

INUTILIS SIBI, PERNICIOSUS PATRIAE:
A PLATONIC ARGUMENT AGAINST SOPHISTIC RHETORIC¹⁾

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Critics of style in antiquity liked to say that if Zeus spoke Greek, he would talk like Plato.²⁾ They might have added that if Plato had spoken Latin when he talked about rhetoric, he would have said *Odi et amo* - I hate and I love. Both sides of this hate-love relationship had far-reaching consequences. One of them is the immensely long and influential after-life of Plato's charges against sophistic rhetoric. The repetition and amplification of his arguments constitute a dominant feature of the warfare between philosophy and rhetoric that erupted intermittently from the early fourth century B.C. to the end of antiquity, and indeed to modern times. Plato's invective, as is well known, is based on grounds both moral and technical. Much attention has been paid to the ramifications of the arguments tending to prove that rhetoric is not an art (*technê*),³⁾ by far the most telling charge, since if there was no art there could be no systematic instruction, hence no lucrative profession for the sophists. Among his other charges the most enduring, because it expressed a fundamental reaction widespread among the Greeks long before Plato and long after him, was the assertion that rhetoric was either useless or positively dangerous both to the state and to the rhetor himself.⁴⁾ I should like to examine this argument as it was employed at several different periods, partly in order to trace its development, partly to discover how far it reflected a reality in Greek and Roman life.⁵⁾

ANTI-RHETORICAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE PLATO

Our story begins in the last third of the fifth century,

when hostility to the sophists and their teaching formed a familiar theme in Greek literature. Fear of the subversive power of eloquence - "Wretched Persuasion, irresistible child of *Atê*" Aeschylus calls her in the *Agamemnon* (385-386) - was of course nothing new; many instances of such concern could be cited from archaic and classical times.⁶⁾ But it was the sophists' systematic approach to the teaching of eloquence and, even more, the disconcerting consequences in Athenian political life that brought apprehension to a new level of intensity. As a result, writers of the late fifth century often record a view of rhetoric foreshadowing in broad outline Plato's polemic.

That rhetoric is harmful to society is a frequent theme in Old Comedy, which normally identifies the rhetor with the demagogue. At times it forms part of the more general complaint of the older generation against the younger, the traditionalists against the innovators. In the *Acharnians*, for example, the old men of the Chorus describe with bitter resentment the way they are humiliated by the upstart young orators. A young man, acting as prosecutor, belabors an old man with rounded phrases, sets word-traps for him, and "tearing, troubling, confusing old Tithonus," deprives him of the money he has saved to buy himself a coffin, money that must now be spent to pay a fine (690-692).

Here it is a specific segment of the *polis* that feels threatened by the consequences of sophistic teaching. Elsewhere Aristophanes implies that the entire city is endangered, either because the young men are being corrupted through a kind of education that rejects the traditional values, or because the sophistic orators deceive the juries and the assembly by their ability to make the worse argument appear better (the Old Comedy version of the sophistic claim to make the weaker stronger),⁷⁾ or (more generally) by their superior cleverness (*deinotês*). The *Clouds* and the *Frogs* provide examples of all these charges, as when the *Dikaios Logos* in the *Clouds* pronounces the city mad for breeding the *Adikos Logos* to inflict outrage on the youngsters (925-926) and tells Pheidippides that if he studies with the sophists he will be taught to

consider everything base fair and fair base and will also be filled with unnatural lust (1020-1021). That sophistic rhetoric or demagoguery and homosexuality go together is a common imputation.⁸⁾ In the *Knights* the strongest proof that the Sausage-seller can outdo Cleon as a demagogue is his homosexual record (1242-1262). In the *Frogs* Euripides is blamed for instilling in the young men both forms of vice: he teaches them to chatter and babble, thus emptying the palaestras and turning the babblers into sexual perverts (1069-1071).

Characters in Euripidean tragedy frequently express fears aroused by a combination of unscrupulous ambition and cleverness in speaking (often described as *deinotês* or being *deinos legein*), and the concern is adapted to a surprising variety of mythical situations.⁹⁾ One comment must stand for all: Medea's description of the man who combines injustice with cleverness of speech (being *sophos legein*), and, boasting that he will cover up his unjust deed with his tongue, stops at nothing (*Medea* 580-583). Often there is also a reference to the clever speaker's ability to charm an audience. In the *Hippolytus* Phaedra says that cities and households are destroyed by excessively fair speeches (*kaloî lian logoi*), and she deplores the consequences of saying what pleases the ear (486-489). Her phrase, *terpna legein* (to say what is pleasant) corresponds to the word *charizesthai* (to charm, gratify), common in denunciations of sophistic rhetoric by Plato and his followers, and usually associated with the concept of rhetoric as a form of flattery (*kolakeia*).¹⁰⁾ Already in Old Comedy this charge was lodged even against the most distinguished of the sophists, as in the *Kolakes* of Eupolis, which portrayed Protagoras as toadying to the rich man, Callias.¹¹⁾

Still another kind of threat to the state emanating from rhetoric is mentioned by Thucydides. A famous passage in the Mytilene debate represents Cleon as complaining that Athenian fondness for speeches constitutes a danger, together with ill-timed pity and compassion (3.40.2-3). In this instance the danger is that through their enjoyment of debate, as if the assembly were a theatre, the Athenians will become too

unstable to maintain a consistent policy.¹²⁾ The comic poets in like manner made fun of the changeableness of the Athenian *demos*, a topic easily combined with attacks on unscrupulous rhetors who manipulate the mob for their own advantage.¹³⁾

Old Comedy also hints now and then that the practice of oratory is inconvenient or even dangerous to the orator himself. The fatigue and harassment suffered by the lawyer (the subject of a vivid passage in the *Theaetetus* of Plato) are already mentioned in the *Clouds*, when the Just Argument contrasts the enviable condition of the young athlete with the sorry state of the pupil of the sophists: babbling in the agora coarse jests and dragged along for the sake of a hair-splitting-pettifogging-barefaced-knavish-boring affair (1003-1004). Actual danger to the rhetor when he has won power for a time and then is ousted is a theme in the *Knights*, where it is suggested that the people he has deluded are in fact aware of his knavery and are just waiting for the right moment to turn on him. The Chorus reproaches old Demos for being gullible and easily misled by fawning speakers, but he replies that he voluntarily plays the fool and deliberately fattens thieving politicians until the time comes to destroy them (1115-1130).¹⁴⁾ The danger that threatens the demagogue - a fall from power when the fickle citizens desert him - was one that fifth-century politics had made familiar to the Athenians. Ostracism or exile had befallen Hipparchus, Aristides, Cimon, Themistocles, Ephialtes, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Hyperbolus (first ostracized, later murdered), while Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, had died in chains.¹⁵⁾ Actual execution was far less common, but by the time of Demosthenes, who died by his own hand, and Hypereides, who was in fact executed, the danger of death as a consequence of oratorical eminence - a necessary condition of political power - became a reality.

A different kind of disadvantage to the speaker, inherent in his very mastery of rhetoric, was the likelihood that polished oratory would so prejudice the listener that he would react against the orator, and thus, the more eloquent the speaker was, the more likely he would be to lose his case.

In the rhetorical treatises of the fourth century warnings about this danger begin to appear, as when Aristotle advises the concealment of artifice, comparing it to mixing drinks (*Rhet.* 1404b18-21), but already in the fifth century the disclaimer of *deinotês* is so common in the Proem of actual and fictitious speeches as to prove that speakers were systematically attempting to compensate for the possible disadvantage of appearing too eloquent.¹⁶⁾

THE PLATONIC OPPOSITION

All the anti-rhetorical charges take on a new coherence when Plato works them into a pattern of accusations that intertwine the immorality and the inartistic nature of sophistic rhetoric. According to Plato, an art must be useful (*Gorg.* 501B).¹⁷⁾ Discussion of the fundamental issue, "Is rhetoric useful?" (*chreiôdês, utilis*) enabled its enemies to conclude that it was not just devoid of usefulness but positively dangerous (*epiblabês, perniciosâ*). The kind of deception ascribed to the rhetors by the comic poets, which from the first included deception in the realm of values, making the base seem fair and vice versa, chimed perfectly with Plato's view of what was essentially harmful to the individual and society, an issue that was for him always a matter of values.

The *Apology* foreshadows the *Gorgias*. Socrates' claim that he alone benefits the citizens, because he urges them to care for *phronêsis*, *alêtheia*, and the *psychê*, rather than *chrêmata*, *doxa*, and *timê* (29D-E, 36C), and that his life of questioning and refuting, in obedience to the command of Apollo, is the greatest good that ever came to Athens (30A) implies that the actual statesmen instill false values and do harm, rather than good, to the citizens.

The charge is made explicit in the *Gorgias*, where Socrates maintains that four of the greatest statesmen of the fifth century, Cimon, Miltiades, Themistocles, and Pericles, far from benefiting the citizens in any real sense, left them worse than they found them (502D ff, 515C ff). Pericles, Plato's major target, made the Athenians lazy, cowardly,

talkative, and greedy (515E). One proof is that the statesmen themselves were ultimately rejected - ostracized, exiled, fined, even sentenced to death.

In this dialogue the nature of power is the crucial issue. The most profound attraction of rhetoric in every period of political liberty has been its promise of power; that is what *aretê politikê* really meant. The rhetors represented by Gorgias' pupil Polus have as their goal power and as their ideal the tyrant, whose power seems unlimited. But according to Socrates what the successful rhetor or tyrant achieves is not power at all, because he does not know what is truly in his best interest. When, in the myth of the Last Judgment, the consequences of political success are revealed *sub specie aeternitatis*, the incurable sinners - those doomed to eternal punishment - prove to be those who enjoyed the greatest power in life, tyrants, kings, and the like (525D). Moreover, even in their days of glory the rhetors are the reverse of powerful. They are in fact slaves, because they depend for success on the favor of those they purport to govern. They are mere flatterers (*kolakes*), at the mercy of the *dêmos*, exactly like the demagogue in the *Knights* of Aristophanes.

The unhappy consequences for the rhetor of the practice of rhetoric become part of Plato's contrast between the two ways of life, the active and the contemplative. Hence the *Gorgias* presents much evidence of the ultimate uselessness or even danger of being a rhetor (here equivalent to *politikos*, statesman); the greater the success, the greater the danger. An equally sharp contrast between philosopher and rhetor, this time the dicanic orator, occurs in the *Theaetetus*, where the basis of the contrast is the presence or absence of leisure (*scholê*). The courtroom lawyer is depicted in terms that amplify the brief description in the *Clouds*, referred to above. Socrates says that those who have been rolling around (*kalindoumenoî*) in the courts since their youth seem, when compared to philosophers, like slaves compared to free men. In contrast to the philosophers, with their infinite leisure, the lawyers are always in a hurry, driven by the water-clock, forbidden to deviate from the affidavit, arguing always about a fellow-

slave, whose life is often at stake.¹⁸) As a result, Socrates says, they become nervous, high-strung, knowing how to fawn upon their master with words and flatter him (*charisasthai*) with deeds, but small and not upright in their souls. The slavery they have suffered from youth deprives them of growth, straightforwardness, and freedom, compelling them to do crooked things by imposing on them great risks and fears, while their souls are tender. Unable to bear these burdens with justice and truth, they turn to deceit and reciprocal wrong-doing. Thus they become bent and cramped, so that they go from youth to manhood with nothing healthy in their minds, while yet supposing themselves to have become clever and wise (172D-173B).

As Plato shaped it, what we may, for the sake of brevity, christen the *periculum-topos* consisted of two principal charges: (1) sophistic rhetoric endangers society because it fosters false values and enables them to prevail, and (2) it endangers the orator himself because it instills these values in his soul. It also requires him to spend his time in ignoble, tedious activities, and it exposes him to the danger of exile and death, but for Plato the most serious danger is to the soul of the rhetor, not to his life, property, or political survival. In Roman times, as we shall see, the emphasis changed.

Already in Plato's lifetime his arguments against sophistic rhetoric as immoral and inartistic were being repeated with embellishments. An early example is the lost *Gryllus* of Aristotle, a dialogue somehow related to the profusion of encomia in honor of Xenophon's son, who was killed in battle in 362. The *Gryllus*, which attacked the claim of rhetoric to be a *technê*, was evidently not itself an encomium, since it criticized the myriad writers of these eulogies for fawning on Xenophon (again the word *charisomenoi*). Diogenes Laertius, to whom we owe this information, adds that one such eulogy was composed by Isocrates (II.55). It is well known that when Aristotle began to teach rhetoric in the Academy, probably around 360, he proclaimed his intent with a parody of a line spoken by Odysseus in the *Philoctetes* of Euripides: It is

disgraceful to be silent and let the barbarians speak. For the word "barbarians" Aristotle substituted the name Isocrates, thus, according to Philodemus, exposing himself to dreadful retribution and ill-will, whether from the students of Isocrates or some other sophists.¹⁹⁾ Cephisodorus, one of Isocrates' pupils, wrote four books *Against Aristotle*, and Isocrates himself in the *Antidosis* (composed around 352) responded to various attacks, not only on rhetoric, but also on himself, from whatever source. One passage, which insists on the benefits conferred on the state by those leaders who were most practiced in rhetoric (231), sounds like a reply to Plato's attack on the four statesmen in the *Gorgias* and has even been thought to have inspired the *Defence of the Four* by the sophist Aelius Aristides five hundred years later.²⁰⁾

In the mid-fourth century B.C. the rivalry between philosophy and rhetoric was beyond question a live issue. The very success of Isocrates' school was what inspired the Academy to take up the teaching of rhetoric in the first place, and Aristotle's afternoon lectures on the subject were revolutionary in their consequences. Some famous orators (Lycurgus, Hypereides) were said to have studied with both Plato and Isocrates, but others adhered to one school or the other, and rivalry must have been keen, although we have no reason to believe that the relation of the leaders themselves - Plato and Isocrates - was acrimonious.

Despite the tremendous success of Isocrates' school in his lifetime, the struggle for supremacy was won by the philosophers. In the next two centuries all major advances, even in rhetoric, were made by the philosophical schools, the Peripatetic in particular, although the Academy and the Stoa also had some impact.²¹⁾ Thus for a time the arguments against rhetoric were superfluous, and we hear few echoes of the Platonic invective. But in the second century B.C. the rivalry again became acute, with the appearance of a bold challenge to the primacy of the philosophers. Hermagoras of Temnos (ca. 150 B.C.) now emerged as the first spokesman for rhetoric since Isocrates himself who could offer a sufficiently comprehensive system to attract wide notice, and among his

innovations was practice in debating *theses*, general questions not limited to specific individuals or circumstances, but broadly philosophical in nature. This aspect of Hermagoras' teaching attracted mature students, rather than mere school-boys. Some philosophers evidently became alarmed, partly because the debate on abstract questions had hitherto been their province, partly because some of the students attracted were Romans. By the mid-second century there had become apparent in the Roman world a tremendous hunger for Greek higher education, as voracious as the contemporary taste for Greek sculpture, and the desire to dominate this great new market inspired a renewal of the warfare between philosophy and rhetoric. It was as if the philosophical schools with one voice had echoed Aristotle and proclaimed, "It is disgraceful to be silent and let the barbarians learn to speak from the rhetoricians."

No doubt this was the time at which philosophers fostered the myth that Demosthenes was the student of Plato, as Pericles of Anaxagoras, a myth conveying the strong implication that even the professional orator might better seek instruction from the Academy than from the rhetoricians.²²⁾ But for most of their ammunition the philosophers turned to Plato himself, and the charges first elaborated in the *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus* were dusted off and put to work again with embellishments suitable to the various schools and the particular circumstances of the second-century Graeco-Roman world. By far the most telling charge was still that rhetoric was not a *technê*, and many new reasons were found for denying it this status,²³⁾ but the lack of utility or the positive harmfulness of rhetoric to the state and to the practitioner evidently continued to be regarded as an effective argument. It is time to consider the reasons for the revival of the *periculum-topos*, some new forms that it took, and the sources (whether schools or individual philosophers) probably responsible for them.

THE *PERICULUM-TOPOS* IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD

The argument was attractive to philosophers because of the nature of the appeal that rhetoric made to the Romans. They too were interested in its practical utility, its power to enhance their effectiveness in political and forensic affairs. Despite the vast differences between fifth-century Athens and second-century Rome, the lure of what the sophists called *aretê politikê* was equally potent for ambitious men in both cities. Those who had leisure and means would pay high prices for an art of persuasion that would give them leadership in the state and with it the power to advance the interests of themselves and their friends.²⁴⁾ If they could be convinced that what the rhetoricians had to offer was ineffective, while the philosophers were better able to help them realize their ambitions, they might turn away from such popular teachers of rhetoric, consulted in Rome, Athens, or Rhodes, as Menedemus and the two Apollonii, and instead patronize Academics like Charmadas or Peripatetics like Diodorus, whom Crassus and Antonius are described (in *de Oratore*) as having heard (late in the second century) deride and belittle rhetoric and rhetoricians.²⁵⁾ Although the polemic reported in *de Oratore* revolved around the charge that rhetoric is not an art and there is no reference to the *periculum-topos*, this line of argument must also have been current, if we may judge by the counter-arguments marshalled by Cicero and Quintilian.²⁶⁾ Some, at least, of the enemies of rhetoric must have considered it worthwhile to try to convince the Romans that both they and their country were endangered by the unrestrained practice of oratory, and that philosophy could teach them to nullify the danger by dosing *eloquentia* with *sapientia*. Whether this type of argument ever had any practical effect on hard-headed Romans, or whether it was simply a debating point that enabled rival schools to score off one another is difficult to judge, but there is no doubt that the Platonic invective about the harm done to the state and the statesman by sophistic rhetoric was developed with a wealth of new detail in the polemic reflected by our sources in Roman times.

To be sure, opposition to rhetoric at Rome did not spring exclusively or even primarily from the philosophers, any more than it had in Greece. Roman conservatism was enough to account for the outraged reaction to the visit of the three Greek ambassadors in 155 B.C., when Carneades in particular shocked the Senate by speaking on successive days for and against the value of justice in the state. All three legates were philosophers, but as George Kennedy observes of Carneades, the Romans probably considered them at least as much rhetoricians as philosophers. All three were esteemed as speakers, and their visit remained a landmark in the history of the reception of Greek rhetoric at Rome.²⁷⁾

The conflict between the generations also affected the Roman attitude towards rhetoric, to judge by a passage from a play by Naeivius,²⁸⁾ which suggests that the Roman stage, like the Attic, early became familiar with references to the danger of oratory, especially as practiced by the young. The question is asked: *Cedo qui vestram rem publicam tantam amisistis tam cito?* (Pray tell, how did you so quickly destroy so great a commonwealth?). Cicero, who quotes the line in *de Senectute* (6.60), says that there were various replies, but *hoc in primis: Proveniebant oratores novi, stulti, adulescentuli* (There sprang up new orators, stupid, mere striplings). The quotation is appropriate to Cicero's defence of old age; what he emphasizes is not so much the danger of oratory as the danger inherent in young orators. But in his rhetorical works he often refers to the widespread belief that Rome had suffered great harm from ambitious, unprincipled speakers, their age not specified. His earliest treatise, *de Inventione*, opens with a defence of rhetoric against just this charge. The defence consists of a condemnation of both *eloquentia sine sapientia* and *sapientia sine eloquentia*. The orator who neglects the study of moral philosophy is *inutilis sibi, perniciosus patriae*, whereas one who arms himself with eloquence in order to defend the state is *et suis et publicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus* (1.1.1)-most helpful and friendly to his own and to the public interest. From eloquence many advantages accrue to the state, provided only that *sapientia*, the *moderatrix omnium rerum*, be at

hand (1.4.5).²⁹)

Cicero is one of our principal sources for the revival and expansion in Rome of the Platonic invective against sophistic rhetoric. The others are his contemporary, the Epicurean Philodemus, in the fragments of his *de Rhetorica*, Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, written towards the end of the first century after Christ, Tacitus in the *Dialogus de Oratoribus* a few years later, and Sextus Empiricus, the Academic philosopher of the second century in his treatise *Against the Rhetoricians*.

A succinct example of how the argument accusing rhetoric of being dangerous to the state had developed by the end of the first century of the Empire is supplied by Quintilian, who devotes Book II, chapter 16 of the *Institutio* to the question *An utilis rhetorice*. (Chapter 17 asks whether it is an art.) Quoting the foes of rhetoric, he says, "It is eloquence (they claim) that saves the guilty from punishment, that sometimes, by its trickery, causes the innocent to be condemned, that leads deliberation in the wrong direction, that arouses not only seditions and popular uprisings, but even wars that cannot be expiated, that, finally, achieves its maximum power when it enables error to prevail over truth. The comic poets charge even Socrates with teaching how to make the worse case seem better, and Plato maintains against Tisias and Gorgias that they made like promises. To them are added examples among the Greeks and Romans, and they list those who by employing their pernicious eloquence not only against individuals but even against states threw into confusion and overturned organized society. For this reason rhetoric was expelled from Sparta, and at Athens also, where the speaker was forbidden to appeal to the emotions, the power of oratory was, so to speak, pruned back (2.16.1-5)."

The antecedents of most of these charges can be found in Old Comedy, Plato, and Aristotle, and if more survived of Hellenistic literature we might detect still closer analogies, but in the present state of our sources one item stands out as a genuine novelty: the allegation that Sparta expelled the rhetors, a charge to which we may turn our attention before considering the Roman development of the *periculum-topos* as a whole.

THE EXPULSION-*TOPOS*

The expulsion of the rhetors has the air of being a historical fact, like the Athenian law against emotional appeals. But in the latter case we know that Quintilian has extended to the whole of Attic oratory a rule that Aristotle says applied to pleading before the Areopagus (*Rhet.* 1354a), and we should perhaps be equally skeptical about the expulsion of the orators, although Quintilian is not alone in mentioning this alleged event. Of our other major sources Sextus Empiricus says that both Sparta and Crete expelled the orators or refused them entry, while Philodemus surprisingly pairs Sparta and Rome as states that get along without rhetoric and elsewhere maintains that Athens expelled and executed the rhetors³⁰⁾ (perhaps a conflation of the expulsion-*topos* with the argument from the *Gorgias* that the Four Statesmen corrupted the Athenians, the proof being their fall from power, which in two cases involved exile of some kind).

What looks like a milder form of the expulsion-*topos* is the assertion that there is no tradition of oratory in certain cities; Sparta, Argos, Corinth, and Thebes are mentioned by Cicero, who makes an exception for Epaminondas in the case of Thebes. This version of the *topos*, which is also used by Tacitus, is normally put in the form of a question, "Who ever heard of an orator from...?"³¹⁾ When such a question is asked, there is usually also a reference to Athens, sometimes Rhodes, as the place where oratory flourished. Cicero's allusion to the absence of oratory in Sparta and the other cities serves to emphasize by contrast the achievement of Athens and Rhodes; there is no reference to the *periculum-topos*. But Tacitus uses the lack of orators in Sparta and Crete (to which he adds Macedon and Persia) as proof that well-ordered states do not tolerate rhetoric.

The expulsion-*topos* proper (characterized in Greek by the verb *ekballein*) seems originally to have referred only to Sparta and Crete. Sextus ascribes the argument to Critolaus the Peripatetic, but says that it was also used by Cleitomachus and Charmadas of the Academy (both pupils of Carneades, who is therefore sometimes suggested as its author).³²⁾ In both

Sextus and Philodemus the expulsion-*topos* constitutes one of the proofs that rhetoric is not an art. In Sextus it takes the form of a syllogism: cities do not expel arts that are useful (*biôphēleis*). But Crete and Sparta barred the orators. Therefore rhetoric is not an art.³³⁾ The criterion of usefulness shows how the *topos* could be attracted to the issue with which Quintilian connects it (*An utilis rhetorice*), which in turn develops into the *periculum-topos*.³⁴⁾

To go behind Critolaus and Carneades and find an earlier source for the expulsion-*topos* has so far proved unrewarding. Both fit the period (mid-second century) when embellishments of the Platonic arguments were being sought, and both were at once competent speakers themselves and enemies of the professional rhetors. Yet it is not difficult to suggest some of the passages that might have inspired them. The general theme of rhetoric as a danger to the state goes back, as we have seen, to Plato and beyond. But Plato does not, in the *Gorgias* or elsewhere, make the point that any state has expelled the rhetors as a class. He does, in *Republic* 398A-B, require that poets be expelled from the ideal state if they do not meet its rigorous moral standards, and there is a similar passage in the *Laws* 817A. But Plato's language in the *Republic* is comparatively mild: *apopempein* (send away), not *ekballein*. The terminology of the second-century expulsion-*topos* is, however, anticipated in the *Gorgias*, in the passage comparing rhetoricians to athletic trainers. Gorgias says that it is not right to attack, hate, and expel (*ekballein*) from the cities the trainers and teachers of those who misuse athletic skills. No more is it right, if someone becomes *rhêtorikos* and through this capacity and art does wrong, to hate and expel from the cities the one who taught him.³⁵⁾ What has happened in the mid-second century is that Carneades, Critolaus, and their followers have asserted as an actual, historical event, occurring in specified states, what Gorgias offered as a hypothetical example of what should not be done anywhere.

Plato also, beyond doubt, inspired the choice of Sparta and Crete as the states that expelled the rhetors, although

he himself never makes this claim. His frequent allusions to them as exemplars of stable government canonized them for the later tradition.³⁶⁾ The very fact that the two men who, in the *Laws*, accompany the Athenian stranger on his long walk across the island, discussing the foundation of the new city, are from Sparta and Crete demonstrates Plato's regard for these states as the two most faithful repositories of the conservative Dorian ethos.

Undoubtedly also the Spartan reputation for taciturnity - the very concept of what it meant to be laconic - made it inevitable that Sparta figure in the expulsion-*topos*.³⁷⁾ There is a passage in the *Protagoras* that may well have affected this development. Socrates, with transparent irony, says that the Spartans and the Cretans have cultivated philosophy more seriously and longer than anyone else. Spartan *sophia* does not, however, show itself in fluent discourse, but in pithy sayings, like those of the Seven Wise Men, of whom Chilon of Sparta was one. Socrates refers to *brachylogia tis Lakonikê* (343B), and Sextus Empiricus tells two anecdotes about the Spartan preference for brevity, one a story that contrasts a laconic envoy with long-winded Athenian ambassadors, the other a dramatic account of how the Spartans refused an appeal couched in a long speech, but yielded when it was presented with appropriate terseness (22-23).

In Sextus it was a Cretan lawgiver, evidently Thaletas, who first forbade those who prided themselves on their oratory to land on the island. Then Lycurgus of Sparta, an admirer of Thaletas,³⁸⁾ enacted the same legislation for his own country. Long afterward a young man who had studied rhetoric abroad was punished by the Ephors upon his return home, because he practiced deceptive speeches in order to mislead Sparta (21). Plutarch, who says that Lycurgus denied entrance to merchants, sophists, seers, and vagabonds, records the expulsion by the Ephors of a certain Cephisophon for offering to speak all day on any subject.³⁹⁾

Philodemus does not mention Sparta or Crete in the fragments of Book V, whose subject is the utility of rhetoric, although he does observe that cities left by the rhetoricians

would be better off than those to which they went, while in his treatment of the *topos* of rhetoric as a danger to the rhetorician he mentions that many orators have been banished or executed.⁴⁰⁾ But in other books, especially those dealing with the issue of rhetoric as a *technê*, Philodemus alludes to some form of the expulsion-*topos* at least four times, saying, for example, that some states, such as Sparta, have expelled the rhetors, along with the perfumers and dyers, although they welcome genuine *technai*, and that the Romans and the Spartans manage their states without rhetoric.⁴¹⁾

Tacitus elaborates the expulsion-*topos* with an adroit adaptation to the circumstances in which he writes. The last speech of Maternus in the *Dialogus* associates great oratory with tumult in the state and as part of the proof that *eloquentia* is the *alumna licentiae* (which fools call liberty) asks what orator has ever been heard of from Sparta or Crete. No more did Macedon, Persia, or any other state *certo imperio contenta* produce a tradition of eloquence. By contrast, orators flourished in Rhodes and Athens, both of them states in which *omnia omnes poterant* - all power belonged to everyone - and it was in the time of civil strife that eloquence bloomed in Rome (40.3-4). As has often been observed,⁴²⁾ Tacitus here contradicts Cicero's statement that eloquence is the companion of peace, the ally of leisure, and the nursling of a settled society (*Brutus* 45), emphasizing his disagreement by echoing Cicero's vocabulary. From Cicero Tacitus may also have taken his reference to Athens and Rhodes, for in the *Brutus* 52 Cicero links the Rhodian and Attic orators stylistically, but the Macedonians and Persians probably owe their presence in Tacitus ultimately to *Gorgias* 470D-471D, where Polus considers Archelaus, King of Macedon, and the Great King exemplars of happiness, while Socrates withholds agreement because he does not know the condition of their *paideia* and *dikaïosynê*.

Leaving the expulsion-*topos* and returning to the broader subject of *periculum*, we find that Sextus Empiricus is our most detailed and reliable informant about the reasons developed after Plato to support his charge that rhetoric threatens the state. (Much evidence is also embedded in the fragments of

Philodemus' *de Rhetorica*, but the condition of the text often makes it difficult to interpret.) Sextus says that among barbarians, who have little or no rhetoric, laws are stable, whereas in Athens they change from day to day. This type of accusation goes back ultimately to Cleon's speech in the Mytilene debate, charging the Athenians with instability and expressing his own preference for *amathia meta sôphrosynês* (ignorance combined with discipline) over *dexiotês meta akolasias* (cleverness accompanied by lack of restraint).⁴³⁾ In the course of time the *amathia* recommended by Cleon has been carried to the extreme of barbarism. A line from Plato Comicus about the impossibility of recognizing Athens if one has been away for three months, because the laws have changed in one's absence, has now been attached to our *topos* (35).⁴⁴⁾

Sextus further maintains that the rhetoricians' practice of teaching their students how to argue according to either the wording of the law or the intent, depending on which approach is more advantageous, shows that their aim is actually subversion of the laws (36-37). Platonic inspiration is particularly evident in two other charges: orators are like jugglers (*ψηφοπαῖκται*), blinding the judges as if by sleight of hand (39), and the demagogue is like a dealer in drugs, because he teaches evil to most people by saying what gives them pleasure (the *charizesthai*-argument again, 42).⁴⁵⁾ Doubtless recalling Plato's famous equation in *Gorgias* 465D7, Sextus uses a different, but related comparison: the demagogue is to the statesman as the drug-dealer is to the physician (41). These arguments are all ascribed to the Academics (43, cf. 20).

Sextus also explores the other branch of the *topos*, that rhetoric either is not useful to the orator himself, or is actively harmful to him. His demonstration that it is *epi-blabês* (harmful) recalls the passage in the *Theaetetus* about the *dikanikos* rhetor, since most of the disadvantages result from the practice of forensic oratory, although the first of these, waste of time (*kalindeisthai en agorais*, rolling around in the assemblies, 27), applies to deliberative oratory as well. Other unpleasant consequences of the oratorical profession are

consorting with evil characters, engaging in vicious practices, making enemies, being a cheat and a wizard, and enduring weariness and exhaustion while listening constantly to the tears and lamentations of those in trouble. In this recital we recognize as echoes of Plato the lack of leisure, the corruption of the orator's own character, and various key words, such as *gôês* (wizard, 28) and the verb *kalindeisthai*, a variant of *kulindoumenoi* in the *Theaetetus* 172C. A very similar list of nuisances comprises the reasons offered by Maternus in Tacitus' *Dialogus* for giving up oratory in favor of writing poetry.⁴⁶⁾

Philodemus in Book V is more interested in the danger of rhetoric to its practitioner than in the peril it offers to the state, although at the close of Book IV he notices that rhetoric is based on deceit and does harm.⁴⁷⁾ He too compares rhetors to magicians, able to bring down the moon, but to no good purpose.⁴⁸⁾ Throughout much of Book V he contrasts the rhetor with the philosopher, always, of course, to the philosopher's advantage. The rhetor, for example, incurs the enmity of powerful rulers, whereas the philosopher gains the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles.⁴⁹⁾

From Philodemus we also learn that the traditional disclaimer of *deinotês* has developed into an elaborate argument about the uselessness of rhetoric: more men are acquitted because they lack rhetoric than because they know it. Stammering is more persuasive than eloquence, because jurors are so fearful of being deceived. By no type of speech is the juror persuaded so effectively as by the brave, just, and temperate actions of the uneducated - a remarkable testimony to the power of persuasion through ethos.⁵⁰⁾ A further amplification of this general *topos* holds that the rewards of eloquence do not compensate for its costs, since in order to seem *epieikês* (modest, reasonable, the ideal quality sought in ethical persuasion), the orator must pretend to be inexpert or risk antagonizing the jury. But if he does so, he forfeits some of the power that rhetoric confers and at the same time loses his integrity, the real cause of success.⁵¹⁾

Philodemus further records the argument that many rhetors have been banished or executed, yet only two or three (he names Themistocles, Alcibiades, and Callistratus) have spoken brilliantly.⁵²⁾ Rhetors who try to restrain the people from satisfying their desires are fined and killed.⁵³⁾ Moreover, the mob tends to envy (*phthonei*) those it has honored when it thinks they do not give enough in return.⁵⁴⁾ That rhetors succeed only so long as they please the people obviously derives from the *topos* of *kolakeia* in the *Gorgias*, which in turn has roots in Old Comedy, but it may be that the topic of *phthonos* had a special appeal to Epicureans. We find it also in Lucretius, who describes *invidia* as the thunderbolt that hurls *e summo... in Tartara taetra* those who have struggled to reach the heights of office.⁵⁵⁾

Philodemus often presents arguments that, while Epicurean in spirit and language, have a distinctly Platonic ring. He says, for example, that it is better to learn from philosophy to care for oneself, than from rhetoric to care for the multitude. This view corresponds to Epicurus' rejection of both rhetoric and politics in favor of cultivating tranquillity, but the line of thought recalls Alcibiades' confession of failure in the *Symposium* and the argument of the *First Alcibiades*.⁵⁶⁾ Furthermore, the Epicureans, perhaps more than any of the other post-Platonic schools, took to heart Plato's contrast between the leisure enjoyed by the philosopher and the futile activity of the rhetor. They may not have valued *scholê* more than did the other schools, but their special *telos* - *ataraxia, tranquillitas* - gave them the strongest possible reason for avoiding rhetoric, which could not do other than destroy the possibility of achieving the *summum bonum*. Diogenes of Oenoanda describes the rhetorical profession as full of excitement and confusion (*tarachê*) over the ability to persuade. Yet control lies with others, not the orator; hence it is pointless to pursue such an activity.⁵⁷⁾ The peculiarity of the sect to which Philodemus belonged was that it approved of one branch of rhetoric, the epideictic, but only because it had nothing to do with the perils and excitements of political and forensic oratory. Even this *genus causarum* had been rejected

by Epicurus, according to the *Vita*, which says that the wise man will not engage in panegyric.⁵⁸⁾

RELATION OF THE *PERICULUM-TOPOS* TO REALITY IN ROME

Quintilian in the passage from *Institutio* II.16 already quoted refers to the formation of lists of Greeks and Romans who by their eloquence overthrew organized society. The Roman list included such stock examples as the Gracchi and the two *seditiosi*, L. Appuleius Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia, both members of the popular party.⁵⁹⁾ This list evidently originates, not with the philosophers, but with the political conservatives whose views Cicero normally reflects. In the introduction to *de Inventione* he for once admits the Gracchi to the company of those in whom *virtus*, *auctoritas*, and *eloquentia* are combined (1.4.5), but in his later works he denounces them as prime examples of unprincipled though eloquent men who endanger the republic. Thus Scaevola in *de Oratore*, when he comments that more harm than good has come to Rome *per homines eloquentissimos*, contrasts the father of the Gracchi, by no means eloquent, yet often a source of salvation to the state, with his two sons, both *diserti* (a word denoting less approval on Cicero's part than *eloquens*), who, however, *rem publicam dissipaverunt* (wasted the property of the commonwealth, 1.38-40). In the *Brutus* Cicero admits that each of the sons was *summus orator*, but says that they both failed to match, in *mens ad rem publicam*, their *ingenium ad bene dicendum* (103). After the Gracchi the most eloquent of the *seditiosi* was Saturninus, while the most wicked man in human history was Glaucia, whom Cicero compares to Hyperbolus, branded for his *improbitas* by the writers of Old Comedy (224). That these four were part of a standard list employed by the enemies of rhetoric is clear from their reappearance in the *Institutio*, when Quintilian tries to refute the *periculum-topos* by extending to generals, magistrates, physicians, and philosophers the charge that they sometimes endanger the state. The Gracchi, Saturninus, and Glaucia, he says, were magistrates, as well as orators (2.16.4).

There was in fact a wealth of native material at hand for

anyone, whether philosopher or political reactionary, who wished to apply the *periculum-topos* to the history of Rome. Moreover, the expulsion-*topos* had become a reality there as well. In 161 B.C., alarmed by we do not know what threats of Greek influence, the Senate passed a decree bidding the praetor Pomponius see to it that there be no rhetors in Rome (*Romae ne essent*).⁶⁰⁾ Unfortunately for the philosophers, the decree applied to them too, and whenever in later times it was used to prove that rhetoric was not an art (because arts are not expelled from cities), the argument could be turned against philosophy. Still further evidence of official hostility might have been seen in the edict of the censors, Crassus and Ahenobarbus, in 92 B.C., against the Latin rhetors, who were accused of maintaining a *ludus impudentiae*.⁶¹⁾ To what extent this edict may lurk behind later allusions to Roman rejection of rhetoric is hard to determine, yet it too offered only qualified support to the position of the philosophical schools, since it was directed, not at all rhetorical teaching, but only at the Latin rhetors. What is certain is that the *topos* of danger to the orator found a predestined home in Roman society.

The history of the Republic is littered with the corpses of statesmen who, like all Romans engaged in political life, had necessarily to engage in oratory as well and came to a violent end, for which their eloquence could, in the context of anti-rhetorical polemic, be made to seem responsible. In *de Oratore* Cicero comments on the death of four of the speakers in that dialogue, Antonius, Sulpicius, Catulus, and Strabo, all of whom perished in the civil wars between Marius and Sulla (3.3.9-11). In the *Brutus* the list of orators *crudelissime interfecti* is appalling. In *de Republica* Cicero names many Romans who suffered from the fickleness of the people (in addition to two of Plato's four, Miltiades and Themistocles), and he says that certain grateful admirers have added his own name to the list of those exiled by the *levitas* and *crudelitas* of the people (1.3.5-6). It obviously gratified Cicero to convert political disaster into a source of self-esteem in this fashion, for he uses the same device in *de*

Legibus, associating himself, by reason of his exile, with the *clarissimi viri* ostracized by Athens, that *ingrata civitas* (3.11.26). It is ironic that not exile but death catapulted him into prominence in the *periculum-topos*, side by side with Demosthenes, with whom he is paired in the famous passage in Juvenal 10.118 (*eloquio sed uterque perit orator*) and in popular philosophy and *declamatio* as well.⁶²⁾

While Cicero clearly finds it necessary to refute the charge that oratory endangers the state, a charge that he counters both by praising the *logos* as the source of civilization and by insisting that what he means by eloquence is always united with *sapientia*,⁶³⁾ he appears to accept as one of the unavoidable risks of public life the possibility of danger to the orator, and he never refers to the expulsion-*topos* except in its milder form of listing states in which oratory is unknown. This is the form in which Tacitus too employs the topic.

Like Cicero in *de Oratore*, but unlike Philodemus, Quintilian, and Sextus Empiricus, Tacitus in the *Dialogus* is concerned with something more than simply rehearsing the charges leveled against rhetoric and the refutations devised by the rhetors. Both dialogues adapt the venerable *topoi* to complex literary forms and purposes. In the case of Tacitus they are related to his inquiry into the reasons for the decline of eloquence, a problem much discussed in the first century of our era.⁶⁴⁾ Through Maternus, Tacitus suggests that the decline results from Rome's changed political situation, but instead of deploring the loss of liberty after the death of the Republic, he praises the new regime in which decisions are made, not by the *imperiti et multi*, but by the *sapientissimus et unus* (41.4). Under the conditions that now obtain, eloquence is as needless as *inter sanos medicus*.

Before arriving at this conclusion, Tacitus employs elements of the *periculum-topos* in both speeches assigned to Maternus. The first recreates in the context of Roman society the picture of the orator's life as one of constant harassment and fatigue that we have met in Old Comedy, the *Theaetetus*, and Philodemus, but substitutes poetry for philosophy as the

preferred activity. Explaining why he has given up oratory for poetry (as Tacitus himself at the time of writing was giving up oratory for history), Maternus expresses his determination to detach himself *a forensi labore* and proclaims his dislike for the hordes of *delatores* whom the orator must endure each day. He so delights in woods, groves, and solitude that he counts it among the principal rewards of poetry that it is not composed *in strepitu* or with clients sitting on one's doorstep or amid the ragged garments and lamentations of the accused. Rather, the mind of the poet *secedit in loca pura*, where the origins and innermost shrines of eloquence are to be found (12.1-2). It soon develops that Maternus is contrasting the *securus et quietus Virgilius secessum* (13.1), not just with the traditional picture of the life of the rhetor, totally lacking in *scholê*, but with the contemporary life of the *delatores*, the notorious and powerful informers who prosecuted men of wealth and position, sometimes with a view to blackmail, sometimes in order to curry favor with the emperor.

Winterbottom, in his analysis of the oratorical style associated with *delatio*, suggests that Quintilian's insistence on the moral function of the orator - *vir bonus dicendi peritus* - originated in his revulsion from the vicious conduct of the great *delatores*, one of whom, M. Aquilius Regulus, was actually called a *vir valde dicendi imperitus*.⁶⁵ Beyond any doubt, the *periculum invidiosae-rogae* found its most apt illustration in the *delatores*. Tacitus in the *Annales* (1.74) says of Suillius Rufus that those who followed his example created *periculum aliis ac posterum sibi*. Of the whole group Quintilian says that they converted the power of speech *ad hominum perniciem* (2.20.2). No wonder then that Maternus, as he abandons oratory, attacks its contemporary mode as *lucrosa* and *sanguinans* and says that it is born *ex velle moribus* (12.2). By contrast, the Golden Age was lacking in orators and accusations, but rich in poets (12.3). Here Tacitus adapts a philosophical commonplace going back to Aristotle, who in the *Protrepticus* commented on the absence of the moral virtues both in the life of the gods and in the Isles of the Blessed, where they were obviously unnecessary. Cicero in the *Hortensius* had

expanded the *topos* by adding eloquence to the list of virtues for which there would have been no need in a sinless society.⁶⁶⁾ Now Tacitus, going a step further, extends the felicity of the legendary bards who lived in the Golden Age to their successors in historical times - Homer and the tragic poets, Virgil, Ovid, Varius, all of whom equal or surpass in fame the greatest orators. He contrasts with the peaceful, carefree life of the poets the *certamina et pericula* endured by Vibius Crispus and Eprius Marcellus, *delatores* whom Aper in a preceding speech (8) had praised as famous, rich and powerful.

Just as Aper plays the role assigned to Polus in the *Gorgias*, so Maternus now draws a Socratic contrast between two ways of life, no longer those of the philosopher and the rhetor, but those of the poet and the *delator*, picturing with a wealth of detail the *inquieta et anxia oratorum vita*. The *delatores* are both fearful and feared, subject to daily demands and to the wrath of those they serve, unable to appear *satis servi* to their masters or *satis liberi* to anyone else. In fact, they are no more powerful than freedmen (*liberti*, 13.4). Here is the Roman counterpart of Plato's equation of the rhetor or tyrant with the slave, a theme from the *Gorgias* embedded in an adaptation of the passage from the *Theaetetus* about the absence of *scholê* in the life of the advocate.⁶⁷⁾ Although it would be far-fetched to hear in Maternus's concluding prayer (that when he dies the statue on his grave may be, not *maestus et atrox, sed hilaris et coronatus*, 13.6) an echo of Socrates' promise of *eudaimonia* both here and hereafter for those who have chosen the life he recommends (*Gorg.* 527C), the importance attached to the choice of lives and the warning that the life chosen must not be that of the rhetor undoubtedly owe much to the Platonic tradition.

The other branches of our *topos* (danger to the state, rephrased as the incompatibility of rhetoric with a well-ordered society, and danger to the orator) appear in the second speech of Maternus, the last in the *Dialogus*. Here Tacitus pronounces final judgment on the causes of the decline of eloquence. He connects great oratory with political

turmoil, non-existent under the present regime, and (perhaps not without irony) converts into a blessing the conditions that have pacified eloquence itself, like everything else, since the days of Augustus (38.2). It is here too that he takes issue with Cicero's praise of oratory in *Brutus* 45 as *pacis... comes otique socia et iam bene constitutae civitatis quasi alumna quaedam*, maintaining, on the contrary, that notable eloquence is an *alumna licentiae... comes seditionum*, which does not occur in *bene constitutis civitatibus* (40.2).⁶⁸⁾

Immediately after this unfavorable assessment of the role of oratory in the state, Tacitus introduces his variation on the expulsion-*topos*, which represents Sparta and Crete, Macedonia and Persia, not indeed as having expelled the orators, but as lacking them because of their *severissima disciplina et severissimae leges*. The existence of many orators in Rhodes and Athens is explained by the political dominance of the mob (the *imperiti*). On the same terms it is easy to account for the more vigorous oratory (*valentiores eloquentiam*) that existed in Republican Rome, when it was rent by civil war and all kinds of dissension. Tacitus has already explained that great subjects foster great oratory (37.4-5). It was not the speeches prosecuting his guardians that brought Demosthenes his fame, nor did the defence of Quinctius and Archias make Cicero great. *Catilina et Milo et Verres et Antonius hanc illi famam circumdederunt* (37.6).⁶⁹⁾ Now Tacitus undercuts the oratory of the Republic by comparing it to the weeds that spring from an unploughed field. His conclusion is a sentence that with characteristic brevity and balance combines the two essential parts of the *periculum-topos* - danger to the state, danger to the orator - emphasizing each through the most authoritative *exemplum* traditional in its category. *Sed nec tanti rei publicae Gracchorum eloquentia fuit, ut pateretur et leges, nec bene famam eloquentiae Cicero tali exitu pensavit* (But the eloquence of the Gracchi was not of such value to the state that it could also endure their legislation, nor did Cicero, with the death that he suffered, pay a fair price for the fame of his oratory).

The *periculum-topos* did not perish with Tacitus, nor indeed

with the end of antiquity. It continued to be used in a variety of ways, often routine and dully repetitive, but sometimes adapted to changing conditions and artistic aims. Renewed emphasis on the moral dangers incurred by the orator himself is evident in Christian authors such as St. Augustine, who adopted an essentially Platonic view of the immorality of artifice and deception.⁷⁰⁾ The classical antecedents of the *topos* became unmistakable when Renaissance humanism made the original sources generally available, so that, for example, the funeral eulogy of a Renaissance Pope could praise him in terms derived from *de Inventione* for combining wisdom with eloquence and thus avoiding the dangers implicit in either quality by itself, or Erasmus, in his influential schoolbook *de Copia Verborum ac Rerum*, could offer as a model of induction combined with example the familiar warning about the excessive price paid by Demosthenes and Cicero for their oratorical triumphs.⁷¹⁾ Of course, every period or country in which political conditions have allowed oratory a share in guiding the course of events has produced enemies of rhetoric who fulminate against the art of making the worse appear the better reason. In our own time the enormously increased influence conferred by television on all the arts of persuasion (commercial even more than political) has given to the old problem entirely new dimensions. Yet the connoisseur of eloquence, in a year of presidential campaigning, must more than ever mourn the absence of orators, in whatever context, who have any need to feign a lack of *deinotês*.

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NOTES

1) Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, D.C., and the Society for the Humanities, Cornell University. I am grateful for helpful criticism on both occasions.

2) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Dem.* 23, Plutarch, *Cic.* 24, Cicero, *Brut.* 121.

3) See especially Harry M. Hubbell, *The Rhetorica of Philodemus: Translation and Commentary* (New Haven, 1920) 364-382, and consult Helen F. North, *Paradosis: Studies in Memory of Edwin A. Quain* (New York, 1976) 11-29.

4) In Greek (especially Attic) usage of the classical period *rhêtôr* usually refers to someone engaged in political life, which normally required public speaking, and is virtually synonymous with *politikos*. In Hellenistic and Roman times it often refers to a teacher of rhetoric. The Latin equivalent of the first meaning is *orator*; one who teaches rhetoric or *declamatio* is a *rhetor* or sometimes a *sophistes* (Juvenal 7.167).

5) Lack of space precludes a discussion of the broader implications of the anti-rhetorical invective, which is but one instance of a category concerned with the abuse of fundamental "culture-gifts" (in this case speech, the *logos*) on which man's very nature and civilization depend. Ramifications of this type of argument, whether concerned with the abuse of a gift conferred on all mankind (e.g., fire, wine) or of one given to a specific individual (e.g., the winged horse) lent themselves to several *topoi* of popular philosophy, including those associated with primitivism and with the "Think mortal thoughts/*Méden agan* complex of ideas.

6) Consult P. W., s.v. *Peithô* (Voigt).

7) Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1402a30ff, Plato, *Phaedr.* 267A-B, Aristophanes, *Clouds* 882-885, 1020-1021, 1038-1040. For a detailed study of Aristophanes' attacks on rhetoric, consult Charles T. Murphy, *HSCP* 49 (1938) 69-113.

8) The imputation is shared with almost every other object of the comic poet's ridicule. Consult K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), especially 141-153.

9) Consult E. R. Dodds on Euripides, *Bacch.* 266-271.

10) Plato, *Theaetetus* 173A; cf. *Gorg.* 462C, 501B,D, 502E, and consult Werner Jaeger, *Paideia* III, tr. Gilbert Highet (New York, 1944) 320 on the *Gryllus* and *Rhetoric* of Aristotle.

11) See Aristotle, *Pol.* 1313b40.

12) 3.38.4. With Cleon's *μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι* (3.38.5) cf. Aristophanes, *Knights* 1115-1120 and see Neil's edition of the *Knights*, *ad loc.*

13) E.g., Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 632. Consult Murphy, *art cit.* (above, note 7).

14) With *Knights* 1139-1140 Neil *ad loc.* compares Livy 6.17.2: *saginare plebem populares suos ut iugulentur*.

15) On the hazards of fifth-century politics consult W. Robert Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, 1971) 1979. Even in normal circumstances rhetors were always vulnerable to prosecution under the law concerning *eisangeleia*, which permitted the impeachment of any rhetor who took bribes to speak contrary to the interests of the *demos*. Hypereides, discussing the limitation of this section of the law to rhetors, refers to the honors and profits attached to speaking and the concomitant risks (4.8-9, 27, 29, 30-31).

16) See, for example, Lysias 12.3 and 19.2, Euripides, *Hipp.* 986-987, with Barrett *ad loc.*, and Plato, *Apol.* 17A-B. Advice on this subject

becomes stereotyped in the handbooks, especially in the doctrine of the Proem. See Cicero, *de Inv.* 1.182.25 and cf. *Or.* 145 (*prudētia hominibus grata est, lingua suspecta*) and *de Or.* 2.4 and 153, and Quintilian 2.17.6 on Antonius, *dissimulator artis*.

17) The Stoics made this requirement part of their definition of a *technê*, and it soon became a commonplace. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Rhetoricians* 10, 43.

18) *περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος*, 173A. We note the ironic echo of Achilles' pursuit of Hector, *Il.* 22.161.

19) Consult Ingemar Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg, 1957) 300-301.

20) See André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristides* (Paris, 1923) 234.

21) Cicero, *de Or.* 1.43, 3.65-68, Quintilian 3.1.15, 12.2.23. Consult George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963) 272-301 and Kroll, P. W. Supp. VII, 1080-1083.

22) See Douglas on *Brutus* 121 for the ancient sources, among whom Plutarch, *Dem.* 5, attributes the story to Hermippus in the third century B.C.

23) For a comprehensive list see Quintilian 2.17 and consult Cicero, *de Or.* 1.90-91 on the reported view of the Academic Charmadas: *nullam artem dicendi esse*.

24) On the financial rewards of teaching rhetoric or writing handbooks see Plato, *Phaedr.* 266C and *Rhet. ad Her.* 1.1.1.

25) Crassus, 1.45-46, Antonius 1.83-93.

26) Cicero, *de Inv.* 1.2-3, *de Or.* 1.30-34 (both passages praise the *logos* in the manner of Isocrates, *Nic.* 5-9, *Antid.* 253-257); Quintilian 2.16.7-10.

27) Consult George Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton, 1972) 53-54 on the embassy of 155 B.C.

28) Perhaps the *Lupus*, a *fabula praetexta* dealing with Romulus and Remus.

29) Cf. also *de Or.* 1.34 and 3.76.

30) Sextus 20-21, Philodemus II 65 frg. ii Sudhaus, cf. I p. 14, frg. v, 359 col. LXX.

31) Cicero, *Brut.* 50, Tacitus, *Dial.* 40.3, Velleius Paterculus 1.17-18.

32) Sextus 20; on Carneades see Kroll, P. W. Supp. VII, 1083ff, and cf. Cicero, *de Or.* 1.45 for the views of his pupils.

33) Sextus 24-25; cf. Philodemus I. 16, frg. ix.

34) 2.16.4.

35) 456D-457C. Isocrates' use of the same illustration (*Antid.* 252) may have reinforced the *topos*, but his terminology is not the same. He refers to the killing, not the expulsion of the athletes.

36) Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton, 1960) 32-39. See also George Huxley, "Crete in Aristotle's Politics," *GRBS* 12 (1971) 505-515.

37) Cicero, *Brut.* 50, commenting on the absence of orators in Sparta,

refers to Spartan *brevitas*, going back to Menelaus in *Il.* 3.213-214.

38) See Pausanias 1.14.4 and Plutarch, *Lyc.* 4 for the tradition about Thaletas of Gortyn and his influence at Sparta in the seventh century.

39) *Aphth. Lac.* 226D, on the ξενηλασία (exile) of undesirables; *Inst. Lac.* 239C, on Cephisophon. The reason for his expulsion (that the good speaker, *mythêtês*, should keep his speech equal to his subject-matter) implies, however, that not all orators were expelled. Cf. *Aphth. Lac.* 208C.

40) II. 146, frg. iii; II. 147-148, frg. iv.

41) I. 16, frg. ix; I. 14, frg. v; cf. II. 65, frg. ii.

42) See, e.g., Gudeman on *Dial.* 40.2.

43) Thucydides 3.37.3.

44) Edmonds, *Fragments of Attic Comedy*, frg. 220.

45) On Plato's use of derogatory comparisons in his attacks on rhetoric, see North, *art cit.*, note 2 above.

46) See below, p. 264. Juvenal adapts the theme to the unprofitable life of the impecunious lawyer and the boring life of the teacher of *declamatio* in *Sat.* 7.106-149, 150-177.

47) I. 223, frg. xlii a.

48) II. 157, frg. xvii.

49) II. 133, frg. iv. This may be, not an Epicurean commonplace, but a reflection of the relations between Philodemus and his patron Piso.

50) II. 136, frg. vi.

51) II. 139-140, frg. xi.

52) II. 147-148, frg. iv.

53) II. 151-152, frg. viii.

54) II. 154, frg. xii.

55) V. 1125-1126. Lucretius' warning is not directed specifically at rhetors, but applies to all who seek wealth and power. In its most general application this theme appears as early as the *Ion* of Euripides 597 λυπρὰ γὰρ τὰ κρεῖσσονα.

56) *Symp.* 216A, *Alc.* I, 127E ff.

57) Frg. LVII. 1-11 ed. Chilton. See also Lucretius III. 995-1002 on Sisyphus as a type of futile ambition for *imperium inane*.

58) οὐ πανηγυριεῖν δέ, 120a Bailey.

59) For a slightly different list of slain orators see *ad Her.* 4.22.31 and consult Douglas on *Brut.* 224.

60) Suetonius, *de Gram. et Rhet.* 25.

61) On the affair of the Latin rhetors, consult Kennedy (above, note 27) 90-91.

62) See Seneca, *de Remed. Fort.* 12.44 and Ps-Quintilian, *Decl.* 268 on the question whether an orator, a doctor, or a philosopher is *civitati utilissimus*.

- 63) E.g., *de Inv.* 1.2-3, *de Or.* 1.30-34.
- 64) Consult Harry Caplan, *Of Eloquence* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970) 160-195.
- 65) Michael Winterbottom, "Quintilian and the Vir Bonus," *JRS* 54 (1964) 90-97, cites Pliny, *Ep.* IV.7, 5, on Regulus.
- 66) Consult Gudeman and Michel *ad loc.*, and see Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1178B 7-23 and *Frg.* 58 Rose, and Cicero, *Hortensius*, *frg.* 92 Ruch, from Augustine, *de Trin.* 14.9.12: *quod opus esset eloquentia, cum iudicia nulla fierent, aut ipsis etiam virtutibus.* For like sentiments see *Dial.* 41.3 on the *civitas in qua nemo peccaret*, Quintilian 2.17.28 (if all judges were philosophers, there would be no need for rhetoric) and Antisthenes, *Frg.* 125 Mullach (If you intend a boy to live with gods, teach him philosophy, if with men, rhetoric). It is, of course, the ultimate admission of the imperfect nature of rhetoric to ally it exclusively with the imperfect state of society.
- 67) Some of the parallels between the *Dialogus* and the *Gorgias* are noted by Franz Egerman, *Hermes* 70 (1935) 424-430.
- 68) Consult R. Dienel, *WS* 37 (1915) 239-271 for adaptations of Cicero in the *Dialogus*; the influence of *de Republica* is traced by Erich Koestermann, *Hermes* 65 (1930) 396-421.
- 69) Cf. 36.1: *magna eloquentia, sicut flamma, materia alitur.*
- 70) See *de Doct. Christ.* 4.5.7 on the obligations of Christian preachers, as *sapientiae filii et ministri.* Cf. John Milton, *P.L.* II. 113-114 on Belial's power to make the worse appear the better reason, and *P.R.* IV. 353-364 (Christ's rejection of the oratory of Greece and Rome).
- 71) Consult John M. McManamon, S.J., "The Ideal Renaissance Pope: Formal Oratory from the Papal Court," *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 14 (1976) 9-70 on the eulogy of Pius II by Domenico de' Domenichi in 1464. For Erasmus, see *de Copia* II, *de Imagine.*