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English Intervention in the Northern War

1657-1660

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**ENGLISH INTERVENTION IN THE NORTHERN
WAR 1657-1660**

BY

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THESIS

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ENGLISH INTERVENTION IN THE NORTHERN WAR 1657-1660.

CHAPTER 1.

ENGLISH INTERVENTION IN THE FIRST DANISH WAR.

The abdication of Queen Christina in 1654 called to the Swedish throne a no mean representative of the house of Vasa. Charles X, Christina's successor, was the grandson of Charles IX and grandsire of Charles XII and the lustre of his meteoric career was in no wise diminished by comparison with that of his great progenitor, Gustavus Adolphus. He was the son of John Casimir, Count palatine of Zweibrucken and Catherine, sister of Gustavus Adolphus. He was therefore on his father's side a descendant of the house of Wittlesbach. He was born at Nyköping Castle on the 8th day of November, 1622. In his youth he had travelled very extensively, his peregrinations carrying him to France, Germany, Holland, and Denmark. At Paris he saw Richelieu at the height of his power and also attended the festivities connected with the birth of the "Grande Monarchque". The invincible Torstensson was his teacher of strategy and the art of war while Oxenstierna guided him in his mastery of the art of diplomacy. He stayed in Germany three and one-half years with the Swedish army, in 1648 being appointed generalissimo of the Swedish forces. At the executive conference at Nuremberg he had an excellent opportunity to master the details of diplomacy, and in his later career he exhibited the thoroughness of Oxenstierna's tutelage. At one time there was a movement on foot for him to marry the Amazonian

Christina but she, like Queen Elizabeth, preferred a state of single blessedness to marital bliss. Charles later married Hedwig Leonora, daughter of Frederick III, duke of Holstein-Gottorp, thus paving a way for a future alliance against the kingdom of Denmark. (1)

Ascending to the Swedish throne at the age of thirty-two, Charles X brought with him such necessary qualities as experience, piety, modesty, and firmness of will. It was as a soldier, however, that he was to win his greatest fame and the energy of the rest of his life was dissipated in a militancy which he deemed necessary to bring popularity to himself and power to the Crown. This is not a tacit admission that Charles was not successful in the administration of the multiplicity of duties connected with home affairs or in the minutiae of diplomacy for he displayed eminent qualities of being able to manage both. His own predilections and aims, however, seemed to make military glory paramount to internal well-being and security and in this respect he was prosecuting the militant ideals of his predecessors who regarded war as Sweden's "most lucrative industry".

Other considerations prompted Charles X to embark on a policy of aggression and expansion. The necessity of holding in leash a turbulent army, which, if disbanded might work untold havoc on the country, and at the same time problem of pacifying a factious nobility and an equally uproarious commons both of whom might engage in strife unless their superfluity of energy was directed into other channels, were factors which conditioned his foreign policy. The glaring fact that the treasury was al-

(1) Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, iv, 4 - 20.

most depleted by sixty years of warfare counted for naught as a negative argument against renewed conquests or foreign invasions in the face of these difficulties.

Not only did internal affairs point to the necessity of this policy but the very position of Sweden at the time of the ascension of Charles made it almost imperative. Beyond the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sweden possessed Finland, Esthonia, Ingria, Livonia, territories which belonged to her before the Thirty Years' War. Her acquisitions at the Peace of Westphalia were numerous; she secured Western Pomerania, Wismar, the Duchies of Bremen and Verden; and a garrison at Warnemunde gave her command of the Port of Rostock. She also held important commercial positions west of Courland especially along the mouths of the Weser, Elbe, and Oder. Her ambition was to gain vantage points on the Vistula which now flowed thru Polish territory from its source to the mouth. This river was the great highway for the shipping of the chief of the Swedish products, wood, hemp, pitch, and tar. If ports could be secured beyond the sea, Charles might replenish his depleted treasury by tolls which he would be able to charge. (1)

Regarding Charles' sudden attack on Poland, little need be said here. By a rapid march into the heart of that kingdom he was able, with the help of the Brandenburg contingent, to win a battle in July 1656 after three days of strenuous fighting. Just as he was preparing to prosecute his victory by pursuing the fugitive John Casimir a powerful coalition was being formed against him. The King of Denmark prepared to invade Sweden, the Russians

(1) Gardiner, History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, III 427. Cam. Mod. His., IV, 403-404.

soon declared war, and the Tartars were knocking at East Prussia. Denmark regarded the attack of Charles on Poland as perilous for her security, since any success which Charles might win, would mean, perhaps fresh embargoes on the Eastern Baltic trade and involve a serious diminution of the Sound tolls. Holland became exercised over the fact that Charles levied tolls upon the shipping in the Baltic ports and sent a fleet into Danish waters to maintain the freedom of the Baltic sea. The Czar of Russia offered to make a defensive and offensive alliance with Denmark, assuring that country that he would not make peace with Sweden until all territory which had been wrested from Denmark was restored to her. The King of Sweden with keen foresight mollified the hostility of the Dutch by negotiating with them a treaty (Convention of Elbing, September 1, 1656) which gave them the position of the most favored nation. King Frederick III of Denmark regarded war with Sweden as a sure means of recovering some of the lost prerogatives of the crown, as well as some of the territory lost to Sweden by the Treaty of Bromsebrö in 1645. On June 1, 1657, he signed a manifesto justifying his action but never issued a formal declaration of war. (1) The manifesto which he prepared was sent to the Courts of the principal powers of Europe. He asserted, in this document, that contrary to the assurance given by the Swedish court, Denmark had been forcibly robbed of the Archbishopsrics of Bremen and Verden nor had adequate reparation been made for the "countries and cities and movables" taken from them as

(1) Bain, Pol. His. of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 241-242.
 Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, iv, 229-232.
 Cam. Mod. His. iv, 583-4.

provided by the Treaty of Bromsebrö. According to this last mentioned treaty Swedish goods and ships were to be exempt from the payment of toll and custom but this privilege, the Danish King complained, had been grossly abused. By false bills of lading they had freed other than Swedish goods from paying these dues, thus causing a serious diminution of Danish revenue. They had also insisted on prescribing to foreign shippers "how and what custom they should pay in the Sound". After a protest and long delay, the Swedes gave answer that it was contained in the Bromsebro Treaty that the "ships might so demean themselves; though they knew full well that this, as a strange business, did not concern the Bromsebro agreements, but was contained and comprehended in the Christianapolish treaty, made at large with the Lords the States General of the United Provinces." He Arraigned the King of Sweden for making war on the city of Dantzic, for preventing free intercourse to that city by excessive tolls which was contrary to the spirit and fact of the Treaty of Bromsebrö. The Swedish king had prohibited the "trading of Dantzic as if the whole dominion at Sea, after which the Swedish aspired a long time, had fallen into his hand. Instead of remedying of that which is past they seek to divert the channel of the river Weyssel quite another way from the city of Dantzic intending thereby to obstruct the trading to that city; denying all equal and just reparation of the above mentioned defamations, wrongs, and damages, and breaking off the intended treaty of peace and friendship by the recalling home the Swedish agent or deputy." (1)

(1) Mercurius Politicus, No. 7921, p. 371.

No more opportune move could have been made by Denmark than to declare war against Sweden since Charles now found a way to extricate himself from the difficulties with which he was beset in Poland. By a prodigious march from the heart of that country he appeared on the confines of Holstein on July 18th at the head of an army of 6000 men in less than three weeks' time. He soon drove the Danes from Premen and their expulsion from Holstein followed shortly after. The Danish forces now fled precipitately to Jutland and to their new fortress at Frederickssode which proved to be a well nigh impregnable barrier against the expeditious designs of Charles. The duke of Gottorp allied himself with the Swedish king in the treaty of Kiel (September 10th).

His Highness the Protector of England had already viewed with some alarm the outbreak of the war between Sweden and Denmark. The King of Sweden looked to England for assistance and dispatched an envoy to the English court for the purpose of securing effective aid against his numerous enemies. The King of Sweden extended hearty greetings and felicitations to Cromwell and expressed that it was his joy to count "among the chief felicities of his age to have a prince contemporary unto himself of such heroic endowments, as by the glorious fame of his abilities for peace and war, draws all the world unto a just admiration of him. Besides the great interest of affairs between both nations and the various mutualities and obligations thence arising, and whom he finds with that praiseworthy emulation so cheerfully and courageously carried on still to whatsoever the common cause and exigency require; for hence indeed it is apparent that God made his oppressed militant church against their great insulting enemies, when as the rest, and no less interested parties, either take no care at all of the

said estate thereof, or even themselves do impiously rise up against the same, basely thus deserting and betraying the common cause." He concluded his letter with a succinct plea for an alliance and delegated George Fleetwood to act as his representative in England. (1)

In January, Fleetwood asked the Protector for a loan. The Protector in turn demanded that the Swedes cede Bremen as security for the money. This Charles was unwilling to do since he felt that this territory was a necessary recruiting ground for his armies. Charles was willing, however, to cede Oldenburg or East Friesland but Cromwell spurned the offer. (2)

Cromwell regarded the powerful coalition which was formed against the King of Sweden as a Catholic plot against a Protestant Power. He felt that Denmark had been misguided and misled into declaring war against Sweden and was thereby furthering the work of the Pope and the House of Hapsburg in extirpating the Protestant religion.

In August, 1657, Charles sent Friersendorf to London to renew these offers with some further concessions. In addition to the cession of Oldenburg, Charles now was ready to give up his claim to the county of Delmenhorst, to surrender East Friesland, and to allow the English to garrison the Bishopric of Munster. For these concessions, the Swedish King desired that the English should join him in his war to divide Denmark between the Protector

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 507.

(2) Carlson, op. cit. 242.

Carlbon, Sverige och England, 1655-7, 133-6.

and himself. But he was not willing to surrender Bremen at this time. Later in the year (October and November) he gave Friesendorf the power to offer it but it was not acceptable to Cromwell. (1)

The unexpected resistance of the fortress of Frederickssode prevented the King of Sweden from making any further progress in his military campaign until the middle of October. The Swedish fleet, early in September, had suffered a serious reversal in a two days' battle. Charles was rapidly approaching a most serious crisis in his career. In July, Denmark negotiated an offensive and defensive alliance with Poland. The Great Elector Frederick William allied himself with Poland (Treaty of Wehlau, Sept. 1657) and with Denmark (Treaty of Copenhagen, Oct. 20). Charles faced a circle of enemies - Austrians, Poles, Brandenburgers and Danes. With so many forces lined up against him he was ready to accept the proffered mediation of France and England.

Charles, had, from the beginning of the war, looked for aid from his oldest ally, France. The wily Mazarin had promised him ample subsidies if he would engage in a general war against the house of Austria. These promises had been renewed with definite assurance of even larger subsidies in September. (2) Although anxious for financial assistance Charles was equally desirous of securing the aid of the English fleet since England was the only power who could thwart the growing pretensions of Denmark.

(1) Carlbon, Sverige och England, 141-145

(2) Mazarin to French Ambassador, Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, iv, 243.

As early as March, Philip Meadowe was appointed envoy extraordinary to Denmark for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between the belligerent kings. He did not actually sail, however, till September 3. (1) In August the Protector sent Major-General Jephson to Sweden on a like mission. (2) In the letter of credence which Jephson was to bear to the King of Sweden the Protector proclaimed his earnest passion "to do all good offices, which God shall put in our power for the healing of the breach, and thereby prevent the evils and inconveniences, which must arise upon the common cause from this war, at a time when our enemies are uniting and engaging themselves in most dangerous counsels and practices against the profession and professors of the true religion". (3) In the secret letter which the ambassador was to bear he was instructed to inform the King of Sweden that England was not in a position to grant financial aid owing to the depleted condition of the treasury after the Dutch and Spanish wars. If the Swedish King was disposed to treat regarding Bremen the English would be willing to send over land and naval forces to take that place and keep as large a fleet as necessary to maintain the satus quo of the coast. The English desired definite assurances as to what harbor would be provided for the landing of the forces in case the English sent aid.

- Meadowe's letter to the King of Denmark expressed Cromwell's regrets at news of war between the two states, "whose power and
- (1) He was to have 400 £ for preliminary expenses in addition to 1000£ a year salary. Cal. St. Papers, Dom., 1657-1658, 52.
- (2) Ibid., 51.
- (3) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 479

force being conjoined might have been a terror to the common enemy and of great advantage to the Protestant interest; but being turned one against the other, besides the effusion of much Christian blood and the weakening of themselves, it must needs be of great prejudice and hazard to the Protestant cause, especially at this time when the Pope's party do with one consent arm against the professors thereof in all parts of the world; and it is certain that nothing could have fallen out more for the advantage of Spain, who is at open war with us, and for the good of the King of Hungary and that Austrian family, the head and chief pillar of the Popish state, than this rupture at this time".

Major-General Jephson urged the Secretary of State, Thurloe, to send the fleet intimating that if the King of Denmark's obstinacy would result in the devolution of the power of the Baltic Sea to other hands, assistance rendered the King of Sweden might put a part of that sea in English control. The English ambassador soon saw that the King of Sweden was beset by so many enemies he would perforce have to make peace with some of them in order to maintain the integrity of his interests both in Sweden and Germany. The Swedes desired at least twenty ships. This need became all the more urgent when grave fears arose that the Dutch were ready to grant a sum of money and, if it were necessary, to send eighteen ships for the succor of the Dane. (1)

Meanwhile Friesendorff and Fleetwood in England were using their utmost endeavors to secure the naval aid in favor of Sweden. On October 3, 1657, orders were issued to prepare a fleet of twenty vessels for the Baltic under the command of Admiral Montagu.- "The

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 582.

design for the twenty ships," wrote Thurloe to Montagu, "is to give countenance to Sweden whose affairs are in a most dangerous condition, being left alone in the midst of very many powerful enemies, as the Pole, the King of Hungary, the Muscovite and the Dane: and fears also the Dutch, who give money, and if need be will send to the Danes the eighteen ships which were appointed to be upon Dogger Bank. The ministers of the King of Sweden are of the opinion that if twenty ships were sent that way to wait upon the motions of the Dutch, though no act of unkindness passed, yet it would keep the Dutch from him." (1) The Dutch did not send their ships and consequently Montagu's squadron remained at home.

Jephson made some attempts to explain to Charles the reasons why the fleet was not sent. The Swedish King replied that "he wished either that had been done, or that so much occasion had not been given to expect it". He also asserted that if the Protector "had as much cause to know the King of Denmark and the rest of the Protestant princes in Germany as he himself hath (who he saith for the most part do very little care for the obligation of a promise, but submit still to the greater power), he would have thought it the likeliest way to have brought Denmark to a peace by making him afraid." (2)

The Swedish ambassadors were assiduous in their efforts to secure a loan. Even in this they were unsuccessful. In November, 1657, the Protector made a promise of a loan of £30,000 to be paid

(1) Cal. St. Papers Dom., 1657-8, 431, 432.

Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 582

(2) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 629, 643.

in three monthly installments. By December the Government was unable to pay the first installment averring that all ready money was needed to pay off the crews of the fleet which had just returned from the Mediterranean. (1)

In January, 1658, Jephson had an interview with Charles X. His report of it was as follows: "I discoursed largely to him the reasons which hindered you from giving that present supply of money which was promised and he very earnestly expected. He could not (or at least would not) seem to be unsatisfied with them; but I found he was very much troubled that the thing was not done." (2)

The King's demands for assistance were as follows: "Though the King of Sweden be supplied with men yet it will be impossible for him to go on with so great a war without some supply of money; which you may please to consider in what proportion and on what terms it may be done. Then he says, that if the King of Denmark will not consent to a peace: 'twill not be possible for him to carry on his war unless the Protector join with him against the other; and therefore desires order may be given to the envoy in Denmark to declare to the King of Denmark that, unless he will assent to peace on equitable terms, you will help Sweden against him. Lastly he desires that, in the meantime, you would give order to your public minister in Holland to press the States General not to assist the King of Denmark." (3)

(1) Ibid, vi, 674.

(2) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 727.

(3) Ibid, vi, 729.

In January 1658 the Protector expressed grave apprehensions lest the Swedish King must succumb to the powerful coalition organized against him. In a speech which he delivered to Parliament he declared that the question which such an issue of events had raised "was whether the Christian world should be all popery". "The Protestant cause", he averred, "was struck at, nay, quite trodden under foot." Sweden, the chief defender and champion of Protestantism was in the midst of the gravest dangers, beset on all sides by insidious foes. Charles was the only prince who offered passable resistance to "this mighty current coming from all parts against all Protestant," "a poor prince, and yet in his person as gallant and as good, as any that these late ages have brought forth. . . . A man that hath adventured his all against the Popish interest in Poland, and made his acquisitions still good for the Protestant religion. He is now reduced into a corner, and what addes to the grief of all is that men of our religion forget this and seek his ruin." Nor were religious interests alone concerned for the success of the coalition against Charles would seriously threaten and endanger the maritime and commercial power of England. "If they can shut us out of the Baltic Sea, and make themselves masters of that, where is your trade? Where are your materials to preserve your shipping? . . . You have accounted yourselves happy in being environed with a great ditch from all the world besides. Truly, you will not be able to keep your ditch, nor your shipping, unless you turn your ships and shipping into troops of horse and companies of foot, and fight to defend yourselves on terra firma." (1)

(1) Carlyle, Cromwell's Speeches and Letters, iv, 252 ff.

The King of Denmark accepted the proffered mediation but stipulated that he would not treat unless all the countries whose territory was washed by the waves of the Baltic Sea should be included. Such a treaty arrangement would include Poland who could not, without breaking her treaty of alliance, negotiate without the House of Austria. This would signify, as Jephson put it, that the Protector would have to "become the mediator for reconciling the differences between all the Catholic princes." In the mind of the English ambassador a general treaty between all the Protestant was a desideratum highly advantageous not only to the honor of the Protector but to the public interest as well. Treating with the several countries separately would "only palliate a disease in some members, whereunto every relapse doubles the danger to the whole body." (1)

It soon became apparent to Jephson that Sweden would demand Scania and other places beyond the Baltic in lieu of Jutland and Holstein. The Swedish King was firm in his belief that a permanent peace could not be secured until the distrust and jealousy of Denmark that the "Swedes under pretence of their own freedom" would defraud them of the tolls in the Sound, which the Danish King called "an usurpation to the prejudice of Sweden, and others on the Baltic Sea; and this he supposeth cannot be done without a general freedom of trade granted to all; and if nothing be thought fit to be given for satisfaction of the King of Denmark's loss, which he says will not therein amount to above thirty-thousand dollars a year." Such an amicable arrangement might be effected in a yearly agreement with such princes and states that

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 628-9.

had occasion to use the Baltic. (1)

Not long after the attack on Frederickssode, which capitulated (October 23-4) Charles made strenuous preparations for assembling transport vessels in sufficient quantity to convey his troops to Funen; but he was to be aided by an unexpected auxillary force. The weather in the latter part of December and the first part of January 1658 grew intensely cold so that by the latter part of January the ice over the Little Belt was firm enough to support an army. Charles planned an attack on Funen by using the small island of Brandso, which lay midway between Funen and Jutland, as a support. By January 30th the cold had become most intense. Charles now gave orders to his troops to start and only a short interval of time elapsed before the Swedish troops occupied Brandso. The advance continued over the ice, the troops dismounting whenever it was too thin, leading their horses as wide apart as possible until the weak spot in the ice was passed. With marvelous rapidity the Danish troops drawn up to oppose the Swedish advance were overwhelmed and captured. Funen itself was taken and the only loss incurred by Charles in this unique exploit was two companies of cavalry which disappeared under the ice in the midst of the fighting.

Not content with the successful outcome of this perilous venture Charles now was fired with the virile ambition to cross the Great Belt in much the same way as he had crossed the Little Belt. Here he was prompted and guided by the expert advice of his skilled and agile-minded compatriot, Eric Dahlberg, his chief engineer. He strongly advised the circuitous route to Copenhagen

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 674.

by way of Svendborg and the islands of Langeland, Laaland, and Falster. Charles was not in agreement with the projected plan of attack and only after long consultation and deliberation which lasted the greater part of the night could he be moved to see the requisite necessity and wisdom of the proposed route. The cavalry began the invasion on the night of February 5, cutting their way thru the ice which thawed beneath the horses' hoofs and made marching perilous for the infantry who faced the imminent danger of falling thru the melted ice. The besieging host reached the island of Laaland in safety and the fortress there capitulated without a struggle. In less than a week, Charles was on "terra firma", the entire army uniting their forces in Zealand. "Natura hoc debuit uni" was the conceited inscription the medal bore which Charles ordered to be struck in commemoration of the event.

When the news of the taking of Funen had been received, Frederick III, the King of Denmark, signified his willingness to enter into peace negotiations with the King of Sweden and sent for Philip Meadowe. He nominated his commissioners, leaving the choice of time and place to the pleasure of the Swedish King. Upon information from the English ambassador that the Danish king was ready to sue for peace, Charles appointed Bielk and Ulfield as his representatives and chose Langeland as the place for treating. Sir Philip Meadowe secured an interview with the Swedish sovereign and pressed upon him the cogent necessity for amity and friendship between him and the King of Denmark. Such an arrangement could only come about as a result of the willingness of Charles to agree to a suspension of hostilities during the time peace negotiations were being conducted. This was unobtain-

able from the Swedish king who, although courteous, nevertheless remained resolved and determined. "God had shown him the way and built him a bridge and he could do no less than go over." were the words he uttered in the presence of the representative of the Commonwealth who reported them back to Secretary of State. (1)

The next day the Commissioners, together with the French ambassador, acting in the capacity of mediators, met at Warenburg and began the first negotiations looking to a final cessation of hostilities between the Scandinavian kings who had, in the meantime, agreed to grant the formalities of "modus tractandi" and the like. The Commissioners of Denmark presented their project for the solution of the difficulties, and then the Swedes their draft articles. The English mediator, Meadowe, regarded them both as monsters, "one in defectu, the other in excessu". So divergent were the claims of the opposing parties, that the mediators despaired of healing the estrangement, unless one or both of the parties concerned could be made to abate the more unreasonable of their demands. The Swedes desired Scania, Bleking, Bornholm, Bahus, Fronten, (2) in addition to 4000 armed troops, horse and foot, eight of the best Danish ships, and a sum of money. (3) The French and English mediators drew up a plan for consideration which they considered equitable to both countries and pressed the negotiators to accept it. The city of Copenhagen could scarcely hope to hold out against the grizzled veterans of Charles' army.

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 802.

(2) Probably another form of Trondhjem.

(3) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 803.

Nor could the King of Denmark expect aid from the Poles and Brandenburgers who were far remote. "Unless I make a peace, adieu Denmark" was the decision of the King of Denmark after surveying the situation. (1) However preposterous the Swedish proposals seemed at first Denmark was forced to accede to them when negotiations were opened again near Roeskild. She agreed to transfer Scania, Halland and Bleking, the island of Bornholm, Badus and Trondhjem, Norwegian provinces. She was subjected to the further humiliation of furnishing 4000 troops, half infantry and half cavalry to the Swedish king, to renounce all anti-Swedish alliances, and to exempt Swedish vessels even when carrying foreign goods to pay toll. (2) The Sound was to be closed by both countries to any hostile fleets. Such a treaty was thoroughly consonant with English aspirations in the Sound. It was to the material interest of England to keep the Sound from falling into the hands of one power which might then dictate at will toll dues and exactions. The division of the narrow entry into the Baltic between two emulous powers was a preventative of further exactions or usurpations in the Sound.

A wonderful display of friendship and good will between the two Scandinavian kings occurred after the signing of the peace treaty. Charles, at the express wish of King Frederick came to Fredericksburg where he was entertained with the utmost of regal splendor. The English ambassador, Sir Philip Meadowe, in company with the Danish king went out about three miles from Fredericksburg to meet his majesty the King of Sweden who was then on his

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 802 ff.

(2) Bain, Scandinavia, 247; Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 802
Garden, Histoire Générale des Traités de Paix, i, 97.

way from Roeskild. The King of Denmark was attended by about 600 horse in addition to his ordinary guard of gentlemen and officers, the King of Sweden by 400 horse, besides the attendants of his court. All form and ceremony was most cautiously observed. Both kings alighted out of their coaches at the same time and each went forward at an appropriate distance on foot, to meet and salute the other. The King of Denmark then escorted the Swedish king to his coach, giving him the place of honor, the English plenipotentiary and the duke of Sundurburgh seating themselves at the left. From Thursday until Saturday numerous banquets and entertainments were held. It seemed, indeed, that the erstwhile belligerent monarchs were reconciled and the apparent amity and friendship which existed between them sugared well for the future peace and security of the two countries. (1)

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vi, 850.

CHAPTER II.

ENGLISH INTERVENTION IN THE SECOND DANISH WAR.

The mere signing of the treaty of Roeskild did not, by any means, adjust all the difficulties connected with the execution of the salient changes wrought by that peace arrangement. Many points were yet in dispute and the commissioners labored long and strenuously to eventuate the desired readjustments. Negotiations continued during the months of March and April. It is quite probable that Charles hoped to use the army quartered in Denmark to wrest new concessions. He himself seems to have been engrossed with the idea of forming a Scandinavian union which would clearly involve the subjection of Denmark to the overweening influence of Sweden. He meant to adopt the title, "King of Sweden and the Goths of Denmark, Norway, and the Wends." He had even gone so far as to settle the form of installation. His mind loved to dwell on the picture of his new subjects doing homage to him in Scania, he wearing the Swedish crown on his head and the Danish crown lying before him on a table. (1). Attempts of the Swedes to form such an alliance encountered hostile opposition on the part of the Dutch who were assiduous in their determination to prevent a conjunction of the two powers, since such a union would play havoc with Dutch maritime interests and aspirations. They exercised a monopoly of the carrying trade with Russia and Danzig and did not relish the idea of facing a powerful competitor in their lucrative industry.

(1) Carlson, op. cit., 309.

Charles became insistent in his demand that the Danes assist him in closing the Sound to foreign armaments. In June he acquiesced to a Scandinavian defensive alliance on condition that the Danes agree to his demands. This would mean that Denmark would have to renounce the then existing alliance with the Dutch, a condition which sat too hard upon the Danes. Charles had also some room for complaint that the terms of the Treaty of Roeskild had never been fully carried out. In June, 1658 Meadove reported to his Government the status of affairs in Sweden. "The Swedish maxim is that the Dane will never want the will to do them hurt, and therefore they must take away his power. They thought the terms of the peace too favorable to Denmark. . . . I know several of the Swedish senators at their convention at Gottenburg, besides the military men of the army, were displeased that his Majesty had so treated away an opportunity the fairest that ever prince, had, and upon the justest quarrel too, of possessing himself entirely of that kingdom; and some reflections were cast upon me upon that account, which makes the Swedes more rigorous in exacting the utmost of the conditions agreed, and I wish they do no more." (1) Charles with an unresilient fixity of purpose determined to obliterate the Kingdom of Denmark from the map of Europe. (2) He now prepared to continue his program of attack, which had been arrested by the Peace of Roeskild,

(1) English Historical Review, vii, 737.

(2) The real causes of the so-called second Danish War have not as yet been clearly elucidated by historical research. No attempt has been made here to determine the ultimate reasons for Charles' suddenly renewed attack on Denmark.

namely, to take the city of Copenhagen itself. The consent of the Råd (Senate) was obtained on July 7 and in less than two weeks General Brandel received orders to ship the cavalry from Kiel to Zealand, and to prepare for a direct attack on the Danish capital. All formalities of making a declaration of war were swept aside in his ambition to crush a hostile neighbor. Considerations for the standards of international equity were glaringly absent. (1) On August 5, 1658 Charles embarked from Kiel. His fleet was made up of eleven war vessels and sixty transport ships, with about 4000 cavalry and 1200 infantry. Two days later the army landed at Korsor, the advance guard leaving at once for Copenhagen. The main army was unable to march with such rapidity and did not come to the city until the eleventh. The first news of the proposed Swedish attack on Copenhagen came on Sunday the 8th, during the holding of church services. The city was soon in the utmost consternation and excitement. There were only about 400 soldiers within the walls of the city. The fortifications were in the poorest condition, the breast works scarcely three feet high. The King was urged to flee to Norway but raver counsels inspired him to remain and he declared with admirable fortitude that "he would die as a bird in his nest." The brave spirit evinced by the King was contagious and his subjects displayed unwonted loyalty and devotion. On August 9 representatives of the Magistracy, the Clergy, and the teaching profession were summoned at the call of the King to the Royal Castle and asked

(1) Cam Mod. Hist., iv, 586-7.

N. Bain, Scandinavia, 248-250.

Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, 708 ff.

if they wished to risk life for the defense of the Fatherland. With remarkable unanimity they answered in the affirmative. About 1200 soldiers assembled at the summons of the alarm drum and all who had been transferred elsewhere in surrounding territory came to the city. Every citizen felt it incumbent upon himself to become a soldier in the defense of his city. Even the students, 600 or more, armed themselves and joined the valiant conglomerate host composed of soldiers, citizens, nobility, and students in repairing the defense of the walls. The suburbs were abandoned and burned. Cattle were driven inside the fortifications to supply the city in the event of a long siege. (1)

On August 11 Charles drew his army up before Copenhagen. His proposed method of attack had been to storm the city immediately upon his arrival, but the sight of the burnt suburbs deterred him and he halted to call a conference at Valbey Hill. Dahlberg, his chief engineer, advised taking the city by assault; but the rest of his councillors felt that the army was too weak to undertake such an herculean task and the danger too great in case the attack failed. Wrangel urged the storming of Kronborg, which guarded the northern entrance to the Sound. This plan found favor with the Swedish King and on the 15th he dispatched Wrangel with 3000 men to take the castle. (2)

The news of Charles' suddenly renewed attack upon Denmark caused renewed disturbances in the council rooms of European diplomats." "J'avoue que je suis dans la plus grande inquietude que J'ai jamais," wrote Mazarin to Terlon. The three powers of

(1) Carlson, Geschichte Schwedens, 311.

Bain, op. Cit., 251.

(2) Carlson, op. cit., 313

Brandenburg, Austria, and Poland viewed with especial alarm the rapacious designs of the northern king. Theirs was a fear that, if Charles were successful, the free intercourse of nations trading in the Baltic would be restricted and not only Prussia, but the Sound and all the north would be subjected to the nascent Empire of Sweden. They all shared the desire to aid Denmark and extricate her from the perilous position in which she was involved and thereby ward off impending attacks on their own domains. The provinces of the United Netherlands were unusually active in thwarting the advance of the Swede. By a treaty with Denmark in 1649 they rested under the obligation of furnishing aid to Denmark in case the latter were attacked; they were all the more eager to fulfill their treaty obligations when imminent disaster threatened their all important and vital trade interests. With almost incredible celerity they assembled a most formidable fleet of thirty-five war vessels and a large number of transports, carrying on board about 2000 men. The fleet was in charge of Admiral Opdam, Vice-Admiral Cornelius de Witte, and Peter Floris. On October 29 the Dutch fleet sailed with a full wind into the Sound. Here they met the Swedish fleet, forty-four vessels strong with some 7000 men on board and with 1846 cannon under the command of Admiral Wrangel, Bjelkenstjerna, Sjöhjelm, and G. Wrangel. (1) The two fleets began the engagement between seven and eight o'clock in the morning. Admiral Witte was the first to come into fire and in the course of the battle was fatally wounded. Four Dutch ships were burned or sunk, others were badly damaged, while the Swedes suffered a loss of only two vessels, one to the enemy, the other by go-

(1) Bain, op. cit., 252, gives the size of the fleet 40 war vessels and 28 transports, with an army of 2200 men. Page 252.

ing aground. The combined Dutch and Danish fleets, however, remained masters of the sea and the Swedish fleet was forced to retire to Landeskrona.

Of the events of the next few months little can be said here. Successful issue crowned the efforts to the Danes to capture Trondhjem; disaffection and an uprising among the inhabitants gave them Bornholm. Poles, Brandenburgers, and Austrians combined their forces and stormed Thorn in Prussia, the Great Elector and Montesculi leading the host. By the end of 1658 Denmark had recovered Jutland. (1)

Charles, as in his previous war counted on receiving substantial aid from England. He sent a letter to Cromwell explaining his reasons for attacking Denmark and justifying his action. "The King of Sweden hath invaded the Dane and very probably hath Copenhagen by this time," wrote Thurloe to Henry Cromwell on August 27. He felt that Denmark would be "in all probability utterly lost.. If Denmark be lost Norway will follow the same fate, and then his Majesty of Sweden may abbreviate his long title and write himself King of the North." (2) More especially did he desire that England send a fleet to act in conjunction with his own against the combined squadrons of the Dutch and the Danes. The necessity for prompt action on the part of Cromwell was urged vehemently by the French, thru their ambassador in England. To the importunate demands of the French the Secretary of State replied that England was at peace with all nations and that she was not anxious to become involved in a fresh imbroglio. Charles X had begun the war anew

(1) Carlson, op. cit., 317 ff.

(2) Thurloe St. Papers, vii, 339, 345, 352, 359.

and had broken a most solemn treaty which the English had been instrumental in securing thru their intervention. Such a breach of faith constituted a reprehensible error, in the mind of the Protector. Concomitantly, the English could not witness, with pacific mien, the surrender of all the northern lands to him who wielded the sceptre of the Swedes. To this the French ambassador, Bourdeaux, could only reply that it was no less to the interests of England than France to bring succor to the Swedish king, especially a prince who had been instrumental in diverting the common enemies of these two countries. (1)

Previous to the aforementioned interview with the Secretary of State, the French ambassador had visited the principal ministers of the Council of State urging upon them the necessity for sending naval aid to the King of Sweden. Three days later, they were disposed to follow this advice and orders were sent to the fleet at Dunes to be prepared to make a voyage to the Sound. Three days later the French ambassador was courteously informed that the Protector had no desire to become entangled in the affairs of the North. This sudden reversion of feeling was attributed to the hostility that some members of the council had for Lieutenant-General Fleetwood whose brother was acting as representative of the King of Sweden in England. It was rumored that several ministers in the council sympathized with Holland and wished to avoid any pretext for engaging in a new war with that country. (2)

(1) Bourdeaux to Cardinal Mazarin, Guizot, Histoire de R. Cromwell I, 254.

(2) Ibid., 249, 254.

England was unwilling to bear the entire expense of fitting out a navy without the assurance of some financial assistance from France. The French ambassador labored at length to show Thurloe, the Secretary of State, that, up to the present time England had incurred little expense and she had been able to enjoy the fruits of the diversion of Swedish interests to Germany by being permitted to take Dunkirk. Besides the French treasury was well nigh depleted by the expenditure of 400,000 francs during that year and could ill afford any further drains. The English were ever solicitous lest naval aid sent to the Swedes would provoke hostilities between them and Holland since maritime interests of both had often clashed before. Animated by the fear of war, they desired a definite declaration of what the French attitude would be, since they felt it would be a gross injustice for them to bear the brunt of the war alone. The French ambassador attempted to allay the fears of the English by proving that any assistance rendered by them could not be construed as an unfriendly act toward Holland. He declared that such usage was common among nations and that the Dutch themselves had given an example of it. (1)

Despite the overwhelming opposition which Charles faced he did not surrender his sanguine hope of taking Copenhagen. A ferocious assault was made on the city on the night of February 10-11, 1659, but the Swedes were repulsed. Charles suffered irreparable losses in many of his best officers and men. He was now forced to entrench himself on the Danish island. His hope in this crisis lay with England. In the meantime Oliver Cromwell had died but Richard the

(1) Bourdeaux to Cardinal Mazarin, Histoire de R. Cromwell I 254

young Protector had given evidences of his friendship toward Sweden. After wearisome deliberation and counsel, the French and the English had been able to come together to sign a guarantee Treaty, for the purpose of intervening in the Northern War and bring about a peace between Sweden and her enemies, with the possible exception of Austria, against whom France desired to employ the Swedish forces. (1)

The two mediating powers agreed to propose to the two belligerent Kings of Sweden and Denmark: first, a renewal of the treaty of Roeskild without including their allies or confederates; second, to declare themselves enemies to him who refuse these terms and assist him who accepted them; third, to send ambassadors to the Dutch to induce them to join the proposed mediation; fourth, if war should be declared on England by reason of any assistance rendered, that France should aid England or if, on the contrary, war should be declared against France, England should come to the rescue; fifth, that after peace had been made between Denmark and Sweden to interpose to reconcile the differences of the King of Poland and the Duke of Brandenburg with Sweden.

On April 6, 1659 the English fleet, forty-three ships strong of which the greatest vessel carried 80 guns, the smallest 28, under the command of Admiral Montagu sailed for the Sound. The Admiral had been sent as it afterwards proved to maintain the equilibrium of the Sound against the Dutch.

In the debate in Parliament which followed the sending of the fleet, Thurloe, Secretary of State, related in detail the progress

(1) Carlson, op. cit., 330-332.

of affairs in the north of Europe, especially the situation in the Baltic. This included a recital of the agreements then existing among the powers, the vital interests of each in the Baltic, and the new turn in events in that part of the world. He announced that the new Protector Richard had seen fit to send a fleet to the Baltic not for the purpose of espousing the cause of any one of the belligerents, nor to become involved in a war in which the English could have little interest, but for maintaining a watchful eye and surveillance on English commerce and the general interests of the nation. One of the members entertained a covert suspicion that information regarding the Baltic situation had been withheld. The Secretary of State hastened to assure him that everything had been conducted in a perfect spirit of candor and any aspersions which might be cast on the Secretary were wholly unwarranted and uncharitable. A vote of confidence, 176 to 98, left to his Highness, the Lord Protector, the privilege of executing the vote of Parliament concerning the equipment of the fleet etc., but the question of war or peace was reserved as a prerogative of Parliament. (1)

Pressure had been brought to bear as early as December, 1658, to force Holland to accede to the proposed mediation by France and England. The Dutch looked askance at the designs of the English and French and desired to know upon what grounds the King of Sweden and the King of Denmark would proceed to treat, for unless these two powers were somewhat evenly balanced in their power, they would be perpetually at war, making it necessary for the Dutch to defend one of them. The Dutch prepared to send a good fleet with

(1) Burton, Diary III, 315, 376-385.

4000 men to the Sound. They were in favor of reverting to the terms of the treaty made in 1645 between Sweden and Denmark and of forcing the King of Sweden to disgorge the possessions which he had won by the Treaty of Roeskild. This proposal both the English and French felt to be most unreasonable and almost ridiculous more especially since they regarded the second Danish War a mere continuation of the first as a result of the animosities and jealousies over the non full execution of the Treaty of Roeskild. They had small hope of bringing the King of Sweden to accept such hard terms since he would never consent to evacuate Scania and the other places which he had won without a protracted struggle. Then there was the ever potent fear that the King of Sweden might march into Holstein and endeavor to fight the elector of Brandenburg. If he were successful the Dutch might rue the consequences. Other arguments, equally ponderous were recounted to influence the Dutch in making a decision favorable to the mediators. They were importuned to consider that their treaty with Denmark was defensive in character only, but that Scania and the other territory acquired by Sweden at the Treaty of Roeskild could not but be rightfully counted as a legal possession of Sweden and any connivance with the Danes to wrest this territory from the King of Sweden would immediately change the status of the then existing alliance to an offensive treaty against Sweden. However, both the French and English ambassadors were ready to acquiesce in the proposal to modify or even cancel some of the provisions of the Treaty of Roeskild, especially those articles which concerned the passing of ships thru the Sound many of which were ill defined and gave room for constant complaint by the Dutch. Neither the French nor English liked the provision. In case of war it was

certainly undesirable that either the Swedish or the Danish king might claim from the other the right of excluding the ships of the country with whom they were at war. It was surely to the advantage of all countries which had interests in the Baltic, in case of war with one of the northern kings to be able to pass thru the Sound.(1) The English were prone to cast the charge of disingenuity at the Dutch. "The truth is, they would give the law to all Europe, and not receive it from any, and have England and France, and everybody else, steer after their compass, and their north pole is their traffic, measuring all things only by that, without any other considerations whatsoever, and in the which they are not willing anybody else should have the least share; and this trade of the East Sea is one of their great mysteries in trade, they vending there what they bring out of the east, south, and west; and again supplying other countries with the commodities of that sea; Poland alone spent more pepper than all the rest of Europe; and by this backing the King of Denmark, and bringing down the King of Sweden they thought to make themselves absolute masters of that sea; and although their Spanish and East Indy trade be richer, yet the destroying of this trade is also the destroying of those other; but besides the commodities of the East Sea being bulky, did employ numbers of ships and seamen, so that failure thereof will make them inconsiderable in both." (2)

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vii, 523.

(2) . Downing, the Eng. Ambassador in Holland to Thurloe,
Thurloe St. Papers, vii, 525.

With both England and France laboring to secure the acquiescence of Holland to a joint mediation, that country was almost forced to consent since she feared a breach with England if she continued the war. On May 11, 1659, the so-called first Hague Concert was signed by the three powers of France, England and the Netherlands, in which they mutually agreed to end the war on the basis of the Treaty of Roeskild. In this Concert England showed herself to side with the interests of Sweden, Holland the least. The presence of the strong English fleet in the Sound deterred the Dutch from taking any contrary action and gave the English the preponderance of influence.

He who finds his way thru the manifold and diverting interests of diplomacy naturally stops to propound this question to himself: why did England manifest such an abiding and intense interest in the northern affairs? A partial solution to this question has been indicated in the negotiations leading up to the consent of England to join in the mediation. The pressure brought to bear by France was no doubt one of the potent factors. But even more cogent reasons than the extraneous influence exercised by the wily Mazarin can be detected: more than one individual raised the doubt whether it would be for the material interests of England, especially for their trade and commerce in the Baltic that the control of the Sound should potentially belong to the Swedish king who might raise or lower tolls at will. Should success crown Charles' endeavors England was perturbed over such a victory giving "the Swede the solid and entire possession of the chief materials, as masts, deals, pitch, tar, copper, iron etc. needful for the apparel and equipage of our ships, too great a treasure to

be entrusted in one hand." (1) Some had serious misgivings over the wisdom of joining with France, we did not feel that "the conscience, honor, or trade or navigation and our fleet, yea the safety of the State, ought to be set at stake to gratify the French; who doubtless for one of these two reasons, endeavor to engage us in this over-hasty war, against both our own interests and our allies, either that they may thereby advance and enlarge their conquest upon the German Empire and make themselves Master of all Flanders; or rather that they may set all Protestant Princes and States at variance, then make peace with Spain and so at last extirpate the Protestant religion having first weakened the defenders thereof by their own arms." (2)

Immediately upon conclusion of the deliberations of the Hague Concert the Dutch sent their fleet to the Sound under the command of Admiral Ruyter, carrying on board the four representatives from the Netherlands, two destined for Sweden, and two for Denmark to act as mediators. The Council of State and Parliament of England appointed Colonel Algernon Sidney, Admiral Edwin Montagu, Sir Robert Honeywood and Thomas Boone as ambassadors (3) on July 1, 1659. White Locke had refused to accept an appointment excusing himself on the grounds of old age and other infirmities. His real reasons were otherwise. Since he had been ambassador to Sweden alone, he was not disposed to undertake a task which might involve him in some unpleasant consequences over the questions of precedence and

(1) Somers' Tracts, vi, 330.

(2) Somers' Tracts, ii, 584.

(3) Cal. St. Papers (dom.) 1658-59, 390; 1659-1660, 1.

the like. He was therefore released from his appointment. (1)

Sidney, Honeywood, and Boone were all three members of Parliament, Sidney being a member of the Council of State.

In July the second Hague Concert was signed by England and the Netherlands. According to the terms of this treaty Trondhjem should be given to Denmark. Further provisions made it incumbent on these mediating powers to use their combined fleets against him who refused to accept the conditions laid down in the first Hague Concert within a fortnight. The French minister refused to sign the treaty for fear of losing such a valuable ally as Sweden in the event that he should prosecute a war against Austria. (2)

The English Ambassadors, on July 31, had a private audience with the King of Sweden at which they proposed a treaty between him and his enemy, Denmark. They desired that he nominate a time, place, and commissioners; that he order hostilities to cease during the time that the negotiations were being conducted. Charles very pertinently replied, albeit courteously, that he had by several declarations and communications sufficiently evidenced his sincere desire of peace. He left it to the better judgment of the Ambassadors whether such a peace with Denmark should be a general or particular one. This he followed with a lengthy and querulous prolegomena of all the straits in which he had found himself since he came to the throne of Sweden, with a vehement tirade against the multitude of enemies wherewith he was oppressed. He evinced an earnest desire for peace but could not nominate commissioners nor

(1) Whitelocke? Memorials, iv, 351.

Cal. St. Papers (Dom.) 1659-1660, 11.

(2) Carlson, op. cit., 340.

designate a time and place for meeting, nor issue safe conducts, until he knew whether or not the King of Denmark had a mind to treat with him. On the first of August the English ambassadors held a conference concerning the progress already made in their appointed task. They thereupon resolved to go to Copenhagen and to sound the King of Denmark regarding the proposed peace arrangements. The latter replied that the King of Sweden had broken the Treaty of Roeskild, even contrary to the plighted faith which he had given to observe the same; that he had, without sufficient provocation wasted and harried the country, pillaged and destroyed royal possessions, and as the greatest injury of all had forced the King to shut himself up in his capital. In order to extricate himself from perilous position in which he was placed and avoid complete annihilation, the Danish king had called on the Emperor, the King of Poland and the Duke of Brandenburg to come to his assistance. Under these circumstances he desired that his allies should be comprehended in the treaty.

The next day following this interview the rix-hoffmaster (1) of Denmark informed the Commissioners that the King had dispatched a messenger to the Duke of Brandenburg to ascertain if he desired to be included in the treaty. This he said was done, because the Danish king regarded himself more closely allied to him than any one else. The Danish king had promised to bring the strongest in-

(1) Rix-hoffmaster, an official whose title may be rendered in English as "Royal High Steward". The title suggests his duties and functions at the Danish Court.

fluence to bear on the Duke but having done all in his power to persuade him, if he did refuse, he would proceed to treat without him. The Commissioners were unwilling to delay and therefore desired immediate assent to a treaty to be based on the Treaty of Roeskild. To the importunate demands of the Commissioners the hoffmaster rejoined that according to the above mentioned treaty Sweden was to deliver up to the Danes the provinces of Jutland and Holstein, a concession which he felt the Swedes would never make. He further opined that if the Danes should treat without their allies and peace should not ensue the King of Denmark would be deserted by his erstwhile friends who would then be free to turn against him. The Danes, however, consented to treat with the Commissioners, who had the opportunity of going between the two parties concerned and were, in a measure, in a better position to terminate or adjust whatever differences existed. This the English Commissioners found very suitable to their instructions and most probably to put an end to wrangling over titles, procedure, time, place, etc. The Commissioners then desired to know what alterations or excisions the Danish King desired in the Treaty of Roeskild. The next few days were consumed in consultation with the rix-hoffmaster and some of the Danish Senators, one of whom lugubriously discoursed on the cruelty, unfaithfulness, and cupidity of the Swedish king. He asserted that the Danes were dependent upon the mediators, especially those of England, for making peace and he attempted to show that it was to the interest of England, above all other nations, to maintain the security of Denmark in order to preserve a proper equilibrium in the north, Denmark acting as a balance to Sweden. If this equilibrium were unduly disturbed

and the Swede allowed to gain the entire mastery over the Sound and the Baltic Sea, he might prove extremely vexatious to all his neighbors who might have occasion to trade there.

To these proposals the Commissioners made a brief reply in which they stated it was not their intention, much less their desire to oppress the King of Denmark, but rather to reconcile the two kings and make such a peace for the Danish King as might be thoroughly consonant with the principles of justice and equity and the present condition of affairs of those states most interested in the war and more especially those who had commercial interests in the Baltic. They gave definite assurances that they would exert utmost care and diligence in employing such means as would most likely effect an amicable settlement. Following this protracted conference the Commissioners retired to Elsinore. (1)

On the 8th of August two of the English Commissioners, Honeywood and Sidney, went to Fredericksburg, where they requested an audience with the King of Denmark. This the latter was unwilling to grant, excusing himself on the grounds of an indisposition but appointing in his stead two senators to hear any proposals which the English plenipotentiaries might make. The English felt that he was only feigning illness because he disliked the agreement made by the powers at the Hague and because he had some apprehensions lest the Commissioners would force him to accede to a treaty arrangement which he did not like. At the appointed time of meeting the English mediators found two senators, two secretaries, and two other clerks who during the interview wrote down all that was said by the Commissioners, an act which the latter regarded as almost discourteous

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vii, 724 ff.

The Commissioners laid before the Danish representatives a proposal that the treaty should be negotiated between both parties interested by the mediators thus avoiding a serious loss of time which might be frittered away in frivolous disputes upon the preliminaries and other points which might engender cavils. Upon receipt of the written acceptance by the King of Sweden of the Treaty of Roeskild, or any exceptions which he might make to it, the English promised to communicate to the other powers and endeavor, in all seriousness and fidelity, to secure a permanent peace which would be at once equitable and honorable. The Danish representatives were by no means in favor of this solution of their difficulties but the English Commissioners argued that only in thiswise could the estrangement be healed in the time which the English fleet was allowed to stay in the Sound.

The Danes took the matter under advisement, and promised to make a report to their Majesty and bring a speedy answer. On August 9 they were ready to submit a reply. The two senators and the two secretaries who had treated previously came to the English Commissioners with a reply that they would not treat otherwise than by plenipotentiaries regularly appointed. The English representatives divined their occult motives to delay the peace arrangements until the English and Dutch fleets had been forced to retire. They refused to be shunted off in this wise and accordingly demanded an audience from the King, whereupon they were informed that he was indisposed and unable to see the Commissioners. He, however, appointed agents to treat but the English felt that this would only result in serious delays and would never bring the two kings closer together. The Commissioners then spent some time in framing a project for a treaty based upon the agreement made at the Hague,

which they proposed to submit to the two kings and to proceed against him who refused to accept it as provided for in the Hague Concert.

(1)

On August 24 a letter of instructions was sent to Admiral Montagu in which the Council of State instructed him to employ his utmost endeavors to remove all misunderstandings which had arisen between the King of Sweden and the United Provinces. He was warned not to join the fleet under his command to the navy of either Sweden or Denmark, nor to give comfort or aid to either of the warring powers. He was enjoined to refrain from any act of hostility against either of the belligerent powers not only during the period mentioned in the Hague Convention but also three weeks after the expiration of that time. During this time he was to use his endeavors to bring about a peace between the two northern kings upon the foundation of the treaty agreed upon at Roeskild. Moreover, during all the negotiations he was to maintain friendly relations with the fleet of the Dutch. He was further charged to co-operate with the Commander-in-chief and the Public ministers of the United Provinces in obtaining from the Swedish king a consent to abstain from hostile acts during the time of treating. (2)

On August 19 the two English Commissioners, Honeywood and Sidney, came to Copenhagen and pressed the King of Denmark and his Senate for their consent to treat with the King of Sweden and to the employment of mediators for this purpose. The Danes finally consented, naming two senators as their commissioners. The King,

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vii, 726 ff.

(2) Ibid., vii, 727.

however, only gave his consent on condition that his letter accepting mediation should be shown to the King of Sweden only, that no copy of it should be made and in case peace was not secured it should be returned to him. The Commissioners returned to Elsinore to the King of Sweden to whom they showed the declaration of the King of Denmark expressing his readiness to treat. "Je vous recois comme mediateurs, non pas arbitres" was the laconic reply which the Swedish king then made. He thereupon named two senators to act as his representatives one of whom was Bielk who had served as an ambassador from the Swedish Court to Denmark. He had been made a prisoner by the Danes who accused him of practices ill-befitting the duties of a public minister and was not yet released from prison.

The King was apprehensive lest the King of Denmark in being forced into making peace would never keep it. To allay his fears the Commissioners attempted to demonstrate the weakness of the Danes, and the readiness of the mediating states to make good the treaty. Charles continued in much the same vein as before, adding that it was necessary for him to rely on his own strength and not depend on the assistance of his friends for his security. He felt that inasmuch as he had gained numerous advantages thru the prowess of his own sword, it would be great folly to abandon them and become resigned to a dependence on others. The Commissioners urged that since Bielk was a prisoner, he would hardly propose anything which would obstruct the treaty; that the latter would have his freedom in a few days when the article for the general release of prisoners was drawn up. The Commissioners also desired that, while the letters of safe conducts and other necessary preliminaries were being drawn up, the Swedish King should go over the

principal points of difference between himself and the Dane. This Charles refused to do, stormily demanding the immediate release of Bielk and refusing to discuss the matter further with the mediators. On August 17 the Commissioners retired to Copenhagen where they attempted to mediate with the King of Denmark in securing the release of Bielk. They were successful in their efforts and on the 18th delivered him to Charles.

The Commissioners, shortly after their return, were received by the King of Sweden in a tent full of officers, courtiers, and servants making it impossible for them to hold a private interview. They presented a paper which they declared had been drawn up by the ministers of the mediating states. The Swedish King thereupon inquired what it was and what it contained. The Commissioners replied that it was a project for a treaty which they hoped his Majesty would peruse since it might expedite the much desired treaty of peace. Again, as before, the Swedish King replied, especially for the benefit of the English Commissioners, that he received them "comme mediateurs, non pas arbitres". He declared he would not receive the project of a treaty, much more he would treat with no one save the King of Denmark himself. He became excessively wrathful. Turning to the ministers from Holland he declared that he regarded them as his enemies and would under no consideration allow them to act as mediators. His anger grew more intense and he savagely turned away and went to the other side of the room. He soon after declared that the Commissioners made projects upon their fleets, but he, laying his hand on his sword, had a project by his side. (1) The Commissioners were well amazed because by his

(1) As Ranke, Englische Geschichte, iv, 240, well says the exact words used on the occasion are not known.

conduct "his majesty shew'd, he did not well remember, by whose help he hath been maintained all this summer, and enabled to make his conquests, which yet would have appeared more strange if we had not been accustomed to it". (1)

The Commissioners held another meeting on August 24. After the usual civilities had passed on both sides in a place midway between the two tents of the Danes and the Swedes, the representatives retired to their headquarters. The Swedes desired to move the place of deliberations to Elsinore or Roeskild. This both the Danes and the Dutch refused to do. In order to obviate a lengthy and tedious dispute over the changes which both parties desired in the Treaty of Roeskild, the Danes resolved to agree to them all. Several other provisions were added which set the time for the evacuation of the Swedish forces, provision for the declaration of a general proclamation of amnesty for the inhabitants of Bornholm who had risen in revolt and slain the entire garrison there and who otherwise could expect destruction only unless special provision was made by the treaty. (2)

Not long after the actual beginning of the mediation the time of the truce expired and the Dutch fleet at once began to assume a hostile attitude toward Sweden. The situation at home demanded the presence of the English fleet and on the 26th it sailed, leaving the supremacy of the sea as well as the preponderant influence in the peace negotiations to the Dutch. The King of Sweden, however, could not or would not be persuaded to sign a peace unless Kronborg remained a Swedish possession. All hope to effect a reconciliation

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vii, 732

(2) Ibid., vii, 732 ff.

disappeared, hostilities were once more resumed, and Charles soon faced a plethora of foes. The Danes, Poles and Austrians united in a concerted attack on the small Swedish army which was stationed on the island of Funen and in the battle fought at Nyborg forced them to surrender (Nov. 14, 1659) Major-General Botliger with 2000 men fell in the attack. The allies were anxious to prosecute their victory still farther and attack Zealand, hoping thereby to end the war immediately. To this the Dutch withheld their consent.

Charles now sought to reconcile himself with his greatest enemy, the United Provinces, by proposing a partition of the Danish dominions. He was willing to surrender Trondhjem and Bornholm, but demanded as a recompense, Aggerhus Lehen. He also desired to raze Kronborg and make traffic thru the Sound free for all. To these liberal grants, the Holland ambassadors replied that not an inch of territory should be taken from the Danes, and, though Frederick himself were willing, they would not permit any territorial readjustments. (1)

Negotiations were once more entered into with the Danes. At the same time the Swedes prepared to engage in a winter campaign in Norway. This would entail the levying of fresh subsidies and Charles was forced to cross over to Sweden to meet his diet which he had called to assemble at Gothenburg. Not long after his arrival there he was seized with a fever which proved fatal and he died February 12-13, 1660. (2)

(1) Carlson, op. cit., 344 ff.

(2) Ibid., 350-353.

When the news came of the death of Charles, the mediating powers renewed their efforts to make peace with greater vigor than ever before. (1) During the first few days in April the Commissioners met daily but they seem to have accomplished little. Their method of procedure was to go over the Treaty of Roeskild, examining every point, changing wherever necessary. The Danes spent a long time disputing the second article of the treaty since they desired a change which would enable them to contract defensive alliances. The Swedes, feared that under the cover of defensive they would contract offensive alliances. They also had a suspicion that the Emperor, the Kings of Poland and Denmark, the Elector of Brandenburg, under the pretense of mutual defense, were preparing to form a league against Sweden. For this reason they refused to give their consent to a change in the aforementioned article. The mediators sided with the Swedes and the Danes were forced to yield their demands.

After several days of deliberation the Danes proposed to the mediators the plan of presenting in toto the terms and conditions upon which they would make peace. The English mediator, Sidney, was ready to accept this suggestion since he felt that the proposals of the Danes would have to conform with the stipulations of the Hague or else they would be regarded as refusants. The other mediators, however, favored a plan of having each interested party deliver in writing those changes which they desired in the Treaty of Roeskild, so as to enable the mediating powers to recon-

(1) Mercurius Politicus, No. 614, P. 1211.

cile the differences between them. The Swedes prepared a long formal document containing a number of definite changes and additions which they desired in the Roeskild Treaty. None were however contrary to the spirit of that treaty; but not so with the Danes, for their numerous exceptions constituted a distinct violation of the treaty. (1)

The two points of dissension were the disposition of Bornholm and recompenes for the losses incurred by the Guinea Company. In order to force Sweden to come to terms Admiral Ruyter was given permission in April to seize nine Swedish men-of-war in the Sound. The Swedes retaliated by placing an embargo on goods and ships which were at Stockholm, Gothenburg, Abo, and Rival. The French and English Commissioners regarded this action of the Dutch as an unwarranted piece of hostility and felt that they could not work with the mediator of that country. (2)

In this crisis came the suggestion of Hannibal Sehested that the contending parties treat directly rather than thru mediators. This method was adopted and in a few days treaty negotiations were entered into. (May 1660) which proved successful. June 6, 1660 the two powers signed the Peace of Copenhagen. By its terms Frederick of Denmark received Trondhjem and Bornholm, the latter on condition that he purchase eighteen great estates in Scania for the Swedish Crown. The terms of the Treaty of Roeskild were once more

(1) Thurloe St. Papers, vii

(2) Carlson, Op. cit., 370-371.

reaffirmed but the provision which excluded warships from the Sound was now abandoned. (1)

Sweden emerged from this as the greatest power in the North. She was now at the zenith of her glory. She became one of the largest states in Europe, possessing a territory more than 16,000 geographical square miles in extent. In addition to this she ranked as the first military power. But there were also innumerable points of weakness in Sweden's position. Her population at the most liberal estimates was scarcely more than 2,500,000 souls, and was by no means a homogeneous one for in her various territories were Finns, Slavs, Danes, and Germans. There was no hope for true national unity among such divergent peoples with such varying aspirations. Only a strong military power could hold such anti-ethnographical units together.

Historians in the past have been wont to condemn the acts of Sweden's warlike kings as a most suicidal-political policy. Instead of deprecating the activities of Charles as having a most pernicious effect on Sweden, may we not see something salutary in his policy? War is beneficial in this respect that it engenders loyalty, self-sacrifice, a spirit of duty. It usually brings forward a number of heroic geniuses. In case of Sweden this axiom was especially true. The world has ever been amazed at the galaxy of statesmen, warriors, heroes, and monarchs who came from the land of the Midnight Sun. While the material side of Sweden's greatness was sadly neglected, the world of heroes has been nobly enriched by the career and exploits of such a man as Charles X. His

(1) Carlson, op. cit., 371, 372; Gardén, Histoire Generale des Traites de Paix, i, 99.

life and work makes one almost ready to accept the Carlylian dictum that history is at bottom the record of the great men who have worked in the world.

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