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NATIONAL SECURITY
AND MODERNIZATION
DRIVE WHEELS OF MILITARIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

In searching for an explanation of rising militarization of the developing world, we tend to neglect the principal sources of our discontent the nation-state system and modernization The success of these movements obscures the force and violence accompanying them It is unpleasant to recognize that what we hold most dear is costly and dangerous Unless we begin with the assumption that what we seek to preserve and extend are major obstacles to peace, then one can doubt whether the peoples of the world community will be able to fashion a workable political system that will at least manage conflicts short of mutual destruction if not eliminate completely the play of force in deciding our life chances

Part one of this paper elaborates on the close connection between militarization, modernization, and the nation-state system Against this background, this paper argues that any successful attempt to reduce or eliminate the role of force or violence in resolving conflict or to arrest the militarization of the global order implies working within the nation-state system and with the forces driving the modernization process forward The margins of opportunity and maneuver to diminish conflict and violence, while narrow, are still discernible and significant Exploiting them is worthwhile if modest gains move us away from the brink of nuclear holocaust and save lives even as we resign ourselves to intermittent but chronic disorder and dislocation The final section of the paper suggests some small steps that might be taken to ameliorate the more threatening features of our present plight

Overview of the Argument

The very success of the process of globalizing the nation-state as the basic unit of international relations has been the single most important factor explaining the militarization of the developing world The Cold War has certainly been a catalyst, as each of the superpowers have transferred enormous quantities of arms to developing states in their search for allies We tend to forget, however, that the superpower competition is itself a manifestation of the historic nation-state competition Their struggle is evidence of the problem of the system's incipient anarchy, as Kenneth Waltz reminds us,[1] rather than a viable solution for it In arming themselves, they have acted in their own national interests, however otherwise those interests have been veiled or even genuinely informed by ideological considerations

Were there no superpowers and we had before us merely a collection of equally powerful developed nation-states -- after the model of previous centuries -- the arms races characterizing the global scene today would still very likely be an enormous political problem facing the international community The proliferation of military establishments and organized centers for the use of force are synonymous with the rise of the modern state [2] Its task remains that of settling differences among those pledging -- or compelled to pledge -- loyalty to it and of defending its territory and population against outside attack In the absence of a higher law or moral prescription to which states and their leaders can appeal or some form of accommodation or compromise among rival nations that can resolve

interstate or intrastate conflicts, force or its threat is the great arbiter of differences between domestic groups and foreign peoples The security dilemma with which we are all familiar was not created by the superpower conflict, it simply deepened the problem and divided the world community along yet another axis in the wake of the decolonization process, accelerated and accented by the antagonism between Moscow and Washington but not necessarily the product of that dispute

The triumph of the nation-state, as the provisional answer to the security problem confronting all peoples and the world community, is joined by the revolutionary force of modernization (including reactionary responses like Khomeiny's Iran to it) as the second most powerful explanation for the militarization of the world, including the developing states Modernization has several characteristics, more or less related, although the rate of development and the impact of its several features differs from state to state depending on a host of varying local factors and conditions Modernization refers (1) to the development of national consciousness and unity over tribal, religious, ethnic, or linguistic barriers to internal cohesion, (2) to the definition of personal worth and social role from ascription as a condition of birth to earned or politically assigned status based in varying measure on some notion of social and economic utility and of expanded mass participation (or mobilization) in political affairs,[3] (3) to the reform of domestic socio-economic political institutions, (4) to the preoccupation of revolutionary groups and governments with the socio-economic welfare of national populations, and (5) to the growth of the size and technical

proficiency of the military establishment viewed both as an instrument and as an end of reform

The modernization process has been synchronous, if not synonymous, with the experience of violent conflict and with the steady growth of military centers of power around the globe While these characteristics of modernization have occurred in many parts of the globe without resort to force or its threat, militarization and modernization are not strangers to each other, their histories are entwined, and they enjoy intimate company in the theories of political change advanced by social scientists and political reformers [4]

In short, force pays -- or appears to pay It meets the broad security needs of peoples, it responds -- or seems to respond -- to the driving forces behind modernization's several dimensions In light of this real or perceived success story, it is pointless to the partisans of militarization to underscore its shortcomings the undermining of the security function by overarming[5] or the corruption of the modernization process by the subversion of popular aspirations for the sake of personal aggrandizement (Khaddafi's Libya), by the horrendous costs of transition to a brave new world (Pol Pot's Cambodia), by the squandering of resources (oil for prestige arms like F-14s for the Shah of Iran and F-15's for Saudi Arabia), or by the disruptive and destructive reactionary movements that they inspire (Khomeiny's Iran or Pinochet's Chile)

If force seems to pay, then it may also pay us to look more closely at its successes and the incentives that are raised in the calculations of decision-makers in developing states to continue on the present path toward ever greater qualitative and quantitative militarization A greater

appreciation of these incentives suggests the kinds of remedies needed either to reduce the impact on decisions that support militarization (where it occurs), to channel militarization toward constructive purposes, like regional peacekeeping and the support of non-alignment, and to create zones of stability that will encourage arms control and disarmament negotiations and accords

The Security Dilemma Viewed as an Opportunity
The Experience of the Developing States

The decolonization experience so far provides little support and less comfort for those who would like to cite history to demonstrate the limited utility of force today World Wars I and II, in devastating the European powers, also destroyed the Eurocentric system and, along with it, the colonial structure that was an integral component of the Eurocentric world The Cold War gave impetus to the decolonization process The superpower conflict induced Moscow and Washington, in search of allies everywhere, to portray themselves as the friends of national self-determination The European colonial powers had to learn this lesson the hard way at Suez The Nasser regime survived because it could play upon the pressures exerted by the superpowers on the European states In condemning France's and Britain's invasion, the United States exposed the dependency of its allies on the American security guarantee The Soviet Union's sabre-rattling provided the occasion for the exercise of American power The audience before which this fleeting display of superpower unity was enacted was, of course, the developing states whose allegiance remains a continuing concern of each superpower's global strategy

Increased military capability appears useful to developing states for a variety of purposes related to decolonization to complete the decolonization process, to preserve non-alignment in the Cold War struggle that, incidentally, has aided the self-determination movement, and to fend off efforts by the developed states, particularly the superpowers, to re-establish colonial rule under a different guise The civil strife in Namibia is only the latest installment of the long African effort to end white colonial rule South Africa remains the final bastion The peaceful engagement policy of the Reagan administration may bring about desired change Many Africans, however, are not betting solely on that dubious prospect Similarly, Palestinians and their supporters -- or those who use them for their purposes -- are not easily convinced that Israel will agree to a Palestinian homeland, short of the threat or use of arms The aim of a Palestinian state assumes in many Arabs minds, whatever the substantive truth of the perception, a struggle against western imperialism

American-Soviet interventions around the globe are also a source of concern The American record in Latin America is long and durable Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), Santo Domingo (1965), Chile (1973), Grenada (1983), and, on a longer-term basis, El Salvador and Nicaragua In Asia, memories of Vietnam have not waned In Africa, there is Angola and intermittent support for the South African regime as well as Zaire Lebanon in 1958 and 1984 bracket continued American efforts to influence and shape internal Middle East politics With the growth of Soviet military capabilities -- increased airlift and a blue water navy -- the ability to intervene has been matched by a heightened willingness to exercise Soviet power Afghanistan is the most blatant example, but

sizeable Soviet military detachments are garrisoned in Cuba and Syria with additional missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia

These decolonization and counter-colonization efforts tell only a part of the story of the militarization of the developing states By their own measure, success in arms reinforces the need for strong, modern military establishments From several perspectives, more and better arms and militarization make sense The military prowess of the developing states, has determined outcomes of interstate conflicts and has been a decisive factor in deciding the victorious parties in intrastate strife These successes, in turn, highlight the strategic assets at the disposal of the developing states and their utility as bargaining levers and chips in extracting concessions from other states, particularly the superpowers [6]

The incentives for militarization are also rooted in regional conflicts Winners and losers are not dissuaded by the costs and risks of military preparedness India and Israel owe their regional dominance to victories on the battlefield Their adversaries, however, have not relented, but have re-doubled their efforts to regain their lost status Iraq's Hussein might well regret his country's attack on Iran after four years of costly war, but at the start of the conflict, most analysts favored Iraq's chances of imposing its demands on the Khomeiny regime Similarly, Argentina's ruling junta felt it could impose its demands on Britain by a show of force That it lost and was toppled from power does not negate the point that the incentives for using or threatening force are great despite the many setbacks experienced by specific nations State leaders assume that losses in war happen to someone else, they act much

like many of us when we consider our chances about being involved in an automobile accident

The chances taken by Iraq and Argentina were prompted by the calculation made by all strategists the likelihood of gaining advantages by force appears to outweigh immediate costs or risks Little else except some form of balancing counterforce appears effective to dissuade resort to violence, although mounting such an effort can easily generate into a destabilizing arms race As Andre Beaufre has shown,[7] these sobering considerations are recognized more in the breach than in the observance since expected losses appear tolerable while gains seem certain and clear at hand War has not lost its luster among many developing states nor do many look upon it as reprehensible as is the case among many developed states Furthermore nuclear weapons, as Yehezkel Dror argues,[8] are also approached with less disdain among Third World nations Important barriers to proliferation are increasingly in danger of being transgressed We now have a Christian, Communist, Hindu and Jewish bomb Can an Islamic bomb be far behind?

The number of successful military interventions launched by developing states to control the political fate of other states and their governments gives a fillip to militarization that is hard to argue away Cuba's intervention in Ethiopia and Angola turned the tide in favor of Communist-backed governments Morocco restored Zaire's control of Shaba province The northern half of Chad has fallen under Libyan influence Algeria skillfully checks Morocco's pretentions to the western Sahara by providing arms and sanctuary to the Polisario

Table 1 outlines the military interventions initiated by African states against neighbors to establish order, to counter or to support insurgencies, and, generally, to influence or control the political processes and governmental decisions within other states The use of Cuban troops to bolster sagging Ethiopian forces against Somalia and Eritrean rebels and to ensure the victory of the Neto regime in Angola illustrate spectacularly how developing states are mastering the soldiering skills of the developed states and are spearheading fundamental restructuring of the domestic political orders of third states Of the 33 interventions noted in Table 1 over the past twenty years in Africa, approximately two-thirds can be categorized as successes

Other regions record similar favorable outcomes for the intervening state, whatever one may think of the threat to regional or global peace that the use of military force may entail India's intervention in the Pakistan civil war led, simultaneously, to the creation of Bangladesh and to undisputed Indian dominance over South Asia Syria's stock is now high as its clients in Lebanon score heavily against the Lebanese army and the United States Vietnam's hold on Southeast Asia remains firm despite Chinese and ASEAN efforts to contain Hanoi in Cambodia and Laos

As winners in these age-old nation-state security games, developing states possessing effective military forces inevitably become attractive partners for other nations, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union Former American Secretary of State Alexander Haig referred often to Argentina and South Africa as valuable strategic assets to anchor his ill-considered conception of what should be the West's strategy in the southern hemisphere Off-and-on, Washington has considered Israel an

TABLE 1
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS BY DEVELOPING STATES IN AFRICA
1964-present*

Target State	Intervening State	Time Span	Forces Involved		Outcome
Zanzibar	Tanganyika	1/17/64-4/6/64	100-200 police	Internal Security (IS)	Success
Tanganyika	U K and Nigeria	U K 1/25/64-4/26/64 Nigeria 3/28/64-mid-summer 1964	600 British 600 Nigerian	IS	
Congo(Leopoldville, Kinshasa)	Ethiopia Ghana, Belgium, U S	7/12/67-12/67	various elements	IS	Success
Nigeria	Egypt	8/68-8/69(?)	Small number of combat troops and ground crews	IS	Success
Sudan	Egypt	3/27-30/70	Egyptian pilots	Counter Insurgency (CI)	Success
Sierra Leone	Guinea	3/28/71-early 72(?)	200 troops, plus helicopters	IS	Success
Burundi	Zaire	4/30/72-mid-72(?)	100 troops, & jet fighters	CI	Success
Uganda	Libya	9/20/72-1974	approx 400 military technicians (Palestinians, plus transport aircraft)	CI	No clear outcome
Angola	South Africa	8/75-3/26/76	4000-5000 troops with armor & air transport	Support Insurgency	Failure
Angola	Zaire (see above)	9/75-1/76	Two commando battalions plus armor and artillery	Support Insurgency	Failure

Target State	Intervening State	Time Span	Forces Involved	Type of Operation	Outcome
Angola	Cuba	7/75-present	up to 20,000 Cubans with armor, artillery and air support	CI	Success
Mauritania	Morocco	12/20/75-9/9/79	9000 troops with armor & air support	CI	Failure
Mozambique	Tanzania	1976-1979	200-1000 combat troops	External Defense	Success
Zaire	France/ Morocco (U S)	4/7/77- May, 1977	France 65 advisors & air transport Morocco 1500 infantry	CI	Success
Zaire	France	May, 1978	French paratroopers	Humanitarian	Success
Ethiopia	Somalia	7/77-3/15/78	17000-40000 troops, with armor & air support	Support Insurgency	Failure
Ethiopia	USSR, East Germany, S Yemen, Cuba	1/78-present	Russia 1500 military, E Germany 1000, S Yemen 3000, Cuba 22000 with armor, air support	CI	Success in Ogaden, mixed results in Eritrea
Equatorial Guinea	Cuba	1978-80	500	IS	Failure
Sao Tome & Principe	Angola/Cuba	2/78-1981	1500 Angolan troops with Cuban advisors	IS	Success
Chad	Libya	4/78-6/80	3-4000, with armor and air support	Support Insurgency	Success
Uganda	Tanzania	1/79-4/24/79	30000-40000 troops, with armor/air support	Support Insurgency	Success

Target State	Intervening State	Time Span	Forces Involved	Type of Operation	Outcome
Uganda	Tanzania/ Mozambique	3/25/79- present	Initially 3000-4000 troops, by 1979, 1500	CI	Success
Uganda	Libya	3/79-4/24/79	approx 2500 with Palestinians	External Defense	Failure
Chad	Nigeria	4/7/79- 6/3/79	1600 armed infantry	Peace-keeping	Failure
Equatorial Guinea	Morocco	9/24/79- present	200 military	IS	Success
Chad	Zaire/OAU	1/27/80- May, 80	500 troops from Zaire	Peace-keeping	Failure
Chad	Libya	6/1980- 11/3/81	8000-9000 troops, with armor and air support	CI	Success
Gambia	Senegal	10/28/80- 11/9/80	400	IS	Success
Gambia	Senegal	8/2/81- present(?)	2700-5000	IS	Success
Chad	Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, OAU	11/15/81- 6/82	Zaire 600 Nigeria 2000 Senegal 600	Peace-keeping	Failure
Somalia	Ethiopia	Fall, 1981- present	unknown	Support Insurgency	Uncertain
Chad	Libya	Spring, 1983 -present	3000-6000	Support Insurgency	Uncertain
Chad	France/ Zaire	August, 1983 -present	3000-France 2000-Zaire	CI	Uncertain

*Source University of Illinois Research Team, Factors Affecting the Role and Employment of Peacekeeping Forces in Africa South of the Sahara, Contract No MDA 908-82-C-0174 (December, 1982) and authors update

extension of American military power in the Middle East Only recently the Reagan administration gave form to this thinking in military accords signed between the Israeli and American governments No less does the Soviet Union see Cuban, Vietnamese, and Syrian military forces as instruments of its efforts to increase its influence around the globe

The strategic assets at the disposal of developing states are, of course, greater than simply the increasingly large and sophisticated forces that they have created Bases, for use in a wide variety of third state security activities, also make developing states attractive Robert Harkavy's Great Powers Competition for Overseas Bases traces the growth of superpower basing systems to support their armed forces and to cover a wide range of activities repair facilities, storage of ammunition and supplies, anchorage and overflights, refueling, crew R and R, staging, flag showing, communication links, navigation reconnaissance and intelligence, satellite tracking, and garrisoning of troops [9] Developing states have also been helpful in re-transferring arms (e g Libyan Mirages to Egypt) in financing arms acquisitions (e g Saudi support for Morocco's war against the Polisario), in gathering intelligence (Israel on the Arab states), in proposing peace initiatives (Morocco and Saudi efforts on behalf of the PLO), and in support of terrorism and counter-terrorism (PLO, Libyan Israeli, and Northern Irish activities)

Modernization, Militarization, and the Domestication of International Relations

Except for the Bangladesh episode, the nation-state as a unit of political organization has held up remarkably well It has survived

decolonization and the Cold War The bipolarity of the superpower conflict has been fundamentally shaped and inflected by the rise of new centers of power in the developing world The interests and demands of these states cannot be ignored, as suggested above, since they are able to affect outcomes between states at war and between rival factions vying to control the government of a state Developing states must now be counted among the significant international actors determining -- to use Arnold Wolfers' characterization -- possession and milieu goals [10] The latter have become increasingly important and represent the principal aim of military force today, whether used directly or as a bargaining lever The distinction between high and low politics, so precious to power politics analysts, has lost much of its theoretical and practical force as international relations have become increasingly domesticated

Closely associated with this domestication process, but distinguishable from it, is the use or threat of organized violence to speed and ensure the modernization process in its various forms It is perhaps conceptually and analytically possible to separate the processes of militarization and modernization, but they are, however, more closely entwined and symbiotically reinforcing than the well intentioned proponents of arms control and disarmament would like us to believe Nor can they be simply associated with a particular socio-economic order, like capitalism, as some authors would have us conclude [11] What explains Syrian President Assad's systematic extermination of dissidents within his regime or Idi Amin's terrorism against his own people?

For purposes of analysis five different features of the modernization process have been identified Militarization can be associated with each

one First, in many states the army is not only the state but the principal vehicle for nation-building and the glue that holds together a society otherwise at odds with itself The large number of military regimes on the Right and Left around the world suggest the critical role that the military play in maintaining national cohesion Like Prussia before, many nations may be characterized as states in search of a national identity The Central African Republic, Zaire, and Sudan fit this image Controlling fissiparous and centrifugal forces within national societies is among the key roles played by military forces, as in Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt and Guatemala

This nation-building and system-maintenance role, while a necessary condition of modernization, is not sufficient for its full expression Military regimes, like Samoza's Nicaragua and Marcos' Philippines, are used by conservative elements as barriers to the emergence of domestic socio-economic and political institutions that elicit increased popular participation in national politics and that private social development of the poor and disadvantaged and a redistributionof wealth It has been almost inevitable that the reliance on military force to show modernization has compelled a corresponding resort to violence to overthrow these <u>anciens regimes</u> Once a new order, as in Cuba and in Nicaragua, is installed newly acquired coercive habits are hard to break These modernization trends are by no means liberal or democratic when viewed from a western perspective Modernizing regimes are often no less oppressive than their authoritarian predecessors -- even worse as the Pol Pot regime reveals They are, however, animated by a pervasive reformist urge that is largely opposed to traditional ways and feudal arrangements and to privileges for

the few The slow, painful, disruptive transformation of the western world from Gemeinschaft to Gesselschaft has now spread to the rest of the globe, bringing with it new and powerful incentives to arm, whether to create a revolution, preserve it, or to export it to other states to ensure the survival of these socio-political transformations Militarism and modernism, like Siamese twins sharing a common circulatory system, are viewed as so mutually dependent that most leaders of the developing world, can hardly conceive them as ever being separated

More, of course, is at play than simply the destruction of feudal institutions and special privilege to open the way for lasting reform Even democratic states, like India, have adopted strategies and rationalized government expenditures that tie inextricably the nation's security and welfare functions Since the problems of security, broadly conceived, have put pressures on developing states to increase their defense expenditures, they have tried to decrease the cost of arms purchases abroad to save their reserves and to maximize their independence As a result, they have gradually developed their own arms industries

Not only are developing states able to produce more weapons than ever before but they are also able to design and fabricate a larger variety of sophisticated weapons systems Table 2 lists the growing number of states in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East which produce weapon systems in four major categories -- aircraft, armored vehicles, tactical missiles, and naval vessels and the number of systems that states within each category are producing The level of production independence achieved by a state with respect to a particular weapon system varies The range, as defined by Andrew Ross, covers licensed assembly at the lowest point of

Table 2

ARMS PRODUCTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1960, 1970, 1980

AIRCRAFT	1960		1970		1980	
	# of countries	# of systems	# of countries	# of systems	# of countries	# of systems
Fighters	1	2	3	4	6	10
Trainers (jet)	3	3	4	4	3	5
Trainers (basic)	6	7	5	6	11	13
Maritime (reconnaissance)	-	-	-	-	2	2
Transports	1	1	4	6	8	11
Aircraft (engines)	1	1	2	2	6	8
Helicopters	1	1	2	2	11	15
Avionics	-	-	-	-	3	3
Total	7	15	8	24	18	67
GROUND EQUIPMENT						
Tanks	-	-	3	3	5	6
APC	-	-	1	2	5	6
Armored Cars	-	-	2	2	2	2
Reconnaissance Vehicles	-	-	-	-	2	2
Armored Bridgelayers	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total	-	-	5	7	6	17
MISSILES						
Surface-to-air	-	-	-	-	5	6
Air-to-ground	-	-	1	1	3	3
Air-to-air	1	1	2	2	5	5
Surface-to-surface	1	1	1	1	3	4
Anti-tank	-	-	1	1	7	8
Total	1	2	5	5	9	26
NAVAL VESSELS						
Frigates	1	1	1	1	4	5
Corvettes	2	2	2	2	1	1
Patrol Craft	8	8	13	13	20	25
Submarines	-	-	-	-	3	3
Amphibious Craft	1	1	2	2	4	4
Support Craft	6	6	4	4	7	7
Total	13	18	15	22	25	45

Sources Andrew L Ross, Arms Production in Developing Countries The Continuing Proliferation of Conventional Weapons, No N-1615-AF, Rand Corporation Note, Santa Monica, California, 1981, pp 16-19 and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook, 1974, pp 230-258, and ibid, 1980, pp 168-173 (Cambridge Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Inc) The People's Republic of China is excluded

capability to licensed component production, licensed system production, system modification and reverse engineering, dependent R & D and production, and independent R & D and production at succeedingly higher levels on the scale [12] In short, the number of states producing weapons of any kind, the number of different weapons produced by these states, and the levels of production independence reached by these states are increasing

In each of the weapons categories that are listed in Table 2, the number of states producing a particular item has grown, in several cases they have more than doubled in the decade between 1970 and 1980 Several areas bear particular notice Between 1970 and 1980, the number of states producing fighters grew from three to six, basic trainers from five to eleven, and helicopters from two to eleven Over-all, the number of states in the developing world producing aircraft at some level of independence doubled from eight to eighteen [13] Similarly, naval craft producers climbed from fifteen to twenty five with a significant increase in the number of states capable of producing patrol and support craft [14]

Production of armored vehicles and tactical missiles has grown more slowly Over the decade since 1970, the number of states producing tanks increased from three to five and armored personnel carriers (APCs) from one to five The total number of ground armor producing states rose from five to six [15] The producers of tactical missiles tripled in the same period from five to nine [16] Producers of SAM missiles leaped from zero to five,[17] those producing anti-tank weapons, from one to seven [18] Five states (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and South Africa) produce arms at some level of independent capability in all four major categories

These figures also imply a high stage of technological development since aircraft, missiles, electronics, and aircraft engines require a broad scientific, engineering, and industrial base However much countries like China or India may still be considered underdeveloped, measured by GNP and per capita income, they have been able to accumulate the technological systems to produce advanced military equipment One can metaphorically speak of a Belgium emerging from India or a Netherlands arising from an otherwise underdeveloped South Korea The same process of modernization, with military technology as the spearhead, may be seen to be operating in other states, like Brazil, Pakistan, and Argentina [19] Modernization is seen to be partially a function of a technologically advanced warfighting and economic system, linked to a capacity to sell arms and military know-how abroad

The interest in advanced military technology is associated logically with still another indicator of the growing military capability of developing states the proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 shattered any remaining illusions that nuclear proliferation might be arrested in the developing world [20] The Chinese nuclear explosion, based on a sophisticated enrichment process, should have ended such hopes, a decade earlier Pakistan, according to public reports, is rapidly approaching the explosion of the first Islamic bomb [21] Other candidates for nuclear status include Iraq, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina Many analysts assume that Israel has acquired the necessary technology and has assembled, short of testing, several nuclear bombs [22]

Developing states are already exporting their surplus arms production capacity abroad Among developing states, Israel, Brazil, and, to a lesser extent, South Korea have enjoyed some success as arms suppliers Israel has reached world stature as a supplier of quality products, some indigenously produced, like the Gabriel surface-to-surface missile, or adapted the technology of its suppliers, like the Kfir fighter, patterned after the French Mirage airframe and powered by US-built GE engines

Israel sells military arms and equipment to a wide range of customers, including West Germany, Indonesia, South Africa, Singapore, Taiwan, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and, until recently, Nicaragua It has reportedly sold war materiel to Iran although diplomatic relations between the two states have been severed Its Daggar aircraft, capable of being armed with air-to-ground missiles, is currently being employed by Argentine air forces It also produces civil aircraft, all forms of tactical missiles (listed in Table 2), patrol boats, armored vehicles, artillery and small arms, radar systems, communication and navigation systems, industrial and shipborne monitoring and control systems, medical electronics, microelectronics, computers and computerized communications systems, fire control systems, security systems, air and ground crew equipment, ground-support equipment, and microwave components [23] ACDA lists exports of $260 million for 1981 and $360 million for 1982, figures that are likely to be conservative [24]

Brazil has also captured markets in the Middle East and Africa and must be considered an important arms supplier It has sold equipment, especially light armored vehicles, to Togo, Libya, Qatar, and Iraq The Cascavel, a light armored vehicle that mounts a 90 mm cannon and carries

laser range-finders, has seen service with Iraqi armed forces in the war with Iran and with Libyan forces in Chad Brazil's state-owned Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica (Embraer) is the world's sixth largest aviation firm It sells the twin-engine Bandeirante aircraft worldwide and also manufactures the Xavante jet under Italian license Brazilian arms are also attractive to developed states The United States Marines closely studied a Brazilian light tank for possible purchase, and France has already purchased Brazilian light transport aircraft for its armed forces Brazil is likely to continue to invest in its arms industry in the future As one close student of Brazilian politics and foreign and security policy observes

> Brazilian arms are especially attractive to third-world countries since they are comparatively simple, high quality, and free of ideological ties Because of the growing demand for Brazilian arms, and given that Brazil must increase exports to compensate for rising petroleum prices, the state continues to assign a high priority to investment in what already is the largest and most sophisticated conventional-weapons industry in South America As a major arms supplier, Brazil will be able to exert greater pressure on its neighbors and to increase its influence in the emerging commercial markets of black Africa, the Middle East, and Asia [25]

There is much force in the argument that spending resources on arms reduces what can be devoted to human welfare, and there is considerable documentation comparing expenditures for both objectives [26] However, this relationship is far from being a zero-sum game as perceived by national decision-makers concerned with security and welfare problems [27] As this paper has suggested, there are powerful economic and technological incentives that prompt decision-makers in developing states to invest in

arms production At least in the short and middle term, marginal gains appear to be forthcoming, justifying the original investment It does little good to argue with the leadership of these national production centers that they are wasting national resources, much less does the argument cut that global resources are being squandered with the result that regional and world tensions are likely to rise These considerations apparently have lesser weight when one examines the specific decision taken by decision-makers at the national level where resource allocation goes on Announced commmitments to arms control goals or to a decrease in arms traffic are repeatedly subordinated by arms producing states to the continued expansion of military production and transfers Neutralist governments in India and Brazil, while critical of superpower arms policies, are committed to the expansion and improvement of their arms producing and marketing capabilities India integrates economic and military planning, going further than some non-western states The Brazilian leadership is no less bent on a policy of military and economic independence, however doubtful or illusory that goal may appear [28]

Some analysts in the developing world are prepared to argue that economic development can actually be spurred either as a spin-off of military preparedness or, further, as a direct result of military expenditures The welfare-defense debate may be characterized in these terms If the predominant opinion within India still views defense spending as an economic burden, influential segments of the security community promote military expenditures and arms production as complements of civilian economic development or as a motor-force of the civilian economy [29]

From a political and psychological perspective, the economic claims of these schools of thought are not especially relevant What counts more, often more than real economic benefits, in determining resource allocations favoring arms production is the perception of economic and technological gain Further research will be needed to determine the validity of the economic claims of supporters of increased defense spending and arms production as well as the political influence of these advocates at the national level in allocating scarse resourse for arms and welfare If the upward increase in global military spending, especially on the part of developing states is any guide, and if reference to specific case studies of the behavior of national leaders in Israel, Brazil, and India are any indication, the argument that one must sacrifice welfare for military prowess and vice versa is by no means universally accepted Many go beyond the guns-butter tradeoff and argue that a nation gets more butter because of guns

Some of the incentives for militarization, outlined above, are reflected in Tables 3-6 in the expansion among developing states of military expenditures, personnel, and capabilities They show upward trends, respectively, in absolute military expenditures, per capita expenditures, arms imports, and the size of armed forces They suggest not only a response to security and modernization but a process by which militarization fuels itself Military and militarized regimes tend to favor their own needs and interests even at the expense of decreased welfare expenditures In many quarters within the developing world, the modern military establishment is regarded as a measure of modernization Since scientific and technological progress furnishes ever new levels of

TABLE 6

ARMS IMPORTS OF THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING WORLD, 1970-1979

(in billion constant 1978 dollars)



Source ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979, p 7

efficient and effective lethality, the military modernization process becomes open-ended Created is a vicious cycle security and modernization imperatives that drive the reform of domestic socio-economic institutions, the re-distributions and equalization of natural wealth, greater industrialization, and increased technological development provide the occasion for enhanced militarization which, once commenced, becomes self-perpetuating

NEUTRALIZING AND NEGATING THE INCENTIVES OF MILITARIZATION

Taming the Superpowers and Disengaging from the Cold War

The incentives favoring militarization today would appear to outweigh the costs and risks run in pursuing such a policy The upward curve of the indicators displayed in Tables 3-6 are a source of concern If the analysis above is correct, militarization, measured as some form of quantitative and qualitative increase in arms capability in the developing world, is deeply embedded in the nation-state system and in the modernization process sweeping through the system One is led to the unsettling conclusion that both would have to be dismantled or transformed before the play of force or the threat of violence in resolving conflicts were eliminated We would face the paradoxical situation that overwhelming force would have to be marshalled to bring about a reversal of deep, unrelenting historical trends of passionate concern to literally billions of people

It may be argued that the superpowers have, indeed, attempted to do precisely that to bend the globalization of the nation-state and modernization process to their advantage While representing themselves as

the friends of national self-determination and the partisans of reform, the superpower conflict can be viewed as an attempt by Moscow and Washington to capture and enlist these forces for their needs and interests They have invested enormous military resources either in the direct use of force or in the form of military aid and arms to promote their national and ideological objectives in the developing world Many believe in both camps that the East-West balance hangs on the outcome of the North-South conflict Witness Soviet support of wars of liberation and American efforts in Vietnam and El Salvador to prevent foreign intervention, to forestall domestic takeover by hostile elements, and to reform domestic institutions in order to neutralize the source of revolutionary warfare, viz , the disadvantaged who are mobilized to oppose the government

In the name of collective security (Truman and Brezhnev doctrines), both superpowers ostensibly defend nation-states against foreign invasion and seek to preserve and extend either liberal-democratic or socialist economic and political institutions around the world Neither has the capability to impose its will on the global political system nor to ensure that its preferences become law in guiding the political and institutional development of the developing world The superpowers are blocked partly as a consequence of the will and capacity of the developing state to resist superpower pressures or to manipulate the conflict at the expense of one or the other of them -- or both If the postwar experience is any guide and if the current phase of the superpower conflict is any indication, both will undoubtedly continue to try to widen their influence The prospects for superpower accommodation in the developing world in the foreseeable future do not appear high

Lacking a federator to impose order on the international system and confronting the likelihood of more and increasingly lethal and destructive upheaval in attempts by the superpowers to try to play a federator role, what can the developing states do to lower the possibilities and prospects of global and regional conflict within the existing nation-state structure and under the pressures of continued social, economic and political change? In other words, how can the current forces dominating the global scene be used or tempered to decrease the costs and risks of militarization and how can they be directed toward peacekeeping and regional stability?

Two general principles would appear useful to guide and control the militarization process (1) insulate the superpower conflict as much as possible from conflicts in the developing world and (2) de-militarize the modernization process Both principles, while easy to state, are extremely difficult to apply The following points are designed to be modest steps toward them

The non-alignment movement, currently polarized and moribund, needs to be revived as a response to the heightened tensions between the superpowers That will be hard The visionary and strong leadership of the original non-aligned movement has not been replaced by a cadre of similar stature and imagination States, like Cuba and Egypt, have tarnished their credentials in aligning, respectively, with the Soviet Union and the United States Internal splits within the movement have also weakened the force of these states in international negotiations

The incentives for non-alignment still exist What is partly lacking is an institutional vehicle to give stability and direction to the grouping Formed, say, within the U N , like the Group of 77, the

non-aligned movement would have a dual task to press the superpower to agree to arms control and disarmament accords at the nuclear and conventional levels and to oversee superpower security activities in the principal regions of the world This might include annual reports of military actions (e g the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the U S in El Salvador), movements of troops, base agreements and use of foreign facilities, military advisory missions, and arms and military technology transfers

These monitoring tasks of the developing states would aim at exposing the threats to regional and global peace posed by American and Soviet military policies and behavior There currently exists no independent agency within the U N that tracks superpower moves The International Institute for Strategic Studies and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute attempt part of this job, but neither focuses specifically on plotting superpower behavior and influence in the developing world A monitoring agency attached to a non-aligned grouping would presumably have the resources and interest to shed light on superpower moves that might undermine the non-aligned movement In this regard, the French proposal to invest the U N with its own intelligence satellites makes sense It would provide an independent means for verifying the superpower strategic balance It would be an international instrument available to monitor superpower accords under START and perhaps under a revived superpower conventional arms transfer talks (CAT)

Developing states should also continue to diversify their sources of supply for arms and military technology and, where feasible, undertake their own production If militarization cannot be excised from the

nation-state system and modernization process, its more harmful effects can perhaps be softened and contained Reducing dependency on the superpowers is a useful first step Where arms purchases threaten a state's economic reserves and balance of payments situation, it may make sense to encourage domestic production as the best, if imperfect, means available today to respond to often contradictory security and modernization imperatives

Second, regional security organizations should be fostered They are useful insulators against superpower depredations They can be expected to play a moderating role in reducing regional conflict and even a peacekeeping function at some time in the future All this will take time, but the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Contadora group within the Organization of American States (OAS), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations suggest that such groupings can be useful buffers between the superpowers and act as peacemakers within their regions or as checks against local hegemonists These organizations also have an interest in monitoring arms and military technology flows within their spheres of interest It would appear useful to lodge these monitoring services within the same agency formed by the non-aligned movement within the U N An international staff of experts, with access to global intelligence services of the military attache system and strategic research centers around the globe, could publish annual reviews on militarization, measured by expenditures made on arms, the kind and number of materials produced or purchased abroad, and the transfers and aid made to a nation by the superpowers or third states creating new and more sensitive instruments than we now have to measure militarization would also be among its major responsibilities

Armed with these data, and data impact statements, similar to arms control evaluations required by U S statute to accompany new weapons proposals, might be published The military council envisioned by the U N Charter might well be reorganized and given new life as an arms control watchdog rather than to plan, as originally envisioned, operations on behalf of collective security roles that are beyond the U N 's capacity to pursue An international military staff of experts could be used to sound the alarm of emerging disequilibrium whether as a result of superpower activities or of local powers bent on gaining ascendancy at the expense of their neighbors

Third, where clear ascendancy has been achieved, it should be recognized as a fact of international life and recorded by the United Nations as a fait accompli Such realism is in keeping with the intent of the founders of the U N Charter that assigned special security responsibilities and authority to the Security Council and its five permanent members States like India in South Asia, Nigeria in Black Africa, and Brazil in Latin America play, because of their size and resources as well as their real or emerging military prowess, critical regional security roles Their importance should be acknowledged by the world community and their regional positions formalized to provide an incipient political structure to a region Although local adversaries will certainly resist extending such status, it make little sense to ignore the military weight of selected developing states and their special responsibility for regional and global security Some states are more equal than others, however otherwise they migh. be legally and morally equivalent

In this respect, a country like Japan, while not a developing state, should also enjoy permanent Security Council membership Its elevation would emphasize its special role in the international economic system and the link between that system and peace in the developing world Japan's participation would symbolize the need to address the non-military determinants of security on a systematic basis and to enlist the developed and developing states in this enterprise

In this connection, the European Community might also be given a permanent seat As a civil body it would have a special role for pressing the need for progress in augmenting southern-tier welfare as a bar to civil strife, regional conflict, and superpower intervention In this way the positive aspects of modernization would be emphasized and efforts designed to promote them would be addressed in the Security Council in a non-threatening manner Although the current permanent members of the Security Council resist tying narrowly conceived security issues to human welfare, there is ample reason for the developing states to press this point while there is still time to deal with security and modernization questions on a broad front

As Table 7 suggests, military expenditures in constant 1978 dollars has been surprisingly level in Africa, Latin American, and South Asia in the 1970s To keep them flat and to lower the level of spending in the Middle East and East Asia, the security and welfare of the peoples living in these regions will have to be addressed as different aspects of what in the final analysis appears to be a single problem

The problem of peace is so complex that it seems reasonable to seek it in regional parts and to fashion security and modernization strategies

TABLE 7

MILITARY EXPENDITURES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD BY REGIONS, 1970-1979

(in billion constant 1978 dollars)



Source ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979, pp 43-46

appropriate to each region If war cannot be eliminated from a particular region, then perhaps its infection to other regions and to the rest of the globe can be quarantined That is a more modest goal than one seeking global harmony and prosperity By that token it is more likely to be within our reach We have to take the world as it is, as a world of parts, and attempt to keep as many of these pieces as intact as possible in making them the elements of an evolving mosaic, often maddeningly within pattern but nevertheless informed by a sense of what works Such a peace will undoubtedly be shaky and unsettling but very likely safer than that which we have currently fashioned

FOOTNOTES

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2 Alfred Vagts, History of Militarism, (New York Meridian, revised, 1979), John H Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York David McKay, 1976)

3 Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first to recognize that the rise of massed based governmental systems would be dominated by considerations of mobilization to achieve political objectives and that mobilization would be based on some levelling notion of equality by which the mass could be mobilized as a mass See Alexis De Tocqueville, De la Democratie en Amerique (Paris Pagnerre, 1850), 2 vols

4 See for example, Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York Columbia University Press, 1959)

5 The security dilemma is explicated in Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1976)

6 These points are developed at greater length in the following Edward A Kolodziej and Robert E Harkavy, Developing States and the International Security System, in The Foreign Policy Priorities of Third World States, edited by John Stremlau (Boulder Westview, 1982), pp 19-48, and Edward A Kolodziej and Robert E Harkavy, Security Policies of Developing Countries (Lexington Lexington Books, 198), pp 331-368

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8 Yehezkel Dror, Nuclear Weapons in Third World Conflict, in Adelphi Paper, No 161, The Future of Strategic Deterrence (London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), Part II, pp 45-52

9 Robert E Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases (New York Pergamon, 1982)

10 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) For a brief, but stimulating review of current trends in the evolving structure of the international system, see Stanley Hoffmann, Security in an Age of Turbulence Means of Response, in Third-World Conflict and International Security, Part II (London International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), pp 1-18

11 See Mary Kaldor and Ashborn Eide, eds , The World Military Order (London Macmillan, 1979)

12 Andrew L Ross, see Table 2

13 Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand

14 Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Israel, Ivory Coast, North Korea, South Korea, Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela

15 Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, South Korea, South Africa

16 Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, South Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, Taiwan

17 Brazil, India, Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan

18 Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Taiwan

19 See articles on these three states, respectively, by Professors David Myers, Stephen Cohen, and Edward Milenky, in Security Policies of Developing Countries, n 6

20 For a useful review of developing state nuclear programs, consult John Kerry King, ed , International Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D C Government Printing Office, 1979), and George Quester, ed , Nuclear Proliferation (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1981)

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22 Robert E Harkavy, Spectre of a Middle Eastern Holocaust (Denver University of Denver Press, 1977), also S Aronson, Nuclearization of the Middle East The Jerusalem Quarterly, No 2 (Winter, 1977), pp 27-44

23 The list is drawn from Bernard Reich's analysis of Israeli security policy in Security Policies of Developing Countries, pp 216-217

24 U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (Washington, D C Government Printing Office, 1984), p 73

25 Myers, Security Policies of Developing Countries, p 69 For a general overview of arms transfers and international politics, consult Andrew Pierre, Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1982)