, see Webber 2010). President Morales even refers to his agenda as "indigenous

[333] In a review of the history and state of the subfield, Varshney provides a good definition of ethnicity: "Following Horowitz (1985 [2000]), ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective belonging, which could be based on a common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some combination of these)" (2009, 277).

[334] "Political situations that evoke participation along class lines may appear and disappear just as they do for participation along ethnic lines" (374). And "identifying someone as a member of an ethnic category at a particular time and in a particular place does not mean that, for political purposes, he will continue to hold that identity in other places and at other times" (372).

socialism" (Pretel 2014). Respondents' self-declaration as a member of one of Bolivia's 35 recognized indigenous groups (INE 2012) should, therefore, be salient to voting in 2014. Just over half, 55.19%, of the sample self-declared as indigenous, in line with the over 60% who self-declared as indigenous in the 2001 census and the 48% that did so in the 2012 census (Mallén 2013).

Though ideology is a strong and consistent predictor of voting in Latin America (Colomer 2005), respondent ideology is not included in the model, as it was not asked in the survey. There was a question about the respondent's candidate choice in the 2009 election, but the inclusion of previous vote choice presented both theoretical and statistical problems. First, theoretically, media reputation would have preceded that decision as well. So, if media reputation preceded both votes, including information about the 2009 vote would add no value to the analysis in 2014.[335] Second, including previous vote choice immediately cut the sample size from 2009 to 1088, most obviously among those too young to have voted in 2009. In a country in which approximately half the population is below age 24 (World Bank), excluding persons who could vote in 2014 but not in 2009 seems irresponsible. Finally, from a methodological standpoint, in addition to the reduction in sample size overall, the reduced small sample of 1088 included multiple overly influential points that skewed the data.[336] Obviously, there remains some risk of omitted variable bias; but the opportunity to employ originally collected data in an area in which research on political communication and behavior is limited merits such risk.

---

[335] "You're assuming path dependency (your theoretical story), so I don't see that you gain any analytical leverage by entering previous vote in the model" (Scott Althaus, personal correspondence, November 3, 2016).
[336] See Appendix B for detailed statistical justification

To reiterate, this paper asks: How is media consumption associated with candidate preference in 2014 Bolivia?

$$\text{Vote choice} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Gender} + \beta_2\text{Age} + \beta_3\text{Education level} + \beta_4\textbf{Indigenous status} + \beta_5\text{City size} + \beta_6\text{Newspaper use} + \beta_7\text{Television news use} + \beta_8\textbf{Radio}\text{ news use} + \beta_8\textbf{Internet}\text{ news use} + \varepsilon$$

Findings

The multinomial model (Table 5.2) shows that only education and indigenous status are relatively and consistently associated with vote choice: higher education is associated with more right-leaning vote choice and indigenous status with opting for centrist and left-leaning candidates.

Table 5.2: Using incumbent Morales (center left) as the base outcome, did media consumption matter in the 2014 Bolivian election?

Candidate	Coef.	SE	Candidate	Coef.	SE
Fernando Vargas (far left)			*Jorge Quiroga (center right)*		
Female	- 0.1722	0.7892	Female	0.4818	0.2434 **
Age	0.0064	0.0269	Age	0.0168	0.0084 **
Education	- 0.2697	0.2343	Education	0.1805	0.0583 ***
Indigenous	0.2949	0.8624	Indigenous	- 1.0454	0.2520 ***
City size	0.4165	0.3844	City size	0.3989	0.1253 ***
Newspaper	0.3273	0.2439	Newspaper	- 0.0295	0.0799
TV	0.3981	0.6791	TV	0.1861	0.1565
Radio	0.2431	0.2733	Radio	- 0.0955	0.0569 *
Internet	- 0.0182	0.2976	Internet	0.0643	0.0706
Juan del Granado (center)			*Samuel Doria Medina (far right)*		
Female	- 0.1828	0.2388	Female	0.2255	0.1467
Age	0.0149	0.0083 *	Age	0.0050	0.0053
Education	0.1965	0.0569 ***	Education	0.1898	0.0361 ***
Indigenous	- 0.4017	0.2400 *	Indigenous	- 0.8743	0.1493 ***
City size	- 0.0412	0.1084	City size	0.24341	0.0707 ***
Newspaper	0.0838	0.0791	Newspaper	0.0688	0.0486
TV	0.0510	0.1165	TV	0.2303	0.0978 **
Radio	0.0505	0.0628	Radio	- 0.0543	0.0359
Internet	0.1920	0.0681 ***	Internet	0.0477	0.0433

Multinomial logistic regression
n=1471
*legend: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

News media consumption is only significant three times. Relative to the baseline (center-left) incumbent, getting news via radio was negatively associated with voting for the right-leaning candidate, Jorge Quiroga, but not for the far-right candidate, Doria Medina. In fact, for Doria Medina, television news consumption was positive and significant. Getting news via Internet had a strong positive association with voting for the centrist candidate del Granado, whose party had broken a previous allegiance with the incumbent Morales' party. Del Granado's party represents a non-mainstream strand within the Bolivian left.

In terms of magnitude of effects, a one-unit increase in Internet news consumption resulted in a 21% increase in likelihood of voting for del Granado over Morales. A one-unit increase in radio news listenership was related to a nine-percent reduction in likelihood of voting for Quiroga relative to Morales. And a one-unit increase in television news consumption was associated with 25% increase in probability of voting for Doria Medina, relative to Morales. The largest magnitude effect was for indigenous status, which was associated with a 65% reduction in voting for Quiroga and a 60% reduction in voting for Doria Medina.

As a further test of media significance, I replicated the analysis with centrist del Granado as the base category (Table 5.3). In that model, the negative and significant effect of radio remains for Quiroga, but the positive and significant effect of television for Doria Medina disappears. Internet news consumption was also negative and highly significant for both Morales and Doria Medina. The biggest impact in magnitude of effect continues to be that of indigenous status, in the positive direction for the incumbent and the negative direction for the two right-leaning candidates.

Table 5.3: Using centrist del Granado as the base outcome, did media consumption matter in the 2014 Bolivian election?

Fernando Vargas (far left)

Candidate	Coef.	SE
Female	0.0106	0.8198
Age	-0.0086	0.0280
Education	-0.4662	0.2400*
Indigenous	0.6967	0.8901
City size	0.4576	0.3975
Newspaper	0.2435	0.2547
TV	0.3471	0.6881
Radio	0.1927	0.2795
Internet	-0.2102	0.3037

Juan “Evo” Morales (center left)

Candidate	Coef.	SE
Female	0.1828	0.2388
Age	-0.0149	0.0083*
Education	-0.1965	0.0569***
Indigenous	0.4017	0.2401*
City size	0.0412	0.1084
Newspaper	-0.0838	0.0791
TV	-0.0510	0.1165
Radio	-0.0505	0.0628
Internet	-0.1920	0.0681***

Jorge Quiroga (center right)

Candidate	Coef.	SE
Female	0.6646	0.3238**
Age	0.0019	0.0113
Education	-0.0160	0.0772
Indigenous	-0.6437	0.3134*
City size	0.4401	0.1594***
Newspaper	-0.1133	0.1069
TV	0.1351	0.1905
Radio	-0.1460	0.0804*
Internet	-0.1277	0.0921

Samuel Doria Medina (far right)

Candidate	Coef.	SE
Female	0.4083	0.2588
Age	-0.0099	0.0092
Education	-0.0067	0.0621
Indigenous	-0.4726	0.2608*
City size	0.2846	0.1208**
Newspaper	-0.0150	0.0859
TV	0.1793	0.1458
Radio	-0.1047	0.0670
Internet	-0.1443	0.0733***

Multinomial logistic regression
n=1471
*legend: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01*

At no point in either multinomial models is newspaper readership significant for candidate selection. In fact, regardless of what candidate is used as the base category, newspaper readership is never significant for vote choice in this survey. This may be an artefact of newspaper readership being quite low in Bolivia:

> "Circulation figures are unreliable in the absence of an independent auditing system. They are also hard to obtain. It is accepted among the professionals that most newspapers, even those that serve the large urban centers such as La Paz and Santa Cruz, have a small circulation" (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 101 FN 16).

Using other candidates as the base category[337], media variables are significant in only three instances: radio is positive and significant at the $p<0.1$ level for both Morales and del Granado when Quiroga is the base category; television is negative and significant for Morales at the $p<0.05$ level when Doria Medina is the base category; and Internet is positive and significant at the $p<0.05$ level for del Granado when Doria Medina is the base category. Overall, therefore, regardless of how the five candidates are compared to each other, increased news media consumption on a particular platform seems of little import in the 2014 Bolivian presidential election.

Simplifying the model

Given the difficulty of extrapolating meaning from multinomial logit, I also conducted separate logistic regression analysis to determine predictors of left voting and predictors of right-leaning voting, considering the strong ideological

[337] Coefficients not reported

bent of Latin American voting (Colomer 2005). This also allowed for analysis of support for the traditional status quo (right-leaning) or support for continued change (left-leaning). To determine the predictors of left-leaning voting, two left-leaning candidates (Vargas and Morales) were coded 1 and the two right-leaning candidates (Quiroga and Doria Medina) coded as 0; then, to determine the predictors of right-leaning voting, the coding was flipped, with the two right-leaning candidates coded as 1 and the two left-leaning candidates coded as 0. The centrist, del Granado, was coded 0 in both cases. Table 5.4 displays the resulting odds ratios for these models:

Table 5.4: Likelihood of voting for a left- or right-leaning candidate as a function of news consumption

	Left-leaning Odds Ratio		Right-leaning Odds Ratio	
Female	0.8222		1.3519	**
Age	0.9909	**	1.0061	
Education	0.8267	***	1.1849	***
Indigenous	2.2514	***	0.4175	***
City size	0.8119	***	1.3226	***
Newspaper	0.9488		1.0370	
TV	0.8440	**	1.2406	**
Radio	1.0461		0.9315	**
Internet	0.9237	**	1.0278	

Logistic regression
$n = 1471$

A one-unit increase in the frequency of television news viewership was associated with a 24% increase in voting for one of the two right-leaning candidates and with a 15.7% decrease in voting for one of the left-leaning candidates. A one-unit increase in radio listenership was associated with a 7% decrease in likelihood of voting for a right-leaning candidate. A one-unit increase in Internet news consumption results in an 8% decrease in likelihood of voting for a left-leaning candidate. Again, newspaper readership has no impact on vote

choice. In terms of meaningfulness, indigenous status was, by far, the biggest predictor, with self-declared indigenous persons 125% more likely to vote for a left-leaning candidate and almost 60% less likely to express a preference for a right-leaning candidate.

Given the incumbent advantage evidenced by Morales's lead in the polls, a third model examined just the predictors of voting for incumbent Morales (Table 5.5). Intent to vote for Vargas, del Granado, Quiroga or Doria Medina was coded 0, with intent to vote for Morales coded 1.

In that model, traditional demographic markers were significant in their expected directions, with younger, less educated, indigenous, rural voters more likely to support Morales. As for media, neither newspaper readership nor radio listenership had any effect. Television news consumption was negatively associated with support for Morales, as expected, with a one-unit increase in television news consumption associated with a 16% decrease in likelihood of voting for Morales. Getting news via Internet was also negative and significant, with a one-unit increase in online news consumption yielding an approximately 7.5% decrease in expressing one's intent to vote for the incumbent. Again though, the largest predictor of support for Morales was, by far, indigenous status, which was associated with a 120% increase in likelihood of stating intent to vote for Morales.

Table 5.5: Likelihood of voting for the incumbent Morales as a function of media consumption

	Odds Ratio	
Female	0.8300	
Age	0.9908	**
Education	0.8343	***
Indigenous	2.20412	***
City size	0.8074	***
Newspaper	0.9414	
Television	0.8400	**
Radio	1.0407	
Internet	0.9248	**

Logistic regression
n = 1471

Discussion

Gerring defines a case study "as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" (2004, 342). It is an exploratory investigation rather than a causal one, geared more toward theory generation than theory testing (Gerring 2004, 346). This chapter presents an attempt to extend the theory presented in Chapter Two from political engagement to actual vote choice.

The AmericasBarometer in Bolivia in the mid-2000s disaggregated questions about the frequency of consumption of various news media.[338] Since that time though, the survey has only included one general question about total news consumption. This means that, for countries at the lowest levels of development, there are no other publicly available surveys that would allow for investigation between (disaggregated) news consumption and political

[338] Similar analyses on that data shows that, as expected, in a country with compulsory and enforced voting, news consumption has no impact on voting. But both radio news consumption and getting news via newspaper are positively associated with indices of civic and political participation.

engagement, making the opportunity I was given to insert questions into a survey especially relevant for Bolivia and countries like it. I treated this as an opportunity to triangulate and extend tests from the previous chapters.

Unfortunately, in choosing among candidates for Bolivia's 2014 presidential election, news media consumption seems to have mattered little. Newspaper readership was at no point significant. Television viewership was positive and significant for right-leaning candidates and negative and significant for left-leaning candidates. But, with almost 78% of the population watching television for news daily and over 90% watching it at least weekly, that significance may not be meaningful for actual voting returns in an election in which one candidate has a strong advantage. Morales' having rewritten the constitution to its advantage just a few years earlier may also be dulling results.

Radio listenership was at no point positive for vote choice, which is surprising given the touted historical importance of Bolivian radio as a counterweight to government (O'Connor 1990). The ubiquitous consumption of radio news in Bolivia, then, may be less important in the modern age than proponents of community radio might hail.

Most confusing are the results for Internet news consumption. Internet news was negative and significant for voting for left-leaning candidates overall and for the incumbent specifically. Since voting is compulsory and enforced, these findings cannot be directly compared to findings for Internet in the previous chapters – when it was always positive for turnout, when significant – but it does raise questions, given the regional expectation (in Chapter Three) that Internet across the region would be associated with change-oriented activities.

After all, the incumbent was the change candidate in this election. Still relatively low Internet penetration and clearly low per capita income suggest that the full impact of Internet news on politics has not yet penetrated Bolivia. As Internet penetration in Bolivia increases beyond major cities, looking at who the consumers of online news there are should prove interesting.

Gainous, Wagner and Abbott (2015) theorize that increased exposure to dissonant information on the Internet explains the association they find between Internet news consumption and negative attitudes about government and non-traditional participation. They further show that, in the context of nine Asian countries in 2010, Internet news consumption was negatively associated with traditional forms of participation. This chapter adds to the scholarly discussion of the association between news and political choices, but suggests that consumers of community radio and consumers of Internet news may not both be reacting in the same way to non-mainstream information.

Chapter 6: CONCLUSION

Before his death in 2017, Colin Seymour-Ure, a scholar on British media and politics, pointed out that academics know a lot about the interaction between news and politics in a few countries under very specific circumstances, but much less about that relationship in other places. My dissertation has endeavored to expand that understanding by investigating the importance of media in Latin America. I posited that the public uses media reputation, the accumulation of years of interactions between the press and government, as a cue about the independence of any medium. I expected that consumers of media that criticize the status quo would be more likely to engage in activities to change the status quo. In doing so, I integrated terminology from very disparate literatures—political communication, contentious politics and comparative institutions—that may be speaking past each other and would benefit from greater interaction.

My analysis in Chapters Three and Four utilized different models due to limitations in their respective data sources. For example, the World Values Survey (WVS) does not include an ordinal or otherwise scale-measure of race or ethnicity like the AmericasBarometer does. The analysis in Chapter Three was also more disaggregated than in Chapter Four, which covered more countries. Meanwhile, Chapter Five uses original data to examine an extension of my theory in one country.

In short, my results in Chapters Three, Four, and Five were mixed. However, I was able to confirm that the emerging literature about the special relationship between political engagement and Internet news consumption holds outside of the developed world.

Television and radio news consumption

Significant findings about television were extremely rare, as expected, as it is the most regulated media platform and speaks to the median voter, which is status quo-reinforcing. It was positive and statistically significant twice – against expectations – in Chapter Three, for petitioning in Argentina and Brazil using data from the sixth wave of WVS. Television had a negative relationship, as expected, with participation in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay but for different behaviors: petitioning in Mexico, boycotting in Ecuador, and demonstrating in Peru and Uruguay. The medium was not at all statistically significant in Chapter Four, which looked at protest using the AmericasBarometer.

Overall, these findings sum to suggest that, in modern Latin America, television largely does not seem to be associated with change-oriented political engagement. People choose entertainment over news on television (e.g., Prior 2007). Even when asked how they find out about the world and current events, people who get their news via television do not seem affected by that news in any measurable way.

There are two complications in interpreting results about television, one general and one unique. Firstly, there were not expectations for television for all countries. No directional expectation existed for Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras and Paraguay. Of those, television was only significant twice, both times in the negative direction, for petitioning and demonstrating in Chile. The lack of a classification about the reputation of media means that, regardless of the medium, any behavioral findings are hard to interpret.

The more specific problem with television was the combined measure of television and radio news consumption that was used in WVS5. These platforms serve very different roles in this region, as manifested in the different classifications for television and radio about support for the status quo in a majority of the countries.[339]

As a result of this platform aggregation, my results for radio in WVS5 were equally difficult to interpret. In fact, at no point in the analysis in Chapter Three, because of the combined measure am I able to say that findings conform with my expectations because the expected impact of radio and television was, for most of the region, different. At the minimum, my classification system had a directional classification for one platform and no expectation for the other; in some cases, I expected these platforms to have opposite categorizations. In sum, I could not disentangle the impact of radio from the impact of television with WVS5 data.

The combined measure in WVS5 and inconsistent reputation codings left me I unable to attribute the following findings to television or radio:

Positive and significant:	Petitioning, boycotting and demonstrating in Brazil; Petitioning in Uruguay
Negative and significant:	Demonstrating in Argentina; Petitioning in Mexico

There was no expectation for either television or radio news in Chile, yet there were multiple findings in Chapter Three: TV news, radio news and

[339] The questionnaire for the seventh wave of WVS, which is being fielded right now, has not yet been made public. The data, which will be released in 2020, is scheduled to include five more countries (Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Venezuela) in Latin America, meaning WVS7 will include more than double the coverage of Latin America than WVS5 did. One hopes that, having disaggregated the media consumption question in WVS6, the World Values Survey secretariat does not return to a combined measure or use a simple overall news consumption measure in WVS7.

TV/radio news were negative and significant for petitioning in both waves of WVS, while TV/radio was positive for demonstrating in WVS5 but TV news was negative for demonstrating in WVS6. The lack of a directional expectation also makes it impossible to interpret the negative relationship between radio news and petitioning in Mexico. In contrast, I can definitively say that findings were against expectations in Ecuador and Peru in WVS6.

The possible importance of radio becomes more apparent in Chapter Four, where radio is significantly associated with protesting in seven countries in the sample: Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Peru. That finding is only against expectations in Ecuador, where the association was positive instead of negative, as was expected. In fact, in Chapter Three, only in Chile, Mexico and Peru was radio ever significantly associated with engagement in a negative direction. In all other instances, it was positive. That speaks to the potentially motivating content of radio news overall, which merits more scholarly attention.

The different findings about radio between Chapters Three and Four also raise questions. Since radio was positive and significant in both chapters in Ecuador, completely against expectations, these results suggest that reputation may only capture part of the larger media attentiveness dynamic. While radio was also positive and significant for boycotting, demonstrating and striking in Argentina in WVS6, the lack of a question about protest in that country in the 2008 AmericasBarometer makes it impossible for me to compare those results to Chapter Four. Radio in Mexico was negative and significant for petitioning in WVS6 but positive and significant for protesting in the 2008 AmericasBarometer,

which lends credence to the idea that different media may be associated with different forms of engagement. Finally, radio was never significant in Colombia, Nicaragua or Uruguay in either chapter, despite directional expectations that radio's counter-status quo reputation would be motivating.

Newspapers

Findings for newspapers were largely against expectations. In about two-thirds of countries, newspapers were classified as supporting the status quo, whereas in the other third there was no evidence in either direction. In no country were newspapers classified as against the status quo. However, when significant, newspaper readership in both Chapters Three and Four was overwhelmingly associated with increased change-oriented political participation, even after accounting for education and political interest. This again suggests that media reputation may be—likely is—part of a larger dynamic at work.

This is in line with Newton (1999), who found that reading broadsheets in England was associated with increased political engagement but reading tabloids was not. Daily newspaper readership is a relatively luxury, as it requires both high literacy and disposable income. The Target Group Indexes (TGI) for most of Latin America show that most newspaper readers still come from higher socioeconomic classes (Soong 2000), but that may be changing. The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers reported strong and growing sales across the region in the last decade (*Economist* 2011). Bakker (2012) attributes most of the growth to the expansion of free dailies in the region, which

are likely not as linked to the government or status quo positions as traditional broadsheets and may present ideas quite outside the mainstream. Bakker noted that, in areas with low newspaper penetration, free dailies could mobilize a new segment of newspaper consumers. If the term "newspapers" combines broadcasting and niche business models, which target different audiences, looking at aggregate patterns in newspaper readership may, therefore, be less informative than doing the same for other media platforms. The measure employed in the previous chapters may be too blunt.

Internet news

Though initially I did not expect to find that Internet news consumption mattered much for engagement in Latin America, my results suggest that it clearly does. This was especially noticeable in Chapter Three, which employed data from the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey. In Chile, Colombia and Mexico, Internet was statistically significant for each form of political participation at some point. With the exception of the anomalous finding for Guatemala in the 2008 AmericasBarometer, Internet news consumption was never significant and negative for any form of participation, only positive. And the magnitude of the findings was large, with a one-unit increase in Internet news consumption having the same impact as a one-unit increase in education or interest in politics.

This is undoubtedly the largest contribution that the dissertation makes to the body of literature of media and politics. If there is something different about Internet news and if it truly is more mobilizing, then the world should see a

notable increase of political messaging and involvement as broadband rolls out to more parts of the world.

There are two potential pitfalls associated with this expectation: first, the Internet arguably makes it even easier to avoid news than cable television did when it was introduced. So the number of people paying attention to any news at all may drop. Second, the Internet's truly being different in some way for political participation might worsen the digital divide both within and across countries. Scholars know that some people avoid news and others seek it out, and that those who seek out news are more civically engaged (Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster 2010). To draw an analogy to the Industrial Revolution, which had been geographically limited in scope at its inception, will this revolution in technology and participation leave substantial portions of the world behind? Within countries, will it privilege those who already participate more at the expense of those who do not? Either of those has important policy implications for governments to consider, as well as normative consequences for those who believe in equality.

The 2012 iteration of the AmericasBarometer included a question about what political information respondents have shared on social media.[340] The question was not repeated in 2014 or 2016, nor was the question about media disaggregated in 2012.[341] As such, it is not possible with this data to speak to the large body of literature that interrogates how citizens use the Internet and why

[340] PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut?
[341] GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never

the Internet might be special for participation (Dahlgren 2005, Kushin and Yamamoto 2010, Rainie et al 2012, Tufekci and Wilson 2012, Xenos, Vromen and Loader 2014). In fact, as long as the AmericasBarometers does not disaggregate its question about media consumption, it will not be possible to tell whether the importance of online news is the people's ability to direct their own searches or whether the social or interactive aspect of online news consumption is more important. This may leave scholars of the public sphere hamstrung for data in Latin America.

Where does the media matter?

Comparing the results in Chapters Three and Four, it is hard to make any definitive call about where media reputation might matter for political engagement and where it might not. This is largely because only a few countries includes questions about both news consumption and participation in both surveys. Where they did overlap, results were, again, mixed:

Ecuador: Radio and Internet news consumption in both surveys was associated with increased engagement, though the importance of the Internet for demonstrating/protesting was not duplicated.

Brazil: Newspaper readership was only associated with boycotting in WVS6 in Chapter Three; but with protesting in both 2006 and 2008 in Chapter Four. Internet news consumption was positive and significant for all forms of engagement in Chapter Three, but only in 2006 in Chapter Four. TV/radio news was widely relevant for

engagement in Chapter Three, but not at even one point significant in Chapter Four.

Chile: The Internet was important for all behaviors but Chapter Three, but almost no media mattered for protesting in Chapter Four.

Colombia: Newspaper and Internet news consumption were highly significant for every behavior in Chapter Three, but for almost nothing in Chapter Four.

In Uruguay, Peru and Mexico, there were neither enough instances of significance nor a clear pattern that I might compare in any meaningful way.

Overall, with the exception of Ecuador, I cannot definitively say that media consumption would definitely matter for political participation in any country. I can claim that the relationship between the two appears to be much more nuanced than many in comparative politics often consider. And I hope it has become clear that media should be an element in more comparative research moving forward, as well as that comparative methods might expand the geographic reach of political communication research.

Revisiting the theory

Oddly enough, my finding that, consumption of traditional news did not have a large and meaningful impact on is generally in line with the theory presented in Chapter Two: that media perceived as promoting status quo values (which was the mode in Latin America) will not stimulate consumers to engage politically. However, news consumption, especially online, did seem to matter for engagement.

Are the decisions to consume media that challenges the status quo and to act against the status quo two behaviors jointly caused by some set of background variables (Matthew Winters, personal correspondence, November 19, 2017)? Absent data on personality or genetics, this is a very difficult question to address. Incorporating these considerations would also, again, atomize the study of media and politics. If nothing else, the media's acting as a signal about more widely spread discontent might still be important as a trigger for action.

Bimber (1999) asked "Does the Medium Matter?" for how citizens contact government officials. At the time, he found significant but small effects. In asking if the medium matters for participating, I found similar results. This research addresses a dearth made plain by Humphreys (2011), that there are far too few large-N comparative studies of media and politics done within political science generally and within comparative politics specifically (161).

The odd duck: Bolivia

Chapter Five stands out because it is not a simple test of the theory in Chapter Two but an extension of it. Unlike the other chapters, which do not include voting because it is compulsory, Chapter Five zooms directly to candidate choice with original data that was collected from a survey fielded almost a decade after WVS5 and the 2004 AmericasBarometer. And the findings are especially strange.

Unlike in the previous chapters, television news consumption has an impact on voting that is both statistically significant and substantial: a one-unit increase in television news consumption was associated with double-digit

differences in the probability of voting for candidates. The fact that the Bolivian media is well-known to be associated with right-leaning candidates and their financial supporters means this could be a reflection of self-sorting.

Also notable in Bolivia was the non-result for radio. Bolivia, like El Salvador and Peru, has a well-documented history of political and community radio. In the 2014 election though, radio did not seem to matter for vote choice. One wonders if the pervasive use of radio in Bolivia—like television news in other countries—might make it impossible to discern any variation among radio users. Or, like the newspaper measure in Chapters Three and Four, in a country where so many people regularly listen to the radio for news, measuring "radio" consumption may be too blunt a measure.

Bolivia is not included in the next iteration of the World Values Survey, but Paraguay and Venezuela are scheduled to be. Both have high daily radio news consumption rates – around 40% – but radio is oppositional in Paraguay and supportive of the government in Venezuela. In the absence of a Bolivia in that survey, those two countries should be interesting test cases for the importance of radio on the continent.

Extensions

There are two logical extensions for the theory and analysis presented here. First, I can go smaller and test the theory in more detail within one country, such as by looking at media outlets. This is similar to research looking at cable news in the United States. Using an outlet's reputation as a proxy for content would allow for more longitudinal analysis. For example, Mexico's long-standing

ruling party lost power in 2000 after 71 years. During that period, television news was highly affiliated with the party. The disruption could be arguably treated as an intervention, allowing for a closer look at media reputations and participation in the form of a natural experiment.

Going lower on the level analysis may mean focusing within a country as well. Mexico has a federal system and it is relatively easy to get data, often even at the state level. Does media reputation matter evenly across Mexico or are there regional differences? For countries large in area or population, or with notable cultural differences, it might be unreasonable to assume equivalent findings everywhere. In that case, the approach presented here may be more feasible than region-specific content analysis, for example. This extension may be similarly feasible in Brazil.

Secondly, I can go wider by expanding the scope of my inquiry beyond the Western Hemisphere. The artificially imposed geographic boundaries of Africa, which do not overlap with cultural boundaries, stand in stark contrast to the largely natural boundaries in Latin America, which do overlay with culture. Africa is also home to 2000 languages, approximately one-third of all languages in the world (Felter 2015). There are, therefore, many different hierarchical ways to test the importance of media reputation. The longer tenure of African leaders than those in Latin America (*Economist* 2012) also means that there may be stronger relationships between media and officials reputed as close to the status quo or promoting change.

The state of the Fourth Estate

Is the press in any given place a watchdog, a lapdog or a guard dog (Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien 1995)? This analogy seems especially important in a time when press freedom is in retreat worldwide (Reporters Without Borders 2018). Does the press protect the freedoms of the masses, push the will of the government or work for an oligarchy? My dissertation contends that different media in any country may—and probably do—fulfill different roles. The original classifications (presented in the following appendix) suggested television news in most of Latin America to represent status quo values, not those of change, in other words with the reputation of a government lapdog. Results presented in the previous chapters suggest news on the Internet may fulfill more of the watchdog role many envision when they talk about media independence or press freedom.

REFERENCES

Aalberg, Toril, Arild Blekesaune and Eiri Elvestad. 2013. "Media Choice and Informed Democracy: Toward increasing news consumption gaps in Europe?" *International Journal of Press/Politics* 18(3): 281-303. DOI: 0.1177/1940161213485990

Aarts, Kees and Holli A. Semetko. 2003. "The Divided Electorate: Media Use and Political Involvement." *Journal of Politics* 65(3): 759–784. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2508.00211

Abbott, Jason. 2011. "Electoral Authoritarianism and the Print Media in Malaysia: Measuring Political Bias and Analyzing Its Cause." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 38: 1–38. DOI: 10.1080/00927678.2010.520575

--- 2012. "Democracy@internet.org Revisited: analysing the socio-political impact of the internet and new social media in East Asia." *Third World Quarterly* 33(2)" 333–357. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.666015

@abcronkhite. 2017. "So apparently I'm not including race or ethnicity in my analysis today #confused #howdoiscalethisexactly #YesItActuallySaysCrossbreed" Twitter (April 20, 12:32 pm EDT) https://twitter.com/abcronkhite/status/855111893542985728 (April 20, 2017)

Achen, Christopher H. 1975. "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response." *American Political Science Review* 69(4): 1218-1231 DOI: 10.2307/1955282

--- 1982. *Interpreting and Using Regression*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Adhikary, Mukesh. 2015. "Why does the Indian PM favour radio?" *BBC*. (April 9) http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/why-does-the-indian-pm-favour-radio (June 4, 2015)

--- 2015. "Radio provides lifeline in quake-hit Nepal." *BBC*. (May 26) http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/community-radio-a-lifeline-in-quakehit-nepal (June 4, 2015)

Ahonen, Tomi. 2011. "Digital Divide: Global household penetration rates for technology." *VRWorld* (January 26). https://vrworld.com/2011/01/26/digital-divide-global-household-penetration-rates-for-technology/ (September 7, 2017)

Albright, Jeremy. 2015. "What is the Bootstrap?" *MethodsConsulants.com* (February 26). https://www.methodsconsultants.com/tutorial/what-is-the-bootstrap/ (February 28, 2017)

Aldana-Amabile, Susana. 2008. "The media in Paraguay: from the coverage of political democracy to the obsession with violence." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 167-178.

Aldana-Durán, Celia. 2008. "The media in Peru: the challenge of constructing a meaningful democracy." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 179-192.

Allen, Benjamin S. 2008. "Pink Tide Rising." Presented at the Bay Area Latin American Forum, Berkeley. http://clasarchive.berkeley.edu/Publications/articles/fall2008/other/BRLAS-Fall2008-Carr.pdf (April 7, 2015).

Allen, Craig. 2014. "Photographers on the Front Lines of the Great War." *New York Times* (June 30) https://nyti.ms/2oNMTDC (October 17, 2017)

Allern, Sigurd and Mark Blach-Ørsten. 2011. "The News Media as a Political Institution." *Journalism Studies* 12(1): 92-105. DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2010.511958

Almond, Gabriel. 1996. "The Civic Culture: Prehistory, Retrospect, and Prospect." UC
Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4mm1285j (April 18, 2017)

--- and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Althaus, Scott L, Anne M. Cizmar and James G. Gimpel. 2009. "Media Supply, Audience Demand, and the Geography of News Consumption in the United States." *Political Communication* 26(3): 249-277. DOI: 10.1080/10584600903053361

Althaus, Scott L. and David Tewksbury. 2000. "Patterns of Internet and Traditional News Media Use in a Networked Community." *Political Communication* 17: 21-45. DOI:10.1080/105846000198495

Althaus, Scott L. and Todd C. Trautman. 2008. "The Impact of Television Market Size on Voter Turnout in American Elections." *American Politics Research* 36(6): 824-856. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08317767

Altheide, David L. 1984. "Media Hegemony: A failure of perspective." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48:476-490. DOI: 10.1086/268844

Aly, Waleed. 2017. "Voting Should Be Mandatory." *New York Times* (January 19). https://nyti.ms/2k4bb9u (September 7, 2017)

AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org

Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 66-81. DOI: 10.2307/2952259

Andrade Cruz, Breno de Paula. 2017. "Boicote Social." *Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios* 19(63). DOI: 10.7819/rbgn.v0i0.2868

Andrews, Kenneth T. and Michael Biggs. 2006. "The Dynamics of Protest Diffusion: Movement Organizations, Social Networks, and News Media in the 1960 Sit-Ins." *American Sociological Review* 71(5): 752-777.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden and James M. Snyder. 2008. "The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review* 102(2): 215-232. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055408080210

Arango Forero, Germán, Liliana Gutiérrez Coba, Alfonso Forero Gutiérrez, Jairo Valderrama Valderrama, Rodolfo Prada Penagos, Luz Carmen Barrera Avellaneda and Adriana Guzmán de Reyes. 2009. "The Media in Colombia." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 63-76.

Asp, Kent. 2014. "News media logic in a New Institutional perspective." *Journalism Studies* 15(3): 256-270. DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2014.889456

Bachmann, Ingrid. 2011. "Ecuadoran authorities refuse to renew license for radio station critical of government." Journalism in the Americas blog (June 1). https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/ecuadoran-authorities-refuse-renew-license-radio-station-critical-government (September 1, 2017)

Bae, Hyuhn-Suhck. 2000. "Product Differentiation in National TV Newscasts: A Comparison of the Cable All-News Networks and the Broadcast Networks." *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 44(1): 62-77. DOI: 10.1207/s15506878jobem4401_5

Baker, C. Edwin. 2002. *Media, Markets, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge.

--- 2007. *Media Concentration and Democracy: Why ownership matters*. New York: Cambridge.

Bakker, Piet. 2012. "The rise of free daily newspapers in Latin America." *Revista de Comunicación* 11: 129-149.

Bakker, Tom P. and Claes H. de Vreese. 2011. “Good News for the Future? Young People, Internet Use, and Political Participation.” *Communication Research* 38(4): 451-470. DOI: 10.1177/0093650210381738

Barnes, Samuel H., Max Kaase, Klaus R. Allerback, Barbara Farah, Felix Heunks, Ronald Inglehart, M. Kent Jennings, Hans D. Klingemann, Allan Marsh and Leopold Rosenmayr. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Barnett, Michael L., John M. Jermier and Barbara A. Lafferty. 2006. “Corporate Reputation: The Definitional Landscape.” *Corporate Reputation Review* 9(1): 26-38. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.crr.1550012

Barr, Caelainn. 2017. “Inequality index: where are the world's most unequal countries?” *The Guardian* (April 26). https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/datablog/2017/apr/26/inequality-index-where-are-the-worlds-most-unequal-countries (October 5, 2017)
Bartels, Larry M. 1993. “Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure.” *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 267-285.

Bartlett, Jonathan. 2014. “R squared in logistic regression.” TheStateGeek.com (February 8) http://thestatsgeek.com/2014/02/08/r-squared-in-logistic-regression/ (July 14, 2017)

Bastenier, MA. 2013. “Evo Morales no tiene mandato, tiene una mision.” *El Pais* (May 23) http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/05/25/actualidad/1369436652_644598.html (February 21, 2017)

Bates, Robert H. 2009. “From Case Studies to Social Science: A strategy for political research.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford, 173-185.

--- Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Batista Pereira, Frederico. 2011. “Political Knowledge Levels Across the Urban-Rural Divide in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 68. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO868en.pdf (March 26, 2015)

Baum, Matthew A. 2002. “Sex, Lies, and War: How soft news brings foreign policy to the inattentive public.” *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 91-109. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055402004252

BBC. 2013. "Protests as Ecuador approves oil drilling in Amazon." (August 16) http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-23723644/protests-as-ecuador-approves-oil-drilling-in-amazon (November 20, 2017)

BBC. 2015. "Barack Obama to join India PM Narendra Modi in radio address." January 22. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-30928824 (Accessed June 16, 2015)

Bebbington, Denise Humphreys and Anthony Bebbington. 2010. "Anatomy of a Regional Conflict: Tarija and Resource Grievances in Morales's Bolivia." *Latin American Perspectives* 37(4): 140-160.

Becerra, Martín and Guillermo Mastrini. 2009. *Los Dueños de la Palabra*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.

Benavides, Cristóbal, Maria Ignacia Errázuriz, David Kimber, Isabel Santa Maria and Aldo van Weezel. 2009. "The Chilean Media Landscape." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 138-150.

Bennett, W. Lance. 1990. "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States." *Journal of Communication* 40(2): 103 -125. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1990.tb02265.x

--- 1996. "An Introduction to Journalism Norms and Representations of Politics." *Political Communication* 13: 373-384. DOI: 10.1080/10584609.1996.9963126

--- 2017. "Press-Government Relations in a Changing Media Environment." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, eds Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. New York: Oxford University Press, 249-262. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.40

--- Regina Lawrence and Steven Livingston. 2006. "None Dare Call It Torture: Indexing and the Limits of Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal." *Journal of Communication* 56: 467-485. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00296.x

--- and Shanto Iyengar. 2008. "A New Era of Minimal Effects? The changing foundations of Political Communication." *Journal of Communication* 58: 707–731. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00410.x

--- 2010. "The Shifting Foundations of Political Communication: Responding to a Defense of the Media Effects Paradigm." *Journal of Communication* 60(1): 35-39. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01471.x

--- and Alexandra Segerberg. 2013. "The Logic of Connective Action." *Information, Communication & Society* 15(5): 739-768. DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661

Benson, Rodney. 2006. “Bringing the Sociology of Media Back in.” *Political Communication* 21: 275-292. DOI: 10.1080/10584600490481299

--- 2014. “Strategy Follows Structure: a media sociology manifesto.” In *Media Sociology: a reappraisal*, ed Silvio Waisbord. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bernhard, William. 1998. “A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence.” *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 311-327. doi:10.2307/2585666

Biggs, Philippa. 2016. “The State of Broadband: Broadband catalyzing sustainable development.” *Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations. http://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/reports/bb-annualreport2016.pdf (September 7, 2017)

Bimber, Bruce. 1999. “The Internet and Citizen Communication with Government: Does the medium matter?” *Political Communication* 16(4): 409-428. DOI: 10.1080/105846099198569

Birch, Sarah. 2008. “Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence in Electoral Processes: A Cross-National Analysis.” *Electoral Studies* 27(2): 305-20.

Bisbal, Marcelino. 2007. “Los Medios en Venezuela. ¿Dónde estamos?” *Espacio Abierto* 16(4). http://www2.scielo.org.ve/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1315-00062007000400001&lng=es (August 14, 2015)

Bleck, Jaimie and Kristin Michelitch. 2011. “Good Morning Timbuktu! The impact of radio in rural Islamic Africa.” http://people.tamu.edu/~kdionne/MGAPE/papers/bleck_01.pdf (March 23, 2015)

Bloch, Hannah. 2015. “That Little Syrian Boy: Here's Who He Was.” *NPR* (September 3) http://n.pr/1FkIVTS (August 18, 2016)

Blondel, Jean. 2008. “About Insitutions, Mainly, but not Exclusively, Political.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, eds Sarah A. Binder, RAW Rhodes and Bert A. Rockman. New York: Oxford, 716-730. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0036

Blumler, J.G. 2017. “Epilogue for a Comparative Leap Forward.” *Journalism Studies* 18(5): 682-690. DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2017.1294392

--- and M. Gurevitch. 1975. “Towards a Comparative Framework for Political Communication Research.” *Political Communication*, ed. S. H. Chaffee. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 165-193.

--- 1995. *The Crisis of Public Communication*. New York: Routledge.

Boas, Taylor C. 2005. “Television and Neopopulism in Latin America: Media effects in Brazil and Peru.” *Latin American Research Review* 40(2): 27-49. http://lasa-4.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol40no2/Boas.pdf (March 23, 2015)

--- 2013. “Mass Media and Politics in Latin America.” In *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 4th ed., eds Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 48-77.

--- 2014. “Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Boczkowski, Pablo. 2004. *Digitizing the News: Innovation in Online Newspapers*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

--- 2010. *News at Work: Imitation in an age of information abundance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

--- and Martin de Santos. 2007. “When More Media Equals Less News: Patterns of Content Homogenization in Argentina’s Leading Print and Online Newspapers.” *Political Communication* 24: 167-180. DOI: 10.1080/10584600701313025

Bode, Leticia and Emily K. Vraga. 2017. “Studying Politics Across Media.” *Political Communication* (forthcoming). DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2017.1334730

Boes, Stefan and Rainer Winkelmann. 2004. “Income and Happiness: New Results from Generalized Threshold and Sequential Models.” IZA Discussion Paper 1175. https://ssrn.com/abstract=561724 (March 27, 2018)

“Bolivia Announces Special Rules for Election Day.” 2014. *Telesur* (October 7) http://bit.ly/2usakrV (July 17, 2017)

Bond, R.M, CJ Fariss, JJ Jones, AD Kramer, C Marlow, JE Settle and JH Fowler. 2012. “A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization.” *Nature* 489: 295-298. DOI:10.1038/nature11421

Booth, John A. 1979. "Political Participation in Latin America: Levels, Structure, Context, Concentration and Rationality." *Latin American Research Review* 14(3): 29-60.

Boulianne, Shelley. 2009. "Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of Research." *Political Communication* 26(2): 193-211. DOI: 10.1080/10584600902854363

--- 2015. "Social media use and participation: a meta-analysis of current research" *Information, Communication & Society* 18(5): 524-538, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2015.1008542

Boykoff, Maxwell T. and Jules M.Boykoff. 2007. "Climate change and journalistic norms: A case-study of US mass-media coverage." *Geoforum* 38(6): 1190-1204. DOI: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.01.008

Brady, Henry, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Scholzman. 1995. "Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 89: 271-94. DOI: 10.2307/2082425

Brant, Rollin. 1990. "Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic Regression." *Biometrics* 46(4): 1171-1178 DOI: 10.2307/2532457

Bratton, Michael. 2009. "Democratic Attitudes and Political Participation: An Exploratory Comparison across World Regions." Paper prepared for the Congress of the International Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile. http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_1542.pdf (November 13, 2017)

Breed, Warren. 1955. "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis." *Social Forces* 33: 326–335. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5329/2898d02e721b211d35981df9be4144355717.pdf (June 28, 2018)

Breuer, A. and Groshek, J. 2014. "Online Media and Offline Empowerment in Democratic Transition: Linking Forms of Internet Use with Political Attitudes and Behaviors in Post-Rebellion Tunisia." *Journal of Information Technology and Policy* 11(1): 25-44. DOI: 10.1080/19331681.2013.850464

Brewster, Rachel. 2009. "Unpacking the State's Reputation." Harvard International Law Journal 50(2): 231-269 https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/3353696 (June 5, 2018)

Bromley, DB. 2000. "Psychological aspects of corporate identity, image and reputation." *Corporate Reputation Review* 3: 240-252.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

@bruceecurb. 2017. “One in four Brazilian lower house lawmakers have changed parties since January 2015.” Twitter (September 25, 12:53 pm EDT) https://twitter.com/bruceecurb/status/912374488024612867 (September 25, 2017)

Brumberg, Daniel. 2002. “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(4): 56-68. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0064

Brunelle, Jessica. 2013. “Political Social Media Users in the Americas are Tolerant and Pro-Democratic.” *AmericasBarometer Insights 92*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO892en_V2_01.29.15.pdf (November 17, 2017)

Bryant, Jennings, Susan Thompson and Bruce W. Finklea. 2013. *Fundamentals of Media Effects*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland.

Bulkley, Kate. 2012. “The rise of citizen journalism.” *The Guardian* (June 10) https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/jun/11/rise-of-citizen-journalism (November 27, 2017)

Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2017. “The Politics of Rating Freedom: Ideological Affinity, Private Authority, and the Freedom in the World Ratings.” *Perspectives on Politics* 15(3): 711-
731. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592717000925

Cabral, L. 2005. “The Economics of Reputation: A Primer.” New York University. http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/reputation/Reputation_June05.pdf (March 3, 2017)

Calvo, Ernesto and M. Victoria Murillo. 2012. “Argentina: The Persistence of Peronism.” *Journal of Democracy* 23(2): 148-161. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2012.0029

Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Campbell, James E., John R. Alford, and Keith Henry. 1984. “Television Markets and Congressional Elections.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 9(4): 665-678. http://www.jstor.org/stable/439638

Cañizalez, Andrés and Jairo Lugo-Ocando. 2008. “The Media in Venezuela: the revolution was televised, but no one was really watching.” In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 193-210.

Cappella, J.N. and Jamieson, K.H. 1997. *Spiral of cynicism: The press and the public good*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Carle, Jill. 2014. "5 key takeaways about political engagement in emerging and developing nations." Pew Research (December 18) http://pewrsr.ch/1DQlUvU (May 15, 2018)

Carlin, Ryan E. and Gregory J. Love. 2015. "Who Is the Latin American Voter?" In *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts*, eds Ryan E. Carlin, Matthew M. Singer, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 31-60.

Carothers, Thomas and Richard Youngs. 2015. "The Complexities of Global Protests." Carnegie Endowment for International Science (October 8) http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/10/08/complexities-of-global-protests-pub-61537 (May 15, 2018)

Carpenter, James and John Bithell. 2000. "Bootstrap confidence intervals: when, which, what?" *Statistics in Medicine* 19: 1141-1164.

Carreras, Miguel and Néstor Castañeda-Angarita. 2014. "Who Votes in Latin America? A Test of Three Theoretical Perspectives." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(8) 1079-1104. DOI: 10.1177/0010414013488558

Carreras, Miguel and Yasemin İrepoğlu. 2013. "Trust in elections, vote buying, and turnout in Latin America." *Electoral Studies* 32: 609-619. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.07.012

Caruso, Catherine. 2017. "Counting Protests: Maps built from the 'Count Love' project reveal patterns in American protests." Boston University press release (October 20) https://www.bu.edu/research/articles/counting-american-protests/ (May 15, 2018)

Caselli, Irene. 2012. "'Beggars sitting on a sack of gold?' Ecuadoreans protest mining." *Christian Science Monitor* (March 22) https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/0322/Beggars-sitting-on-a-sack-of-gold-Ecuadoreans-protest-mining (November 20, 2017)

Castillo, Mariano and Gloria Carrasco. 2013. "Court clears path for Bolivia's Morales to run for 3rd term." *CNN* (April 30) http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/30/world/americas/bolivia-morales-re-election/index.html (October 5, 2017)

Central Intelligence Agency. ND. "Bolivia." *The World Factbook*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bl.html (March 30, 2015 and February 24, 2017)

--- ND. “Median Age.” The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html (June 3, 2018)

CEPAL. 2016. “ECLAC: Internet Use and Access Increases Sharply in Latin America and the Caribbean.” United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (September 12) https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/eclac-internet-use-and-access-increases-sharply-latin-america-and-caribbean (November 26, 2017)

Chaffee, Steven H. 1975. “The Diffusion of Political Information.” *Political Communication*, ed. S. H. Chaffee. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 85-128.

--- and Stacey Frank. 1996. “How Americans Get Political Information: Print versus broadcast news.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546(1): 48-58. DOI: 10.1177/0002716296546001005

--- and Stacey Frank Kahnihan. 1997. “Learning about Politics from the Mass Media, *Political Communication* 14(4): 421-430. DOI: 10.1080/105846097199218

--- and Yuko Miyo. 1983. “Selective Exposure and the Reinforcement Hypothesis: an intergenerational panel study of the 1980 presidential campaign.” *Communication Research* 10(1): 3-36.

--- Xinshu Zhao and Glenn Leshner. 1994. “Political Knowledge and the Campaign Media of 1992.” *Communication Research* 21(3): 305-324. DOI: 10.1177/009365094021003004

Chapman, Jane. 2015. *Comparative Media History: An Introduction: 1789 to the Present*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Chavez, Lydia. 1985. “Hyper-Inflation Traumatizes Bolivia.” *New York Times* (April 8). http://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/08/business/hyper-inflation-traumatizes-bolivia.html (October 5, 2017)

Cho, Hyunyi. 2000. “Public opinion as personal cultivation: A normative notion and a source of social control in traditional China.” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 12(3): 299-323. DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/12.3.299

Chojkier, Gabriela. 2012. “Ask the Expert: Literacy in Latin America.” USAID (September 6) https://blog.usaid.gov/2012/09/ask-the-expert-literacy-in-latin-america/ (March 17, 2018)

Christensen, Henrik Serup. 2012. “Simply slacktivism? Internet participation in Finland.” *eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government* 4(1): 1-23. http://www.jedem.org/article/view/93 (August 25, 2015).

Clarke, Anna. 2014. "84% of the adult population regularly read newspapers." *Joint Readership Survey.* http://newsbrandsireland.ie/84-of-the-adult-population-regularly-read-newspapers/ (December 29, 2016)

Clavery, Elisa, Marianna Holanda and Daniel Bramatti. 2017. "Atual legislatura é a mais 'infiel' dos últimos dez anos: Um de cada quatro deputados federais mudou de partido desde a eleição de 2014; migrações provocam brigas na base do governo." O Estado de Sao Paulo (September 25) http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,atual-legislatura-e-a-mais-infiel-dos-ultimos-dez-anos,70002014628 (September 25, 2017)

Cohn, Scott. 2013. "Tough Wall Street Enforcement Lost in 'Revolving Door': Study." *CNBC.com* (February 11) http://cnb.cx/VQ0Lgc (November 1, 2015)

Cole, Harold L. and Patrick J. Kehoe. 1997. "Reviving Reputation Models of International Debt." *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review* 21(1): 31-30 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6608919.pdf (June 5, 2018)

Collier, David and James E. Mahon, Jr. 1993. "Conceptual 'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 87(4): 845-855. DOI: 10.2307/2938818

Colomer, Josep M. 2005. "The Left-Right Dimension in Latin America." UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 813 http://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/353/813.pdf?sequence=1 (March 26, 2015).

"Cómo se vota en los países del Mercosur." 2012. *La Gaceta* (September 7) http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/509442/politica/como-se-vota-paises-mercosur.html (March 31, 2015)

Conger, Lucy. 1997. "From Intimidation to Assassination: Silencing the Press." In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 97-108.

Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey and Devra C. Moehler. 2015. "Moderation from Bias: A field experiment on partisan media in a new democracy." *Journal of Politics* 77(2): 575-587.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The nature of belief systems in mass publics." *Critical Review* 18: 1-74 DOI: 10.1080/08913810608443650

Cook, Timothy E. 1998. *Governing with the News: The news media as a political institution.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

-- 2006. “The News Media as a Political Institution: Looking Backward and Looking Forward.” *Political Communication* 23(2): 159-171. DOI: 10.1080/10584600600629711

Coppedge, Michael. 1998. “The Dynamic Diversity of Latin American Party Systems.” *Party Politics* 4(4): 547-568 DOI: 10.1177/1354068898004004007

Cordova, Abby. 2010. “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” *AmericasBarometer Insights 6*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en_v2.pdf (May 15, 2018)

Corrigall-Brown, Catherine and RimaWilkes. 2014. “Media exposure and the engaged citizen: How the media shape political participation.” *Social Science Journal* 51(3): 408-421 DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2014.03.009

Coulson, David C. and Stephen Lacy. 1996. “Journalists’ Perceptions of How Newspaper and Broadcast News Competition Affects Newspaper Content.” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 7(2): 354-363. DOI: 10.1177/107769909607300207

Crozat, Matthew. 1998. “Are the Times A-Changin’? Assessing the acceptance of protest in western democracies.” In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, eds. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 59-82.

Cruz Sanchez, Filiberto. 1997. *Historia de los Medios de Comunicación en República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: El Nuevo Diario.

Cunningham, John M. 2018. “A Brief History of Press Freedom.” *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (May 3) https://www.britannica.com/story/250-years-of-press-freedom (June 4, 2018).

Curran, James, Shanto Iyengar, Anker Brink Lund and Inka Salovaara-Moring. 2009. “Media System, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study.” *European Journal of Communication* 24: 5-26. DOI: 10.1177/0267323108098943

CVCU. 2016. “Short biography of Jacques-René Rabier.” Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance de l'Europe at the Uiversity of Luxembourg. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2008/6/30/b51e0f46-febe-44a2-820d-5e2cd4ccd7a7/publishable_en.pdf (November 8, 2017)

Dahlgren, Peter. 2005. “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation.” *Political Communication* 22(2): 147-162, DOI:
10.1080/10584600590933160

Dalton, Russell. 2002. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Los Angeles: Sage.

--- Alix Van Sickle and Steven Weldon. 2009. "The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour." *British Journal of Political Science* 40(1): 51-73. DOI:10.1017/S000712340999038X

Dasgupta, Partho. 2016. "Media penetration: A sneak into households." *The Economic Times of India* (July 14). https://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/et-commentary/media-penetration-a-sneak-into-households/ (September 7, 2017)

David, Eric. 2015. "Only 37.9% of the World Uses the Internet, says Internet.org Report." *SiliconAngle* (February 25) http://siliconangle.com/blog/2015/02/25/only-37-9-of-the-world-uses-the-internet-says-internet-org-report/ (February 26, 2015)

Davis, Stuart. 2017. "Why do airports play CNN?" *Quora* (October 19) https://www.quora.com/Why-do-airports-play-CNN (June 28, 2018)

de Albuquerque, Alfonso. 2005. "Another 'Fourth Branch'." *Journalism* 6(4): 486-504 DOI: 10.1177/1464884905056817

--- 2012. "On Models and Margins: Comparative media models viewed from a Brazilian perspective." In *Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World*, eds. Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- 2013. "Media/politics connection: beyond political parallelism." *Media, Culture & Society* 35(6): 742-758. DOI: 10.1177/0163443713491302

de Jong, Feike. 2017. "Which city has the most protests?" *The Guardian* (September 7) https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/sep/07/which-city-most-protests-hong-kong-trump (May 15, 2018)

de la Fuente Jeria. 2010. "El Dificil Parto de Otra Democracia: la Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia." *Latin American Research Review* 45: 5-26.

de la Peña, Guillermo. 2005. "Social and Cultural Policies Toward Indigenous Peoples: Perspectives from Latin America." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34: 717–39. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.34.081804.120343

de Santiago, Monica. 2013. "The Pink Tide in Latin America: An Overview." In *Modern Latin America*, 8th Edition Companion Website https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-8-venezuela/moments-in-venezuelan-history/the-pink-tide-in-latin-america/ (December 7, 2017)

de Sola Pool, Ithiel, Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner. 1955. *The Prestige Press: A comparative study*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

de Vreese, Claes H. and Hajo Boomgaarden. 2006. "News, Political Knowledge and Participation: The Differential Effects of News Media Exposure on Political Knowledge and Participation." *Acta Politica* 41: 317–341. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500164

Della Porta, Donatella. 2004. "Comparative Politics and Social Movements." In *Methods of Social Movement Research*, eds. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 286-313.

--- 2013. "Repertoires of Contention." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, eds DA Snow, D Della Porta, B Klandermans and D McAdam. DOI: 10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm178

Delli Carpini, Michael X. 2000. "Youth, Civic Engagement, and the New Information Environment." *Political Communication* 17: 341-349. DOI: 10.1080/10584600050178942

--- and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

DeLuca, Kevin M, Sean Lawson and Ye Sun. 2012. "Occupy Wall Street on the Public Screens of Social Media: The Many Framings of the Birth of a Protest Movement." *Communication, Culture and Critique* 5(4): 483–509 DOI: 10.1111/j.1753-9137.2012.01141.x

DGME (Dirección General de Medios Estatales). http://www.comunicacion.gob.bo/?q=20130514/direcci%C3%B3n-general-de-medios-estatales-dgme (March 30, 2015)

Diniz Alves, José Eustáquio, Suzana Cavenaghi and George Martine. 2013. "Population and changes in Gender Inequalities in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the XXVII IUSSP International Population Conference, Busan, Korea. https://iussp.org/sites/default/files/event_call_for_papers/Paper_Genero%20e%20desenvolvimento_IUSSP_10ago013_0.pdf (March 14, 2018)

Donnelly, Michael J. and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2016. “Income Measures in Cross-National Surveys: Problems and Solutions.” *Political Science Research and Methods* 1-9. DOI:10.1017/psrm.2016.40

Doubek, James. 2017. “How Disinformation And Distortions On Social Media Affected Elections Worldwide.” *NPR* (November 16) https://n.pr/2mttryQ (November 20, 2017)

Doyle, Gillian. 2002. *Media Ownership: The Economics and Politics of Convergence and Concentration in the UK and European Media*. London: Sage.

Drummond MF & A McGuire. 2001. *Economic evaluation in health care: Merging theory with practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eaton, Kent. 2007. “Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization.” *Politics & Society* 35(1): 71-102. DOI: 10.1177/0032329206297145

Economic Times (of India). 2014. “PM Narendra Modi's interaction with people on radio an important initiative” (September 25) http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-09-25/news/54317841_1_private-fm-channels-all-india-radio-pm-narendra-modi (August 6, 2015)

Economist, The. 2006. “Power Grab: Evo Morales seeks control of Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly.” (September 7). http://www.economist.com/node/7894730 (October 5, 2017)

--- 2006. “Violence in Brazil.” (May 17) https://econ.st/JxNrHq (March 25, 2018)

--- 2008. “Bringing the poor online: It won't be as easy as providing mobile phones.” (February 22) http://econ.st/JxZVie (November 16, 2017)

--- 2008. “Not all bad news.” (July 24) http://www.economist.com/node/11792392 (November 27, 2017)

--- 2011. “A literary deficit.” (December 10) https://www.economist.com/node/21541435 (June 2, 2018)

--- 2012. “Staying Power.” (March 5) https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2012/03/05/staying-power (June 7, 2018)

--- 2013. “To Each Their Own.” https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21574634-chinas-model-controlling-internet-being-adopted-elsewhere-each-their-own (November 27, 2017)

Eisinger, Peter K. 1973. "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 67(1): 11-28.

"El diario en papel crecerá en los próximos cinco años." 2010. *La Nación* (August 17) https://www.lanacion.com.ar/1295266-el-diario-en-papel-crecera-en-los-proximos-cinco-anos (June 2, 2018)

El-Issawi, Fatima. 2016. "Moroccan National Media: between change and status quo." London School of Economics (April) http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16989/1/MoroccoReport.pdf (October 15, 2017)

Electoral Commission. 2006. *Compulsory Voting Around the World*. London: Electoral Commission. http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/electoral_commission_pdf_file/0020/16157/ECCompVotingfinal_22225-16484__E__N__S__W__.pdf (December 14, 2010).

Elff, Martin. 2007. "Social Structure and Electoral Behavior in Comparative Perspective: The Decline of Social Cleavages in Western Europe Revisited." *Perspectives on Politics* 5(2): 277-294. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070788

Englebert, Pierre, Stacy Tarango and Matthew Carter. 2002. "Dismemberment and Suffocation: A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(10): 1093-1118. DOI: 10.1177/001041402237944

Enjolras, Bernard, Kari Steen-Johnsen, Dag Wollebæk. 2012. "Social media and mobilization to offline demonstrations: Transcending participatory divides?" *New Media & Society* 15(6): 890-908. DOI: 10.1177/1461444812462844

Entman, Robert M. 1991. "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents." *Journal of Communication* 41 (4): 6 – 27. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1991.tb02328.x

--- 2003. "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11." *Political Communication* 20: 415-432. DOI: 10.1080/10584600390244176

Equipos MORI. 2014. Encuestas Pre-Electorales antes de las Elecciones Generales en Bolivia.

Erbring, Lutz, Edie N. Goldenberg and Arthur H. Miller. 1980. "Front-Page News and Real-World Cues: A New Look at Agenda-Setting by the Media." *American Journal of Political Science* 24(1):16. DOI: 10.2307/2110923

Esser, Frank. 2015. “Comparative Political Communication Research: The Undiminished Relevance of the Beginnings.” In *Can the Media Serve Democracy? Essays in Honour of Jay G. Blumler*, eds Stephen Coleman, Giles Moss, and Katy Parry. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 44-52.

--- and Barbara Pfetsch. 2004. *Comparing Political Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

European Commission. 2008. “35 Years of EuroBarometer: European integration as seen by public opinion in the Member States of the European Union 1973 – 2008.” http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/docs/35_years_en.pdf (November 8, 2017)

Evans, Geoffrey. 1999. “Class Voting: From premature obituary to reasoned appraisal.” In *The End of Class Politics?* Ed Geoffrey Evans. New York: Oxford, 1-20.

Eveland, William P., Myiah J. Hutchens, and Fei Shen. 2009. “Exposure, attention, or ‘use’ of news? Assessing aspects of the reliability and validity of a central concept in political communication research.” *Communication Methods and Measures* 3(4): 223 - 244. DOI: 10.1080/19312450903378925

“Evo Morales: Su aprobación sube a 56% tras doble gratificación por Navidad” [Evo Morales: His popularity climbs to 56% following the doublé Christmas bonus]. 2013. *Peru 21* (December 15) http://peru21.pe/mundo/evo-morales-su-aprobacion-sube-56-doble-gratificacion-navidad-2161533 (February 21, 2017)

Falconer, Alan D. 1990. “The Role of Religion in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Case of Northern Ireland.” *Security Dialogue* 21(3): 273-280. DOI: 10.1177/096701069002100304

Feldman, Lauren, Edward W. Maibach, Connie Roser-Renouf and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2012. “Climate on Cable: The Nature and Impact of Global Warming Coverage on F*ox News*, *CNN*, and *MSNBC*.” *International Journal of Press/Politics* 17(1): 3-31 DOI: 10.1177/1940161211425410

Feldman, Stanley. 1988. “Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values.” *American Journal of Political Science* 32(2): 416-440 DOI: 10.2307/2111130

Felter, Claire. 2015. “Why does Africa have so many languages?” *Christian Science Monitor* (April 21) https://www.csmonitor.com/Science/Science-Notebook/2015/0421/Why-does-Africa-have-so-many-languages (June 7, 2018)

Feres Júnior, João, Lorena Miguel and Eduardo Barbabela. 2014. “Political Protest in Brazil: The role of the news media.” Prepared for the annual Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago.

Flew, Terry and Silvio Waisbord. 2015. “The ongoing significance of national media systems in the context of media globalization.” *Media, Culture & Society* 37(4): 620–636. DOI: 10.1177/0163443714566903

Flichy, Patrice. 2007. *The Internet Imaginaire*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fombrun, Charles J. 2012. “The Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation*, eds Timothy G. Pollock and Michael L. Barnett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 95-113

Foreman, Peter O., David A. Whetten, and Alison Mackey. 2012. “An Identity-Based View of Reputation, Image, and Legitimacy: Clarifications and Distinctions Among Related Constructs.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation*, eds Timothy G. Pollock and Michael L. Barnett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 179-200.

Fourie, Pieter J. 2008. *Media Studies: Media History, Media and Society*. Cape Town: Juta.

Fowler, Anthony. 2013. “Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8(2): 159-182. DOI: 10.1561/100.00012055

Fox, Elizabeth. 1997. *Latin American Broadcasting: from tango to telenova*. Bedfordshire, UK: University of Luton Press.

Fox, John. 2008. *Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Linear Models*. Los Angeles: Sage.

--- and Sanford Weisberg. 2011. *An R Companion to Applied Regression*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Fraile, Marta and Shanto Iyengar. 2014. “Not All News Sources Are Equally Informative
A Cross-National Analysis of Political Knowledge in Europe.” *International Journal of Press/Politics* 19(3): 275-294. DOI: 10.1177/1940161214528993

Frankal, Elliot. 2005. “Compulsory voting around the world.” *The Guardian* (July 4). https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/04/voterapathy.uk (September 7, 2017)

Freedom House. 2008. “Bolivia.” *Freedom of the Press*. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2007/bolivia#.VR7O2vnF9OY (April 3, 2015)

--- 2017. *Freedom of the Press*. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017 (September 12, 2017)

--- 2017. *Methodology*. https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2017 (November 20, 2017)

--- 2018. *Democracy in Crisis*. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (February 5, 2018)

Freitag, Markus and Richard Traunmüller. 2009. “Spheres of trust: An empirical analysis of the foundations of particularised and generalised trust.” *European Journal of Political Research* 48(6): 782-803. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00849

Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer. 2000. “Happiness, Economy and Institutions.” *The Economic Journal* 110(466): 918-938. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00570

Friedmann, Sarah J. 2014. “Going Global: Exploring the determinants of civil society engagement in global perspective.” M.A. thesis. Georgetown University. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/709894 (July 26, 2015)

Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gaines, Brian J. and James H. Kuklinski. 2011. “Experimental Estimation of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Related to Self-Selection.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 724–736. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00518.x

Gainous, Jason, Kevin M. Wagner and Jason P. Abbott. 2015. “Civic Disobedience: Does Internet Use Stimulate Political Unrest in East Asia?” *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 12: 219–236. DOI: 10.1080/19331681.2015.1034909

Gainous, Jason, Kevin M. Wagner and Tricia Gray. “Internet freedom and social media effects: democracy and citizen attitudes in Latin America.” Online Information Review 40(5): 712 – 738. DOI: 10.1108/OIR-11-2015-0351

Galperin, Hernan. 2017. “Why Are Half of Latin Americans Not Online? A Four-Country Study of Reasons for Internet Nonadoption.” *International Journal of Communication* 11: 3332–3354.

García Béjar, Ligia. 2009. "The media in Paraguay: a locked nation in times of change." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 183-188.

Garcia Calderon, F. 1925. "Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America." *Foreign Affairs* 459-477.

Garrett, R. Kelly. 2006. "Protest in an Information Society: a review of literature on social movements and new ICTs." *Information, Communication & Society* 9(2): 202-224, DOI: 10.1080/13691180600630773

Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2004. "Making the International Local: The Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole, Local Casualties, and Media Coverage." *Political Communication* 21(2): 139-159. DOI: 10.1080/10584600490443859

Gaskins, Benjamin and Jennifer Jerit. 2012. "Internet News: Is it a replacement for traditional media outlets?" *International Journal of Press/Politics* 17(2): 190-213. DOI: 10.1177/1940161211434640

Gaviria, Alejandro, Ugo Panizza and Jessica Seddon Wallack. 2004. "Economic, Social and Demographic Determinants of Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from the 1990s." *Revista Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Económico* 3: 151-182. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?pid=S2074-47062004000200006&script=sci_arttext&tlng=pt (May 27, 2015)

Gerring, John. 2004. "What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?" *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 341-354. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055404001182

--- Strom C. Thacker and Carola Moreno. 2008. "Are Parliamentary Systems Better?" *Comparative Political Studies* 42(3): 327-359. DOI: 10.1177/0010414008325573

Gerstenfeld, Manfred. 2016. "The radically flawed methodology of Freedom House." *Jerusalem Post* (May 23) http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/The-radically-flawed-methodology-of-Freedom-House-454794 (November 20, 2017).

Ghersetti, Marina. 2014. "Still the Same? Comparing news content in online and print media." Journalism Practice 8(4): 373-389. DOI: 10.1080/17512786.2013.813201

Gibson, Rachel and Marta Cantijoch. 2013. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Participation in the Age of the Internet: Is Online Political Engagement Really Different to Offline?" *Journal of Politics* 75(3): 701–716. DOI:10.1017/S0022381613000431

Gilens, Martin and Craig Hertzman. 2000. "Corporate Ownership and News Bias: Newspaper Coverage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act." *Journal of Politics* 62(2): 369 – 386. DOI: 10.1111/0022-3816.00017

Gill, Jeff. 2006. *Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research*. New York: Cambridge.

Gilliam, Franklin D. Jr. and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. "Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 560-573.

Gillwald, Alison. 2017. "Internet Use Barriers and User Strategies: Perspectives from Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Rwanda." Beyond Access Policy Paper https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2017/07/Comparative-Africa-Research-ICT-Africa-2017.pdf (November 16, 2017)

Giugale, Marcelo, McDonald Benjamin, Gregor Barié, Jorge Uquillas, Malcom Childess, Rémy Prud'homme, Jonas Frank, Lisa Bhansali, Julissa Mantilla, Beatriz Perez Perazzo, Oscar Antezana, and Fernando Jiménez. 2006. "Bolivia: Toward a New Social Contract – Options for the Constituent Assembly." World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BOLIVIA/Resources/Bolivia_CSA_Report.pdf (May 14, 2018)

Giugni, Marc0. 2009. "Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly." Swiss Political Science Review 15(2): 361–68 DOI: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2009.tb00136.x

Gold, Howard J. 2005. "Explaining third-party success in gubernatorial elections: The cases of Alaska, Connecticut, Maine and Minnesota." *Social Science Journal* 42(4): 523-540 DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2005.09.010

Gomez, Ricardo and Kemly Camacho. 2013. "Users of ICT at Public Access Centers: Age, Education, Gender, and Income Differences in Users." In *ICT Influences on Human Development, Interaction, and Collaboration*, ed. Susheel Chhabra. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 1-21.

González-Rodríguez, Gustavo. 2008. "The media in Chile: the restoration of democracy and the subsequent concentration in media ownership." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 61-77.

Gramajo, Silvio René. 2014. "Media and Politicians in Guatemala: a marriage will last until money do them part." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 139-156.

Grazzi, Matteo and Sebastián Vergara. 2014. "Internet in Latin America: who uses it? … and for what?" *Economics of Innovation and New Technology* 23(4): 327-352. DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2013.854513

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts & Minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Rune Stubager. 2010. "The Political Conditionality of Mass Media Influence: When Do Parties Follow Mass Media Attention?" *British Journal of Political Scienc*e 40(3), 663-677 DOI: 10.1017/S0007123410000037

Griffiths, Catherine S. 2011. "Political Consumerism in Four Post-Communist Countries: An Exploratory Look." In *Boycotts and Dixie Chicks: Creative Political Participation at Home and Abroad*, author Andrew S. McFarland. New York: Routledge, 81-100.

Grillo, Ioan. 2009. "Mexico's Election Rebellion: Just Vote No." *Time* (June 18) http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905313,00.html (December 20, 2009).

Grisaffi, Thomas. 2010. "We Are Originarios … 'We Just Aren't from Here': Coca leaf and Identity Politics in the Chapare, Bolivia." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 29(4): 425–439 DOI: 10.1111/j.1470-9856.2010.00385.x

Grupo MediosMedios. "Directorio de Medios de Comunicación – Bolivia." http://www.mediosmedios.com.ar/A.%20Bolivia.htm (March 30, 2015).

Guardian, The. 2014. "How can we get young people excited about local elections?." March 12. http://gu.com/p/3ne3z/stw (Accessed August 24, 2015)

Guedes-Bailey, Olga and Othon F. Jambeiro Barbosa. 2008. "The Media in Brazil: An historical overview of Brazilian broadcasting politics." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: Open University Press, 46-60.

Guillén, Mauro F. and Sandra L. Suárez. 2005. "Explaining the Global Digital Divide: Economic, Political and Sociological Drivers of Cross-National Internet Use." *Social Forces* 84(2): 681-708. DOI: 10.1353/sof.2006.0015

Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Honest Threats: The interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2): 175-200. DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046002001

Gurevitch, Michael. 2004. "State of the Art of Comparative Political Communication Research: Poised for Maturity?" In *Comparing Political Communication*, eds. Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 325-343.

--- and Jay G. Blumler. 1990. "Political Communication Systems and Democratic Values." In *Democracy and the Mass Media*, ed J. Lichtenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 24-35.

Gutiérrez Rentería, María Elena. 2009. "The Media Industry in Mexico." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan B. Albarran. New York: Routledge, 34-46.

Hafez, Kai. 2013. "The Methodology Trap: Why media and communication studies are not really international." *Communications* 38(3): 323-329. DOI: 10.1515/commun-2013

Hale, Henry E. 2008. *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of states and nations in Eurasia and the world.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Andrea E. 2014. "The Impact of Media Consumption on Civic Participation: Examining media and social capital effects." http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/gs_rp/548/ (July 26, 2015).

Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms" *Political Studies* 44(5): 936-957. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x

Hallin, Daniel C. 2000. "Media, Political Power, and Democratization in Mexico." In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, eds James Curran and Myung-Jin Park. New York: Routledge, 97-110.

--- and Paolo Mancini. 2004. *Comparing Media Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- and Paolo Mancini. 2012. *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- and Paolo Mancini. 2017. "Ten Years After Comparing Media Systems: What Have We Learned?" *Political Communication* 34(2): 155-171. DOl: 10.1080/10584609.2016.1233158

--- and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos. 2002. "Political clientelism and the media: southern Europe and Latin America in comparative perspective." *Media, Culture & Society* 24: 175–195. DOI: 10.1177/016344370202400202

Hanitzsch, Thomas, Maria Anikina, Rosa Berganza, Incilay Cangoz, Mihai Coman, Basyouni Hamada, Folker Hanusch, Christopher D. Karadjov, Claudia Mellado, Sonia Virginia Moreira, Peter G. Mwesige, Patrick Lee Plaisance, Zvi Reich, Josef Seethaler, Elizabeth A. Skewes, Dani Vardiansyah Noor, and Kee Wang Yuen. 2010. "Modeling Perceived Influences on Journalism: Evidence from a cross-national survey of journalists." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 87(1): 5-22. DOI: 10.1177/107769901008700101

Hanitzsch, Thomas, Folker Hanusch, Claudia Mellado, Maria Anikina, Rosa Berganza, Incilay Cangoz, Mihai Coman, Basyouni Hamada, María Elena Hernández, Christopher D. Karadjov, Sonia Virginia Moreira, Peter G. Mwesige, Patrick Lee Plaisance, Zvi Reich, Josef Seethaler, Elizabeth A. Skewes, Dani Vardiansyah Noor and Edgar Kee Wang Yuen. 2011. "Mapping Journalism Cultures Across Nations: A comparative study of 18 countries." *Journalism Studies* 12(3): 273-293. DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2010.512502

Harlow, Summer and Dustin Harp. 2012. "Collective Action on the Web." *Information, Communication & Society* 15(2): 196-216, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2011.591411

Hartmann, Tilo. 2009. *Media Choice: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview*. New York: Routledge.

Haynie, Devon. 2017. "Latin America's Right Turn." *US News and World Report* (January 9) https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-01-09/the-consequences-of-latin-americas-move-to-the-right (November 27, 2017)

Hellwig, Timothy and David Samuels. 2007. "Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 65-90.
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000045

Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2004. "Information Institutions and Comparative Politics: A research agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4): 725-740. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592704040472

Helms, Ariel. Hillary Rosenjack, and Kelly Schultz. 2016. "Who is Interested in Politics?" *AmericasBarometer Insights 126*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO926en.pdf (November 27, 2017)

Henrich, Joseph, Steven J. Heine and Ara Norenzayan. 2010. "The weirdest people in the world?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33: 61-135. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X0999152X

Henríquez Consalvi, Carlos "Santiago." 2010. *Broadcasting the Civil War in El Salvador: A memoir of guerrilla radio.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Herbst, Susan. 1994. *Politics at the Margin: Historical Studies of Public Expression outside the Mainstream*. New York: Cambridge.

Hirst, Martin. 2013. "Right to know: the 'nation', the 'people' and the Fourth Estate." *The Conversation* (December 10) https://theconversation.com/right-to-know-the-nation-the-people-and-the-fourth-estate-21253 (June 6, 2018)

Hoffman, Kelly and Miguel Angel Centeno. 2003. "The Lopsided Continent: Inequality in Latin America." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29: 363-390. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100141

Hoffman, Lindsay H. 2006. "Is Internet Content Different After All? A content analysis of mobilizing information in online and print newspapers." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 83(1): 58-76. DOI: 10.1177/107769900608300105

Hofstetter, C. Richard. 1998. "Political Talk Radio, Situational Involvement, and Political Mobilization." *Social Science Quarterly* 79(2): 273-286

Hooker, Juliet. 2005. "Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural Citizenship in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37:285-310. doi:10.1017/S0022216X05009016

Horowitz, Donald L. 1990. "Comparing Democratic Systems." *Journal of Democracy* 1(4): 73-79. DOI: 10.1353/jod.1990.0056

--- 2000[1985]. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

"How Americans get their news." 2014. American Press Institute (March 17). https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-get-news (December 29, 2016)

Howad, Philip N. 2010. *The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam*. New York: Oxford.

Howe, Patrick and Brady Teufel. 2014. "Native Advertising and Digital Natives: The Effects of Age and Advertisement Format on News Website Credibility Judgments." *#ISOJ* 4(1): 78-90.

Htun, Mala. 2004. "From 'Racial Democracy' to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil." *Latin American Research Review* 39(1): 60-89. DOI: 10.1353/lar.2004.0010

Hudson, Eileen, Fernando Salas, Lucila Carbaja and Florencia Traibel. 2009. "The Media in Uruguay." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 171-182.

Hughes, Sallie. 2008. "The media in Mexico: from authoritarian institution to hybrid system." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 131-149.

--- and Chappell H. Lawson. 2004. "Propaganda and Crony Capitalism: Partisan Bias in Mexican Television News." *Latin American Research Review* 39(3): 81-105. DOI: 10.1353/lar.2004.0050

--- 2005. "The Barriers to Media Opening in Latin America." *Political Communication*, 22(1): 9-25. DOI: 10.1080/10584600590908410

Humphreys, Peter. 2012. "A political scientist's contribution to the comparative study of media systems in Europe." In *Trends in communication policy research: new theories, methods and subjects*, eds Natasha Just and Manuel Puppis. Bristol: Hobbs, 157-176

Hunter, Margaret. 2007. "The Persistent Problem of Colorism: Skin Tone, Status, and Inequality." *Sociology Compass* 1(1): 237–254. DOI:10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00006.x

--- 2013. "The Consequences of Colorism." In *The Melanin Millennium*, ed. Ronald E. Hall. New York: Springer Dordrecht, 247-256. DOI:10.1007/978-94-007-4608-4_16

"Illiteracy Rate Drops to Historic Lows in Bolivia." 2015. *Telesur* (June 17). http://bit.ly/1fh7afg (August 7, 2017)

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

--- 2008. "Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006." *West European Politics* 31(2): 130-146 DOI: 10.1080/01402380701834747

--- and Christian Welzel. 2008. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: the human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge.

--- 2011. "The WVS Cultural Map of the World." http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/InglehartWelzel2011.pdf (November 26, 2017)

Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 2001. Bolivia: Población por Sexo y Área Según Departamento, Provincia y Municipio. http://www.ine.gob.bo/indice/visualizador.aspx?ah=PC20102.HTM (March 31, 2015)

--- 2012. *Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2012 de Bolivia*. http://www.ine.gob.bo:8081/censo2012/PDF/resultadosCPV2012.pdf (September 24, 2014)

International Telecommunication Union (ITU). *World Telecommunication Indicators/ICT Indicators Database*. 18th Edition. CD-ROM. 2014.

"Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet." 2017. Pew Research Center (January 12) http://pewrsr.ch/1iPfZJX (August 24, 2015)

"Internet censorship listed: how does each country compare?" 2012. *The Guardian* (April 16) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list (February 13, 2018)

Iyengar, Shanto. 1994. *Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

--- James Curran, Anker Brink Lund, Inka Saovaara-Moring, Kyu S. Hahn, and Sharon Coen. 2010. "Cross-National versus Individual-Level Differences in Political Information: A Media Systems Perspective." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 20(3): 291–309. DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2010.490707

--- and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

--- Donald R. Kinder, Mark D. Peters, Jon A. Krosnick. 1984. "The evening news and presidential evaluations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46(4): 778-787. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.46.4.778

--- Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder. 1982. "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." American Political Science Review 76(4): 848-858. DOI: 10.1017/S000305540018966X

Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. DOI: 10.2307/1961959

Jalali, Rita and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1992. "Racial and Ethnic Conflicts: A Global Perspective." *Political Science Quarterly* 107(4): 585-606.

Jennings, Kent M., and Vicki Zeitner. 2003. "Internet Use and Civic Engagement: A Longitudinal Analysis." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 67(3): 311-34

Jordán Tobar, Rodrigo and Allen Panchana Macay. 2009. "The Media in Ecuador." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 103-124.

Johnson, Steven. 2014. *How We Got to Now: Six Innovations That Made the Modern World*. New York: Riverhead Books

Jowell, Roger, Caroline Roberts, Rory Fitzgerald and Gillian Eva. 2007. *Measuring Attitudes Cross-Nationally: Lessons from the European Social Survey*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Jurkowitz, Mark, Paul Hitlin, Amy Mitchell, Laura Houston Santhanam, Steve Adams, Monica Anderson and Nancy Vogt. 2013. "The Changing TV News Landscape." *Pew Research Center* (March 17) http://pewrsr.ch/YC2YGP (June 5, 2018)

Kaplan, Daniel T. 2009. *Statistical Modeling: A Fresh Approac*h. Lexington, KY: Ingram.

Kaplan, Richard L. 2006. "The News about New Institutionalism: journalism's ethic of objectivity and its political origins." *Political Communication* 23(2): 173-185. DOI: 10.1080/10584600600629737

Karaian, Jason. 2015. "We now spend more than eight hours a day consuming media." Quartz.com https://qz.com/416416/we-now-spend-more-than-eight-hours-a-day-consuming-media/ (March 14, 2018)

Karppinen, Kari and Hallvard Moe. 2016. "What We Talk About When Talk About 'Media Independence'." *Javnost* 23(2): 105-119, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2016.1162986

Karush, Matthew B. 2012. *Culture of Class: Radio and cinema in the making of a divided Argentina, 1920-1946*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Kasfir, Nelson. 1979. "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation." *World Politics* 31(3): 365-388. DOI: 10.2307/2009994

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2004. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002." *The World Bank* http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/govmatters3_wber.pdf (November 16, 2017)

--- 2010. "The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues." Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_wgi_kaufmann.pdf (November 20, 2017)

Kawashima-Ginsberg, Kei and Felicia Sullivan. 2017. "Study: 60 percent of rural millennials lack access to a political life." *The Conversation* https://theconversation.com/study-60-percent-of-rural-millennials-lack-access-to-a-political-life-74513 (March 25, 2018)

Keenan, Joe. 1997. "*La Gacetilla*: How advertising masquerades as news." In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 41-48.

Kelly, Sanja, Madeline Earp, Laura Reed, Adrian Shahbaz, and Mai Truong. 2015. "Privatizing Censorship, Eroding Privacy." Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net-2015/freedom-net-2015-privatizing-censorship-eroding-privacy (November 27, 2017)

Kendzior, Sarah and Noah Tucker. 2015. "Dashcams for Freedom: How Central Asians are fighting for their rights, one YouTube clip at a time." *Foreign Policy* (August 5) http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/dashcams-for-freedom-central-asia-corruption-human-rights/ (August 10, 2015)

Kenski, Kate and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2010. "Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge, and Participation." *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 50(2): 173-192, DOI: 10.1207/s15506878jobem5002_1

Kernell, Samuel, Gary C. Jacobson, Thad Kousser and Lynn Vavreck. 2016. *The Logic of American Politics*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Khan, Mohammed Shahadat Hossain, Mahbub Hasan and Che Kum Clement. 2012. "Barriers to the Introduction of ICT into Education in Developing Countries: The example of Bangladesh." *International Journal of Instruction* 5(2): 61-80. http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED533790 (August 10, 2015)

Kim, Jehae, Patricio Rojas, Joanna Huey, Kathleen Connors and Stephanie Wang. ND. "Latin America." OpenNet Initiative https://opennet.net/research/regions/la (March 10, 2018)

King, Desmond. 1995. *Actively Seeking Work? The politics of unemployment and Welfare Policy in the United States and Great Britain.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

King, Gary and Langche Zeng. 2001. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data." *Political Analysis* 9(2): 137-153. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a004868

Kirby, Peadar. 2010. "Probing the Significance of Latin America's 'Pink Tide'." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 89: 127-133.

Kittilson, Maki Caul (2007): "Research Resources in Comparative Political Behaviour." In The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour, eds Russel J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0047

Klandermans, B. 1997. *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Klein, Herbert S. 2011. *A Concise History of Bolivia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42(2): 1-32.

Knobloch-Westerwick, Silvia and Jingbo Meng. 2009. "Looking the Other Way: Selective Exposure to Attitude-Consistent and Counterattitudinal Political Information." *Communication Research* 36(3): 426-448. DOI: 10.1177/0093650209333030

Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. "Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, eds David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell, 19-46. DOI: 10.1002/9780470999103.ch2

Kraul, Chris. 2016. "The pendulum swings: Here's how Latin America has shifted politically over the years." *Los Angeles Times* (July 1) http://beta.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-latin-american-pendulum-adv-snap-story.html (November 27, 2017)

Kreps, David M. and Robert Wilson. 1980. "Reputation and Imperfect Information." *Journal of Economic Theory* 27(2): 253-279. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

Krippendorff, K. 2004. *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kroh, Martin and Hannes Neiss. 2012. On the causal nature of the relationship between Internet access and political engagement: Evidence from German panel data." In *Digital Media and Political Engagement Worldwide: A Comparative Study*, eds. Eva Anduiza, Michael James Jensen, and Laia Jorba. New York: Cambridge

Ksiazek, Thomas B., Edward C. Malthouse, and James G. Webster. 2010. “News-seekers and Avoiders: Exploring Patterns of Total News Consumption Across Media and the Relationship to Civic Participation.” *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 54(4): 551–568. DOI: 10.1080/08838151.2010.519808

Kushin, Matthew James and Masahiro Yamamoto. 2010. “Did Social Media Really Matter? College Students’ Use of Online Media and Political Decision Making in the 2008 Election.” *Mass Communication and Society* 13: 608–630 DOI: 10.1080/15205436.2010.516863

Laborda, Fernando. 2010. “Los Kirchner y la prensa.” *La Nacion* (August 24) http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1297429-los-kirchner-y-la-prensa (August 16, 2017)

Lacey, Marc. 2009. “Disgruntled Mexicans Plan an Election Message to Politicians: We Prefer Nobody.” *New York Times* (June 20) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/world/americas/21mexico.html (January 28, 2011)

Lancaster, Henry. 2015. “Executive Summary.” [online] “Bolivia - Telecoms, IP Networks and Digital Media - Insights and Statistics.” (January 29). http://www.budde.com.au/Research/Bolivia-Telecoms-IP-Networks-and-Digital-Media-Insights-and-Statistics.html (April 3, 2015).

LANIC (Latin American Network Information Center). 2015. “Political Parties.” http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/region/politicalparties (May 31, 2018)

Lange, Donald, Peggy M. Lee and Ye Dai. 2011. “Organizational Reputation: A review.” *Journal of Management* 37: 153-184. DOI: 10.1177/0149206310390963

Lapidos, Juliet. 2008. “Doing Democracy Right: Why are other countries so much better at conducting elections than we are?” *Slate.com* (October 17) http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/how_they_do_it/2008/10/doing_democracy_right.html (November 18, 2017)

Lasswell, Harold. 1936. *Politics: Who gets what, when and how.* New York: Mc-Graw-Hill.

Lawson, Chappell H. 2002. *Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

--- and James A. McCann. 2004. “Television News, Mexico’s 2000 Elections and Media Effects in Emerging Democracies.” *British Journal of Political Science* 35: 1-30. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000013

Layton, Matthew L. 2012. "Who Trusts the Mass Media in Latin America?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 74. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO874_en.pdf (October 11, 2014)

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. *The People's Choice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Robert K. Merton. 1948. "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action." In *The Communication of Ideas*, ed Lyman Bryson. New York: Harper & Bros.

Ledeur, Kathyn. 2002. "Coca y Conflicto en el Chapare." *Washington Office on Latin America* (June.) http://esvetue.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/past/ddhr_bolivia_brief_esp.pdf (March 30, 2015).

Leiner, Barry M., Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts and Stephen Wolff. 2012. "Brief History of the Internet." *InternetSociety.org*. October 15. http://www.internetsociety.org/brief-history-internet (August 23, 2015).

Leitner, Helga, Eric Sheppard and Kristin M. Sziarto. 2008. "The spatialities of contentious politics." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 33(2): 157-172 DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5661.2008.00293.x

Levi, Margaret. 1997. "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis." In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, eds. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 19-41.

Levitsky, Steven and María Victoria Murillo. 2008. "Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner." *Journal of Democracy* 19(2): 16-30. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2008.0030

Liao, Tim Futing. 1994. *Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, probit, and other generalized linear models*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Liebes, Tamar. 2000. "Performing a dream and its dissolution: A social history of broadcasting in Israel." In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, eds James Curran and Myung-Jin Park. New York: Routledge, 305-323.

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lilleker, Darren G. 2006. *Key Concepts in Political Communication*. London: Sage.

Lindeboom, M and E van Doorslaer. 2004. "Cut-point shift and index shift in self-reported health." *Journal of Health Economics* 23(6): 1083-99. DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.01.002

Ling, Justin. 2015. "As Canadian Police Demand Journalists' Material, the Law Offers Limited Protection." *Vice News* (October 30) https://news.vice.com/article/as-canadian-police-demand-journalists-material-the-law-offers-limited-protection (October 17, 2017)

Linz, Juan José. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(4): 51-69. DOI: 10.1353/jod.1990.0011

Lippmann, Walter. 1922. *Public opinion*. New York: Free Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1996. *American Exceptionalism: A double-edged sword.* New York: WW Norton & Company Inc.

--- and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*, eds Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1-64.

Lipsky, Michael. 1968. "Protest as a political resource." *American Political Science Review* 62(4): 1144-1158 DOI: 10.2307/1953909

Liptak, Adam. 2005. "Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source." *New York Times* (July 7) https://nyti.ms/2tjGCBh (October 16, 2017)

Livingstone, Sonia and Tim Markham. 2008. "The contribution of media consumption to civic participation." *British Journal of Sociology* 59(2): 351-371 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00197.x

López, Bruno. 1997. "Balancing Act: surviving as a television reporter in Mexico." *In A Culture of Collusion: an inside look at the Mexican Press*, ed. William A. Orme, Jr. Boulder, CO: North-South Center Press, 89-96.

Lozada, Fernando and Gridvia C. Kuncar. 1983. "Las Emisoras de Bolivia: Una Historica Experiencia de Comunicacion Autogestionaria." In *Comunicacion Alternativa y Busquedas Democraticas*, ed Fernando Reyes Matta. Mexico City: ILET/Friedrich Ebea Stiftung, 105-132.

Luengo, Oscar G. and Marcus Maurer. 2009. "A Virtuous Circle for All? Media Exposure and Political Trust in Europe." CONfines 9(5): 39-48 http://confines.mty.itesm.mx/articulos9/GLuengoMaurer.pdf (May 16, 2018)

Luskin, Robert C. 1990. "Explaining Political Sophistication." *Political Behavior* 12(4): 331-361. DOI: 10.1007/BF00992793

Lutz, Christoph, Christian Pieter Hoffmann, and Miriam Meckel. 2014. "Beyond just politics: A systematic literature review of online participation ." *First Monday* 19(7). DOI: 10.5210/fm.v19i7.5260

Lynch, Tiffany. 2013. "The Country That's Never Had an Election." *Foreign Policy* (November 6) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/06/the-country-thats-never-had-an-election/ (October 16, 2017)

Machado, Fabiana, Carlos Scartascini and Mariano Tommasi. 2009. "Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America." IDB Working Paper Series 110. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89188 (August 19, 2015).

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1950. *The Prince and the Discourses.* New York: Mc-Graw Hill.

Macrory, Robbie. 2010. "The Bugle and the Penguins: Democracy and the Media in Argentina." Master's thesis. Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London.

Madrid, Raúl L. 2012. *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America.* New York: Cambridge.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico.* New York: Cambridge.

Magro, Maira. 2010. "Newspaper circulation in Latin America expected to increase, study says." Journalism in the Americas blog (August 17) https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/newspaper-circulation-latin-america-expected-increase-study-says (May 14, 2016)

Mahon, John F. 2002. "Corporate Reputation: Research Agenda Using Strategy and Stakeholder Literature." *Business Society* 41: 415-445. DOI: 10.1177/0007650302238776

Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change." In *Explaining Institutional Change*, eds. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-37.

Maier, Scott. 2010. "All the News Fit to Post? Comparing news content on the web to newspapers, television, and radio." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 87(3/4): 548-562. DOI: 10.1177/107769901008700307

Mair, Peter, Seymour Martin Lipset, Michael Hout and John H. Goldthrope. 1999. "Critical Commentary: Four perspectives on the end of class politics?" In *The End of Class Politics?* Ed Geoffrey Evans. New York: Oxford, 308-322.

Mainwaring, Scott and Frances Hagopian. 2005. "Introduction: The third wave of democratization in Latin America." *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2005. "Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic transitions, breakdowns and erosions." *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 14-59.

--- 2015. "Cross-Currents in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 26(1): 114-127. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2015.0003

Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. "Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0863en.pdf (November 17, 2017)

--- "Who Consumes News Media in Latin America and the Caribbean?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 70. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO870en.pdf (October 11, 2014)

Mallén, Patricia Rey. 2013. "Bolivian Census Highlights How Changes In Bolivian Demographics Might Affect President Evo Morales' Power Base." *International Business Times* (July 8) http://www.ibtimes.com/bolivian-census-highlights-how-changes-bolivian-demographics-might-affect-president-evo-morales (December 12, 2017)

Mancini, Paolo. 2008. "Party–Press Parallelism." In *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*, ed. W. Donsbach. DOI: 10.1002/9781405186407.wbiecp013

--- 2016. " Parallelism, Political." In The *International Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, ed. G. Mazzoleni. DOI: 10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc068

"Many in Emerging and Developing Nations Disconnected from Politics." 2014. *Pew Research Center* (December 18)
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/12/18/many-in-emerging-and-developing-nations-disconnected-from-politics/ (August 23, 2017).

Manyika, James, Armando Cabral, Lohini Moodley, Suraj Moraje, Safroadu Yeboah-Amankwah, Michael Chui, and Jerry Anthonyrajah. 2013. *Lions go digital: The Internet's transformative potential in Africa*. McKinsey Global Institute Report: San Francisco, CA.
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/lions_go_digital_the_internets_transformative_potential_in_africa (August 10, 2015)

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 2011. "Elaborating the 'New Institutionalism'." In The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed Robert E. Goodin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 159-175. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0008

Marien, Sofie, Marc Hooghe and Ellen Quintelier. 2010. "Inequalities in Non-Institutionalized Forms of Political Participation. A Multilevel Analysis for 25 countries." *Political Studies* 58(1): 187-213.

Marsh, David, Pault Hart and Karen Tindall. 2010. "Celebrity Politics: The Politics of the Late Modernity?" *Political Studies Review* 8(3): 322–340. DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-9302.2010.00215.x

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1973. *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton.

Matsa, Katerina Eva and Kristine Lu. 2016. "10 Facts about the Changing Digital News Landscape." *Pew Research Center* (September 14) http://pewrsr.ch/2cwijL4 (August 24, 2017)

Matos, Carolina. 2008. *Journalism and Political Democracy in Brazil*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

--- 2012. *Media and Politics in Latin America: globalization, democracy and identity*. London: IB Tauris.

McAdam, Douglas. 1996. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions."
In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, eds D McAdam, J McCarthy and M. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23–40.

McChesney, Robert W. 2003. "Theses on media deregulation." Media, Culture & Society 25: 125–133. DOI: 10.1177/0163443703025001595

--- and Victor Pickard. "News Media a Political Institutions." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, eds Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. New York: Oxford University Press, 263-274.

McLeod, Douglas and Benjamin H. Detenber. 1999. "Framing Effects of Television News Coverage of Social Protest." *Journal of Communication* 49(3): 3-23.

McLeod, Jack M. and Daniel G. McDonald. 1985. "Media Orientations and Their Impact on Political Processes." Communication Research 12(1): 3-33 DOI 10.1177/009365085012001001

McCleod, Jack M., Ramona R. Rush and Karl H. Friederich. 1968. "The Mass Media and Political Information in Quito, Ecuador." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 32(4): 75-587. DOI: 10.1086/267647

McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. "The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36: 176–187.

McIntyre, Karen. 2014. "The Evolution of Social Media from 1969 to 2013: A Change in Competition and a Trend Toward Complementary, Niche Sites." The Journal of Social Media in Society 3(2). http://thejsms.org/tsmri/index.php/TSMRI/article/viewFile/89/43 (October 12, 2017)

McNeish, John-Andrew. 2006. "Stones on the Road: The politics of participation and generation of crisis in Bolivia." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 25(2): 220-240. http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2719-stones-on-the-road.pdf (March 23, 2015)

Meier, Werner A. and Josef Trappel. 1998. "Media Concentration and the Public Interest." In *Media Policy: Convergence, Concentration & Commerce*, eds Denis McQuail and Karen Siune. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 38-59.

Mehen, Michael. 2012. "Interview with Charles Berger." International Journal of Communication 6: 1491-1497 http://www.ifkw.uni-muenchen.de/lehrbereiche/meyen/publikationen/publ_meyen/ica_fellows.pdf (June 1, 2018)

Metcalf, Stephen. 2017. "Neoliberalism: the idea that swallowed the world." *The Guardian* (August 18). https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/aug/18/neoliberalism-the-idea-that-changed-the-world (October 5, 2017)

Meyer, David S. 2004. "Protest and Political Opportunities." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 125–45 DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110545

--- and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." *Social Forces* 82(4): 1457–1492 DOI: 10.1353/sof.2004.0082

--- and Sidney Tarrow. 1998. "A Movement Society: Contentious politics for a new century." In *The Social Movement Society*, eds. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1-28.

Mill, John Stuart. [1843] 2012. *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, Volume 1.* Oxford: Benediction Classics.

Mirani, Leo. 2015. "Millions of Facebook users have no idea they're using the internet." *Quartz.com* (February 9) http://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-theyre-using-the-internet/ (Accessed August 17, 2015)

Mitchell, Amy, Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel and Elisa Shearer. 2016. "The Modern News Consumer." Pew Research Center (July 7) http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/ (July 10, 2017)

Mitchell, Ben and Jorge Carlos Guerreo. ND. "Populism in Latin America." https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/20410/1/Mitchell_Ben.pdf (March 12, 2018)

Molyneux, Logan. 2017. "Multiplatform news consumption and its connections to civic engagement." *Journalism* (forthcoming). DOI: 10.1177/1464884917730216

Monroe, Burt L. and Philip A. Schrodt. 2008. "Introduction to the Special Issue: The Statistical Analysis of Political Text." *Political Analysis* 16: 351-355. DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpn017

Montero, Carlos and Catherine E. Shoichet. 2014. "Morales declares victory in Bolivian presidential vote." CNN.com (October 12) http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/12/world/americas/bolivia-elections/ (February 26, 2017)

Montoya-Londoño, Catalina. 2014. "In search of a model for the Colombian media system today." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 66-81.

Moore, Will H. and David A. Siegel. 2013. *A Mathematics Course for Political & Social Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Morales, Juan Antonio and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 1989. "Bolivia's Economic Crisis." In *Developing Country Debt and the World Economy*, ed Jeffrey D. Sachs. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 57-80.

Moreira Gomes, Gislene. 2011. "Arepas, tortillas and *beijús*: Heterogeneity of communicative struggles in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Communication Research* 1(2). http://www.alaic.net/journal/index.php/jlacr/article/view/5 (January 16, 2015).

Moring, Tom. 2006. "Political Advertising on Television in the Nordic and Baltic States." In *The Sage Handbook of Political Advertising*, eds Lynda Lee Kaid and Chrstina Holtz-Bacha. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 181-210l

Morozov, E. 2011. *The Net Delusion – The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: Public Affairs.

Morris, Aldon D. and Suzanne Staggenborg. 2004. "Leadership in Social Movements." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, eds David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Maldan, MA: Blackwell, 171-196.

Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. "The Normalization of Protest in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights 42*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0842en.pdf (November 16, 2017)

Mossberger, Karen, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Mary Stansbury. 2003. *Virtual Inequality: Beyond the Digital Divide*. Berkeley: Georgetown University Press

Mueni, Joy. 2018. "Media freedom in Kenya: analogies are being drawn with Moi's repressive era." *The Conversation* (February 11) https://theconversation.com/media-freedom-in-kenya-analogies-are-being-drawn-with-mois-repressive-era-91497 (May 1, 2018)

Muggah, Robert and Ilona Szabó de Carvalho. 2016. "Latin America's cities: unequal, dangerous and fragile. But that can change." *World Economic Forum* (June 13) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/latin-america-s-cities-unequal-dangerous-and-fragile-but-that-can-change/ (November 27, 2017)

Mutz, Diana C., and Paul S. Martin. 2002. "Facilitating Communication Across Lines of Political Difference: The role of mass media." *American Political Science Review* 95 (1):97-114.

Napoli, Philip M. 2014. "Automated Media: An Institutional Theory Perspective on Algorithmic Media Production and Consumption." Communication Theory 24: 340–360. DOI: 10.1111/comt.12039

Narayan, Chandrika. 2016. "Little boy in Aleppo a vivid reminder of war's horror." *CNN* (August 18) http://cnn.it/2bz0h8l (August 18, 2016)

NDTV.com. 2015. "PM Narendra Modi's 'Mann ki Baat' Radio Address Today." May 31. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-narendra-modis-mann-ki-baat-radio-address-today-767369 (Accessed June 16, 2015)

"Nearly 47 per cent of global population now online – UN report." 2016. *UN News Centre* (September 15). http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54931 (September 7, 2017)

Nelson, Thomas E, Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 91(3): 567-583 DOI: 10.2307/2952075

Neuman, William. 2014. “President of Bolivia Claims Victory in Election.” *New York Times* (October 12)https://nyti.ms/2vlQnjs (July 14, 2017)

“New Bolivia Constitution in force.” 2009. *BBC* (February 7) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7877107.stm (October 5, 2017)

Newton, Kenneth. 1999. “Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise?” *British Journal of Political Science* 29(4): 577-599. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123499000289

Nicholls, Walter, Byron Miller and Justin Beaumont. 2013. *Spaces of Contention: Spatialities and Social Movements*. New York: Routledge.

Nichols, John and Robert W. McChesney. 2013. *Dollarocracy: How the Money and Media Election Complex is Destroying America*. New York: Perseus.

Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis. 2017. “Where do people get their news?The British media landscape in 5 charts.” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (May 30) https://medium.com/oxford-university/where-do-people-get-their-news-8e850a0dea03 (June 6, 2018)

Njuguna, David. 2016. “Tackling cholera through radio in Kenya.” *BBC* (April 27). https://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/tackling-cholera-through-radio-kenya (September 7, 2017)

Noe, Thomas. 2012. “A Survey of the Economic Theory of Reputation: its logic and limits.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Reputation*, eds Timothy G. Pollock and Michael L. Barnett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 114-139.

Norris, Pippa. 1997. “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems.” *International Political Science Review* 18(3): 297-312. DOI: 10.1177/019251297018003005

--- 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- 2001. *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge.

--- 2004. “A Virtuous Circle? The Impact of Political Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies.” Paper prepared for inclusion in the PSA Yearbook. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/PSA2000%20Yearbook.pdf (March 30, 2015)

--- 2006. "Political Protest in Fragile States." Paper for the plenary panel *PS01 Political Action and Beyond* at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Fukuoka, Japan, July 13. http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_5497.pdf (November 16, 2017)

--- 2009. "Comparative Political Communications: Common Frameworks or Babelian Confusion?" *Government and Opposition* 44(3): 321-340. DOI:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2009.01290.x

--- and Ronald Inglehart. 2009. *Cosmopolitan Communication: Cultural diversity in a globalized world*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst. 2005. "Who Demonstrates? Antistate Rebels, Conventional Participants, or Everyone?" *Comparative Politics* 37(2): 189 – 205.

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- 1997. "The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problem." WIDER Annual Lecture. UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki. https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/AL01-1997.pdf (June 12, 2017)

Nossek, Hillel amd Yehiel Limor. 2001. "Fifty Years In A 'Marriage Of Convenience': News Media And Military Censorship In Israel." *Communication Law and Policy* 6(1): 1-35. DOI: 10.1207/S15326926CLP0601_01

O'Connell, Ann A. 2006. *Logistic Regression Models for Ordinal Response Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

O'Connor, Alan. 1990. "The Miners' Radio Stations in Bolivia: A Culture of Resistance." *Journal of Communication* 40(1): 102-110.

O'Neill, Claire M. 1996. "Making Democracy Work: Putnam and his critics." *South European Society & Politics* 1(2): 307–318 DOI: 10.1080/13608749608539477

OECD. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2007. "Competition and Barriers to Entry." *Policy Brief* (January) http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37921908.pdf (August 30, 2017)

OEP. Organo Electoral Plurinacional – Tribunal Supremo Electoral. 2014. "Resultados Finales del Cómputo Nacional." (October 28). http://www.oep.org.bo/Computo2014/ (March 30, 2015)

Ohiani, Ehizogie. 2016. "Meaty issues on the radio." *BBC* (June 1). http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere/meaty-issues-radio (September 7, 2017)

Oikonomakis, Leonidas and Fran Espinoza. 2014. "Bolivia: MAS and the Movements that Brought It to State Power." In *Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical action from below*, eds. Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden and Marc Becker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 285-305.

Olmstead, Kenny, Amy Mitchell and Tom Rosensteil. 2011. "Navigating news online: Where people go, how they get there and what lures them away." Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism. (May 9). http://www.journalism.org/node/25008 (July 22, 2014)

"Only One Percent of Americans are Really Politically Active." 2014. *The Atlantic* (May 9) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/only-one-percent-of-americans-are-really-politically-active/425286 (July 19, 2017)

OpenNet Initiative. ND. "Political Content." http://map.opennet.net/filtering-pol.html (February 13, 2018)

Oppenheimer, Andrés. 2017. "This is no joke: Bolivian ruler invokes his 'human right' to stay in power." *Miami Herald* (October 5) http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article176991121.html (October 6, 2017)

Oremus, Will. 2016. "Who Controls Your Facebook Feed." *Slate* (January 3). http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s_news_feed_algorithm_works.html (August 24, 2017)

Orme, William A. Jr. 1997. "Overview: From collusion to confrontation." In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 1-17.

Ortiz, Isabel, Sara Burke, Mohamed Berrada and Hernán Cortés. 2013. "World Protests 2006-2013." Initiative for Policy Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York
Working Paper 2013. http://policydialogue.org/publications/working-papers/world-protests-2006-2013/ (October 15, 2017)

Page, Benjamin I. 1996. "The Mass Media as Political Actors." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 29(1): 20-24. DOI: 10.2307/420185

Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos, Sharon Coen, James Curran, Toril Aalberg, David Rowe, Paul Jones, Hernando Rojas and Rod Tiffen. 2013. "Online Threat, But Television is Still Dominant." *Journalism Practice* 7(6): 690-704, DOI: 10.1080/17512786.2012.761324

Pasek, Josh, Kate Kenski, Daniel Romer and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 2006. "America's Youth and Community Engagement: How Use of Mass Media Is Related to Civic Activity and Political Awareness in 14- to 22-Year-Olds." *Communication Research* 33(3): 115-135 DOI: 10.1177/0093650206287073

Perez-Linan, Anibal. 2002. "Television News and Political Partisanship in Latin America." *Political Research Quarterly* 55(3): 571-588. DOI: 10.1177/106591290205500304

Peters, Jonathan. 2016. "Shield laws and journalist's privilege: The basics every reporter should know." *Columbia Journalism Review* (August 22) https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php (October 17, 2017)

Pew Center for Excellence in Journalism. 2008. "The Color of News." (October 29). http://www.journalism.org/2008/10/29/the-color-of-news/ (July 24, 2014)

--- 2010. "New Media, Old Media." (May 23). http://www.journalism.org/2010/05/23/new-media-old-media/ (March 30, 2015)

--- 2012. "Demographics and Political Views of News Audiences." (September 27). http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/section-4-demographics-and-political-views-of-news-audiences/ (September 4, 2017)

--- 2012. "In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable." (September 27). http://www.journalism.org/media-indicators/where-americans-get-news/ (August 27, 2014)

--- 2014. "Key Indicators in Media & News." (March 26). http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/state-of-the-news-media-2014-key-indicators-in-media-and-news/#audience (July 24, 2014)

--- 2016. State of the News Media 2016. http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/state-of-the-news-media-2016/ (December 29, 2016)

Pew Research Center. 2015. "Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet." http://pewrsr.ch/1iPfZJX (August 24, 2015)

Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-267. DOI: 10.2307/2586011

Podesta, Don. 2014. "The Correlation Between Press Freedom and Democracy." *Center for International Media Assistance* (April 22) http://www.cima.ned.org/blog/correlation-press-freedom-democracy-report/ (August 15, 2017).

Pollock, John C. and Karen Killeen. 1995. "Newspapers and the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill Hearings: Comparing City Structures and Major City Coverage." Presented at the Annual Meeting Speech Communication Association, San Antonio.

Ponsford, Dominic and William Turvill Twitter. 2015. "New law provides protection for journalists' sources from police snooping - but no prior notification." PressGazette (November 4) http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/new-law-provides-protection-journalists-sources-police-snooping-no-prior-notification/ (October 17, 2017)

Porto, Mauro P. 2007. *Televisão E Política no Brasil: A Rede Globo e as interpretações da audiencia*. Rio de Janeiro: E-papers Serviços Editoriais.

--- and Daniel C. Hallin. 2009. "Media and Democratization in Latin America." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 14(3): 291-295. DOI: 10.1177/1940161209336231

Posada Carbó, Eduardo. 2000. "Electoral Juggling: A Comparative History of the Corruption of Suffrage in Latin America, 1830-1930." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32: 611-644.

Posner, Daniel N. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 529-545. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055404041334

Potter, Deborah and Katerina Eva Matsa. 2014. "A Boom in Acquisitions and Content Sharing Shapes Local TV News in 2013." Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism. (March 26). http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/a-boom-in-acquisitions-and-content-sharing-shapes-local-tv-news-in-2013/ (March 30, 2015).

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80: 17-43. DOI: 10.2307/1957082

Power, Timothy J. and James C. Garand. 2007. "Determinants of invalid voting in Latin America." *Electoral Studies* 26: 432-444. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2006.11.001

Pretel, Enrique Andres. 2014. "Bolivia's Morales claims re-election victory." Reuters, October 13. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-bolivia-election-idUSKCN0I103120141013 (April 7, 2015)

Prior, Marcus. 2005. "News vs. Entertainment: How increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 577–592. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00143.x

--- 2007. *Post-Broadcast Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- 2010. "You've Either Got It or You Don't? The Stability of Political Interest over the Life Cycle." *Journal of Politics* 72(3): 747-766. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381610000149

Protzel, Javier. 2014. "Media Systems and Political Action in Peru." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 82-99.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Remmer, Karen L. 2012. "The Rise of Leftist– Populist Governance in Latin America: The Roots of Electoral Change." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(8): 947-972. DOI: 10.1177/0010414011428595

Quandt, Katie Rose. 2014. "While You Procrastinate on Facebook, More Than Half the World Still Doesn't Have Internet Access." Mother Jones (October 13) http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/sixty-percent-global-population-still-lack-internet-access/ (August 2, 2017)

Quaranta, Mario. 2015. *Political Protest in Western Europe: Exploring the role of context in political action*. London: Springer.

Quijano, Anibal. 2000. "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America." Nepantla: Views from South 1(3): 533-580. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/23903

Quintanilla, Victor. 2014. "Clashing powers in Bolivia: the tensions between Evo Morales's government and the private media." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 178-193.

Rainie, Lee. 2009. "The new news audience." Pew Research Center (November 13). http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/11/13/the-new-news-audience/ (September 4, 2017)

--- Aaron Smith, Kay Leehman Schlozman, Henry Brady and Sidney Verba. 2012. "Social Media and Political Engagement." Pew Research Center (October 19) http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/10/19/social-media-and-political-engagement/ (June 7, 2018)

Rau, Richard R. and David P. Redlawsk. 1997. "Voting Correctly." *American Political Science Review* 91(3): 585-598. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2952076

Reed, Matt. 2008. "The rural arena: The diversity of protest in rural England." *Journal of Rural Studies* 24(2): 209-218 DOI:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2007.12.006

Reese, Stephen D. and Jane Ballinger. 2001. "The Roots of a Sociology of News: Remember Mr. Gates and Social Control in the Newsroom." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 78(4): 641-658. DOI: 10.1177/107769900107800402

Regan, Mac. 2017. "Opinion: Blaming Trump? Representatives and Citizens Need to Do Their Jobs." MorningConsult.com (September 20) https://morningconsult.com/opinions/blaming-trump-representatives-citizens-need-to-do-their-jobs/ (October 11, 2017)

Reich, Zvi. 2016. "Comparing News Reporting Across Print, Radio, Television and Online." *Journalism Studies* 17(5): 552-572. DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2015.1006898

Repoll, Jerónimo. 2010. "Política y medios de comunicación en Argentina: Kirchner, *Clarín* y la ley." *Andamios* 7(14); 35-67 http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/anda/v7n14/v7n14a3.pdf (June 28, 2018)

Reporters sans Frontières (RSF). 2017. Detailed methodology. https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology (November 20, 2017)

Reporters Without Borders. 2017. *World Press Freedom Index.* https://rsf.org/en/ranking (October 18, 2017)

--- 2017. "Mexico" https://rsf.org/en/mexico (November 21, 2017)

--- 2018. "RSF Index 2018: Hatred of journalism threatens democracies" https://rsf.org/en/rsf-index-2018-hatred-journalism-threatens-democracies (April 26, 2018)

Reyna, Edgar. 2017. "Encuesta: La mayoría de los periodistas en México dicen ser censurados por sus empleadores." Splinter (June 26) http://espanol.splinternews.com/encuesta-la-mayoria-de-los-periodistas-en-mexico-dicen-1796436681 (October 7, 2017)

Rice, Roberta. 2011. "Bolivia: Ethnicity and Power." In *The Paradox of Democracy in Latin America.* New York: University of Toronto Press, 277-298.

Riva Palacio, Raymundo. 1997. “A Culture of Collusion: The ties that bind the press and the PRI.” In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 21-32.

Robinson, Michael J. 1976. “Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of ‘The Selling of the Pentagon’.” *American Political Science Review* 70(2): 409-432. DOI: 10.2307/1959647

Rockwell, Rick and Noreene Janus. 2003. *Media Power in Central America*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Romero, Simon. 2009. “Bolivians Ratify New Constitution.” *New York Times* (January 25) https://nyti.ms/2xWYKUV (October 5, 2017)

Rosen, Jay. 2005. “Journalism Under Scrutiny.” *Washington Post* (November 22) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/11/14/DI2005111400854.html (October 16, 2017)

Rosenthal RW and HJ Landau. 1979. “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bargaining with Reputations.” *Journal of Mathematical Psychology* 20: 233-255. DOI: 10.1016/0022-2496(79)90025-7

Rost, Alejandro. 2017. “Argentina.” *Reuters Digital News Report 2017* http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/ (August 2, 2017)

Rucht, Dieter. 2007. “The Spread of Protest Politics.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. New York: Oxford, 708-723. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0038

Ruijgrok, Kris. 2017. “From the web to the streets: internet and protests under authoritarian regimes.” *Democratization* 24(3): 498-520, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2016.1223630

Ryfe, David Michael. 2006. “Guest Editor's Introduction: New Institutionalism and the News.” *Political Communication* 23(2): 135-144. DOI: 10.1080/10584600600728109

Sachs, Jeffrey. 1987. “The Bolivian Hyperinflation and Stabilization.” *American Economic Review* 77(2): 279-283.

Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. “Women’s Social Movements in Latin America.” *Gender and Society* 4(3): 354-369. DOI: 10.1177/089124390004003006

Salzman, Catherin and Ryan Salzman. 2009. "The media in Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 47-62.

Salzman, Ryan. 2011. "News Media Consumption in Latin America: Who Does It?" *Journal of Spanish Language* Media 4: 23-39. http://spanishmedia.mcom.ttu.edu/pdf/vol4JSLM.pdf#page=25 (April 11, 2012).

--- 2011. "News Media Consumption and the Democratic Behavior of Individuals in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle.

--- and Rosa Aloisi. 2009. "News Media Consumption and Political Participation in Central America: Causation and Explanation." *Journal of Spanish Language Media* 2: 46-75. http://spanishmedia.mcom.ttu.edu/pdf/vol-22009.pdf#page=48 (March 23, 2015)

Sandoval-García, Carlos. 2008. "The media in Costa Rica: many media, scarce communication." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 61-77.

Sansone L. 1998. "Racismo sem etnicidade. Politicas publicas e discriminacão racial em perspectiva comparada." *Dados* 41(4): 751–83.

Santhanam, Laura. 2014. "22 countries where voting is mandatory." *PBS NewsHour* (November 3). http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/22-countries-voting-mandatory/ (September 7, 2017)

Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." *American Political Science Review* 64(4): 1033-1053. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356

Scheufele, Dietram A. and Matthew C. Nisbet. 2002. "Being a Citizen Online: New Opportunities and Dead Ends." International Journal of Press/Politics 7(3): 55-75 DOI: 10.1177/1081180X0200700304

Scheufele, Dietram A. and David Tewksbury. 2007. "Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models." *Journal of Communication* 57: 9–20. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326.x

Schirmer, Jennifer G. 1989. "'Those Who Die for Life Cannot be Called Dead:' Women and Human Rights Protest in Latin America." *Feminist Review* 32: 3-29. DOI: 10.1057/fr.1989.17

Schmidt, Susan and Jim VandeHei. 2005. “NY Times Reporter Released from Jail.” *Washington Post* (September 30) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/19/AR2005101900795.html (October 16, 2017)

Schmitt-Beck, Rüdigr. 2004. “Political Communication Effects: The impact of mass media and personal conversations on voting.” In *Comparing Political Communication*, eds. Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 293-322.

Schmucler, H. 1979. “Los medios de comunicación masiva en la Argentina.” Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de la Comunicación 4., México: UNAM, pp. 13-23.

Schuck, Andreas RT, Rens Vliegenthart, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Matthijs Elenbaas, Rachid Azrout, Joost van Spanje and Claes H. de Vreese. 2013. “Explaining Campaign News Coverage: How Medium, Time, and Context Explain Variation in the Media Framing of the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections.” *Journal of Political Marketing* 12(1): 8-28 DOI: 10.1080/15377857.2013.752192

Schudson, Michael. 1998. *The Good Citizen: A history of American civic life*. New York: The Free Press.

--- 2002. “The News Media as Political Institutions.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 249-269. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.111201.115816

--- and Susan E. Tifft. 2005. “American Journalism in Historical Perspective.” In *The Press*, eds Geneva Overholser and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 17-47.

Schulz, Kathryn. 2017. “What Calling Congress Achieves.” *The New Yorker* (March 6) https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/what-calling-congress-achieves (October 16, 2017)

Schwoch, James. 1993. “Broadcast Media and Latin American Politics: The historical context.” In *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Thomas E. Skidmore. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 39-54.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2004. “Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America.” Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe 11(2) http://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/eial/article/view/999/1034 (May 4, 2018)

--- 2005. “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries.” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 38(1): 51-56. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096505055782

--- 2006. “The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America.” *World Development* 34(2): 381-404. DOI: 0.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.012

--- 2007. “The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America.” *Journal of Democracy* 18(3): 81-95. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2007.0057

Semetko, Holli A. 1996. “Political Balance on Television: Campaigns in the United States, Britain, and Germany.” *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 1996 1: 51-71. DOI: 10.1177/1081180X96001001005

--- 2007. “Political Communication.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. New York: Oxford, 123-143.

Sen, Krishna. 2003. “Radio days: media-politics in Indonesia.” *The Pacific Review* 16(4): 573–589. DOI: 10.1080/0951274032000132263

Sewell, William H. 2007. “Space in Contentious Politics.” In *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, eds Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, Sidney Tarrow, William H. Sewell and Charles Tilley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 51-80.

Shah, Dhavan, Jaeho Cho, William P. Eveland Jr, and Nojin Kwak. 2005. “Information and Expression in a Digital Age: Modeling Internet Effects on Civic Participation.” *Communication Research* 32(5): 531-565. DOI: 10.1177/0093650205279209

Shah, Dhavan, Nojin Kwak and R. Holbert. 2001. “‘Connecting’ and ‘disconnecting’ with civic life.” *Political Communications* 18: 141–162.

Shah, Dhavan, JM McLeod and SH Yoon. 2001. “Communication, context, and community.” *Communication Research* 28: 464–506.

Shah, Dhavan, H. Rojas and J. Cho. 2009. “Media and civic participation: On understanding and misunderstanding communication effects.” In *Media effects: Advances in theory and research*, eds J. Bryant & MB Oliver. New York: Routledge, 207–227.

Sharma, Ruchir. 2016. “The Anti-Incumbency Wave Is Changing the Politics of Latin America.” *TIME* (June 6) http://time.com/4358194/the-anti-incumbency-wave-is-changing-the-politics-of-latin-america/ (November 27, 2017)

“Shield Law 101: Frequently Asked Questions.” ND. Society of Professional Journalists. https://www.spj.org/shieldlaw-faq.asp (October 17, 2017)

Siebert, Fred S., Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm. 1956. *Four Theories of the Press: the authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do.* Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Sigal, Leon V. 1973. Reporters and Officials: Organization and Politics of Newsmaking. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Silvestri, Luciana and Roberto S. Vassolo. 2009. "Media and Entertainment in Argentina: doing business in a fragmented society." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 151-170.

"Sinclair Broadcast Group." 2017. *Last Week Tonight with John Oliver*, season 4, episode 18 (July 2) https://youtu.be/GvtNyOzGogc (October 18, 2017)

Sinclair, John. 1999. *Latin American Television: a global view*. New York: Oxford.

Skidmore, Thomas E. 1993. "Politics and the Media in a Democratizing Latin America." In *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Thomas E. Skidmore. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 1-22.

Skoric, Marko M, Qinfeng Zhu, Debbie Goh and Natalie Pang. 2015. "Social media and citizen engagement: A meta-analytic review." new media & society 18(9): 1817-1839 DOI: 10.1177/1461444815616221

Smith, Aaron, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba and Henry Brady. 2009. "The Internet and Civic Engagement." Pew Internet and American Life Project. September. http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/09/01/the-internet-and-civic-engagement/ (August 10, 2015)

Smith, Gerry. 2016. "The Fading Newspaper." *Bloomberg* (April 19) https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-fading-newspaper (November 27, 2017)

Sobieraj, Sarah and Jeffrey M. Berry. 2011. "From Incivility to Outrage: Political Discourse in Blogs, Talk Radio, and Cable News." *Political Communication* 28(1): 19-41, DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2010.542360

Soong, Roland. 2000. "Socio-economic Characteristics of Newspaper Readers in Latin America." ZonaLatina.com blog (August 7) http://www.zonalatina.com/Zldata130.htm (June 7, 2018)

Soruco, Gonzalo and Juliet Pinto. 2009. "The Mass Media in Bolivia." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 88-102.

Spada, Paolo, Jonathan Mellon, Tiago Peixoto and Fredrik M. Sjoberg. 2015. "Effects of the Internet on Participation Study of a Public Policy Referendum in Brazil." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7204. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21643/WPS7204.pdf?sequence=1 (August 23, 2015).

Sparrow, Bartholomew H. 1999. *Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

--- 2006. "A Research Agenda for an Institutional Media." *Political Communication* 23(2): 145-157, DOI: 10.1080/10584600600629695

Statista. ND. https://www.statista.com/statistics/274868/internet-penetration-in-latin-america (June 2, 2018)

--- ND. https://www.statista.com/statistics/209109/number-of-internet-users-per-100-inhabitants-in-colombia-since-2000/ (June 3, 2018)

--- ND. https://www.statista.com/statistics/316796/brazil-frequency-newspaper-consumption-age/ (March 14, 2018)

--- ND. https://www.statista.com/statistics/316789/brazil-frequency-newspaper-consumption/ (March 14, 2018)

--- ND. https://www.statista.com/statistics/747316/most-used-media-education-level-brazil/ (March 14, 2018)

"Statistics on Radio." 2013. UNESCO (February 13). http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/prizes-and-celebrations/celebrations/international-days/world-radio-day-2013/statistics-on-radio/ (September 7, 2017)

Statwing. ND. "Interpreting residual plots to improve your regression." Statwing Documentation http://docs.statwing.com/interpreting-residual-plots-to-improve-your-regression/#x-unbalanced-header (July 10, 2017)

Stegmueller, Daniel. 2013. "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches." *American Journal of Political Science* 57: 748-76. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12001

Stelter, Brian. 2012. "Big Three Newscasts Are Changing the State of Play." *New York Times* (January 8) https://nyti.ms/2ltJs7e (June 5, 2018)

Stockemer, Daniel. 2014. "What drives unconventional political participation? A two level study." *The Social Science Journal* 51: 201–211. DOI: 10.1016/j.soscij.2013.10.012

Stockmann, Daniela. 2009. “One size doesn't fit all: Measuring news reception East and West.” *Chinese Journal of Communication* 2(2): 140-157. DOI: 10.1080/17544750902826640

Stolle, Dietlind and Marc Hooghe. 2011. “Shifting Inequalities.” European Societies 13(1): 119-142. DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2010.523476

Stolle, Dietlind and Michele Micheletti. 2013. *Political Consumerism: Global Responsibility in Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stokes, Susan C. 2007. “Political Clientelism.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press, 604-627.

Straubhaar, Joseph. 2001. “Brazil: the role of the state in world television.” In *Media and Globalization: why the state matters*, eds Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 133-153.

--- Organ Olsen, and Maria Cavaliari Nunes. 1993. “The Brazilian Case: Influencing the voter.” In *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Thomas E. Skidmore. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 118-136.

Strömbäck, Jesper, Monika Djerf-Pierre and Adam Shehata. 2013. “The Dynamics of Political Interest and News Media Consumption: A Longitudinal Perspective.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 25(4): 414-435.

Strömbäck, Jesper and Adam Shehata. 2010. “Media malaise or a virtuous circle? Exploring the causal relationships between news media exposure, political news attention and political interest.” *European Journal of Political Research* 49: 575–597. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01913.x

Stroud, Natalie Jomini. 2008. “Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the concept of selective exposure.” *Political Behavior* 30(3): 341-366.

--- 2010. “Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure.” *Journal of Communication* 60: 556-576. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x

--- 2011. *Niche News: The politics of news choice*. New York: Oxford.

--- 2017. “Attention as a Valuable Resource.” *Political Communication* 34(3): 479-489. DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2017.1330077

Stuster, J. Dana. 2013. “Mapped: Every Protest on the Planet since 1979.” *Foreign Policy* (August 23) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/23/mapped-every-protest-on-the-planet-since-1979/ (May 15, 2018)

“Syrian civil war timeline: Tracking five years of conflict.” 2016. *The Independent* (March 13) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-civil-war-timeline-tracking-five-years-of-conflict-a6929411.html (August 18, 2016)

Taggart, Andrew James. 2011. “Fukuyama on institutional development & institutional decay.” Blog post (July 12) https://andrewjtaggart.com/2011/07/12/fukuyama-on-institutional-development-institutional-decay/ (June 6, 2018)

Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social
Movements. In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, eds D McAdam, J McCarthy and M. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 41–61.

Taylor, Clarence. 2002. “African American Religious Leadership and the Civil Rights Movement.” *History Now: The journal of the Gilder Lehrman Institute* https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/civil-rights-movement/essays/african-american-religious-leadership-and-civil-rights-m (August 30, 2017)

Taylor, Matthew. 2009. “Evo Morales hails ‘new Bolivia’ as constitution is approved.” *The Guardian* (January 26) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/26/bolivia (October 5, 2017)

Telles, Edward and Liza Steele. 2012. “Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?” *AmericasBarometer Insights 7*3. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO873en.pdf (March 14, 2018)

Temple, Bogusia and Alys Young. 2004. “Qualitative research and translation dilemmas.” *Qualitative Research* 4(2); 161-178 DOI: 10.1177/1468794104044430

Tewksbury, David. 2005. “The Seeds of Audience Fragmentation: Specialization in the Use of Online News Sites.” *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 49(3): 332–348. DOI: 10.1207/s15506878jobem4903_5

Thesen, Gunnar. 2012. “When good news is scarce and bad news is good: Government responsibilities and opposition possibilities in political agenda-setting.” *European Journal of Political Research* 52(3): 364-389 DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02075.x

Thorbjørnsrud, Kjersti. 2013. "The Autonomy of Scandinavian Public Service Broadcasters During Election Campaign Periods: Principles and Practices." *Nordicom Review* 34(1): 63-76 http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sv/tidskrifter/nordicom-review/nordicom-review-12013/autonomy-scandinavian-public-service-broadcasters (August 30, 2017)

Thussu, Daya Kishan. 2008. "Fourth Estate." In *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*, ed Wolfgang Donsbach. Maldan, MA: Blackwell. DOI: 10.1111/b.9781405131995.2008.x

--- 2009. *Internationalizing Media Studies*. New York: Routledge.

Tilly, Charles. 1983. "Speaking Your Mind Without Elections, Surveys, or Social Movements." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47: 461 – 478. DOI: 10.1086/268805

Tironi, Eugenio and Guillermo Sunkel. 2000. "The Modernization of Communications: the media in the transition to democracy in Chile." Trans. Richard Gunther. In *Democracy and the Media: a comparative perspective*, eds Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 165-194.

Titcomb, James and James Carson. 2017. "Fake news: What exactly is it – and can it really swing an election?" *The Telegraph* (November 14) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/fake-news-exactly-has-really-had-influence/ (November 27, 2017)

Torrico Villanueva, Erick. 2008. "The Media in Bolivia: The market-driven economy, 'shock therapy' and the democracy that ended." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 29-45.

Torniainen, Tatu Juhani and Olli Juhani Saastamoinen. 2007. "Formal and informal institutions and their hierarchy in the regulation of the forest lease in Russia." *Forestry* (*Lond*) 80(5): 489-501. DOI: 10.1093/forestry/cpm033

Tovrov, Daniel. 2011. "Saudi Women Vote: Which countries still don't allow women's suffrange?" *International Business Times* (September 26) http://www.ibtimes.com/saudi-women-vote-which-countries-still-dont-allow-womens-suffrage-318260 (October 16, 2017)

Tower, Craig. 2008. "Radio Ways: Society, locality and FM technology in Koutiala Mali." PhD dissertation. Northwestern University.

Transparency International. 2017. "Explanation of how individual country scores of the corruption perception index are calculated." (January 27) https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/explanation_of_how_individual_country_scores_of_the_corruption_perceptions (November 20, 2017)

Tuchman, Gaye. 1978. *Making News: A study in the construction of reality*. New York: Free Press.

Tucker, Ericka. 2013. "Community Radio in Political Theory and Development Practice." *Journal of Development and Communication Studies* 2(2/3): 392-420. http://www.academia.edu/4188725/Community_Radio_in_Political_Theory_and_Development_Practice (July 26, 2015)

Tufekci, Zeynep and Christopher Wilson. 2012. "Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: Observations From Tahrir Square." *Journal of Communication* 62(2): 363-379 DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01629.x

UNDP. 2014. Human Development Report 2014. New York: UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf (March 30, 2015)

UNDP. 2015. Human Development Report 2015. New York: UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf (January 25, 2017)

UNESCO. ND. Defining Community Broadcasting. New York: UNESCO. https://en.unesco.org/community-media-sustainability/policy-series/defining (May 8, 2018)

--- 2003. Global Monitoring Report: Latin America and the Caribbean. New York: UNESCO https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/sites/gem-report/files/laamcari.pdf (May 8, 2018)

--- 2017. "Trends in Media Independence." World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development. New York: UNESCO https://en.unesco.org/world-media-trends-2017/trends-media-independence (June 8, 2018)

USA Today. 2014. "Top 10 Internet-censored countries." (February 5) http://usat.ly/1nagHBx (November 27, 2017)

USAID. 2010. "Urbanization in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Challenges." (April 13) http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadu384.pdf (November 27, 2017)

Valenzuela, Sebastián. 2013. "Unpacking the Use of Social Media for Protest Behavior: The Roles of Information, Opinion Expression, and Activism." *American Behavioral Scientist* 57(7) 920 – 942. DOI: 10.1177/0002764213479375

--- Arturo Arriagada and Andrés Scherman. 2012. "The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior: The Case of Chile." *Journal of Communication* 62(2): 299–314 DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01635.x

van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge.

van Deth, Jan W. 2009. "Establishing Equivalence." In *The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds, Todd Landman and Neil Robinson. Los Angeles: Sage, 84-100.

--- and Martin Elff. 2004. "Politicisation, economic development and political interest in Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 477–508. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00162.x

van Dijk, Jan. 2005. *The Deepening Divide: Inequality in the Information Society*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Van Laer, Jeroen. 2010. "Activists Online and Offline: The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest Demonstrations." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 15(3): 347-366.

van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien. 2015. "People protest for many reasons, yet we don't know how effective protests are." London School of Economics and Political Science blog on British Politics and Policy (November 30) http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/how-effective-are-protests/ (October 16, 2017)

--- and Bert Klandermans. 2013. "The Social Psychology of Protest." *Current Sociology* 61(5-6): 886-905. DOI 10.1177/0011392113479314

"Vargas Llosa: "México es la dictadura perfecta." 1990. *El País* (September 1) https://elpais.com/diario/1990/09/01/cultura/652140001_850215.html (October 6, 2017)

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2009. "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict." In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford, 274-294.

Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

--- and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A seven-nation comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Verba, S, Schlozman, KL & Brady, HE. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vialey, Patricia, Marcelo Belinche, and Christian Tovar. 2008. “The media in Argentina: democracy, crisis and the reconfiguration of media groups.” In *The Media in Latin America*, ed Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: Open University Press, 13-28.

Vice, Margaret and Hanyu Chwe. 2017. “Poor ratings for Peña Nieto, political parties.” Pew Research Center (September 14) http://pewrsr.ch/2xne6UE (October 7, 2017)

Villegas, Paulina. 2018. “Mexico Moves to Regulate Government Ads. Critics Say It’s a Sham.” New York Times (April 15) https://nyti.ms/2H238Kg (April 16, 2018)

Voltmer, Katrin. 2006. *Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies*. New York: Routledge.

von Beyne, Klaus. 2008. “Political Institutions – Old and New.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, eds Sarah A. Binder, RAW Rhodes and Bert A. Rockman. New York: Oxford, 743-758. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0038

“Voto bronca: una protesta muy fuerte que triunfó en la Capital y Santa Fe” [Blank voting: a strong proposition that won in the capital city and Santa Fe]. *Clarín*, October 15, 2001. http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2001/10/15/p-02801.htm (January 28, 2011).

“Voto obligatorio y nuevo mapa electoral en Bolivia.” *El Mundo*, October 8, 2014. http://www.elmundo.com/portal/resultados/detalles/?idx=244046&idprevia=1#.VRrjCPnF90Y (March 31, 2015)

Waisbord, Silvio. 2000. “Media in South America: Between the rock of the state and the hard place of the market.” In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, eds James Curran and Myung-Jin Park. New York: Routledge, 50-62.

--- 2000. *Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, accountability, and democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

--- 2001. “Hybrid media helps democracy breathe.” *OpenDemocracy.net* (August 8) https://www.opendemocracy.net/media-publicservice/article_70.jsp (June 5, 2018)

--- 2009. “Advocacy Journalism in a Global Context.” In *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, eds Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch. New York: Routledge, 371-385.

--- 2012. “Political Communication in Latin America.” In *The SAGE Handbook of Political Communication*, eds. Holli A. Semetko and Margaret Scammell. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 437-450. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/10.4135/9781446201015.n35

--- 2013. “Media Policies and the Blindspots of Media Globalization: Insights from Latin America.” *Media, Culture & Society* 35(1): 132-138. DOI: 10.1177/0163443712464567

--- 2015. “De-Westernization and Cosmopolitan Media Studies.” In *Internationalizing International Communication*, ed. Chin-Chuan Lee. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 178-200. DOI: 10.3998/nmw.12748916.0001.001

--- and Nancy Morris. 2001. “Introduction: Rethinking media globalization and state power.” In *Media and Globalization: why the state matters*, eds Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, vii – xvi.

Walgrave, Stefaan, Stuart Soroka and Michiel Nuytemans. 2008. “The Mass Media's Political Agenda-Setting Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and Government in Belgium (1993 to 2000).” *Comparative Political Studies* 41(6): 814-836. DOI: 10.1177/0010414006299098

Walgrave, Stefaan, Ruud Wouters, and Pauline Ketelaars. 2016. “Response Problems in the Protest Survey Design: Evidence from Fifty-One Protest Events in Seven Countries.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 21(1): 83-104 DOI: 10.17813/1086/671X-21-1-83

Wallace-Salinas, Arturo. 2008. “The media in Nicaragua: an escape valve for a dysfunctional democracy.” In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 150-166.

Walsh, Catherine E. 2001. “The Ecuadorian Political Irruption: Uprisings, Coups, Rebellions and Democracy.” *Nepantla: Views from South* 2(1): 173-205.

WAN-IFRA. 2014. “World Press Trends 2014.” World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers http://www.arpp.ru/images/123/51253_WAN-IFRA_WPT_2014.pdf (June 6, 2018)

Weaver. Vesla M. 2012. “The Electoral Consequences of Skin Color: The ‘Hidden’ Side of Race in Politics.” *Political Behavior* 34(1): 159–192. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-010-9152-7

Webber, Jeffery R. 2010. “Bolivia in the Era of Evo Morales.” *Latin American Research Review* 45(3): 248-260.

Webster, James G. 2006. "Beneath the Veneer of Fragmentation: Television Audience Polarization in a Multichannel World." *Journal of Communication* 22(5): 284-301. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2005.tb02677.x

--- 2009. "The Role of Structure in Media Choice." In *Media Choice: A Theoretical and Empirical Overview*, ed Tilo Hartmann. New York: Routledge, 221-233.

Weigelt, Keith and Colin Camerer. 1988. "Reputation and Corporate Strategy: A review of recent theory and applications." *Strategic Management Journal* 9(5): 443-454. DOI: DOI: 10.1002/smj.4250090505

Weinger, Mackenzie. 2013. "How to rescue liberal talk radio." *Politico* (November 28) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/liberal-talk-radio-rescue-100408.html (October 16, 2017)

Weiss, Jack. 2003. "Lecture 9—Wednesday, Sept. 17, 2003." https://www.unc.edu/courses/2007spring/biol/145/001/docs/lectures/Sep17.html (July 10, 2017)

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca and Matthew S. Winters. 2011. "The Link Between Voting and Life Satisfaction in Latin America." *Latin American Politics and Society* 53(4): 101–126. DOI: 10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00135.x

Wessler, Halrtmut. 2011. "Public Sphere." *Oxford Bibliographies* (February 23) http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756841/obo-9780199756841-0030.xml (August 23, 2017)

West, John. 2014. "Freedom of the Press in Asia." Asian Century Institute (March 26) http://asiancenturyinstitute.com/society/175-freedom-of-the-press-in-asia (June 6, 2018)

Westlund, Oscar. 2015. "News consumption in an age of mobile media: Patterns, people, place, and participation." *Mobile Media & Communication* 3(2): 151–159. DOI: 10.1177/2050157914563369

Williams, Casey. 2016. "For Poor Americans, Getting Online Is About More Than Just Cheap Internet: The government has a plan to offer subsidized Internet access. But experts say that's not enough." *Huffington Post* (March 30) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/low-income-lifeline-internet-subsidy_us_56f5617ee4b014d3fe22f176 (November 16, 2017)

Williams, Richard. 2006. "Interpreting and using heterogeneous choice & generalized ordered logit models." https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/gologit2/RWNASUG2006.ppt (March 27, 2018)

--- 2010. "Generalized Ordered Logit Models." Prepared for the the Midwest Sociology Meetings, Chicago. https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/gologit2/MSS2010-Handout.pdf (May 9, 2018)

--- 2016. "Understanding and interpreting generalized ordered logit models." *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 40(1): 7-20 DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2015.1112384

Williamson, John. 2004. "The Strange History of the Washington Consensus." *Journal of Post Keynesian Econom*ics 27(2): 195-206.

Winseck, Dwayne. 2008. "The State of Media Ownership and Media Markets: Competition or Concentration and Why Should We Care?" *Sociology Compass* 2: 34-47 DOI: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00061.x

Wirth, Werner and Steffan Kolb. 2004. "Designs and methods of comparative political communication research." In *Comparing Political Communication*, eds. Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 87-111.

Wolfsfeld, Gadi. 2004. *Media and the Path to Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

--- 2011. *Making Sense of Media and Politics: Five principles in political communication.* New York: Routledge.

Woltman, Heather, Andrea Feldstain, J. Christine MacKay, and Meredith Rocchi. 2012. "An introduction to hierarchical linear modeling." *Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology* 8(1): 52-69 DOI: 10.20982/tqmp.08.1.p052

Woods, Michael. 2003. "Deconstructing rural protest: the emergence of a new social movement." *Journal of Rural Studies* 19(3): 309-325 DOI: 10.1016/S0743-0167(03)00008-1

Wooldridge, Adrian. 2014. "What's gone wrong with democracy?" The Economist (March 1) https://www.economist.com/node/21596796 (May 15, 2018)

World Bank. 2014. *World Development Indicators 2014*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0163-1 (February 15, 2015)

--- 2016. Country Data: Bolivia. http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia (February 26, 2017)

World Press Trends. 2017. "Global newspaper industry revenues." World Press Trends Database. http://www.wptdatabase.org/world-press-trends-2017-facts-and-figures (March 14, 2018)

World Values Survey Wave 5 Official Aggregate v.20141107. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN.

World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014 Official Aggregate v.20141107. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN.

Wurgaft, Ramy. 2009. "Los Bolivianos eligen a Evo Morales como president para un Segundo mandato" [Bolivians elect Evo Morales president for a second term]. *El Mundo*, December 6. http://www.elmundo.es/america/2009/12/06/noticias/1260137599.html (February 26, 2017).

Xenos, Michael Ariadne Vromen and Brian D. Loader. 2014. "The great equalizer? Patterns of social media use and youth political engagement in three advanced democracies." *Information, Communication & Society* 17(2): 151-167, DOI:
10.1080/1369118X.2013.871318

Yasher, Deborah J. 1998. "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 31(1): 23-42.

--- 1999. "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and Postliberal Challenge in Latin America." *World Politics* 52(1): 76-104. DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100020037

--- 2015. "Race Matter in Latin America: How Racial and Ethnic Identities Shape the Region's Politics." Foreign Affairs https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2015-02-16/does-race-matter-latin-america (May 18, 2018)

Zaller, John. 2003. "A New Standard of News Quality: Burglar Alarms for the Monitorial Citizen." *Political Communication* 20: 109–130. DOI: 10.1080/10584600390211136

Zeta de Pozo, Rosa. 2009. "The Media in Peru." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 125-138.

Zhang, Weiwu, Thomas J. Johnson, Trent Seltzer and Shannon L. Bichard. 2010. "The Revolution Will be Networked: The Influence of Social Networking Sites on Political Attitudes and Behavior." *Social Science Computer Review* 28: 75-92. DOI: 10.1177/0894439309335162

Zissis, Carin. 2006. "Bolivia's Nationalization of Oil and Gas." *Council on Foreign Relations* (May 12). http://on.cfr.org/2wztz0w (October 5, 2017)

APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

This chapter details the classification scheme laid out in Chapter Three for each country in the region. For the larger countries in the region – Mexico and Brazil, for example – there were multiple scholarly sources, allowing for more confidence in classification. For some smaller countries, such as the Dominican Republic, there was only one that detailed the specifics of the place, effectively rendering a directional coding less likely absent multiple clear references to the closeness of politics and media.

I, therefore, approached the classifications cautiously. I compiled a list of every reference I could find about the relationship between media and government, as well as about citizen perceptions of that relationship. For countries in which there were multiple references – for Colombia, for example, I found 24 specific references across multiple sources – I was cautious with classifications, only assigning a classification when multiple sources concurred. I compared sources by (literally) writing down every reference I found. For Brazil, multiple sources referenced using culture via television especially as a means of nation-building and, by extension, control or reinforcement of the status quo and quashing of ideas outside the mainstream.

For countries with fewer references, since I was coding using fewer sources, I focused on specific details. In Uruguay, for example, the government required an oath of loyalty from those wishing to acquire television licenses. Such strong evidence, even from one source, was clear justification for classification as reinforcing the status quo.

When sources were available in both English and another language, I have listed the English-language source for ease of replication. That was obviously not possible in call cases. The Becerra and Mastrini book, for example, if one of very few to detail ownership patterns across the region, making it an invaluable resource for finding specific links between the political class and media.

Country-specific sources are listed where appropriate. Some pieces of research covered the whole region.[342] Full details of the specifics for the

---

[342] Multi-national sources:

Becerra, Martín and Guillermo Mastrini. 2009. *Los Dueños de la Palabra*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.

Boas, Taylor C. 2013. "Mass Media and Politics in Latin America." *In Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, 4th ed., eds Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 48-77.

Fourie, Pieter J. 2008. *Media Studies: Media History, Media and Society*. Cape Town: Juta.

Fox, Elizabeth. 1997. *Latin American Broadcasting: from tango to telenova*. Bedfordshire, UK: University of Luton Press.

Layton, Matthew L. 2012. "Who Trusts the Mass Media in Latin America?" AmericasBarometer Insights 74. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO874_en.pdf (October 11, 2014)

Macrory, Robbie. 2010. "Who Consumes News Media in Latin America and the Caribbean?" AmericasBarometer Insights 70. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO870en.pdf (October 11, 2014)

Matos, Carolina. 2012. Media and Politics in Latin America: globalization, democracy and identity. London: IB Tauris.

Moreira Gomes, Gislene. 2011. "Arepas, tortillas and beijús: Heterogeneity of communicative struggles in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Communication Researc*h 1(2). http://www.alaic.net/journal/index.php/jlacr/article/view/5 (January 16, 2015).

Rockwell, Rick and Noreene Janus. 2003. Media Power in Central America. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Salzman, Catherin and Ryan Salzman. 2009. "The media in Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 47-62.

Schwoch, James. 1993. "Broadcast Media and Latin American Politics: The historical context." In *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Thomas E. Skidmore. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 39-54.

Skidmore, Thomas E. 1993. "Politics and the Media in a Democratizing Latin America." In *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Thomas E. Skidmore. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 1-22.

Waisbord, Silvio. 2000. "Media in South America: Between the rock of the state and the hard place of the market." In *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, eds James Curran and Myung-Jin Park. New York: Routledge, 50-62.

Waisbord, Silvio.2000. *Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, accountability, and democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

classifications – including detailed references mentioned below with page numbers – will be available on abcronkhite.com in Fall 2018.

Argentina[343]

Broadcast media, especially television, were overtly used as a means of socialization by Argentina's military and democratic leaders (Karush 2012). *Clarin* is the most dominant media group and most media outlets reflect a market-based or corporate structure (Becerra and Mastrini 2009). Radio is more activist than other media platforms (Silvestri and Vassolo 2009), whilst newspapers tend to promote the status quo with little diversity of voices (Fox 1997, 104; Vialey, Belinche and Tovar 2008, 26).

Waisbord, Silvio. 2012. "Political Communication in Latin America." In *The SAGE Handbook of Political Communicatio*n, eds. Holli A. Semetko and Margaret Scammell. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 437-450. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.proxy2.library.illinois.edu/10.4135/9781446201015.n35

Waisbord, Silvio. 2013. "Media Policies and the Blindspots of Media Globalization: Insights from Latin America." *Media, Culture & Society* 35(1): 132-138. DOI: 10.1177/0163443712464567

[343] Sources:

Boczkowski, Pablo. 2010. *News at Work: Imitation in an age of information abundance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Boczkowski, Pablo and Martin de Santos. 2007. "When More Media Equals Less News: Patterns of Content Homogenization in Argentina's Leading Print and Online Newspapers." *Political Communication* 24: 167-180. DOI: 10.1080/10584600701313025

Karush, Matthew B. 2012. *Culture of Class: Radio and cinema in the making of a divided Argentina, 1920-1946*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Macrory, Robbie. 2010. "The Bugle and the Penguins: Democracy and the Media in Argentina." Master's thesis. Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London.

Repoll, Jerónimo. 2010. "Política y medios de comunicación en Argentina: Kirchner, Clarín y la ley." *Andamios* 7(14); 35-67 http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/anda/v7n14/v7n14a3.pdf (June 28, 2018)

Silvestri, Luciana and Roberto S. Vassolo. 2009. "Media and Entertainment in Argentina: doing business in a fragmented society." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 151-170.

Vialey, Patricia, Marcelo Belinche, and Christian Tovar. 2008. "The media in Argentina: democracy, crisis and the reconfiguration of media groups." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: Open University Press, 13-28.

A prominent semiologist went so far as to summarize the situation this way:

> The situation in Argentina is one where the relationship between the press and politicians is very close. Liberal ideas about press independence have not gained much prestige in Argentina. So, even though the press proclaims itself the voice of truth, most of us acknowledge that the press responds to particular interests and its messages are not ours, but rather favor pre-determined elite ideas (Schmucler 1979 quoted in Repoll 2010, 38).[344]

Such a clear statement from an Argentine academic gave a clear indication of how the press – in this case newspapers and television specifically – should be classified.

It is television, therefore, that is most associated with government, having faced censorship before being nationalized in 1973 (Fox 1997, 104; Vialey, Belinche and Tovar 2008, 18). Even in private hands, television remains loyal to whatever administration might be in power (Fox 1997, 107).

To that end, television is coded as aligned with government and newspapers as neutral. There is no data to support any expectation for radio, resulting in a neutral categorization.

[344] Original Spanish: "Tratemos de pensar la situación de los medios de comunicación en la Argentina donde, como en pocos países latinoamericanos, la relación medios-políticos ha sido y es tan estrecha. Las ideas liberales sobre la autonomía de los medios no han tenido demasiado prestigio en la Argentina, y quienes las enarbolaron supieron arrear su estandarte ante situaciones de crisis. Esto quiere decir que aunque se hayan repetido con frecuencia grandes frases sobre el periodismo como heraldo de la verdad, pocos se escandalizan cuando se verifica que los medios responden a intereses particulares y que los mensajes no son neutros, sino que favorecen tendencias o concepciones determinadas."

Bolivia[345]

Bolivia has a rich radio history (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 78). The first commercial station in the country began broadcasting in 1929 (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 95). The political import of radio can be traced back to at least miners strikes starting in 1948, with the miners' union founding its first network of 25 radio stations to spread its message in 1952 (Moreira Gomes 2011). There are over 40 radio stations with sufficiently large reach to be listed nationally (Grupo MediosMedios) and over 800 radio stations across the country (Freedom House 2007).[346]

Community radio goes back decades and has grown in the 21st century. Radio Soberanía, run by the *cocalero*[347] union, promoted the causes and

---

[345] Sources:
Grupo MediosMedios. "Directorio de Medios de Comunicación – Bolivia." http://www.mediosmedios.com.ar/A.%20Bolivia.htm (March 30, 2015).
Ledeur, Kathyn. 2002. "Coca y Conflicto en el Chapare." Washington Office on Latin America (June.) http://esvetue.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/past/ddhr_bolivia_brief_esp.pdf (March 30, 2015).
Oikonomakis, Leonidas and Fran Espinoza. 2014. "Bolivia: MAS and the Movements that Brought It to State Power." In *Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical action from below*, eds. Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden and Marc Becker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 285-305.
Soruco, Gonzalo and Juliet Pinto. 2009. "The Mass Media in Bolivia." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 88-102.
Torrico Villanueva, Erick. 2008. "The Media in Bolivia: The market-driven economy, 'shock therapy' and the democracy that ended." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 29-45.

[346] These are conservative numbers, as Torrico Villanueva places the number above 900 (2008, 34): "The total number of community radio stations in Latin America are around 10,000, with Peru having the largest proportion and Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil in second, third, and fourth place. If unlicensed stations are also taken into account, the overall numbers are much higher. Recent surveys by UNESCO, for example, show there are more than 10,000 community radio stations still waiting for licenses in Brazil alone" (UNESCO 2013). http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/prizes-and-celebrations/celebrations/international- days/world-radio-day-2013/statistics-on-radio/ (December 29, 2016)

[347] Defied by Oxford dictionaries as "one who dedicates him or herself to the growing of coca," the raw material for cocaine, but also a stimulant grown and chewed for centuries by workers in the mountain region between Bolivia and Peru (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 291).

candidacy of now-President Juan "Evo" Morales (Ledeur 2002, 10); Radio Kawsachuan Coca ("long live coca") was built after Morales was elected to the office of the Presidency and occupies one of the largest buildings in that region's commercial center (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 287); and the Venezuelan government under Hugo Chavez supported the establishment of new community radio stations in Bolivia as part of its Socialist agenda (Waisbord 2013, 134).

Television and newspapers, on the other hand, are generally associated with the business oligarchy, including the politically active Monaterio, Kuljis, Rivero, Doria Medina[348] and Marinkovic families (Tabbie Saenz, personal correspondence, December 13, 2016).[349] Those families and the others in the *mestizo* and immigrant oligarchy (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, Torrico Villanueva 2008) controlled Bolivian politics through most of the 20th century. The Santa Cruz media played a large part in the conservative, mainstream opposition to then-candidate Morales in the 2004 election (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 38). Given the conservative, oligarchic history of politics in Bolivia, television and newspaper are coded as promoting status quo values of the government (4th branch), with radio acting as a watchdog or calling for change (4th estate).

[348] A 2014 candidate for president

[349] Corroborated by Branko Marinkovic (personal correspondence, December 12, 2016). The breakdown of ownership is: Monasterio owns *Unitel* (television), Klujis *Red Uno* (television), Rivero *El Deber* (newspaper Santa Cruz), Garafulic *Pagina 7* (newspaper La Paz), Duran *El Mundo* (newspaper La Paz), Canelas *Los Timpos* (newspaper Cochabamba), Marinkovic *El Dia* (newspaper La Paz). Additionally a Venezuelan businessman named Gil holds a large stake in the government television stations: *PAT*, *Cadena A* and *ATB*.

Brazil[350]

The alliance between Brazilian politics and television is well known (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 46; Fox 1997, 53). They are extremely close and, like in Argentina, television was employed by governments as a means of national socialization under supposedly friendly military control (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 52; Straubhaar 2001, 137). In fact, "the structures and practices of the Brazilian television industry are a direct result of the submission of the state and the media regulatory bodies to the economic elite, broadcasters and politicians, and their political, ideological and economic interests" (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 59). Globo's relationship with the government and its self-censorship would provoke one executive to "identify Globo with the motto of the nation itself" (Sinclair 1999, 68). In his book on Brazilian political communication, Porto referred to television

---

[350] Sources:
Boas, Taylor C. 2014. "Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
Feres Júnior, João, Lorena Miguel and Eduardo Barbabela. 2014. "Political Protest in Brazil: The role of the news media." Prepared for the annual Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago.
Guedes-Bailey, Olga and Othon F. Jambeiro Barbosa. 2008. "The Media in Brazil: An historical overview of Brazilian broadcasting politics." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: Open University Press, 46-60.
Matos, Carolina. 2008. *Journalism and Political Democracy in Brazil*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Porto, Mauro P. 2007. *Televisão E Política no Brasil: A Rede Globo e as interpretações da audiencia*. Rio de Janeiro: E-papers Serviços Editoriais.
Spada, Paolo, Jonathan Mellon, Tiago Peixoto and Fredrik M. Sjoberg. 2015. "Effects of the Internet on Participation Study of a Public Policy Referendum in Brazil." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7204. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21643/WPS7204.pdf?sequence=1 (August 23, 2015).
Straubhaar, Joseph. 2001. "Brazil: the role of the state in world television." In *Media and Globalization: why the state matters*, eds Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 133-153.
Straubhaar, Joseph, Organ Olsen, and Maria Cavaliari Nunes. 1993. "The Brazilian Case: Influencing the voter." In *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin Ame*rica, ed. Thomas E. Skidmore. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 118-136.

in Brazil as “hegemonic” (2007, 106) and to Globo’s coverage of protests as presenting the official or government frame of events (2007, 122) – specific and clear examples that provide evidence of the closeness of television and politics in Brazil.

Newspapers are also repute as close to government and parties but much less so than television (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 58), in part because there is no one newspaper as dominant as TV’s Globo group and many newspapers have historically been regionally focused (Becerra and Mastrini 2009). Radio began with small clubs that were eventually bought out (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008). It was political only in its early years (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 48; Fox 1997, 54).

Therefore, television is coded as most aligned with Brazilian governments historically, with newspapers and radio receiving neutral codings.

Chile[351]

Radio in Chile is segmented (Benavides et al 2009) and small (Becerra and Mastrini 2009) but is considered the most credible medium by far (Gonzalez-Rodriguez 2008, 63). There is little community radio and little diversity of voice

---

[351] Sources:
Benavides, Cristóbal, Maria Ignacia Errázuriz, David Kimber, Isabel Santa Maria and Aldo van Weezel. 2009. “The Chilean Media Landscape.” In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 138-150.
González-Rodríguez, Gustavo. 2008. “The media in Chile: the restoration of democracy and the subsequent concentration in media ownership.” In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 61-77.
Tironi, Eugenio and Guillermo Sunkel. 2000. “The Modernization of Communications: the media in the transition to democracy in Chile.” Trans. Richard Gunther. In *Democracy and the Media: a comparative perspective*, eds Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 165-194.

because there is no public or governments support for small or upstart stations (Gonzalez-Rodriguez 2008, 72).

Until 1973, each party in Chile owned or was affiliated with a newspaper (Tironi and Sunkel 2000, 167). And the newspapers have been criticized for not taking on the dictatorships more forcefully (Benavides et al 2009).

Television is effectively a market-focused duopoly more focused on profits than politics (Becerra and Mastrini 2009), but with a political-military history. It was, in fact, the last military dictatorship that privatized all television, taking it out of the hands of the universities that had begun the major stations (Fox 1997, 125). Television was forced to be apolitical – and not show opposition voices – by the military regime (Fox 1997, 126). That reticence renders television to be perceived more as an instrument of government than radio, though most pressure on it is market pressure.

The market realities, such as a dependence on advertising (Benavides et al 2009), and the choice to remain apolitical after the return of democracy yield neutral codings for radio and television in Chile. There is simply not enough evidence to be certain of any reputation. Historical party ownership yields a coding as close to government or promoting the status quo for newspapers.

Colombia[352]

The Colombian government, in an attempt to create political parity between parties, has effectively created a television duopoly by keeping control

---

[352] Sources:
Arango Forero, Germán, Liliana Gutiérrez Coba, Alfonso Forero Gutiérrez, Jairo Valderrama Valderrama, Rodolfo Prada Penagos, Luz Carmen Barrera Avellaneda and Adriana Guzmán

over television news and information programs, whilst allowing media independence relative to entertainment programming (Fox 1997, 93). Colombian television has the highest concentration of ownership in Latin America (Becerra and Mastrini 2009) and continues to be seen as politically close to government (Arango et al 2009). Journalism in Colombia combines clientelism and low regulation (Montoya-Londoño 2014).

Multiple Colombian newspaper editors have become head of state, so much so that politics and newspapers are treated as having a revolving door (Bonilla and Narvaez 2008, 79; Montoya-Londoño 2014, 72), a specific classification criterion. But those newspapers serve only an elite readership (Arango et al 2009). Only radio, including the growing segment of community radio (Arango et al 2009), is seen an offering an alternative or even edgy political viewpoint (Bonilla and Narvaez 2008, 86-88). Given that the strong and documented affiliations between newspapers and television and the political and business classes, newspapers and television are coded as promoting status quo values and radio as a watchdog.

---

de Reyes. 2009. "The Media in Colombia." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 63-76.

Bonilla, Jorge Iván and Ancízar Narváez Montoya. 2008. "The media in Colombia: Beyond violence and a market-driven economy." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 78-99.

Montoya-Londoño, Catalina. 2014. "In search of a model for the Colombian media system today." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 66-81.

Costa Rica[353]

Costa Rica's media stands out for its lack of political entanglement historically. Both television and newspapers are reputed for being conservative, but in a libertarian or pro- business way (Sandoval-Garcia 2008, 103). Newspapers especially are apolitical (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 111-113). And there is very little history of community or political radio, rendering neutral classifications for all three platforms.

Dominican Republic[354]

Dominican newspapers were vital in the struggle against US occupation in the early 20th century (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 197) and enjoyed press freedom in the brief democracy before the Trujillo dictatorship (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 210). The history of radio in the Dominican Republic goes back to 1924 (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 212). During the dictatorship, following a new press law in 1944 (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 249), both newspapers and radio promoted government positions or were forced to close (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 225-226). Radio Caribe was so identified with the dictatorship that its offices and towers were destroyed by jubilant protesters after Trujillo's death (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 261).

With the reemergence of democracy, both television and radio stations were aligned with political parties and positions; but stations emitting opposition voices were forced to close (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 277). Even today, there is little

[353] Sandoval-García, Carlos. 2008. "The media in Costa Rica: many media, scarce communication." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 61-77.
[354] Cruz Sanchez, Filiberto. 1997. *Historia de los Medios de Comunicación en República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: El Nuevo Diario.

distinction made between publicity and propaganda (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 288), suggesting all news is still seen as the voice of government.

Ecuador[355]

A near-monopoly accounts for most of Ecuador's newspaper and television media, which tend to exhibit a pro-business more than pro-government mentality (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 125). In a country with a high Gini coefficient (never below 45 and above 50 for most of the 1990s) and political-business oligarchy, a pro-business line equates to a pro-status quo line (See Walsh 2001 for details). Radio includes more news than other media platforms (Jordan Tobar and Panchana Macay 2009). There are a number of small, illegal radio stations as well as at least 26 community radio stations (Jordan Tobar and Panchana Macay 2009), but all three platforms are seen as close to the political-business oligarchy. The latest president, left-leaning for the first time in the country's history, has refused to renew licenses and caused strain with the media elite (Bachman 2011), but, historically, all traditional platforms in Ecuador are seen as aligned with the state.

---

[355] Sources:
Bachmann, Ingrid. 2011. "Ecuadoran authorities refuse to renew license for radio station critical of government." Journalism in the Americas blog (June 1). https://knightcenter.utexas.edu/blog/ecuadoran-authorities-refuse-renew-license-radio-station-critical-government (September 1, 2017)
Jordán Tobar, Rodrigo and Allen Panchana Macay. 2009. "The Media in Ecuador." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 103-124.
McCleod, Jack M., Ramona R. Rush and Karl H. Friederich. 1968. "The Mass Media and Political Information in Quito, Ecuador." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 32(4): 75-587. DOI: 10.1086/267647
Walsh, Catherine E. 2001. "The Ecuadorian Political Irruption: Uprisings, Coups, Rebellions and Democracy." *Nepantla: Views from South* 2(1): 173-205.

El Salvador[356]

The guerrilla opposition in El Salvador's civil war actively employed radio as a means to combat mainstream media, which presented the government's view (Henriquez Consalvi 2010). Newspapers were aligned with the military (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 33); and the television oligopoly defends the state's view (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 137). So it was the underground radio that presented alternative views (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 40). Henriquez Consalvi (2010)'s book is, in fact, a first-hand account by a guerrilla radio "star" of how radio was employed by anti-government groups. Since the advent of democracy, the diversity of voice in traditional media has grown (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 39), but not substantially. Therefore, newspapers and television are coded as aligned with the state and radio as adversarial.

Guatemala[357]

> "Twelve families and two business groups control all television, most radio, and all but one newspaper in Guatemala" (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 53).

The mainstream Guatemalan press – television and newspapers – like many other countries in the region has a pro-business, government-neutral stance by most accounts (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 94). Newspaper especially produce very little content that goes against government and have been censored

---

356 Henríquez Consalvi, Carlos "Santiago." 2010. *Broadcasting the Civil War in El Salvador: A memoir of guerrilla radio.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
357 Gramajo, Silvio René. 2014. "Media and Politicians in Guatemala: a marriage will last until money do them part." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 139-156.

nonetheless when they do (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 98), both clear evidence of promoting status quo values, by choice or out of necessity. Television is described as “bland” and cooperative or acquiescing to government as well (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 94, 105). Some media owners participate in politics (Gramajo 2014).

Radio is the most independent medium – many radio stations were started without any kind of licensing (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 51) – but it has very little reach relative to its television. There is some news presented in Mayan for the minority (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 91), but even radio tends to take a very corporate stance (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 93). As such, newspapers and television are coded as aligned with government and radio as neutral in Guatemala.

Honduras

Honduran newspapers are highly politicized, with each party traditionally having its own outlet (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 28). All media platforms are controlled by an oligarchy known as the 5 families (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 18), with television news the most timid (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 131) and radio the most credible or important (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 28). The political influence of print media is limited by the country’s 25 languages; but newspapers are nonetheless coded as most aligned with government, whilst television and radio are coded as neutral.

Mexico[358]

Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America in which to be a journalist, not just in modern times but also historically (Hughes 2008, 147). Television especially is aligned with government, both during decades of one-party rule and in the recent years with two main parties (Gutierrez Rentaria 2009; Fox 1997, 37), in part since the interests of television owners and politicians, though distinct, have often aligned (Sinclair 1999, 38). Radio is politically important but there is no history of government involvement (Fox 1997, 38); and radio is dwarfed by the influence of television (Gutierrez Rentaria

[358] Sources:
Gutiérrez Rentería, María Elena. 2009. "The Media Industry in Mexico." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan B. Albarran. New York: Routledge, 34-46.
Hughes, Sallie. 2008. "The media in Mexico: from authoritarian institution to hybrid system." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 131-149.
Hughes, Sallie and Chappell H. Lawson. 2004. "Propaganda and Crony Capitalism: Partisan Bias in Mexican Television News." *Latin American Research Review* 39(3): 81-105. DOI: 10.1353/lar.2004.0050
Keenan, Joe. 1997. "La Gacetilla: How advertising masquerades as news." In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 41-48.
Lawson, Chappell H. 2002. *Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lawson, Chappell H. and James A. McCann. 2004. "Television News, Mexico's 2000 Elections and Media Effects in Emerging Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 35: 1-30. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000013
López, Bruno. 1997. "Balancing Act: surviving as a television reporter in Mexico." In *A Culture of Collusion: an inside look at the Mexican Press*, ed. William A. Orme, Jr. Boulder, CO: North-South Center Press, 89-96.
Orme, William A. Jr. 1997. "Overview: From collusion to confrontation." In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 1-17.
Riva Palacio, Raymundo. 1997. "A Culture of Collusion: The ties that bind the press and the PRI." In *A Culture of Collusion: An inside look at the Mexican press*, ed. William A. Orme Jr. Miami: North-South Center Press, 21-32.
Sinclair, John. 1999. *Latin American Television: a global view*. New York: Oxford.
"Vargas Llosa: "México es la dictadura perfecta." 1990. *El País* (September 1) https://elpais.com/diario/1990/09/01/cultura/652140001_850215.html (October 6, 2017)
Villegas, Paulina. 2018. "Mexico Moves to Regulate Government Ads. Critics Say It's a Sham." *New York Times* (April 15) https://nyti.ms/2H238Kg (April 16, 2018)

2009). Newspapers are less obviously partisan but remain dependent on government advertising, rendering them subservient (Hughes 2008, 132).

The word most often used to describe the relationship between the Mexican government and press is collusion, in large part because much political advertising in the press is presented as if it were news (Keenan 1997; Orme 1997; Villegas 2018), akin to native advertising or content marketing[359] in the United States.

Therefore, television and newspapers are coded as promoting the status quo, whilst radio is classified as not reputed to be close to government.

Nicaragua[360]

Neither newspapers nor television news have traditionally criticized government very much (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 72; Wallace-Salinas 2008, 151). Newspapers have played the role of the opposition at times in the past (Wallace-Salinas 2008, 154), but generally are more concerned about market forces than political ones. "The Chamorro and Sacassa families … have been involved in both media and politics since the nation's beginning … in 1821" (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 52), strong evidence that the media would be perceived as promoting the status quo.

---

[359] Native advertising is defined as "advertiser-sponsored content that is designed to appear to the user as similar to editorial content" (Howe and Teufel 2014, 79).
[360] Wallace-Salinas, Arturo. 2008. "The media in Nicaragua: an escape valve for a dysfunctional democracy." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 150-166.

Television is sensationalist to the point of being graphically violent (Wallace-Salinas 2008, 162) and is largely seen as apolitical despite a soft historical association with government (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 84-85).

Radio is the most leftwing (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 86), but radio presents a diversity of oppositional voices (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 88; Wallace-Salinas 2008). For example, the Sandista party founded Radio Ya and the station continues to promote the party (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 51). There is long history of community radio (Wallace-Salinas 2008, 157), important in a country with notably low functional literacy despite official literacy statistics (Wallace-Salinas 2008, 150). And many radio stations were started without any kind of licensing (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 51).

Therefore, television is coded as aligned with government (very slightly), newspapers as neutral and radio as critical.

Panama

Politics and business are intertwined in Panama (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 53), with the government selecting editors of newspapers (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 55), a codified linkage between newspapers and the status quo. Television is also considered a government mouthpiece (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 56, 63). Radio is seen as offering opposition viewpoints (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 56, 67). Therefore, newspapers and television are coded as 4th branch of government and radio as 4th estate.

Paraguay[361]

Like Mexico, Paraguay has been ruled by one party for most of its existence. Unlike Mexico, despite the newspaper's editor being from a political family (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 140), the main newspaper in Paraguay took on the ruling party and was actually closed by the dictatorship for 5 years (Aldana-Amabile 2008). Newspapers have been a constant presence, but the 60% Guarani speaking population (Aldana-Amabile 2008, 168) limits the effect of print media. Television is seen as graphic and sensationalist (Aldana-Amabile 2008, 175), with only radio offering a peasant or opposition voice (Aldana-Amabile 2008, 171). For this reason, "radio plays a significant social relevance role, especially in rural areas" (García Béjar 2009, 184). As such, newspapers are coded as neutral, as is television, with radio coded as watchdog.

Peru[362]

Peru's print media has been criticized for underplaying the violence multiple administrations have committed against citizens (Aldana-Duran 2008,

---

[361] Sources:
Aldana-Amabile, Susana. 2008. "The media in Paraguay: from the coverage of political democracy to the obsession with violence." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 167-178.
García Béjar, Ligia. 2009. "The media in Paraguay: a locked nation in times of change." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 183-188.
[362] Sources:
Aldana-Durán, Celia. 2008. "The media in Peru: the challenge of constructing a meaningful democracy." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 179-192.
Boas, Taylor C. 2005. "Television and Neopopulism in Latin America: Media effects in Brazil and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 40(2): 27-49. http://lasa-4.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol40no2/Boas.pdf (March 23, 2015)
Protzel, Javier. 2014. "Media Systems and Political Action in Peru." In *Media Systems and Communication Policies in Latin America*, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 82-99.

183) and for accepting bribes from politicians to compensate for low pay (Aldana-Duran 2008, 185). Newspapers are nonetheless seen as more legitimate than television news, which also accepted bribes (Aldana-Duran 2008, 184) and tax breaks and other incentives (Fox 1997, 86-87). Corporate media's support of the Fujimori regime in the 1990s in exchange for subsidies begot a perception of its being a government lapdog (Protzel 2014).

Radio has faced the least government scrutiny or persecution (Aldana-Duran 2008, 181) and is the most trusted platform (Aldana-Duran 2008, 185), with almost 1500 stations (Aldana-Duran 2008, 185), including over 60 community radio stations (Zeta de Pozo 2009). This gives radio particular political power in a country with 93 languages (Aldana-Duran 2008, 195), especially in rural areas (Protzel 2014, 93).

Newspapers and television are therefore coded as aligned with government, radio as oppositional.

Uruguay[363]

Newspapers are closest to government and highly partisan (Hudson et al 2009), having been censored repeatedly since 1967 (Fox 1997, 111). Television responds to the oligarchy in Uruguay (Hudson et al 2009), but also to military influence (Fox 1997, 114) and broadcasters must swear an oath of allegiance by law to receive or maintain a license (Fox 1997, 113). Radio is politically important

---

Zeta de Pozo, Rosa. 2009. "The Media in Peru." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 125-138.

[363] Hudson, Eileen, Fernando Salas, Lucila Carbaja and Florencia Traibel. 2009. "The Media in Uruguay." In *The Handbook of Spanish Language Media*, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 171-182.

and has been going back decades, in part for its long history (Fox 1997, 31) and in part for its role in rural mobilization (Hudson et al 2009). Newspapers and television are, therefore, coded as aligned with government, radio as watchdog.

Venezuela[364]

Politics and media in Venezuela are described as having a "symbiotic dependence" on each other (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 201), with Hugo Chavez having famously prided himself on orchestrating a "mediated coup" (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 191). Newspapers have traditionally downplayed problems (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 202) and television and radio licenses been awarded to close political allies (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 195). There is a strong government presence in radio (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 198); and media owners have often throughout the country's history run media businesses at a loss to gain influence or favor for their other businesses (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 193). The government has been using selective advertising to manipulate media content since the 1970s (Fox 1997). The Chavez administration's decision not to renew television licenses in 2007 pushed some media outlets toward the opposition (Cañizalez and Lugo-

[364] Sources:
Bisbal, Marcelino. 2007. "Los Medios en Venezuela. ¿Dónde estamos?" Espacio Abierto 16(4). http://www2.scielo.org.ve/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1315-00062007000400001&lng=es (August 14, 2015)
Cañizalez, Andrés and Jairo Lugo-Ocando. 2008. "The Media in Venezuela: the revolution was televised, but no one was really watching." In *The Media in Latin America*, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 193-210.

Ocando 2008, 197), but historically all media in Venezuela are seen as very aligned with government.

In summary:

- = 4th Branch of or aligned with government (meaning no association with behavior)
0 = No expectation can be extrapolated from sources (as of Spring 2017)
+ = 4th Estate of government or watchdog (translating to an association with behavior)

Table A.1: Country classifications

Country	Newspaper	Television	Radio
Argentina	0	-	0
Bolivia	-	-	+
Brazil	0	-	0
Chile	-	0	0
Colombia	-	-	+
Costa Rica	0	0	0
Dominican Rep.	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-
El Salvador	-	-	+
Guatemala	-	-	0
Honduras	-	0	0
Mexico	-	-	0
Nicaragua	0	-	+
Panama	-	-	+
Paraguay	0	0	+
Peru	-	-	+
Uruguay	-	-	+
Venezuela	-	-	-

APPENDIX B: JUSTIFICATION FOR MODELING DECISIONS IN CHAPTER 5

My dissertation explores links between media as a political institution and aggregate behavioral patterns in different countries. Consumers of media more with reputations for challenging the status quo engage more often and in different ways than consumers of mainstream or government-aligned media. The original data collected for Chapter 5 of this dissertation do not include any measure of ideology or other political affiliation that might serve as an indicator of respondents' existing political preferences. Theoretically, media selection based on reputation should precede any current political *decisions, as coming to know the reputation of different media is part of socialization. Nonetheless, the model required testing to see if another variable (previous vote choice) might be a reasonable approximation for ideology. This appendix to the dissertation is intended to buttress the decision to exclude previous vote choice from the final model in the Chapter Five.

Background

I was given the opportunity to insert questions about media consumption into a privately-funded pre-electoral survey conducted by Equipos Mori across Bolivia in mid-2014. Survey administrators fielded a nationally representative survey sample, based on the 2012 census, for a total of 2009 possible respondents in the first round. Interviews were conducted face-to-face. The survey firm reported that total sampling error was estimated at +/- 2.2%, with

greatest expected error in the two states (out of nine) with smallest populations and most difficult topography (Equipos Mori 2014, 6).[365]

I duplicated questions from the fifth World Values Survey, using the Spanish-language wording from neighboring Chile, and inserted them into a pre-electoral survey gauging public sentiment about the state of the country and candidates:

People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never (read out and code one answer for each):

Daily newspaper
Printed magazines
TV news
Radio news
Mobile phone
Email
Internet
Talk with friends or colleagues[366]

Could you please tell me, how do you principally inform yourself about what is going on in the country? (Do not read options, mark just one).

TV News
Work colleagues
Newspaper
Radio
Friends
Neighbors
Church
Internet sites (excluding newspapers)
Community center
Social networks
School
Family[367]

I'm next going to name various means of communication. For each one, could you please tell me how much confidence you have in it?

Newspapers
TV news
Radio[368]

---

365 Survey organizers had originally agreed to include my questions in at least three rounds planned pre-electoral surveys, yielding a much larger pooled sample. Unfortunately, funding was too tight for them to make good on that agreement (Jose Luis Galvez, personal correspondence, May 12, 2014). Therefore, the data are from the July 17 – 28 iteration of the survey.
366 Questions were asked in this order
367 No order to responses since volunteered only
368 Questions were asked in this order

For the first question, about frequency of media use, survey administrators independently chose to modify the question to include “2 to 3 times per week” between daily and weekly.[369]

Finally, drawing from WVS question 225, respondents were asked “How often, if ever, do you use a personal computer?” and “How often, if ever, do you use a cell phone?,” with *never*, *occasionally* and *frequently* as possible responses. The original World Values question includes “Don’t know what a computer is” as a possible response. Survey organizers found this implausible, and suggested the question be modified to include “don’t know how to use a computer/cell phone” and “don’t have access to a computer/cell phone” instead.

Descriptive statistics

The sample roughly resembles what one would expect of a sample in Bolivia. The median respondent has completed high school and resides in an urban area. There are slightly more women in the sample than men; and approximately 55% of the sample self-identifies as indigenous. The modal response on age – 25 – approximates statistics published by the US government (CIA), but the mean and median of the sample skew higher, as the sample is limited to eligible voters (mean age 35, median 38.3).

Since the overall theory is about the importance of media consumption for behavior, it is first necessary to make sure that there actually is variation in media

[369] I did not learn of this modification until the final results were sent to me.

consumption habits, not just so-called news junkies[370] consuming a lot of news across many platforms and news avoiders[371] not consuming on any platform. This matters because Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster (2010) showed that news consumption is associated with increased political engagement among both groups, but the benefit is higher for news junkies. Therefore, were the Bolivia survey sample to be bimodal, with news junkies at one end and news avoiders at the other, I could not be confident in pooled results, since Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster showed the two groups cannot be treated as if equal (in their sample from the United States).

Over two-thirds of respondents reported not using electronic means to receive news.[372] The highest reported correlations were also among news consumed via electronic means, as shown in Table A2.1. Though there is no clear line for what is high versus what is low covariance (Gill 2006, 368), I am always wary of anything approaching or over 0.5.[373] With that in mind, only Internet use was considered for further analysis; getting news via social media or cell phone, as is more common in the developed world, were dropped from the model, as over three-quarters of respondents never used either medium. For traditional

[370] Most academic definitions are based on Zaller (2003) presentation of the traditional journalistic expectation of the public as informed and information-seeking. Zaller does not offer a specific definition of a "news junkie" but rather contrasts that abstract expectation of the informed citizen versus what he refers to as the "monitorial citizen" who only pays attention to politics when necessary. The term "news junkie" is commonly used. As of July 10, 2017, Merriam-Webster in fact uses "television news junkie" as the example in its more general definition of a junkie: "a person who gets an unusual amount of pleasure from or has an unusual amount of interest in something."
[371] Defined as "those who consume relatively little news, spend almost no time watching cable TV news channels, and avoid news magazines and news Web sites entirely" (Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster 2010, 552).
[372] Responses to all questions were recoded to set never at 0 uniformly throughout analysis.
[373] No correlations between socio-demographic indicators and media use surpassed 0.38 (positive or negative).

media, both news and radio are used often for news consumption, but there is minimal correlation. The ubiquity of television news exposure, as shown in Table A2.2, is in line with findings from other parts of the world (Papathanassopoulos et al 2013). Less than one percent of respondents in the Bolivia survey use all media platforms daily.

Table B.1: Correlations between media platforms used for news

	Newspaper	TV	Radio	Cell	Internet	Social Media
Newspaper	***					
TV	0.2473	***				
Radio	0.0625	0.0126	***			
Cell phone	0.1690	0.0992	0.0020	***		
Internet	0.2968	0.1461	-0.0665	0.4998	***	
Social Media	0.2414	0.1245	-0.0638	0.7767	0.7767	***

Table B.2: Respondents' use of news platforms, in percentages
(*n*=2009)

	Newspaper	TV	Radio	Internet
Never	34.79%	4.53%	21.40%	68.34%
Less than monthly	11.35%	1.59%	4.33%	3.09%
Monthly	14.78%	1.24%	4.33%	4.48%
Weekly	22.75%	3.78%	9.11%	7.27%
2-3 times per week	8.81%	11.00%	13.24%	5.03%
Daily	7.52%	77.85%	47.59%	11.80%

The different constituencies are further illustrated by differences in the "average" consumer of each platform. Women use radio and television more than men, who use newspapers and Internet. Newspaper readers are relatively older and less educated (seemingly correlated issues given widespread illiteracy in the mid-20th century) ("Illiteracy Rate Drops to Historic Lows in Bolivia"). The average television viewer is more urban and slightly more educated than the average radio listener, even though only seven percent of the sample reports

watching news on television less than at least once a week and over three-quarters do so daily.

What influences vote choice?

I limit the analysis here to what predicts voting for the incumbent. Though the 2014 election in Bolivia was multi-party, incumbent Evo Morales went into the race hugely popular and expected to win.[374] Morales, elected first in 2005 with over 50% of the votes and reelected in 2009 with almost two-thirds of votes, enjoyed generally high popularity throughout his two terms.[375] Limiting the analysis to a binary outcome allows me to look at what associations might have existed between voting for the establishment-backed other candidates versus the non-traditional incumbent, which makes sense with a theory about government-media relationships. In binary situations such as vote choice, statisticians employ logistic regression (Moore and Siegel 2013, 264).[376] Interpreting the results requires transforming result coefficients into odds ratios (Liao 1994).

I additionally limit the analysis here to outcomes that might be not just significant but have explanatory power. Since the 2014 election had five candidates, multinomial logistic regression would be the appropriate method to consider all of them. But analysis of multinomial logit is pairwise. How media consumption might have affected voting for the libertarian candidate versus the

---

[374] Morales did win with almost 60% of votes, more than double his nearest competitor among the fractured opposition (Neuman 2014).
[375] Morales' popularity was as high as 80% at one time (Bastenier 2013) but still at 56% in December 2013 ("Evo Morales: Su aprobación sube a 56% tras doble gratificación por Navidad")
[376] Especially in dichotomous situations, "the binomial logit model offers several advantages" (Fox 2008, 374).

green candidate, relative to some base outcome, is not a meaningful analysis for an election in which there was an overwhelming favorite.

Table B.3: What predicts voting for the incumbent?

Variable	Model 1 Coefficient (SE)	Model 2 Coefficient (SE)	Model 3 Coefficient (SE)
Female	- 0.3030(0.0925)**	- 0.2657 (0.0954)**	- 0.2789 (0.0964)**
Age	- 0.0090 (0.0031)**	- 0.0113 (0.0032)***	- 0.0131 (0.0034)***
Education	- 0.1927 (0.0206)***	- 0.15446 (0.0219)***	0.1370 (0.0246)***
Indigenous status		0.7356 (0.0963)***	- 0.0950 (0.0076)***
City size		- 0.1588 (0.0413)***	- 0.1355 (0.0434)**
Newspaper readership			- 0.0220 (0.0327)
TV news consumption			- 0.0358 (0.0240)
Radio news use			0.0648 (0.0240)**
Internet news use			- 0.0391 (0.0312)
n	2009	1975	1975

Logistic Regression

Expanding the model step-by-step helps avoid overfitting. I first expand the model to include measures of indigenous status, which has been a politically salient issue in Bolivia since the turn of the century, and urbanization. McFadden's R-squared increases when this addition is made (from 0.035 [df=4] to 0.080 [df=16]). The addition of media variables further increases the explanatory power of the model[377] (McFadden's log likelihood 0.084 [df=10]) with only city size losing significance slightly when media are added.[378] This is

[377] Models were also run with a number of interaction terms, particularly for education and urbanization relative to each media platform. There was no increase in explanatory power so I opted for the simpler model (Achen 1982).
[378] Bartlett (2014) details how McFadden's R-squared is often quite low, in one simulation in which the probability of the binary outcome was set almost all the way to 1 even yielding a log likelihood of 0.13.

presumably because of the moderate correlation of urbanization with newspaper, television and Internet news consumption (0.32, 0.28 and 0.23 respectively).

Most political scientists would at this point note the omission of some measure of political interest from the model, given the overwhelming evidence of the stability of measures of political interest (Prior 2010) and its importance as an antecedent for political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Ketter 1996), political engagement (Strömbäck and Shehata 2010) and aligning preferences with voting choices (Rau and Redlawsk 1997). Voting is compulsory and enforced in Bolivia; and election are always held on a Sunday on which no traffic is allowed to circulate nor businesses[379] to open until after voting has finished. So, interested in politics or not, citizens must turn out to vote.

Nonetheless, the model seems to provide support to the theory that media consumption platform matters for supporting a non-traditional political candidate in Bolivia. The low usage of the Internet at the time of the survey might explain why getting news via radio increases the likelihood of voting for the incumbent by over six percent, but there is no meaningful increase from the other watchdog entity, the Internet. If most Internet news in Bolivia is from sites linked to mainstream television and newspaper outlets[380], that relationship could also partially explain the non-finding.

---

[379] Other than those such as hospitals and nursing homes that must remain open for public safety, of course. Carrying arms and selling alcohol is also prohibited ("Bolivia Announces Special Rules for Election Day").

[380] Olmstead, Mitchell and Rosenstiel (2011) use Nielsen ratings data to show that, in the US for example, two-thirds of the top 25 Internet news sites are linked to what they call "legacy news organizations". This overlap is not uncommon. In countries with healthy online public spheres, the Internet largely acts as a counterweight to legacy sites. The limited Internet news use in Bolivia at the time of the survey may be indicative of a still underdeveloped online public sphere in that country.

Ideology?

Party identification is not a strong predictor in Bolivia, as parties change and reorganize frequently. Therefore, left-right ideology is generally used a predictor of political affinity. The Equipos Mori July 2014 survey did not ask about ideology, however, leaving a potentially important gap in drawing inferences because there is no clear measure of respondents' pre-existing political leanings or beliefs. In the absence of ideology or other predictors of political leaning and considering Morales' strong performance in the previous two elections, previous vote choice was the survey question that could best approximate respondents' pre-existing political beliefs.

Previous vote choice is not an exact overlay of ideology though, as the former is a moment in time – which could be influenced by any number of election-specific factors – but the latter a persistent over-time tendency. One means to test the validity of the measure before adding it into the final model – which would have the unfortunate side effect of reducing the number of respondents to the model by almost half – is to examine if the sample for the measure generates the same expected population as the base model. The logistic regression presented in Chapter X (Model 3) was:

Voting for the incumbent = $\alpha + \beta_1$Gender + β_2Age + β_3**Education level** + β_4Indigenous status + β_5City size + β_6Newspaper use + β_7**Television news** use+ β_8Radio news use + β_9Internet news use+ ε (Model 3)

This appendix modifies the model to test if how respondents voted in the 2009 presidential election affected 2014 vote choice (Model 4):

$$\text{Voting for the incumbent} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Gender} + \beta_2\text{Age} + \beta_3\text{Education level} + \beta_4\text{Indigenous status} + \beta_5\text{City size} + \beta_6\text{Newspaper use} + \beta_7\text{Television news use} + \beta_8\text{Radio news use} + \beta_9\text{Internet news use} + \beta_{10}\text{Voting record} + \varepsilon \text{ (Model 4)}$$

I define respondents who had not supported Morales as anyone who had voted for any candidate other than Morales or had voted *blanco*[381] in the previous election. Those who were too young to vote or who had not voted, despite being compulsory and enforced in Bolivia, were dropped from the forthcoming analysis, as their previous vote choice and/or feeling about Morales could not be inferred from the available data. This reduces the *n* to 1088.[382]

Before continuing, I examine the descriptive statistics of the subset of data of interest in this appendix:

---

[381] Blank voting is a phenomenon unique to countries with compulsory voting and has been most studied in Latin America, the only area of the world in which compulsory voting is the dominant system (Electoral Commission 2006, 24). *Voto blanco* or *voto bronca* in Spanish – *voto em blanco* in Portuguese – is treated in cross-cultural studies and by the media as a means of expressing displeasure with the administration without the risk that actually voting for the opposition might entail. It occurs even in developed nations with compulsory voting like Australia, but has been most studied by Latin American specialists, since that is the only area of the world dominated by compulsory voting. Blank voting gained such popularity under the dictatorships of the twentieth century that, even now with free and fair elections, since voting is still compulsory in most Latin American countries, blank voting continues as a means to express displeasure with the slate of candidates or parties. In 2001 in Argentina, for example, total blank and null votes amounted to over 20% of the electorate ("Voto bronca: una protesta muy fuerte que triunfó en la Capital y Santa Fe"). In the 2009 Mexican election, the media reported that casting a blank vote was an anonymous means of expressing that "the whole political system stinks" (Grillo 2009) or "voting for nothing is better than backing the politicians currently running the country" (Lacey 2009).

[382] 326 respondents were not old enough to vote in the 2009 election. 107 did not vote. 30 said they considered their vote a secret. 276 respondents said they did not know or did not respond (collapsed in the survey into one category).

Table B.4: Descriptive statistics

	Model 3				Model 4			
Variable	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**S.D.**	**Min**	**Max**	**Mean**	**S.D.**
Age	18	92	38.30	15.54	18	92	41.53	14.45
Education	1	10	5.04	2.44	1	10	4.89	2.44
City Size	0	3	1.79	1.20	0	3	1.72	1.23
Newspaper	0	5	1.82	1.65	0	5	1.81	1.65
TV	0	5	4.49	1.22	0	5	4.5	1.22
Radio	0	5	3.31	2.02	0	5	3.62	1.92
Internet	0	5	1.13	1.83	0	5	0.91	1.67

Figure B.1: Proportional frequency distribution of respondent age



Over half of the population in Bolivia is below 25 years old (52% according to a 2016 estimate) with a media age of 24 (CIA 2017). Approximately another third of the population is between 25 and 54, leaving only 11% of the population over 55. The skewed distribution in age in the sample is in line with expectations about the country overall.

Figure B.2: Frequency distribution of respondent education



Scale: 1 no studies; 2 incomplete primary school; 3 complete primary school; 4 incomplete secondary school; 5 complete secondary school; 6 introductory technical school; 7 advanced technical school; 8 some college; 9 university degree; 10 advanced degree

Most Bolivian young persons now complete secondary school, but less than 70 percent did so 25 years ago (World Bank 2016). As such, there remains a chunk of the population with very little education, a chunk that has a primary or secondary education and very few with college or postgraduate degrees.

Figure B.3: Frequency distribution of city size (urbanization)



The most rural areas are coded 0. State capitals are the largest cities in the states, coded 3. Approximately two-thirds of the population lived in urban areas in 2015 (CIA 2017), which explains the skew in the sample.

Statistical analysis is straightforward in many cases when data are distributed normally, allowing for assumptions about mean and variance (Fox 2008, 382). But there is no reason to expect a normal distribution of news consumption, making it especially important to examine descriptive statistics. This non-normal distribution happens because news consumption is habitual – with 76% of adults in a recent survey noting that they always turn to the same news outlets (Mitchell et al 2016). Television is ubiquitous worldwide; and newspapers and Internet service are expensive in developing countries, which

would diminish mass use of those media. The lopsided distributions are, therefore, reasonable. The heavy use of radio makes sense in a developing country with a long tradition of radio, such as Bolivia.

Figures B.4 – B.7: Frequency distribution of news consumption by media platform
Scale: Frequency of using the media platform for news consumption, scaled from never (0) to daily (5)

Figure B.4: Newspaper readership



Figure B.5: TV news consumption



Figure B.6: Radio news consumption



Figure B.7: Internet news use



Table B.5: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Model 3 Yes	Model 3 No	Model 4 Yes	Model 4 No
Female	1021	988	538	550
Indigenous	1090	885	667	421
Voted for Incumbent in This Election?	1035	974	741	347
Voted for Incumbent in Last Election?			831	257

Figure B.8: Distribution by gender



Figure B.9: Indigenous status



Men outnumber women at birth in Bolivia, but, as in most places, women outlive men. The almost equal distribution by gender in the sample, therefore, seems reasonable.

Over two-thirds of Bolivians identify as *mestizo*, with at least 44% indicating that they consider themselves part of some indigenous group (CIA 2017). In some cases, the percentage self-declaring as indigenous is as high as two-thirds of the population.

Figure B.10: Voted Morales in 2014



Figure B.11: Voted Morales in 2009



Morales was elected in 2009 with 63% of valid votes (Wurgaft 2009).[383] Morales would go on to win the 2014 election with approximately 60% of valid votes

[383] Incorrectly filed, damaged and "blank" votes are usually not reported in election results.

(Montero and Shoichet 2009). The histogram in Figure B.11 shows an approximately 80/20 split though.

Re-running the model

Re-running the model (Table B.6) suggests that previous voting record is quite important as a predictor of 2014 vote choice. In the amended model, voting record is highly statistically significant – increasing the likelihood of voting for Morales in 2014 more than ten-fold – and reduces slightly the predictive power of education and urbanization (though both remain significant). Further, from a theoretical perspective, the inclusion of voting record in the model results in the negative association between the consumption of television news and voting for the incumbent becoming significant at the $p<.10$ level. As the television industry in Bolivia is reputed for its association with traditional political parties in opposition to Morales, that finding would actually lend strength to the chapter's results, as consumption of media repute as close to the government historically should correlate with establishment candidates, which Morales is not.

Table B.6

Parameter	Model 3 Coefficient (SE)	OR	Model 4 Coefficient (SE)	OR
Female	- 0.2550 (0.1420)˙	0.7749	- 0.1592 (0.5737)	0.8529
Age	- 0.0078 (0.0055)	0.9922	- 0.0075 (0.0061)	0.9925
Education	- 0.1695 (0.0348)***	0.8441	- 0.1143 (0.0395)**	0.8920
Indigenous	0.7485 (0.1410)***	2.1138	0.7184 (0.1590)***	2.0511
Urban	- 0.1704 (0.0724)**	0.8434	- 0.1709 (0.0700)*	0.8429
Newspaper	- 0.0614 (0.0468)	0.9405	- 0.0770 (0.0527)	0.8497
TV	- 0.1212 (0.0749)	0.8859	- 0.1628 (0.0838)˙	0.9259
Radio	0.0140 (0.0360)	1.0141	0.0108 (0.0400)	1.0109
Internet	- 0.0433 (0.0471)	0.9577	- 0.0431 (0.0539)	0.9577
Voting history			2.3150 (0.1750)***	10.1246
Intercept	2.6244 (0.5020)***		0.8579 (0.5736)	
n=1088				

Heterogeneity

Component-plus-residual plots are a simple way to visualize differences between voters. Figures B.13 through B.17 show who voted for the incumbent (above the fit line) versus who voted against him (below the fit line). On all variables, there appears to be much more heterogeneity among those who voted against incumbent Morales, as shown by the long tails below the fit line. This is important because non-normal or non-systemmatically distribution of errors are indications of poor model fit. Large y-axis datapoints indicate that, though the model may be useful, it could be a quite poor fit in some cases (Statwing).

In this survey, those supporting Morales seem to be a larger, more homogenous voting bloc. This means that looking at the full sample without disaggregating it masks heterogeneity among those who voted against him. This heterogeneity among those who voted against Morales makes intuitive sense in country and time during which the opposition was not unified and the incumbent was facing challengers on both his ideological left and right.

Figure B.12: C-R plot of age



Figure B.13: C-R plot of education



Figure B.14: C-R plot of city size



Figure B.15: C-R plot of newspaper use



Figure B.16: C-R plot of TV news



Figure B.17: C-R plot of radio news



None of the component-residual plots show unexpected clustering on the X-axis or a non-linear relationship; and all plots suggest monotone relationships. Comparing the fit lines across the figures shows very little variation from

linearity, except among the extremely small group of respondents who never or very rarely view television news, as evidenced by the curvature in that line.

Gauging the efficiency of the model

Collinearity among variables renders confidence intervals large and lowers the power of hypothesis testing (Fox 2008, 307). Strong collinearity can, in fact, increase variance so much as to make predictors useless as they become indistinguishable from chance. The variable inflation factor (VIF) provides an index that measures how much the variance of a coefficient might be increased due to collinearity. Testing for VIF, none of the confidence intervals approach two[384], which would suggest collinearity: female (1.027), age (1.136), education (1.262), indigenous status (1.021), city size (1.078), newspaper (1.118), television (1.048), radio (1.017), Internet (1.215), and voting record (1.010).

In addition to problems from collinearity, data points far from the fit line can also render a model inefficient or even incorrect. In ordinary least squares regression, "outliers" are observations so influential that they change the coefficients. While "outliers" are an inappropriate concept for logistic regression (Fox and Weisberg 2002, 317), there are influential points that can similarly change the odds ratios. Gauging the influence of these points is akin to calculating Cook's Distance in least-squares regression, which measures the discrepancy and leverage of outliers (Fox 2008, 250 and 413). Plotting the influential points (Figure B.18) suggests there are some that might be skewing the

[384] An index of 2 would mean that the standard error, which is used to construct the confidence interval, were 1.44 times (the square root of 2), as large as it would be if the factors are uncorrelated.

result – that is, without these respondents, the odds ratios and substantive interpretations of the statistical results could be different.

Figure B.18: Bubble plot of influential points



Specifically, analysis suggests that 67 data points may be overly influential. The descriptive statistics for those respondents are:

Table B.7: Descriptive statistics of influential persons

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	S.D.
Age	23	85	40	43.45	16.12
Education	1	10	4	4.9	2.96
City Size	0	3	1	1.27	1.29
Paper	0	5	1	1.78	1.86
TV	0	5	5	4.18	1.54
Radio	0	5	4	2.96	2.23
Internet	0	5	0	1.08	1.84

Figure B.19: Proportional frequency distribution of age of overly influential respondents



Figure B.20: Frequency distribution of educational attainment by overly influential respondents



The bimodal nature of the educational backgrounds of overly influential persons suggests that opposition to the incumbent in the 2014 election was mix of persons with only a primary education and those with some college education.

Figure B.21: Rural-urban split of overly influential respondents



Figures B.22 – B.25: Frequency distribution of news consumption of overly influential respondents
Scale: Frequency of using the platform for news, scaled from never (0) to daily (5)

Figure B.22: Newspaper use



Figure B.23: Television news



Figure B.24: Radio news



Figure B.25: Internet news



Table B.8: Descriptive statistics of influential persons

Variable	Yes	No
Female	32	35
Indigenous Status	10	48
Voted for Incumbent in This Election?	40	27
Voted for Incumbent in Last Election?	46	21

Figure B.26: Gender of overly influential respondents



Figure B.27: Indigenous status of overly influential persons



Figure B.28: 2014 voting intent of overly influential persons



Figure B.29: 2009 voting record of overly influential respondents



These influential respondents are more rural, consume less television and radio news, and consume more Internet news than the rest of the sample (as depicted in Figures B.1 through B.11). As Figures B.28 and B.29 show, overly influential respondents also seem to have voted for the incumbent in 2009 but not 2014, suggesting they might be dragging down any obvious incumbent effect. Removing those respondents should, therefore, provide an even more accurate test of the importance of previous vote choice in Bolivia's 2014 election.

Of the remaining 1021 respondents:

Table B.9: Descriptive statistics of subset without influential points

Variable	Min	Max	Median	Mean	S.D.
Age	23	92	38	41.4	14.33
Education	1	10	5	4.89	2.47
City Size	0	3	2	1.75	1.22
Paper	0	5	2	1.82	1.63
TV	0	5	5	4.52	1.21
Radio	0	5	3	3.66	1.89
Internet	0	5	0	0.9	1.66

Figure B.30: Proportional frequency distribution of age of subset without overly influential respondents



Figure B.31: Frequency distribution of educational attainment within the subset without overly influential points



Figure B.32: Urban distribution of subset without overly influential persons

Figures B.33 – B.36: Frequency distribution of news consumption in subset without influential persons

Scale: Frequency of using the platform for news, scaled from never (0) to daily (5)

Figure B.33: Newspaper use



Figure B.34: TV news use



Figure B.35: Radio news use



Figure B.36: Internet new use



Table B.10: Descriptive statistics of subset without influential points

Variable	Yes	No
Female	506	515
Indigenous Status	627	394
Voted for Incumbent in This Election?	722	299
Voted for Incumbent in Last Election?	785	236

Figure B.37: Gender distribution in subset without overly influential persons



Figure B.38: Indigenous status in subset without overly influential persons



Figure B.39: 2014 vote intent in subset without overly influential respondents



Figure B.40: 2009 voting record in subset without overly influential persons



The descriptive statistics for this subset mirror the reduced dataset used in model 2. Re-running the model without the influential respondents yields the following result:

Table B.11: Model 4 without influential points

Parameter	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio
Female	- 0.0606 (1960)	0.7749
Age	- 0.0060 (0.0077)	0.9922
Education	- 0.2265 (0.0495)***	0.8441
Indigenous	1.3091 (0.2008)***	2.1138
Urban	- 0.4663 (0.0928)***	0.8434
Newspaper	- 0.0601 (0.0648)	0.9405
TV	- 0.3805 (0.1413)**	0.8859
Radio	- 0.0596 (0.0502)	1.0141
Internet	- 0.0457 (0.0656)	0.9577
Voting Record	3.4953 (0.2397)***	32.9612
Intercept	2.2203 (0.8371)**	

n=1021
Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.'

In this run of the model, the importance of voting record increases more than three-fold. Relative to the theory in the dissertation, consumption of television news becomes more significant and, though not significant, the sign for consumption of radio news shifts to negative. Given Morales' history with *cocalero* radio[385] and the theoretical expectation that consumers of non-traditional media would be more likely to support non-traditional parties in any given country, this is a very non-intuitive result, despite no indication of poor model fit.[386]

[385] Radio Soberanía, run by the *cocalero* union, promoted the causes and candidacy of Morales from his beginnings in the 1980s and 1990s as a grassroots coca leader (Ledebur 2002, 10). *Cocalero* is defied by Oxford dictionaries as "one who dedicates him or herself to the growing of coca," the raw material for cocaine, but also a stimulant grown and chewed for centuries by workers in the mountain region between Bolivia and Peru (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 291).

[386] Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test shows p = 0.16.

Resampling as a test of the model

Resampling with replacement allows one to generate bootstrapped samples, from which you can generate statistics of the bootstrapped samples. These bootstrapped sample statistics give you the distribution in which the 'true' population statistic lies, and this distribution will give you the rough confidence interval of the sample statistics. Resampling with replacement allows one to test the confidence intervals of a dataset and understand better the sampling distribution. "The process of finding confidence intervals directly via resampling is called bootstrapping" (Kaplan 2009, 251).

Over a large number, regressions with bootstrapped samples will yield distributions of estimated coefficients that will center encompass those regression coefficients generated by the original sample data. In other words, bootstrapped samples can yield confidence intervals for sample statistics, and regression with bootstrapped samples can yield confidence intervals for the coefficients with the sample data. Bootstrapping the confidence intervals can increase confidence in results if the sampling distribution is not necessarily normally distributed (Albright 2015) since the only assumption that nonparametric bootstrapping assumes is that the sample distribution is a good approximation of the population distribution. Further, since regular statistical inference tends to overstate confidence intervals, this method generates a more conservative confidence interval (Fox 2008, 602).

For finding confidence intervals "5000 trials is enough to give reliable results" (Kaplan 2009, 265). The Law of Large Numbers means that more simulations should come closer to the true statistics; so I bootstrap 10,000 times.

I include different types of confidence intervals (normal, percentile, bias-corrected) that might account for the possibility that the data may be non-Gaussian (Fox 2008, 595-599).[387] The bias corrected method offers the advantages of the other models without the disadvantages associated with asymmetric distributions[388] in the percentile method (Carpenter and Bithell 2000, 1152-1153).

Table B.12 shows the confidence intervals from bootstrapping on the subset of data without overly influential points. The confidence intervals on the parameters of interest that were significant in the model run – education, indigenous status, urban/rural divide and voting record – do not contain zero, increasing confidence that the p-values are meaningfully significant, not just statistical artifacts. The confidence intervals on the non-significant variables do contain zero, adding strength to the conclusion that they are not significant. For television, which has a highly skewed distribution (since most people watch some television news daily) and which had shown up as weakly significant in model 4, the different confidence intervals recommended for bootstrapping with non-normal data yield results contradictory. The percentile method is the only method that yields confidence intervals that do not cross zero, but can be "overly optimistic" (Albright 2015). Since the normal and bias-corrected confidence intervals both contain zero, labeling the variable as not significant is the conservative choice.

---

[387] See Weiss 2003 for overview of the bootstrap confidence interval options in R
[388] The bias-corrected method "attempts to shift and scale the percentile bootstrap confidence interval to compensate for bias" (Weiss 2003).

Surprisingly though, all types of the confidence intervals for the overall model – constructed as all the indices together[389], not disaggregated to look at each variable, as above, and which in this iteration includes previous vote choices – include zero. That result calls into question the utility of the model including voting record itself for me.

Arguably more importantly, though the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the significant predictor variables do not contain zero, the coefficients from running the model without the overly influential points are outside of the bootstrapped confidence intervals. That suggests that, in the original model run, the confidence intervals were not as tight as would be desirable.

Table B.12: Bootstrapping results for model 4 without overly influential points

	2.5% lower bound	97.5% higher bound
Confidence Intervals: Gender		
Normal	-0.47	0.15
Percentile	-0.48	0.15
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.48	0.15
Confidence Intervals: Age		
Normal	-0.02	0.004
Percentile	-0.02	0.004
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.02	0.004
Confidence Intervals: Education* **		
Normal	-0.19	-0.03
Percentile	-0.2	-0.04
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.2	-0.03
Confidence Intervals: Indigenous Status* **		
Normal	0.40	1.02
Percentile	0.41	1.04
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	0.40	1.02
Confidence Intervals: City Size* **		
Normal	-0.31	-0.03
Percentile	-0.31	-0.03
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.31	-0.03

[389] R code section on "#conf intervals," almost at the end of the full code, shows how this was done

Table B.12 (cont): Bootstrapping results for model 4 without overly influential points

Confidence Intervals: Paper		
Normal	-0.18	0.02
Percentile	-0.18	0.02
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.18	0.02
Confidence Intervals: Television**		
Normal	-0.33	0.01
Percentile	-0.35	-0.004
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.34	0.007
Confidence Intervals: Radio		
Normal	-0.07	0.09
Percentile	-0.07	0.09
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.07	0.09
Confidence Intervals: Internet		
Normal	-0.15	0.06
Percentile	-0.15	0.06
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.15	0.06
Confidence Intervals: Record***		
Normal	1.94	2.63
Percentile	2.01	2.71
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	1.94	2.63
Confidence Intervals: Whole Model		
Normal	-0.26	1.94
Percentile	-0.21	2.03
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.22	2.01

There are then, so far, at least four problems with including voting record as an indication of how a respondent might vote in the 2014 election: it cuts the sample size from 2009 to 1088; 6.2% of the subsample are overly influential respondents (versus just 11 points of 2009, or 0.5%, in the sample, shown in figure B.41); the bootstrapped confidence intervals on the model without overly influential points contain zero; and the coefficients without the overly influential points are outside of the bootstrapped confidence intervals, meaning they are arguably not significant.

Figure B.41: Bubble plot of 11 influential points in original model in Chapter 5



Given the variety of problems with including any measure of political leaning, I opted to run bootstrap confidence intervals on the original model from Chapter 5. Those results are in table B.13.

Table B.13: Bootstrapping results for model based on full sample in Chapter 5

	2.5% lower bound	97.5% higher bound
Confidence Intervals: Gender**		
Normal	-0.5756	-0.0478
Percentile	-0.5814	-0.0488
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.5769	-0.0440
Confidence Intervals: Age***		
Normal	-0.0228	-0.0048
Percentile	-0.0234	-0.0052
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.0231	-0.0050
Confidence Intervals: Education***		
Normal	-0.2047	-0.0745
Percentile	-0.2101	-0.0802
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.2057	-0.0762
Confidence Intervals: Indigenous Status***		
Normal	0.3787	0.9174
Percentile	0.3920	0.9312
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	0.3759	0.9176
Confidence Intervals: City Size**		
Normal	-0.2403	-0.0024
Percentile	-0.2435	-0.0060
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.2423	-0.0043
Confidence Intervals: Paper		
Normal	-0.1229	0.0558
Percentile	-0.1297	0.0568
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.1296	0.0568
Confidence Intervals: Television		
Normal	-0.1483	0.0883
Percentile	-0.1553	0.0842
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.1546	0.0851
Confidence Intervals: Radio**		
Normal	0.0258	0.1625
Percentile	0.0274	0.1622
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	0.0265	0.1616
Confidence Intervals: Internet		
Normal	-0.1691	0.0030
Percentile	-0.1707	0.0019
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	-0.1695	0.0025
Confidence Intervals: Whole Model		
Normal	0.0740	2.501
Percentile	0.797	2.554
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval	0.758	2.512

For the original model, the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the predictor variables that were significant in the original model (gender, age, education, indigenous status, city size and radio news listenership) do not contain zero, suggesting with greater likelihood that these predictors are truly significant. In addition, the original coefficients are contained within the bootstrapped confidence intervals. That increases my confidence in that model as well as in the decision to exclude previous vote choice as a proxy for ideology in the chapter.

Simplified R Code

```
library(car)
library(mosaic)
library(foreign)
library(lattice)
library(sandwich)
library(outliers)
library(boot)
library(MASS)
library(readxl)
library(ggplot2)
library(nnet)
library(reshape2)
library(htmltools)
library(rms)
library(ResourceSelection)
library(modeest)

data<-read_excel
attach(data)
dim(data)

# Who are "average"
# Finding modal respondent for each media platform
AvgX<-(sex*10000000000)+(age*100000000)+(edu*1000000)+(indig*10000)+(capital*100)+(media platform X)
mfv(AvgX)[1]

# Model including voting record as a proxy for ideology or party ID
m2<-glm(prez~gender+age+edu+indig+estrato+paper+tv+radio+internet+record, family=binomial(link="logit"),
data=data)
summary(m2)
exp(coef(m2))
```

```
# Descriptive statistics
summary(variable1)
sd(x, na.rm=TRUE)

truehist(data$variable1, xlab="variable")
barplot(table(data$variable2), xlab="variable2")

truehist(data$variable1, xlab="variable1")
barplot(table(data$variable2), xlab="variable2")

# Heterogeneity
crPlots(m1, "variable1", pch=as.numeric(data$variable1))

sqrt(vif(m1))

# Influential points
influence.measures(m1)
summary(influence.measures(m1))
influencePlot(m1, id.n=4)

# Cooks D & disaggregating overly influential points
cooksd<-cooks.distance(m1)
a<-cbind(data, cooksd)
a$influential<-a$cooksd>4/length(m1$residuals)
overlyinfluential<-subset(a, a$influential=="TRUE")
dim(overlyinfluential)
withoutoverlyinfluential<-subset(a, a$influential=="FALSE")
dim(withoutoverlyinfluential)

summary(overlyinfluential$variable1)
sd(overlyinfluential$age, na.rm=TRUE)

table(overlyinfluential$variable1)
```

```
truehist(overlyinfluential$variable1, xlab="variable1")
barplot(table(overlyinfluential$variable2), xlab="variable2")

truehist(overlyinfluential$variable1, xlab=" variable1")
barplot(table(overlyinfluential$variable2), xlab="variable2")

summary(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable1)
sd(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable1, na.rm=TRUE)

table(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable1)

truehist(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable1, xlab="variable1")
barplot(table(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable2), xlab="variable2")

truehist(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable1, xlab="variable1")
barplot(table(withoutoverlyinfluential$variable2), xlab="variable2")

# Model without overly influential points
m1noinfluence<-glm(prez~xyz, family=binomial(link="logit"), data=withoutoverlyinfluential)
summary(m1noinfluence)
exp(coef(m1noinfluence))

# Hosmer-Lemeshow
h1<-hoslem.test(data$prez, fitted(m1), g=10)
h1
cbind(h1$expected, h1$observed)

# Bootstrap
logit.bootstrap<-function(data,i){
data<-data[i,]
m3<-glm(prez~ gender+age+edu+indig+estrato+paper+tv+radio+internet+record, data=data, family=binomial(link=
"logit"))
coefficients(m3)
}
```

```
exp(coef(m3))

logit.boot<-boot(data=data, statistic=logit.bootstrap, R=10000)
logit.boot
plot(logit.boot, index=1)

# Confidence intervals
boot.ci(logit.boot, type= "all", index=2)
boot.ci(logit.boot, type="all")

# Original model
data<-data[i,]
m4<-glm(prez~ gender+age+edu+indig+estrato+paper+tv+radio+internet, data=data, family=binomial(link= "logit"))
coefficients(m4)
}
exp(coef(m4))
```