

A STUDY OF MASTER YINSHUN'S *WEISHIXUE TANYUAN* 唯識學探源: AN
INTELLECTUAL PREHISTORY OF THE YOGĀCĀRA

BY

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THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in Religion
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2024

Urbana, Illinois

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ABSTRACT

This study is an examination of Venerable Master Yinshun's *Searching the Origins of Consciousness Only* (*Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源). The *Weishixue Tanyuan* is one of Yinshun's earlier works. In it he lays out an intellectual prehistory of the mature Yogācāra of Dharmapāla and Xuanzang. He constructs this history using canonical Chinese translations of Indian texts.

In this study, I have two major aims. The first is to present the broad outline of Master Yinshun's history as faithfully and literally as possible to an English-speaking audience. The second is to examine the hermeneutics that Master Yinshun applied in reading his sources and constructing his history.

In constructing his history, Yinshun applies a hermeneutic I call *Indian Normativism*. This way of reading views Indian texts and texts with a traceable line of transmission from India as more able to give an accurate account of the Buddhism of Shakyamuni. By constructing his history from sufficiently Indian texts, Master Yinshun was able to point out a continuous line of development from the earliest Buddhist sources to the mature Yogācāra.

The purpose of this project is not to undermine Yinshun's project, but to reveal how a traditional Buddhist master in the modern period justified a form of Buddhism to itself using Buddhist criteria. Yinshun is successful in constructing a useful history in *Weishixue tanyuan* and this work is especially useful for students of the Yogācāra.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many thanks to my Master's advisor, Dr. Alexander L. Mayer, for his many years of mentorship. I would also like to thank my colleague Kongyan Voo for meeting with me and discussing important aspects of Venerable Master Yinshun's thought. Many thanks to Dr. Christopher Callahan and Dr. Adam Newman, both for sitting on my defense committee and for being invaluable teachers during my time at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign.

I would also like to thank my close group of friends, especially John Walker, for his invaluable proofreading and Jihye Robinson for her continued encouragement through the writing process.

Finally, I would like to share my thanks and my love for my family, especially my parents and my wife, Thereza D. Lituma, who supported me throughout the long and difficult process of creating this project.

To My Wife, Thereza D. Lituma

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 The Motivations for this Project and Yinshun's Hermeneutic

This project is first and foremost a study of Master Yinshun's *Searching the Origins of Consciousness Only* (*Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源).¹ The *Tanyuan* is an intellectual history of the Indian precursors of the Yogācāra. I had two motivations for writing this study. Firstly, while Yinshun's writings on the other two major Mahāyāna orientations—the *Mādhyamaka* and the *Tathāgatagarbha*—have been written about in English by scholars such as Scott Hurley and Stefania Travagnin, there seems to be a lack of English scholarship on Yinshun's view of the Yogācāra. Secondly, I wanted to examine the hermeneutics of Master Yinshun, whom I consider to be a great modern intellectual historian of Buddhism. I especially wanted to understand how a thinker working within the constraints of the tradition could justify the Yogācāra as a legitimate foundation for a science of the mind using the epistemology of the tradition itself. In other words, my motivation was a desire to see how, in the modern period, Buddhism justified itself to itself on its own terms.

The largest chapters of this project are chapters five and six on Yinshun's histories of the development of the store house consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and perfuming (*vāsana*) doctrines. In these sections, I hope to be able to guide non-native Chinese speakers through the various arguments and evidences Yinshun gives to account for the development of the Yogācāra and to cleave as closely and literally as possible to Yinshun's own understanding of the topic. However, while these sections make up the bulk of the project, my motivating questions are really about Yinshun's hermeneutic, and I include these sections to give the reader a wholistic sense of how

¹ From here onwards I will also refer to this text by the shortened title *Tanyuan*. This should not be confused with Master Yinshun's similarly titled *Searching the Origins of Emptiness* (*Xingkongxue tanyuan* 性空探源) which I will always refer to by its full title.

Yinshun justifies his history.

Yinshun's hermeneutic in the *Tanyuan* can be called a hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism*. Readers who apply *Indian Normativism* consider an Indian text or a text with a traceable line of transmission going back to India as more legitimate and more able to tell us about *real* or *original* Buddhism. In this view, Buddhism as we know it in the contemporary world is a development from the Buddhism of Shakyamuni Buddha as he is presented in the *āgamas*. Some developments are compatible with and maintain this original Buddhism, while other developments either obscure the clarity of or introduce non-Buddhist elements into that original Buddhism. Chinese intellectuals deployed this hermeneutic in response to the declining status of Buddhism in China during the late Qing Dynasty and the Early Republican period and it characterizes many of Yinshun's contemporaries. Though this hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism* limits those texts that can be considered *real* Buddhist texts, my goal here is not to critique Yinshun's use of this hermeneutic. As we shall see, it serves the purposes of his history quite well by delimiting those sources he thought he ought to cite. In this project, I merely wish to point out those moments when *Indian Normativism* has some guiding hand in Yinshun's history.

Yinshun brings his other hermeneutical contributions to his reading of the development of the Yogācāra. The *Tanyuan* reflects his non-sectarianism and his understanding of how dialectic occurs within the Buddhist tradition. While Yinshun is clear in the *Tanyuan* that he did not view the Yogācāra of Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla or Xuanzang 玄奘 to be a sufficient account of ultimate truth, the *Tanyuan* is not a polemical work. It is evident throughout the text that he is primarily motivated by a desire to uncover how the Yogācāra came to be and not by a desire to relegate it to second position behind his own preferred form of Buddhism. While Yinshun does

occasionally offer comments on the value of this or that doctrine from this or that school, he always presents the precursors of the Yogācāra in the context of a dialectical development. In Yinshun's view, the various schools and sects of Buddhism never arbitrarily come up with a new doctrine. They always develop their doctrines in response to problems posed by earlier stages of development. Ultimately, according to Yinshun, all Buddhist doctrinal developments are responses to the problems posed by the tension between karmic retribution and the fundamental insight of non-self. In the case of the Yogācāra, Yinshun identifies a pattern of development. In his view, at each stage of development differing precursors of the Yogācāra have either a *true mind* (*zhen xin* 真心) or a *delusional mind* (*wang xin* 妄心) tendency. Those thinkers with a true mind tendency emphasize the unity and pureness of the mind. They look to it to account for karmic continuity and the possibility of salvation. Those thinkers with a delusional mind tendency take the mind to be the cause of the defilements that chain beings to saṃsāra and point to the mind as the ground upon which the everyday phenomenal world rests. While the terms *true mind* and *delusional mind* do not appear in the texts that Yinshun uses to build his history, they are good guides for a student of the Yogācāra. This hermeneutic of the tension between the true mind and delusional mind is one of Yinshun's great contributions in the *Tanyuan*. By pointing out this tension he is able to direct his readers towards the perennial disagreements within the Yogācāra that arise and rearise at different stages of its historical development.

The *Tanyuan* is a great work of Buddhist scholarship from within the Chinese Buddhist tradition. Though it was shaped by its historical context, Yinshun's history of the development of the Yogācāra is invaluable for students of the Yogācāra. It is my hope then that this project can serve as introduction of Yinshun's history and hermeneutic to English speaking students of Yogācāra Buddhism.

Chapter 2: Yinshun and Modern Chinese Buddhism

2.1 Master Yinshun's Life

Venerable Master Yinshun 印順導師 (1906-2005), the author of the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源, was a respected Buddhist scholar-monk, and an active member in Chinese intellectual debate from the Republican period up to the beginning of the 21st century. He was closely associated with Master Taixu 太虛大師 (1890-1947), another Buddhist modernizer. Though Yinshun was formally trained in the *Sanlun* 三論 school, the Chinese counterpart to Indian Mādhyamaka, in his writings Yinshun sought to transcend Buddhist sectarianism. He advocated for a more universal Buddhism that could meet the challenges posed to religion by a rapidly modernizing Chinese society. Yinshun was committed to Buddhism from an early age and viewed it, rather than indigenous Chinese thought or Christianity, two traditions he had studied in his youth, as the best religious solution for modern China.

Turning to Buddhism at the age of twenty, Yinshun found the reasonable, comprehensive, and hopeful religious message for which he had been looking, despite the fact that he could neither understand a great deal of what he read in the Buddhist scriptures nor find in his town educated monks knowledgeable enough to help. In 1928, after the sudden death of his parents, Yinshun began to think about becoming a monk, a decision he made in 1930. Having traveled to Putuo Shan, he was tonsured and given the Dharma name Yinshun by the monk Qingnian (also known as Yushan, 1875–1957), one of Taixu's ordination brothers. Shortly thereafter he received the monastic precepts at the Tiantong si, in nearby

Ningbo, under the respected master Yuanying.²

After his ordination, Yinshun entered into conversation with other Chinese intellectuals, such as Ouyang Jingwu, and this had a profound impact on his own method of scholarship. Like other Buddhist intellectuals at the time, Yinshun focused on textual history and historicism to justify his Buddhological positions. Yinshun wrote a three intellectual histories on the three major doctrinal orientations of the Mahāyāna—Searching for the Origins of the Yogācāra (*Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源), Searching for the Origins of Emptiness (*xingkong Tanyuan* 性空探源) and A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha (*rulaizang zhi yanjiu* 如來藏之研究). In these three studies Yinshun gives an intellectual history of each doctrinal orientation using the canonical Chinese translations of Indian texts.

The *Weishixue tanyuan* is first of these three intellectual histories. Yinshun was inspired to begin writing a history of consciousness only (*weishi* 唯識) in 1937. While he was staying in Wuhan 武漢市, he read an unpublished Chinese translation of a history of the Yogācāra by Yuki Reimon 結城令聞. Though he found the work inspiring, Yinshun's view of the intellectual prehistory of the mature Yogācāra differed from Yuki Reimon's and this motivated him to begin writing the *Weishixue tanyuan*. As he says in his own words in the introduction of the *Weishixue tanyuan*, consciousness only scholars during the Republican period were noisy to the point of annoyance and his aim in writing this work was to present a clear pre-history of consciousness only thought that could help proponents of consciousness only understand their own positions.³

² Don A. Pittman, *Toward a Modern Buddhism, Taixu's Reforms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 266.

³ 「我想寫唯識思想史，倒不是為了與人爭辯，反而是覺得唯識學者的爭辯，噪聒得討厭了（我自己從前就是一個）！針對唯識學界的爭論，預備作一番清理工作，讓大家了解自己，了解對方，一笑而罷。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. a4a5-7)

While Yinshun, as a non-sectarian scholar with Mādhyamaka leanings, did not believe the *weishi* teaching was identical with ultimate truth (*zhendi* 真諦), he was successful in laying out a straightforward intellectual history of the Indian precursors to *weishi* thought.

Yinshun's writing was interrupted by political turmoil in China forcing him to relocate multiple times. He completed and published the work in 1944 in Chongqing in what was then the province of Sichuan. The Communist victory in mainland China in 1949 forced Yinshun to move to Hong Kong and in 1952 he relocated to Taipei, Taiwan. There he developed his now famous humanistic Buddhism (*renjian fojiao* 人間佛教).

2.2 Chinese Scientism and Ouyang Jingwu's Yogācāra

The popularity of scientism in China during the Republican period was a major cause for the renewed interest in Yogācāra studies. This was for two reasons. Firstly, western science offered explanatory power that Buddhism and indigenous Chinese thought could not provide. Secondly, Scientism, the belief that science is the best or only way to discover truths about the world, seemingly promised a path to material and political equality with the West. However, scientism and the wholesale adoption of western ways of life conflicted with the nationalist project of the republican period. While the adoption of scientific methods seemed inevitable, there was an undercurrent of Chinese intellectuals that held scientism in suspicion and looked for more characteristically Chinese modes of thought. Yogācāra and consciousness only thought was a strong candidate as it had a well-developed ontology and epistemology.

I want to write the history of consciousness-only thought, not because I want to argue with others, but because I find the arguments of consciousness-only scholars noisy to the point of annoyance (I used to be one myself)! In response to the criticisms in the consciousness-only academic community, we are going to do some cleaning up work, so that everyone can understand themselves and each other, and let it go with a smile.

During the 1920s, a number of other writers used Yogācāra thought in their discussions of science in general, and of dogmatic scientism in particular. By drawing on Yogācāra thought, Buddhists were able to make substantial criticisms of the materialism upon which scientism was based. They also used Yogācāra to examine and critique the epistemological underpinnings of the scientific method, which was being held up during the 1920s as a foolproof method for reaching truth.⁴

Yogācāra, unlike other Chinese Buddhist schools such as Tiantai and Chan, had a well-argued defense of an idealist ontology and it was recruited by Chinese thinkers to critique the ontological materialism that scientism depended upon. Yogācāra Buddhism was especially well placed to serve as a Chinese or Buddhist ontology, metaphysic, epistemology.

Yogācāra, and Indian Buddhism generally, was also used to develop an alternative to western psychology. Psychology was a contested field of study in the late Qing and early republican period. While Chinese thinkers were importing western psychology, they were also turning to Asian traditions of thought which could serve as bases for a Chinese psychology. Thinkers as radically different as Xunzi and Wang Yangming were brought into conversation with Freud and the Behaviorists.⁵ This contestedness allowed the Yogācāra, with its robust

⁴ Erik J. Hammerstrom, "Yogācāra and Science in the 1920s: The Wuchang School's Approach To Modern Mind Science." In *Transforming Consciousness*, edited by John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 170.

⁵ Erik J. Hammerstrom, "Yogācāra and Science in the 1920s: The Wuchang School's Approach To Modern Mind Science." In *Transforming Consciousness*, edited by John Makeham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 184.

"Two factors influencing the rise of modern mind science in China were a series of lectures given by Bertrand Russell in Beijing in 1920, later published as *The Analysis of Mind*; and the return of Chinese students of psychology from Europe and America that started around the same year. In August 1921, the first organization

account of the mind, to be forwarded as a legitimate option with which one could build a sufficiently Chinese science of the mind.

The contestedness of fields like psychology allowed for intellectual traditions like Buddhism to be forwarded as legitimate options. But why did the Yogācāra receive more attention than other Chinese intellectual traditions at this time? The scope of this question is too large to properly answer here in full, but the rationale of Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871-1943), the greatest popularizer of the Yogācāra in the late Qing and early Republican period, can give us some insight as to why Yogācāra was such an attractive option.

First, it is important to note that unlike others attracted to Yogācāra at that time, Ouyang did not turn to Yogācāra to create a unique synthesis with some larger idiosyncratic philosophical project. He did not necessarily see Yogācāra as a way to save China politically. Although he remained a Chinese patriot throughout his life, his interest in Yogācāra was due more to his genuine concern with the predicament of Buddhism in China rather than to a concern about China itself. For Ouyang, Yogācāra was an antidote to the following problems Buddhism faced

dedicated to the study of modern mind science, the Chinese Psychological Society (Zhongguo xinli xuehui 中國心理學會), was formed. Beginning the following year, the association began publishing the journal *Xinli* 心理 (Psychology). Although articles on psychology were already appearing in the broader Chinese periodical press, *Xinli* was the only periodical solely dedicated to the subject to appear in Chinese until 1928. An examination of the contents of the first five years of this journal carried out in 1927 by Siegen Chou of Stanford University helps to place the Wuchang School's efforts to use Yogācāra to examine mind science into their proper context. During those five years, one of twenty-one categories of articles that appeared in the journal was "Systematic Psychology." According to Chou, this category included articles on "Buddhist psychology; introspective vs. behaviorist psychology; Wang Yang[ming]'s psychology (1472–1528); life of Freud and progress of his thought; [Zhu Xi]'s (1130–1200) and [Xunzi]'s (about 300 B. C.) thoughts on psychology." From this list, it appears that Zhang Yaoliang 張耀翔 (1863–1964), the president of the society and chief editor and contributor to the journal, took seriously its stated purpose, which was to create a synthesis of new ideas from Western mind science and ideas from Chinese classical culture. In the 1924 article "Wang Yangming xinlixue 王陽明心理學" (The Psychology of Wang Yangming), Neo-Confucian views on the nature of mind were compared with those of modern psychology"

during his lifetime: (1) Chan Buddhist anti-intellectual sentiments; (2) the doctrinal errors of the Tiantai and Huayan schools; and (3) the lack of a systematic approach among Chinese intellectuals.⁶

Chan Buddhism, and the other great Sinitic Buddhist schools, dominated Buddhism in China during this period. Chan, Huayan and Tiantai represented a later development in Chinese Buddhist intellectual history. These schools were a synthesis of different intellectual strains and tended to sinify Buddhist ideas, mixing them with and adapting them to the preexisting Chinese milieu. As textual studies became more sophisticated in China, a problem naturally emerged. These dominant forms of Chinese Buddhism did not align neatly with what scholars knew about early Indian Buddhism, which tended to be analytic. This problem was compounded by the anti-intellectual rhetoric of Chinese Buddhism, which while usually attributed to Chan Buddhism, ran through almost all Sinitic forms of Buddhism. In short, two major issues drove Chinese Buddhist intellectuals away from Chinese sources towards Indian sources. Firstly, Sinitic Buddhism was too synthetic. It contained within itself too many conflicting strains of thought for it to be a basis of an elegant Chinese science of the mind. Secondly, Sinitic Buddhism was too alienated from Buddhism's Indian context. This led to a focus on historicity during this period of Buddhist studies. Building a science of the mind on the basis of older Indian texts and highlighting the direct path of transmission of those texts would bring an air of legitimacy to the project.

Ouyang Jingwu also set the stage for how the Buddhists would approach this project in contrast to their Neo-Confucian contemporaries. While figures like Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-

⁶ Eyal Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology." In *Transforming Consciousness*, edited by John Makeham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 294.

1995) used western intellectual history as a foil against which to develop a modern Chinese philosophy, Buddhist intellectuals writing about the Yogācāra were more focused on transmitting and justifying Buddhism on its own terms. These scholars preferred to use texts within the tradition exclusively rather than to integrate or respond to western or non-Buddhist texts. That is not to say that the Yogācāra was a fixed or uncontested category. What was considered as the true Yogācāra was hotly debated, especially between scholars associated with Master Taixu, who generally accepted the pre-Tang dynasty Chinese Yogācāra of the *Dilun* 地論 and *Shelun* 攝論 schools as legitimate texts and included *tathāgatagarbha* texts in their intellectual projects, and those intellectuals in Ouyang Jingwu's circle, who rejected the strong *tathāgatagarbha* thesis as it existed in China and was more concerned with the Yogācāra of Xuanzang 玄奘 which had a direct connection to Indian materials.⁷ Master Yinshun fell into the first of these two categories. While his history does make use of the works of Xuanzang's major disciple, Kuiji 窺基, Yinshun also gives an account of the prehistory of *tathāgatagarbha* thought as it relates to the mature Yogācāra and does not undermine the legitimacy of the *Dilun* 地論 or the *Shelun* 攝論 schools.

This is not to say that Master Yinshun's and Ouyang Jingwu's projects were diametrically opposed, with one defending and the other undermining the *tathāgatagarbha* infused strains of

⁷ Eyal Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology." In *Transforming Consciousness*, edited by John Makeham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 300.

Both Ouyang and Taixu seem to have been aware of two different approaches within Buddhism that are different to a certain extent. They nevertheless disagree on the nature of the difference. Whereas Ouyang held that *faxiang* is entirely separate from *weishi*, Taixu argued that they could not be separated into two independent aspects; rather, *faxiang* must be subsumed within *weishi*.

Taixu was also critical of Ouyang's classification of the scriptures. He used *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* as an example. For Ouyang, *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* was classified as a *weishi* text. Taixu, on the other hand, held that *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* includes both *faxiang* and *weishi*, arguing that whereas the first chapter in the treatise focused on the *ālāyavijñāna* (*weishi* according to Ouyang), the second chapter focused on characteristics and explained the three natures (*faxiang* according to Ouyang)

the Yogācāra.⁸ Their projects shared a hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism*. In this view, Indian texts, or Chinese texts with a traceable line of transmission connecting them to Indian thought, are thought of as a more legitimate means to come to understand early Buddhism. This can be seen in both Yinshun's and Ouyang Jingwu's extensive use of canonical translations of Indian texts. But the hermeneutic of Indian Normativism still allowed a space where what exactly the historical Yogācāra included and did not include could be contested.

⁸ Eyal Aviv, "Ouyang Jingwu: From Yogācāra Scholasticism to Soteriology." In *Transforming Consciousness*, edited by John Makeham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 305.

Ouyang's particular view of *tathāgatagarbha* is important for our understanding of the scholastic Buddhist movement for two reasons. First, it contributes to our understanding of Ouyang's teaching as a whole. He is known as a staunch critic of East Asian Buddhist schools, such as Tiantai and Huayan, and of foundational texts in East Asian Buddhism, such as the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* and the **Śūraṅgama-sūtra* and their misinterpretation of Buddhism (and he was especially critical of their *tathāgatagarbha* theories). Thus it may come as a surprise (it certainly did for me) that later in life he studied texts such as the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* that preached a version of *tathāgatagarbha* theory. Either Ouyang's thought had shifted with time or he had developed a more nuanced view of the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching.

Chapter 3: The Structure of the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源

3.1 Yinshun's Historical and Chronological Approach

The organization of the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源 reflects Yinshun's historical emphasis. Yinshun divides his prehistory of the mature Yogācāra into two periods, the period of early Buddhism (*yuanshi fojiao* 原始佛教) and the period of sectarian Buddhism (*bupai fojiao* 部派佛教). The first volume of the book deals with the early Buddhist period. It describes the types of nascent consciousness only thought that already existed in the *āgamas* and gives an account of dependent origination, which Yinshun views as the wellspring from which consciousness only thought and sectarian Buddhism arose. The second volume of the book deals with the sectarian Buddhist period. It is divided into three sections. Each of the sections gives an account of the intellectual prehistory of a particular doctrine that is characteristic of the mature Yogācāra, namely the fundamental consciousness (*benshi* 本識), the perfuming doctrine (*xunxi* 熏習) and objectless ontology (*wujing lun* 無境論).

3.2 The Antecedents to Mature Yogācāra

Master Yinshun gives an intellectual prehistory for four Buddhist doctrinal positions. The first is accepted in all Buddhist schools and the other three are accepted in the mature Yogācāra and Buddhist schools that have been influenced by consciousness only thought. The four doctrines are 1) the twelve links of dependent origination (*pratīyasamutpāda*), 2) the store house consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), 3) the perfuming of seeds in the storehouse consciousness (*vāsanā*), 4) and the ontology of objectlessness (*wujinglun* 無境論).

The model of the twelve links of dependent origination was developed in the earliest

period of historical Buddhism and appears in the *āgamas*, the oldest extant collections of Buddhist texts. The next two doctrines, the storehouse consciousness and perfuming, were developed in the sectarian period. These two doctrines were produced by an ongoing process of mutual influence and debate between different Buddhist schools. The last doctrine, the ontology of objectlessness, also developed in the sectarian period, however it was not articulated as an explicit doctrine. Instead, the other three epistemological doctrines naturally led consciousness only thinkers, who privileged consciousness over form (*rūpa*), to develop an ontology that excluded external objects. Objectlessness is a consequence of earlier debates, and it should be noted that this ontological position has no equivalent Sanskrit term.

3.3 Important Sectarian Schools

Yinshun includes several Buddhist schools in his prehistory of the Yogācāra. He treats the early Buddhist period and the *āgamas* as a single undifferentiated unit. In Yinshun's account, it is only in the sectarian period that the doctrinal positions of different schools are significant enough that debate and mutual influence begins to be significant. Yinshun includes this graph showing the proliferation of different Indian Buddhist schools during this period:⁹

⁹ 《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 41a09-42a10)




Figure 1: Yinshun's Graph of Sectarian Period Schools

While Yinshun mentions all of these schools, only six of these schools play a significant role in his prehistory. These are the Mahāsāṃghika (*dazhongbu* 大眾部), the Sthaviravāda (*shangzuobu* 上座部), the three schools descended from the Sthaviravāda, the Vātsīputrīya (*duzixi* 犢子系), the Vibhajyavāda (*fenbieshuo* 分別說), the Sarvāstivāda (*shuo yiqie youbu* 說一切有部), and finally, the Sautrāntika (*jingliangbu* 經量部), which itself is descended from the Sarvāstivāda.¹⁰ Sometime after the reign of emperor Aśoka, a schism occurred in the Buddhist community. Two groups came out of this earliest schism, the Mahāsāṃghika (*dazhongbu* 大眾部) and the Sthaviravāda (*shangzuobu* 上座部). Both of these would give rise further schism and

¹⁰ The Sautrāntika 經量部 (*jingliangbu*) does not appear on the graph above, but it is closely related to and descended from the Saṃkrāntika (說轉部 *shuozhuanbu*). 「後期的經量與說轉部，思想上確有很大的距離。我國古德雖說它是一部，也分別經部的本計與末計。經量本計——說轉部，初從有部流出，是有部與犢子系的折中者，也建立勝義補特伽羅。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 59a5-8)

There is indeed a big ideological gap between the later Sautrāntika and the [earlier] Saṃkrāntika. Although our country's ancient masters say that they are a single school, they also distinguish the original teaching and the later teaching of the Sautrāntika. The original teaching of the Sautrāntika - the Saṃkrāntika, originally flowed out from the Sarvāstivāda, and was a compromise between the Sarvāstivāda and the Vātsīputrīya. It also established the paramārthapudgala.

sub-schools, however Yinshun treats these two highest subdivisions differently. While Yinshun gives a detailed account of the doctrinal positions of the sub-schools of the Sthaviravāda, for all intents and purposes, he treats the Mahāsāṃghika as a single unified Buddhological orientation.

According to traditional Buddhist lore, the Mahāsāṃghika, meaning the great saṅgha, received its name because when the schism occurred, the majority of the members of the *saṅgha* belonged to it, rather than to the Sthaviravāda. The Mahāsāṃghika no longer exists, but some of its views have come down to us in the present. Its members had a high view of the Buddhas and a low view of the conditional world. Buddhas, and to a lesser extent Bodhisattvas, were thought to transcend the phenomenal world by the Mahāsāṃghika. All phenomena were understood by the Mahāsāṃghika to be afflicted to a lesser or greater degree. The Mahāsāṃghika's views would play a prominent role in the later rejection of the *śrāvaka* path by the Mahāyāna.

The Sthaviravāda, meaning those who uphold the elders, received its name because most of its supporters were elder monks at the time of the schism between it and the Mahāsāṃghika. The Sthaviravāda are famous for being the predecessor of our contemporary Theravāda however, the Theravāda is just one among many schools that descend from the Sthaviravāda. Yinshun identifies four sub-schools of the Sthaviravāda that play an important role in the prehistory of the mature Yogācāra. These schools are the Vātsīputrīya (*duzixi* 犢子系), the Vibhajyavāda (*fenbieshuo* 分別說), the Sarvāstivāda (*shuo yiqie youbu* 說一切有部), and finally, the Sautrāntika (*jingliangbu* 經量部). The Sthaviravāda and its sub-schools differ in their Buddhology from the Mahāsāṃghika and these schools emphasize *abhidharma* more than the Mahāsāṃghika.

The Vātsīputrīya derive their name and their teachings from their principal master, Vatsīputra. Vatsīputra aimed to account for the possibility of a sentient being existing from

moment to moment and life to life if the existence of an unchanging self is impossible. The Vātsīputrīya posit that the *pudgala*, the person that is the cause and recipient of karma, truly exists and that it is neither subsumed in nor is separate from the five skandhas. Thus, the *pudgala* can be said to neither be conditioned nor unconditioned and it is able to carry karma from moment to moment without being a reified self. Because of their emphasis on the *pudgala*, this school is often referred to as the *pudgalavāda*.

The Vibhajyavāda (*fenbieshuo* 分別說) literally means those who uphold distinctions. Of all of the schools that Yinshun deals with in detail, this school is the most similar to the contemporary Theravāda. This school posits that the mind is fundamentally pure but is defiled by adventitious defilements. This doctrine plays an important role in the development of the *ālayavijñāna* and prefigures the *tathāgatagarbha* tendencies in mature consciousness only thought.

The Sarvāstivāda (*shuo yiqie youbu* 說一切有部) literally means those who uphold that everything exists. This school taught that all dharmas exist in the past, the present and the future. Dharmas are able to exist in this way because, regardless of their manifestation in the present moment, dharmas have a nature and these natures are substances (*ti* 體). It is the substance that exists in the past or in the future regardless of whether any particular dharma is or is not manifesting in the conditioned world.

The Sautrāntika (*jingliangbu* 經量部) developed out of the Sarvāstivāda. The Sautrāntika de-emphasize *abhidharma*, unlike the Sarvāstivāda, and it takes scripture (*sūtra*) to the authoritative source of knowledge about the conditioned world. Among all the schools of the sectarian period this school is the most similar to the mature Yogācāra and Vasubandhu is said to have belonged to this school before his conversion to the Mahāyāna.

Chapter 4: Consciousness Only in the Āgamas

4.1 Dependent Origination and Consciousness Only

Yinshun begins his intellectual pre-history of the Yogācāra by focusing on the antecedents to consciousness only thought found in early Buddhism. Yinshun pays special attention to the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratīyasamutpāda*, *yuanqi* 緣起). He begins his discussion with a simple definition of dependent origination from the *Samyuktāgama* (*za'a'hanjing* 雜阿含經).

「緣起的定義，像經上說：「此有故彼有，此生故彼生；此無故彼無，此滅故彼滅。」意思說：宇宙、人生，要皆為關係的存在，無獨立的個體，因關係的演變分離而消失。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 5a1-3)

The definition of dependent origination is as the sutra says: "This exists because that exists, this arises because that arises, this does not exist because that does not exist, this ceases because that ceases." The meaning is this: The entirety of the universe and human life must be (nothing but) the existence of relationships, not independent substances, and there is degradation to due to the evolution and separation of relationships.

This doctrine is the basis of all Buddhism. Put simply, there are no unchanging things. Only the relationships between things exist. The most popular form of this doctrine is the model of the twelve links of dependent origination, however as Yinshun notes, there are multiple models of

dependent origination. The *Samyuktāgama* for example only lists ten links (*aṅga*, *zhi* 支).

《雜阿含經》卷 10：「此有故彼有，此生故彼生，謂緣無明有行，乃至生、老、病、死、憂、悲、惱、苦集；所謂此無故彼無，此滅故彼滅，謂無明滅則行滅，乃至生、老、病、死、憂、悲、惱、苦滅」(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 67, a5-8)

Samyuktāgama Scroll 10: This exists because that exists, this arises because that arises. It is said that there are volitional formations (xing 行, saṃskāra) due to ignorance, which leads to birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, sadness, affliction, and suffering. It is said that this does not exist because that does not exist, this ceases because that ceases. It is said that if ignorance ceases, then the formations will cease, and even birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, sadness, afflictions, and suffering will cease.

In Yinshun's view, while this ten-link model differs from the more standard twelve link model, it still points to a universal principle of Buddhist causality. When this phenomenon appears, that phenomenon appears. When this phenomenon is extinguished, that phenomenon is extinguished. Thus, in his view, it can be said then that dependent origination has two kinds of movement. The first is the generative flow (*liuzhuan men* 流轉門) where one phenomenon causes another to arise. The second is the regressive flow (*huanmie men* 還滅門) where the extinguishing of one phenomenon causes the extinguishing of another.

In the schema of the twelve links of dependent origination, there are twelve phenomena that give rise in causal succession. These are ignorance (*avidyā*, *wuming* 無明), which gives rise

to volitional formations (*saṃskāra*, *xing* 行), which gives rise to consciousness (*viññāna*, *shi* 識), which gives rise to psycho-physical existence (*nāmarūpa*, *mingse* 名色), which gives rise to the six sense bases (*ṣaḍāyatana*, *liuruchu* 六入處), which give rise to sense impression (*sparsā*, *chu* 觸), which gives rise to sensation (*vedanā*, *shou* 受), which gives rise to craving (*trṣṇā*, *ai* 愛), which gives rise to clinging (*upādāna*, *qu* 取), which gives rise to existence (*bhava*, *you* 有), which gives rise to birth (*jāti*, *sheng* 生), which finally gives rise to old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*, *laosi* 老死). While the members of this list, especially the links of consciousness and psycho-physical existence, are crucial for the development of the mature Yogācāra, Yinshun is not particularly interested in how the twelve-link list became dominant. Instead, he is more interested in how the basic observation of dependent origination serves as a basis for later Buddhist doctrinal developments. In fact, in Yinshun's view, all developed forms of Buddhism are restatements and developments of dependent origination.

「釋尊體證了法爾如是的緣起法，又給弟子們解說。所以從緣起中心的見地考察起來，可說整個佛法是緣起法門多方面的善巧說明。佛弟子，也沒有不從這裡得到悟證。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 7a10-12)

"The Buddha realized the primordial dharma of dependent origination and explained it to his disciples. Therefore, from an investigation of the core insight of the of dependent origination, it can be said that the entire Buddha Dharma is a skillful explanation of the many aspects of the dharma of Dependent Origination. All Buddhist disciples also learn from this to obtain enlightenment."

In Yinshun's view, all forms of Buddhism are developments of this foundational insight, but different strains of Buddhist thought emphasize different aspects of the truth of dependent origination. The strains of Buddhist thought that would anticipate the Yogācāra focused on the role of consciousness (*viññāna*, *shi* 識) and psycho-physical existence (*nāmarūpa*, *mingse* 名色). These two fall under the rubric of the skandhas, the five constituent parts of a sentient being. In the first volume of the *Tanyuan* Yinshun examines the the relationship between consciousness and psycho-physical existence and identifies a crucial tension posed by the juxtaposition of these two links. Both of these links contain or subsume the skandha of consciousness (*viññāna*, *shi* 識) and both are mutually dependent upon each other for their existence. This makes their relationship quite subtle and difficult to apprehend. Yinshun cites a passage from the *Dīrghāgama* where the Buddha questions Ānanda about the relationship between consciousness and psycho-physical existence as it enters a mother's womb at conception to clarify the complicated relationship between these two links.

「這識與名色的相互關係，正像《大緣方便經》所啟示的：「阿難！緣識有名色，此為何義？若識不入母胎者，有名色不？答曰：無也。若識入胎不出者，有名色不？答曰：無也。若識出胎，嬰孩壞敗，名色得增長不？答曰：無也。阿難！若無識者，有名色不？答曰：無也。阿難！我以是緣，知名色由識，緣識有名色。我所說者，義在於此。阿難！緣名色有識，此為何義？若識不住名色，則識無住處；若無住處，寧有生老病死、憂悲苦惱不？答曰：無也。阿難！若無名色，寧有識不？答曰：無也。阿難！我以此緣，知

識由名色，緣名色有識。我所說者，義在於此。」」《唯識學探源》

(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 18a11-19a7)

"This mutual relationship between consciousness (vijñāna, shi 識) and psycho-physical existence (nāmarūpa, mingse 名色) is explained in the Mahānidāna Sutta [of the Dīrghāgama]:

"Ānanda! [Because of] conditioning consciousness there is psycho-physical existence. What is the meaning of this? If consciousness does not enter the mother's womb, is there psycho-physical existence? He answered: No. If the consciousness enters the womb and does not come out, is there psycho-physical existence? He answered: No. If the consciousness comes out of the womb and the baby is destroyed, does psycho-physical existence grow? He answered: No. Ānanda! If there is no consciousness, is there psycho-physical existence? He answered: With this condition, I know that psycho-physical existence is caused by consciousness (shi 識), and [because of] conditioning consciousness there is psycho-physical existence. The meaning of what I said is this. Ānanda! [Because of] conditioning psycho-physical existence (mingse 名色) there is consciousness. What is the meaning of this? If consciousness does not abide in psycho-physical existence, then the consciousness has no place to abide. If there is no place to abide, could there be birth, old age, illness, death, sorrow, sadness, suffering and affliction? He answered: No. Ānanda! If there is no psycho-physical existence, could there be consciousness? He answered: No. Ānanda! With this condition, I know consciousness causes psycho-physical existence, and that [because of] conditioning psycho-physical existence exist there is consciousness. This is the

meaning of what I said."

Vijñāna and *nāmarūpa* form a pair that are interdependent. Both serve as a necessary condition for the other to persist through time. This entails an explicit early Buddhist embryology that emphasizes the role that consciousness plays in forming the skandhas that constitute a sentient being. In this view, though *nāmarūpa* includes within itself *vijñāna*, as it is one of the five skandhas, that *vijñāna* plays a special conditioning role that maintains the existence of *nāmarūpa* as a whole.

This interdependence poses a problem. While both consciousness and psycho-physical existence fall under the rubric of the skandhas, *nāmarūpa* includes all five skandhas within itself. If the links of dependent origination arise sequentially, how then can *vijñāna* stand alone and then arise again under the rubric of *nāmarūpa*? This can be dealt with easily if one understands dependent origination not to be a sequential process. But there is still the question, why is the cause of *vijñāna* included within its fruit? Common sense would preclude this and, as we shall see, certain Buddhist schools of the sectarian period do preclude the possibility that a cause and its fruit can exist in the same moment.

For those who upheld the six *vijñāna* model of the mind as it is found in the *āgamas*, the question of the relationship between *vijñāna* and its fruit posed a problem. Is this conditioning *vijñāna* something other than one of the constituent members of the five skandhas? Could it be something other than the sensory and mental consciousnesses? The mature Yogācāra identifies this conditioning *vijñāna* with the *ālayavijñāna*. It is this consciousness that enters the womb and causes psycho-physical existence to arise. But this conceptualization of a conditioning *vijñāna* only comes about after a long period of doctrinal development. Yinshun describes this

development in his discussion of the subtle mind (*xixin* 細心) in the first chapter of the second volume of the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源.

Chapter 5: The Fundamental Consciousness

5.1 *Ālaya* and the Problem of Rebirth

Buddhism, like other Indian traditions, accepts reincarnation and karmic retribution. Since the beginningless past sentient beings have been reborn an infinite number of times and a being's current state is determined by its past actions. Buddhism also rejects the notion of an unchanging self. Beings and phenomena in the world lack an unchanging nature. All things are in a constant state of change. As soon as a phenomenon comes into being, it changes into a different phenomenon.

These two views, beginningless karmic retribution and the non-self, have a natural tension. Since all actions arise and pass away in an instant, what is the connection between the body and mind that acts in the present moment and the body and mind that will receive the results of that action in the future? In the naive karmic scheme, karmic retribution in the present moment is meted out to a being on the basis of that being's past actions. However, the supposed enactor of these past actions has disappeared. Just as in the case of any other phenomenon, the person arises and then ceases to be. If karmic retribution is self-inflicted, then the Buddhist understanding of non-self seems to pose major challenges to this naive view.

Orthodox Indian traditions posit the existence of an unchanging self, the *ātman*. This self is the subject of reincarnation and the keeper and receiver of karmic retribution, but this solution is not open to Buddhist thinkers. What then maintains a being's karmic continuity? The various schools of the sectarian school posited some sort of entity, either within sentient beings or external to sentient beings, that could maintain the karmic continuity without recourse to an *ātman*. But, as Yinshun points out in the second volume of the *Tanyuan*, this solution poses more difficulties. Yinshun offers a set of shared questions that the schools of the sectarian period

pursued. If karma is maintained by something, what is that thing? Is it subject to change as well? Where is it found? Is it found in sentient beings or is it an external force acting upon them? Does karma exist in the past—in the moment that the action was taken—or does it somehow exist in the present-when the action is retributed?

The mature Yogācāra uses the *ālayavijñāna* to resolve these problems. It is a collection of vijñāna that maintains the copresence of the past and the present. The *ālaya* is what is reborn lifetime to lifetime, and it is that which retributes the fruits of karma. It is, in the view of the mature Yogācāra, the fundamental consciousness (*benshi* 本識) and the third link of the twelve links of dependent origination. However, the *ālaya* is not found in the *āgamas*. It is the product of a long intellectual development that took place during the sectarian period.

These sectarian Buddhist schools had to develop theories that allowed them to preserve the naive view of karmic retribution while also maintaining impermanence and non-self. Their answers to this problematic were varied, however Yinshun points to a few shared strategies that each school used to develop its theories. These strategies involved inferring some unchanging continuity from the changing phenomenal world.

「他們的意見，誠然是龐雜的，紛歧的；但把他們的思想歸納起來，依舊現出一致的傾向：都是以現實的存在作思想的出發點；從間斷的推論到相續的，從顯現的到潛在的，從粗顯的到微細的，從差別的到統一的，或者從無常的到常住的，從無我的到有我的。他們都是在相續的、潛在的、微細的、統一的、或常住的、有我的理論上，建立前後不即不離，不斷不常而不違反諸行無常的東西，拿來克服這嚴重的困難。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA

2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 47a1-6)

Their opinions are indeed complex and divergent; but when summarizing their thoughts, they still show a consistent tendency: they all take real existence as the starting point of their thinking; from discontinuous they infer continuity, from the apparent, the potential, from the gross to the subtle, from the differentiated to the unified, or from the impermanent to the permanent, from the selfless to the self. Upon the theory that there is a continuous, potential, subtle, unified, or permanent self, they overcome this serious difficulty by establishing something that is neither identical with nor inseparable from before and after, neither cut off nor continuous, and does not violate the impermanence of all formations (saṃskṛta, 行 xing).

The two doctrinal developments that follow this pattern are the subtle mind doctrine and the *vāsanā* doctrine. Finally, the objectless ontology of the Yogācāra is inferred from these two doctrines. Let us first look at chapter one of the second volume of the *Tanyuan* where Yinshun gives a history of the development of the subtle mind.

5.2 The Subtle Mind (*xixin* 細心)

The various Buddhist schools of the sectarian period reasoned there must be a subtle, latent, and hidden karmic continuity in the changing phenomenal world and/or in the nature of sentient beings. All sentient beings have minds. This distinguishes them from non-sentient things like rocks and trees. But the mind can be temporarily interrupted. For example, in dreamless sleep or in a state of stupor, there is no mental content. In these states, our experience is as if there was no phenomenal world at all. But when one wakes, the world returns, and it has

maintained the continuity it had before. Take for example, a person who wakes up from dreamless sleep. When he wakes, he finds the external world to be continuous, but he also finds that his mind and karmic history is continuous. He is the same person that he was before. What happened to his mind while sleeping? It cannot be that it was annihilated during his dreamless sleep. If it was, then his current mind would lack a causal explanation, and, in the Buddhist view, there are no spontaneously arising uncaused things. Therefore, while he was asleep, there must have been a kind of subtle mind (*xixin* 細心) that serves as the cause for his present moment of waking mental awareness.

The example of the dreamless sleeper is comparable to a meditator who enters the higher levels of samādhi. When a mediator enters the fourth *dhyāna*, there is no mental content. It is as if there is no mind at all, yet when the meditator arises from their meditation, he is the same person that he was before meditating. Master Yinshun argues that sectarian Buddhist thinkers developed their theories of karmic retribution and continuity from this basic observation—the mind has a subtle continuity that is maintained even when it seemingly disappears.

This subtle mind (*xixin* 細心) would eventually be adopted as the seventh consciousness of sentient beings, the other six being the consciousnesses of the five senses—sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch—along with the gross mental consciousness—thought. The subtle mind allowed sectarian Buddhists to explain more than just the continuity of the mind, it became the explanation for the continuity of karmic retribution.

「細心，是受生命終者，根身的執持者，縛解的連繫者。它為了業果緣起的要求而建立，它就是生命的本質。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 50a2-3)

The subtle mind is that which suffers the ending of life, that which appropriates the body and that which fastens and loosens the bonds [of rebirth]. It was established for the requirements of karma and dependent origination, and it is the essence of life.

The subtle mind served for sectarian Buddhists the same role that the *ātman* serves for Orthodox Indian thinkers. It is the subject of rebirth, the agent of action and the sufferer of karmic retribution. It is also the precursor to the mature Yogācāra's *ālayavijñāna*. However, the theories that different sectarian Buddhist schools gave vary widely in their explanation of how this subtle mind existed.

5.3 The Sarvāstivāda's Doctrine of Momentariness

The fundamental observation of Buddhism is that all phenomena are subject to change. But the nature of this change is unclear. When we think of change in a naive way, we often think of discrete objects which, after persisting for some period of time, then transform into something else. However, as we have already seen in Yinshun's discussion of dependent origination, Buddhism challenges this naive mereology. Discrete objects never exist by themselves. Rather everything is constituted by a complex of relationships and these relationships are processual. Is the idea that an object can persist for some given period of time even tenable if this is assumed to be the case? If so, how long can something exist unchanged? What even is a discrete thing at all if things are merely combinations of causal relationships?

The Sarvāstivāda claimed that all dharmas arise and cease in a moment (*cha'na shengmie* 剎那生滅). This doctrine is used to systematize the nature of change. This doctrine of

momentariness is not universally assumed in the sectarian period or in later developed Buddhism, but this idea has an enormous impact on the development of doctrine in the sectarian period. All sectarian Buddhist schools must either accept the Sarvāstivāda's understanding of change or must confront it with some alternative. This has huge consequences in the development of the subtle mind doctrine and is a good place to begin our study of Yinshun's intellectual prehistory of the subtle mind.

The Sarvāstivāda are those who hold that everything exists in the three times. That is to say, all possible dharmas exist in the past, present and future.

「一切有部，是依三世實有而得名的。據它的解說，已生已滅是過去，未生未滅是未來，已生未滅是現在。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 60a12-61a1)

The Sarvāstivāda obtain their name on the basis of the doctrine of the reality of [dharmas in] the three times. According to their explanation, that which has already arisen and ceased is the past. That which has yet to arise and yet to cease is the future. That which has arisen but has yet to cease is the present.

This may seem to stand in contradiction to the Sarvāstivāda's doctrine of momentariness, however the Sarvāstivāda makes a subtle ontological distinction between dharmas that exist in the manifest present and other kinds of dharmas. According to the Sarvāstivāda, when a dharma is manifest, that dharma is called the present. When it has disappeared, that dharma is the past. When it has not yet arisen, it is the future. But this is not what one would normally understand "all dharmas existing" to mean. We would expect this to mean that all things exist in a real

manifest sense now or that we could somehow have access to the past and the future in this present moment. But this is not the claim of the Sarvāstivāda. Instead, the Sarvāstivāda claimed that a every dharma's nature (*dharmatā, fati* 法體) exists in the past, present, and future, but the effects (*zuoyong* 作用) of these dharma natures arise and cease in time. It is these effects that we normally call the present.

「這三世，是依法體的現起引生自果作用，和作用的息滅而分別的。生滅，只是作用的起滅。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 61a1-2)

These three times are distinguished according to the manifestation a self-resultant effect of the dharmatā (fati 法體), and the cessation of its effect. Saṃsāra is merely the arising and ceasing of these effects (zuoyong 作用).

The Sarvāstivāda introduced a new ontological level—a dharma's nature, which itself is not a manifest thing in the phenomenal world. A dharma's nature (*fati* 法體) and its manifested effect (*zuoyong* 作用) are distinguished in this view. The dharma nature is said to be substantially real (*shiyou* 實有) as it exists regardless as to whether its effect is manifest or unmanifest. It can be said to exist in the past, present, and future. While the effect arises in a single moment (*cha'na* 剎那) and then immediately ceases in that same moment, the dharma's nature abides uninterrupted regardless of the arising or ceasing of the effect.

「依三世實有的見地，未來，早具足了無量無邊的一切法。因現在法引生自果的作用，使未來世中的某一類法，剎那生起引生自果的作用，這叫做從未

來來現在。現在只有一剎那，剎那間作用就要息滅；作用息滅以後的法體，名為過去法，這叫做從現在到過去。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 61a4-7)

According to the view of the reality of the three times, the future is already filled with all the immeasurable and boundless dharmas. Because the present dharma induces the arising of its own self resultant effect, a certain type of dharma in the future life will instantly have the effect of causing its own fruition. This is called coming from the future to the present. The present is only made up of one moment (cha'na 剎那), and the [present] effect (zuoyong 作用) will cease in this moment; after the ceasing of the effect, the dharma nature is called a past dharma. This is called going from the present to the past.

In this view, it is only the phenomenal world of effects (*zuoyong* 作用) that is undergoing change from moment to moment. The abiding world of dharma natures does not change. It also never manifests as a dharma nature *as such*, only manifesting as an effect. These dharma natures are substantially real (*dravyasat, shiyou* 實有). They, unlike the changing phenomenal world of dharmas that arises and ceases in a moment, are real, abiding metaphorically underneath the world of phenomena. Yinshun uses the image of a short hallway between two rooms to illustrate the Sarvāstivāda's view of the arising and ceasing effects in the flow of time.

「這好像甲屋住滿了很多的人，這些人，一個跟一個的經過一條短短的走廊，到乙屋去。正在經過走廊的時候，好比是現在。甲屋沒有經過走廊的人，好比是未來。已經通過走廊，進入乙屋去的，當然是過去了。」《唯識學

探源》 (CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 61a7-10)

This is as if there was a Room A that is filled with many people. One by one these people pass through a short corridor to Room B. When people pass through the corridor, this is analogous to the present. There are no people passing through the corridor in Room A. This is like the future. Those who have already passed through the corridor and entered Room B of course represents the past.

This poses other questions. If the world is merely made up of momentarily rising and ceasing effects, and sentient beings are merely things in the world, how is it possible that a sentient being's karma can be maintained? How could a being's karmic continuity persist from lifetime to lifetime or even moment to moment if it arises and ceases in a single moment? We will return to the Sarvāstivāda in our exploration of Yinshun's account to see how it maintains a being's karmic continuity, but as we go on with Yinshun's prehistory, we shall see the Sarvāstivāda's doctrine of momentariness appears and reappears again and again, either as problem to be dealt with or as a foil against which opposing conceptions of time and ontology were developed.

5.4 Vātsīputrīya

The Vātsīputrīya are a branch of the Sthaviravāda and thus shared many doctrines in common with the Sarvāstivāda. The Vātsīputrīya accepted the doctrine of momentariness, but this group felt that momentariness posed a serious problem to karma. How is it that a being's karmic continuity was maintained if that being arose and ceased in a moment? The Vātsīputrīya resolved this tension using the pudgala, the personhood of a sentient being. The Vātsīputrīya's conception of the pudgala was quite different than the understanding found in other sectarian

groups. It established the ineffable pudgala (*bukeshuo wo* 不可說我).

「《俱舍論·破我品》(卷三〇), 曾談到犢子部所認為非有補特伽羅不可的理由說:「若定無有補特伽羅, 為說阿誰流轉生死?若一切類我體都無, 剎那滅心於曾所受久相似境, 何能憶知? ...若實無我, 業已滅壞, 云何復能生未來果? 」」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 52a6-10)

One passage in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Scroll 30) in the “The Refutation of the View of a Self (atmavādapratishedha)” mentions the reason why the Vātsīputrīya believed that there must be a an ineffable pudgala.

"If it is determined that there is no pudgala, how can it be said that there is someone wandering through life and death? ... If every kind of self is inexistent and the mind is extinguished in the very moment that it grasps the semblance of an object, how can it be remembered? If there really is no self and karma has already been destroyed, why is it said that future fruit can return and arise?"

According to the Vātsīputrīya, the mind arises and is destroyed in a single moment. Using the terms of the abhidharma, this means that the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caitta*) are subject to arising and ceasing in a single moment (*cha'na shengmie* 剎那生滅). It is unclear if all other dharmas are also subject to momentariness, as the Sarvāstivāda holds, but as we have seen in our discussion of dependent origination, a sentient being's existence is dependent on the interdependent existence of consciousness (*vijñāna, shi* 識) and psycho-physical existence (*nāmarūpa, mingse* 名色). Without these, there is no sentient being. Thus, if mental phenomena

are subject to momentariness, the sentient being is also subject to momentariness and its karmic continuity is in peril.

The Vātsīputrīya introduced the ineffable pudgala as an entity that is not subject to momentariness and can act as the carrier of karmic continuity. It serves a similar function that the ātman serves in orthodox Indian thought. As Yinshun states, it is 1) the subject of rebirth (*lunhui zhuti* 輪迴主體), 2) the preserver of past experience (*baocun guoqu jingyan* 保存過去經驗), 3) the basis for the six consciousnesses (*liushi shengqi de suoyi* 六識生起的所依), and 4) that which increases the six internal sense bases (*zengzhang liuchu* 增長六處). These are all attributed to *ālaya* in the mature Yogācāra.

This pudgala is ineffable. It cannot be predicated and thus it cannot be called either permanent or changing. This ineffability allowed for the Vātsīputrīya to claim that it is not subject to momentariness by not saying anything about it at all. This opens an obvious line of attack. A critic of the Vātsīputrīya's position could easily say the ineffable pudgala is merely a heretical self. In his description of the ineffable pudgala, Yinshun voices the questions of the critics of this position. If all things are ineffable, then why call it a self? Why claim that it can carry karma? Ultimately the term pudgala is still a description based on language. Why describe it in terms of a self or in terms of a pudgala?

However, the Vātsīputrīya argued for the ineffability of the pudgala on the basis of the five dharma treasuries (*wufacang* 五法藏). This model is a development of the three dharma treasuries of the Sarvāstivāda, with which we are already familiar. These are the treasury of the past (*atītakośa*, *guoquzang* 過去藏), the treasury of the future (*anāgatakośa*, *weilaizang* 未來藏) and the treasury of the present (*pratyutpannakośa*, *xianzaizang* 現在藏). The fourth category, the treasury of the unconditioned (*asamskṛtakośa*, *wuweizang* 無爲藏) is added for unconditioned

phenomena such as space, extinction of phenomena and thusness (*tathātā*, *zhenru* 真如). The unique contribution of the Vātsīputrīya then is the treasury of the ineffable (*anabhilāpyakośa*, *bukeshuozang* 不可說藏) which is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The ineffable pudgala of the Vātsīputrīya is subsumed under this last category.

According to Yinshun, by positing the existence of this category, the ineffable treasury, the Vātsīputrīya were able to sidestep the issue of claiming that the pudgala is either conditioned or unconditioned. If this kind of self is conditioned, then it is subject to momentariness. It arises and ceases in a moment and cannot transmigrate from lifetime to lifetime. If it is unconditioned, then it is not a real manifest thing in the phenomenal world. It would not be identical with the five skandhas, the five constituent parts of a sentient being.

「有為是無常的，無為是常住的，而我卻不可說是有為、無為，是常、是無常。理由是，假使我是無常，那從前世到後世的輪迴，仍舊建立不起來。外道的即蘊計我，有斷滅的過失，也就在此。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 57a1-3)

The conditioned (saṃskṛta, 有為 youwei) is impermanent, the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta, 無為 wuwei) is permanent, but the self cannot be said to be conditioned or unconditioned, permanent, or impermanent. The reason is this: suppose if the self was impermanent, then reincarnation from the past life to the next life would still not be established. Here also, in the heretical (view of that kind of self that is a) self which is reckoned as the skandhas, there is the error of annihilation.

The self cannot be unconditioned, because that would be a heretical self, a self like the *ātman* of orthodox Indian thought. It also cannot be identical with the skandhas, the processual conditioned stuff that makes up a being, because if it was, that would mean that the self is annihilated from moment to moment. This would also a heretical stance as the self must carry karma into the next life if one is not to deny karmic retribution. This ineffable pudgala, like so much of Buddhism, aims to take a middle stance between annihilationism and eternalism.

「假使是常住，那我應該離卻無常的五蘊而存在，同時也就不應該有受苦受樂的差別。外道的離蘊計我，就有這樣的過失。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 57a3-5)

Suppose that it is permanent, then the self should exist apart from the five impermanent skandhas, and at the same time, there should be no difference between receiving suffering and receiving happiness. The heretical (view of) self reckoned as separate from skandhas also has this kind of error.

If the ineffable pudgala is totally separate from the phenomenal world, just as a dharma's nature is separate from the world in the view of the Sarvāstivāda, then it would have no relation to the manifest phenomenal world. That kind of self could not be the recipient of pleasure or pain. It would merely exist separately and parallel to the experiences of pleasure or pain that a being undergoes. This notion that the ineffable self cannot be an eternalist or an annihilationist conception of self poses more questions. What is this ineffable self? How or where does it exist? What is its relationship to the processual skandhas that make up a being or the unconditioned realm of space and extinction?

「犢子部見到這一點，才說非有為、非無為。雖不就是有為的五蘊，卻也不可與五蘊分離而獨存。它舉火與薪的比喻，不可說薪是火，也不可說離薪有火。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 57a5-7)

When the Vātsīputrīya considered this point, they said that it is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. Although it is not simply the five conditioned skandhas, it also cannot be separated from the five skandhas and exist independently. The Vātsīputrīya use the metaphor of fire and firewood. You cannot say that firewood is fire. It cannot be said that there is fire separate from firewood.

The ineffable pudgala is dependent upon reality, but not part of it. The ineffable self is not found in the skandhas, as for example consciousness or form is found in and as part of a sentient being, but it relies on the skandhas for its existence. The metaphor of fire and wood is used to describe this relationship.

「他的雙非論，使人很自然的想到有一不離五蘊的形而上的實體。這些，

《俱舍論·破我品》(卷二九)，有較詳細的記述：

「犢子部執有補特伽羅，其體與蘊不一不異。……非我所立補特伽羅，如仁所徵實有、假有。……此如世間依薪立火，……謂非離薪可立有火，而薪與火非異非一。……如是，不離蘊立補特伽羅，然補特伽羅與蘊非異一。」

《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 57a7-12)[A13] 《阿毘達磨

俱舍論》卷 29 〈9 破執我品〉 (CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 152, c9-28)

His theory of double negation theory makes people naturally think of a metaphysical entity that is inseparable from the five aggregates. This is described in more detail in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Scroll 29) in the “The Refutation of the View of a Self (atmavāda-pratiṣedha)”:

“The Vātsīputrīya uphold the pudgala. Its substance and the skandhas are neither the same nor different. ... The pudgala is not established by the self, but (its) substantial existence (shiyou 實有) or conventional existence (jiayou 假有) is evidenced by its existence (ren 仁).¹¹ ... This is like the firewood establishing fire in the world. ...It is said that fire cannot be established with the separation of firewood, but firewood and fire are neither different nor the same. ...In this way, there is a pudgala without separation from the skandhas, but pudgala and the skandhas are neither different nor the same.”

The Vātsīputrīya wanted to avoid positing a heretical reified metaphysical entity, but it takes the empirical existence (*cun* 存)¹¹ of a karmic continuity, observed through meditational practice and attainments, as an undeniable reality that must be explained. Thus, it had to posit the existence of some entity that carries karma from moment to moment. This pudgala cannot be conditioned or unconditioned, lest it fall into the error of annihilationism or eternalism posed by the momentariness doctrine. Thus, it must be a kind of ineffable—neither conditioned nor

¹¹ I have read the character *ren* 仁 here as a phonetic loan character (*jiajiezi* 假借字) for the character *cun* 存. While *cun* and *you* 有 are both translated here as *existence*, the two words should be distinguished. The apparent existence of the pudgala leads the Vātsīputrīya to infer the existence of a pudgala in a theoretical sense. That inferred pudgala could be either substantially or conventionally existent.

unconditioned—person. This is an ingenious solution to the problem of momentariness, and one cannot help but think of this as a kind of precursor to Nāgārjuna's fourfold negation. But this is not the only solution to the problem of karmic continuity nor is it the most important predecessor to the subtle mind (*xixin* 細心) doctrine.

5.5 Orthodox Sarvāstivāda

The Sarvāstivāda itself had to resolve the problems posed by momentariness. While the Sarvāstivāda's ontology claims that the phenomenal world and the sentient beings within it arise and cease within a single moment, the Sarvāstivāda did not deny the existence of a karmic continuity and the existence of a kind of self that carries that continuity. It did however deny the existence of persons in the naive sense.

「一切有部，也曾談到有我，像《大毘婆沙論》（卷九）說：「我有二種：一者法我，二者補特伽羅我。善說法者，唯說實有法我，法性實有如實見故，不名惡見。」 [A20]」《唯識學探源》 (CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 60a9-11)[A20] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 9(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 41, a18-20)

Sarvāstivāda also once mention an existent self, as stated in the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra (Scroll 9):

There are two kinds of self: one is the dharma-self, and the other is self of the pudgala. Those who are good at preaching the Dharma only say that the dharma-self is substantially existent (shiyou 實有). The nature of dharmas (faxing 法性) is substantially existent. Therefore, this is a true view. It is not called a pernicious view.

From the point of view of momentariness, dharma natures are understood to be substantially real (*shiyou* 實有). They neither arise nor cease. Their effects (*zuoyong* 作用) do arise and cease moment to moment. Those effects make up everything in the changing phenomenal world, including persons (*pudgala, butejialuo* 補特伽羅). Thus, the person and its constantly changing constituent parts are only conventionally existent, but the dharma natures that give rise to those parts can be said to be a kind of unchanging self, a self of dharmas (*fawo* 法我). In Yinshun's view, the Sarvāstivāda's view entails that every dharma nature exists as an independent and no-interdependent kind of self.

「從諸法的自體上看：法法都是各各差別，常住自性，沒有什麼變化可說，彼此間也說不上什麼連繫。「法法各住自性」，是真實有，一切有部依此建立實法我。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 61a13-62a2)[A21]

Keeping in mind the nature of all dharmas: each and every dharma is different and always exists in its own nature. There is no such thing as change, and one cannot say there is a connection between this and that. "Each and every dharma abides in its own nature." This is true substantial existence. The Sarvāstivāda bases the real existence of the dharma-selves on this.

Thus, there is a substantially real kind of self, the self of dharma natures, but this self seems to have little to do with persons as we see them in the world. This also does not solve the problem of maintaining karmic continuity. The Sarvāstivāda posited the conventionally established person (*jiamingde butejialuo* 假名的補特伽羅) to explain the existence of persons in the naive sense.

The conventionally established *pudgala* is that which carries the karma from moment to moment, but ultimately it is an illusion. It is nothing but a collection of relationships that allows for the illusion of the persistence of a being through time.

「在身心的相續中，雖沒有真實的補特伽羅，但從和合相續的關係上，也可假名為補特伽羅。依這假名的補特伽羅，才說有從前生流轉到後世。假名補特伽羅，依實有的五蘊和合而假說，並非實有的存在。」《唯識學探源》

(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 62a7-10)

In the continuity of body and mind, although there is no truly substantially real pudgala, from the confluent and continuous relationships (of dharmas), there is something that can also conventionally be called (jiaming 假名) pudgala. Based on this conventionally named pudgala, it is said that there is a flow from past lives into the future. The conventionally named pudgala is a conventionally true teaching (jiashuo 假說) based on the combination of the five substantially real skandhas, but it is certainly not a substantially existent thing.

According to Yinshun's account, in the Sarvāstivāda's view, the illusion of the person is based on the skandhas. The skandhas are based upon the momentary arising and ceasing of the manifest effects (*zuoyong* 作用) of dharmas and finally those arising and ceasing dharmas are based upon the unchanging, constantly abiding and substantially real dharma natures.

5.6 Saṃkrāntika

The Saṃkrāntika developed from the Sarvāstivāda as a dissident group. These masters

were unsatisfied with the Sarvāstivāda's account of the karmic continuity of a being. The Saṃkrāntika claimed that something is really transferred from one life to the next. This thing is the highest person (*paramārthapudgala*, *shengyi butejialuo* 勝義補特伽羅). This highest person is the substantially real force behind the pudgala that persists for a period of time. The Saṃkrāntika received its name from the belief that the skandhas, the constituent parts of a sentient being and a being's *pudgala*, are actually transferred from one life to the next. Yinshun notes that this concept is difficult to reconstruct from extant texts as the school was eclipsed by their descendent school, the Sautrāntika, but there are some scant references to the school in the work of Kuiji, the chief disciple of Xuanzang.

「窺基《異部宗輪論述記》，有關於勝義補特伽羅的解說：「有實法我，能從前世轉至後世。……但是微細難可施設，即實我也。不同正量等非即蘊離蘊，蘊外調然有別體也。」[A19]」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 60a2-4)[A19] 《異部宗輪論疏述記》卷 1(CBETA, X53, no. 844, p. 589, c13-p. 590, a7 // Z 1:83, p. 233, b4-c4 // R83, p. 465, b4-p. 466, a4)

Kuiji's Comments on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra contains an explanation of the paramārthapudgala: "There is a substantially real dharma-self, which is able to transmigrate from the past life to the next life. ... But it is subtle and difficult to implement. This is the substantially real self. (This self) is neither identical with the skandhas nor separate from the skandhas (kind of self) of the Sāṃmitīyanikāya school (of the Vātsīputrīya), because that (kind of self), of course, has a substance outside of the skandhas.

In Kuji's account of the Saṃkrāntika, it seems as if that the skandhas are transferred from one moment in time to another, but it is unclear how Kuji's comment should be taken. Is the highest person a single thing or is it constituted by the many parts? Kuji refers to the highest person as neither identical with nor separate from the skandhas. Could this be a restatement of the Vātsīputrīya's ineffable *pudgala*? Yinshun points out that it is difficult to pinpoint how the highest person relates to other sectarian conceptions of the *pudgala*.

「照這樣說，勝義補特伽羅，就是諸法真實自體的實法我。既不是蘊外別有，該是即蘊的吧！諸法自體，固可以稱為實法我，但它是各各差別的，是否可以建立為統一性的勝義我呢？窺基的解說，還有商榷的餘地。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 60a5-7)

According to this, the paramārthapudgala is just the substantially real dharma self of all of the truly substantially real dharma natures. Since it does not exist outside the skandhas, it should be identical with the skandhas! The self of all dharmas can certainly be called the actual self, but it each one (of the dharma natures) is different. Can (this kind of self) be established as the unified supreme self? There is still room for discussion in Kuji's explanation.

If the highest person is a direct development from the Sarvāstivāda's conception of the substantially real self of dharmas then it would naturally be subsumed under the rubric of the skandhas. It would not be distinct from the conventionally established *pudgala* of the Sarvāstivāda, but from the limited material Yinshun presents, it is clear that the Saṃkrāntika were emphatic that this highest self was substantially real. It persists through time. This marks a

real break with the Sarvāstivāda. While the exact nature of the highest pudgala is unclear from the evidence Yinshun presents, this does not undermine Yinshun's historical project. The Saṃkrāntika's highest pudgala serves as a way maker for the transformation of Sarvāstivāda conception of the self into the Sautrāntika conception of the self.

5.7 Sautrāntika

The Sautrāntika developed out of the Saṃkrāntika and this school was the first to posit the subtle mind (*xixin* 細心) explicitly. This is an important step in Yinshun's history. He identifies this concept as the direct precursor to the mature Yogācāra's *ālayavijñāna*.

「經部中的一部分學者，不滿意六識論者的細心說，覺得它不能圓滿解釋釋尊的本意。它受分別說、大眾系思想的激發，在長期的體認與探索下，走上了七心論。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 80a5-7)

A portion of the scholars in the Sautrāntika were dissatisfied with the six consciousnesses theory of the subtle mind. They felt that it could not satisfactorily explain the original intention of the Buddha. This group received the influence of Vibhajjavāda and Mahāsāṃghika thought and after long period of reasoning and exploration, it came upon the seven-mind theory.

In early Buddhist models of the mind there were six consciousnesses, the five sensory consciousnesses—sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch—along with sixth the gross mental consciousness—thought. The Sautrāntika, having to deal with the apparent reality of karmic continuity and dissatisfied with the Sarvāstivāda's explanation of the conventionally established

pudgala, developed a seven-consciousness schema by adopting concepts from the Vibhajyavāda and the Mahāsāṃghika. We will look at the ideas of these two schools after sketching the Sautrāntika's rationale for a seven-consciousness schema.

The Sautrāntika made certain basic observations about the karmic continuity of sentient beings. For example, what happens to the karmic continuity of beings who enter states where the mind as such, the constant flow of mental images, ceases, such as deep sleep or samādhi. Certain levels of samādhi are said to be literally *mindless* (*wuxin ding* 無心定), but the Sautrāntika reasoned that there must be some kind of consciousness that allowed one to rise from *samādhi* and maintain a karmic continuity.

Their reasoning was something like this. There are three possibilities. 1) If *samādhi* is truly without mind, then the mind is extinguished. There is nothing left to maintain karmic continuity. 2) If samādhi is merely without mental factors (*caitta, xinsuo* 心所)—the functions associated with the workings of the mind—then there would still be a mind. That mind would just not be functioning as it does in everyday experience. This would be analogous to deep sleep, where the mind is preserved but there is no mental content. 3) If *samādhi* has mental factors, then there must be a mind that these mental factors are dependent upon. This would be no different from the regular mind states of everyday waking life. The first possibility is untenable because we can observe that karmic continuity is maintained. The third possibility is unlikely, because if this was the case there would be no reason to call forms of *samādhi* mindless. Therefore, the second possibility must be the case. There must be some kind of subtle mind that persists, even when mental factors are not manifest.

The existence of this kind of subtle mind is attested in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, a text attributed to Vasubandhu that generally supports Sautrāntika positions. In this text the subtle

mind is referred to as the consciousness of heterogeneous ripening (*vipākaphalavijñāna*, *yishuguoshi* 異熟果識).

「像《大乘成業論》說：「一類經為量者，所許細心彼（滅定）位猶有。謂異熟果識，具一切種子，從初結生乃至終沒，展轉相續曾無間斷。彼彼生處，由異熟因品類差別，相續流轉，乃至涅槃方畢竟滅。即由此識無間斷故，於無心位亦說有心。餘六識身，於此諸位皆不轉故，說為無心。……心有二種：一集起心，無量種子集起處故。二種種心，所緣行相差別轉故。」

[A50]《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 80a7-12) [A50]《大乘成業論》卷 1(CBETA, T31, no. 1609, p. 784, b29-c9)

As the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa says:

“A certain faction of the Sautrāntika granted that the subtle mind still exists in a state of samādhi. This so called vipākaphalavijñāna (yishuguoshi 異熟果識) contains all of the bīja from their first arising to their ending. It continuously passes from place to place without interruption. The various places where it arises due to the differing ripening caused by differing kinds (of karma) continually flow until it finally reaches the ultimate extinction of nirvana. It is precisely due to the uninterruptedness of this vijñāna that in the place without mind [or samādhi] it can also be said that there is mind. The remaining six consciousness are in this position (of inexistence). Because they do not change, it is said to be without mind. ...There are two kinds of minds: The first kind, the collecting and arising mind, collects limitless bīja and bears forth (phenomena).

The second, the changing mind [of everyday experience], depends upon the differing aspects [objects] to develop.

The Sautrāntika believed that there are two meanings of the term *citta*. The first is that which collects seeds (*bīja*, *zhongzi* 種子). The second is the mind as such, the sufferer of everyday experience. It is the first of these two kinds of consciousness, the *vipākaphalavijñāna* (*yishuguoshi* 異熟果識), which maintains karmic continuity from moment to moment and lifetime to lifetime. It persists through time until the sentient being achieves a final nirvana. It does this because it is a collection of seeds (*bīja*, *zhongzi* 種子)—unmanifest karmic potentialities. We shall return to Yinshun's discussion of the development of seeds later, but it is sufficient to say that this a radically different conception of mind than the conceptions held by the Sautrāntika's predecessor schools. In this conception, the mind is not identified with the constant flow of mental images. Instead, it lies latent, behind the being. It is even the cause of the being's skandhas, the constituent parts of its mind and body. Yinshun gives his own gloss of the term collecting and arising (*jiqi* 集起).

「它為什麼稱為集起呢？它含攝蘊藏著一切法的種子（能攝藏），是一切種子積集的所在（所藏處），所以叫集。因善或不善諸法的熏習，使種子生果的功能，漸漸地發展、擴大、成熟；一遇外緣的和合，就從集起心所攝藏的種子，生起可愛或不可愛的果報：這就是起。從集起的意義上說，它不但是生命的當體，還是萬有的動力，也可以說是宇宙萬有的本源。它開展一切，總攝一切，是一切的中心。唯識學上的本識思想，已到含苞待放的階段

了。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 81a5-10)

Why is it called a collecting and rising? It contains the seeds of all dharmas (it is the storing), and it is the place where all seeds accumulate (it is that which is stored), so it is called a collection. Because of the perfuming (vāsanā, xunxi 熏習) of wholesome or unwholesome dharmas, it causes the seeds to bear the effects of fruits to gradually develop, expand, and mature; once it meets the coalescence of external conditions, the seeds stored collecting and arising mind will give rise to desirable or undesirable results: this is the arising. From the sense of the word collecting, it is not only the substance of life, but also the driving force of all things, and can also be said to be the origin of all things in the universe. It develops everything, takes in everything, and is the center of everything. The thought of fundamental consciousness of consciousness-only studies has already reached the budding stage.

This subtle mind, the repository of karmic potentialities, is similar to the *ālayavijñāna* of the mature Yogācāra. It is the cause and maintainer of all things, both the mind of sentient beings and the world in which sentient beings find themselves. However, Sautrāntika's schema does not include the *manovijñāna* (*yishi* 意識) of the mature Yogācāra, the consciousness that maintains a subject object distinction. As Yinshun will show, the mature Yogācāra model of the mind only fully arose after the Sautrāntika adopted certain ideas from the Vibhāgyavāda and the Mahāsāṃghika.

5.8 Vibhajyavāda

The Vibhajyavāda was another Sthaviravāda school that rejected the Sarvāstivāda's doctrine of momentariness. This school developed its own subtle mind theory, however it did so in a distinct way from the Sautrāntika by emphasizing the fundamental purity of the mind. This school eventually developed into a number influential sub-schools, one of these beings the Tāmraśāṭīya (*chitongye bu* 赤銅鑠部), which itself may be the direct predecessor to our contemporary Theravāda school.¹² The Vibhajyavāda's understanding the mind has some resemblances to the doctrines of the Theravāda.

「上座系的本典——《舍利弗阿毘曇》，已把六識與境界分別解說，並且說境界是「初生心」。規定初生心為境界而不是意識，這是非常有意義的。細心思想的最初倡導者，我認為是它。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 88a12-89a3)

The original text of Sthaviravāda—the Śāriputrābhidharma, has already distinguished the six consciousnesses from manodhātu, and said that the manodhātu is the “first arising of mind.” It is very important to note that the manodhātu that is the first moment of mind is not identical with the manas (yishi 意識) [of the mature Yogācāra]. I consider The Vibhajyavāda to be the earliest proponents of subtle mind thought.

The Śāriputrābhidharma established the existence of a mental cause (*manodhātu, yijie* 境界)

¹² The other schools Yinshun mentions as descending from the Vibhajyavāda are the Mahīśāsaka (*huadi bu* 化地部), the Kāśyapīya (*yinguang bu* 飲光部) and the Dharmaguptaka (*fazang bu* 法藏部).

which is the first moment of the arising of mind. This is the cause of the mind as such, the everyday mind that is constituted by the constant procession of mental images. Yinshun is quick to point out that this term is not synonymous with the *manas* (*yishi* 意識), the consciousness that the mature Yogācāra posits as the cause and maintainer of a subject-object distinction. The above passage of the *Śāriputrābhidharma* does not make any claims about the nature of this mental cause or whether it persists through time. As we have seen earlier in Yinshun's discussion, if this mental cause is to serve as a maintainer of karmic continuity, it will either exist conventionally, like the pudgala of the Sarvāstivāda, or persist through time in a substantial way, like the ineffable pudgala of the Vātsīputrīya.

「謂譬喻者分別論師，執滅盡定細心不滅。彼說：無有有情而無色者，亦無有定而無心者。若定無心，命根應斷，便名為死，非謂在定」。據《大毘婆沙論》（卷一五二）所說：滅盡定、無想定中有細心，分別論師與譬喻者的見解相同。但譬喻者是心心所前後相續論者，分別論師卻是王所同時相應的相續論者。心識相續的見解，他倆有很大的差別。」《唯識學探源》

(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 89a10-90a2) [A66] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 152(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 774, a14-17)

The Vibhajyavāda masters of the Dārṣṭāntika hold that the mind is not extinguished in nirodhasamāpatti (miejinding 滅盡定). They say: There are no sentient being without form, and likewise there is no samādhi without mind. If there was a mindless the samādhi, the faculty of life would correspondingly be interrupted, which is called death. Thus it is not said of samādhi (that the mind is

extinguished.) According to the "Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra" (Scroll 152):
The view of the Vibhajyavāda and the Dārṣṭāntika correspond that there is subtle
mind in nirodhasamāpatti and in asaṃjñā-samāpatti (wuxiangding 無想定).
However, the Dārṣṭāntika are those who hold that citta and caitta arise in
continuous sequence [one by one], and the Vibhajyavāda are those who hold citta
and caitta continuously arise at the same time. There is a big difference between
them in their views on the continuity of consciousness.

In this passage, Yinshun introduces us to another set of masters, the Darṣṭāntika. This term refers to those masters that rely on metaphors to justify their positions. In the quotations offered by Yinshun in the *Tanyuan*, the positions of these masters almost always align with the Sautrāntika. It is unclear if these masters are members of the Sautrāntika that have been given the title of Darṣṭāntika or if these are Vibhajyavādins that are also Darṣṭāntika, however it is clear that the masters mentioned above made similar arguments to the ones made by the Sautrāntika. These masters claimed that there is a kind of mind that persists through states even when the normal procession of mental images of waking experience is interrupted. This persisting mind, for the Vibhajyavāda, is the *manodhātu* (*yijie* 意界).

The Vibhajyavāda went beyond the claims of the Sautrāntika by claiming that this subtle mind is innately pure. Why then, in the view of the Vibhajyavāda, are the minds of sentient beings almost always impure and afflicted by defilements? That is because the mind's innate purity is concealed by latent tendencies (*anusāya*, *suimian* 隨眠). These latent tendencies are unmanifest potentialities for future afflictions that prevent the mind from becoming enlightened.

「分別論者，以心性本淨說著名，這是一般所熟知的。這裡，先對它的覺性融然一體論，加以簡單的考察。分別論者的心性本淨，《大毘婆沙論》曾稱之為一心相續論者，像卷二二說：

「有執但有一心，如說一心相續論者。彼作是說：……聖道未現在前，煩惱未斷，故心有隨眠。聖道現前，煩惱斷故，心無隨眠。此心雖有隨眠無隨眠時異，而性是一。如衣、鏡、金等，未浣、磨、鍊等時，名有垢衣等。若浣、磨、鍊等已，名無垢衣等。有無垢等，時雖有異，而性無別，心亦如是。」 [A67]」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 90a2-9)[A67]

《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 22(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 110, a10-20)

The Vibhajyavāda is generally known for its theory of the original pure nature of the mind. Here, let us first briefly examine its theory of a harmonious unified nature of cognition. The Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra explains the Vibhajyavāda's original purity of the mind's nature as the continuity of the one mind. As scroll twenty two states:

“There are those who hold that there is only one mind. These are those who teach the continuity of the one mind. These teachers say ... Before the holy path manifests the afflictions have not yet been eliminated. Therefore, the mind has latent tendencies (suimian 隨眠, anusāya). When Holy Path manifests, because the afflictions have been cut off, the mind does not have latent tendencies.

Although the times at which this mind has or does not have latent tendencies is different, its nature is the same. For example, when clothes, mirrors, gold, etc., have not yet been washed, polished, or refined, these are called defiled and so on.

If one has already washed, polished, or refined these, they are called without defilement and so on. Although the times are different, the (underlying) natures are not different. The mind is also like this.

In this view, the *manodhātu* is always fundamentally pure but that purity is only revealed when one pursues the holy path. This conception of the mind anticipates later explicitly *tathāgatagarbha* infused strains of the mature *Yogācāra*. Yinshun's inclusion of the *Vibhajyavāda* in his history is significant. In Yinshun's view, the development of the *tathāgatagarbha* was intimately linked to the development of the mature *Yogācāra* well before the flowering of the *Dilun* 地論 and *Shelun* 攝論 schools in China.

The *Vibhajyavāda* also stressed the unity of the nature of the mind and its persistence through time as a continuum of successive moments. In the *Vibhajyavāda*'s view, a moment of mind gives rise to a subsequent moment of mind which retains the memories of the past experiences of the prior moment of mind. This allowed them to reject the *Sarvāstivāda*'s conception that the mind arises and ceases in a single moment and to explain how memory functions.

「《大毘婆沙論》卷一一，還有覺性是一論者，其實也就是分別論者一心論的異名，它說：

「有執覺性是一，如說前後一覺論者。彼作是說：前作事覺，後憶念覺，相用雖異，其性是一。如是可能憶本所作，以前後位覺體一故，前位所作後位能憶。」

這一覺論者，依前後一覺的理由，成立追憶過去的可能。它的「相用雖異，

其性是一」，豈不與一心論者的「此心雖有隨眠無隨眠時異，而性是一」
[A70]的見解相同嗎？」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p.
91a1-8)[A68] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 11(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 55,
b14-18) [A69] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 11(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 55,
b16) [A70] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 22(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 110, a17-
18)

Volume 11 of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra, also includes the theory that the cognizing nature is one. In fact, this is simply a different name for the one mind theory of Vibhajyavāda. It says:

“There are those who hold that the cognizing nature (juexing 覺性) is one. These are like those that hold the theory of one cognition before and after. These masters say: Though the form and function of the cognition of things done in the past and the cognition of things remembered later are different, their nature is one. In this way, it is possible to recall earlier acts, and the awareness of the previous and subsequent times is the same. Therefore, the previous position and the subsequent position can be remembered.” This theory of a single cognition establishes the possibility of recalling the past based on the reason of the previous cognitions. How could it be that the above passage’s “even though its form and function are different, its nature is one,” is not the same as the “Although the times at which this mind has or does not have latent tendencies is different, its nature is the same.” said by those that hold there is only one mind.

Because moments of mind cause proceeding moments of mind, a karmic continuity is

maintained. Also, because the nature of the manodhātu is always of the same nature, namely it is of a good nature, it maintains that karmic continuity, regardless of its status as pure or defiled by adventitious defilements. While Yinshun's inclusion of the Vibhajyavāda shows that he is not hostile to the inclusion of *tathāgatagarbha*-like elements in his intellectual history, Yinshun is critical of the Vibhajyavāda. In his view, the Vibhajyavāda wanted to avoid the mechanistic worldview of the Sarvāstivāda, which is admirable, but their conception is too *ātman*-like. Ultimately, in his view, the orthodoxy of the Vibhajyavāda's doctrines are in peril.

「一心論者，不像犢子系建立不同外道的真我，因為佛法是無我的；但不能不建立一貫通前後的生命主體，於是建立一心論。心理的活動與演變，不能機械式的把它割裂成前後獨立的法體。從現象上看，雖然不絕的起滅變化，而無限變化中的覺性，還是統一的。這一體的覺性，豈不是常住嗎？這在反對者的學派看來，一心只是變相的神我。像《成實論》（卷五）主的批評說：「若心是一，即為是常，常即真我。所以者何？以今作後作，常一不變，故名為我。」[A72]」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 92a4-10)[A72] 《成實論》卷 5 〈71 非一心品〉(CBETA, T32, no. 1646, p. 279, b5-7)

Those who uphold the doctrine of the single mind are not like Vātsīputrīya in that they establish the true self of the heretics, because Buddhism is selfless; but they had to establish a consistent subject of life, so they establish the theory of the single mind. Psychological activities and evolution cannot be mechanically understood by splitting it into independent sequential dharma natures [like the

Sarvāstivāda]. From the perspective of phenomena, although it is constantly changing, the awareness in the infinite changes is still unified. Is it not the that this single cognition nature is permanent? This one mind, from the point of view of its opponents, was just the soul in disguise. For example, its main criticism is found in the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (*Cheng shi lun 成實論*) (scroll 5) which says:

"If the mind is one, it is the eternal, and the eternal is the true self. So what then? It can perform future actions with present actions, as it is constantly one and does not change. Therefore, it is called a self."

The Vibhajyavāda, unlike the Vātsīputrīya, opened themselves up to the criticism that their conception of the mind was too much like a self. As the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* states, this conception of mind muddies the causal chain. A future moment may in some way contain within in it all past moments. Again, in the view of the critics of the Vibhajyavāda, this conception was too much like *ātman*. Unlike the in the case of the Vātsīputrīya, Yinshun does not include a defense of this position, but Yinshun does offer some remarks why he thinks that the Vibhajyavāda felt it necessary to posit that the manodhātu was the maintainer of a being's karmic continuity.

「反對者的意見，固然把它看成外道的神我；但在一心論者，卻認為非如此不能建立生命的連鎖。若剎那生滅前後別體，無法說明前後的移轉。《成實論》敘述它的意見說：「以心是一，故能修集。若念念滅，則無集力。」

[A73]本著剎那生滅不能安立因果連繫的觀點，才考慮到心性的一體。這不但一心論者如此，犢子的建立不可說我，經量本計的一味蘊，也都是感到剎那論的困難而這樣的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp.

92a11-93a2)[A73] 《成實論》卷 5 〈69 一心品〉 (CBETA, T32, no. 1646, p. 278, c23)

Although its opponents regard it as a heretical spiritual self, the proponents of the one mind theory believed that without this it would be impossible to establish a chain of life. If there are separate entities before and after the arising and ceasing of a moment, there would be no way to explain the transfer from the past to the future. Tattvasiddhi-sāstra (chengshilun 成實論) states this view:

"Because the mind is one, it is possible to practice cultivate and gather (merits). If thoughts are extinguished, there will be no gathering power."

Based on the view that the instantaneous arising and ceasing (of the mind) is not able to establish the connection of cause and effect, the nature of the mind is taken into consideration. The one mind theorists are not the only ones like this. The ineffable self of the Vātsīputrīya and the skandha of one flavor (ekarasaskandha) of the Sautrāntika are both also like this because they address the difficulties of the theory of momentariness.

Without the persistent, unified, and fundamentally pure *manodhātu*, certain basic observable facts would be at stake for the Vibhajyavāda—namely, the accrual of good merit over time, a being's memorative ability and a being's karmic continuity. While the *manodhātu* would not be adopted wholesale by the mature Yogācāra, it is in the background of certain Sautrāntika conceptions that would be incorporated into the mature Yogācāra.

5.9 Mahāsāṃghika

Yinshun claims the Mahāsāṃghika also influenced what would become the later Sautrāntika's view of the subtle mind. This is another surprising inclusion in his intellectual history as the Mahāsāṃghika had a radically different character than other schools of the sectarian period. It deemphasized *śāstra* and it was the earliest school to promote the bodhisattva ideal. Like the Saṃkrāntika, the views of the Mahāsāṃghika are difficult to fully reconstruct on the basis of surviving texts, but, according to Yinshun, it does seem that the Mahāsāṃghika shared the view of the Sautrāntika and the Vibhajyavāda that mind persisted through mindless states such as samādhi and dreamless sleep.

「《大毘婆沙論》卷一五二，說譬喻分別論者，「說無有有情而無色者，亦無有定而無心者」[A15]；這無色界有色（本是大眾部特有的教義），無心定有心，我認為是大眾與譬喻、分別論者共同的見解。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 118a12-119a2)[A15] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷152(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 774, a15-16)

Scroll 152 of the Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra states that the Dārṣāntika of the Vibhajyavāda are, “those who say that there are no sentient beings that are without form (rūpa), and those who say that there are no beings who attain samādhi that are without mind.” I believe that [the view that] the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu) has form and samādhi has mind (originally this is a peculiar teaching of the Mahāsāṃghika) is a shared view among the Mahāsāṃghika, the Dārṣāntika and the Vibhajyavāda.

The later Mahāsāṃghika developed this view by claiming that multiple minds can arise in the same moment and that the mind pervades the body. This stands in contrast to other views that we have seen so far, such as the Sautrāntika view, which assume that moments of mind arise sequentially and are ontologically different from the body.

「《異部宗輪論》說大眾部末宗異義，有主張「有於一時二心俱起」[A16]的。這二心俱生，還不過是六識並起。但細意識的思想，《異部宗輪論》也確已提到，它說：「心遍於身。」[A17]」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 119a3-7)[A16] 《異部宗輪論》卷 1(CBETA, T49, no. 2031, p. 16, a7) [A17] 《異部宗輪論》卷 1(CBETA, T49, no. 2031, p. 16, a10)

The Samyabhedoparacanacakra explains a different teaching of the later Mahāsāṃghika which asserts that “in one moment two minds arise.” These two minds arise together, which is merely the coexistence of six consciousnesses. However, the subtle consciousness (sūkṣmamanovijñāna, xiyishi 細意識) is mentioned in Samyabhedoparacanacakra, which says: “The mind pervades the body.”

According to the passage above, the Mahāsāṃghika were the first to hold the view that the six consciousnesses arise simultaneously. This is taken for granted in the mature Yogācāra. The Mahāsāṃghika also introduced a seventh consciousness, like the Sautrāntika, but this seventh consciousness corresponds with the body. What is the rationale for this mind-body link? The Mahāsāṃghika argued that the relationship between the mind and the body can be observed. In its view, the mind conforms to the body because the mind constantly appropriates (*upādāna*,

zhishou 執受) the body.

「我們一期生命的延續（生）與崩潰（死），也就在此。我們觸手刺足，不論刺激那一部分，那一部分就能引起感覺；這可以證明有心在執受著。心若一旦不起，根身再也不能有所感覺。所以，大眾未計的細心執受，就是生命的象徵，一切感覺的來源。刺激多方面或者全身，就能引起全身的感受，因此證明心識是普遍的執受著。不然，也就不能同時生起多方面的感受了。」

《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 119a13-120a4)

The continuation (birth) and collapse (death) of our life is just this. If our appendage moves sufficiently, no matter which part (of the body) is stimulated, that part can cause feelings; this can prove that there is mind is within (a moment of) appropriation. If the mind does not arise in a given moment, the body will no longer be able to feel anything. Therefore, the appropriation of the subtle mind of the later Mahāsāṃghika is symbol of life and the source of all feelings. Stimulating multiple aspects or the whole body can cause feelings throughout the body, thus proving that consciousness is universally appropriating. Otherwise, multiple feelings cannot arise at the same time.

The rationale for the Mahāsāṃghika's conception of the subtle mind is not that it is the carrier of a karmic continuity, as was the case with the Sautrāntika. Though it may still do that, it was developed to explain the intimate link between the mind and the body. If the body is just a collection of forms (*rūpa*) and the mind is just a collection of the other four skandhas, why would it be that the mind receives pleasure or pain from the body? Conversely, why would it be

that the body follows the intention of the mind? There must be some sort of function that links the mind and the body. For the mature Yogācāra, this is the *manovijñāna* that constantly appropriates the world. The *manovijñāna* is that part of the mind that says, "This belongs to me. This is me. That does not belong to me. That is not me." Neither it nor the subject-object distinction it maintains are substantially real. What it determines to belong or not to belong to itself is only conventionally established. This is the same function that the subtle mind of the Mahāsāṃghika performs. Like the subtle mind of the Sautrāntika, it also persists through time and change.

「大眾部的執受心，是常在而有演變的，在不息的變化中，適應眾生身量的大小而大小。這遍依於身的心，無時不在，而六識卻是起滅間斷的；所以遍依根身的執受心，必然是細意識。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 120a4-6)

The appropriating mind of the Mahāsāṃghika is ever present and changing within the unceasing changingness, fitting to the various dimensions of the bodies of sentient beings. This mind which universally depends upon the body is never not present, however the six consciousnesses arise and cease. Therefore, the appropriating mind which universally depends on the body must this be the subtle mental consciousness.

But if the subtle mind is that which perceives the world and the body, what about the five sense faculties (*indriya*, 根)? The faculties should also explain bodily sensations. Is there not a redundancy in this view? According to Yinshun, the Mahāsāṃghika held that the sense faculties

do not actually sense anything. Instead, the subtle mind appropriates the sense faculties and does all of the work of perception.

「依大眾部的見解，眼不見色，耳不聞聲，五根只是肉團。細心執持肉體，才能起覺受，生六識。總之，大眾部的細心說，是遍藏在根身之內而無所不在；它與根身有密切的關係。眾生與非眾生，生存與死亡的分野，都在這裡。認識作用的六識，也從它而起。細心的覺受，是生命的表象，是微細的心理活動」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 123a10-124a1)

According to the view of the Mahāsāṃghika, the eye does not see form, the ear does not hear sound, and the five sense organs are just balls of flesh. Cognitive experience, this being the arising of the six consciousnesses, is only able to arise by the subtle mind appropriating these flesh balls. In short, the Mahāsāṃghika's teaching on the subtle mind is that it is concealed all over the inside of the body and that it is omnipresent; it has a close relationship with the physical body. The distinction between sentient and non-sentient beings and the boundary between life and death are both [found] here. The cognizing function of the six consciousnesses also arise from it. The cognitive experience of the subtle mind is the outward manifestation of life and is [all] subtle psychological activity.

The Mahāsāṃghika, by trying to explain the link between the body and mind, collapsed the distinction between mind and the sense faculties. However, this is not a fully idealistic ontology. According to Yinshun, in the view of the Mahāsāṃghika, sensations (*vedanā*, *shou* 受) are still received from the external world, even in periods of time when the sense faculties are not

present, such as samādhi and dreamless sleep.

「大眾未計的「心依於身」[A114]，說明了因心的執取五根，才能遍身生起覺受。執持根身而起覺受，與五識的是否生起無關，與識上的苦受樂受也不同。像入定或熟睡的時候，雖然不起五識與相應受，但出定與醒覺以後，我們還感有一種怡悅或勞頓的領受。假使熟睡時沒有任何身體上的感覺，那醒後的身識與意識，也不該有因熟睡而生勞倦之感，這就是細心執受的明證。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 123a6-10)[A114] 《成實論》卷4〈53 意品〉(CBETA, T32, no. 1646, p. 272, a5-6)

The later Mahāsāṃghika's [teaching that] "the mind is based in the body" explained that it is because of the mind's appropriation of the five sense faculties that cognitive experience can arise throughout the body. Cognitive experience arising from appropriation of the physical body has nothing to do with whether the five consciousnesses arise or not, and it is also different from the painful and pleasant feelings in consciousness. For example, when entering samādhi or sleeping deeply, although the sensations (vedanā) corresponding to the five consciousnesses do not arise after coming out of samadhi or waking up, we still feel a kind of joyful or tired feeling. Suppose there were no physical sensations while sleeping, then after waking up the bodily consciousnesses and the mental consciousness should not have a tired feeling due to deep sleep. This is clear evidence of the appropriation of the subtle mind.

The sensations that are received after moments of mindlessness serve as proof of the

appropriation of the subtle mind during those moments of mindlessness. It also indicates that the external world persists in moments of mindlessness. Thus, even in deep *samādhi*, a being's karmic continuity is maintained. As Yinshun notes, this kind of mind is strikingly similar to the *ādānavijñāna* (*atuonashi* 阿陀那識) as it is described in the two most important Yogācāra scriptures, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.

「在這裡，見到了本識思想的源泉，也見到了「本識」名字的成立。《解深密經》的阿陀那識，《楞伽阿跋多羅寶經》的一切根識，都是直接從這「根本識」演化而出。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 121a8-10)

Here, we see the source of the thought of a fundamental consciousness and the establishment of the name "fundamental consciousness". The ādānavijñāna of the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and all the root consciousnesses in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra directly evolve from this "fundamental consciousness".

With this last contribution by the Mahāsāṃghika, all the antecedents to the eight-consciousness model of the mind of the mature Yogācāra are in place. The Sautrāntika conception of the subtle mind anticipated the *ālayavijñāna*. The Mahāsāṃghika's appropriating subtle mind anticipated the *manovijñāna*. And lastly, the Vibhāṅgyavāda anticipated the *tathāgatagarbha* tendencies of certain strains of the mature Yogācāra. While the developments of these schools fit neatly with each other when viewed in the light of the eventual development of the Yogācāra, Yinshun stresses that each of these doctrines have different rationales and emphases.

「本識思想的成立，雖說與上面所敘述的真我、細蘊、細心都有關係，雖可

說是這些思想共同要求的合流，但比較主要的，要算大眾部的根本識，分別論者的一心，經部的集起心。它們在建立的目的及說明上，各有它的側重點；而根本識的重心，在說明心理活動的源泉。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 121a10-122a1)

Although the establishment of the idea of the fundamental consciousness is related to the true self, subtle aggregates, and careful mind described above, and although it can be said to be the fusion of the common requirements of these ideas, it is more important to weigh the fundamental consciousness of the Mahāsāṃghika, the one mind of the Vibhājyavāda and the collectively arising mind of the Sautrāntika. Each has its own emphasis in the purpose and explanation of its establishment; and focusing on the fundamental consciousness is to explain the source of psychological activities.

While the building blocks for the eight-consciousness model of the mind are in place, we have yet to look at the two other distinctive doctrines of the Yogācāra that Yinshun accounts for in the *Tanyuan*—the doctrine of perfuming (*vāsanā*), and the Yogācāra's objectless ontology. Though Yinshun has dealt some with ontology and mentioned seeds (*bīja*), he has yet to give a full account of how perfuming developed.

「唯識學上的本識，本來著重在生命緣起；在生命依持與現起六識的作用上，湧出了深祕的本識思想。後代的大乘唯識學者，雖也片段的敘述到這些，而把重心移到另一方面。不過，我們應該知道，細心的存在，是不能在持種受熏上得到證明的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p.

124a2-5)

The fundamental consciousness of consciousness-only studies originally focused on the arising of life; on the function of the maintenance of life and the emergence of six consciousnesses, the profound and mysterious idea of the fundamental consciousness emerged. Though later generations of Mahayana consciousness-only scholars described these in fragments, they shifted their focus to another aspect. However, we should know that the existence of the subtle mind cannot be proved by maintaining the [doctrines of] bīja and being vāsanā.

The development of the fundamental consciousness (*benshi* 本識) was rooted in the early Buddhist model of the twelve links of dependent origination, with a special emphasis on the links of consciousness (*vijñāna*, *shi* 識), and psycho-physical existence (*nāmarūpa*, *mingse* 名色). As Yinshun begins the third chapter of the second volume of his history, his focus will shift towards the role that the afflictions (*kleśa*, *fannaο* 煩惱) and the holy path play in the development of perfuming.

Chapter 6: *Vāsanā*

6.1 The Problem of the Continuity of the Afflictions

Vāsanā developed independently from the subtle mind and its development was not tightly linked to the development of the fundamental consciousness, but *vāsanā* aims to resolve a closely related problem. The *ālaya* explains how sentient beings can maintain a karmic continuity without a self. *Vāsanā* explains how a future karmic outcome can be said to exist latently in a past or present moment.

The metaphorical fuel that powers the constant turning of *saṃsāra* is the afflictions (*kleśa*, 煩惱 *fannaof*), the thoughts, words and actions that give rise to future suffering. As the first two of the four noble truths state, existence is marked by suffering and that this suffering arises due to causes. If one removes these causes, then suffering will no longer exist.

In our own lives, we often have moments where the causes of suffering are removed. Imagine a person sitting calmly inside a house by a fire side on a cold winter night. The causes of suffering, anxiety, vulnerability and cold, have all been removed and thus suffering does not exist for this person. Yet, in the final analysis, no one would say this person has ended suffering or achieved final nirvana. Why? Because future suffering will surely be visited upon this person. But is this a reasonable view? The suffering of the future is not real for this person and their past bad karmic actions are not manifest in this current moment. How can we say that this person has afflictions?

But one could say that the person, as they sit by the fireside, might have lesser kinds of afflictions, such as the room being too warm or their mind being mostly, but not completely at ease. So let us take the extreme case. Can it be said that a meditating monk who has achieved the *samādhi* of the fourth *dhyāna* still suffers afflictions? Certainly, like our fireside sitter above, the

monk is experiencing no afflictions. His past bad actions are not present to him while meditating. In fact, no object or mental states are present to him at all! Yet, on the naive view, we would still not say that the monk is enlightened. We would not say that he has put a final end to suffering. At some point the monk will get up from his meditation and his past actions will cause him to undergo some future form of suffering. Why is that? How can it be that the causes of suffering can be non-existent one moment and then cause future suffering in another moment? It is because the causes of suffering somehow exist in a latent state, unmanifest, yet still present. But how can the afflictions exist in this latent state?

In the mature Yogācāra, this latent existence of affliction is explained by *vāsanā* and *bīja*. Like the *ālaya*, these two concepts are the product of the long intellectual development during the sectarian Buddhist period. While the tensions that *vāsanā* and *bīja* aim to solve are slightly different from the tensions that the subtle mind solves, they both explain the latent, unmanifest existence of karma in the present moment. Yinshun says this of the various precursors to *bīja*.

「它們共同的要求，是在某一法沒有現起作用時，早已存在；一旦因緣和合，就會從潛在的能力轉化為現實。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 126a5-6)

Their common requirement is that when a certain dharma does not have a moment of causal efficacy, it already exists; once the causes and conditions come together, it will transform from potential ability into reality.

We have seen in Yinshun's discussions about the development of the subtle mind and the *ālaya* that the karmic continuity of sentient beings was an important concern to the schools of the

sectarian period. As we look at his account of the development of *vāsanā*, we will see that the multiplicity of phenomena that make up the world, both the pure and impure phenomena, were also an important point of focus for these schools. If the function of the subtle mind doctrine is to explain how the unity of a being's karmic continuity persists through time, the function of *vāsanā* then is to explain how a world of multiplicity arises. If one takes the classic Buddhist view of causality, that like cause produces like fruit, why then is the world filled with many different kinds of effects that arise from different kinds of causes? Why is the world not just a homogeneous procession of either pure or impure dharmas? In the mature Yogācāra *bījas* will be used account for this kind of heterogeneous ripening of causes and effects.

「但種習的目的，是要成為一切法生起的功能，它需要的性質是差別、變化。細心的目的，在作為雜染清淨的所依性，這自然需要統一、固定。在這點上，細心與種習，無疑是截然不同的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 125a6-9)

However the purpose of vāsanā (zhongxi 種習) is to establish the capability of all dharmas to arise. Its required characteristic is difference and change. The purpose of the subtle mind is to serve as the basis for the purity and impurity. This naturally requires unification and grounding. On this point, the subtle mind and vāsanā are without a doubt entirely different.

The two, the *ālaya* and *vāsanā*, are tightly linked. The subtle mind of the Sautrāntika is fundamentally the collector and collection of latent karmic potentialities (*bīja*). While the subtle mind is, in a sense, nothing other than a collection of *bīja*, it is still necessary to explore the

rationale for the development of *bīja* separately from a study of the origins of the subtle mind.

Yinshun starts with a basic question we have already asked. Why, if beings always seemingly always intend wholesome things, are they still afflicted?

「我們不也常起善心嗎？在煩惱不起的時候，為什麼還是凡夫，不是聖人？雖然有人高唱「一念清淨一念佛」，事實上，我們還要生起煩惱；過去煩惱的勢力，還在支配我們。這一念善心，不同聖者的善心，還充滿雜染的黑影。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 129a1-4)

Don't we always have wholesome thoughts? When afflictions do not arise, why are we still ordinary people and not saints? Although some people sing "one pure moment of thought is one moment of Buddhahood," in reality, we still give rise to afflictions; the power of past afflictions still dominate us. This one moment of wholesome thought is not the same as the wholesome thought of the saints. It is still full of the shadows of defilements.

This is the same question that the Sautrāntika will wrestle with in their development of the *vāsanā* doctrine. Ultimately, the Sautrāntika found that *bīja* are a necessary part of their schema of karmic continuity as an explanation for the continuity of latent tendencies (*anuśaya*, *suimian* 隨眠).

6.2 The Orthodox Sarvāstivāda's Rejection of *bīja*

Just as in Yinshun's discussion of the development of the subtle mind, the Sarvāstivāda again offer a foil against which one can better understand the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra doctrine

of *vāsanā*. The Sarvāstivāda took a different path to explain the possibility of latent afflictions. It did not need *bīja*. It could explain the existence of afflictions in terms of its ontology of dharma natures. Past events still have a real substantial existence regardless of their manifestation and their outcomes in the future also have a real existence.

「薩婆多部，依現實的存在，推論到未來世中已有色、心一切法的存在，也可說是種子思想的表現。但它是三世實有論者，只見過去、過去，卻不能轉化過去的在新的形式下再現。它與種習思想，不能說無關，但到底是很疏遠的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 126a6-9)

On the basis of the existence of substantial actuality, the Sarvāstivāda infers that rūpa and all mental dharma already exist in the future and this can be said to be a manifestation of vāsanā thought. However, the Sarvāstivādins are those who uphold the existence of the three times. If one considers only the past, the past is not able to transform the past to recreate a new outer form. It cannot be said that this [idea] has no connection with bīja thought, but in the final analysis it is very different [from vāsanā].

Past dharmas cannot be changed in this view. They abide in an unchanging state as dharma natures. An action in the current moment has no effect on past actions. This contrasts with the mature Yogācāra's position that newly collected *bījas*, as they are collected, condition the *bījas* that already make up the *ālaya*. Yinshun argues then that the Sarvāstivāda's account of karmic continuity has little to do with the mature Yogācāra's account.

Rather than positing *bījas* to explain karmic continuity, the Sarvāstivāda and the

Vātsīputrīya posited the existence of the dharma of acquisition (*prāpti, de 得*). This dharma allows for the consequences of action to follow a being's *pudgala* through time. In the orthodox Sarvāstivāda's view, it, like the *pudgala*, is subject to momentariness, arising and ceasing in a single moment. But a series of moments gives rise to the illusory existence of a person and a karmic continuity associated with that person.

「他們要討論的，是業入過去以後，怎樣與有情身心相續發生連繫。因了係屬有情的要求，建立了心不相應行的「得」。薩婆多和犢子系，都是這樣的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 153a3-5)

What they want to discuss is how this past karma remains connected with the body and mind of sentient beings after karma has entered the past. Because of the demand [that karma] belongs to [a particular] sentient being, [the Sarvāstivāda] established the non-mind corresponding factor (citta-viprayukta, xin buxiangying xing 心不相應行) of acquisition (prāpti, de 得). The Sarvāstivāda and the Vātsīputrīya are both like this.

The dharma of acquisition does not correspond to the mind. It is present regardless as to whether the mind *as such* is manifest. This explains how a being's karmic continuity is maintained even in states where the mind disappears. In Yinshun's view, this is a simple system, however, it causes the issue of infinite recursions as each dharma of acquisition requires another dharma of acquisition for it to be maintained.

「但一經研求，一一法有一一法的「得」，「得」也還有得它的「得得」，法前、法後、法俱，成為最瑣碎、最困難的論題。業力，因了得的力量，總算在沒有感果，業得未離以前，還是屬於有情。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 153a5-7)。

But once we examine it, we find that each dharma has its own “acquisition,” and “acquisition” also has its own “acquisition acquisition,” before, after and during [the manifestation of] the dharma. This then becomes a most tedious and difficult theory. Because of acquisition’s power, as long as there is no stimulated [karmic] effect, karmic power attains to the future without the use of the past and still belongs to a sentient being.

While the issue of infinite regress seems inelegant, it is a legitimate question to ask if this is a meaningful critique of the doctrine. Though Yinshun does not include a discussion of the issue of infinite recursion, Buddhism, unlike Aristotelian thought, does not outright deny the existence of infinite recursion. One could take for example the notion of the beginningless past as a legitimate form of infinite recursion within a Buddhist worldview. But the question of the coherency of the Sarvāstivāda's view is not Yinshun's focus. He includes this position to make the point that the Yogācāra did not necessarily have to adopt *vāsanā*. There were alternative options that could be employed to explain the continuity of the afflictions available to thinkers in the sectarian Buddhist period.

6.3 The Mature Concept of *bīja* in the Sautrāntika

The concept of *bīja* is based on the metaphor of a seed and its fruit. If the conditions are

right a seed causes a fruit to arise. This fruit is just like the fruit the seed came from. But a seed does not always produce a fruit and even when it does produce a fruit, it does not necessarily do so immediately. A seed can lie dormant for an extended period of time and still maintain its causal efficacy. The Sautrāntika masters thought of latent karmic potentialities as being like metaphorical seeds that are collected by the subtle mind.

Unlike plant seeds, karmically potent acts do not always result in a future identical act. An act done in the context of a being's life exists in relationship with countless other acts that determine that being's karmic trajectory. *Vāsanā* describes the complex relationship between karmically potent acts in a being's past and helps explain why an act of one sort can produce a future act of a different sort. The term *vāsanā* is based on the metaphor of perfuming or dyeing. When a white piece of cloth is newly made, it looks and smells like its causes. If it is made with cotton, it will be white and smell like cotton, but when a cotton garment is exposed to incense, it takes on the new characteristic of the smell of incense. When a white piece of paper is covered in black ink, it takes on a black color. This is applied to the concept of *bīja* to explain how *bījas* can produce a kind of fruit different from their cause. According to Yinshun, in the view of the Sautrāntika, when an act is performed, there is a kind of unmanifest karmic potentiality that is implanted in the subtle mind. That karmic potentiality is a *bīja*, but that *bīja* is one among countless other *bīja* collected by the subtle mind. When that karmic potentiality is added to the being's subtle mind, it begins to condition all of the other *bījas* that already exist in the subtle mind. It is also conditioned by them in turn. This is *vāsanā*. Thus, when that *bīja* sprouts, when that karmic potentiality becomes a manifest reality, it does not create a future action that is identical with the past action that caused it. While that past action is its cause, there are a limitless number of other conditions changing and shaping the *bīja's* future fruit.

While this simplified account of *vāsanā* does answer the question of how the heterogeneous ripening of causes and fruits can occur in the Sautrāntika view, it poses more questions. What are these *bīja*? Are they dharmas? Are they something else? What is their ontological status. The Sautrāntika claimed that the *bījas* belong under the rubric of non-indicative form (*avijñaptirūpa*, *wubiao* 無表色).

「從有部流出的經部譬喻師，對業力的見解，和有部不同。《大毘婆沙論》

（卷一二二）說：「譬喻者說：表無表業，無實體性。」《唯識學探源》

(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 146a12-147a2)

The Sautrāntika Dārṣāntika Masters that came out of the Sarvāstivāda had a different view of karmic power than the Sarvāstivāda. According to scroll 122 of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra “The Dārṣāntika say: indicative (vijñapti, biao 表) and non-indicative form (avijñaptirūpa, wubiao 無表色) do not have a substantial nature.”

The term non-indicative form (*avijñaptirūpa*, *wubiao* 無表色) is shared between the Sthaviravāda schools. It is an intuitive idea that is used to describe the nature of karma. It can be observed that prior acts cause future acts, but the thing that serves as the mechanism for this chain of acts cannot be seen. The Sthaviravāda identified this thing as belonging to the skandha of form (*rūpa*, *se* 色), but, unlike other things subsumed under the rubric of form, it is not manifest as an observable phenomenon. In the view of the Sarvāstivāda, this unobservable karma stuff is the dharma of acquisition (*prāpti*, *de* 得). Acquisition arises from the dharma nature of acquisition so, according to the Sarvāstivāda's ontology, that means that karma is made up by

something that is substantially real (*dravyasat, shiyou* 實有). The understanding of the Sautrāntika runs counter to this. In its view, non-indicative form does not have a substantially real nature. There is no unchanging something behind karma, therefore karma must be merely conventionally existent (*prajñaptisat, jiayou* 假有).

The Sautrāntika's rationale for holding that non-indicative form is conventionally existent is that it, like all other actions that a sentient being does (*karma*), is merely a collection of form (*se* 色). As per dependent origination, form is not something in and of itself. It is merely a collection of relationships that are conventionally called a thing. Thus, non-indicative form must also be conventionally existent.

「身表、語表與無表色，它都認為不是真實的。形色是依顯色的積聚而假立的；能詮的語聲，一剎那不能詮表，多剎那相續也就不是實有。無表色，是「依過去大種施設，然過去大種體非有故」[A144]，也不是實有。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 147a3-5)[A144] 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》卷 13 〈4 分別業品〉(CBETA, T29, no. 1558, p. 68, c27-28)

Bodily expressions, verbal expressions, and non-indicative form are all regarded as not substantially real. Shapes are conventionally established on the basis of the accumulation of apparent rūpa; an interpretable voice cannot be interpreted in a single moment. A continuum of many moments is not substantially real. Non-indicative form is “based on the great elements of the past, but the great elements of the past are not existent.”

All three kinds of karma, acts of the body, speech, and mind, are merely conventionally existents collections of form. The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* states that the Sautrāntika held that all forms are really the great elements (*mahābhūta*, *dazhong* 大種), the four elements of Indian cosmology—earth, water, fire, and wind—from which everything in the world arises. Here, the Sautrāntika seemingly collapsed the distinction between sentient beings and non-sentient stuff. Both are made up of conventionally existent rūpa. This would seem to eliminate the role of intention in karma. According to Yinshun, this would misrepresent the Sautrāntika's view.

「它雖承認表無表色的名稱，卻不許它是業的實體。那麼業是什麼呢？《大毘婆沙論》（卷一一三）說：「譬喻者說：身、語、意業，皆是一思。」《唯識學探源》（CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 147a5-7）

Although the Sautrāntika inherits the name non-indicative form, it does not allow that it is karma's substantial essence. So, what is karma then? Scroll 113 of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra states "The Dārṣāntika say: The karma of body, speech and intention is all cetanā (si 思)."

While the Sautrāntika does inherit from the Sthaviravāda the term non-indicative form, and this non-indicative form plays some role in the working of karma, in the view of the Sautrāntika the real distinction between a karmic and non-karmic act is volition (*cetanā*, *si* 思). Volition is one of the five skandhas that constitute a sentient being. In the Sautrāntika view, without intention, there is no ripening of causes into fruits.

「《大毘婆沙論》卷一九的「離思無異熟因」[A146]，也是這個意義。《俱舍

論》卷一三，《順正理論》卷三四，都有譬喻者的業力說。大意說：考慮、決定時的「思惟思」，是意業。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 147a8-10)[A146] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷 19 (CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 96, a25-26)

The “apart from cetanā there is no ripening cause (vipākahetu)” of Scroll 19 of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra is also [in reference to] this idea. Scroll 13 of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and scroll 34 of the Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra contain the Dārṣṭāntika teaching on karmic power. In general it says “the cetanā of deliberation” at a time of thinking or decision is intentional karma.

Volition then is the ripening cause that allows for the ripening of a cause into a fruit. This is certainly a break with the views of the Sautrāntika's mother school, the Sarvāstivāda, but it does not fully address the question of how the *bīja* theory developed historically. Yinshun points out that, while we do see the idea that volition (*cetanā*) is central to karmic potency in early texts, the idea of *bīja* does not appear in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra*. The idea of *bīja* does explicitly appear in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. If the Sautrāntika developed *bīja* as an extension of their volition doctrine sometime before Nāgārjuna's lifetime, this places the development of *bīja* roughly around 150 A.D.

「經部師也是從業力潛在的思想，慢慢的走上種子論。《大毘婆沙論》中的譬喻師，還沒有明確的種子說。《大毘婆沙論》集成以後出世的龍樹菩薩，在《中論》裡，才開始敘到業種相續說。種子說的成立，大概在《大毘婆沙論》與《中論》的著作之間。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10,

p. 168a3-6)

The Sautrāntika masters also gradually developed a bīja theory from the idea of latent karmic power. The Dārṣṭāntika in the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra had not yet had a clear explanation of bīja. Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, who lived after the collection of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra, began to teach about the theory of continuation of karma in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The establishment of a bīja theory probably occurred between the writing of the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.

Bījas, as they are understood in the mature Yogācāra, are a product of volitional acts, but the *bīja* doctrine also clarifies some issues regarding the sequence of cause and effect. If time is viewed as a series of arising and ceasing moments, cause and fruit cannot share a continuity. A cause arises and ceases at one moment and its effects arise and cease in the next. However, this goes against our intuition. The two must have a continuity, otherwise it cannot be said that a cause causes its effect. The metaphor of seed is used to describe this relationship between cause and fruit.

「如芽等相續，皆從種子生，從是而生果，離種無相續。從種有相續，從相續有果，先種後有果，不斷亦不常。如是從初心，心法相續生，從是而有果，離心無相續。從心有相續，從相續有果，先業後有果，不斷亦不常。」

[A175]業是過去了，但還能感果；為解決這因果不相及而能成為因果的現象，才採用了種子生果的比喻。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no.

10, p. 168a7-12)[A175] 《中論》卷 3 〈17 觀業品〉(CBETA, T30, no. 1564, p.

22, a11-18)

“Such as the continuity of buds and so on. They all arise from seeds, and from this fruits arise. Without seeds there is no continuum. From seeds, there is a continuum. From a continuum, there are fruits. First there is a seed and then there is a fruit. There is no cut off and also no permanence. It is like this from the first [moment of] mind. A continuum of mental dharmas arise. From this there are fruits. Apart from the mind, there is no continuum. From the mind there is a continuum. From the continuum there are fruits. First there is karma and then there are fruits. There is not cut off and no permanence.” Karma is in the past, but the results can still be retributed; In order to solve the problem that cause and effect are not related but can become cause and effect, the metaphor of seeds and fruits is used.

If we follow Yinshun and allow ourselves to read Nāgārjuna's presentation of seeds into the Sautrāntika's position, then we see that *bīja*, like the subtle mind, challenges the Sarvāstivāda's conception of momentariness. In the case of the real seeds of plants and fruits, there is no discreet moment where a seed stops being a seed and starts being a plant. But when the seed is first planted it is certainly not a plant, and likewise, when a plant brings forth a fruit, it is certainly no longer a seed. Causes and effects, in the Sautrāntika's view, are like this. They are not a series of discreetly arising and ceasing moments. Instead, as they transform from latent karmic potentiality into manifest dharma, they remain a unified but changing continuum.

The mature Yogācāra adopts the idea of *bīja* and views *bījas* in a very similar way as the Sautrāntika did. The seeds are collected by and constitute the *ālayavijñāna* and they give rise to

manifest dharmas. The distinction that the Yogācāra will add to this schema is that these *bījas* are fundamentally constituted by consciousness (*viññāna*, *shi* 識). While *vāsanā* and *bīja* give the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika a coherent alternative to the Sarvāstivāda's account of the existence of latent tendencies and afflictions, these doctrines bring up new set of questions. If these *bījas* cause and are caused by the impure phenomenal world, how can a sentient being give rise to enlightenment? If all the karmic potentialities contained within the subtle mind exist with impurities (*sāśrava*, *youlou* 有漏) how is it at all possible that untainted (*anāśrava*, *wulou* 無漏) dharmas can arise? *Vāsanā* and *bīja* pose a serious problem for the ontology of the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra. While the *vāsanā* doctrine as it has been described so far by Yinshun is sufficient for explaining the continuance of afflictions, it is insufficient for explaining how the holy path can arise.

6.4 *Anāśrava bīja*

In the Sautrāntika's view, impure *bījas* explain the continued latent existence of the afflictions, but the impure *bījas* cannot explain the possibility of the holy path. As per the third noble truth, final nirvana must be possible, therefore there must be something that causes the holy path to arise. Within the Sautrāntika's schema of *vāsanā*, this possibility is explained by the untainted *bījas* (*anāśravabīja*, *wulou zhongzi* 無漏種子).

There are two options for addressing the existence of these untainted *bījas*. Either, they must somehow already exist latently within sentient beings and be manifested by the arising of certain conditions, or purity must be able to arise from impure causes. Yinshun points out that these two alternative views mirror two more basic Buddhist understandings of causality.

There are two ways of viewing a dharma that comes into existence. 1) It is caused by

many causes and conditions, but it has its own essence. This is equivalent to Yinshun's presentation of the Sarvāstivāda's ontology of dharma natures. 2) A dharma is nothing but the coming together of its prerequisite causes and conditions. This view is closer to the Sautrāntika position that the actions of sentient beings (*karma*) are conventionally existent.

「我們要知道：佛法內有兩個思想：(一)、一法的生起，雖需要種種的條件，但它不是假合的，有它的自性；在它未生以前，已經具體而微的存在。假使沒有這自性親因，雖有其它的助緣，也不能生起。(二)、認為某一法的生起，需要種種的因緣，離因緣即失其存在。因緣有親有疏，但親疏只是必要與不必要的問題，就是主要條件，也不必是一個。這兩個思想對立著，經部雖不是徹底的，但它的本有無漏種子，是屬於後一系列的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 196a5-10)

We need to know: Buddhism has two strains of thought: (1) Although the emergence of a dharma requires various conditions, it is not a conventional amalgam and has its own self-nature; before it arises, it already exists in a concrete and subtle way. If there is no such self-nature, it cannot arise even if there are other supporting conditions. (2) It is believed that the emergence of a certain dharma requires various causes and conditions, and its existence will be lost if it is separated from the causes and conditions. Causes and conditions may be close or distant, but closeness and distance are only a matter of necessity and non-necessity. This is the primary condition. This [primary condition] does not have to be one. These two ideas are in opposition to each other. Although the Sautrāntika is not completely [this way], its original untainted seeds

(anāśravabīja, wulou zhongzi 無漏種子) belong to the latter strain [of thought].

Both the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika had to explain how untainted dharmas arise from the impure world to account for the possibility of nirvana. However, the Sarvāstivāda's ontology gave them a relatively neat explanation. The impure phenomenal world is not the cause of the holy path. It is the dharma natures, which are themselves not manifest changing things, that give rise to the effect that is the manifest holy path. As Yinshun says, in the Sarvāstivāda's view the holy path already exists in a latent state and the moment in which arises is not caused by preceding moments.

「有部的見解，因緣生，並不是說新生某一法體，不過從緣使法體生起作用。見道以前還沒有無漏現行過，所以初念的無漏法，是沒有同類因的。」

《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 194a3-4)

The view of the Sarvāstivāda is that causes and conditions arise, which does not mean that a certain dharma nature arises anew, but that from the conditions stimulating the dharma nature there arises a causal efficacy (zuoyong 作用).

Before seeing the path, there has been no pure (anāśrava, wulou 無漏) practice, so the first thought moment of the pure dharmas does not have the same cause.

Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda claimed that like cause does not necessarily produce like fruit. Instead, the dharma nature is activated by a cause. Thus, when one sees the holy path, pure dharmas arise, but this option is not tenable for the Sautrāntika, or their predecessor school, the Saṃkrāntika. These two schools rejected the Sarvāstivāda's ontology of dharma natures. The

Samkrāntika instead upheld the position that beings already have a holy dharma (*shengfa* 聖法) within themselves. As we had discussed before, it is hard to reconstruct the positions of the Samkrāntika, but Kuiji offers some about this primordially existing holy dharma.

「初從有部流出的經部，就是說轉部，它是有本有無漏種子思想的。《異部宗輪論》說：「異生位中亦有聖法。」 [A248]這聖法，窺基解說做「即無漏種法爾成就」 [A249]。在凡夫身中的聖法，當然不會生起現行，必然是潛在的，被隱覆的。不論它的名稱如何，意義如何，它有無漏種子的性能，這是不會錯的。」《唯識學探源》 (CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. 194a12-195a6)[A248] 《異部宗輪論》卷 1(CBETA, T49, no. 2031, p. 17, b5) [A249] 《異部宗輪論疏述記》卷 1(CBETA, X53, no. 844, p. 590, a3 // Z 1:83, p. 233, b18 // R83, p. 465, b18)

The Sautrāntika that first flowed out of the Sarvāstivāda was the Samkrāntika. It had originally pure bīja thought. The Samayabhedoparacanacakra states:

“Differing beings also have a holy dharma within [them].” Kuiji says of this holy dharma that “it is the achievement of a pure seed of dharma nature.” The holy dharma in an ordinary person's body will of course not arise in a manifest way but must be latent and hidden. Regardless of its name or meaning, it is unmistakable that it has the function of anāśravabīja.

Kuiji goes as far as saying that this preexisting holy dharma is an untainted *bīja* (*wulou zhongzi* 無漏種子). The Samkrāntika conception of a holy dharma is reminiscent of the concept of the

untainted *bījas* as they will be employed in the mature Yogācāra, and it anticipates certain *tathāgatagarbha* strains in the Yogācāra. But the existence of primordially existing pure seeds does not seem to follow directly from the Saṃkrāntika's conception of a holy dharma (*shengfa* 聖法). While the Sautrāntika did adopt the position that there are primordially existent untainted causes, their positions were more complicated than the position of the Saṃkrāntika.

「從《順正理論》去看，後期的經部師，主張無漏種子本有，但這無漏種子的本身，卻是有漏的。譬喻者，不許有同時因果的俱有因。因此，有部不立本有無漏種，還可以說有因緣，經部不立本有無漏種，就有無漏無因的困難了。《順正理論》卷一五，批評經部的不立俱有因時，就談到它的淨界本有。淨界是本有的，但要相續轉變，有其它的助緣，才能生起無漏。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 195a6-10)

Judging from Abhidharmanyāyānusārasāstra, later Sautrāntika masters advocated that the pure seeds exist primordially, but these pure seeds themselves were with impurities (sāśrava). The Darṣāntika did not allow that a cause and an effect could exist simultaneously. Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda did not establish primordially existent pure seeds, but they could still say [that pure dharmas] had causes and conditions. The Sautrāntika did not establish primordially existent pure seeds and thus had the difficulty [of explaining] causeless pure seeds [and their pure fruits]. In scroll 15 of the Abhidharmanyāyānusārasāstra, when criticizing Sautrāntika's failure to establish all causes, it talks about its primordially existent of the pure cause (jing jie 淨界). The pure cause is

primordially existent, but it needs to be continuously transformed and there are other supporting conditions before it can arise without impurities.

According to their critics, the Sautrāntika posited that there is a pure *dhātu* (jingjie 淨界). This pure cause is primordially existent in sentient beings, however it is activated by the arousal of impure seeds that serve as assisting conditions (*zhuyuan* 助緣). In this view, there are no pure karmic potentialities as such. Instead, there is a kind of non-*bīja* cause that brings these pure potentialities into existence. As Yinshun states, the Sautrāntika were locked into this position because of their understanding of causality that they inherited from earlier Darṣāntika masters. The Darṣāntika masters argued that causes and effects could not exist simultaneously. As we have seen in Nāgārjuna's presentation of *bīja*, *bīja* are not subject to momentariness. They do not arise and cease in a series of discreet moments. Instead, they exist in a unified changing continuum. If a pure *bīja* were to already exist in a sentient being, it would be both a pure cause and a pure fruit simultaneously. The introduction of the pure *dhātu* as a means to explain the purification of impure seeds allowed the Sautrāntika to retain the Darṣāntika understanding of the sequentially of causation, but it only opens up more difficulties. For example, what is the ontological status of this pure cause? Is it unconditioned or is it subject to the conditional world? Yinshun does not offer any of the Sautrāntika's attempts to deal with these difficulties. There may be no sources on how the Sautrāntika dealt with this problematic as, in some sense, it is at this stage of development where the mature Yogācāra comes into being. According to Buddhist lore Vasubandhu, one of the great originators of the mature Yogācāra, was an eminent Sautrāntika master before he converted to the Mahāyāna. He, and the mature Yogācāra more broadly, accepts the Sautrāntika's *bīja* doctrine. Later Yogācāra thinkers who developed

Vasubandhu's thought, such as Dharmapāla, would deal with the problems posed by the existence of untainted *bījas*. In Yinshun's view, the problem posed by the pure *dhātu* required later thinkers of the Yogācāra to either radically modify their understanding of *bīja* or incorporate the views of the Sarvāstivāda into the *vāsanā* doctrine.

「這只有兩條路可走：一、改造有部的思想，承認三性諸法種子的本有，與業力熏發而感異熟果。二、擴大熏習的界限，不單是善惡思心所能熏。後代的唯識學者，都曾走過這兩條路，或者還折衷過；但到極盡思辨的護法唯識，還不免有困難存在。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 190a2-5)

There are only two ways to go: 1.) Transform Sarvāstivāda thought, recognize the primordial existence of the seeds of the three natures [the pure, impure, and neutral natures], along with the perfuming of karmic power and heterogeneous ripening of fruit. 2.) Expand the boundaries of perfuming so that it was no longer simply the perfuming of wholesome and unwholesome mental intention (cetanā). Later generations of consciousness-only scholars have gone down these two paths, or even made compromises. However, even when it comes to Dharmapāla's extremely speculative consciousness-only, there are still difficulties.

Yinshun notes in this passage that, while the mature Yogācāra takes up the Sautrāntika project of *vāsanā*, Yogācāra thinkers modify certain Sarvāstivāda ideas to deal with the difficulties posed by *vāsanā*. It is noteworthy that he ends his history of *vāsanā* here. By ending this portion of his

history, Yinshun emphasizes the problems posed by *vāsanā*, showing that the system, at least as the Sautrāntika presented it, is still fundamentally insufficient for explaining the possibility of the holy path.

6.5 Yinshun's View of *bīja* as Insufficient

Yinshun's assessment that *vāsanā* is insufficient is not surprising. Though he sought to promote a non-sectarian Buddhism in his works, his primary training was in the *Sanlun* 三論 teachings, the sinified strain of Mādhyamaka thought. Ultimately, in Yinshun's view, any kind of thinking that relies on a reified existent *something* falls short of a complete account of ultimate truth. For Yinshun, the *bījas* are one such category of reified somethings, regardless of the subtle explanations for their existence and function.

「種子論者，雖懂得這巧妙的解說，但它思想的本質，總覺得要有些實在才有作用。它建立自己的種子論，可以微妙解決，但對於別人，卻未便如此籠統。俱舍論主，對犢子系的不可說我，非要它說出個究竟，到底是假、是實。護法也要責問識類，你到底是假、是實，是善惡，還是無記。在我看來，微妙的，也就是困難的。在思想上覺得非有些實在性不可的學者，它們的困難，可說無法解除；除非它困難慣了，不再覺得它自己的困難。假使不理解這點，那你就不能理會《中論》破斥種子的頌文：「若如汝分別，其過則甚多；是故汝所說，於義則不然。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 193a3-10)

Although the seed theorists understand this clever explanation, the essence of

their thinking is that there must always be some substantially real [thing] for there to be a [manifest] effect. It establishes its own seed theory, which can be solved in subtle ways, but others are not in the position to be this vague. In the case of the ineffable pudgala of the Vātsīputrīya, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya insists on getting to the bottom of the matter of whether it is conventionally existent or substantially real. Dharmapāla also demands an answer as to whether the [differing] types of consciousness are ultimately conventional, substantial, good, evil, or neutral. In my view, what is subtle is exactly what is difficult. For scholars who feel that they must have something that is substantially real in their thinking, their difficulties can be said to be insurmountable, unless they get used to the difficulties and no longer think of their own difficulties. Supposing that you do not understand, then at this point one cannot understand the hymn that denounces the seeds in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: "If you distinguish, your faults will be many; therefore, what you said is not so in truth."

Thinkers of the mature Yogācāra would attempt to address the difficulties that Yinshun points out in his history. The most complete attempt to resolve the difficulties surrounding the doctrine of *bīja* can be found in the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 which uses the doctrine of the triple nature (*trisvabhāva*, *sanxing* 三性) to deal with the status of various kinds of tainted and untainted *bīja*. But even this solution is insufficient to Yinshun's. In his view, both the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika establish a reality separate from words that stands behind the conventional reality established by speech. In the view of the mature Yogācāra, though *bījas* can be deemed as pure or impure, these are really just conventional designations. The arising of the holy path occurs

regardless of this designating.

「這個見解，初期的瑜伽派，像〈本地分〉也還取同樣的見地。它建立了離言自性，假說自性。在世間所認為真實的假說自性背後，還有它所依的真實的離言自性。它要建立有宗，它認為沒有這離言的實性，無法建立因果緣起，它要反對徹底無自性的大乘。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 204a7-10)

This view was also adopted by the early Yogācāra, such as “Manobhūmi” [section of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra]. It establishes the self-nature separated from words (nirabhilāpya-svabhāva, liyan zixing 離言自性), and the conventionally designated self-nature (prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva, jiashuo xixing 假說自性). Behind the conventionally designated self-nature that the world considers to be real, there is also the real self-nature separated from words on which it rests. It wants to establish a thesis of [positive]existence. It believes that without this reality separate from words, it is impossible to establish cause and effect. It wants to oppose the [kind of] Mahayana which has no self-nature at all.

Yinshun does not give a full account of the development of the triple nature in the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源, but something can be said about his thoughts on the triple nature from the above passage. In Yinshun's view, *vāsanā*, as it was inherited from the Sautrāntika, is insufficient and stands against the project of the Mahāyāna. In Yinshun's view, the Mahāyāna ought to eliminate all unchanging substantially real entities, but the Yogācāra falls short of this ideal.

Chapter 7: Objectlessness as an Yogācāra Ontology

7.1 Consciousness Only Epistemology and Ontology

Yinshun concludes his intellectual prehistory of the Yogācāra with a short discussion about the development of the Yogācāra's objectless ontology. Ontology has been present throughout his earlier discussions, but the sectarian period doctrinal models we have looked at so far have not been primarily concerned with questions of ontology. Though, for example, the Sarvāstivāda introduced its ontology of dharma natures to deal with the issues posed by momentariness, the driving question for the Sarvāstivāda was not what the world was made of. It would not be appropriate to classify the Sarvāstivāda or any of the other sectarian schools as materialist, dualist, idealist, *et cetera*.

Why then would it be important for Yinshun to discuss the development of the Yogācāra's ontology? There are two major reasons. Firstly, the Yogācāra is popularly understood to uphold a distinctive idealist ontology. Secondly, in the *Tanyuan* Yinshun is working within the Chinese tradition, which due to its own particular history, is more concerned with ontological questions than the Indian tradition. One must only look to the debates on the nature of emptiness during the lifetime of Kumārajīva and his disciples to see this kind of ontologizing in the Chinese tradition.

This is not to say that the models that Yinshun presents in his history of the subtle mind and his history of *vāsanā* have no ontological implications. However, as Yinshun proceeds with his discussion of the history of the Yogācāra's objectless ontology, he is careful to distinguish between epistemological consciousness only and ontological consciousness only thought. The consciousness only of the sectarian period primarily falls within the epistemological kind of consciousness only. These thinkers reasoned that beings only have access to consciousness. Beyond consciousness, there is no valid means of coming to know about the world. They did not

necessarily infer from this that the world is made of a single mental substance. That is to say that epistemological consciousness only came first and then the ontology of consciousness only followed. According to Yinshun, consciousness only thought is really rooted in a basic observation. When different beings perceive the same object, they see different things.

「不但凡聖的見解不同，就是凡夫，也是因人而不同的。對象好像共同，而引起的感情、觀念不同，這可以知道我們所認為如何如何，並不就是實在，是因能知的心情而轉移的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 200a13-201a2)

Not only do worldly saints have different opinions, but even ordinary people have different opinions. The objects seem to be the same, but the feelings and ideas they induce are different. This shows that what we think is not substantially real but is caused and transferred by the cognizing mind.

How can this difference in perception be explained? If one were to uphold the doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda, as Yinshun has presented them, this difference of perception would be difficult to account for. Every phenomenon is just a collection of effects that arise from their respective dharma natures. Those dharmas natures are exactly what they are. A difference in perception could only be accounted for by claiming that one being is ignorant of what collection of dharma natures gave rise to this or that phenomenon while the other perceives the phenomenon as it actually is. As for the other schools—namely the Mahāsāṃghika, the Vibhāyavāda and the Sautrāntika—we have already seen in Yinshun's discussion of the subtle mind that, in their view, the mind is implicated in the arising and ceasing of all phenomena. The mind then could have

some role in creating this difference of perception.

The Sautrāntika radicalized this idea. Its claim is that all dharmas are conventionally existent (*jiayou* 假有). We have seen the Sautrāntika's argument in Yinshun's discussion *vāsanā* that all forms (*rūpa, se* 色), including the acts of body, speech and mind, are conventionally existent, but the Sautrāntika extended this idea beyond the scope of karmically potent acts. Taking the difference of perception between different sentient beings as evidence, the Sautrāntika masters reasoned that all objects of perception must be conventionally established, as their nature, whether good or evil, is variable and depends upon the cognizer.

「這樣，經部師就提出了「境不成實」的思想，如《大毘婆沙論》（卷五六）說：「譬喻者說：能繫結是實，所繫事是假，補特伽羅亦假。……彼說有染與無染境，不決定故，知境非實。謂如有一端正女人，種種莊嚴來入眾會，有見起敬，有見起貪，有見起瞋，有見起嫉，有見起厭，有見起悲，有見生捨。應知此中子見起敬，諸耽欲者見而起貪，諸怨憎者見而起瞋，諸同夫者見而起嫉，諸有修習不淨觀者見而起厭，諸離欲仙見起悲愍，……諸阿羅漢見而生捨。由此故知境無實體。」[A253]」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 201a2-9)[A253] 《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》卷56(CBETA, T27, no. 1545, p. 288, b16-27)

In this way, the Sautrāntika masters put forward the idea that 'objects cannot be substantially [real].' For example, "*Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāsāstra*" (scroll 56) says: *The Darṣāntika say: The binder is real. That which is bound is conventional. The pudgala is also conventional. ... They say this because [objects*

of cognition] are not determined [in their nature], one knows that that which is tainted or untainted is not substantially real. It is said that if an upright woman comes to the assembly with all kinds of adornments, some will be respectful, some will be greedy, and some will stare angrily, some will be jealous, some will loathe [her], some will feel pity and some will be indifferent. It should be known that when you see [her] respect arises. When all those who indulge in desires see [her] greed arises. When all those who are resentful, and hate see [her] staring angrily arises in anger. When all those who are alike to her see [her] jealousy arises. When all those who have not practiced pure contemplation see [her] loathing arises. When all of the hermits who have separated from desire see [her] pity arises. ... When all of the arhats see [her] indifference arises. From this one knows that objects have no substantially real essence.

The metaphor above is quite intuitive. A noble woman does not have an unchanging nature that makes greed or anger arise in beings. This is attested to by the fact that when an arhat sees a noble woman, indifference (*upekṣā*, she 捨) arises while greed and anger does not. This is consistent with the Sautrāntika's disagreement with the essentialism of the Sarvāstivāda, but this epistemological non-essentialism does not imply an explicitly idealist ontology. However, we should remember here that, according to the Sautrāntika, the subtle mind is implicated maintaining a being's karmic continuity.

「但它還有其它的見解，像《順正理論》（卷五三）說：「又如淨穢不成實故，謂別生趣同分有情，於一事中取淨穢異。既淨穢相非定可得，故無成實淨穢二境。」[A256]有情因業力的關係，在某一趣內受生，或人、或天、或畜生、或餓鬼，因生趣的不同，所見的淨穢也有差別。像人見海水充滿、清淨；餓鬼卻見乾涸得一無所有，或者是膿血、火燄。這隨類所見的不同，不但是感情觀念的不同了。境不成實，更可以得一證明。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 202a08-203a2)[A256] 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 53(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 639, b7-10)

But they [the Sautrāntika] also have other opinions, such as Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra (Scroll 53) which says: "Another example is that purity and filth are not substantial. It is said that different beings have the same sentience and grasp purity and filth in a single phenomenon. Since the images of purity and filth are not the same, it is not possible that the substance of purity and filth are two objects. Due to the binding of karma, sentient beings are born in a certain realm, whether they are humans, gods, animals, or hungry ghosts. Because of their differing states of birth, the purity and filth they see is also different. Just like a person who sees the water of the sea as full and pure, a hungry ghost sees it dried up to nothing, or filled with pus, blood, or fire. This difference in what is seen is not only a difference in feelings and concepts. One can certainly obtain proof that objects are not substances.

All sentient beings are the same in the fact that they have a mind, but when two sentient beings

with different karmic pasts cognize the same object, one may see it as a pure thing while the other sees it as an impure thing. It would be ridiculous to think that one object of cognition has two natures, one pure nature revealing itself to one being and another impure nature revealing itself to the other. While the Sautrāntika never makes the claim that an object of cognition is just mental stuff, it does allow that the mind is critical in constructing what an object is. What an object is—the object's characteristics—is almost exclusively a question of the karmic background of the cognizer of that object. The example that the Sautrāntika gives in the above passage is inherited by and used in almost exactly the same way by later Yogācāra thinkers.

「後代的唯識家，常用「天見寶莊嚴，人見為清水，魚見為窟宅，鬼見為膿血」的一境四心，證明外境的無實，也只是「謂別生趣同分有情，於一事中取淨穢異」的見地。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 203a2-4)

Later generations of consciousness-only practitioners often use the “one object four minds” metaphor that “the gods see gem adornments, humans see it as clear water, fish see it as cave houses, and ghosts see it as pus and blood” to prove the view that the external world is insubstantial and is only [differentiated by] “different places of incarnation and different sentient beings grasping different [levels of] purity and filth in one phenomena.”

In the views of both the Sautrāntika and the mature Yogācāra, the cognizer determines what an object is. But does this apply to objects that are not cognized? Are there possibly some things in the world that are not subject to being conventionally established by an act of cognition? While

the Sautrāntika does not answer this question explicitly, Yinshun attempts to uncover the Sautrāntika's view of un-cognized objects by looking at a critique leveled against the Sautrāntika. The *Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra*, a text criticizing Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika positions mentions the teaching of a certain Sthaviravāda master about the existence of the sense spheres (*āyatana*, 處). These sense spheres are the building blocks of the sense faculties (*indriya*, 根), object of cognition (*viṣaya*, 境) and cognition itself (*viññāna*, 識). In effect, the sense spheres allow for cognition to occur and constitute the cognizer, the cognized object and the cognition itself.

「《順正理論》(卷四)說：「此中上座作如是言：五識依緣俱非實有，極微一一不成所依所緣事故，眾微和合方成所依所緣事故。……故處是假。」

[A257]它從五識的不能緣極微相，斷定一一極微的自體沒有作五識的所緣用。不但一一沒有所緣用，就是眾微和合，眾微還是沒有作所緣的作用。與「如盲一一各住無見色用，眾盲和集見用亦無」[A258]一樣。這樣，五識所緣的境界，只是和合的假相，不是真實。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 203a6-12)[A257] 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 4(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 350, c5-17) [A258] 《阿毘達磨順正理論》卷 4(CBETA, T29, no. 1562, p. 350, c15-16)

Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra (Scroll 4) says: "Herein, the Sthaviravāda master instructed like this: The perceptual objects of the five consciousnesses are not substantially real. Because each is extremely small and cannot act as the basis or object of perception for a phenomenon, therefore only the coalescing of many

small things can act as the basis or object of perception for a phenomenon. ... Therefore, the sense spheres (āyatana) are conventional." From the inability of the five consciousnesses to subjectively apprehend extremely small images, it is concluded that each extremely subtle substance has no function as the object of the five consciousnesses. Not only do they have no effect as objects one by one but, even if all the small things are combined, the mass of small things still has no function as an object. It is the same as "Just as blind people have no use for seeing form, so too also blind people collectively have no use for seeing". In this way, the realm of the objects cognized by the five consciousness is just an amalgamation of conventionally designated images. It is not truly substantially real.

In the above passage cited by Yinshun a certain Sthaviravāda master, whose views likely are those of the Sautrāntika, states that the twelve sense spheres, the constituent parts of the cognizer, cognized object and cognition, are conventionally existent and are subtle (*wei* 微). The use of the term subtle likely has something to do with contemporary Indian theories of atomic particles (*aṇurajas, jiwei* 極微). These particles are subtle in the sense that they are so small that they cannot be perceived. The sense spheres are infinitesimally small. So small that, unless they coalesce into a larger object, they cannot serve as the basis for a manifest effect (*zuoyong* 作用) to arise. As Yinshun notes in his comments on the passage, following this view, the sense spheres cannot be cognized as such. It is only when they make up a conventionally existent object that they become objects of cognition. This puts their status, epistemically speaking, in peril. Beings have no means of knowing the sense spheres and even if beings were able to infer their

existence, nothing would be gained by coming to know about them because the natures of the objects that they constitute would inevitably, in the Sautrāntika's view, be constructed by the mind and the karmic past of the cognizer who is perceiving them. The sense spheres and the objects they constitute, like everything else, are conventionally established. From the Sautrāntika point of view, sentient beings are limited epistemically to their own perceptions and, post nirvana enlightened states set aside, trying to come to know something outside of cognition is a fruitless task.

This view had influence on the early Yogācāra, but the early Yogācāra, in Yinshun's view, still needed some reality that stands behind the objects of cognitions to maintain causality in their system. As we have discussed before, the Yogācāra later developed the three natures doctrine to maintain a kind of compromise position between the radical non-essentialism of the Sautrāntika and the radical realism Sarvāstivāda.

「這個見解，初期的瑜伽派，像〈本地分〉也還取同樣的見地。它建立了離言自性，假說自性。在世間所認為真實的假說自性背後，還有它所依的真實的離言自性。它要建立有宗，它認為沒有這離言的實性，無法建立因果緣起，它要反對徹底無自性的大乘。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 204a7-10)

This view was also adopted by the early Yogācāra, such as the “Manobhūmi” [section of the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra]. It establishes the self-nature separated from words (nirabhilāpya-svabhāva, liyan zixing 離言自性), and the conventionally designated self-nature (prajñapti-vāda-svabhāva, jiashuo xixing 假說自性). Behind the conventionally designated self-nature that the world

considers to be real, there is also the real self-nature separated from words on which it rests. It wants to establish a thesis of [positive]existence. It believes that without this reality separate from words, it is impossible to establish cause and effect. It wants to oppose the [kind of] Mahayana which has no self-nature at all.

For the mature Yogācāra, there is a kind of real world, but that world is behind the conventionally established world of unenlightened cognition. This is not to say that the Yogācāra holds that there is some external world separate from vijñāna. This would violate the basic notion of the consciousness only (*weishi* 唯識) thesis. But it is right to say that the idealist ontology of the Yogācāra is a product of the epistemic pessimism of the Sautrāntika. Yinshun concludes then that, following the earlier observations of the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra disagrees with the Sarvāstivāda about the substantiality dharmas.

「瑜伽派，認為凡是有漏心識所認識的，都是假說自性，都不能離卻名言相。像有部的客觀存在的青相，是必然要反對的。沒有名言識的力量，決不能知道它是青是色。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp.

205a13-206a2)

The Yogācāra believes that everything cognized by the impure (sāsrava) mind. Everything is a conventionally imputed self-nature. Everything is inseparable from [its] name. This is necessarily counter to [a concept like] the Sarvāstivāda's objectively existent blue image. Without the power of vijñāna [that cognizes and is cognized as] names and words, we cannot know it is blue or that it is rūpa.

The Yogācāra recognizes that all objects in the mind of common unenlightened beings (*prtagbjana, fanfu* 凡夫) are names. Mental objects are not misapprehended facsimiles of real objects out there in the world. Fundamentally, in the view of the Yogācāra, objects are the misapprehensions themselves. The misapprehension is what the object *is*. These names cloud a sentient being's view of the ineffable reality separated from words that is behind our ignorantly imputed conventional reality and which itself is not made up of misapprehensions.

「它與經部一樣的，在假說自性的背後，建立離言自性。這一法的依它離言自性，是必有的，不然就是惡取空。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 206a2-3)

Like the Sautrāntika, it establishes a self-nature behind the conventionally established self-nature. The self-nature of each dharma must exist, otherwise [one would commit the error] of wrongfully grasping emptiness.

In Yinshun's view the Yogācāra and the Sautrāntika both established an ineffable reality. If they did not, in his view, they would have lost an essentialist reality with which they could maintain causality, or, in terms the Yogācāra itself would use, without the self-nature separated from words sentient beings would grasp emptiness in the wrong way. Yinshun's presentation of the relationship between the imputed nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva, bianji suo zhixing* 遍計所執性) and the nature of existence arising from causes and conditions (*paratantrasvabhāva, yita qixing* 依他起性) here is debatable, but his general conclusion, that the objectless ontology of the mature Yogācāra is a development of the epistemological consciousness only of the Sautrāntika is certainly compelling.

7.2 An Incomplete Chapter

As I mentioned in my discussion of the historical context of the *Weishixue tanyuan*, this book is the first of three works that Yinshun wrote that outline the history of the three major Mahāyāna doctrinal orientations—the Yogācāra, the Mādhyamaka, and the Tathāgatagarbha. It is a relatively early work and Yinshun would go on to write more about the Yogācāra, especially in his much more extensive work *Indian Buddhism* (*yindu zhi fojiao* 印度之佛教). The *Tanyuan* does not give an exhaustive account of the development of the mature Yogācāra and the section on the origin of the Yogācāra's objectless ontology was, in Yinshun's own view, insufficient.

「本書是預擬唯識思想史的上編；把序說刪去，讓它自成段落。作者的意見或者有點不易明瞭，即如最後的〈無境論探源〉，也不免簡陋。「無境」，即唯識家的「空」義。真心與妄心說空不同；而且空義的闡發，從根本聖典到前二期佛教，多方面的關涉，比細心說與種子說，要複雜得多。預備另作專題去考察它，所以這裡只略為一提。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. a6a9-13)

This book is the first part of a pre-planned history of consciousness-only thought; the preface has been deleted, and it has become its own section. The author's opinions may be a little difficult to understand, and even the final chapter, "Exploring the Origins of Objectlessness," is also crude. "Objectlessness" is the meaning of "emptiness" in the consciousness-only school. The true mind and the delusional mind teachings on emptiness are different; and the elucidation of the meaning of emptiness, from the fundamental scriptures to the first two periods of Buddhism, involves many aspects and is much more complicated than the theory

of the subtle mind and the theory of bīja. [I] plan to write another work to investigate the topic, so [I] only mention it briefly here.

Looking at Yinshun's other works may be fruitful for those who wish to study his intellectual pre-history of the Yogācāra's ontology and the development of the triple nature doctrine. It is important to keep in mind that the *Tanyuan* is one of Yinshun's earlier works. Yinshun's own thoughts about the history of the Yogācāra inevitably developed through time. In the passage above, he gestures to the fact that there is some relationship between objectlessness and emptiness, and that the mature Yogācāra's understandings of emptiness are complicated by the fact that different streams of the Yogācāra expound different teachings. Keeping in mind the fact that the *Tanyuan* and the history Yinshun presents in it represent his understanding of the Yogācāra at a particular point in time, let us turn to a discussion of Yinshun's hermeneutics.

Chapter 8: Yinshun's Hermeneutics

8.1 The Hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism*

Yinshun's hermeneutics in the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源 are shaped by the historical context of the intellectual debates about the place of psychology and science in the late Qing and early Republican periods. It is important to remember that Chinese intellectuals were considering the Yogācāra, along with a number of other alternatives, as a possible foundation for a sufficiently Chinese science of the mind. Yinshun's approach reflects this. He is systematic, breaking the distinctive doctrines of the Yogācāra into discreet parts and analyzing the histories of these parts in terms of one school and then another. The work is not a devotional work. It is a historical one.

That is not to say that the *Weishixue tanyuan* is a scientific work. While Yinshun does discuss psychology, physics, ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics, he never discusses these in relation to sources outside of the Buddhist tradition. Yinshun's project is bounded within the tradition. Yinshun justifies his intellectual history in terms of the Buddhist tradition, rather than on the terms of the larger history of philosophy. Even though Yinshun relies heavily on texts to make his arguments, he never makes those arguments in terms of a strict philology. Yinshun's interest then is to justify a kind of Buddhism, the Yogācāra, to itself using its own historical criteria. That said, Yinshun made specific choices as to which sources and which Buddhisms he chose to include in his history.

The dominant hermeneutic of the *Tanyuan* can be called a hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism*. Yinshun, like his rough contemporary Ouyang Jingwu, was interested in what older Indian sources had to say about doctrine and its development. These sources are, in the view of Indian Normativism, closer to the wellspring of Buddhism. They are more legitimate

than later sources, which may have muddled, mixed, or developed doctrines into something that their originators did not intend them to be. This can be seen in the texts that he chooses to cite. The vast majority of his citations come from Chinese translations of Indian texts, and the majority of the Indian texts he cites are *śāstras* and *abhidharma* texts. While *sūtras* do appear, such as the *Samyuktāgama* and the *Dirghāgama*, these citations are restricted to Yinshun's discussion of early Buddhism. He references the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the two most important Yogācāra *sūtras*, but these references are generally brought in to confirm that an argument made in an *abhidharma* text has a parallel in scripture.

By far, the two texts that Yinshun cites the most in the *Tanyuan* are the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* (*Dapiposha lun* 大毘婆沙論) and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍論). The first of these was the central text of the Vaibhāṣika, an orthodox sub-school of the Sarvāstivāda in the Kāśmīra kingdom. The work is encyclopedic, containing refutations of all the sectarian period schools competing with the Sarvāstivāda at the time of the text's composition. The utility of this kind of text for Yinshun's project is obvious, but Yinshun's reliance on the text is noteworthy. It was originally composed in Sanskrit, but the Sanskrit text is only extant in fragments. The complete text is only preserved in three Chinese versions. The most widely cited version and the version that Yinshun cites is Xuanzang's translation. The second most cited text in the *Tanyuan*, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, is attributed to Vasubandhu. It critiques the positions of the Vaibhāṣika and generally takes Sautrāntika positions. Its Sanskrit version was preserved in Indian commentaries and the full Sanskrit text was rediscovered in 1930, a mere seven years before Yinshun began writing the *Tanyuan*, however, Yinshun again cites Xuanzang's translations, not the Sanskrit text.

The only significant Chinese text that Yinshun cites multiple times in the *Tanyuan* is

Kuiji's Comments on the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (*Yibuzong lunlun shuji* 異部宗輪論述記).

The root text, the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, is a critique of twenty Buddhist schools of the sectarian period from the view of the Sarvāstivāda. Again, the encyclopedic nature of this text gives it an evident utility for this kind of project. Kuiji's comments on the text help to clarify certain arguments that are not fully explained in the root text. For example, Yinshun relies on Kuiji's comments to sketch a fuller picture of the Saṃkrāntika doctrine of the highest person (*paramārthapudgala*, *shengyi butejialuo* 勝義補特伽羅) as referring to the transmission of the skandhas from one lifetime to another.

The abhidharma texts Yinshun chooses to cite reveal something central about Yinshun's project in the *Tanyuan*. The texts he cites in the *Tanyuan* are closely associated with Indian, rather than Chinese Buddhism. The vast majority of Yinshun's cited texts come from the Sarvāstivāda, the Sautrāntika or Vasubandhu. The one text that does not have an Indian author comes from Kuiji, who, being the chief disciple of Xuanzang, can be thought of as having a close link to Indian Buddhism. The proximity of these texts to Indian Buddhism legitimates the history that Yinshun presents. All these texts have a sectarian affiliation and lore surrounding their transmission from one master to another. It can be reasonably said then that Yinshun seeks to offer an Indian history, a history flowing directly from the wellspring of Śākyamuni and the *āgamas*, rather than from later Chinese masters.

Of course, Yinshun builds his history on Chinese translations, rather than Sanskrit texts, but this does not undermine his Indian Normativism. It is unclear how much Sanskrit Yinshun knew at the time of writing the *Tanyuan*, but Yinshun did not need recourse to Indian language texts to legitimate his history. The Chinese translations that he relies upon are themselves legitimized by their provenance. An example of this legitimation of Chinese translations is the

Tattvasiddhiśāstra (*Cheng shi lun* 成實論). This text generally takes up Sautrāntika positions and anticipates many Mahāyāna positions that would arise later. The translation of this text is attributed to Kumārajīva, who, though being from Kucha, serves as a symbol for the transmission of Indian thought into China. Another example is Xuanzang's translation of the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra* (*Dapiposha lun* 大毘婆沙論), the text that Yinshun by far quotes the most in the *Tanyuan*. Though the text he cites is only extant as a Chinese translation, the text's association with Xuanzang gives it a traceable line of transmission. A text such as this has a much clearer link to Indian Buddhism than other Yogācāra texts that have unknown lines of transmission, such as the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (*Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論).

In fact, Yinshun's use of Chinese translations allows him to give a fuller account of the development of doctrine in the sectarian period than he would have been able to give if he relied only on Indian language sources. Most of the texts that are cited in the *Tanyuan* do not have fully extant Indian manuscripts. This is especially true of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika *abhidharma* texts that are so crucial to Yinshun's history. Nearly all these texts are only extant in Chinese translations or as fragments of Indian language manuscripts. By using Chinese translations, rather than Indian texts, Yinshun is able to get under and behind the highly developed doctrinal stances that we see presented in well preserved Indian manuscripts. For example, he draws the link between the Vibhajyavāda, the Theravāda and the Yogācāra in his history of the fundamental consciousness (*benshi* 本識). This sort of argument would be impossible to make on the basis of Indian manuscripts alone. This makes legitimating the line of transmission for the texts he chooses to cite even more important to verify. Yinshun only wants to examine those texts that can be reasonably understood to tell us something about Buddhism in the sectarian period. If a text has a clear connection to Indian Buddhism, then in Yinshun's view,

it can shed light on the development of the Yogācāra from its origins to its full development in schools of Dharmapāla and Xuanzang.

8.2 The Interplay of The True Mind and Delusional Mind

The large time scale of Yinshun's history allowed him to identify general patterns in the development of the Yogācāra. He identifies two major tendencies in the precursors of the mature Yogācāra—these being the tendency of the true mind (*zhenxin* 真心) and the tendency of the delusional mind (*wangxin* 妄心). In Yinshun's view, the continual interplay between these two tendencies can be seen over and over again in the development and transmission of consciousness only thought. Though Yinshun only mentions this distinction in the introduction of the *Tanyuan*, this distinction determines how Yinshun approaches his history, dividing the different sub-sections of the second volume by school.

「度大乘佛教的開展中，唯心論有真心派與妄心派二大流。傳到中國來，即有地論師、攝論師、唯識師三派。此兩大流，真心派從印度東方（南）的大眾、分別說系發展而來；妄心派從印度西方（北）的說一切有系中出來。在長期的離合發展中，彼此關涉得很深；然兩大體系的不同，到底存在。大體的說：妄心派重於論典，如無著、世親等的著作：重思辨，重分析，重事相，重認識論；以虛妄心為染淨的所依，清淨法是附屬的。真心派重於經典，都編集為經典的體裁：重直覺，重綜合，重理性，重本體論；以真常心為染淨的所依，雜染是外鑠的。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, pp. a4a07-a5a1)

During the development of Mahayana Buddhism, there were two main streams of idealism: the true mind school and the delusional mind school. When it was introduced to China, there were three schools: the Dilun masters, the Shelun masters and the Weishi masters. Of these two major streams, the True Mind sect developed from the Mahāsāṃghika of east (south) India and the Vibhajyavāda; the delusional school came from the Sarvāstivāda in the west (north) of India. In their long-term divergent and convergent development, these two are closely related to each other; however, differences between the two systems still exist. Generally speaking: the delusional mind school places more emphasis on treatises, such as the works of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, etc.: it emphasizes speculation, analysis, facts, and epistemology; it takes the delusional mind as the basis for the purification of defilements, and pure dharmas as ancillary. The true mind sect places more emphasis on the sūtras, which are all compiled into the genre of classics: they emphasize intuition, synthesis, rationality, and ontology; they take the true and eternal mind as the basis [both] of purity and defilements, and the defilements are [considered] external.

These two terms, the true mind and the delusional mind, do not appear in the texts that Yinshun cites as such, but the distinction can be reasonably read into any of the texts he cites. Broadly speaking, the true mind position was developed by schools that approached the mind as a unified whole and that anticipated certain *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines. The delusional mind position was developed by schools that analyzed mind in terms of its parts and emphasized abhidarmic analysis and *śāstra* texts. The utility of this hermeneutic is that it is not restricted to the sectarian

period. It can be used to analyze the various kinds of consciousness-only thought from any historical period. For example, one could apply this distinction to the northern and southern *Dilun* schools (*Dilun zong* 地論宗). The southern *Dilun* had a true mind tendency and the northern *Dilun* had a delusional mind tendency. This can also be applied to many other debates in the history of consciousness only Buddhism—Xuanzang's Yogācāra and the Huayan 華嚴 school, the differences of opinion found in the *Chengweishilun* 成唯識論 between Sthiramati and Dharmapāla, or even to the differing views of the mind as pure or impure found in the *āgamas*. In my view, while Yinshun writes very little about this distinction in the *Tanyuan*, applying this hermeneutic to the texts he cites is one of his greatest contributions in the *Tanyuan* and it is a great tool that can help students of Buddhism to understand the major debates in the history of consciousness only much more easily.

8.3 A Pattern of Intellectual Development

Yinshun offers another hermeneutic that I believe is useful to students of consciousness only. At the start of volume two, Yinshun identifies a pattern of development that all the sectarian schools that he includes in his history followed as they responded to the problems posed by a naive view of karma and non-self. The differing attempts to resolve these tensions by sectarian period thinkers can be daunting to a student. Yinshun provides this shared pattern of development before beginning his discussion of the sectarian period to help the reader wrestle with the seemingly endless variation between the different sectarian schools. Namely, all the schools of the sectarian period observed the changing phenomenal world and from their observations inferred something continuous, subtle, or unified. These continuous, subtle, or unified entities could then be used to explain how a being and its karma subsists through time.

「他們的意見，誠然是龐雜的，紛歧的；但把他們的思想歸納起來，依舊現出一致的傾向：都是以現實的存在作思想的出發點；從間斷的推論到相續的，從顯現的到潛在的，從粗顯的到微細的，從差別的到統一的，或者從無常的到常住的，從無我的到有我的。他們都是在相續的、潛在的、微細的、統一的、或常住的、有我的理論上，建立前後不即不離，不斷不常而不違反諸行無常的東西，拿來克服這嚴重的困難。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q3, Y10, no. 10, p. 47a1-6)

Their opinions are indeed complex and divergent; but when summarizing their thoughts, they still show a consistent tendency: they all take real existence as the starting point of their thinking; from discontinuous they infer continuity, from the apparent, the potential, from the gross to the subtle, from the differentiated to the unified, or from the impermanent to the permanent, from the selfless to the self. Upon the theory that there is a continuous, potential, subtle, unified, or permanent self, they overcome this serious difficulty by establishing something that is neither identical with nor inseparable from before and after, neither cut off nor continuous, and does not violate the impermanence of all formations (saṃskṛta, 行 xing).

While the amount of material that is relevant to constructing a pre-history of the Yogācāra is daunting, if a student realizes what the various sectarian schools are doing—first observing the world of becoming and then inferring some subtle, continuous or unified something that is behind that impermanent world of formations (*saṃskṛta, xing* 行)—the task of understanding

these schools becomes much easier. The question is no longer comparing a long list of radically different schools and doctrines to reconstruct an intellectual history. Instead, it becomes a question of what this or that particular school emphasized and what sort of thing it inferred to solve the shared problematic of karmic continuity and retribution.

But the last line of the above passage hints at a major problem in consciousness only studies. In the view of many Buddhist scholars, consciousness only thinkers, by inferring something unified, unchanging, unmanifest, or pure standing under the phenomenal world, stray closely, maybe too closely, to positing an unchanging self. During his life, Yinshun positioned himself as a non-sectarian thinker, but as we will see, Yinshun, at least during the composition of the *Tanyuan*, was critical of consciousness only thought on the grounds that it reified reality in order to solve the problems posed by a naive understanding of karma.

8.4 Yinshun's Rejection of Sectarianism

In general, Yinshun tried to avoid sectarian infighting in his writing. While his formal training was as a *Sanlun* 三論 monk and his thought has noticeable Mādhyamaka tendencies, he was a famously irenic thinker. Though Yinshun is not thought of first and foremost as a proponent of the one vehicle (*ekayāna*, *yicheng* 一乘), he viewed all of the various Buddhist teachings as being aimed at a single goal—the realization of Buddhahood. He gives a short account of his view in the first chapter of *Cheng fozhidao* 成佛之道.

「佛法，為了適應不同的根性，所以有種種道：福德道，智慧道；難行道，易行道；世間道，出世間道；聲聞道，菩薩道……。然究竟說來，並無二道，一切無非成佛的法門，無非是『欲令眾生開、示、悟、入佛（之）知

見』，所以說『一道一清淨，一味一解脫』；『方便有多門，歸元無二路』。如長江、大河，從發源地起，有種種溪澗、種種湖泊、種種江河，都匯入而同趣大海一樣。一切法門，無非是成佛之道，所以《阿含經》與《法華經》中，稱佛法為『一乘道』。」《成佛之道》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y12, no. 12, pp. 19a08-20a4)

In order to adapt to differing natures, Buddhism has various paths: the path of merit, the path of wisdom; the difficult path, the easy path; the worldly path, the transcendental path; the śrāvaka path, the bodhisattva path and so on. However, ultimately speaking, there are no two paths, and everything is nothing more than the method of becoming a Buddha. It is nothing more than "the desire to enable sentient beings to enlighten, reveal, realize, and enter the enlightened view of the Buddha." Therefore, it is said that "The one path is pure. Liberation is of a single flavor"; "There are many expedient means, but there are not two ways to return to the origin." Just as the Yangtze River arises from its places of origin, the various streams, various lakes, and various rivers, all flow into it and form the same shape as the sea. All of the Buddhist teachings are nothing more than the path to Buddhahood, therefore the Buddhadharma found in the Āgama Sūtras and the Lotus Sūtra [and all of the various other sūtras], is called the "One Vehicle Path (ekayāna, yicheng dao 一乘道)."

Yinshun's anti-sectarianism is in line with the more irenic type of anti-sectarianism found in the various kinds of *Lotus Sūtra* Buddhism. In this view, all Buddhist teachings are aimed at helping all sentient beings eventually achieve full-fledged Buddhahood. While in the more antagonistic

versions of this *Lotus Sutra* view there is tendency to try to eliminate other paths that are thought of as distractions from the one true vehicle, this antagonism does not characterize Yinshun. Yinshun has an ecumenical view of the one vehicle. He thinks of all teachings flowing into the one final goal of achieving Buddhahood like the various tributaries of one great river.

This is reflected in how Yinshun builds his history in the *Tanyuan*. He rarely comments on how close to or how far from the ultimate truth this or that doctrine or school is. He does not organize his history in terms of the veracity of the differing teachings found in the early and sectarian periods. However, Yinshun's anti-sectarianism has some notable exceptions. For example, he was famously opposed to Pure Land Buddhism as it was developed in China, viewing it as a corruption of earlier Indian Pure Land thought.¹³ In the final portion of this project, I will turn to a discussion of Yinshun's evaluation of the precursors of the mature Yogācāra. While Yinshun does not critique consciousness only to the same degree that he critiques Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, and the primary purpose of the *Tanyuan* is not to evaluate the Yogācāra in terms of the ultimate truth, Yinshun does seem to view the mature Yogācāra and its precursors as insufficient in a few key ways.

¹³ Travagnin, Stefina. "Master Yinshun and the Pure Land Thought: A Doctrinal Gap Between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism." *Acta Orientalia Acaemiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*. 57.3 (2004): 273.

"Yinshun's position comes out from his *panjiao* 叛教 too. Even if Pure Land doctrine is rooted in the Early Mahāyāna (*chuqi dacheng fofa* 初期大乘佛法), development and spread in China is classified as belonging to the Late Mahāyāna (*houqi dacheng fofa* 後期大乘佛法) and Esoteric Mahāyāna (*mimi dacheng fofa* 秘密大乘佛法), that are the phases in which the Dharma has already been subjected to corruption by external as well as internal non-Buddhist influences."

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Insufficiency of the Yogācāra in Yinshun's View

As I have discussed above, Yinshun's hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism* informs which texts he chooses to cite in the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源. In general, texts with a traceable line of transmission to India are preferred and, in Yinshun's view, these texts are more useful than Chinese texts as a means to build a history of the development of the Yogācāra.

One text that Yinshun returns to on a handful of occasions in the *Tanyuan* is Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*zhong lun* 中論). While this text does fit the criteria of Indian Normativism, this text, the foundational text of the Mādhyamaka, is a surprising inclusion in a history of the Yogācāra.

Yinshun brings in the *Kārika* to make certain arguments that cannot be made on the basis of non-Mahāyāna sectarian period texts.¹⁴ But Yinshun also uses the *Kārika* in a polemical way.

¹⁴ For example, Yinshun infers that the doctrine of *bīja* must have been developed sometime before Nāgārjuna's lifetime because the metaphor of seeds and fruits is used by Nāgārjuna in the *Kārika*.

「如芽等相續，皆從種子生，從是而生果，離種無相續。從種有相續，從相續有果，先種後有果，不斷亦不常。如是從初心，心法相續生，從是而有果，離心無相續。從心有相續，從相續有果，先業後有果，不斷亦不常。」[A175]業是過去了，但還能感果；為解決這因果不相及而能成為因果的現象，才採用了種子生果的比喻。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 168a7-12)[A175] 《中論》卷3〈17 觀業品〉(CBETA, T30, no. 1564, p. 22, a11-18)

“Such as the continuity of buds and so on. They all arise from seeds, and from this fruits arise. From seeds, there is a continuum. From a continuum, there are fruits. First there is a seed and then there is a fruit. There is no cut off and also no permanence. It is like this from the first [moment of] mind. A continuum of mental dharmas arise. From this there are fruits. Apart from the mind, there is no continuum. From the mind there is a continuum. From the continuum there are fruits. First there is karma and then there are fruits. There is not cut off and no permanence.” Karma is in the past, but the results can still be retributed; In order to solve the problem that cause and effect are not related but can become cause and effect, the metaphor of seeds and fruits is used.

He uses the *Kārika* in a similar way to give a fuller understanding of the non-dispersing dharma (*bushi fa* 不失法) of the Sāṃmitīya-nikāya school (*zhengliang bu* 正量部). Though he is unable to fully establish what the role of this dharma was in this passage, he gestures to some of the difficulties posed by trying to use the *Kārika* and its commentaries as a foil against which to understand the doctrines of the sectarian period. (CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, pp. 154a09-155a2)

As I stated before, the material covered by the *Tanyuan* is not organized by its relative closeness to ultimate truth as Yinshun understood it, but in a few rare cases Yinshun does give an evaluation of certain sectarian period doctrines. For example, he concludes his discussion of the Sautrāntika's understanding of *bīja* by discussing one major problem posed by the *bīja* doctrine. The *bīja* doctrine reifies something that is real and persistent through time.

「種子論者，雖懂得這巧妙的解說，但它思想的本質，總覺得要有些實在才有作用。它建立自己的種子論，可以微妙解決，但對於別人，卻未便如此籠統。俱舍論主，對犢子系的不可說我，非要它說出個究竟，到底是假、是實。護法也要責問識類，你到底是假、是實，是善惡，還是無記。在我看來，微妙的，也就是困難的。在思想上覺得非有些實在性不可的學者，它們的困難，可說無法解除；除非它困難慣了，不再覺得它自己的困難。假使不理解這點，那你就不能理會《中論》破斥種子的頌文：「若如汝分別，其過則甚多；是故汝所說，於義則不然。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 193a3-10)

Although the seed theorists understand this clever explanation, the essence of their thinking is that there must always be some substantially real [thing] for there to be a [manifest] effect. It establishes its own seed theory, which can be solved in subtle ways, but others are not in the position to be this vague. In the case of the ineffable pudgala of the Vātsīputrīya, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya insists on getting to the bottom of the matter of whether it is conventionally existent or substantially real. Dharmapāla also demands an answer as to whether

the [differing] types of consciousness are ultimately conventional, substantial, good, evil, or neutral. In my view, what is subtle is exactly what is difficult. For scholars who feel that they must have something that is substantially real in their thinking, their difficulties can be said to be insurmountable, unless they get used to the difficulties and no longer think of their own difficulties. Supposing that you do not understand, then at this point one cannot understand the hymn that denounces the seeds in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: "If you distinguish, your faults will be many; therefore, what you said is not so in truth."

Yinshun gestures here to the fact that from the point of view of the Mādhyamaka the project of establishing karmic continuity using *bīja* and *vāsanā* has a fundamental fault. It reifies a substantially existent something. According to the basic assumptions of Buddhism, this reified something must be explained away. While the *Tanyuan* is not first and foremost a polemical work, Yinshun's preference for the Mādhyamaka over the Yogācāra is present in the work, and according to Yinshun's history, consciousness only Buddhism as it existed at the time of Vasubandhu was an incomplete project. The problems posed by the *bīja* would not be dealt with until the time of Dharmapāla, but even Dharmapāla's Yogācāra is highly speculative in Yinshun's view, and it is unclear whether Yinshun believed that these problems were properly resolved either by Dharmapāla or Xuanzang.¹⁵

¹⁵ Yinshun understood the *bījas* not only to be problematic because the *bījas* are reified entities, but also because, in his view, the *bījas* posed a problem for explaining Buddhist ontology. The Sautrāntika could not adequately explain the possibility of wholesome dharmas arising in an unwholesome world. Later thinkers would have to continue the project by expanding the bounds of what *vāsanā* is or by adopting an altered form of Sarvāstivāda thought.

「這只有兩條路可走：一、改造有部的思想，承認三性諸法種子的本有，與業力熏發而感異熟果。二、擴大熏習的界限，不單是善惡思心所能熏。後代的唯識學者，都曾走過這兩條路，或者還折衷過；但到極盡思辨的護法唯識，還不免有困難存在。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 190a2-5)

Yinshun's concern that the Yogācāra reifies entities in a heterodox way extends beyond his account of *bīja*. While Yinshun does not provide a pre-history of the doctrine of the triple nature (*trisvabhāva*, *sanxing* 三性), he does mention the doctrine in a few passages. Yinshun's concern is that by positing that there is a perfected nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*, *yuanchengshixing* 圓成實性,) which stands behind our everyday conventionally existent reality established by words, the Yogācāra is saying that the eighteen *dhātus* are substantially real entities. His understanding is that the Yogācāra is trying to point people away from some false world of concepts to a true world of discreet entities that exists behind it.

「一切境界，都不離心識名言的勢力，這雖已達到了認識論上的唯識，但隱在認識背後的離言自性，經部說是十八界，瑜伽派也承認它是緣起因果，也不見得就是心吧！似乎也沒有充分理由，證實它就是虛妄分別的心心所。

〈真實義品〉成立離言自性，引用小乘共許的教典，我不知它比經部高超了多少！」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. 206a3-7)

All objects of perception are inseparable from the power of mental names and words. Although this has already reached the epistemological level of consciousness-only, the self-nature separated from words behind the knowledge is said to be the eighteen dhātus, and the Yogācāra also recognizes it as [the ground of] dependent origination and cause and effect. It's not necessarily the mind!

*There are only two ways to go: 1.) Transform Sarvāstivāda thought, recognize the primordial existence of the seeds of the three natures [the pure, impure and neutral natures], along with the perfuming of karmic power and heterogeneous ripening of fruit. 2.) Expand the boundaries of perfuming so that it was no longer simply the perfuming of wholesome and unwholesome mental intention (*cetanā*). Later generations of consciousness-only scholars have gone down these two paths, or even made compromises. However, even when it comes to Dharmapāla's extremely speculative consciousness-only, there are still difficulties.*

There seems to be no sufficient reason to prove that they are just the false distinctions [made by] the mind (citta) and the mental factors (caitta). The "Tattvārtha-paṭala" [section of Asāṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi] establishes the self-nature separated from words and quotes the teachings of the Hīnayāna. I don't know how much superior it is to the Sautrāntika [teachings]!

Ultimately Yinshun's understanding, at least at the time of writing the *Tanyuan*, is that the Yogācāra equates the eighteen *dhātus*—the constituent parts of cognition, objects of cognition and faculties of cognition—with dependent origination. This is, at least in the dominant understanding of the Chinese Mahāyāna, a view that belongs to the Hīnayāna. Though Yinshun's project in the *Tanyuan* is not polemical, this is certainly the most common critique leveled against the Yogācāra in the Chinese tradition, namely that the Yogācāra is a kind of *pseudo-hīnayāna*. This passage reveals Yinshun's view that, when compared to the Mādhyamaka at least, the Yogācāra's account of the ultimate truth is insufficient.

9.2 Conclusion

Master Yinshun succeeded in creating a rigorous intellectual pre-history of the Yogācāra in the *Weishixue tanyuan* 唯識學探源. The hermeneutic of *Indian Normativism* helped rather than harmed his project. It allowed him to create a through line of consciousness only thought from its earliest form in the *āgamas* to its most baroque form in the teachings of Xuanzang and his disciple Kuiji. However, the *Weishixue tanyuan*, as Yinshun mentions in the book's

introduction, is an incomplete text.¹⁶ It does not give a full account of the pre-history of Yogācāra's objectless ontology. It only describes the complete development of the fundamental consciousness (*benshi* 本識), seeds (*zhongzi* 種子) and perfuming (*xunxi* 熏習). It also fails to account for certain key doctrines such as the triple nature (*trisvabhāva*). Yinshun would later take up some of these doctrines that were left out of the *Tanyuan* in his later works, such as Indian Buddhism (*yindu zhi fojiao* 印度之佛教). The *Tanyuan* is not a polemical work and Yinshun's preference for the Mādhyamaka is not overt in the text. Those passages where Yinshun does reveal his view of the Yogācāra as insufficient do not compromise the work's historical and pedagogical utility, but it is clear that Yinshun finds the Sautrāntika's and the Yogācāra's understanding of *bīja* and *vāsanā* to pose major problems for the consciousness only project. It can be said then that Yinshun gives two great contributions to consciousness only studies in the *Tanyuan*. Firstly, he is able to point out the continuous development of consciousness only from its earliest Indian sources to its full development in the mature Yogācāra. Secondly, he is able to highlight the major problematics that consciousness only aims to resolve and the problems that it itself poses.

¹⁶ Yinshun writes in the updated introduction to the work that the last chapter on objectlessness is flawed and incomplete. He goes as far as saying that objectlessness in the Yogācāra is the counterpart to emptiness in the Mādhyamaka. He does not talk about the parallel between these two doctrines in the *Tanyuan*. This comment may point towards a change in his thought and is also likely informed by his commitment to irenic non-sectarianism.

「本書是預擬唯識思想史的上編；把序說刪去，讓它自成段落。作者的意見或者有點不易明瞭，即如最後的〈無境論探源〉，也不免簡陋。「無境」，即唯識家的「空」義。真心與妄心說空不同；而且空義的闡發，從根本聖典到前二期佛教，多方面的關涉，比細心說與種子說，要複雜得多。預備另作專題去考察它，所以這裡只略為一提。」《唯識學探源》(CBETA 2023.Q4, Y10, no. 10, p. a6a9-13)

This book is the first part of a pre-planned history of knowledge-only thought; the preface is deleted and it has become its own section. The author's opinions may be a little difficult to understand, and even the final chapter, "Exploring the Origins of Objectlessness," is also crude. "Objectlessness" is the meaning of "emptiness" in the consciousness-only school. The true mind and the delusional mind teachings on emptiness are different; and the elucidation of the meaning of emptiness, from the fundamental scriptures to the first two periods of Buddhism, involve many aspects and is much more complicated than the theory of the subtle mind and the theory of bīja. [I] plan to write another work to investigate the topic, so [I] only mention it briefly here.

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