

REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1939-1952

BY

CHARLES JOHN GRAHAM

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
SUPERVISION BY Charles John Graham

ENTITLED REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1939-1952

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C. A. Berdahl

In Charge of Thesis

Francis G. Wilson

Head of Department

Recommendation concurred in†

Clarence A. Berdahl

7 Corey

Charles M. Kneier

Rorden Dangerfield

Francis G. Wilson

Committee

on

Final Examination†

† Required for doctor's degree but not for master's.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| PREFACE | 1 |
| I. PAST IS PROLOGUE | 3 |
| The New-Era Republicans. | 3 |
| The Historic Reversal. | 4 |
| In Power in the Twenties | 6 |
| In Opposition in the Thirties. | 12 |
| II. REPUBLICANS AND THE COMING OF THE WAR. | 19 |
| Opposition to Neutrality Relaxation. | 20 |
| Voting Measurement System Explained. | 21 |
| The Selective Service Debate | 26 |
| The Willkie Convention and Campaign. | 35 |
| Position on Lend Lease | 46 |
| Pre-war Voting Patterns. | 57 |
| III. WARTIME COOPERATION. | 61 |
| Reaction to Pearl Harbor | 61 |
| Search for a Wartime Role. | 63 |
| National Committee Declaration of 1942 | 66 |
| Wartime Voting Patterns. | 70 |
| Fight over the Party Chairmanship. | 76 |
| The Mackinac Conference. | 78 |
| Republicans on the Committee of Eight. | 89 |
| The 1944 Convention and Campaign | 94 |
| IV. PLANNING THE PEACE | 105 |
| The Party in the 79th Congress | 105 |

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| Vandenberg's Public Confession | 108 |
| Republican Acceptance of International Organization. | 117 |
| Policy Declaration of 1945 | 121 |
| National Committee Meeting, April, 1946. | 124 |
| Debate on the British Loan | 127 |
| V. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS | 132 |
| Republican Organization in Congress. | 132 |
| Voting Patterns, 1947-1948 | 133 |
| Aid to Greece and Turkey | 140 |
| Relief for War-Devastated Countries. | 144 |
| The European Recovery Program. | 146 |
| The Vandenberg Resolution. | 157 |
| Convention and Campaign of 1948. | 160 |
| VI. REPUBLICANS AND THE COLD WAR: EUROPE | 170 |
| Economic Assistance. | 170 |
| Aid to Spain and Yugoslavia. | 181 |
| The North Atlantic Pact. | 182 |
| Military Aid to Europe | 185 |
| The "Troops to Europe" Issue | 190 |
| Trade with Communist Countries | 198 |
| VII. REPUBLICANS AND THE COLD WAR: ASIA | 206 |
| China. | 206 |
| Aid to Korea | 214 |
| Republican Reaction to the Korean War. | 221 |
| Removal of General MacArthur | 225 |
| Grain for India. | 234 |
| The Japanese Peace Treaty. | 236 |

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|---|------|
| VIII. COOPERATORS <u>VS.</u> OPPOSITIONISTS, 1949-1952. | 239 |
| Republican Organization in the 81st Congress | 239 |
| The Decline of Bipartisanship. | 241 |
| Policy Declaration of 1950 | 255 |
| Attempts to Revive Bipartisanship. | 258 |
| Statement of the Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee. | 262 |
| The Drive to Oust Acheson. | 265 |
| Republican Organization in the 82nd Congress | 268 |
| Continued Decline of Bipartisanship. | 269 |
| Voting Patterns. | 273 |
| Foreign Policy Views of Taft and Eisenhower. | 277 |
| The 1952 Platform. | 281 |
| IX. REPUBLICANS AND THE TARIFF | 285 |
| The Party of High Tariffs. | 285 |
| Opposition to the Reciprocal Trade Program | 288 |
| Wartime Modification of the Party's Position | 294 |
| The Republicans Accept the Principle of Reciprocal Trade . . | 297 |
| X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE NEW LOOK IN REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY | 304 |
| Problems of the Opposition Party | 304 |
| Republican Foreign Policy Trends | 308 |
| The Fundamental Change in Republican Foreign Policy. | 312 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 320 |
| VITA | 329 |

PREFACE

Many volumes have been written dealing with American politics, and it is a perpetually fascinating subject for scholars, journalists, columnists, and politicians themselves. A great deal has been discovered about the way political parties in the United States work to gain office and how they operate in the government, but relatively little has been written about how one or the other of our major parties functioned and operated over a period of time either with regard to all questions of public policy or on a given issue. Our minor parties have perhaps fared better in this respect, but the task of producing a complete history of the Republican party, for example, has yet to be undertaken, if indeed it will ever be feasible.

Even books treating the behavior of one party on a particular issue over an extended period of time are comparatively rare, and it is this type of study which is attempted here with regard to Republican foreign policy from the opening of the Second World War in Europe to the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration. During this period--September, 1939, to January, 1953--foreign policy assumed a central significance for the United States equalled only seldom in our history. These years found the Republicans out of the White House and constituting the Minority in Congress for all but two years. The Republicans were therefore not "responsible" for our foreign policy, but this does not mean that their attitudes were unimportant in determining the course pursued by the United States in world affairs. In a democracy no Government or Majority can afford to have the gap between its policies and those of its Opposition become too wide, and under our system the Majority party is seldom in a position to carry out an extensive program, even in foreign affairs, without the active consent of at least part of the Minority.

In 1939 the opposition of the Republicans in Congress to Democratic foreign policy was almost unanimous; after 1941 Republicans gave their consent in varying degrees to various phases of Administration policy. Thus the country found itself greatly concerned during this entire period with questions about what policies were held by which Republicans and which Republicans were the most powerful in Congress and the party. These are the questions which I have attempted to answer in detail below.

To my thesis adviser at the University of Illinois, Dr. Clarence A. Berdahl, must go credit for suggesting this comprehensive topic, for many helpful suggestions and criticisms, and for patience with my struggling first efforts. I wish to thank Dr. Floyd E. McCaffree, Director of Research for the Republican National Committee, for his cooperation in making a collection of party documents available to me. Only by many months of household chores can I repay my wife, Bonnie, for the untold hours she spent translating my handwriting into a typewritten manuscript.

CHAPTER I

PAST IS PROLOGUE

It is still customary, both academically and popularly, to begin any review of Republican foreign policy with a discussion of the League fight of 1919-1920 and the policies of the Harding Administration. This study, which really proposes a much later date as a starting point, must do likewise. There seem to be good reasons for not starting earlier and for treating World War I as the cause as well as the beginning of all which has followed. If World War II can be said to have destroyed the old issues and created new ones for United States foreign policy, certainly this was at least as true of World War I. The decisions made after 1918 set the course for American participation in world affairs, and, inevitably, the activities of the Republican party in that period were crucial in determining the character of Republican foreign policy for the following decades.

Occasionally, to be sure, attempts have been made within and without the party to call up the foreign policy sentiments of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles Evans Hughes; to remind Republicans of a later day that these, as well as Lodge, Harding, and Borah, are part of the party's heritage.¹ The spirit of these early saints, it has been contended, was quite different and certainly more worthy as a guide for the party's behavior. We are asked to recall that the able and farsighted statesmen of the Republican Era "developed a strong, open, almost aggressive foreign policy."²

¹Russell W. Davenport, "The Fate of Mighty Nations", Fortune, May, 1943, pp. 114-140

²Ibid., p. 116

It is true that in the first decade of the century Republican Administrations had made suggestions for a world court and periodic conferences among nations to discuss common problems. The early movement for a league of nations had much Republican leadership and backing. William Howard Taft was the first President of the League to Enforce Peace, and many prominent Republicans were among its leaders. Through the battle of the League and into the campaign of 1920 Republican friends of the League of Nations fought to commit the party to international cooperation through the League and the Court.³

The period following the end of World War I, however, saw the twilight of these internationalist gods.⁴ The Republicans who debated foreign policy in the 1940's had to read about these men of 1900-1920, while they were reared in the schools of the leaders of the twenties and the thirties when Republican attitudes were quite different.

Just which factors were most important in bringing forth the new and different post-war Republican party are difficult to isolate. There had, of course, been non-interventionist elements in the party all along. They were the "irreconcilables" of the League fight, and they apparently had a strong

³Republican foreign policy before World War I is reviewed in Clarence A. Berdahl, Policy of the United States with Regard to the League of Nations, and Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and the World Court.

⁴It should be kept in mind that it was the attitude of the Republicans in international affairs that changed so drastically after 1920. To justify rejection of the League a philosophy of minimum participation had to be developed. As will be seen below the international activities of the United States in the twenties became very extensive in terms of attendance at international meetings and interest and concern in world affairs--perhaps significantly more so than before World War I. There was no league to reject in the earlier period. Whether or not we were any less "isolationist" in that period ought to be examined in the light of concrete governmental activities as well as in stated sentiments.

"In 1917 public opinion in the United States repudiated our century-old tradition of isolation. With the defeat of Germany in 1918 our prewar isolationism revived to become a dogma." Richard B. Scandrett, Jr., "Self-Government and Isolation," Forum, April, 1940, pp. 214-217

voice in the convention of 1920. The end of the "Republican Era" came with the split in the Party in 1912. Russell Davenport contends that had Hughes won in 1916, the "new-era Republicans," as he calls the pro-leaguers, would have remained in command of the party, and he feels this narrow defeat played its part in changing the character of the party.⁵

The hate engendered by the League controversy has often been mentioned as an important factor. Unable to react objectively to any Wilsonian proposal, the Republicans were driven to justifying their stand on the League on the grounds of a theory of national isolation.⁶ The events which put Warren Harding in the White House in 1920 must also be considered as factors in the molding of the new party. The story of the nomination and the platform on which the candidate was asked to stand has been related many times and need not be repeated here in detail:

The Republican Party stands [the platform stated] for agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. We believe that such an international association must be based upon international justice, and must provide methods which shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of impartial courts, and which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action, so that nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war."⁷

As Dr. C. A. Berdahl has said, "on this platform Senator Harding made an almost ideal candidate."⁸ The "Thirty One" friends of the League apparently

⁵Davenport, Fortune, p. 138

⁶John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, discusses the political hatred of Lodge for Wilson

⁷Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1920, pp. 96-97

⁸Clarence A. Berdahl, "The United States and the League of Nations", Michigan Law Review, Vol. XXVII, p. 618, (Apr. 1929)

thought he meant to endorse the League. Others were confident he meant to reject it. In Des Moines on October 7 Harding said, "It is not interpretation but rejection I am seeking."⁹ Immediately following that speech, Borah, one of the Senate's "irreconcilables" who had up to now refused to join the campaign, announced that he would enter actively.¹⁰ The mystery and confusion of Harding's position were not removed even to election day. After the inauguration, however, time, if not the President's utterances, made it clear that he would make no move to take the United States into the League of Nations.

II

The relations of the United States with the League of Nations under the Republicans might be portrayed on a graph by an almost straight ascending line from zero in 1921 to something just short of 100 percent participation (membership) at the end of the Republican period. The use of zero for 1921 would be no exaggeration in view of the famous policy at that time of refusing even to answer communications from Geneva. The extent of our participation in the late twenties has been outlined by Dr. Berdahl who describes the type and character of our relationship in 1928-1929.¹¹ There was, first of all, he points out, a great deal of unofficial cooperation with the League by individual Americans who served as members of numerous organs, commissions, and agencies of the League, but who did not represent the government. Secondly, the Administration had "unofficial observers" at meetings of practically every organ, committee, or conference of the League to observe the functioning of

⁹New York Times, Oct. 1920, p. 1

¹⁰James Malin, The United States After the World War, p. 66

¹¹Berdahl, Michigan Law Review, pp. 627-630

these bodies and report to Washington but not to participate in the proceedings or discussions. Thirdly, there were what Secretary Hughes called "official representatives acting in an unofficial capacity," and, fourthly, completely official representatives were designated in increasing numbers to sit with League committees and commissions such as the Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments (1924), the Preparatory Disarmament Conference, the Opium Conferences, and the International Economic Conference.

The policy of non-membership in the League, however, was fixed and never questioned by the successive Republican Administrations. The platform of 1928 stated it this way:

"This Government has definitely refused membership in the League of Nations and to assume any obligation under the covenant of the League.

"On this we stand.

"In accordance, however, with the long established American practice of giving aid and assistance to other peoples, we have most usefully assisted by cooperation in the humanitarian and technical work undertaken by the League without involving ourselves in European policies by accepting membership."¹²

The Permanent Court of International Justice was a different matter. The idea of a court had been associated with Republican foreign policy for a quarter of a century, and it did not die easily. All three of the Republican presidents from 1921-1933 favored joining the World Court, and each of them attempted to get the Senate to adhere to the protocol. President Harding submitted the proposal to the Senate on February 24, 1923. No action was taken. Coolidge recommended ratification in his first annual message in December, 1923. After more than two years of debate, wherein the Republicans in the Senate were divided along lines reminiscent of the League controversy, the resolution for adherence, with reservations, was successful on January 25, 1926. After

¹²Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1928, p. 113

deliberation at a special conference in Geneva among other members of the Court, it was agreed to accept all of the reservations save the second part of the last (the fifth). On Armistice Day following the election of 1926, which had brought heavy defeats to the Republicans, Coolidge announced he would not ask the Senate to modify its position with respect to the Court.¹³

Shortly after Hoover's election in November 1928, the Council of the League decided to invite a committee of experts to meet at Geneva for the purpose of considering amendments to the Statute which established the Court. Elihu Root was invited to become a member of the committee, an act which caused at once the question to arise whether or not the problem of the American Fifth Reservation might be solved. A formula submitted by Root was accepted by the committee, and on December 10, 1930, Hoover submitted the Protocols to the Senate. In spite of his repeated urgings, they were never brought to a vote during Hoover's administration.¹⁴

Thus it is clear that in spite of the somewhat middle-of-the road policies of the Republican Administrations there was a large, even predominant, group in the party consistently opposed to any suggestion that the United States participate in permanent international organization.¹⁵ These same elements, however, felt that the goals of worldwide disarmament and the outlawry of war were worthy ones and were willing to attempt to reach agreement with the great military powers of the world for this method of attack on the war problem. The Kellogg-Briand Pact met little opposition in the Senate, and the original suggestion for a conference on naval disarmament came from William E. Borah,

¹³Malin, pp. 465-483

¹⁴William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933, pp. 27-40

¹⁵George Grassmuck's study shows that during the period 1921-1931 68.5% of Republican Senators' votes on roll calls were favorable to participation in international organization. Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, p. 72

pacifist and isolationist, who was then the third ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and destined to replace Lodge as chairman in 1924.¹⁶ The result was the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 where three treaties were signed regarding the level of naval strength, and these were guided through the Senate by Lodge.¹⁷

In 1924 the Coolidge Administration designated Mr. Joseph C. Grew to sit with the League's Temporary Mixed Commission on the Reduction of Armaments, and in 1926 sent a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Conference sitting in Geneva. When it seemed to Coolidge in 1927 that this commission was not making satisfactory progress along the lines he wished to see, he suggested a conference of the powers signatory to the Washington Naval Treaties to discuss the extension of the limitation of armaments. Italy and France declined, but Japan, Great Britain, and the United States met at Geneva from June 20 to August 4 without arriving at any agreement.

In his Memorial Day speech of 1929, President Hoover asserted that reduction of armaments was the only way to support the Kellogg Pact. He accepted the invitation to the World Conference on the Reduction of Armaments in 1932 and sent a delegation headed by Mr. Hugh Gibson. When the failure of the conference appeared imminent, Mr. Hoover sent a series of proposals designed to suggest a solution for the deadlocked conference, but he left office before the conference had ended.¹⁸

Mr. Hoover's efforts were specifically cited for praise in the 1932 Republican platform, although there were a few words of caution about the maintenance

¹⁶Karl Schriftgiesser, This Was Normalcy, p. 134

¹⁷Ibid., p. 138

¹⁸Myers, pp. 137-152

of naval parity:

"Conscious that the limitation of armaments will contribute to security against war, and that the financial burdens of military preparation have been shamefully increased throughout the world the Administration under President Hoover has made steady efforts and marked progress in the direction of proportional reduction of arms by agreement with other nations.

"...this policy will be pursued...

"Meanwhile maintenance of our Navy on the basis of parity with any nation is a fundamental policy to which the Republican Party is committed."¹⁹

Aside from these matters of League, Court, international law, and disarmament, which were problems of a world-wide nature, the Republican Administrations were called upon to form policies with regard to various specific area problems.

With respect to Europe the theory was clear: under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine the Government of the United States would take no part in European political questions. Secretary of State Hughes made a distinction between political and economic questions, saying the United States was vitally interested in the latter field owing to its position in the monetary world. Actually, of course, since economic implications were found to be present in almost all matters, the distinction broke down in practice and was used primarily for political purposes as a means of conciliating the extreme isolationists in the party.²⁰

The Harding Administration undertook to make treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, while in the meantime German payments under the Versailles Treaty came to a halt. When France undertook to collect by force, a commission of experts worked out the Dawes Plan for collection of reparations,

¹⁹Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1932, pp. 114-115

²⁰Malin, p. 442

and to implement the plan there followed the London and Paris financial conferences at which the United States was officially represented.

In the matter of foreign debts owed the United States, settlements were negotiated over a period of years to provide for payment in a long period and, in effect, for partial cancellation, this in spite of the fact that the official Republican position was for full repayment.²¹ A few governments repudiated their debts entirely. One of these was the Soviet Union, and this fact was given as one of the reasons for not recognizing the new Soviet regime. Added to this were the charges that the Soviet Government did not represent the Russian people and that the Soviets continued to carry on revolutionary activities in the United States against the Government.

Pacific area policies were outlined by Mr. Hughes on November 30, 1923, when he stated:

"In relation to the Pacific Ocean and the Far East we have developed the policies of 1) the Open Door, 2) the maintenance of the integrity of China, 3) cooperation with other powers in the declaration of common principles, 4) cooperation with other powers by conference and consultation in the interests of peace, 5) limitation of naval armament, 6) the limitation of fortification and naval bases."²²

Nearly a decade later, when the United States and the League of Nations were faced by a crisis in the Far East, President Hoover's Secretary of State put forth the famous Stimson Doctrine as a policy under which the United States could cooperate with the League in censuring Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Briefly stated it was that the United States could not admit the legality of any situation, nor did it intend to recognize any treaty of agreement entered into between these governments which might impair the treaty

²¹Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1928, p. 113

²²Malin, p. 365

rights of the United States or of its citizens in China. Furthermore, the statement was made that the United States did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the covenant and obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.²³

III

As the Great Depression settled down upon the United States, the attention of the American people was largely diverted from matters of foreign policy. The last term of the Republicans and the first of the Democrats saw the efforts of the Government directed to domestic economic problems of the gravest kind.

In the election of 1932 the Republicans not only lost control of the Executive branch but were reduced to a relatively small minority in both houses of Congress. In 1933 there were in the House of Representatives only 115 Republicans and in the upper house only 35 Senators. In 1935 their numbers were 103 Representatives and 25 Senators, and in 1937 after the Roosevelt "landslide" of 1936 there were only 89 Republicans in the House and 16 in the Senate. Significant gains were made in the election of 1938 bringing the figures to 23 in the Senate and 169 in the House of Representatives.

The greatest significance in the above statistics lies in two resulting factors. First of all the Republicans became the Minority and fell heir to the tradition of this role in opposing the President's program in foreign as well as domestic policy. That the Republicans carried this strategy to extremes may have partly been due to the second major factor which was that Republican representation in Congress after 1932 was confined to certain geographical areas which were at that time traditionally isolationist. "By 1936

²³Myers, pp. 160-161

the Democrats held most of the metropolitan and sea coast congressional seats while the Republicans became an inland party, driven out of the big cities and away from the sea."²⁴ In the study by George Grassmuck, noted above, it is shown that these rural and inland areas tended generally to be less sympathetic to measures of international participation and national defense.

Taken together these factors intensified the isolationist attitudes of the Republican party in the thirties as against the twenties. The following figures from the Grassmuck study are revealing. In the Senate the Republican votes favorable to increasing the Army decreased by 13.4 percent in the thirties as against the twenties. On support for foreign loans and aid the percentage of decrease was 63.8 percent, and on participation in international organization, the decrease was 52 percent. In the House of Representatives the decreases in favorable votes were as follows: on increasing the Army, 30 percent, on support for the Navy, 09.2 percent, and on foreign loans and aid, 62.6 percent.²⁵ Grassmuck points out the importance of the anti-presidential attitude of the Republicans by noting in the above figures that the change of attitude on the part of the Republicans in Congress from a Republican to a Democratic Administration was greatest on those issues where presidential prestige and influence was most important, namely foreign aid and international organization.²⁶

With this view of the general trends of Republican Congressional voting in the thirties, the party's actions on some of the specific issues can be examined. Although on national defense matters there was some decrease in

²⁴Grassmuck, p. 113

²⁵Ibid., p. 139

²⁶Ibid.

Republican support from the twenties to the thirties, by and large it remained high although not so high as Democratic support. As noted above the 1932 platform, while endorsing disarmament as a worthy aim, called for maintaining the Navy at parity. The 1936 platform was noncommittal, but Grassmuck's tabulations show that the percent of favorable Republican roll call votes from 1933-1941 was 63.85 in the House and 70.45 in the Senate. The percentages for Army support are somewhat lower, being 44.3 for the House and 54.2 for the Senate.²⁷

The major Republican criteria for judging military affairs issues was whether or not a given measure would increase American commitments abroad. Republican opposition to the fortification of Guam is a case in point. The first pronouncement was a statement drawn up in 1939 by the House Republicans from the military and naval affairs committees and other regular committees which dealt with national defense.

"The Monroe Doctrine...is a policy of defense...

"Obviously our military establishment must be adequate to carry out the obligation so clearly implied in the Monroe Doctrine--the obligation to prevent the extension of foreign political domination through military action in the Western Hemisphere...

"For our defense in the Pacific we believe the mission of our military establishment is the maintenance, impregnably, of the line following roughly the 180th meridian, commencing at the Alaskan Islands, passing somewhat westward of Hawaii, and thence generally southeastward to include and cover the Panama Canal.

.....

"We find ourselves in agreement with...pending legislation looking toward the addition and strengthening of naval aviation and submarine bases in the Atlantic as well as the addition of similar bases in the vast Pacific area bounded...by the 180th meridian...

"We entertain serious doubts as to the necessity or wisdom of extending our line of defense as far to the Westward as the Islands of Guam."

²⁷Ibid., p. 33

By 1932 the controlling elements in both parties were agreed that the United States should not join the League of Nations, although some leading men in each favored membership. Both party platforms and both candidates, on the other hand, called for joining the world court, but when Mr. Roosevelt submitted a protocol to the Senate in 1935 he was unsuccessful in pushing it through. The resolution of approval was defeated by a vote of 52 for adherence to 36 against, thus failing to get the needed two-thirds majority.²⁸ Nine Republicans voted for the court and 14 against, and as if to finally bury this long-lived issue, the 1936 Republican platform for the first time stated that the party was opposed to joining the court.²⁹ The rejection of 1936 was final and our relationship with the League and the Permanent Court was settled once and for all. The Republican Party through its rejection first of the League and finally of the Court had become the symbol of opposition to international organization.

Final rejection of the League, however, did not solve America's problems with regard to the new conflicts and dangers arising in Europe and Asia. America's first answer to these threats was the same as it had been in 1793, in 1806, and in 1914--neutrality. By 1935 Italy had attacked Ethiopia. Also in 1935 the Nye Committee, investigating the munitions industry, brought out in the course of its public hearings some disturbing information concerning the international trade in arms.

Neither party had spoken of neutrality in the platforms of 1932, but by 1935, "right or wrong, the nation wanted legal protection against actions leading to war and expected Congress to provide such protection."³⁰

²⁸Ibid., p. 88

²⁹Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1936, p. 145

³⁰Grassmuck, p. 115

The primary issue throughout the debates over neutrality from 1935-1939 was the strictness of the neutrality requirements imposed on the President. The Pittman Resolution, the initial neutrality law, passed in August, 1935, was not considered as a permanent solution, and its operation was limited to six months. From that time until our entry into World War II there were 39 Senate and 18 House roll calls related to this broad issue of developing and maintaining or relaxing strict neutrality laws. In February, 1936, the Pittman Resolution was extended, with modifications, for one year. In 1937 Senate Joint Resolution 51 extended the neutrality law indefinitely, but by 1939 Mr. Roosevelt was asking for the repeal of certain parts of the law which he felt were working against our best interests.

The President after 1935 became increasingly identified with efforts to relax the laws and allow more discretion to the Chief Executive. This fact in itself tended to make the Republicans in Congress defend a strict neutrality. Add to this the other factor mentioned above, that Republican representation in Congress during this period was largely from the northern, inland areas. These areas, standing to lose little or nothing, economically, from strict neutrality, generally opposed relaxation of the laws. Working together, these factors made it almost inevitable that the Republicans would oppose changes in the stricter provisions of the law.³¹ Grassmuck's survey of the roll calls mentioned above show that Republicans in the House of Representatives cast only 13 percent of their votes for neutrality relaxation and that Republicans in the Senate voted favorably on this issue only 31.8 percent of the time.³²

³¹Grassmuck, pp. 113-132. The foregoing discussion is largely based on the findings and conclusions of the Grassmuck study.

³²Ibid., p. 120

Coming up to the end of the period considered in this chapter, the final question facing the first session of the Seventy-Sixth Congress was one regarding repeal of certain sections of the neutrality law. The President had pointed out to Congress early in 1939 that "we have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly--may actually give aid to the aggressor and deny it to the victim."³³ The House of Representatives went along with the President's request by a vote of 201 to 187 with the Republicans in opposition by a margin of 150 to 8.³⁴ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, by a vote of 16 to 11 on July 11, decided not to report the bill to the floor. Congress adjourned its regular session with the laws unchanged.

IV

In concluding this brief survey of Republican policies during the twenties and the thirties it may be asked what phases of the party's experience were most important in determining the character of GOP foreign policy in the fall of 1939 when the war in Europe began. In two periods of crucial foreign policy decision, the Republicans found themselves in the role of the opposition. In both cases the Presidents they were opposing were taking bold strides toward more international involvement for the United States. If the GOP was to oppose the foreign policies of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, it was most apt to develop theories of non-participation and non-intervention in international affairs. Thus during the two great periods of crisis in American foreign policy, 1914-1920 and 1935-1939, the Republicans took stands against the kind of international actions proposed by the Democratic executive.

³³Cong., Record, Vol. 84, p. 75 (76th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 4, 1939)

³⁴Ibid., p. 8513 (June 30, 1939)

What kind of foreign policies would have been adopted by the Republicans if the Presidents during these crises had been from their own party cannot be determined. Being the opposition in Congress the GOP did not feel it necessary or possible to formulate detailed positive programs to meet the urgent problems as they arose. There were many ideas among individuals and groups about what American policy should be, but Republican policy as it was made by the party in Congress was largely a matter of opposition.³⁵

³⁵Further discussion of the problems experienced by the Republicans as an opposition party will be found in Chapter X: Conclusion

CHAPTER II

REPUBLICANS AND THE COMING OF THE WAR

Having aided effectively in defeating neutrality revision, the Republicans went home when Congress adjourned in August, 1939, and they may have found some support for their stand when they made political soundings among their constituents. The American Institute of Public Opinion found that by and large a majority of Republicans in the country had views similar to their congressmen, although not always in the same proportions. Without question they wanted to stay out of war, and many of them were willing to go to almost any lengths to do so.

Fifty-two percent of the Republican voters, said the AIPO, thought that the Constitution should be amended to require a national referendum before Congress could draft men for war overseas (September 19).¹ Only forty-seven percent thought Congress should change the neutrality law so that the United States could sell war materials to England and France (September 3).² Just seventeen percent thought the United States should allow its citizens to travel on ships of countries which were then at war (September 14).³ On September 19 only thirteen percent thought we should send our own army and navy abroad to fight Germany.⁴

War was declared by Great Britain and France on Germany on September 3. On September 13 Mr. Roosevelt called a special session of Congress for September 21 to reconsider the amendments to the Neutrality Act, the main

¹Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 4, p. 103, (Mar., 1940)

²Ibid., p. 105

³Ibid., p. 106

⁴Ibid.

issue being the repeal of the embargo on arms. At this special session there were twenty-two Republicans in the Senate (total membership of 96) with three former Republicans, Messrs. Lundeen and Shipstead of Minnesota and Norris of Nebraska. Senator McNary of Oregon was the Minority Leader and Chairman of the Republican Conference; Austin of Maine was the Party whip; and William E. Borah of Idaho was ranking Republican member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which had in addition the following Minority members: Johnson of California, Capper of Kansas, Vandenberg of Michigan, White of Maine, as well as Lundeen of Minnesota. Figure IV indicates that all of these, with exception of White and Austin, were clearly isolationists. In the House of Representatives, whose total membership is 435, there were 166 Republicans. Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts was the Minority Leader and Hamilton Fish, arch-isolationist, was the ranking Minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Senate took up the resolution to amend the Neutrality Act which had passed the House in the regular session. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported the resolution favorably but with considerable amendment, eliminating completely the embargo on the export of arms which the House had retained with some reservations. There was no Minority report, but on October 10 Senator Tobey of New Hampshire moved to recommit the resolution to committee, and, although the motion was defeated, he was supported by a majority of the Republicans 15 to 7.⁵

There followed a series of fifteen amendments proposed by Republicans and Democrats who were opposed to relaxing neutrality. Among the Republicans these amendments were supported regularly by a group comprising more than half of

⁵Cong. Record, Vol. 85, p. 237. (76th Cong., 2nd Sess., Oct. 10, 1939)

their membership in the Senate. Senators Johnson, Capper, Frazier, Nye, Wiley, Borah, McNary, Reed, Danaher, Holman, and Lodge voted almost solidly for these amendments; Senators Tobey, Vandenberg, Davis, and Townsend voted for somewhat fewer of them, and Senator Taft was found voting for about half of these. As was so often the case, the Senator from Ohio himself proposed the two amendments which gained the widest support among Republican Senators. The first of these would have prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from using more than one half the money available for exchange stabilization under the Gold Reserve Act for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange of any belligerent. Every Republican voting in the Senate supported this amendment.⁶

Another Taft amendment, which would have prohibited any United States Government agency or corporation from financing the export of goods to a belligerent, was supported by all the Republicans save one.⁷ The voting during the entire consideration of this measure found a small group of Senators opposing almost all of the limiting amendments. Senators Austin, Hale, Gibson, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Barbour, Gurney, and White voted as a group opposed to the efforts of the majority of the Republicans to amend the resolution. Using the record of Senator Johnson of California as an example of the voting of the extreme isolationist Republicans in the Senate, a scale will show that Austin voted against Johnson on eighteen roll calls out of twenty, Hale and Gibson on sixteen, and Barbour and Gurney on thirteen and fourteen respectively. (Figure I)

Figure I and the others of its type throughout this paper are designed to reveal trends in voting among Congressional Republicans, and for this purpose all the foreign policy roll calls from September, 1939, through the last

⁶Ibid., p. 923 (Oct. 26, 1939)

⁷Ibid., p. 925

adjournment of Congress in 1952 have been used. This means, of course, that only those issues on which individual yeas and nays were recorded are considered, but it seems evident that the issues on which roll calls are taken are the ones that members of Congress consider the most important, the ones on which some members at least want their positions and the positions of others recorded and available to constituents, the Administration, and the country at large. It is felt, also, that, a recorded vote comes nearest to indicating the political (not necessarily personal) attitudes of members.




Figure I. Republican voting in the Senate on
H.J. Res. 306 (Neutrality Relaxation)

It is clear that the main questions at issue among Republicans (1939-1952) were (1) the degree to which the United States should participate in world politics, and (2) the extent to which Republicans in Congress should cooperate with the Democratic Administration in the area of foreign policy. At first the two questions were almost synonymous, that is, the internationalists tended to follow Administration leadership, while the isolationists opposed it. After 1949, however, as will be shown below, many Republicans who favored a considerable degree of American participation in world affairs opposed the Administration's method and manner of carrying this out. None the less, there tended to be throughout the entire period two consistent groups at the extreme poles on both issues. The group most violently opposed to Administration

policies in 1952 was the most extreme isolationist before 1949 (Langer, Malone, Kem, Wherry). It can even be contended that these men were still isolationists, but the same cannot be said of all those who followed them in their opposition to the Administration. At the other extreme the group that was made up of the leading internationalists before 1949 was the same who also continued to support the Administration down to 1952. (Lodge, Saltonstall, H. A. Smith, Morse).

In order to discover trends on these two issues among the whole Republican membership in Congress, it is possible to compare the voting of all members with the record of the extreme group. The extreme isolationist or oppositionist group was selected for this purpose, but the problem then became to find a single individual whose record could be used as a standard of isolationism or, later, opposition. In the Senate William Langer of North Dakota was chosen, because, among this group, his tenure in the Senate covered more of the period than any other, and because his record is among the most isolationist (Langer voted against ratification of the United Nations Charter). Langer, however, did not enter the Senate until 1941, so the record of Hiram Johnson (equally isolationist) was used for the 76th Congress. In the House Noah M. Mason of Illinois, whose membership covers the entire period of the study, was selected. Mason is from the heart of Chicago Tribune Republicanism, and has been a consistent supporter of that newspaper's foreign policy views.

It is not to be inferred that Langer or Mason were the most isolationist members of Congress at all times, nor that their own positions were not modified from time to time, but it is clear that the contrast in voting on foreign policy between these men and such men as Austin, Lodge, Saltonstall, and Morse is greater than that of any other two Republican groups in Congress.

On the final Senate vote on neutrality relaxation fifteen Republicans voted against the resolution and eight supported it. The eight were: Taft,

Gurney, Hale, Bridges, Austin, Gibson, Barbour, and Reed. It is quite clear that a majority of the Republicans in the Senate were opposed to relaxing neutrality to the extent proposed by this resolution.

In the House of Representatives the situation was somewhat different. The Senate version differed considerably from the House version and the question before the House was to what extent it would insist on its position which retained many more restrictions on trade with belligerents than did the Senate measure. There were five roll calls on various phases of the resolution. One hundred forty-four of the Republican Congressmen voted together in opposition to the attempts to further relax the neutrality law. The greatest number of Republicans which broke away from the majority position on any vote was twenty-one. Only two Republican Representatives voted against the party position on all five roll-call votes. However, on the final vote eighteen Republicans voted for repeal, ten more than had done so in June.⁸

We may conclude from this examination that the outbreak of war in Europe had little effect on Republican views of what the United States ought to do. In the Senate the desire to help England and France contended with the desire to stay neutral, and a few Senators broke away from what might be called the Congressional party position. Outside of Congress a few Republican leaders were beginning to press for more aid, but by November, 1939, Congressional party thinking had not changed.

II

Congress came back to Washington in January for an election-year session with important decisions to make. Early in the session the Republicans received the report of a Program Committee which had been appointed by the National Committee early in 1938. At that time there had been a great deal

⁸New York Times, November 3, 1939, pp. 1-2

of discussion about the possibility of holding a mid-term convention designed to rejuvenate the spirits of the party, crushed in 1936. Many prominent Republicans, including former President Herbert Hoover, favored such a step, but it met the opposition of Alfred Landon, the party's titular leader, and his 1936 running mate, Frank Knox, publisher of the Chicago Daily News. In lieu of the convention, the idea of a program committee was accepted and began work under the leadership of Dr. Glenn Frank, former President of the University of Wisconsin. The membership on the committee eventually comprised more than 200 members including specific representation of farmers, manufacturers, educators, labor, the professions, and many other groups. No holders of public office were included, nor were any members of the National Committee appointed, and Dr. Frank made a great deal of the fact that it was a layman's group. He envisioned it as a study committee which would sample GOP opinion in the country and study the issues which the party and the nation faced, but he was clear to point out that:

"It is not the business of this commission to write platforms for the 1938 and 1940 campaigns...The sole legal source of national party policy is the national convention, and the custodians of party policy in the interval between national conventions are the Republican members in the Senate and the House when, as now, the party is not in power."⁹

The committee divided into nine regional groups designated to study problems directly or particularly concerning their areas, but it is interesting to note that no group was assigned the topic of foreign policy. In the final report of the committee, issued by the National Committee on February 19, 1940, scant attention was given to foreign affairs in spite of their growing urgency. This much was stated:

⁹Ibid., Jan. 7, 1938, p. 7

"In the forefront of our foreign policy must be the avoidance of all commitments and courses of action that might involve us in other peoples' wars. When such wars are on, we must observe a scrupulous government neutrality."¹⁰

A strong defense was called for, but the implication was clear that this defense was to be confined to the Western Hemisphere, a view widely held by Republicans in Congress. There was no discussion of foreign aid, selective service, or other issues which confronted Congress at the moment.¹¹

The Selective Service debate was one of the longest of the session, lasting from August 7 to September 13. In the Senate there were fourteen roll-call votes before the bill passed in final form. Again, as in the neutrality debate, Republicans and a few Democrats tried to modify the bill before it was enacted.

When the bill was reported favorably out of the Committee, a minority of three members wrote a dissenting report. Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado (Democrat), John Thomas of Idaho (Republican), and Ernest Lundeen (Farmer-Labor) of Minnesota signed a statement which called for the use of voluntary enlistment until such a system had failed to meet the needs of the armed services:

"Voluntary enlistment [the report concluded] should be given a thorough trial before any Hitlerized method of peacetime conscription with its far reaching implication of militarism and imperialism is adopted as a permanent policy in America. After a thorough and fair trial, if the voluntary enlistment plan fails in part or in whole, then before it is too late, the minority will be glad to support conscription, but not before."¹²

On the question of limiting the use of troops to the Western Hemisphere the Republicans were nearly united. In the Senate there were no Republican

¹⁰Ibid., Feb. 19, 1940, p. 2

¹¹Ibid.

¹²S. Rept., No. 2002, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Aug. 5, 1940), p. 13

votes against the Lodge amendment which would have restricted service of men drafted to the Western Hemisphere and Territories of the United States. On the second issue the Senate Republicans were divided, but in the House the Republicans supported (135-25) an amendment which was accepted to provide for a period of voluntary enlistment before the draft would become effective.¹³ The bill passed the House September 7, and, with the above amendment attached, fifty-four Republicans voted for it and 111 against.¹⁴ In the Senate the Republicans cast eight yeas and ten nays, with two others announced against the bill and three for it.¹⁵

Voting among the Republicans in the Senate on this issue formed a somewhat different pattern than it had on the neutrality bill the year before. There were a total of eleven roll-call votes and the familiar division in the party can be observed. Austin, Gurney, Gibson, and Barbour voted against all but two of the amendments designed to modify the committee measure, while Johnson and Capper voted for all but one.¹⁶ There was, however, considerable wavering in the ranks of the isolationists. Danaher, for example, voted "no" on three of the "crippling" amendments, and even more striking is the fact that Senators Lodge and Holman were found voting almost identically to the Austin group. It is to be remembered that while the Selective Service issue was partially fought out on lines of "intervention" versus "non-intervention," it was also a defense measure, and Republican support for national defense had remained relatively high through the entire period of the twenties and thirties.¹⁷ (Figure II).

¹³Cong. Record, Vol. 86, p. 11748 (76th Cong., 3rd Sess., Sept. 7, 1940)

¹⁴Ibid., p. 11755

¹⁵Ibid., p. 11142. (Aug. 23, 1940)

¹⁶Announced positions will be included throughout except where noted.

¹⁷George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, p. 36




Figure II. Republican voting in the Senate on Selective Service, 1940

In the House of Representatives a similar pattern can be noted, and the frequently well-united ranks of the party in that chamber were somewhat shattered on this issue. Sixty of the most faithful stood strongly against the bill and in favor of all proposed modifications. Thirty-nine varied by only one vote on five roll calls from that position. Twelve wavered twice, twenty-six three times, ten four times, and twelve representatives voted in opposition to the sixty on five out of five roll calls. (Figure III)




Figure III. Republican voting in the House of Representatives on Selective Service, 1940.

Another issue developed when, on July 22, 1940, President Roosevelt sent to Congress a message in which he stated that as a result of the European War, with the resultant blockades and counter-blockades, the sale of Latin-American products in their natural market was being prevented. This, he declared, was causing and would continue to cause distress in Latin American countries until the war was ended and normal commerce restored. For these reasons he asked Congress to increase the capital and lending powers of the Export-Import Bank by \$500,000,000 to enable the bank to make loans to Latin American countries for the financing and orderly marketing of some part of their surpluses.¹⁸

The proposal was submitted to the appropriate Senate and House committees and subsequently was reported favorably in both Houses. In the Senate Robert Taft wrote a Minority report which was signed by the Republican members of the Committee on Banking and Currency. Taft pointed out that this bill would remove for Latin American countries the limitation of \$20,000,000 on loans to one country. It also, he reminded the Senate, would remove the limitation prohibiting loans to finance the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. Continuing, the Minority argued against this bill for several specific reasons:

1. The constitutionality of the proposition was challenged on the grounds that no such powers were given Congress under Article 1, Section 8.
2. Taft maintained that the policy of international surplus control is not only futile but positively harmful to the producers of North and South America.
3. The furnishing of economic aid to South America was not thought to be an advisable step.

¹⁸Cong. Record, Vol. 86, pp. 9571-9572 . (76th Cong., 3rd Sess., July 22, 1940)

4. The new policy, the Taft opinion stated, had a definitely "anti-German" flavor. It seemed to suggest that we should prevent the Germans from acquiring American products. It could hardly be considered wise to adopt such a policy before the totalitarian nations had taken any economic steps of the kind contemplated.

5. This step would in the long run be encouraging Latin American competition for North American products.

"We know [the Minority report concluded] as individuals that the poorest way to make a man a good neighbor is to lend him money. It is far more likely to make him your enemy for life. The same result has come in the past from international loans and is bound to come in the future."¹⁹

Republican Senators were almost unanimous in their opposition to the bill when it came up for vote, only one voting for it on final passage. And the party was equally united in the House of Representatives where a total of only five votes was cast against the party majority on the three roll calls taken on this issue. Only four Republican votes were cast in favor of the bill on final passage in the House.

In reviewing foreign policy voting in the 2nd and 3rd Sessions of the 76th Congress we find, in brief, the following: In the Senate six Republicans voted against the extreme isolationists on more than half the roll-call votes. These internationalists were quite regularly supporting the Administration in its efforts to prepare the United States for possible war and to act on an international scale to solve certain problems arising out of the wars in Europe and Asia. (Figure IV). In the House of Representatives greater unity was maintained in the Republican ranks, and only two Republicans voted differently than Mason on as many as half the votes recorded. (Figure V)

¹⁹S. Rept., No. 2005, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., (Aug. 6, 1940), p. 9

| | |
|----|----------------------|
| 0 | Johnson |
| 1 | Capper |
| 2 | Nye |
| 3 | Reed (A) |
| 4 | Frazier, Wiley |
| 5 | Borah, Thomas, Tobey |
| 6 | McNary |
| 7 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | Vandenberg |
| 10 | Danaher |
| 11 | |
| 12 | Townsend |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Davis |
| 15 | Taft |
| 16 | Lodge |
| 17 | Holman |
| 18 | |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | White |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | Bridges |
| 27 | |
| 28 | |
| 29 | Gurney |
| 30 | Barbour |
| 31 | Hale |
| 32 | |
| 33 | |
| 34 | Gibson |
| 35 | |
| 36 | |
| 37 | Austin |
| 38 | |
| 39 | |
| 40 | |
| 41 | |
| 42 | |
| 43 | |
| 44 | |
| 45 | |
| 46 | |

Figure IV: Republican voting on Foreign Policy issues in the Senate; 76th Congress; 1939 (2nd Sess.)-1940; as compared with the record of Senator Hiram Johnson of California

(The letter (A) indicates that no vote or announced position was recorded for that Senator on more than one third of the roll calls compiled. In compilations for the House, members not voting or announced on more than one third of the recorded votes are not included in the tabulations)




Figure V: Republican voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the House of Representatives; 76th Congress; 1939(2nd Sess.)-1940; as compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois

III

Again the question arises as to whether or not Republican congressional views were representative of the "rank and file" of party members. First of all one must say that it would not be expected that they would represent Republican views from all parts of the country but only of the states and districts which elected them. To the extent that Republicans from areas represented in Congress by Democrats had views different from those in areas represented by Republicans, their opinions were not heard in the party councils on Capitol Hill.

That there were such variations became evident in several ways during 1940. The first was the appearance of many prominent Republicans high in the circles of a new organization known as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. This group was formed through the efforts of leading citizens of both parties to take every form of political action possible to obtain American aid for the countries still fighting Germany in Europe. The group was headed by William Allen White, a prime mover in the organization. White was chosen for his ability, his sympathy for the cause of allied aid, and also what he represented. Coming from the Middle West, traditional seat of isolation, he was an outstanding liberal Republican who at the same time was on very good terms with President Roosevelt.

The efforts of the group took several forms, among them the formation of local groups and regional organizations seeking to influence public opinion in favor of American support for England and France. Newspaper and magazine space was purchased on a nation-wide scale, and full page messages were printed periodically. Not only did the Committee seek to mold public opinion, but also to bring the force of this public opinion to bear on public officials and especially on Congress.

The 1940 political conventions gave another opportunity for the Committee to gain political support for a program of aid to the allies. Henry L. Stimson, a Secretary of War under Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover, was active in the group, and was particularly anxious that the Republican party should not follow an isolationist policy. William Allen White felt the best hope in this direction was to keep the Republican Committee on Resolutions from making any definite declaration on foreign policy that would prevent the Presidential candidate from taking a stand in favor of aiding the allies. Many supporters of the Committee to Aid the Allies had friends in high places in the Republican party, and they promised to work through these friends while White worked through his fellow Kansan, Alf Landon.²⁰

On the opposite side of the question was the America First Committee in which many Republicans were active but which was also intended to be private and nonpartisan. This group, which opposed first the relaxation of neutrality, secondly the loaning of money to the Allies, and finally the entrance of the United States into the war, was headed by General Robert E. Wood, chairman of the board of Sears Roebuck and Company, who was considered to be a Republican, and a majority of the national committee of America First with political affiliations were Republicans.²¹ Among the many Republicans who served as speakers or advisors for the America First Committee were Philip LaFollette, former Governor of Wisconsin, Senator Gerald P. Nye (North Dakota), Representatives Karl Mundt (South Dakota), Hamilton Fish (New York), and Dewey Short (Missouri).²²

²⁰Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, p. 66

²¹Wayne S. Cole, American First, p. 169

²²Ibid., p. 170

During its brief life, which ended in December, 1941, this organization attempted by the same methods used by the Committee to Defend America to influence public opinion and the course of legislation along lines consistent with its principles of non-intervention. Although it cannot be said that the committee was totally without influence in the course of American foreign policy, it is obvious that it failed completely to achieve its major objectives.

The fascinating story of Wendell Willkie's rise and fall in the Republican Party has been told in considerable detail by Donald Johnson in his doctoral thesis entitled Wendell Willkie and the Republican Party.²³ The Herculean effort which brought Willkie forward from comparative obscurity, the spectacular convention where he was nominated, and the candidate's attempts to swing the party away from its stand against intervention in the European War--all these are examined by Dr. Johnson. The details need not be gone over again.

Willkie's earliest and strongest backing came from certain eastern business interests and the editors of the New York Herald Tribune. By and large Willkie's foreign policy views coincided with those of his backers. It was obvious that his attitudes would bear little resemblance to those of the party in Congress. Willkie was to do much wavering and compromising in the course of the campaign, but from beginning to end it was clear that he favored as much aid to the British as possible, and supported most of the President's efforts in this direction.²⁴ It became very difficult for him to attack the President's foreign policy program, and he was often found to be criticizing the President for too little rather than too much intervention and preparation for war.

²³University of Illinois, 1952

²⁴Donald Johnson, Wendell Willkie and the Republican Party, pp. 71-76. See also Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie, Chaps. 9-12

At the time the 1940 platform was written Willkie was far from the favored candidate for the nomination but was nonetheless enough in the running to have some influence on the drafting of the foreign policy plank. On June 8 he spoke out to say that sentiment in the Republican party was overwhelmingly for aid short of war and that he was confident that the Republican party was not isolationist.

"I don't think there is any chance that the Republicans will adopt any isolation plank. I haven't been able to find any strong isolation group in the Republican Party, and I am sure that the country is overwhelmingly in favor of granting immediate aid to the allies."²⁵

This kind of a statement must certainly be considered something akin to whistling in the dark, for that there would be a real battle over the platform on the issue of intervention appeared certain from the beginning. John D. M. Hamilton, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, was saying that the declaration on foreign policy would be the most important in the platform.²⁶

The Republican Resolutions Committee convened informally on June 17, several days before the opening of the convention. Turner Catledge, New York Times reporter, wrote that "a strong current toward a declaration of sympathy for the forces still battling Nazi domination, as well as for all possible material aid 'short of war', developed quickly among the 40-odd members..."²⁷ Led by Mr. Landon and Walter E. Edge of New Jersey, this "current" was reported to be pushing into the background, for the time being at least, any serious agitation for a restatement of the traditional isolation policy for which the party had been noted in recent years.

²⁵New York Times, June 9, 1940, p. 3

²⁶Ibid., June 14, 1940, p. 18

²⁷Ibid., June 18, 1940, p. 1

In spite of this sentiment Mr. Herbert K. Hyde, a Dewey supporter, was chosen chairman of the Committee, although it was said that his foreign policy views were not sought before the selection was made.²⁸ Mr. Landon refused the chairmanship so as to be free to make his fight for allied aid in the committee and, if necessary, on the convention floor. Mr. Landon, in line with the views of William Allen White, was said to favor a short "postal card" platform with the most general and simple statement possible on foreign affairs, leaving details to be filled in to meet events abroad. He said, "I favor all possible aid to the allies that does not involve any commitment that will take us into war unless the vital interests of America are threatened in a tangible and concrete way."²⁹

On the 18th Landon was chosen Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy and National Defense. The membership of the subcommittee represented almost all shades of opinion on the foreign policy issue ranging from strong pro-ally sentiment in the East to old-time isolation in the West.³⁰ The subcommittee held hearings the same day, and a general cross-section of views was presented. H. C. Hogan of Indiana told the group that the Middle Western Region, for which he was Program Committee Chairman, was "definitely and overwhelmingly" for staying out of the war. Furthermore, he said the idea of following a policy of giving aid to the belligerents "short of war" was like rabbit sausage--"half rabbit and half horse." A delegate from North Carolina endorsed the views of the Frank Committee for the Southeastern States. E. E. Galloway of Florida warned the committee that if it tried to counter the New

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., June 19, 1940, p. 1

Deal foreign policy it might as well give up hope of again breaking into the solid South, for he had no doubt of the popularity of that policy in the Southeast. William S. Howe of Somerville, Massachusetts, speaking for former Governor John H. Trumbull of Connecticut, insisted the party would make a grave mistake if it failed to recognize the idealistic strain of Americans which was now being aroused by events abroad. Howe also favored giving all help to the allies "short of an expeditionary force," and said this was the expressed opinion of New England.³¹

At this point in the efforts to write a platform a bomb shell exploded in Washington and was immediately felt in the deliberations of the Committee on Resolutions. Mr. Roosevelt on June 20 appointed Frank Knox, editor of the Chicago Daily News and Republican Vice-Presidential candidate in 1936, and Henry L. Stimson, both considered to be pro-interventionist Republicans, to be the Secretaries of Navy and War respectively. The immediate reaction at the convention was generally to the effect that these appointments were made to form a psuedo-coalition cabinet to gain the support of certain segments of the Republican party. It was also felt that this more than ever demanded that the Republican party take a stand as the "peace party." Many observers were certain that from this incident would result a more clearly anti-intervention foreign policy plank, and this is just what many leading Republicans were saying. The National Committee Chairman, Mr. John Hamilton, issued the following statement:

"The action which has been taken by Colonel Knox and Mr. Stimson in associating themselves with the present national administration as members of the President's cabinet is purely personal on their part. Every individual has the right to serve the State and Government as he sees fit. As members of the President's Cabinet they

³¹Ibid.

owe their allegiance to the President and hereafter will speak and act in that capacity. Colonel Knox's and Mr. Stimson's desire for American intervention in European affairs is so well known that their appointment speaks for itself."³²

This statement was subsequently adopted as the sentiment of the National Committee. Colonel Knox resigned as a delegate-at-large to the convention from Illinois. The isolationists on the platform committee took the position that the appointments made it virtually mandatory for the convention to adopt a non-intervention plank. Even Mr. Landon was reported to feel that the appointments had given the Republicans the cue to become strictly a "peace party" and to attack the Democrats as the "war party."

It is a little difficult at first to see the logic of this position, but perhaps the best explanation came from Herbert Hyde who said, "The appointment indicates that President Roosevelt is attempting to lead this nation into war, because a coalition government is not possible in our two-party system of government in times of peace."³³ The Republicans were anxious to show that they did not consider that a coalition had been formed and that the Republican party was not represented by Knox and Stimson in the Cabinet. The two best ways to make this clear were to read Knox and Stimson out of the party and to adopt a foreign policy plank absolutely opposed to the Administration program.

The first of these actions was taken by Hamilton's statement, but in another twenty-four hours the move to include support for aid to the allies revived strongly. Many leaders still were determined to pin the label of peace on their party, but a goodly number of the platform writers seemed equally intent upon avoiding any action that would run directly counter to what they felt was the current popular demand for every possible material assistance to the allies.

³²Ibid., June, 21, 1940, p. 1

³³Ibid.

On June 22, Thomas Dewey of New York declared himself to be in favor of aid to the allies without violating international or domestic law or entering the war. Willkie, of course, was for aid to the allies without going to war. By this time it appeared that the best way out of the controversy over the platform was to leave the whole matter mainly up to the candidate. The idea would have been to tell the convention and to state in the platform that the international situation was so fluid that the party could take no restricted stand on this issue. It evidently appeared at this stage that almost any positive stand would lead to clash in the full Resolutions Committee or on the floor of the convention.³⁴ Also on June 22 there was a meeting of the delegates of thirteen western states and Alaska called by Ezra Whitla, national committee-man from Idaho. This group adopted a resolution opposing any intervention by the United States in European or Asiatic wars, and selected Senator John Thomas, also of Idaho, to present these views to the Committee on Resolutions.³⁵

The same day tentative agreement "in principle" was reported reached on the foreign policy plank. It was learned that the main features of the plank were (1) a condemnation of the Roosevelt Administration's foreign policy; (2) a declaration for keeping us out of war; and (3) while the originally planned support for aid to the allies "short of war" was omitted, there was a general statement of support for all "oppressed peoples" in their fight for freedom, and approval of such aid to these beleaguered governments as might be extended without violation of international law or peril to the United States. Finally, coupled with the foregoing statement and evidently inserted as part of the bargain, was a reference to the cost in lives and money of the last venture of the United States into foreign wars.³⁶

³⁴Ibid., June 23, 1940, p. 1

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

After the drafting committee had completed its work, the resolution went to the full platform committee. At a session of the committee on June 26, C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois, backed by Senators Thomas, Lodge, and Hyde, succeeded in writing in still another sentence which provided that any aid extended to oppressed peoples "does not include the sons of America." This language was a part of the Illinois State Republican Platform. The next morning when the drafters met again to approve the document for mimeographing, Messrs. Pepper and Edge discovered the new clause. Apparently outnumbered by the non-interventionists, they threatened to resign, and Mr. Pepper actually left the room. Brooks finally agreed to withdraw the new clause in the interests of a unanimous report, but told the committee he might go before the convention to explain his position.

This episode over the 1940 Republican platform is quite illustrative of how platforms are written and of what their language can be taken to mean. It is difficult to say just where a majority of the convention stood on aid to the allies and on an anti-war program for the party. The New York Times felt the platform indicated that the convention was overwhelmingly non-interventionist.³⁷ William Allen White was certain that seventy percent of the delegates favored aid to the allies short of war. The nomination of Willkie would tend to support the latter view, but the later rejection of Willkie by large segments of the party throws any such conclusion into doubt.

Whether or not the platform represented the views of the convention is impossible to guess. That there were two strong conflicting points of view is obvious. One was primarily agreed that we stay out of war but also wanted to include a statement in support of aid to the allies. The other group was

³⁷Ibid., June 27, 1940, p. 22

anxious to see a strong anti-intervention plank adopted and would accept approval of any aid only in the most general terms and then only grudgingly. Both the Committee on Resolutions as a whole and its foreign policy subcommittee were divided along these lines. The fact that the fight did not reach the floor of the convention could be taken to indicate that neither group felt the report was entirely unrepresentative of their views and that each felt no new strength would be found on the floor. To this extent the plank could be said to represent the views of the convention--and a rather delicate balance of those views at that. One phrase different, in one direction or the other, might have resulted in a lack of unanimity in the report.

To most people reading the 1940 platform today, or even on the day it was adopted, it would seem merely a weak and meaningless statement which should be ignored in favor of an examination of the views of the candidate. And so it is, abstractly considered. And yet reading it against the background of the struggle over every word in its sentences, it gives some indication of the state of foreign policy in the Republican party convention. It tells us that the faction which wanted aid to the allies was not strong enough to have a direct statement to that effect adopted. It tells us that the isolationist group was not strong enough to exclude all mention of aid, but was able to exact additional strong anti-intervention statements as a price for the inclusion of the clause favoring aid to oppressed peoples.³⁸

³⁸"The Republican Party is firmly opposed to involving this Nation in foreign war.

"We are still suffering from the ill effects of the last World War:--a war which cost us a twenty-four billion dollar increase in our national debt, billions of uncollectible foreign debts, and the complete upset of our economic system, in addition to the loss of human life and irreparable damage to the health of thousands of our boys...

"Our sympathies have been profoundly stirred by invasion of unoffending countries and by disaster to nations whose ideals most clearly resemble our own. We favor the extension to all peoples fighting for liberty, or whose liberty is threatened, of such aid as shall not be in violation of international law or consistent with the requirements of our own defense..." Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1940, p. 141

Considering this balance of strength and remembering the stand of the Republicans in Congress in 1939-1940, one is bound to conclude that Wendell Willkie did not on matters of foreign policy represent the views of the Republican organization. That he may have come close to representing the views of a large segment of the party "rank and file" is to be presumed from the public opinion polls, but can never be clearly proved. The factors which influenced his nomination are too complex to analyze in terms of his foreign policy views, but the nomination of Senator McNary would indicate that the convention did not support Willkie's views so strongly that it felt it necessary to nominate a running mate with similar ideas. It seems probable that McNary was nominated chiefly for his favorable views toward public power to counteract the anti-public power views often expressed by Willkie. McNary's voting record shows that he opposed all measures to aid the allies--even those measures which were specifically endorsed by Wendell Willkie. All the efforts from June to November which were made to create an appearance of agreement between the two men were never convincing.

Willkie's statements on foreign policy during the campaign were often confusing, contradictory, and puzzling, but there was little doubt that his opinions remained essentially as he stated them in his acceptance speech at Elwood, Indiana, on August 17. There, after a rather careful and lengthy explanation of his thinking on the situation America faced, he specifically indicated his support of Selective Service and the general foreign policy line of the Roosevelt Administration:

"I cannot ask the American people to put their faith in me without recording my conviction that some form of Selective Service is the only democratic way in which to assure the trained and competent manpower we need in our national defense.

"Also, in the light of my principles we must honestly face our relationship with Great Britain. We must admit that the loss of the British fleet would greatly weaken our defense...

"The President of the United States recently said, 'We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation, and at the same time we will harness the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in America may have the equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense.'

"I should like to state that I am in agreement with those two principles as I understand them--and I don't understand them as implying military involvement in the present hostilities. As an American citizen I am glad to pledge whole-hearted support to the President in whatever action he may take in accord with those principles."³⁹

He then went on to attack Roosevelt's policy on two grounds: (1) for making belligerent and threatening statements which were uncalled for and unnecessary and thus running the risk of taking us into war; (2) for failing to take the people of the United States into his confidence in his diplomatic moves.

Senator McNary and other non-interventionists were placed in a very difficult position in trying to march under a Willkie banner emblazoned with the foregoing principles. They were, by and large, restricted to agreeing again and again with the Willkie statement which said he was against our entering the war--a rather frustrating situation to say the least. Willkie's defeat deprived political observers of their chance to see whether or not Willkie would have been able as President to change the views of Congressional Republicans and gain their support for his policies. It will be seen later that in his role as "titular leader" of the party Willkie did attempt to influence party policy, largely without success.

IV

The Republicans, although defeated for control of the Executive, just about held their own in the House of Representatives and gained six Senate seats. There were now twenty-eight Republican Senators and 162 Representatives.

³⁹New York Times, August 18, 1940, p. 33

The Minority leadership remained in the hands of Senator McNary and Joseph Martin, and McNary's voting record for the 1941 session indicates he was influenced in his foreign policy views little, if at all, by the experience of running with Wendell Willkie. He continued to line up solidly with the majority of Republicans in the Senate who opposed all efforts to further commit the United States on the international scene. It is curious, however, that Senator Austin was again the Republican whip in the Senate, for during the entire period from 1939 to 1942 he was voting in almost constant opposition to the isolationist group. He voted in opposition to such Senators as Johnson, Nye, and Capper more than three-fourths of the time during this entire period. On some issues his percentage of deviation neared 100 percent.

In November, 1940, William E. Borah, Republican Senator from Idaho, died after thirty-three years in the Senate and seventeen as ranking Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He was replaced in this latter role by Hiram Johnson of California, whose voting record on foreign policy from 1939 to 1941 paralleled Borah's almost exactly. Added to the Committee at this time was Senator Nye, again with a roll-call record almost identical to that of Borah. Add to this the fact that in this session Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, who for a time had worn the Farmer-Labor label, decided to list himself among the Republicans, and it is evident that the character of the Republican representation on the Committee was unchanged by Borah's death.

Taking the session as a whole, the Republican voting pattern was about the same as in the two previous years. The large majority of Republicans continued to oppose consistently the Administration's measures for relaxing neutrality, aiding the allies, and strengthening Selective Service, while a small but persistent minority voted down the line in support of these measures.

In the Senate the majority was augmented by the election of Butler of Nebraska, Brooks of Illinois, Willis of Indiana, and, to a slightly lesser extent, Burton of Ohio and Aiken of Vermont. Senator Brewster, who replaced Hale from Maine, was found less often with the minority than his predecessor, but Senator Ball from Minnesota voted regularly with Senators Austin, Gurney, and Barbour against the majority. Senator Thomas, who replaced Borah from Idaho, voted as consistently with the non-intervention group as did Borah before him, and the same was true of William Langer, who replaced Frazier as a Senator from North Dakota.

Although there were numerous changes in the Republican membership in the House of Representatives, few, if any, of these were significant for their effect on the foreign policy complexion of the party in the lower chamber. Four of the group which had dissented from the majority most often were not returned to the 77th Congress, while two new members were added to this group.

The lend-lease Bill was introduced on January 10 of the year-long session which was to end with the United States at war.⁴⁰ It was reported to the House January 30 with the views of the Minority on the Foreign Affairs Committee presented by Mr. Hamilton Fish the next day.⁴¹ This report, signed by each Minority member, began by stating that, "We are for all aid to Britain short of War and short of sacrificing our own defense and our own freedom. The British, in their valiant struggle which has aroused our deepest sympathy, need planes, guns and war material." But the Republicans were convinced that "this bill does not provide dollar exchange for Britain, and is not needed to procure coordination of our defense efforts. This bill will not provide any additional

⁴⁰Cong. Record, Vol. 87, p. 121 (77th Cong., 1st Sess., Jan. 10, 1941)

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 427-429

war supplies for Britain within the 60-90 days of her crisis, unless the President uses the powers provided to dispose of part of our arms or our Navy, which he and his Cabinet officers have specifically denied they could spare."⁴²

After asserting that this bill would give the President "unlimited, unprecedented and unpredictable powers literally to seize anything in this country and give it to any other country," the Republicans proposed their own seven-point program to meet the situation.

- "1. A \$2,000,000,000 credit to Britain, to be used in this country for purchasing arms when her dollar balance for this purpose is exhausted, requiring reasonable collateral security if available.
- "2. Permit the sale by our Government of arms to Britain only when our highest Army and Navy officers certify in writing such arms are not necessary for our national defense.
- "3. A one-year time limit on all extraordinary powers.
- "4. Provide that no vessels of the U. S. Navy shall be disposed of without consent of Congress.
- "5. Prohibit the use of our ports for repair bases for belligerents' ships.
- "6. Prohibit the use of American vessels to transfer exports to belligerents.
- "7. Prohibit the convoying of merchantmen by our Navy."⁴³

On February 8 a roll-call vote was taken on a motion to recommit the bill to committee. It was defeated by the House (263-160), but the Republicans supported it (149-11). On the same day the bill was passed in the House, but it received the favorable votes of only 24 Republicans while 135 opposed it.⁴⁴

⁴²H. Rept. No. 18, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 30, 1941)

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Cong. Record, Vol. 87, p. 814-815. (77th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 8, 1941)

In the upper chamber Senator Johnson submitted a report on behalf of "a few of the Minority." This was a short report which offered nothing in the way of an alternative program but summarized Johnson's objections to the bill as follows:

"A. There is no need now for additional aid to Britain. Britain is receiving--and will continue to receive--all aid necessary that can with due regard to our safety be accorded.

"1. [The bill] is successful only in concealing its purpose. It is not a bill for aiding Britain nor a bill for the national defense of our country.

"2. If read realistically, it grants extraordinary powers to the President such as have never before been granted to a Chief Executive.

"3. It makes of the Chief Executive a dictator, and worse, a dictator with power to take us into war.

"4. It transfers the war making power from Congress to the President.

"5. It leaves to the President (a) the determination of aggressor nations and (b) what punishments shall be meted out to them.

"6. It commits the American people permanently to support the course he takes, for once embarked upon a course, it will be necessary for the people to follow through."⁴⁵

There followed, on the Senate floor, a long series of amendments to limit or restrict the application of the lend-lease program. A few of the amendments which received the widest Republican support were (1) a Taft proposal that nothing in the act should be deemed to confer any additional authority to employ military personnel beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the Territories of the United States;⁴⁶ (2) a Reynolds (Democrat of North Carolina) amendment to prohibit use of any of the aid for the Soviet Union;⁴⁷

⁴⁵S. Rept., No. 45, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., (Feb. 13, 1941), Part 2, p. 6

⁴⁶Cong. Record, Vol. 87, p. 1971. (77th Cong., 1st Sess., March 7, 1941)

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 1984

and (3) an amendment by Senator Vandenberg that would have required certification by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that articles sent abroad were not needed in United States defense.⁴⁸ On final passage of the bill, March 8, the Republicans divided ten for and seventeen against the bill.⁴⁹

Senator Ball, writing in The Republican, reported that Minority members in both houses divided roughly into three groups in their initial attitude toward the bill. A few in both houses were ready to vote for the bill as it stood. A somewhat larger group, Ball felt, were strongly opposed to the legislation along the lines proposed on the grounds that the lend-lease program would tend to bring on war because it was essentially a war-like act. It appeared to Ball, finally, that a majority of Republicans in both houses favored aid to Britain but wanted to wait before taking a position, and that many of these would vote for the bill if it were amended.⁵⁰

This may well have been an accurate report of the private views of Republican congressmen, especially before the voting began. It is impossible to tell from the "yea and nay" votes in the House whether there were three attitudes. Republican Representatives voted (149-11) in favor of recommitting the bill to the Committee with instructions to report it out as a \$2,000,000,000 credit to Great Britain. They voted (135-24) against the bill when it passed the House.⁵¹ In the Senate, where there were eighteen roll-call votes on the bill, three groups might have formed, but they did not. There were only two--a majority of twenty-three who, with few exceptions, voted for all the amendments

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 1991

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 2144

⁵⁰Joseph H. Ball, "This Month in Congress," The Republican, February, 1941, pp. 8-9

⁵¹Cong. Record, Vol. 87, p. 815. (77th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 8, 1941)

and against the bill, and a minority of five who voted against most of the amendments and for the bill.

Senator Ball reported that there was considerable resentment that the President consulted only with the Majority in drafting the bill. He also pointed out that Wendell Willkie's support of the bill was not received with much enthusiasm. The titular leader's entrance on the scene came with a statement issued in New York in which he urged prompt passage of the lend-lease measure as a step in keeping the United States out of war.⁵² Willkie had consulted with none of the Party leaders before issuing his statement. His position raised the whole question of the role of a defeated presidential candidate. Colonel McCormick read Willkie out of the party after the Chicago Tribune branded him as "Mr. Roosevelt's fictitious opponent...Quisling...fifth columnist...New Deal Democrat...barefoot boy of Elwood...barefaced fraud."⁵³ Senator Taft said he saw "no justification in precedent or principle for the view that a defeated candidate for President is the titular leader of the party."⁵⁴ Other observers thought Willkie may have had some influence on the Bridges-Austin-Gurney group, but from an analysis of the voting it would appear that the pattern set on the lend-lease issue was merely a continuation of the voting records of this group since 1939. In other words, Willkie had no influence in Congress and did not even seem to embarrass most Republican Congressmen. He was not speaking for the Congressional party.

The public opinion polls of the day, however, indicate that perhaps Willkie had more support among the "rank and file" of the party, and the results

⁵²Newsweek, February 24, 1941, p. 18

⁵³Ibid., p. 17

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 18

of the polls on this issue are very interesting. On January 21, 1941, this question was asked: "If the British are unable to pay cash for war material bought in this country, should our government lend or lease war materials to Britain to be paid back in the same materials or other goods after the war?" Sixty-two percent of the Republican voters approved, thirty-two percent disapproved.⁵⁵ In February the question was asked, "Do you think Congress should pass the Lend-Lease Bill?" The Republicans answered thirty-eight percent "Yes," forty-one percent "No" and twenty-one percent gave a qualified answer.⁵⁶ While it could be argued that the provisions of the bill were in some ways different than the conditions set forth in the first question, it seems more likely that there was an actual shift in opinion. By the time the second poll was taken, the Congressional lines had formed, and it was clear that most Republican Congressmen would vote against the bill. Many Republicans evidently felt they should follow their party leaders in Congress rather than Mr. Willkie, and thus disapprove the bill or qualify their support.

With the shift of Republican "rank and file" opinion on the lend-lease issue came a shift in Willkie's popular standing. By July 26, thirty-eight percent of the Republicans polled did not like Willkie as well as at election time.⁵⁷ Apparently any party leadership he had during the campaign was rapidly passing from his hands.

As mentioned above, the main thesis of Republican opposition to lend-lease was that it went far beyond all aid possible to Britain "short of war," that it would give President Roosevelt dictatorial powers, that it would amount to

⁵⁵Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 5, p. 321 (June, 1941)

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 323

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 666 (Fall, 1941)

an abdication by Congress and would be a long step toward intervention in the war. Many Republicans, however, who were leaders in the fight against passage of the lend-lease bill, conceded with its enactment that Congress and the people had decided on a course of action and that henceforth they would support that course. Thus the House debate on the seven billion dollar appropriation found Mr. John Taber, ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee, supporting passage. Republican floor leader Joseph W. Martin (Massachusetts) took the same position, and the Republicans in the House as a whole voted 105-45 in favor of the appropriation.⁵⁸ Only seven Republican Senators opposed passage of the money bill.⁵⁹

Another issue coming before Congress in the spring of 1941 was the Ship Seizure Bill in which the Administration sought authority to seize ships of other nations interned in our harbors. The test of strength came on a re-committal motion in the House and an amendment in the Senate which would have forbidden the transfers of the ships of one belligerent to another belligerent. The aim of these amendments offered by Mr. Culkin (Republican, of New York) in the House and Mr. Vandenberg in the Senate was another attempt to block aid to Britain since the ships in question were French and Italian, and Republicans felt that the effort would be made to transfer them to the British Navy. Proponents of the amendments claimed such a transfer would constitute a provocative act inviting war. The Administration disclaimed any intention of making such transfers but opposed the amendment. In the House all the Republicans but thirteen supported the amendment,⁶⁰ while in the Senate the Republican vote in

⁵⁸Cong. Record, Vol. 87, p. 2384 (77th Cong., 1st Sess., March 19, 1941)

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 2509 (Mar. 24, 1941)

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 3727 (May 7, 1941)

favor of the amendment was 22 to 3.⁶¹ On the final votes, fifty Republicans in the House and ten in the Senate voted for the bill.⁶²

Near the end of the summer, less than four months before Pearl Harbor, fifteen Republicans outside of Congress issued a "blast" at Administration foreign policy, calling upon Congress to stop the drift into war. It is quoted here in part.

"The American people should insistently demand that Congress put a stop to step-by-step projection of the United States into undeclared war...Exceeding its expressed purpose, the Lend-Lease Bill has been followed by naval action, by military occupation of bases outside the Western Hemisphere, by promise of unauthorized aid to Russia and by other belligerent moves...

"We have gone as far as is consistent either with law, with sentiment or with security... It [the war] is not purely a world conflict between tyranny and freedom. The Anglo-Russian alliance has dissipated that illusion...

"Few people honestly believe that the Axis is now, or will in the future, be in a position to threaten the independence of any part of this Hemisphere if our defenses are properly prepared.

"Freedom in America does not depend on the outcome of struggle for material power between other nations."⁶³

The group who prepared and signed this statement was headed by Governor Frank Lowden and included Herbert Hoover, Alf Landon, Robert M. Hutchins, John L. Lewis, and Charles G. Dawes among its signers. The declaration was read aloud to a formal caucus of the Republican members of the House, called at the instigation of a group of the most isolationist GOP Congressmen, headed by Hamilton Fish, purportedly for two reasons: (1) to condemn Wendell Willkie for his support of the Administration's foreign policy; and (2) to outline a

⁶¹Ibid. p. 4103 (May 15, 1941)

⁶²Ibid. p. 4108

⁶³New York Times, August 6, 1941, p. 6

guiding Republican policy.⁶⁴ After a session of denunciations of the President and Willkie, the caucus produced a declaration of policy on which all could agree:

"We reaffirm the pledge of our 1940 Party platform: 'The Republican party is firmly opposed to involving this nation in foreign war.' We approve the restatement of this principle subsequently written into the 1940 Democratic platform: 'We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our Army, Naval, or Air forces to fight outside of the Americas except in case of attack.' We demand fulfillment of these pledges.

"We reaffirm the declaration of our Party platform as follows: 'Our national defense must be so strong that no unfriendly power shall ever set foot on our soil. To assure this strength our national economy, the true basis of America's strength, must be free of unwarranted government interference.'

"The lend-lease policy was presented to the American people as a measure short of war. We insist that it be administered as a short-of-war measure..."⁶⁵

This was certainly the most minimal statement possible; the least common denominator of opinion. It would seem rather remarkable that a House caucus would so restrict itself on a foreign policy statement when agreement among House Republicans on so many issues was so widespread. Party regularity on roll-call votes had been quite well maintained in most instances and it would seem that it might have been possible to take a strong stand against certain specific Administration policies. Perhaps there was a real fear that Republican voting had not been with the trend of public opinion even among the party's own rank and file.

Late in 1941 the Administration asked for the repeal first of Section 6 and later of Sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939. This action would permit the arming of American merchantmen and their sailing to belligerent

⁶⁴Time, August 18, 1941, pp. 13-14

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 18

ports and into combat areas. Republican opinion as voiced in the polls taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion was initially divided almost equally for and against this further relaxation of neutrality. In a survey made in October, forty-nine percent of Republican voters said "yes," and forty-four percent "no," in response to a question stating the proposed change.⁶⁶ In November fifty-nine percent favored repeal while only thirty-four percent were opposed.⁶⁷

A further development of the neutrality debate was the introduction of an amendment to the bill by Senators Warren Austin, Styles Bridges, and Chan Gurney for complete repeal of the Neutrality Act. This was apparently an attempt by this small interventionist group in the Senate to seize the initiative not only from the rest of the party but from the Democrats as well. At least it was so hailed by Mr. Willkie, who supported it by releasing a statement, signed by leading Republicans in forty states--including six Republican Governors and twenty-six members of the National Committee in favor of this amendment:

"The requirement of America today is for a forthright, direct international policy designed to encompass the destruction of totalitarianism by whatever means necessary. This policy should be presented to us by our elected leader forcibly and not in doses as if we were children...

"Millions upon millions of Republicans are resolved that the ugly smudge of obstructive isolationism shall be removed from the face of their party...

"Congress is now considering certain modifications to an act called the Neutrality Act. This act was not of Republican origin. Whatever purpose it may have served originally, it serves no useful purpose now...it in effect constitutes an aid to Hitler...proclaims our neutrality in a struggle in which neither the people nor Congress have shown themselves neutral...and...is preventing the fulfillment

⁶⁶Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 6, p. 162 (Spring, 1941)

⁶⁷Ibid.

of a policy of aid to Britain and her allies which the American people overwhelmingly endorse."⁶⁸

This message was sent to all Republican members of Congress, but its effect was slight if not nil. The Republicans on the House Foreign Affairs Committee submitted a Minority report in which they opposed outright the whole idea of the repeal.

"1. The arming of our merchantmen will not furnish effective protection to the crews.

"2. The proposal is part of an administration plan to destroy our neutrality laws and to put us into war by subterfuge.

"3. Experience in this war and the last has shown that arming merchant ships is an ineffective way to protect the lives of the crews and often does more harm than good.

"4. It is difficult to see how the Navy could now be able to furnish arms and gun crews for merchantmen in view of recent statements to the contrary.

"5. Under international law, an armed merchantman is a warship, subject to attack without warning."⁶⁹

The original House bill provided for repeal of Section 6 (the arming of merchantmen) only. On a roll-call vote to recommit this bill to the Committee for further hearings the Republicans voted favorably (114-37). When the bill came back with the Senate amendments repealing Sections 2 and 3 as well, the Republicans voted against acceptance of the Senate version (137-22).

In the Senate twenty-one Republicans voted solidly for all the limiting amendments, against the Committee amendments, and against the resolution on final passage. Senators Ball, Bridges, Gurney, and Austin voted exactly the opposite on every roll call. Senator Barbour voted once with the majority,

⁶⁸Time, November 3, 1941, pp. 16-17

⁶⁹H. Rept. No. 1267, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 15, 1941), p. 10

and Brewster joined the minority on the final roll call. Senators White and Burton, who were often found with the Austin group, voted solidly with the majority.

Senator Ball's comment on the session as a whole seems apt: In so far as they can do so, Republican Representatives and Senators in the Congress have committed the GOP to the isolationist, America-first camp, and if they have their way, the party will stand or fall with that cause in 1942 and 1944....⁷⁰ That there would continue to be a division in Republican ranks over foreign policy appeared certain. In general those Republicans who had consistently opposed the Administration foreign policy were still opposed, while those who had supported an interventionist policy were prepared to support the latest developments of that policy. The interventionist senators had really embraced most of the Administration's program. Each from time to time attempted to show how he was really an opponent of the Administration and thus deserved to be considered a Republican. But they were not convincing, or at least it was impossible to ascertain a position on which they could agree that was opposed to the Administration's policy. They might well be foes of Roosevelt on other issues, but they were not on foreign policy. Clearly, also, the minority would have to be called "bolters" so far as the Congressional party was concerned. The majority position of the party in both houses was too clear to mistake. The claim of the minority to being Republicans on foreign policy had to rest on their opinion that large numbers of Republican voters, also, supported the President's course in international affairs. That this was a valid claim was indicated from the results of the polls, a survey of

⁷⁰Joseph Ball, "This Month in Congress," The Republican, December, 1941, p. 18

Republican leaders,⁷¹ and the fact that a number of members of the National Committee supported Administration measures which were being bitterly opposed by Republican leaders in Congress. In Congress, however, leadership and control rested with those dedicated to keeping America disentangled from the wars in Europe and Asia. (Figure VI) (Figure VII)

⁷¹A poll of more than 9,000 Republican Party leaders conducted by the Republican showed a majority favored following the Roosevelt Administration foreign policy.

| | |
|----|---|
| 0 | Langer |
| 1 | |
| 2 | Johnson, Nye |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Butler |
| 5 | Shipstead, Tobey |
| 6 | Willis, Capper, Taft, Wiley |
| 7 | Danaher, Thomas, Brooks, Reed, Lodge, Holman, Aiken |
| 8 | Vandenberg, Davis |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | Burton, McNary |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 | Brewster |
| 17 | White |
| 18 | Bridges |
| 19 | Gurney |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | Ball, Bartour |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | Austin |
| 28 | |
| 29 | |
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| 37 | |

Figure VI: Republican voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the Senate; 77th Cong., 1941; as compared with the record of Sen. William Langer of North Dakota.




Figure VII: Republican voting of foreign policy issues in the House of Representatives; 77th Congress; 1941; as compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois

CHAPTER III

WAR-TIME COOPERATION

The Republican leadership responded without question to the challenge of Pearl Harbor. It was not necessary for them to make political soundings. The Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin, said, "There is only one party when it comes to the integrity and honor of the country." Charles McNary, Republican floor leader in the Senate, said, "The Republicans will all go along...with whatever is done."¹ Mr. Hamilton Fish, an ardent isolationist, announced that he would take the floor to urge the American people to present a united front in support of the President, and, he continued, "if there is a call for troops, I expect to offer my services to a combat division."²

Representative Charles Eaton, later ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the White House to say, "I am an old-time Yankee, and when people start shoving us around, I'm ready to shove back. We're going to have a united nation now." Other comments were in a similar vein:

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, an isolationist Presidential aspirant in 1940: "I have fought every trend which leads America to needless war. But when war comes to us, I stand for the swiftest and most invincible answer."³ Senator Warren Austin, leading pre-war internationalist: "There should be a vacation on politics, and the vote on the war resolution should be unanimous."⁴ Senator Taft said he could see a declaration of war as the only course.

¹New York Times, Dec. 8, 1941, p. 1

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Mr. Alf Landon wrote to the President: "There is an imperative need for courageous, unified action by the American people. The Japanese attack leaves no choice. Nothing must be permitted to interrupt our victory over the foreign foe. Please command me in any way I can be of service."⁵ Wendell Willkie: "I have not the slightest doubt as to what a united America should and will do."⁶

A New York Times editorial on December 9 summed it up:

"Congress has spoken--no, thundered--its answer to the madness of Japan. With a swiftness of action never before achieved in the whole history of this country and a unanimity of mind and spirit which for all practical purposes is complete, the challenge of the treacherous fiend that now becomes the mortal foe has been accepted. Gone is every sign of partisanship in the Capitol of the United States. Gone is every trace of hesitancy and indecision. There are no party lines today in Congress."⁷

This was the situation after Pearl Harbor. It was a high point of national unity. There was to be a united and non-partisan prosecution of the war. But, that was as far as non-partisanship would go. There was to be no bipartisan war cabinet and certainly no automatic agreement on what kind of a foreign policy should grow out of or follow the end of the war. Senator Ball, who was observing from the halls of Congress, was perhaps most aware of this in February 1942:

"Although the Japanese attack united America in our war effort, it has already become clearly apparent that it did not by any means settle the basic foreign policy issue that dominated the national political scene and Congress during 1940-1941. That issue has merely been shelved for the time being, and it is this writer's conviction that sooner or later it must be decided by the people acting either in a national election or in the conventions of the great political parties...

"Perhaps so far as the people were concerned this issue was decided against isolation by Pearl Harbor. But so far as the political

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., Dec. 9, 1941, p. 30

leaders of the people in Congress are concerned, there is plenty of evidence that isolationism is not a dead issue but merely put on the shelf until a more opportune time to argue it...so far as this writer has noticed, no isolationist leader has publicly, or even privately, admitted he or she was in error, and plenty of them privately argue that the interventionist policy was responsible for Japan's attack."⁸

On December 11 Senator Tobey asked for information on Pearl Harbor losses, for a Congressional investigation of what happened, and for the removal of Mr. Knox as Secretary of the Navy. On December 16 Senator Vandenberg wrote a letter to President Roosevelt asking his opinion on creating a joint Congressional committee to advise with him on the prosecution of the war. Mr. Vandenberg said his proposal was not to interfere with the President's prerogative of conducting the war but rather to satisfy Congressional responsibility.

As can be seen from the above statements and actions, the Republicans were casting about in the early days of the war to find out what kind of a role an opposition party can play under war conditions. On December 21 Representative Martin, House Minority Leader, called off indefinitely a meeting of State Chairmen and Vice Chairmen called for January 12 in Washington. In taking this action he said:

"The new conditions have persuaded me that a postponement of that meeting is desirable. A little later conditions will be clarified so that we can better determine the course to pursue...the entrance of the United States into the World War has altered the political question.

"The Republican Party will support President Roosevelt to a man in the war effort, but it expects Senatorial, Congressional, and State elections to be held next year, and it will fight to win. We must retain the two-party system."⁹

Senator Styles Bridges of the internationalist group declared in a radio broadcast that, "The function of the Republican party at this time should be support without hesitation and with all the energies at their command for the

⁸Joseph Ball, "This Month in Congress," The Republican, Feb., 1942, pp. 17-18

⁹New York Times, Dec. 22, 1941, p. 10

prosecution of this war... We should be the constructive party of the opposition. This should be done in a way which will not impede the progress of the war. I think it essential that we have a two-party system in this country, and I am going to do my part to make it a strong minority party."¹⁰

In spite of the urgings of the National Committee Chairman, Joseph W. Martin, that Lincoln Day celebrations be turned from Republican Party rallies into great patriotic demonstrations, the speeches celebrating Lincoln's birthday gave Republican leaders of all shades of opinion an opportunity to discuss further what they thought the party could do in wartime. Mr. Landon, speaking to Republican members of the House and Senate, criticized the New Deal's handling of the war especially in matters of production.¹¹ He deplored, too, the statement of Edward J. Flynn, Democratic National Chairman, in which he said that "no misfortune except a major defeat could befall this country to the extent involved in the election of a Congress hostile to the President."¹²

Mr. Martin on this occasion agreed with Landon on vigorous support of the President in prosecution of the war. Both insisted that the major function of members of Congress in wartime, whether they were Republicans or Democrats, was to voice constructive criticism which would help the Executive conduct the war effort more efficiently and effectively: "I venture to say," Mr. Martin added, "no opposition party has ever given more complete support than we have to President Roosevelt during the war period. While we cooperate with the President to win the war, we must keep alive the two-party system of government..."¹³

¹⁰Ibid., Dec. 9, 1941, p. 39

¹¹Ibid., Feb. 12, 1942, p. 21

¹²Radio Address, Feb. 2, 1942

¹³New York Times, Feb. 12, 1942, p. 21

On the same day Mr. Willkie made a speech in which was contained a lengthy analysis of what he conceived ought to be the role of the party. Essentially his advice was that the opposition offered by the Republican party ought not to be purely negative. The party should keep free to develop affirmative programs and cooperate with the Administration where possible. A negative policy, he maintained, "permits the majority to dictate not only its own, but its opposition's course. It can establish its policies with the assurance that the minority will show up punctiliously on the other side...Now I want the Republican party to be a free agent--free to develop its own policies--free to stand on the side of sound thinking and right whoever may espouse it, or whoever may oppose it... The two-party system can be preserved only if the Republican party becomes and remains a constructive force. Let us do more proposing than opposing. Let us exercise our freedom by developing our own policies."¹⁴

In the course of the war the Republicans did, as a matter of fact, devote a great deal of attention to developing constructive policies. In early 1942, however, their attention was turned more exclusively to the elections coming up in November. In another Lincoln Day speech Mr. Clarence Budington Kelland, Executive Director of Publicity of the Republican National Committee, argued that a wartime recess in politics would mean "the destruction of the two-party system, the erection of the tyranny of the one-party system, and the disappearance of the republic. No sane American believes that elections will be suspended, delayed, or abolished for the duration of the war. There will be elections. But to state that there will be elections, and at the same time to urge political unity, is to state an absurdity. If there is political unity, an election is a farce."¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid., Feb. 13, 1942, p. 1

¹⁵Ibid., p. 15

At a meeting of the Republican National Committee in Chicago, April 20-21, a struggle ensued over the resolution to be adopted as party policy. Several of the party's leaders spoke out in advance of the meeting on what they felt the committee's course of action should be. Governor Dewey felt that the one thing to be avoided was a struggle over the wording of a resolution and urged only an effort to unite the party in support of the war and develop an "American doctrine for...maintaining the peace thereafter."¹⁶

Although not present at the meeting, Mr. Willkie, however, submitted a resolution which, in addition to supporting the war effort until an "absolute and irrevocable victory" was gained, would also pledge the party to "undertake now and in the future whatever just and reasonable international responsibilities may be demanded in a modern world reduced in size and bound together by airplane, by radio, by mass production, by all the close inter-relations of invention and industry which we Americans have done so much to create, to the end that our own liberty may be preserved, that free institutions and a free way of life may be supported and encouraged in the rest of the world, and that the blighting and destructive process of war may not again be forced on us and free and peace-loving peoples of this earth by tyrannous aggressors operating not by the rule of law, but by the rule of force..."¹⁷

Senator Taft's proposals were restricted to strong support of the war effort with emphasis on the need for a "vigorous minority" with a "vigorous and independent policy."¹⁸ Taft said he did not think anyone knew enough about

¹⁶Ibid., April 22, 1942, p. 19

¹⁷Ibid., April 20, 1942, p. 11

¹⁸Ibid., p. 1

what conditions at the end of the war would be to permit a policy statement by the Committee on post-war policy. He also expressed his belief that the National Committee could not commit the party to any policy. A platform put forward by Senator C. Wayland Brooks of Illinois and backed by Colonel McCormick, editor and publisher of the Chicago Tribune, similarly pledged all to the war effort and to the preservation of the two-party system.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the Chicago Tribune spoke up with some sharp words about Mr. Willkie's attempt to exert his leadership:

"While custom gives the party's last nominee for President the privilege of offering his advice, custom does not apply to Mr. Willkie. He is not a Republican. He deserted the principles of the party that nominated him even before the election, and any advice he may offer can be considered only in the light of the betrayal that that desertion involved."²⁰

However, the Willkie sentiment prevailed to the extent that this paragraph was included in the final resolution:

"We realize that after this war the responsibility of the nation will not be circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United States; that our nation has an obligation to assist in bringing about understanding, comity, and cooperation among the nations of the world in order that our own liberty may be preserved and the blighting and destructive processes of war may not again be forced upon the free and peace-loving peoples of the earth."²¹

Mr. Willkie hailed this declaration as an abandonment of isolationism by the Republican party, while Taft said that the committee had successfully eliminated the reference in the Willkie proposal to responsibilities which sounded to him like another League of Nations. It was known that Dewey had instructed his friends on the committee to support the Willkie resolution, and after the meeting had adjourned, Dewey said, "I am delighted, of course."²²

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., April 21, 1942, p. 13

²²James Hagerty in New York Times, April 22, 1942, p. 18

The resolution was favorably greeted by such widely opposed figures as Representative Hamilton Fish and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

In a sense, the struggle at Chicago may be considered the opening up of the great new issue destined to dominate Republican (and national) foreign policy thinking through the war and into the post-war years--the role of the United States in world politics following the end of World War II. For some time to come every party meeting, declaration, or vote in Congress dealing with foreign affairs would become a test of strength between those who would restrict and those who would expand the role of the United States on the international scene, or later, between those who would oppose and those who would follow the Democratic Administration's lead in foreign policy. This study is in the main devoted to an analysis of the relative strength of the two groups from year to year as well as to an investigation of their maneuvers and changing doctrines.

It has previously been shown that the same two groups existed prior to the appearance of this great issue. The division which appeared in Republican ranks over intervention before Pearl Harbor was the framework in which the new struggle began. It may have appeared momentarily that the war had obliterated not only the old issue but the old enmities. It is true that never again would a Republican claim the title of an isolationist in the same sense as did Senator Nye, but this same group, not so unwise as to oppose the war effort, began immediately to resist the efforts of the interventionists to take advantage of the high tide of internationalist sentiment to commit the party to a post-war course of broad participation in world affairs.

II

The issue of post-war participation raised at the April meeting of the National Committee became immediately important in the choice of Republican

candidates to run in the November elections. By July of 1942 the public opinion polls showed that seventy percent of avowed Republican voters favored the United States joining a league of nations after the war, and in December that sixty-nine percent favored taking steps now to set up such an organization with our allies.²³

Whether Mr. Willkie himself wielded a correspondingly greater influence in the party or not is questionable, but his supporters of the internationalist wing felt strong enough to attempt to influence the selection of Republican congressional candidates in certain areas. Some of these Republicans were said to feel that the test of a congressman's suitability to serve in wartime should be determined by his pre-war attitudes on certain issues such as neutrality relaxation, selective service, and lend-lease.²⁴ One may wonder where they proposed to find a very large number of Republican congressmen who had voted the "Willkie line" on these issues.

The most notable attempt to unseat an isolationist Republican was in the 26th district of New York, where Hamilton Fish was seeking renomination. Fish's record had been isolationist almost to the point of being pro-Axis. Further, he was the ranking Republican member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and would be its chairman were the Republicans to win a majority in the House. Both Mr. Dewey and Mr. Willkie openly opposed Fish's renomination, but he was both nominated and elected. As a result of the 1942 elections, the Republicans gained eight Senate seats and lost none, giving them a total of thirty-eight.

Among the new Republican Senators elected, only three found their places in the extreme groups on foreign policy. Senators Moore of Oklahoma and Wherry

²³Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 6, pp. 491 and 661, (Winter, 1942)

²⁴W. H. Lawrence, in New York Times, April 19, 1942, IV, p. 7

of Nebraska joined the group of Johnson, Shipstead, Langer, and Butler who steadfastly maintained the extreme non-interventionist position in constant opposition to the Administration's efforts to lead the United States into ever wider participation in world politics and international organization. Senator Ferguson of Michigan, on the other hand, nearly matched the voting record of his colleague, Arthur Vandenberg, in the latter's efforts to create a bipartisan foreign policy in cooperation with the Administration. The remainder of the Class of '42 was generally found voting somewhere in the middle of the road, although usually favoring the isolationist side. This group included Senators Buck of Delaware, Wilson of Iowa, Hawkes of New Jersey, Bushfield of South Dakota, Revercomb of West Virginia, and Robertson of Wyoming. House Republican strength was increased by the 1942 elections from 165 to 203, a strong come-back even for an off-year ballot.

The voting patterns in the 78th Congress show a sharp reversal of those of before the war, and for this reason are probably misleading. It is true that Pearl Harbor was probably the most important single event in the conversion of Republicans from isolationism to internationalism, but it is doubtful that there had really been a change of the magnitude reflected in Figures I and II. The roll-call votes of this Congress were few in number and the sentiment of wartime was running high. Further, seven of the Senate votes used in the compilation concerned high-level appointments in the State Department on which there is normally little opposition, and if these are excluded from the scale, the results are those shown in Figure III, which probably gives a more accurate picture of what was going on in the Congressional party.

Turning to a closer examination of foreign policy issues coming up in Congress during the war, it is evident that there were actually very few decisions made in Congress on immediate problems facing the country. Our

foreign policy was war--all the Republicans with the exception of Jeannette Rankin (Montana), an ardent pacifist, voted for our declaration of war against Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. There were other non-controversial bills passed through Congress to which the political "consensus" extended. In addition, there was the reciprocal trade extension in 1943 which will be considered later.²⁵ There were a variety of other measures touching foreign policy in the 78th Congress, including extension of Lend Lease on which the Republicans voted as follows:

| | <u>In Favor</u> | | <u>Opposed</u> | |
|--------|-----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| | <u>Senate</u> | <u>House</u> | <u>Senate</u> | <u>House</u> |
| 1943-- | 38 | 195 | 0 | 6 |
| 1944-- | 31 | 156 | 1 | 24 |

A major issue on which there was considerable debate and several roll-call votes was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, which was largely financed by the United States and which distributed aid to stricken areas in the war zones. In addition to many Republicans' general opposition to the distribution of American funds abroad, there were charges that aid was being distributed in some areas of eastern Europe so as to serve the ends of the Communist movements in certain countries.

When the bill to authorize \$1,350,000,000 for UNRRA came before the Senate in 1944, there was a concerted effort 1) to reduce the amount to be authorized, and 2) to grant the funds on the condition that none would be used for "the promotion of any educational, religious, or political program in any country in which rehabilitation is carried on." The Republicans in the Senate

²⁵See Chapter IX.




Figure I: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the House of Representatives; 78th Congress; 1943-1944; as compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois.




Figure II: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 78th Congress; 1943-1944; as compared with the record of Senator William Langer of North Dakota

Figure III: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate;
 78th Congress; 1943-1944; as compared with the record of Senator
 William Langer of North Dakota; excluding roll calls to confirm
 certain State Department appointments.

| | |
|----|---|
| 0 | Langer, Johnson (A) |
| 1 | |
| 2 | Thomas (A), Reed (A) |
| 3 | Nye, Cordon-McNary (A), Shipstead, Butler, Bridges (A), Robertson |
| 4 | Millikin, Danaher, Brooks, Taft, Aiken, Bevercomb, Wiley |
| 5 | Buck, Willis, Wilson, Weeks-Lodge, Wherry, Tobey |
| 6 | Holman, Gurney, Brewster, Ferguson, Austin |
| 7 | Capper, Burton, Davis, Vandenberg |
| 8 | White |
| 9 | Ball |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |

voted (16-8) against a proposed cut of \$1,000,000,000 in the amount authorized, but supported (23-1) placing the aforementioned condition on the grant.²⁶ In the House Republican voting on roll-call votes was more favorable than unfavorable toward continued strong support of the UNRRA program, although the votes were widely scattered between complete opposition and complete support.

III

The trends of foreign policy opinion in the Republican party during World War II, however, cannot, to a very great extent, be ascertained by the party's roll-call voting in Congress. Contention within the party was largely centered on the issue of American participation in international affairs after the end of the war. Victories and defeats for one group or the other were measured in terms of the wording of resolutions adopted, the views of men chosen to certain positions, or the nomination and election of candidates whose leanings were toward "isolationism" or "internationalism". The lines were much more fluid than before Pearl Harbor, and, as we have seen by voting in Congress, neither group could claim that its view represented Republican foreign policy. Prior to 1942 one could at least say with some certainty that the Republican congressional party stood for non-intervention.

In view of the confusion and the impossibility of predicting on which side of an issue a majority of Republicans would be found, it is particularly interesting to note the unusual efforts which were made during this period to form a long-range, systematic policy on issues which would face the country when the war ended. Every party gathering felt obliged to declare itself on this issue, resolutions were introduced into Congress, and special study groups were formed and submitted reports.

²⁶Cong. Record, Vol. 90, pp. 1826-1828. (78th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 17, 1944)

It has been noted above how the main problem in writing a National Committee Resolution in the spring of 1942 was to reach an agreement on a statement of post-war policy. The Declaration of policy adopted by House Republicans in September of the same year contained a paragraph on the same issue which was meaningful only in that it showed clearly the disagreement and division within the ranks.²⁷ This statement had been drawn up over a period of months by a group under the leadership of Representative J. William Ditter (Pennsylvania), Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee. In this group were Clifford R. Hope (Kansas), Albert E. Carter (California), Everett M. Dirksen (Illinois), Richard B. Wigglesworth (Massachusetts), and John M. Robsion (Kentucky), each of whom drew up ten points which he thought ought to be included. The drafts were then pooled and submitted to the Republican Conference which adopted it by what Minority Leader Martin called an "almost unanimous" vote.

When the National Committee met in St. Louis after the election (December 8), the contest for a new Chairman to succeed Joseph W. Martin was fought out largely on foreign policy grounds. The early favorite for the position was Werner W. Schroeder, Illinois National Committeeman, who had the backing of the Chicago Tribune, but there were other contenders including Frank E. Gannett, a Rochester, New York, newspaper publisher and ex-congressman John B. Hollister of Ohio. A late entrant in the race was Fred Baker, acting committeeman from Washington, who showed surprising strength in the final showdown.

²⁷"We recognize that the United States has an obligation and responsibility to work with other nations to bring about a world understanding and cooperative spirit which will have for its objective the continued maintenance of peace. In so doing, we must not endanger our own independence, weaken our American way of life or our system of government." Quoted from New York Times, Sept. 23, 1942, p. 3

Although Willkie was not present at the meeting, the party's titular leader was determined to prevent the election of a chairman who was so clearly isolationist as Schroeder. He was careful not to endorse any specific candidate for fear that his endorsement would help to solidify his opposition, but as the time for the meeting neared, the internationalists appeared to be rallying to Baker.

Schroeder came to the meeting claiming to have 55 or 60 votes, and refusing to listen to pleas from Martin and others that he withdraw to avoid the fight that was almost certain to come from the Willkie forces under the prodding of Willkie's assistant, Lemoyne A. Jones. Hour after hour was spent in an effort to reach a compromise, but when the voting began in the afternoon of December 8, the Committee was split wide open. The first ballot gave Schroeder 40 votes; Baker 40; Harrison Spangler, Iowa Committeeman, 15; Gannet 3; Mattingly (Missouri) 1; with 4 passes. On the second poll Schroeder slipped to 38 votes, Baker increased his vote to 43, Spangler got 15, Gannet 4, and Mattingly 1.

This slight shift seemed to doom Schroeder's chances, and Carroll Reece of Tennessee, who had voted for him, moved for a half-hour recess. After earnest consultation, Schroeder and Baker announced to the reconvened committee that they were both withdrawing in favor of Harrison Spangler, and asked all their friends to support him. Accordingly the Iowan was unanimously elected, and a triumph for Willkie was proclaimed by the Chicago Tribune, although it changed its mind in a later edition and ridiculed any such idea. Others, however, continued to claim it as such, including Willkie who said, "A person should not boast of victory."²⁸

²⁸New York Times, Dec. 8, 1942, p. 1

It seemed doubtful, however, that on foreign policy views Spangler was a great deal closer to Willkie's ideas than was Schroeder. The new chairman claimed that he had had no part in the isolationist-interventionist debate of 1941, but he felt that some who opposed entry into the war were activated by patriotic motives. He believed that the United States would have certain post-war obligations, but he did not know just what they would be.

"...We haven't the same world, with the modern bomber, that we had in the days of the 30-knot battleship. You no longer can say that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are moats around America.

"My job is to build up an army of voters in the United States to defeat the New Deal, and I don't think there are any votes in China, or Mongolia, or Russia that I can get for the Republicans."²⁹

The Committee itself dodged a foreign policy debate by reaffirming the resolution of the April meeting. Curiously, this reaffirmation was moved by Senator Taft who had once called the April declaration "a great mistake."³⁰

In June of 1943 the new chairman announced the appointment of a Post-War Advisory Council of forty-nine members to develop "a realistic peacetime program for American progress."³¹ In making the announcement, Spangler issued the following statement:

"Although the winning of the war is our first concern, the Republican Party is intensely interested in the tremendous problems, both foreign and domestic, which will face us when victory comes. They will arise as an aftermath of the war, accentuated by our ten-year debacle under the reactionary New Deal. They will call for the wisest statesmanship and the best and most patriotic efforts of all our citizens.

²⁹Ibid., p. 26

³⁰Accounts of the St. Louis meeting are found in T. R. B., "The GOP Starts to Plan," New Republic, Dec. 21, 1942, pp. 821-823; and in the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1942, p. 23; Dec. 4, 1942, p. 21; Dec. 5, 1942, p. 32; Dec. 6, 1942, p. 46; Dec. 7, 1942, p. 1; Dec. 8, 1942, p. 1; Dec. 13, 1942, Section IV, p. 10.

³¹Ibid., June 1, 1943, p. 1

"The problems of lasting world peace must be met courageously and realistically. We must approach this in a spirit of friendly cooperation with the other nations of the world, keeping in mind the welfare of our country."³²

Spangler said the council was organized with the cooperation of the congressional party's leaders, Senator McNary and Representative Martin. He stressed that the group was chosen from the "elected" representatives of the Republican party, but added that all Republicans would be consulted, including Willkie, Landon, and Hoover. In addition to six members of the National Committee and the chairmen of the Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Committees (Senator John G. Townsend of Delaware and Representative J. William Ditter of Pennsylvania), there were twenty-four Republican governors, five Senators, and twelve Congressional representatives.³³ Some sort of a middle course had been followed in the selection of the "forty nine", but it was generally felt that the pre-war isolationists were predominant. From the Senate the balance was apparently quite even. Senators McNary and Austin clearly represented divergent positions while Hawkes and Vandenberg (now veering sharply toward internationalism) could be said to balance each other. Senator Taft was from the middle of the road. From the House of Representatives, however, none of the few pre-war interventionists was chosen, although

³²Ibid.

³³Members of the National Committee were C. B. Kelland (Arizona), H. Leonard (Colorado), Mrs. B. Baur (Illinois), Mrs. P. C. Hay (Michigan), D. Whetstone (Montana), H. A. Smith (later an internationalist Senator from New Jersey). The Governors were Warren (Cal.), Vivan (Col.), Baldwin (Conn.), Bacon (Del.), Bottolfsen (Idaho), Green (Ill.), Hickenlooper (Iowa), Schoeppel (Kans.), Sewall (Me.), Saltonstall (Mass.), Kelly (Mich.), Thyne (Minn.), Donnell (Mo.), Ford (Mont.), Griswold (Neb.), Blood (N.H.), Dewey (N.Y.), Bricker (Ohio), Snell (Ore.), Martin (Pa.), Sharpe (S.D.), Langlie (Wash.), Goodland (Wis.)

Frances P. Bolton (Ohio) and Edith Nourse Rogers (Massachusetts) later had internationalist records. Others appointed from the House were the Minority Leader, Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Massachusetts), Albert E. Carter (Colorado), Everett M. Dirksen (Illinois), Roy C. Woodruff (Michigan), Louis E. Miller (Missouri), Charles Halleck (Indiana), Clifford R. Hope (Kansas), August H. Andresen (Minnesota), Daniel A. Reed (New York), Carroll E. Reece (Tennessee).

The Council divided itself into subcommittees for the study of various segments of post-war policy. These were supplied with research and clerical aids, and they were to continue their studies over a period of months. The Council was to make a report to the National Committee prior to the 1944 convention. It was believed that perhaps the new group could keep the smoldering intra-party controversy over post-war issues from breaking into full flames at or before the convention.³⁴ Plans were made for a meeting of the Council on Mackinac Island in September, and before that time, as well as during that famous conference, the ears of the country were deluged (and no doubt confused) by a steady stream of statements, bold and hedged, on what American post-war foreign policy should be.

That extreme positions would be held by some of the Council members at the Mackinac meeting was taken for granted, and the chief problem was, as always, one of reconciliation. The job of bringing this about seemed to fall chiefly to Senators Vandenberg and Taft.

There was a wide variety of proposals under consideration. Senators Vandenberg and White were the sponsors of a resolution in the Senate which set three aims: "(1) the prosecution of the war to conclusive victory; (2) the participation of the United States in post-war cooperation between nations

³⁴New York Times, June 1, 1943, p. 1

(sovereign) to prevent, by any necessary means, the recurrence of military aggression, and to establish permanent peace with justice in a free world; (3) the present examination of these aims, so far as consistent with the united war effort, and their ultimate achievement by due constitutional process and with faithful recognition of American interests."³⁵

Meanwhile another resolution had been introduced into the Senate by Ball (Republican, of Minnesota), Burton (Republican, of Ohio), Hill (Democrat, of Alabama), and Hatch (Democrat, of New Mexico), and from the coincidence of these men's names it became known as the B₂H₂ Resolution. These senators, supported by, perhaps, eight or ten others, wanted the Senate to go one step further than that envisioned by the Vandenberg-White resolution by endorsing an international police force:

"...an International authority...with authority to settle international disputes peacefully, and with power, including military force, to suppress military aggression and to preserve the peace of the world."³⁶

A group known as the Republican Post-War Policy Association, with approximately 300 members and headed by Deneen A. Watson, a Chicago lawyer who had been Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, favored a strong internationalist statement. Watson sent an eleven-point program of the essentials of a post-war foreign policy which in general favored the utmost degree of post-war collaboration among nations. The program included:

"Establishment of a Council of Nations, with the United Nations as a nucleus, to prevent by force the rise of new forms of aggression and to solve by peaceful methods world-wide problems. In this air-plane-shrunk world, most of our great economic and social problems are world-wide....It is obvious that the loose international relationships of the past which relied upon alliances and balance-of-power politics are no longer adequate. The plain truth of the matter is

³⁵Chicago Tribune, Sept. 5, 1943, p. 5

³⁶Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1943, p. 35

that the world is a large community of nations, approaching unity, but without any practical form of government to handle world affairs. In the creation of such a Council of Nations, we must start slowly, with limited powers, and gradually develop permanent machinery....

"Establishment of a World Court to adjudicate international disputes.

"Creation of an international police force to restrain aggression, such force to be composed of armed forces of members of the Council of Nations, and subject to call of council only when needed...."³⁷

Willkie supporters, of course, worked constantly for a similar end, and counted among their numbers such Council members as Senator Austin and Governor Baldwin of Connecticut.

On the eve of the conference Governor Dewey surprised the Council members by proposing an outright continuing military alliance between the United States and Great Britain to keep the peace after the end of the war. He said he hoped that Russia and China might be brought into a four-way arrangement. Immediately this plan had its backers among the Dewey men and threatened, if Dewey pressed the point, to spoil the efforts at compromise being made by Vandenberg and Taft. Taft lost no time in expressing his opposition to the Dewey proposal and referred to his own stand against a British-American military alliance. Dewey, however, soon indicated that he would not press for adoption of this specific suggestion into the conference declaration.

Lastly, the extreme nationalist wing of the party was represented on the Council by several midwestern members led by Governor Dwight H. Green of Illinois and supported by Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune. Green announced that he had not come to the conference with any text of a proposal, but said that any program of post-war action would have to contain safe-guards for our sovereignty, and that any plans would have to be submitted to the veterans of the war:

³⁷New York Times, Sept. 5, 1943, p. 1

"Obviously there must be correlation between the United States and other nations and their peoples, not only to prevent recurrence of war, but to assure economic and social reconstruction. I have deliberately chosen to use the word 'correlation' because its internal definition means the establishment of mutual or reciprocal relationships..."³⁸

The foreign policy committee at the conference was composed of Vandenberg, as Chairman, Austin, Governors Green of Illinois and Martin of Pennsylvania, and Representatives Bolton (Ohio) and Eaton (New Jersey).³⁹ Vandenberg was the mediator and negotiator among the several views presented, and it was chiefly his formula which was applied to the drafting of a resolution. At one point in the conference a group of the governors on the Council, apparently fearing that the "Washington cabal" was too much in the saddle and that some partisan, yet vague declaration would be adopted, issued a statement calling for a positive and non-partisan stand. This "Governors' revolt" was led by Baldwin of Connecticut and was composed largely of the New England group plus Thye of Minnesota. Baldwin proposed that the United States sponsor a council of nations to promote peace after the war, a world court to decide justiciable disputes between nations, and international military collaboration to enforce the decrees of these bodies.

Following this development, Senator Vandenberg announced that the Committee on Foreign Policy would hold open sessions at which all Council members might ask questions and present their views before a final policy statement was drafted. To Vandenberg, however, this apparently was only a temporary delay in the working out of his compromise formula. His aim, as he had stated in August of this same year, was to find:

³⁸Chicago Tribune, Sept 7, 1943, p. 1

³⁹Although Eaton was not appointed to the original Council of Forty Nine, he is listed in several accounts as having been active at Mackinac and a member of this committee.

"...a middle ground between those extremists at one end of the line who would cheerfully give America away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation which has come to be an impossibility."⁴⁰

The very great extremes represented at this conference were illustrated by the Green statement quoted above and a statement by Governor Sewall of Maine who said he did not interpret the Mackinac Charter to mean that this country would refuse under any and all circumstances to give up a degree of sovereignty in affecting an international peace-keeping organization.⁴¹ The aim of the isolationists seemed to be to get a declaration against any sacrifice of sovereignty and then to define as such a sacrifice any agreement made with other nations to submit to jointly-made decisions. On the other hand, many internationalists felt we had reached the point where sovereignty in certain areas of life must be surrendered to a supra-national authority. It seemed entirely possible that the result of these extreme positions would be a non-committal statement, but Vandenberg's compromise formula was not one of mere verbiage such as is so often applied in party platforms to satisfy all factions. Vandenberg's was not a compromise of words, but a middle position in which he himself believed, and to which he wanted to commit the party:

"I am sure [he wrote] we can frankly assert our purpose to participate in post-war cooperation to prevent by any necessary means the recurrence of military aggression and to establish permanent peace with justice in a free world so far as this is humanly obtainable. But I am equally sure that this has to be paralleled by equally forthright reassurance to our own American people that we intend to be... vigilant in the preservation of our legitimate American interests... I do not believe that these two objectives are incompatible in any sense so long as a 'rule of reason' is applied to each.... I think we must also emphasize the fact that we intend to maintain our own sovereignty in the final analysis. This does not mean that we would

⁴⁰Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 55

⁴¹New York Times, Sept. 8, 1943, p. 1

decline to restrict ourselves in mutual cooperations which are practical and useful...⁴²

The word "sovereignty" was a bone of contention in drafting the resolution. The isolationists wanted it in; the internationalists wanted it out. The final resolution stated it this way:

"responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world."⁴³

Vandenberg wanted the word "sovereign" included and later explained his position at the time:

"We yield some element of total sovereignty (in a literal sense) every time we make any cooperative treaty with other nations. It has been done countless times, and it has never occurred to anybody that we were violating a constitutional principle (and, of course, we weren't). It was only this practical fact which I have sought to emphasize in my insistence on the literal word "sovereignty" in the Mackinac Charter... I thought I was doing a good Constitutional job."⁴⁴

Following the endorsement of an international organization quoted above, the Charter continued:

"In making this recommendation we ground our judgment upon the belief that both the foreign policy and the domestic policy of every country are related to each other so closely that each member of the United Nations ought to consider both the immediate and remote consequences of every proposition with careful regard for (1) its effect upon the vital interests of the nation, and (2) its bearing upon the foreseeable international developments.

"If there should be a conflict between the two, then the United States of America should adhere to the policy which will preserve its constitutionalism as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, itself, and the Bill of Rights, as administered through our Republican form of Government. Constitutionalism should be adhered to in determining the substance of our policies and shall be followed in ways and means of making international commitments."⁴⁵

⁴²Vandenberg, p. 56

⁴³New York Times, Sept. 7, 1943, p. 8

⁴⁴Vandenberg, p. 60

⁴⁵New York Times, Sept. 7, 1943, p. 8

The idea of an international police force was impliedly if not specifically rejected:

"In addition to these things this council advises that peace and security ought to be ultimately established upon other sanctions than force. It recommends that we work toward a policy which will comprehend other means than war for the determination of international controversy; and the attainment of a peace that will prevail by virtue of its inherent reciprocal interests and its spiritual foundation, reached from time to time with the understanding of the peoples of the negotiating nations."⁴⁶

Everyone expressed pleasure at the text of the resolution as adopted.

Governor Green was pleased with the passage which stressed constitutionalism.

He regarded this as "an avowal of Americanism as Americans understand it."⁴⁷

The Chicago Tribune also rejoiced:

"The great conspiracy to stampede the Republicans into the betrayal of their country failed utterly because of the firmness of Governor Green. At Mackinac he furnished a rallying point for the general, if unorganized common sense of the members of the party's post-war advisory council....

"The declaration for 'responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations' visualized the America of the nationalist Americans. They see the strongest nation in the world, and they are conscious of the obligations to humanity that flow from that power..."⁴⁸

Governors Baldwin and Sewall of the internationalist wing likewise expressed satisfaction, although they sought assurances from Vandenberg that some of the vague references to "cooperative organization" really meant a definite form of international council, and that the pledge for "organized justice" meant in fact some form of World Court. Vandenberg gave these assurances. Deneen Watson of the Post-War Policy Association voiced his approval, and Senator Austin, who stated that he had proposed to file a minority report

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Chicago Tribune, Sept. 8, 1943, p. 1

⁴⁸Ibid., Sept. 10, 1943, p. 14

if the group had attempted to "bodge the question," stated that "what we did [was] marvelous, absolutely marvelous. We have gone further than we could possibly have gone had we continued the fight. For one thing, we got rid of that overworked word 'cooperation'."⁴⁹ Wendell Willkie said it was "a step in the right direction."⁵⁰

Thus, as with so many declarations of policy, the Mackinac Charter became many things to many people. It was, in a sense, the fence-straddling sort of statement, but to Vandenberg, what sounded like a straddle was a position. The extremes on both sides of the question had been eliminated. International cooperation, yes; world state, no. Constitutionalism, yes; isolationism, no. In addition to what the antagonists of the deal had to say about the Mackinac Charter, it has been hailed by many as the death of isolationism or a real turning point in Republican foreign policy.⁵¹ It seems probable that the corners had already been turned prior to Mackinac, but certainly Mackinac seemed to settle the question as to whether the Republicans would support United States membership in an international organization. Beyond that probably nothing was permanently decided.

IV

Early in October the House of Representatives voted (360-29) for the Fulbright Resolution which was slightly more positive, but still quite vague, on the question of international organization:

"Resolved by the House of Representatives [the statement] read that the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among nations of the world,

⁴⁹New York Times, Sept. 9, 1943, p. 3

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 29

⁵¹Ibid., p. 24

and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its Constitutional processes."⁵²

Of the twenty-nine opposing this resolution, twenty-six were Republicans. If this could be taken to mean that all but twenty-six Republicans in the House favored a league of nations, it would indeed be significant. It is more likely, however, that it must be taken to mean only that all but twenty-six favored our participation in "appropriate international machinery," which might conceivably include those who thought that none was "appropriate".

Following this, the Senate worked out a compromise resolution along lines somewhat similar to the Vandenberg-White resolution introduced previously. The compromise suggested by Senator Connally and bearing his name included two important features of the Republican resolution at Mackinac--sovereignty and constitutional process. Attack on the compromise came not only from the isolationist Republicans, but also from the B₂H₂ group who wanted a stronger statement in favor of United States participation in a supra-national authority. The Resolution was, however, finally adopted with minor changes by a vote of 85 to 5. Three of these five were Republicans--Langer, Johnson, and Shipstead.

In a way this resolution was a more satisfactory statement. Surely it was more specific and may be taken to indicate support of almost all Republican Senators for an international organization of some kind. It was the most definite commitment yet by Republican leaders of all shades of opinion:

"...the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."⁵³

A final paragraph, of which Senator Raymond Willis of Indiana was the author,

⁵²Newsweek, Oct. 4, 1943, pp. 42-44.

⁵³Text in Vandenberg, p. 64

stated that any treaty made in pursuance of this resolution must be made only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."⁵⁴ This was aimed at scotching any attempt on the part of the Administration to seal the country's fate by means of an executive agreement, and further, it was designed to defeat the efforts of some few Senators to abolish the two-thirds rule for treaty ratification. There had been serious proposals to substitute consent to ratification either by a majority of the Senate alone or of both houses. What a different climate than that of a decade later in which the Bricker amendment was proposed and nearly carried!

One other very important development on the Congressional scene should be briefly mentioned here--the formation and functioning of the so-called "Committee of Eight." This was a group of Senators from both parties who met secretly and informally in 1944 with the Secretary of State to aid in finding a basis on which the Administration could speak with certainty for the United States in talks with our allies about the shape of a post-war international organization. In March, 1944, Hull appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to suggest the formation of such a group, no doubt as part of the Administration's effort to avoid the charge made against Wilson that he failed to consult Congress.

Senator Vandenberg consulted with Senator Taft on the advisability of such a step in an election year. Taft put his ideas into a letter on March 29, suggesting that if the cooperation were merely to draw a blueprint for a new league, the question was not important. But he added that, if the proposed committee were to confer on all matters of foreign policy, Vandenberg should

⁵⁴Ibid.

express willingness to cooperate under certain conditions. These conditions Vandenberg accepted and set out in a letter to Connally:

"None of us would decline for an instant any effective cooperation... We believe there is a serious need for greater liaison...in respect to foreign policy... But...the creation of this special committee should be accompanied by a clear and explicit definition of its function and jurisdiction... If it is to deal specifically with the application of [the committee's] studies to our actual peace settlements--and no less an effort would seem to be of much practical advantage--I respectfully suggest that we should have the understanding that we shall be fully informed at all times regarding all the facts on which foreign policy depends...and that the request for this cooperation should appropriately come from the President himself.

"It would, of course, be understood that we would not attempt or presume to speak for or to bind our minority colleagues to any course of subsequent action... If clear and irreconcilable differences of opinion should develop...we would reserve the right to resign."⁵⁵

As a matter of fact, the President did not issue the invitation, but an agreement was reached, and the first meeting took place in Hull's office on April 25. The group consisted of Connally, Barkley, George, and Gillette (Democrats), LaFollette (Progressive), and Vandenberg, White, and Austin (Republicans). A rather full account of the meetings and history of this group has been given by Vandenberg himself; and, since this is almost the sole source of information with such authority, no purpose would be served in repeating here what is told there.⁵⁶ It is necessary only to outline this committee's role to complete the over-all picture.

As was emphasized by Vandenberg, there was no official Republican participation in this committee. No Senate caucus selected these three Republicans

⁵⁵Vandenberg, pp. 94-95

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 95. See also Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945, (State Dept. Pub. No. 3580, Feb. 1950) pp. 258-260 ff. Shortly after the first steps toward forming the Senate group were made, Secretary Hull also met in his office with 24 freshmen members of the House of Representatives at their request to outline to them steps being taken toward the formation of a postwar international organization.

to sit with Hull. The group was selected by Connally, apparently in consultation with Vandenberg. The Republicans chosen were obviously selected for their views, which were considered to be favorable to some type of international organization. All three were members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but all were junior members. Both Senator Johnson, who was the ranking Minority member, and Senator Capper, who was next ranking, were passed over. Vandenberg and White were next in line of seniority, but Austin, who was included on Connally's own initiative,⁵⁷ ranked last among the Republicans, below Senators Shipstead, Nye, and Davis. Certainly, then, these men were not representative Republican Senators. Vandenberg still was calling himself an "insulationist," but it has been shown that his voting record in the 78th Congress had placed him very close to the most extreme internationalist Republicans in the Senate.

Vandenberg was pleased with the lines along which the State Department had been planning. He found the Department's ideas very conservative and much in line with his own thinking. His major initial point of difference with Hull was the time for launching an international organization. Vandenberg wanted to wait until a "just peace" had been established, while Hull wanted to go ahead immediately.

A more serious difference of opinion developed in mid-May when Hull wanted to take his plan to Churchill and Stalin with an endorsement from the Committee of Eight. This Vandenberg felt he could not give for the reason mentioned above, and, also, because he felt further study was needed. Finally, he did not feel he could pretend, "even by indirection," to commit the next Republican President if there should be one. A long series of discussions followed, and no written endorsement was given.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 90-107

The committee continued to meet during the week prior to and during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which was laying the groundwork for a new international organization. The major question which remained at issue in the Committee of Eight and which was not settled at Dumbarton Oaks was concerning the power of the representatives to the new organization to commit the United States to war. Vandenberg would not consent to go this far in removing the power to declare war from the hands of Congress.⁵⁸

As a result of the measure of agreement that had been reached in the Committee of Eight, however, and also in the Hull-Dulles conferences of the campaign period,⁵⁹ the issues at Dumbarton Oaks were kept out of domestic political wrangling. Both Vandenberg and Dulles thought this was of great advantage to the Republican party, since it would rob the Administration of its argument that it would "break the continuity" of the peace negotiation if Roosevelt were to be defeated.

V

With the Mackinac Charter the Republicans felt they had seized the initiative on the political scene with regard to post-war planning in foreign policy. The party had almost, if not quite, committed itself to a new league of nations and hoped thus to quiet fears that a Republican President elected in 1944 would repeat the debacle of 1921. When Frank Walker, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, called on all to plan now for post-war peace,⁶⁰ Vandenberg could answer that the Democrats had not gone as far as the Republicans had at Mackinac.⁶¹ And Republican Chairman Spangler at the National Committee meeting

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 117

⁵⁹See below p. 101

⁶⁰New York Times, Jan. 7, 1944, p. 9

⁶¹Ibid., Jan. 8, 1944, p. 27

in Chicago in January 1944 boasted that "the Republicans might rightly claim that at the Mackinac Conference they had taken the leadership in formulating a foreign policy for the nation."

"The declaration [he said] had received the approval of Republican members of the Senate and House, won the endorsement of leading newspapers, made possible the adoption of the non-partisan Connally Resolution, and influenced the terms arranged by Secretary Hull at the Moscow conference.

"To this time the present Administration has not offered to the people any such declaration. The foreign policy of the Administration has not been declared in direct and simple terms..."⁶²

The main source of Republican pleasure over the Mackinac Charter, however, was probably that it could be used as a basis for the 1944 platform and thus avoid a bruising fight just before the campaign opened. At least this was what many hoped. The National Committee in January approved the declaration for itself. Satisfaction with the declaration, or at least with each person's own interpretation of the declaration, seemed universal. As the prospective candidates for the Presidential nomination, however, began to fire the opening salvos of their campaigns, it was clear that discussion within the party on the issue of post-war foreign policy had only begun, and the struggle for control of the party was more bitter than ever between the internationalists and the isolationists.

Willkie was committed to a general international organization of strong powers and openly attacked the Dewey proposal for an Anglo-American alliance as a sure way to divide the world in two and prepare for another war. Taft decided to support rejuvenation of the old League but declared that the first step should be to write an international law by which the nations would agree to be governed. Disputes over the law would be settled by a world court, whose

⁶²Ibid., Jan. 11, 1944, p. 13

decisions would be sure to create a climate of public opinion in which the law could be enforced. He also favored (in agreement with Winston Churchill) the establishment of regional organizations and courts. He had this to say about the surrender of sovereignty:

"We will no longer have a free hand, because we will have agreed to make war under circumstances found to exist by an international body in which we do not have a majority voice. I see no infringement of sovereignty in undertaking that obligation. However, I think the obligation should be carefully defined. The types of law violation constituting aggression should be clear and definite, and the method of finding the action of any nation to be aggression should be equally clear."⁶³

Taft felt that the formation of the new world structure should be delayed until the war's end. This was also the position taken by some of the more isolationist members of the party, such as Governor Bricker of Ohio, who stated that pending the setting up of the final international organization, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China would agree to keep the world under control.⁶⁴

John Foster Dulles, not a prospective candidate for the Presidential nomination but a close advisor of Governor Dewey, favored an international organization and was the chairman of a Commission for a Just and Durable Peace in the Federal Council of Churches. Dulles emphasized in a speech at Atlantic City in February the need to create a system which could accommodate peaceful change—following the theme of his pre-war book, War, Peace and Change:⁶⁵

"To identify peace with the perpetuation of any given status quo is wholly unrealistic. There is no force that can be amassed sufficient to prevent change in the world. To attempt to do so is to attempt the impossible."⁶⁶

⁶³Ibid., Feb. 6, 1944, Sec. 8, p. 6

⁶⁴Ibid., April 26, 1944, p. 15

⁶⁵New York, 1939

⁶⁶New York Times, Feb. 9, 1944, p. 20

The 1944 Republican convention was now approaching. Primary elections were being held, and one of these was particularly significant. In Wisconsin Wendell Willkie lost heavily in his opening contest to Governor Dewey, and, following his defeat, announced his withdrawal from the race for the nomination. There was much discussion as to just what this meant in terms of mid-western Republican sentiment on foreign policy. Neither Dewey nor Stassen, who ran a good second, were of the isolationist group, but comparatively speaking, Dewey was less of an internationalist in foreign policy than Willkie.

A platform had now to be written on which any of the candidates might stand. Everyone agreed that the Mackinac declaration would form the basis of discussion, but each of the leading contenders for the nomination wanted to "improve" it by making it accord more nearly with his own views. There was much talk of writing a foreign policy plank which would "lift that question above any one political party."⁶⁷

As has recently become customary, the preliminary Committee on Resolutions met nearly a week prior to the opening of the convention.⁶⁸ Senator Taft was chosen its chairman. Public hearings were held at which a variety of opinions were presented by private organizations. Later, Senator Warren Austin, a strong internationalist, was chosen chairman of the Sub-committee on Foreign Policy, and a proposed plank, developed by Austin and Vandenberg, was already being circulated.

A major controversy now began to develop on the question of whether the use of force to insure international peace would be written into the platform. Governor Bricker said he was definitely opposed to it. Governor Sewall of Maine

⁶⁷Ibid., June 19, 1944, p. 27

⁶⁸This group, chosen by the Nat'l. Committee, gives way to the regular committee which is formally elected by the convention itself.

said that any declaration which closed the door on the possibility of policing the peace would be meaningless. The text being circulated by Vandenberg and Austin, while more definite than the Mackinac Charter on the point of joining a new league, was ambiguous on this matter of an international police force.

"We shall achieve [our] aim through organized cooperation and not by joining a world state. We favor responsible participation by the United States in a post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world..."⁶⁹

"Such organization should develop effective cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repel military aggression."⁶⁹

The remarkable fact, of course, is that any official Republican declaration could come this near to acceptance of the idea of an internationally controlled military force. It is striking evidence of how high the tide of internationalism was running. The public opinion polls showed in this period that 72 percent of those who voted for Willkie in 1940 favored a police force in connection with the union of nations, which was favored by 82 percent of them.⁷⁰

The Vandenberg-Austin text was adopted unanimously by the Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on June 24. Before this action was taken, Senator Ball of Minnesota attempted to secure the deletion of the words "and not by joining a world state." He also wanted to substitute "free nations" for "sovereign nations." Further, Ball would have added to the statement about "peace forces" the following:

"The surest way to achieve maximum justice in the peace settlement is to have the final decisions made by a United Nations association organized for that purpose and applying agreed-upon principles. Failing that, we should strive for the widest degree of consultation among nations over peace settlements."⁷¹

⁶⁹Ibid., June 23, 1944, p. 1

⁷⁰Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 7, p. 760 (Winter, 1943)

⁷¹New York Times, June 25, 1944, p. 1

On the other side, Senator Robertson of Wyoming offered a completely new plank which read as follows:

"We pledge United States collaboration with world nations to prevent war. We pledge to protect the interests and resources of the United States. We pledge to maintain our position of supremacy on the sea, on land, and in the air, believing this to be the greatest factor for world peace. We pledge that any peace arrived at will be in accordance with the Constitution. We oppose an international police force. We oppose the international New Deal with the United States playing the role of Santa Claus."⁷²

None of these proposed modifications was made, but Senator Austin did not immediately give out the exact text of the draft. On the twenty-sixth a "Governors' bloc," comprised of some of the same governors who had made their weight felt at Mackinac, came to the forefront once more with a demand that they be allowed to inspect the plank.⁷³ At a conference the night before, a sub-committee made up of Governors Baldwin, Sewall, and Hickenlooper had been appointed to make known their wishes to Senator Taft. Their aim was reported to be a statement which would include endorsement of the use by the United Nations of "economic sanctions backed by force," and a platform closer to the Mackinac Resolution. The governors were shown the text and apparently were allowed to participate in the final drafting at the level of the Resolutions Committee. However, Chairman Taft reported that no significant changes had been made.

Also on the twenty-sixth Wendell Willkie, who had been shown the draft, announced in a lengthy statement that he considered the proposed resolution ambiguous and was thus disappointed in it. It was a strong attack and came as

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Wills, Vt., Saltonstall, Mass., Edge, N.J., Martin, Pa., Bacon, Del., Thye, Minn., Schoeppell, Kans., Griswold, Neb., Willis, Ky., Warren, Calif., Donnell, Mo., (absent Bricker and Green)

an apparent shock to Willkie backers who had supposed Willkie could accept the platform since Austin had so highly praised it.

"A Republican President [Willkie said] elected under the proposed platform in 1944 could, with equal integrity, announce that the United States would not enter any world organization in which the nations agreed jointly to use their sovereign power for the suppression of aggression.

"The net result would be no international organization. No effective international force for the suppression of aggression. No peaceful world. Another world war fought in vain. And the youth of America once more betrayed."⁷⁴

Senator Austin immediately came to the defense of the platform. He said it was not ambiguous and that Willkie was mistaken in saying that the policy of the resolution would result in no international organization: "It expressly supports such an organization. It does not support an international integrated army. Its military resources are vested in a council-with power to direct them in the right regions, to the right places, on the right occasions."⁷⁵

Others of Mr. Willkie's own sympathizers were quick to defend the plank against his attack. Senator Ball said that, on the whole, it was a strong commitment by the party to a strong and effective international organization. Senator Burton said, "I think we can stand on this platform." Senator Taft was more caustic when he said he would be very much surprised if the plank adopted by the Democratic Platform Committee suited Mr. Willkie any better than that of the Republicans.⁷⁶

So much for Willkie's ideas. Partly on the basis of Willkie's attack on the platform, the Chicago Tribune, although noting the "concessions" to the

⁷⁴New York Times, June 27, 1944, p. 1

⁷⁵Ibid., June 27, 1944, p. 13

⁷⁶Ibid.

internationalist wing of the party, endorsed the platform as "satisfactory."⁷⁷ At any rate, all factions now awaited the interpretations of the Presidential candidate, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York. Although Dewey had been regarded as an isolationist in 1940, his recent statements in favor of an outright Anglo-American alliance had tended to place him in the internationalist camp, or at least to incur for him the enmity of the Chicago Tribune and the mid-western isolationists. He was now considered the most likely heir to Willkie's supporters.

Dewey's acceptance speech tended to confirm him as a member of the internationalist wing, but he did not satisfy in every detail the demands of the most extreme internationalists in the party. He said in part:

"... We are agreed, all of us, that America will participate with other sovereign nations in a cooperative effort to prevent future wars. Let us face up boldly to the magnitude of that task. We shall not make secure the peace of the world by mere words.

"... We must have as our representatives in this task the ablest men and women America can produce, and the structure they join in building must rest upon the solid rock of a united American public opinion.

"... Recently the overwhelming majesty of that broad area of agreement has become obvious. The Republican party can take pride in helping to define it and broaden it. There are only a few, a very few, who really believe that America should try to remain aloof from the world. There are only a relatively few who believe it would be practical for America or her allies to renounce all sovereignty and join a superstate.

"I certainly would not deny those two extremes the right to their opinions; but I stand firmly with the overwhelming majority of my fellow-citizens in that wide area of agreement. That agreement was clearly expressed by the Republican Mackinac declaration and was adopted in the foreign policy plank of this convention."⁷⁸

At a press conference Dewey made one clarifying statement to supplement his acceptance speech when he said he opposed the establishment of any international police force recruited from the forces of the United Nations which

⁷⁷Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1944, p. 10

⁷⁸New York Times, June 29, 1944, p. 1

would operate under international control rather than national control. He was also, he said, against surrendering the right of the United States to make war on its own.

The nomination of Governor John W. Bricker for Vice-President again paired an isolationist with an internationalist. An interesting development of the campaign was the nomination of Bricker as the Vice-Presidential candidate on the ticket of the America-First party headed by the Reverend Gerald L. K. Smith. Governor Bricker said he would accept the support of that party, but Governor Dewey denounced it.

Dewey gave out a further statement of his foreign policy views on August 16. In it he drew attention to the forthcoming conference at Dumbarton Oaks which would open preliminary discussions of a permanent international organization. He said that the objective of a world organization was a bipartisan one and pointed out that this aim had been repeatedly urged by the Republican party. He then went on to say:

"I have been deeply disturbed by some of the recent reports concerning the forthcoming conference. These indicate that it is planned to subject the nations of the world, great and small, permanently to the coercive power of the four nations holding this conference...

"The fact that we four have developed overwhelming power as against our enemies does not give us the right to organize the world so that we four shall always be free to do what we please, while the rest of the world is made subject to our cooperation. That would be the rankest form of imperialism...

"In the kind of permanent world organization we seek, all nations, great and small, must be assured of their full rights. For such an organization, military force must be the servant, not the master."⁷⁹

The following day Secretary Hull denied the allegation made by Dewey, assured him that the United States never contemplated establishing a four-power

⁷⁹Ibid., Aug. 17, 1944, p. 1

military alliance to coerce the rest of the world, and invited Dewey to come himself or send a representative to Washington "in a non-partisan spirit" to discuss the security problem with him.⁸⁰ Dewey wired Hull his acceptance, designating John Foster Dulles as his representative. Hull and Dulles held their first meeting on August 23 and on August 25 issued a statement which said they had agreed that the subject of future peace should be kept out of politics. Dewey later told Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. that the only major issue between him and the Administration was on the use of armed force by the proposed security organization.⁸¹ Neither party had taken a position on this question, and Hull and Dulles, therefore, agreed that the issue would not be in the campaign. Dulles emphasized, however, that these agreements did not "preclude full public, non-partisan discussion of the means of attaining lasting peace."⁸²

Thus was foreign policy disposed of in the 1944 campaign and thus was the notion of non-partisanship in foreign policy introduced into the political scene. Whereas the Committee of Eight had created bipartisanship between a few Senators and the State Department with the tacit consent of Senate Republican leaders, now the party's officially chosen presidential candidate had endorsed the idea and set up machinery to make it operate. On the other hand, let it also be noted that such an unorthodox idea had never been endorsed by any official body of the party--National Committee, Convention, or caucus--and thus Dewey's authority to commit the party was certainly open to question.

At Louisville Dewey gave a full exposition of his foreign policy views. He said that we must learn to make peace, as we have learned to make war, a non-partisan matter, to be achieved through a united effort.

⁸⁰Ibid., Aug. 18, 1944, p. 1

⁸¹Vandenberg, p. 112

⁸²Ibid.

"Only through a non-partisan approach to the shaping of a peace structure can America achieve unity of purpose. Only with unity of purpose can America influence the rest of the world in the manner which its real strength has entitled and equipped it. I am deeply convinced our peace efforts can and must become a non-partisan effort.

"I'm happy to say that idea is already at work. I have made a practical beginning with Secretary Hull in a bi-partisan cooperation to establish an international organization for peace and security. Both parties are working together today in this great labor so it can go forward year after year, decade after decade, regardless of the party in power.

"...Experts of both parties and members of the Senate of both parties are now conferring and will continue to confer as the work progresses. So long as I have anything to say about it, I shall insist on two things. First, that the American people shall be fully informed of our efforts to achieve the peace of the world. Secondly, these matters shall never be subjects for partisan political advantage by any individual or party either in or out of power."⁸³

Dewey then outlined his program for America in the years to follow. First, he endorsed unconditional surrender followed by punishment of the war criminals and the disarmament and occupation of the enemy countries by the Big Four. Finally, he said, the long-range task was to establish a world organization "in which all nations may share as sovereign equals, to deal with future threats to the peace of the world from whatever source, and on a permanent basis."

"Upon certain aspects of the organization we are, I think, agreed. There will be a general assembly comprising all peace-loving nations of the world. In this general assembly all nations will have representation. It's generally agreed, too, that there will be a council small enough for almost continuous meeting and prompt action. The major nations will participate in the council and the smaller ones through selected representatives.

"This world organization should develop effective cooperative means to prevent or repel military aggression and such means should include the use of force as well as the mobilization of international opinion, of moral pressure and of economic sanctions, however and to whatever extent they may be devised. There should be a world court to deal with justiciable disputes...

⁸³New York Times, Sept. 8, 1944, p. 9

"...There'll be for each of us, not only as nations but as individuals, the daily task of getting along with our neighbors wherever they are.

"By this I do not mean getting along by the philosophy of the Washington wasters. They've been proposing that America should try to buy the goodwill of the world out of the goods and labor of the American people. They propose to buy for themselves international power out of our pocket books.

"To hear them talk, Uncle Sam must play the role of the kindly but senile old gentleman who seeks to buy the goodwill of his poor relations by giving away the dwindling remains of his youthful earnings. That is no lasting way to win friends or to influence peoples."⁸⁴

Dewey could not satisfy all the elements in his party. Many isolationists condemned him for his internationalist views, but it was an extreme internationalist who succeeded in embarrassing Dewey in the worst manner. Senator Ball said on September 29 that he had read or listened to all of the Governor's speeches and statements, and that to date he had not been convinced "that Dewey's own convictions on this issue are so strong that he would fight vigorously for a foreign policy which will offer real hope of preventing World War III against the inevitable opposition to such a policy."⁸⁵

On October 12 Ball put three questions to each nominee:

"1. Will you support the earliest possible formation of the United Nations security organization and United States' entry therein before any final peace settlements are made either in Europe or in Asia?

"2. Will you oppose any reservations to United States' entry which would weaken the power of the organization to maintain peace and stop aggression?

"3. Should the vote of the United States' representatives commit our quota of troops?"⁸⁶

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., Sept. 30, 1944, p. 1

⁸⁶Ibid., Oct. 13, 1944, p. 5

On October 22 Ball announced that while Dewey had answered only the first two of his questions satisfactorily, Roosevelt had met all three squarely, and, therefore, would receive his support.⁸⁷ What damage he did to Dewey's cause is difficult to ascertain, but Minnesota was lost once more to Roosevelt. In addition to Ball's defection, Dewey lost the support of the New York Times, and Willkie's support was luke warm, at best. But Dewey went as far toward the extreme "world-state" position as he could. In retrospect it is amazing how far he did go. Whether a different position on foreign policy would have gained him the victory is doubtful.

Again the Republican party had chosen as its standard bearer a representative of the eastern and internationalist wing. Again the candidate's views were probably more internationalist than those of the congressional party, although in the absence of specific issues this cannot be definitely determined. Once more defeat returned the party to a minority status where it could well afford to hold its differences strongly. Four more years of opposition lay ahead.

⁸⁷Ibid., Oct. 23, 1944, p. 1

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING THE PEACE

As a newly re-elected Democratic Administration began to plan for peace following World War II, it felt that the Republicans could not, or at least should not, be ignored. It was determined that it would not run the risk of a defeat such as that sustained by Wilson in 1919-1920. To be sure, Roosevelt had a Congressional majority in both Houses which Wilson did not, but he was taking no chances. The Republicans, on the other hand, were not going to sit back and watch Roosevelt make his own kind of peace. The basis of this attitude, however, was quite different for different Republicans. Those who mistrusted the President almost completely were determined to stay his hand wherever they felt he would make unwise decisions. Among other Republicans, the primary concern was that their party should not again be held responsible for sabotaging the peace settlement. These two attitudes, opposition and cooperation, were often mixed and confused within the same groups and individuals, but as before, there was a basic divergence of opinion along these lines in the Republican party at the end of the war. More than a divergence of opinion, it was a struggle for influence and control in the party.

At the convening of the 79th Congress in January, 1945, the Republicans found their strength in the Senate increased by one (from 38 to 39) but reduced in the House from 208 to 190. Two pre-war isolationist Republicans were defeated—Senator Nye of North Dakota, whose isolationism had been little tempered by events since Pearl Harbor, and Senator Davis of Pennsylvania, who in the 78th Congress voted somewhat closer to the internationalist position than previously. New arrivals on the Republican side of the Senate were H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, continuing the internationalist role of his predecessor, Warren Barbour; Wayne Morse of Oregon, who was to be considerably more

internationalist than Rufus C. Holman whom he replaced; Leverett Saltonstall, an internationalist from Massachusetts; Forrest C. Donnell of Missouri, middle-of-the-roader; Thomas C. Hart from Connecticut, who was appointed to fill the seat of Senator Francis Maloney and who was somewhat of an internationalist; Homer Capehart from Indiana, isolationist; and Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa, middle-of-the-roader. There seems to be little question, then, that the internationalist wing among Senate Republicans was somewhat strengthened as a result of the 1944 elections.

Furthermore, the two defeated isolationists--Nye and Davis--were members of the Foreign Relations Committee. In replacing them, the Committee on Committees faced this problem. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire had waited eight years for a place on this committee and was clearly entitled to one of the vacated seats. Contending for the other seat and of equal seniority were Chan Gurney, a pre-war internationalist from South Dakota, and Alexander Wiley, a "war-modified isolationist" from Wisconsin.¹ In the 78th Congress Wiley voted considerably more isolationist than did Gurney, but in the 79th, their voting records were very close. Wiley had apparently planned to get on the Foreign Relations Committee by unseating Senator LaFollette, a Progressive from his own state.² The Republican leadership refused to go along with the unseating but gave Wiley the second open place on the committee roster. Hiram Johnson of California, undaunted in his isolationism, was in 1945 still the ranking Republican member. Following his death late in that year, Senator Capper of Kansas succeeded to his position while Gurney came on the committee as its most junior Republican. Thus was internationalist Republicanism strengthened in the Foreign Relations Committee.

¹"The Foreign Relations Committee," Fortune, May, 1945, pp. 152-156

²Ibid.

Slightly more difficult to assess, but perhaps to be counted as another gain for the internationalist wing was the succession of Wallace White to the position of Senate Minority Leader, formerly held by Charles McNary. There is no doubt but that White's foreign policy record placed him among the internationalists, while McNary had never completely deserted isolationism. At the same time it is to be noted that Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, whose isolationism exceeded McNary's, became the Assistant Floor Leader, or party whip, replacing the internationalist, Warren Austin. Whether any great significance can be attached to this shift is difficult to evaluate since many issues besides foreign policy enter into the selection of men for these posts. Similarly difficult to assess for foreign policy significance was the membership of the Senate Republican Steering Committee, headed by Taft. Arthur Vandenberg was chosen Chairman of the Republican Conference, a post also formerly held by McNary.

In the case of the House, it is more difficult to find any pattern with regard to foreign policy among members defeated or elected in 1944. It was a year of general Republican loss, and among the defeated were both isolationists and internationalists. The position of ranking Minority member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed to Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, a seventy-seven-year-old former clergyman who was definitely an internationalist. Second in rank was Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts, also an internationalist. None of the members on this committee voted regularly with the extreme isolationists in the House on foreign policy, and at least two other members, Bolton of Ohio and Wadsworth of New York, voted with the extreme internationalists. In general it may be concluded that the Republican membership on the committee was slightly more internationalist than the House itself. (Figures I and II)

Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts retained the post of Minority Floor Leader, but Mr. Martin's voting record was much less close to the isolationist position than it had been before Pearl Harbor. Whether he was leading or following his Congressional party to a middle ground cannot here be ascertained, and this is likewise true of Charles Halleck of Indiana who became Chairman of the Republican Steering Committee.

II

The question before the country was how to arrange the world to keep the peace following the war. It was generally agreed that there would be an international organization, but many questions remained unsettled. There were fears on the part of most Republicans, varying only in degree as between isolationists and internationalists, that President Roosevelt was not properly looking out for American interests in his dealings with the Allies--particularly the Russians.

Senator Vandenberg, who had been gradually emerging as the foreign policy leader of Senate Republicans, if not all Republicans, delivered at the beginning of the new session of Congress a "speech heard round the world." In this speech on January 10, 1945, Vandenberg gave a lengthy and carefully prepared analysis of the problems facing America on the international scene.³ The speech had several important aspects. First, it proposed an Allied treaty guaranteeing future disarmament of the Axis Powers:

"I propose that we meet this problem conclusively and at once. There is no reason to wait. America has this same self-interest in permanently, conclusively, and effectively disarming Germany and Japan... It should be handled as this present war is handled. There should be no more need to refer any such action[use of force to keep the Axis disarmed] back to Congress than that Congress should expect

³Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, pp. 132-138




Figure I: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the House of Representatives; 79th Congress; 1945-1946; as compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois




Figure II: Voting on foreign policy issues of Republican members of the House Committee of Foreign Affairs; 79th Congress.

to pass upon battle plans today. The Commander-in-Chief should have instant power to act and he should act. I know of no reason why a hard-and-fast treaty between the major allies should not be signed today to achieve this dependable end. We need not await the determination of our other post-war relationships."⁴

This proposal was probably not the most important aspect of the speech. A second part of it was in the nature of a public confession. It was a statement of his personal viewpoint that had developed slowly but positively since Pearl Harbor:

"I hasten to make my own personal viewpoint clear. I have always been frankly one of those who have believed in our own self-reliance. I still believe that we can never again--regardless of collaborations--allow our national defense to deteriorate to anything like a point of impotence. But I do not believe that any nation hereafter can "immunize" itself by its own exclusive action. Since Pearl Harbor, World War II has put the gory science of mass murder into a new and sinister perspective. Our oceans have ceased to be moats which automatically protect our ramparts. Flesh and blood now compete unequally with winged steel. War has become an all-consuming juggernaut. If World War III ever unhappily arrives, it will open new laboratories of death too horrible to contemplate. I propose to do everything within my power to keep those laboratories closed for keeps."⁵

Thus did Vandenberg reject isolationism. He had done so previously but never in quite such unmistakable terms. He wanted America to cooperate, but this must be done in a way consistent with our traditions of constitutional government and must be done with our own self-interest, enlightened to be sure, primarily in mind:

"I want maximum American cooperation consistent with legitimate American self-interest, with constitutional process, and with collateral events which warrant it, to make the basic idea of Dumbarton Oaks succeed. I want a new dignity and a new authority for international law.

"I think American self-interest requires it. But, Mr. President, this also requires wholehearted reciprocity. In honest candor, I think we should tell other nations that this glorious thing which we contemplate is not and cannot be one-sided. I think we must say

⁴Ibid... p. 136

⁵Ibid... p. 135

again that unshared idealism is a menace which we could not undertake to underwrite in the post-war world."

"I hesitate, even now, to say these things, Mr. President, because a great American illusion seems to have been built up--wittingly or otherwise--that we in the United States dare not publicly discuss these subjects lest we contribute to international dissension... But I frankly confess that I do not know why we must be the only silent partner in this grand alliance. There seems to be no fear of disunity, no hesitation in Moscow, when Moscow wants to assert unilateral war and peace aims which collide with ours.

"There seems to be no fear of disunity, no hesitation in London, when Mr. Churchill proceeds upon his unilateral way to make decisions often repugnant to our ideas and our ideals. Perhaps our allies will plead that their actions are not unilateral; that our President, as Bevin said, has initialed this or that at one of the famous Big Three conferences; that our President, as Churchill said, has been kept constantly 'aware of everything that has happened,' in other words, that by our silence we have acquiesced. But that hypothesis would only make a bad matter worse. It would be the final indictment of our silence--the final obituary for open covenants..."

"... Yet it cannot be denied that our government has not spoken out--to our own people or to our allies--in any such specific fashion as have the others."⁶

Particular attention is given to this speech here for several reasons. First of all it received wide acclaim when it was delivered as the culmination of Vandenberg's own revolution in thinking and as an expression of the thinking of the American people. Second, it outlined Vandenberg's main concerns on the threshold of the post-war era; and third, it stated a position which came nearer to being acceptable to more Republicans, both in Congress and out, than any other put forward to that time. It was a position of highly responsible opposition at a time when many Republican leaders were still failing either to be responsible or else forgetting to oppose. In his efforts to lead the party away from isolationism and to defeat the efforts of those who would have crippled our participation in international cooperation, Vandenberg did not blind himself or fear to call attention to the weaknesses he saw in the

⁶Ibid., pp. 132-133

Administration's handling of foreign policy. This placed him in a very strong position with a Republican party seeking to define its foreign policy stand and with an Administration seeking to carry the country with it into new realms of international activity. It became increasingly certain that both his party and the Administration would look to him for leadership in expressing the broad consensus of American opinion which they, for various political reasons, either could not or would not express. Perhaps both felt they were "using" him for their own ends, but the result was to place Vandenberg in a very enviable position indeed.

On February 13 the State Department announced that Vandenberg, among others mentioned below, had been named a delegate to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco starting April 25. Thus was Vandenberg to continue his role of close cooperation with the Administration in working out the details of the post-war settlements. Vandenberg did not immediately accept. He, along with many other Republicans, was concerned with what was happening at Yalta where the President was then meeting with Stalin and Churchill.

The agreements reached at Yalta were not all made public in this country until 1947, but the decisions with regard to Poland were announced immediately. The three allied leaders agreed on reorganization of the provisional (Lublin) government which the Russians had set up in liberated Poland. The government was to be broadened to include democratic leaders of Poles abroad (such as the exiled leaders in London) in order to form a new National Unity government which would be pledged to hold free elections as soon as possible. But it was also announced that "boundaries of the new Poland were discussed, and it was agreed that the eastern frontier should follow the Curzon line except for certain specified digressions. It was agreed that Poland was to receive substantial

accessions of territory in the north and west."⁷ This seemed to make it clear that the Soviet Union would retain control of Polish territory east of the Curzon line.

The only other announcements of the Conference results were that the Atlantic Charter had been reaffirmed, that certain problems of the organization of the United Nations had been solved, and that some of the agreements reached were not to be revealed at this time. The Republican reaction was necessarily, for the moment, restricted to discussion of these subjects, and the main points of criticism were (1) the sacrifice of Polish territory, (2) the idea that our Executive, sitting in secret sessions with foreign leaders, could commit the United States to arrangements of the type made for Poland, and (3) the secrecy which surrounded the meetings and their results.

On the first point the major concern was among those to whom Polish-American support was politically important. One of these, however, was Vandenberg, and his was an important voice. No official party statements were issued at this time on the Yalta Conference, and criticism was chiefly, although not completely, restricted to speeches in Congress. It should also be noted, however, that Republican criticism was not universal, and that not only Senator Warren Austin, a regular administration supporter, but former President Herbert Hoover had kind words for the Yalta meeting. Hoover said he believed that it comprised "a strong foundation on which to build the world."⁸

Another Yalta agreement was made known to Vandenberg as he entered into preparation for the San Francisco Conference. That was the plan that the U.S.S.R. and the United States would each have three votes in the new League

⁷Ibid., p. 147

⁸New York Times, February 13, 1945, p. 1

assembly. It became increasingly clear that Roosevelt had made a firm commitment in this regard and that the delegates to San Francisco had little choice except as to whether the United States would insist upon her three. Vandenberg was extremely upset about this, because he felt it was another concession to the Soviet.⁹

Several Republicans were to play a part in the San Francisco Conference. In addition to Vandenberg, Representative Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, ranking Minority member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, was appointed as a delegate. Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, was also appointed, and among the official advisers to the delegation were Charles P. Taft, brother of the Senator, and John Foster Dulles, whom Vandenberg thought the most valuable man in the entire group.

The Senate Republican Steering Committee decided that Vandenberg would not go to San Francisco as a representative of the Senate GOP. Vandenberg was reported to have agreed with this policy and felt it was proper for him to go only as an individual.¹⁰

Vandenberg continued before and during the Conference to press for the idea of getting the word "justice" into the Charter. At his insistence the American delegation agreed to propose giving the Assembly jurisdiction over "measures to establish justice; foster observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; encourage the development of rules of international law; and recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of situations likely to violate the principles of the United Nations as declared by them on January 1, 1942."¹¹

⁹Vandenberg, pp. 159-162

¹⁰New York Times, Feb. 19, 1945, p. 23

¹¹Vandenberg, p. 163

One of the few times that any domestic political considerations entered into the San Francisco discussions was on June 4 while a solution of the deadlock over the veto power was still being sought. Stassen, Dulles, and Vandenberg met and agreed that this question involved a fundamental issue in the Administration's foreign policy and that the Republicans had no right to dictate this for President Truman. They felt the whole thing ought to be put up to him for decision, and that they would reserve their right to speak for themselves as Republicans if the policy proved unsatisfactory. They also agreed, however, that they could not go along if there were to be any surrender on this point.¹²

In the meantime Congress was passing on another international agreement which some of the Republicans had a hand in making. Three Republican members of Congress had been part of the United States delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference on post-war international economic policy. Senator Charles Tobey of New Hampshire, Representative Jesse P. Wolcott of Michigan, and Representative Chauncey W. Reed of Illinois were among those who created at Bretton Woods the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Tobey and Wolcott were ranking members of the Senate and House Banking Committees, respectively, and Reed held a corresponding position on the House Coinage Committee.

The decisions of the Conference were submitted to Congress as an executive agreement. A bill (H.R. 2211) was introduced (1) to authorize United States membership in the Fund and the Bank, (2) to authorize the President to appoint our governors and representatives, and (3) to authorize the United States' subscription of funds. Hearings were held by the House Banking and Currency Committee in March, April, and early May. In spite of the fact that Republicans had helped in the drafting of the agreement, their support was by no means assured. Representative Wolcott worked out several changes in the bill to gain

¹²Ibid., p. 203

wider support in his party and cautioned against haste in House action. When the Committee voted to report, Republicans Smith of Ohio, Sumner of Illinois, and Buffett of Nebraska were opposed. These three representatives also led what opposition there was on the floor of the House. They were mainly opposed to the International Monetary Fund which was to make short term loans for rehabilitation. An amendment proposed by Jesse Sumner, Illinois Republican, would have stopped authorization of the Fund, but it was defeated on a division vote (120-18). Following that, Representative Sumner moved to recommit the bill with instructions to drop the Fund. This was defeated on a roll call (326-29), with the Republicans opposed to recommitment (122-29). The bill was passed by the House (345-18) on June 7, the Republican vote being 138 to 18 in favor of passage.¹³

The Senate Banking and Currency Committee reported the bill favorably on July 6 by a vote of 14 to 4 with the Republicans divided evenly, four in favor and four opposed. The latter group--Senators Taft, Butler, Millikin, and Thomas--filed a Minority report which gave their reasons for voting as they did. They felt that (1) it was a great expenditure with negligible benefit to the United States, (2) the United States would have only 27-35 percent of the voting power while providing a much larger share of the money, (3) it would create ill will and lead to depression, (4) neither of the proposed plans would handle the present emergency, and (5) the system would set up managed currencies throughout the world.¹⁴

Senator Taft led the opposition on the Senate floor, first by attempting to postpone the bill until after the Conference on the United Nations Social and Economic Council had been held or until after November 15, 1945. This

¹³Cong. Record, Vol. 91, p. 5731 (79th Cong., 1st Sess., June 7, 1945)

¹⁴S. Rept. No. 452, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (July 6, 1945) Part 2

proposal was rejected (52-31), with the Republicans supporting it (28 to 8).¹⁵ The Committee amendments to the bill were accepted, but all others were defeated, including (1) an amendment providing that no currency could be bought by one country of another from the Fund until all currency restrictions were removed, and (2) a proposal by Ball to suspend membership in the Fund for any country still having currency restrictions after three years. The first of these was rejected (53-23), but supported by the Republicans (21-12); the second was defeated (46-29), while the Republicans favored it (25-7). The Senate passed the bill (61-16), with Republicans voting favorably (19 to 14).¹⁶

It can be seen that the Republicans were not completely satisfied with this venture into international economic planning. The House Republicans were quite favorable after certain changes had been made in the bill, but the GOP Senators were badly divided.

It was a different story with the United Nations Charter presented to the Senate by Vandenberg and Connally, both delegates to San Francisco. On this issue the Republicans had learned a lesson. They would not bear again the stigma that had attached to their opposition to the League of Nations. The Foreign Relations Committee held hearings for just one day before reporting the Charter favorably on June 9 (21 to 1), Hiram Johnson dissenting. The debate was held on June 23 with only a few timid questions being raised about our obligations under the Charter. Eighty-nine Senators voted to consent to ratification, while only two, Langer and Shipstead, voted "nay." Hiram Johnson was unable to attend the session but was announced against the resolution.¹⁷

¹⁵Cong. Record, Vol. 91, p. 7680. (79th Cong., 1st Sess., July 18, 1945)

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 7779-7780

¹⁷Ibid., p. 8190 (July 28, 1945)

This "declaration of peace" was nearly as unanimous as the war resolutions had been four and one-half years before.

Considerably less unity was displayed when Congress came to consider the United Nations Implementation Bill. This was a measure to define certain powers of the President granted by ratification of the Charter and to provide for the appointment of United States representatives to the United Nations. In spite of pleas for unity by Vandenberg and Connally, controversy arose on the floor of the Senate where some of the isolationists objected to the broad powers to be given to the Chief Executive. Senator Donnell spoke all one day in opposition and offered an amendment to require a two-thirds Senate vote on all military agreements between the United States and the United Nations. This was rejected (57-14), with the Republicans voting (15-13) against the amendment.¹⁸

A Democratic isolationist, Burton K. Wheeler (Montana), proposed to amend the bill to require Congressional consent in each case where United States troops were to be used. Rejection of this proposal was by a vote of 65 to 9, the Republicans concurring in the rejection (21-7).¹⁹ Taft offered an amendment to instruct the United States delegation to refuse to vote in any dispute unless the decision reached by the Security Council was in accord with "international justice as well as international peace and security." This, too, was rejected by the Senate (40-18), but supported by the Republicans (17-6).²⁰

Other proposed amendments, all of which were rejected, were (1) a proposal by Millikin to eliminate diplomatic status for Security Council representatives, (Republicans: 13 "yea," 10 "nay"); (2) another Millikin amendment which would

¹⁸Ibid., p. 11303 (Dec. 3, 1945)

¹⁹Ibid., p. 11405 (Dec. 4, 1945)

²⁰Ibid., p. 11407

have required Senate approval for all appointments to the United Nations, (Republicans: 18 "yea," 4 "nay"); (3) another amendment by Taft which would "urge" the Security Council to take immediate action to limit armaments and prohibit weapons such as the atomic bomb and poison gas (Republicans: 12 "yea," 15 "nay"). In spite of their support of some of these limiting amendments, the Republicans voted (23-6) for passage of the bill which cleared the Senate (65-7) on December 4, 1945.²¹

The bill was reported to the House on December 12 with three amendments: (1) members of Congress who serve as delegates would receive no pay nor require Senate confirmation; (2) substitute representatives to the Economic and Social Council or to the Trusteeship Council might be designated without consent of the Senate; (3) confirmation would be required for representatives to certain special agencies which had been exempted by the Senate version. On the floor the Committee amendments were accepted, and full bipartisan support was given the bill. It was passed by a vote of 344 to 15 with the Republicans concurring (150-14).²²

Here again we have the pattern repeated which was observed in the voting on the Bretton Woods agreement. House Republicans lined up consistently with the Administration, while in the Senate the GOP was divided. A majority of Senate Republicans supported the Administration on the final vote, but on several of the limiting amendments a majority of them opposed the bipartisan position. The striking feature about this voting pattern is that it represents an almost exact reversal of the situation immediately preceding Pearl Harbor when House Republicans were almost unanimously opposed to the Administration,

²¹Ibid., p. 11409

²²Ibid., p. 12288 (Dec. 18, 1945)

and only a minority of the Senate GOP voted to support the Administration.

The same pattern was repeated on the bill to extend the Lend-Lease Act for another year from July 1. Unanimity in the House Foreign Affairs Committee was achieved when the Administration accepted a Minority condition that nothing in the act could be "construed to authorize the President to enter or carry out any contract or agreement with a foreign government for post-war relief, post-war rehabilitation, or post-war construction."²³

On the floor of the House an amendment by Representative Robert F. Rich, Pennsylvania Republican, which would have required Congressional approval of all lend-lease settlements was rejected on the plea by Representative James W. Wadsworth, New York Republican, that it would be impossible as a practical matter for Congress to undertake this. Aside from this, there was virtually no direct opposition in the debate and the bill was passed (354-28), with the Republicans supporting it (140-27).²⁴

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee retained the House compromise and reported the bill with the following modification: "Except that a contract or agreement...in which the United States undertakes to furnish to a foreign government defense articles...and which provides for the disposition on terms of sale prescribed by the President...after the President determines they are no longer necessary for use by such government in promoting the defense of the United States, shall not be deemed to be for post-war relief, reconstruction, or rehabilitation."²⁵ Taft proposed an amendment to delete this modification on the grounds that it would nullify the original compromise. This amendment was

²³Ibid., p. 2124 (March 13, 1945)

²⁴Ibid., p. 2152

²⁵S. Rept. No. 178, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 5, 1945) p. 2

defeated (39-39), but the Republicans supported Taft (34-2).²⁶ The Republicans also supported (19-13) an amendment offered by William Langer to prevent sending any farm equipment abroad, but this was defeated (47-28).²⁷

In addition to these measures, the Republicans strongly supported our adherence to the Food and Agriculture Organization, the extension of UNRRA, and the authorizations for this activity.

III

In December, 1945, after a series of meetings, the Republicans in both houses agreed on a policy statement to be presented to the National Committee as a tentative program on which to conduct the 1946 Congressional campaign. Members of the two houses caucused separately to pass judgment on the program and then appointed a "conference committee" of three Senators and four Representatives to work out "minor changes" in the phraseology of the two drafts.²⁸ On this "conference committee" were Taft, Vandenberg, and Millikin from the Senate, with Martin, Halleck, Brown, and Wigglesworth. Following a meeting of this group, Halleck gave out the conference statement:

"Republican members of Congress, supplementing the 1944 Republican platform, present this statement of our aims and purposes...

"In foreign affairs we shall continue to strive to avoid partisanship. But we shall also seek to avoid secrecy, inefficiency, and drift.

"To this purpose we dedicate the following statement:

"We support the United Nations Organization for international peace. We look with particular hope to the General Assembly as the 'town meeting of the world,' wherein the organized conscience of mankind shall find effective expression in behalf of peace with justice.

²⁶Cong. Record, Vol. 91, p. 3247. (79th Cong., 1st Sess., April 10, 1945)

²⁷Ibid., p. 3255

²⁸New York Times, Dec. 6, 1945, p. 18

"We support the indispensable inter-American system as a regional part of the international organization.

"We will engage in essential international relief as a humanitarian obligation and to prevent chaos through misery. We demand sound management and protection against exploitation in this connection. We will assist other nations to rehabilitate themselves under arrangements consistent with intelligent American self-interest and over-all limitations that shall not jeopardize our own economic recovery and stability.

"We believe in fulfilling to the greatest possible degree our war pledges to small nations that they shall have the right to choose the form of government under which they shall live and that sovereign rights and self-government shall be restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We deplore any desertion of these principles.

"We will seek to find common policies with the other great powers, but we reject great-power domination of the world and the thesis that world peace requires us to endorse alien doctrines or abandon efforts to seek justice for the weaker peoples of the world.

"We advocate ultimate international agreements to stabilize military establishments. We demand open diplomacy, at home and abroad, and free communication throughout the world.

"We consider that the maintenance of a strong, solvent, free America is the basis of our greatest contribution to world order."²⁹

Three days later the National Committee, meeting in Chicago, unanimously adopted this declaration. As a compromise with those from the middle and far west who were less ready to support such an internationalist program, the Committee authorized its Chairman, Herbert Brownell, to appoint a sub-committee to receive suggestions from party members throughout the country to supplement this statement.³⁰

The significance of this highly important policy statement lies not only in its words. It is the only time in the period under study with the exception of 1950, that the Republicans in both Houses adopted a joint statement, and that the Congressional party and National Committee endorsed a single declaration.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., Dec. 9, 1945, p. 1

While unanimity was achieved in the National Committee, it is doubtful that this was the case in the Congressional caucuses, although the opposition could not have been very strong.

The resolution itself not only came nearer to expressing a unified Republican policy than is usually achieved; it was more meaningful in terms of current issues than most such statements. This resolution gave the first official party endorsement of bipartisanship. It was not an endorsement of any of the particular mechanisms by which bipartisanship was being achieved, nor of the Republicans who were achieving it, but it did pledge the party to "avoid partisanship." Neither the Congressional party nor the National Committee can take the place of the Convention as a formal policy-making body, but when the only place the party can act on national policy is in Congress, certainly the Congressional group must be given a strong voice in determining party stands. In January, 1945, National Committee Chairman Herbert Brownell had said, in announcing that the National Committee would not at that time make a policy statement, that Congressional Republicans would shape Republican policy.³¹ Now the National Committee was confirming that position by adopting, verbatim, the Congressional declaration.

What were the major points of this important pronouncement?

1. The United Nations organization was unqualifiedly endorsed.
2. Special importance was attached to the General Assembly, and great-power domination of the world was rejected.
3. International relief and rehabilitation were endorsed with certain caution as to their administration.
4. A veiled criticism of Russian policies, and American accession to those

³¹Ibid., Jan. 22, 1945, p. 1

policies, toward the small nations of Eastern Europe. A reference to the Polish settlement at Yalta was no doubt intended.

5. International arms control was advocated.

6. A further criticism of the Yalta Conference was made in the "demand" for open diplomacy at home and abroad.

This comparatively uncritical statement stands in rather sharp contrast to the one adopted by the Committee four months later. The Committee met on April 2, 1946, in Washington for the purpose of electing a new chairman to lead the party into the 1946 Congressional elections. Herbert Brownell, Governor Dewey's selection for Chairman in 1944, was replaced by Representative Carroll B. Reece of Tennessee. Brownell had inevitably been associated with Dewey's internationalist views, while Reece was a pre-war isolationist whose selection as National Chairman was considered a victory for Taft and Bricker. Harold Stassen indicated his displeasure at the selection but accepted it after saying that the issue of isolationism versus internationalism was not likely to recur while Reece was Chairman.

The resolution endorsed by the Committee the same day was a definite change from the sweet tones of the December statement. It deplored the "incoherence and inefficiency of Administration handling of foreign affairs." It noted a "growing tendency by the Administration to pay lip service only to the United Nations and the inter-American organization" while pursuing its own purposes "without consulting with other states."

It further demanded:

"That the State Department be so reorganized that it may possess cohesion and unity of purpose that only those persons who believe in the American way of life and are loyal to the American government shall be employed in the Department.

"That the President and the State Department demonstrate their trust in the UNO and in our own hemisphere organization and consult

with other states before acting in matters of interest to a number of states.

"That only Americans known for their devotion to our form of government be appointed to the various posts of representation in the UNO, and that they be given time and facility for study and the preparation of their positions. Let the United States act in the council of the UNO in a manner commensurate with our world position and prestige and give thereby direction, constructive purpose, and vitality to the UNO.

"That our Administration leadership demonstrate through UNO in behalf of such nations as Poland the same zeal which is now so evident with respect to oil-rich Iran."³²

Two points of this resolution are noteworthy. A much more critical note is set than four months earlier, but, interestingly enough, the major point of criticism is of too little consultation with foreign powers, too much unilateralism, and lack of the use of the United Nations. Is this to be regarded as a tongue-in-cheek type statement, or had the extreme internationalists in the party called the tune? The second significant aspect is the first official party questioning of the loyalty of State Department employees. This attack was to expand to be the overriding issue in domestic politics in the early fifties.

Almost simultaneously with the Committee meeting, Harold Stassen proposed and organized the Republican Open Forums. These meetings, held in most states and many communities, discussed public issues of the day and were "polled" on their opinions by the National Advisory group headed by Stassen. As a program of national significance the idea quickly faded, but the first "poll" indicated that three-fourths of those participating viewed the United Nations as the proper agency for discussion of all matters concerning Soviet Russia and felt the United States must strongly back United Nations' decisions.³³

³²Ibid., April 1, 1945, p. 1

³³Ibid., May 8, 1946, p. 6

IV

In the meantime the Administration was continuing to submit for Congressional approval its plans for American participation in post-war international organizations. Representative Chester E. Morrow, (Republican, of New Hampshire) who had served as a delegate to the preparatory meetings on the formation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, was chosen to present the bill for approval of that organization to the House. Committee hearings revealed almost complete unanimity as to our adherence, and the committee report was unanimous. Certain minor amendments were adopted on the floor. An amendment proposed by Representative Wadsworth of New York and adopted by the House limited our delegation to five, while another proposed by L. H. Smith of Wisconsin required Senate confirmation of the delegates. The House approved the bill on a roll call vote (264-41). The Republicans supported passage (106-37).³⁴ The Senate passed a slightly altered version of the bill which was accepted by the House by a voice vote on July 4.

Following this action the Senate took up the matter of our acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court as embodied in Article 36 of the Statute of the Court. The chief controversy arose over whether or not the Court could decide whether an issue brought before it was or was not a domestic one. Domestic issues were to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Senator Connally offered an amendment to specify that the United States would decide. It was adopted (51-12), with the Republicans supporting it (19-2).³⁵ Senator Millikin proposed an amendment which would have gone one step further to exclude cases from the Court where the United States had not agreed to the

³⁴Cong. Record, Vol. 92, pp. 5530-5531 (79th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 23, 1946)

³⁵Ibid., p. 10697 (Aug. 2, 1946)

applicable International Law. This was defeated (49-11), and the Republicans opposed Millikin (15-6).³⁶ The Senate accepted for the United States the Court's compulsory jurisdiction by a vote of 68 to 12, the Republicans concurring (19-2).³⁷ Thus what three Republican Presidents and Roosevelt had failed to bring to pass was accomplished in a few days with virtually no opposition.

The major foreign policy issue to come before Congress in 1946, however, was on the British Loan agreement. With Great Britain in dire financial condition, the Administration proposed to lend her \$3.75 billion, plus \$650 million in settlement of Lend-Lease. The bill was introduced on January 3 and sent to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee where hearings were held from March 5 to March 20. The witnesses appearing were preponderantly favorable, with some opposition, however, from certain pre-war isolationist groups. The bill was favorably reported on April 10.

The debate was long, and there were numerous Republican attempts to defeat or cripple the bill. It was obviously a measure to which bipartisanship did not extend. This is not to say that many Republicans did not support the loan, but the party in Congress was badly split with a majority in both Houses opposed to it. Because it was an issue not covered by any sort of bipartisan arrangement, the voting patterns were probably more revealing of the status of the foreign policy division in the party than was the voting on any of the measures (chiefly concerning international organization) where Republicans played a role in the planning and pre-legislative stages.

There were eleven roll call votes in the Senate. A review of the proposed amendments and the degree of Republican support will give some idea of the views

³⁶Ibid., p. 10705

³⁷Ibid., p. 10706

and tactics of the bill's opponents. Following some opening skirmishing, Senator McFarland (Democrat, of Arizona) offered an amendment proposing that in return for the loan to Britain, we get permanent possession of the British bases we had been operating. This was defeated, (45-40), but was supported by the Republicans (20-17).³⁸ Taft next came forward with a proposal which was similar to the one he had offered during the pre-war Lend-Lease debate. He proposed to give (not loan) Britain \$1,250 million. This went down (50-16), with only six Republicans supporting it.³⁹ Capehart proposed a loan of \$1.5 billion, available only to offset the unfavorable British trade balance with the United States from 1946-1950. He was defeated (55-25), and the Republicans opposed his amendment (21-16).⁴⁰

Senator Knowland next offered an amendment under which the United States would loan the money only when production exceeded consumption in the United States and Federal income exceeded expenditures. This was defeated (59-19), and Republicans opposed it (19-15).⁴¹ Aiken wanted to delay the loan until England could show the end of blocked sterling, but he was defeated on this (54-19), and opposed by his GOP colleagues (19-15).⁴² The Republicans, however, supported (21-15) an amendment offered by Senator Ellender of Mississippi and Johnston of South Carolina which would have required that 90 percent of the money loaned be spent in the United States. This was defeated (52-20).⁴³

³⁸Ibid., p. 4601 (May 8, 1946)

³⁹Ibid., p. 4744 (May 9, 1946)

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 4696

⁴¹Ibid., p. 4719

⁴²Ibid., p. 4723

⁴³Ibid., p. 4803 (May 10, 1946)

A more polarized voting pattern than that of the Senate Republicans on this issue can hardly be imagined. On the voting as a whole the greater strength appears to have been with the internationalists, but on the final vote, eighteen Republicans voted against passage and only seventeen in favor.

The House Banking and Currency Committee reported the bill favorably on June 13 by a vote of 20 to 5. In the committee hearings strong opposition had been voiced by Mr. Jesse Jones and by the elder statesman, Bernard Baruch. On the floor there were many amendments, following the same line as in the Senate, and an unusual number of speeches on both sides. On the final day of debate Everett Dirksen of Illinois offered a motion to recommit the bill with instructions to the Committee to prepare an amendment requiring security from Great Britain for the loan. This was defeated (219-154), but the Republicans voted in favor of recommitment (124-58). Following this, the bill was passed (219-155), with the Republicans opposed (122-61).⁴⁴

The general picture of Republican voting as seen in Figure I (above) and Figure III probably ought to be compared with that of the 77th Congress (1941-1942) rather than that in the 78th Congress (1943-1944). In the latter years, as indicated earlier, the war spirit combined with the lack of basic foreign policy issues probably gives a false picture of Republican Congressional attitudes. The pattern for 1945-1946, the first post-war years, shows a marked increase in the strength of the internationalist group when compared with pre-war voting. As seen above, the Republicans supported quite strongly the participation of the United States in international organization--a mark, no doubt, of the idealism which had seized the country on this issue. The negative attitude on the British loan, however, indicates that Republicans thought international organization alone ought to keep the peace, and that there was little

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 8956 (July 13, 1946)

necessity to play politics outside the United Nations, especially where it would involve the expenditure of billions of dollars. There was no clear sign in 1945-1946 that the GOP might not be content with a very minimum participation by the United States in world affairs, support for the United Nations notwithstanding.

The Republican victory at the polls in 1946 gave the Republicans control of Congress for the first time in sixteen years and created that rare situation, possible only in American government,--a legislature and executive of different parties. The Senate in January 1947 had 51 Republicans and 45 Democrats; the House, 245 Republicans and 188 Democrats.

| | |
|----|-----------------------------------|
| 0 | Langer |
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Shipstead |
| 4 | Wherry, Moore |
| 5 | Bushfield |
| 6 | Brewster (A), Butler |
| 7 | Brooks, Capehart (A), Robertson |
| 8 | Revercomb |
| 9 | Willis, Young |
| 10 | |
| 11 | Cordon (A) |
| 12 | Wilson, Hawkes, Taft |
| 13 | Buck, Capper |
| 14 | Millikin, Bridges |
| 15 | |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Hickenlooper |
| 18 | Reed (A) |
| 19 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | Aiken (A) |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | White, Gurney |
| 25 | Donnell, Wiley |
| 26 | Hart, Smith |
| 27 | Ball |
| 28 | Saltonstall, Ferguson, Vandenberg |
| 29 | Tobey |
| 30 | Morse |
| 31 | |
| 32 | Austin |
| 33 | |
| 34 | |
| 35 | |
| 36 | |
| 37 | |
| 38 | |
| 39 | |

Figure III: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 79th Congress; 1945-1946; as compared with the record of Senator William Langer of North Dakota

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS

No Republican senator was defeated in the 1946 elections, and thirteen new party members were elected to give the GOP a majority of fifty-one to forty-five.¹ The Republican "Class of '46" has been the subject of several derogatory characterizations, particularly as an isolationist group, but no one label is adequate or fair for these widely-varying newcomers. On foreign policy issues in the 80th Congress Senators Jenner, Kem, Dworshak, Malone, and Williams did, to be sure, vote quite consistently with such isolationists as Butler and Wherry. This certainly gave added strength to that wing of the party which stood outside and opposed to the bipartisan camp, and to this extent 1946 was a contrast to 1944 when the elections had so strongly bolstered the internationalists. Near the middle-of-the-road position were Senators Ecton, Bricker, Cain, Watkins, and McCarthy, while Senators Ives, Martin, and John Sherman Cooper were generally sympathetic with the Administration and Republican leaders of the bipartisan foreign policy. (Figure I)

There were no changes in party leadership in the Senate as the Republicans passed from the Minority to the Majority position. Wallace White became the Majority Leader; Kenneth Wherry, the whip; Eugene Millikin retained the Chairmanship of the Republican Conference; and Taft, the Chairmanship of the Republican Policy Committee. The dominant Republican, however, in terms of foreign

¹In Indiana Jenner was nominated by the Republicans in place of Senator Willis; in Wisconsin McCarthy defeated Senator LaFollette for the GOP nomination; in Kentucky Cooper replaced Republican Senator Stanfill; the following Democrats were replaced by Republicans: Briggs by Kem in Missouri, Gossett by Dworshak in Idaho, Carville by Malone in Nevada, Tunnell by Williams in Delaware, Wheeler by Ecton in Montana, Huffman by Bricker in Ohio, Mitchell by Cain in Washington, Murdock by Watkins in Utah, Mead by Ives in New York, Guffey by Martin in Pennsylvania

policy was Arthur Vandenberg. Although Arthur Capper had been the ranking Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he chose to assume the Chairmanship of the Committee on Agriculture and leave the chair of the former committee to Vandenberg. Vandenberg also was elected President pro tempore of the Senate, and the combined prestige and influence of the two positions gave his opinions great weight and served well to enable him to guide bipartisan foreign policy legislation through the upper house. It would appear that the informal division of power between Taft and Vandenberg, the latter following the former's lead in domestic policy, and vice versa, must have rendered White's leadership more nominal than real.

The remaining members of the Committee on Foreign Relations were White (Maine), Wiley (Wisconsin), Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper (Iowa), and Lodge (Massachusetts). There was not an isolationist in the group, although Senator Wiley offered somewhat less support for the bipartisan program than the others. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who had opposed United States intervention prior to World War II, returned after serving military duty as an ardent advocate of a policy of American leadership in world affairs.

Regarding the relative strength of the isolationist versus the internationalist wing of the party in the 80th Congress, an analysis shows that thirty-two Senators voted with the extreme internationalists on at least one-half of the roll-call votes, while only seventeen voted with them on less than one-half the votes. This is to be compared with comparable figures of fourteen as against twenty-two in the 78th Congress. Allowing for all the inaccuracies of such a rough comparison, this would seem, nevertheless, to be a strong indication that the internationalists were in a more powerful position with

²Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Arthur Vandenberg, pp. 318-319

respect to their Senate colleagues than at any time since World War I. (Figure I)

In the House of Representatives, where the Republicans held a majority of 244 to 191, Joseph W. Martin of Massachusetts was elected Speaker, and Charles W. Halleck of Indiana was chosen as Majority Floor Leader. The latter was elected unanimously after Clarence J. Brown (Ohio), Thomas A. Jenkins (Ohio), and Everett M. Dirksen (Illinois) withdrew, and after Halleck had been indorsed for the position by Governor Dewey.³ Charles A. Eaton (New Jersey) became Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which had thirteen other Republicans on its roster. Analysis of the voting records of these Congressmen shows that the committee was quite heavily weighted with internationalists who tended to support the bipartisan foreign policy, although there is no evidence that any influence other than the operation of seniority achieved this result. (Figure III) Considering the House as a whole the percentage of Republican Congressmen voting with the extreme internationalists increased from 30 percent in the 79th Congress to 55 percent in the 80th. (Figure II)

The Republicans had not been elected to Congress on any particular kind of a foreign policy program. Aside from the National Committee resolution of April, 1946, there was no platform, but it was repeatedly stated by individual candidates and by the Republican leadership that the bipartisan foreign policy would be supported. It can, in fact, be argued that the Republicans would not have won if they had failed to convince the country that they would not desert that policy. Vandenberg was the commanding figure in this respect, but Taft, too, had voiced the opinion that foreign policy would not be an issue in the

³It is not clear whether Dewey's endorsement had any real effect on this selection. If so, it would be an unusual instance of successful intervention in Congressional affairs by a titular party leader.

| | |
|----|--|
| 0 | Langer |
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | Malone |
| 4 | Kem |
| 5 | Moore |
| 6 | Dworshak, Bevercomb |
| 7 | Brooks, Jenner, Hawkes |
| 8 | Wherry, Capehart |
| 9 | Butler, Williams |
| 10 | Donnell, Robertson |
| 11 | Bushfield, Wilson |
| 12 | Buck |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Ecton, Bricker, Watkins |
| 15 | Taft, McCarthy |
| 16 | Reed, Ball, Wiley, Young |
| 17 | Cain, Capper |
| 18 | Baldwin, Hickenlooper, Bridges, Gurney |
| 19 | Millikin, Brewster, Gordon, Aiken |
| 20 | Vandenberg, Martin |
| 21 | Knowland, Flanders, Tobey |
| 22 | Capper, Ferguson, Thye, Ives |
| 23 | Lodge, Saltonstall, Smith, Morse |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | |
| 28 | |

Figure I: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 80th Congress; 1947-1948; as compared with the record of Senator William Langer of North Dakota




Figure II: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the House of Representatives; 80th Congress; 1947-1948; as compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois




Figure III: Voting on foreign policy issues of Republican members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; 80th Congress

campaign, and in a post-election statement had given support to Bipartisanship.⁴

There was criticism, of course, in various quarters and on various issues. The Yalta decisions and the management of the State Department were subjects of attack together with a general grumbling about appeasement of Russia. There was some criticism of our United Nations policy, but practically no criticism of the United Nations itself nor suggestion of the possible dangers of full American participation. As has been shown above, the Republicans in general cooperated in, and approved of, the post-war settlements; that is, the peace treaties and the setting up of international organizations. This phase of our foreign policy, however, was coming to a close as the 80th Congress convened, and although grave new problems were arising, the Republicans had no immediate goals in mind for America's role in foreign affairs.

Early in the first session, Vandenberg reaffirmed his ideas on American foreign policy in a speech in Cleveland. Asserting that Bipartisanship had been established in the United Nations work and in planning European peace, Vandenberg said:

"This record cannot be misread at home or abroad. We have embraced the United Nations as the heart and core of united, unpartisan American policy. We will be faithful to the letter and the spirit of these obligations. In my view, this will be true no matter what administration sits in Washington, and it will remain true to whatever extent the United Nations themselves are faithful to our common pledge."⁵

But at the same time Vandenberg indicated that a permanent Bipartisan policy covering all the world had by no means been established. He criticized the delay in calling a conference of the Pan-American states for negotiation

⁴New York Times, June 1, 1946, p. 3

⁵Vandenberg, pp. 333-336

of a hemispheric defense treaty under the Act of Chapultepec. He also urged that the United States "shift its emphasis" from a policy of seeking unity in China between the communists and non-communists to one of affirmatively aiding Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in seeking a coalition of all non-communist parties under the new constitution of China.⁶

Vandenberg's views were of the greatest importance in learning what Republican foreign policy behavior would be. Taft had said that while he did not believe that Vandenberg claimed to represent the GOP at the Big Four Foreign Ministers' Conferences, he did feel that Vandenberg represented a majority of Republican opinion.⁷

Vandenberg's enormous prestige as well as his strategic organizational position in Congress cast him in a role of very great influence. His voice was often the deciding one in determining Congressional action, and he was continuously consulted by the Administration at various, if not all, stages of policy formation. Indeed, it often appeared as if the Administration were utterly dependent on him to make its policy decisions effective. Only at his own insistence was he relieved from his additional role of an American representative to various international conferences, and even then he was sent to the inter-American meeting at Rio de Janeiro, which he had so long urged. Vandenberg did not feel that he should be a "Co-Secretary of State," and he often stated the difficulties of Congressional representation at the international conference table:

"...I am increasingly impressed with the difficulties confronted by 'Congressional' representatives because of their dual capacity. Of course, it will always be true that a man cannot serve two masters.

⁶Ibid.

⁷New York Times, June 1, 1946, p. 3

Yet that is precisely what I undertake to do--for example--when I, as a Senator, sit in the General Assembly as a delegate, I am helping to make decisions for the United Nations which must pass in review before the American Congress. Having participated in the United Nations in helping to make the decisions, I am not a 'free agent' when I return to the Senate to function in my 'congressional' capacity. Indeed, it could be a most embarrassing and difficult situation in the event that I did not approve of some decision made by the United Nations. I should dislike to oppose in Congress anything to which I had given my consent (if only by reluctant acquiescence) in the United Nations."⁸

The extent to which the Administration consulted Vandenberg was very great, but even on issues such as Greek-Turkish aid, where he did not feel the consultation was all that it might have been, Vandenberg saw eye-to-eye with the State Department on a major part of the legislation confronting the 80th Congress.

If Vandenberg's efforts were a factor contributing to executive-legislative cooperation in foreign policy, there was a counteracting factor in the powerful Republican desire for reduced spending and reduced taxes. Always in the picture when the billion-dollar aid bills were up for consideration was this GOP campaign pledge which seemed to fade further and further from fulfillment with every new foreign policy program. The Administration and Vandenberg had to face a Congress committed to the idea that too many American dollars had already gone abroad in Lend-Lease, UNNRA, the British Loan, and a half dozen lesser programs. When the record of the 80th Congress in this regard is read, it is not difficult to understand why Vandenberg thought Truman might have chosen a happier term than "do-nothing" to apply to that Congress.

II

The new Senate lost no time in unanimously confirming General George Marshall as the new Secretary of State to succeed James F. Byrnes. Vandenberg had grown used to working with Byrnes, but pledged continuing cooperation with

⁸Vandenberg, pp. 330-331

Marshall. Two weeks later, however, in a somewhat less cooperative spirit, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to make a detailed study of the State Department's organization, personnel, and policies. The word "investigation" was deliberately avoided, and the announcement was accompanied by a statement pledging cooperation "to the fullest extent" in a bipartisan foreign policy.⁹ A few days later Marshall offered his cooperation in the study of the State Department.

On February 27, 1947, Vandenberg and certain other Congressional leaders were called to the White House, where Mr. Truman and Secretary Marshall laid before them a top-secret picture of impending disaster in Greece and, in only slightly lesser degree, Turkey. Britain, herself in extreme economic distress, now was forced to pull out of Greece and to end economic and military aid. Greece was threatened by civil war with the Communists, who were supported from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Economic collapse was at hand and the Greek army's morale was deeply shaken. Vandenberg realized immediately that this problem was "probably symbolic of the world-wide ideological clash between Eastern Communism and Western Democracy; and it.. [might] easily be the thing which requires us to make some very fateful and far-reaching decisions."¹⁰ Vandenberg disliked this "crisis diplomacy"--typified by a summons to the White House, alarming diplomatic reports, and an urgent plea by the President for action. He believed that a continuing policy developed through continuing consultation with Congress would largely obviate the necessity for this crisis method. "But it must be remembered," he admitted, "that the whole thing was precipitated on our government so suddenly that there really was very little

⁹New York Times, Jan. 28, 1947, p. 15

¹⁰Vandenberg, p. 340

opportunity for preliminary consultations and studies."¹¹ It was nonetheless true that the Republican majority was placed in the position of following Truman's leadership.

The President took his case to Congress on March 12 in an address to a special joint session. He called for American assistance to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation. He requested \$400,000,000 as an initial grant in economic and armed aid. Vandenberg and Eaton promised their support with certain conditions. Senators Bushfield (South Dakota) and Butler (Nebraska) announced their opposition. Senator Taft was for the "fullest debate" and on April 11 announced his position as follows:

"I intend to vote for the Greek and Turkish loans for the reason that the President's announcements have committed the United States to this policy in the eyes of the world, and to repudiate it now would destroy his prestige in the negotiations with the Russian government, on the success of which ultimate peace depends.

"I do not regard this as a commitment to any similar policy in any other section of the world, or to the continuation of the same policy in Greece and Turkey when peace negotiations are completed.

"In so far as the loans are for reconstruction and rehabilitation we are only doing in Greece what we are doing elsewhere. In so far as they help preserve order, I think they must be justified as a means of maintaining the status quo during the period while the sound basis for peace in Europe is being worked out.

"I am in thorough accord with the Vandenberg amendment proposing that we withdraw whenever a government representing the majority of the people requests us to do so, and whenever the United Nations find that action taken or assistance furnished by them makes the continuance of our assistance undesirable. I believe we should, in any event, withdraw as soon as normal economic conditions are restored."¹²

With Vandenberg taking the Administration's point of view, Taft's position may perhaps be taken as more representative of the GOP in Congress--or at least

¹¹Ibid., p. 339

¹²New York Times, April 11, 1947, p. 1

nearer to the middle of the road. The Vandenberg modification to which Taft last referred was based in part on the Michigan Senator's feeling that the Administration had made a mistake in making no mention of the United Nations in the draft bill. He corrected this omission by successfully urging the State Department to formally notify the United Nations Security Council that:

"The program of economic assistance contemplated by the United States is of an emergency and temporary character. The United States believes that the United Nations and its related agencies should assume the principal responsibility, within their capabilities, for the reconstruction of Greece...the United States is giving momentum to the United Nations by its present policy..."¹³

In addition Vandenberg tied the United Nations into the program through several references in the preamble to the fact that the United Nations had, through its various agencies, recognized the seriousness of the situation in Greece.

Using a somewhat unusual legislative technique, Vandenberg urged all members of the Senate to submit to him their questions about the program for transmittal to the State Department. The 400 questions submitted were consolidated into 111 enquiries, and both questions and official answers were published.

When the bill came to the floor of the Senate, Vandenberg made a lengthy speech in its favor, and was joined in his support by Senators Ball (Minnesota), Morse (Oregon), Ferguson (Michigan), Lodge (Massachusetts), Flanders (Vermont), Baldwin (Connecticut), Brewster (Maine), Smith (New Jersey), Cain (Washington), and Capehart (Indiana). The GOP opponents of the bill who felt strongly enough to speak against it were Senators Malone (Nevada), Wherry (Nebraska), Williams and Buck (Delaware), Bushfield (South Dakota), Brooks (Illinois), Kem (Missouri), Dworshak (Idaho), Hawkes (New Jersey), Revercomb (West Virginia), and Robertson (Wyoming). A motion by the last-mentioned Senator to table the bill was

¹³Vandenberg, p. 345.

defeated by a vote of 67 to 23, and the bill passed by the same vote on April 22, 1947.¹⁴

In the House the opposition was led by Lawrence Smith (Wisconsin), who submitted his minority views saying that the bill was uncertain as to scope and cost, that it by-passed the United Nations, and that it might lead to war.¹⁵ The bill was delayed a week in the evenly divided Rules Committee, and this was followed by a long debate from May 6 to May 9. Charles Eaton (Republican, of New Jersey) and Sol Bloom (Democrat, of New York) managed the support of the bill, and a motion to strike out all after the enacting clause was defeated (127-37). The bill was passed (after the amount to be authorized had been reduced) on a roll call (287-108), with the Republicans divided 127 in favor and 94 against.¹⁶

During the consideration of this measure the political atmosphere was further charged when Gael Sullivan, Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee, publicly called Carroll Reece, Republican National Committee Chairman, to join in a two-party statement endorsing the "Truman Policy" in Greece and Turkey. Sullivan repeatedly used Vandenberg's name in his letter to Reece and in a follow-up public statement. Vandenberg told the Senate that "bipartisan foreign policy was gravely endangered when it got into the rival hands of "partisan national committees" He said:

"Bi-partisan foreign policy is not the result of political coercion but of non-political conviction. I never have even pretended to speak for my party in my foreign policy activities... I have never made any semblance of a partisan demand for support, and I never shall. What

¹⁴Cong. Record, Vol. 93, pp. 3792-3793, (80th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 22, 1947)

¹⁵H. Rept., No. 314, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., (Apr. 25, 1947), pp. 21-24

¹⁶Cong. Record, Vol. 93, p. 4975, (80th Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 1947)

I decline to do myself, I cannot permit the Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee to attempt in my name."¹⁷

Almost at the same time that the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill was under consideration, Congress was dealing with another foreign aid measure in the form of the bill for the Relief for War Devastated countries. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported this bill favorably on April 15 accompanied by a minority report which criticized the amount of aid contemplated and the plan to include the European states now considered to be Russian satellites. This minority report, it should be noted, was not by members of the Minority party in the House; that is, the Democrats, but rather by three Republicans--Chiperfield of Illinois, Jonkman of Michigan, and Smith of Wisconsin.¹⁸

In the floor debate Jonkman proposed an amendment to cut the amount involved from \$350,000,000 to \$200,000,000. This was passed in the House by a vote of 225 to 165, with the Republicans voting for passage (190-36).¹⁹ A substitute bill was then brought forward which would have prohibited the use of any funds in the Russian satellites. Karl Mundt (South Dakota) moved to amend this substitute to permit the use of funds for the satellites if the governments involved would consent to having all supplies distributed by an American mission. Both the amendment and the substitute were accepted by a vote of 324 to 75, with 225 Republican "yeas" and two "nays." The bill in this form passed the House April 30 (333-66), with Republicans supporting passage by a vote of 181 to 45.²⁰

¹⁷Vandenberg, p. 351

¹⁸H. Rept., No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 9, 1947), pp. 6-10

¹⁹Cong. Record, Vol. 93, p. 4292. (80th Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 30, 1947)

²⁰Ibid., p. 4293

The Senate committee reported the resolution with the full \$350 million and with no mention of Russian dominated countries as different from any others. The Senate version did, however, provide for administration of all aid by American missions and stipulated that 94 percent of all goods supplied be purchased in the United States. On the Senate floor an amendment to cut the aid to \$200,000,000 was defeated (164-19), the Republicans opposing the cut (32-12).²¹ This vote came after a statement by Vandenberg that this would be the last relief measure. An "anti-Russian" amendment was also defeated by a voice vote, after which the Senate voted to pass its version of the bill (79-4), with the Republicans voting 42 to 2 in its favor.²²

A conference committee favored the Senate version, and when the bill was returned to the House, Mr. Jonkman moved to recommit it. This motion was defeated (205-170), although 146 Republicans favored recommital as against 72 who opposed it. On final passage the bill received 288 favorable votes of which 127 were Republican. The most notable feature in the Congressional action on this bill was the contrast between strong Senate support and initial opposition in the House to the program. A majority of the Republicans in the House were prepared to condemn the bill to committee rather than pass it in its final version, although a slim majority voted for its passage. In the Senate, however, the attempt to cut the amount authorized was opposed by a healthy majority of the Republicans (32-18), and final approval in that form was never in doubt. The powerful influence of Arthur Vandenberg in the upper house is probably the explanation for this contrast.

Another illustration of this influence was the overwhelming approval given to the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, to which there

²¹Ibid., p. 5245 (May 14, 1947)

²²Ibid., p. 5246

had been some initial opposition. There was opposition to the treaties from both parties during the floor debate, but the Senate gave its consent to ratification by a vote of 79 to 10, the Republicans concurring (42-7).²³

III

The overriding foreign affairs issue in the 80th Congress was the Marshall Plan--that is, the gigantic program of foreign economic assistance which became formalized as the European Recovery Program. The manner in which this program was launched by our government--politically divided against itself, as it was--is the major foreign policy story of this chapter.

By the early summer of 1947 it seemed obvious that the economic problems left in the wake of the war could not be solved by the kind of emergency relief the United States had been granting up to that point. In spite of UNRRA, the Greece-Turkey program, and the relief bill discussed above, Europe was not recovering. Communist pressure in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland was increasing. Britain's supply of dollars, essential to industrial recovery, was at the vanishing point. Freak weather of alternate drought and storm was paralyzing European agriculture and mining. Hunger, unemployment, economic stagnation, and resultant despair all contributed to political unrest.

The seriousness of the situation was not at first realized outside of the Administration. The Republicans in Congress took no initiative in mapping a program to meet the danger, chiefly because they did not know of the danger until the Administration presented them with a program to combat it. The State Department, however, was quick to take leading Republicans into its confidence, once it had decided something had to be done. Secretary Marshall presented the problem and hint of a solution in a commencement address at Harvard University

²³Ibid., p. 6409 (June 5, 1947)

on June 5, 1947. After describing the grave crisis which appeared to exist, Marshall said:

"It is already evident that before the United States Government can proceed much further in its effort to alleviate the situation and help the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this government. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe.

"The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, of the European nations."²⁴

It became now a matter of translating Marshall's idea into a program, which meant the coordination of the efforts of more than a dozen governments, the hammering out of a program acceptable to the United States, and the steering of whatever was proposed through a maze of international and domestic politics. The urgency of the program was very great. When the State Department sent John Foster Dulles to France to assess the danger of a communist attempt to seize power, or the possibility of an outbreak of civil war between the leftists and the Gaulists, he reported that prompt economic help--interim aid pending the inauguration of a long-term program of assistance--was essential to the French and perhaps necessary to avert armed violence.

Dulles and Marshall soon brought Vandenberg into the consultations, and he agreed to help. He had already announced on June 13 that he endorsed the over-all approach. In this statement, read to a meeting of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, Vandenberg also proposed that President Truman appoint a bipartisan council of "our ablest and most experienced citizenship" to study the abilities of the United States to support such a program as was contemplated.

²⁴Vandenberg, p. 375

"Current discussion, in and out of official life, is directed toward new foreign programs of large post-war American rehabilitation--as distinguished from direct relief--to prevent social and economic collapse in many parts of the world. It is a good thing that these discussions are under way in the open. But they should not be misunderstood at home or abroad. At home, they should not invite anxieties that we shall rush into imprudent and inadequately reasoned plans. Abroad, they should not be taken as evidences that our foreign friends can depend upon us as a substitute for depending on themselves...

"I endorse the importance of facing this problem on an over-all basis instead of dealing with anticipated crises, one by one...but equally I recognize that intelligent American self-interest immediately requires a sound, over-all inventory of our own resources to determine the latitude within which we may consider these foreign needs. This comes first because if America ever sags, the world's hopes sag with her."²⁵

The suggestion of a review of our capabilities was approved by the Under-secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. William L. Clayton, and on June 22 President Truman announced creation of three committees to do the job. A nineteen-man committee, carefully balanced among industry, labor, agriculture, and the professions, was formed under the chairmanship of W. Averell Harriman, then the Secretary of Commerce. This was the committee to review the whole problem of foreign aid and to determine "the limit within which the United States may safely and wisely plan." In addition, Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug headed a group to study the state of the nation's resources, and Edwin G. Nourse, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, headed a study group on the impact of foreign assistance upon the domestic economy.

The legislative branch was not to be outdone in thoroughly studying the problems involved before determining what course of action should be taken. With the increasing need for dollars in large quantities to support our foreign policy, the House reached a new ascendancy as a force in determining that policy. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House undertook to investigate the whole problem, and, in addition, the House made use of a special select committee to

²⁵Ibid., p. 376

go to Europe to see what was involved in this crisis. This committee, known as the Herter Committee, was formed from certain members of several of the committees whose field of interest would be involved in the kind of project envisioned by the Marshall Plan. Such a committee had been proposed by Representative Christian Herter of Massachusetts as early as April to provide a wider and larger view of our foreign policy, but was not actually appointed until July. It represented a cross section of House opinion on foreign policy. This committee made several suggestions for the improvement and implementation of the European Recovery Program but basically approved of launching a program of this nature.

The first issue at hand was a proposed stop-gap aid bill for France and Italy to keep them solvent and free until the spring of 1948, by which time a long-range recovery program could be worked out. Congressional reaction was uncertain in spite of the full cooperation of Senator Vandenberg and Congressman Eaton. Senator Taft, without whose cooperation Vandenberg was much less powerful, showed signs of opposition to the program. In late July he spoke at Columbus, giving a good deal of attention to foreign policy:

"In the field of foreign policy, the Congress has done its best to cooperate with the policies of the President. We realize that the Constitution and existing law confer upon the President almost complete power over the foreign policy of the United States. In general I believe Congress should hesitate to interfere unless that policy involves us in the danger of an unnecessary war or proposes to drain the resources of our tax payers and our productive labor to an unreasonable degree.

"I believe it is a field where Congress should not, except with great provocation, give foreign countries a picture of a divided America. I am not happy about the country's foreign policy...

"Our German policy has wrecked the economy of Europe and now we are called upon for cash from our taxpayers to remedy the breakdown. The whole policy has created an impossible situation which only a strong executive policy can hope even to alleviate. Certainly it is beyond the power of Congress which cannot initiate foreign policy. Congress went along this year with the Greek-Turkish loan and with the relief for Europe made necessary by the stupidity of our previous policy...

"No country has ever been so generous as the United States in affording aid to others. We have made dollars available to foreign countries in almost unlimited amounts with little restriction of the use to be made of them. We have thus permitted the rising of many domestic prices. Certainly we are interested in reasonable loans to enable foreign countries to go to work and help themselves, but I believe these loans, hereafter, should be confined to actual goods, machinery, and equipment necessary to enable the countries which secure them to restore their own productive ability. Certainly we must move very cautiously and be sure that additional loans really furnish incentive to the foreign peoples involved to work harder to support themselves and are not too burdensome on our own taxpayers."²⁶

As late as November, 1947, Vandenberg spoke of having "trouble with Bob Taft," which he thought was due to the "presidential fever."

The urgency of the crisis raised the possibility of a special session of Congress late in the year. There was a good deal of initial opposition to this idea at first among Republican members of Congress, but the session was convened in mid-November. Joint hearings on the Interim Foreign Aid Act were held with the members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committees participating. The bill, jointly sponsored by Senators Connally and Vandenberg, was reported by the Senate committee with little change from the Administration's proposal, although it is to be noted that before submitting their requests, the State Department had already cut Italian aid from \$575,000,000 to \$227,000,000, the French request from \$459,000,000 to \$328,000,000, and the Austrian aid from \$87,000,000 to \$58,000,000. By the time the Senate floor debate began, it was evident that there would be little opposition on the final vote. Even Taft announced that he would vote for it, but there was still considerable opposition to certain aspects of the program. A proposed amendment to cut the whole amount of the bill to \$400 million was supported by twenty Republicans, including Taft, but Vandenberg mustered twenty-seven GOP votes against it, and it was easily defeated.

²⁶New York Times, Aug. 1, 1947, p. 8

A similar group of Senators backed a series of amendments to eliminate local currency funds and to provide for giving away certain surplus United States commodities. These were rejected by voice vote, as was a Democratic move to tie the program to the United Nations. It is to be remembered that in the Greek-Turkish aid program it was Vandenberg and other Republicans who were concerned about bringing the United Nations into the picture. By a voice vote, also, an amendment offered by Kem of Missouri to assure that the United States got full credit for all aid was carried. The bill was passed by a vote of 83 to 6, with the Republicans supporting it (44-3).²⁷

The House version of the bill which was reported on December 2 differed from the Senate measure at several points. First, China was included in the aid program; second, there was provision for more off-shore procurement; third, there would be an FBI investigation of all employees administering the aid; fourth, the amount was pared to \$590,000,000, but the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to advance \$150,000,000 pending the actual appropriation.

In the debate on the floor, opposition came from the extreme isolationists in the Republican party such as Noah Mason of Illinois, Clare Hoffman of Michigan, and Leo E. Allen of Illinois. The inclusion of China encountered little opposition, although there was an amendment proposed (and defeated) to limit this aid to \$100. Another amendment which was defeated would have struck out the provision for incentive goods. This was opposed by all of the Herter Committee except August H. Andresen of Minnesota and by most of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but was defeated by a teller vote of only 145 to 132.²⁸

²⁷Cong. Record, Vol. 93, p. 10980, (80th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 1, 1947) The opposing Republicans were Langer (N. D.), Moore (Okla.), and Robertson (Wyo.); the Democrats were McKellar (Tenn.), O'Daniel (Texas), and Taylor (Idaho)

²⁸Ibid., p. 11171 (Dec. 8, 1947)

Two amendments to cut the amount of aid and one to increase it were defeated, and the bill was passed by a voice vote. In the conference Committee China aid was left in, and there were numerous other modifications to the bills of both Houses. The Senate passed this compromise by a voice vote, and the House by a vote of 313 to 82, with the Republicans favoring passage (161 to 70).²⁹

Work could now get under way on the long-range foreign assistance program envisioned by the Marshall Plan. The Republican role in the passage of this plan into law can only partially be told by the way the GOP voted in Congress. This was not a case of the Administration presenting a full-blown proposal to a waiting legislature. As a matter of fact, this was seldom the case in the 80th Congress, but on this program, particularly, the Republican leadership, as well as what was known of Republican opinion, was in large measure responsible for the kind of legislation placed before the lawmakers.

Dulles had been sent on a special mission to France and was present at the Paris meeting of the Big Four in 1947. Vandenberg had been consulted from the very beginning and had played a large role in deciding what Congress should be asked to do. Other Republican Congressional leaders had been consulted as well. There was little doubt but that Vandenberg would have personally supported almost any steps asked for, but it was not his job merely to give vigorous support. He had first to suggest to the Administration what he felt could be pushed through on Capitol Hill and then to work to gain support for the proposed program among his Congressional colleagues.

After the President's message on December 19, 1947, there was the usual variety of comments. Senator White said, "The President's figures will be sustained." Kem stated, "I shall be unable to follow the President further

²⁹Ibid., pp. 11412-11413 (Dec. 15, 1947)

in this foreign venture." Taft asserted that the idea of committing the country for four or five years was not possible. One year at a time was all he could see, while McCarthy felt that we should demand military bases in return for the aid.

From January 8 to February 5 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of hearings that must have been among the most exhaustive in Senate history. Every shade of opinion had its chance for expression. Vandenberg was anxious for just this kind of a national debate. Meanwhile, a group of twenty Republican Senators, called the "revisionists," were meeting in a downtown hotel in Washington. The group was composed of Senators Ball, Brooks, Capehart, Robertson, Jenner, Kem, McCarthy, Knowland, Bricker, Buck, Cain, Ecton, Hawkes, Malone, Reed, Revercomb, Williams, and Young. Although the group claimed they were not out to kill the program, but merely to avoid a split in the party over this issue, they were definitely the isolationist group. In the end nine of this group voted for, and ten against the bill, while Hawkes was announced in opposition. Members of this group, however, offered most of the amendments proposed in the Senate.

Chiefly arising out of Vandenberg's soundings in Congress and his work with the Administration, several modifications in the program had been agreed upon before the bill reached the Senate floor. The administration had originally favored a four-year authorization of \$17,000,000,000. Vandenberg first suggested that the four-year authorization be made general and that the first appropriation be made for the period from April, 1948, to July 1, 1949, and that it be for \$6.8 billion dollars. In the Senate committee this was further modified to make it a one-year appropriation of \$5.3 billion. This was no change in the scope of the program or the rate of expenditure. The Senate committee also

adopted the recommendations of a Brookings Institution Study on the administration of this program, following which the bill was reported unanimously.

It had been at Republican insistence that the Administration had proposed setting up a new agency outside the State Department to carry out this program, and the Brookings Institution made further suggestions for setting it up on a "business-like" basis. The major conclusions reported by Brookings were (1) that a new agency should be established having close relations with, but separate from, the Department of State; (2) that the agency have a single head with cabinet status; (3) that the agency should have a noncorporate form, but should be exempted from certain existing legal restrictions on salaries and personnel; (4) that the head of the agency should have an advisory board appointed by the President to aid the administrator, but not to interfere with administrative aspects of the program.

The floor debate in the Senate lasted from March 1 until March 13, with a total of sixty-nine Senators participating. Vandenberg led the supporters of the bill, while the main opponents were Malone, Langer, Ball, Kem, and Revercomb. As the debate proceeded, there was some evidence that events in Europe, principally the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, were gaining support for the bill.

Among the more controversial amendments which were proposed were the following:

1. An amendment sponsored by Glen Taylor (Democrat, of Idaho) which would have channelled all aid through the United Nations was rejected by a vote of 74 to 13, Republicans voting 39 to 1 in opposition.³¹

³⁰The Brookings Institution, Report to the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, pp. 15-20

³¹Cong. Record, Vol. 94, p. 2460. (80th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 10, 1948)

2. A Taft amendment to reduce the amount of the authorization from \$5.3 billion to \$4 billion was rejected by a vote of 56 to 31, but the Republicans opposed it by only 24 to 23.³²

3. Senator Capehart's substitute bill providing relief funds and loans for reconstruction through the RFC was rejected (22-68), with the Republicans opposed to it (29-19).³³

4. An amendment by Brooks of Illinois to make the European Recovery Program's special representatives abroad more directly responsible to the Administrator of the program and less to the Secretary of State was supported by the Republicans (21-20), but the Senate as a whole rejected it (52-25).³⁴

On the last day of the debate the bill was passed by a resounding majority of 69 to 17, and Republicans supported the bill by a vote of 31 to 13.³⁵

Consideration of ERP in the House stretched from December 17 to March 31, and the bill which emerged had some significant additions. By Administration request, the House committee added \$570,000,000 for China and \$275,000,000 for Greece and Turkey. The Republican members of the committee decided that the best way to proceed would be by an omnibus bill including the aforementioned sums for areas outside the scope of the main European Recovery Program. The Democrats on the committee had some fear that this would delay the program, but the Republicans contended that there was so much sentiment for Greek-Turkish aid among their members that the effect of the combination would assure smoother sailing for the bill. In addition, during the hearings, sentiment developed

³²Ibid., p. 2708. (Mar. 12, 1948)

³³Ibid., p. 2775. (Mar. 13, 1948)

³⁴Ibid., p. 2541. (Mar. 11, 1948)

³⁵Ibid., p. 2793. (Mar. 13, 1948)

for military as well as economic aid to China. The bill was reported with all these features including an amount for the International Children's Fund.

Although there were many amendments offered on the floor, none which would have had a major effect on the scope of this bill was adopted against the wishes of its sponsors. The bill was passed on the last day of March, with all the added grants of aid included, by a vote of 329 to 74, and with the Republicans supporting it (171-61).³⁶

The Senate in the meantime had voted aid bills for Greece and Turkey (\$275,000,000) and for China (\$363,000,000 for economic and military purposes). A Conference Report combining all of these bills as a compromise measure was accepted in the Senate by voice vote, and in the House by a vote of 318 to 75, with the Republicans voting in the same proportions as previously.³⁷

There were two postlogues to this successful climax for the ERP, both of which held possibilities for severely damaging the effectiveness of the program. The first arose over the choice of an administrator for the new Economic Cooperation Administration. It was understood from the early consideration of this bill that the administration of this program would be organically independent of the State Department and that it would be run on "a sound business basis." These were strong selling points for supporters of the bill in Congress. It was also considered important that the head of the new agency should come from the outside business world with strong industrial credentials and not "via the State Department." For this reason, in his discussion with the Administration over this matter, Vandenberg rejected first the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, William Clayton, and later, Dean Acheson, then outside the government and practicing law. Vandenberg apparently then urged the appointment

³⁶Ibid., p. 3321 (Mar. 23, 1948)

³⁷Ibid., p. 4070 (Apr. 2, 1948)

of Paul G. Hoffman, President of Studebaker Corporation, and was successful in obtaining his nomination and confirmation.

Another crisis for the program came in June when the House, led by John Taber, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, ordered a \$2,160,000,000 cut in the first year's appropriation. Only by the most vehement appeal to the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Senate itself was Vandenberg able to have the greater portion of the funds restored and thus save the program.

IV

The launching of the full-scale European aid program was undoubtedly the most noteworthy achievement of the 80th Congress, but there were other significant developments, not the least of which was the Vandenberg Resolution. One cannot be certain whether even the Senators who voted on this resolution were aware of what long-range potentialities it contained. It is likewise difficult to be certain of the exact birthplace of the ideas involved in this generally-worded resolution. It may have been as far back as the San Francisco Conference when Article 51 was formulated. That article set forth that nothing in the Charter should impair the "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs," and until the Security Council had taken measures to maintain peace. In addition Articles 52, 53, and 54 of the Charter permitted the existence of regional arrangements for dealing with problems of international peace and security, and the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Western Hemisphere nations had drafted a hemispheric defense treaty under these articles.

Now in 1948 the intransigence of the Russians was becoming more and more apparent, and by their frequent use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council they were frustrating the hopes for that organization as a peace-keeping device. Many solutions were being proposed for this problem, among which were

suggestions for world government and removal of the veto, either in whole or in part. Vandenberg saw possibilities in the aforementioned portions of the Charter.

Working together with the Undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, Vandenberg sought to define the problem and move toward a solution. As later recalled by Lovett, the problems were reduced primarily to: (1) formal expression by the Senate in favor of removing the United Nations veto from all questions involving the pacific settlement of disputes and the admission of new members to the United Nations; and (2) a mechanism through which the United States could proceed to the support of such regional and collective arrangements as the Western Union Treaty signed at Brussels. Lovett and his staff of experts, with the cooperation of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, produced several draft resolutions, the preferred draft running to three or four pages.

Following this, Vandenberg, first with the aid of Lovett, and finally with Marshall, Dulles, Congressional leaders, and the high military command, perfected the draft. The result was a Senate resolution advising the President to seek security for the free world through United States support of mutual defense arrangements to operate within the United Nations Charter but outside the Security Council veto. It also advised the President to attempt to strengthen the Charter through curbs on the veto itself and by providing a United Nations police force together with the regulation and reduction of armaments under a dependable guaranty against violation.

The text, as finally adopted by the Senator, read as follows:

"Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: therefore be it

"Resolved, that the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate

that this government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

"(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

"(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

"(3) Association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

"(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

"(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

"(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under Article 109 or by the General Assembly."³⁸

After careful examination, the Foreign Relations Committee on June 10 reported the resolution unanimously in favor of passage, and on June 11 the one-day debate was held. After an explanatory statement by Vandenberg, the Michigan Senator submitted to questioning. The Senate rejected (61-6) an amendment proposed by Senator Pepper of Florida which would have deleted all reference to the possibility of American aid.³⁹ The Republicans opposed this amendment by a vote of 31 to 3, and they voted (32-2) in favor of the resolution which was adopted by the Senate (64-4).⁴⁰ A few weeks later, Under-secretary Lovett

³⁸Ibid., pp. 6053-6054 (May 19, 1948)

³⁹Ibid., p. 7846 (June 11, 1948)

⁴⁰Ibid.

sat down at the State Department with the Ambassadors of Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Luxembourg Minister to begin discussions which led eventually to the North Atlantic Treaty.

V

In all his efforts on behalf of bipartisanship in foreign policy Vandenberg firmly believed, or at least said he firmly believed, that he was aiding the Republican cause more than he was helping the Democrats:

"Bi-partisan cooperation in Foreign Policy (which involves no remote suggestion of withholding vigorous and vigilant criticism when and where deserved) is not only 'good patriotism' in my book; it is also the best kind of Republican politics."⁴¹

Thus Vandenberg had an additional reason for sharing the general Republican confidence that 1948 was their party's year to regain control of the Executive. The 1946 victory was looked upon as a stepping stone to the White House, and Vandenberg felt that the Congressional party's behavior on foreign affairs had justified the feeling that the Republicans were well prepared to assume control of the nation's foreign affairs in a responsible manner.

Vandenberg had the additional satisfaction of knowing that many Republicans wanted to nominate him for President. In fact, he felt obliged to devote a good bit of attention to keeping out of the race. He had early determined that he did not want the nomination, but he found that "this business of not running for President is a tough one--if you really mean it."⁴² In spite of all his efforts, his name was placed in nomination at Philadelphia, and he received several votes on the first ballot.

The Senator's primary avowed interest, however, was in the foreign policy plank in the Republican platform. He prepared a rough draft of what he considered an acceptable statement on foreign affairs and sent it to Dulles with

⁴¹Vandenberg, p. 555

⁴²Ibid., p. 421

these words:

"Please give it a quick review--add or subtract--delete or expand. I think it is very necessary that we get something down in 'black and white' without too much delay, because I think it is quite obvious now that a serious effort will be made in the Resolutions Committee at the convention to upset any sort of an enlightened foreign policy and return to the 'good old days' when it took two weeks to cross the Atlantic."⁴³

Vandenberg confided to friends that he could be precipitated into the race for the nomination if (1) it was necessary to block adoption of an isolationist foreign policy plank; or (2) if Governor Green's (Illinois) keynote address to the convention presages a knockdown battle between the isolationist wing and those backing the bipartisan foreign policy approach:

"Philadelphia: My chief interest in this convention at all times was the platform. I was prepared to fight to the finish--on the convention floor if need be--to protect the GOP against a reversion to 'isolationism' or against desertion of the peace plan, including 'collective security' and the European Recovery Program...

"It wasn't necessary--thanks to the superb job done by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., as Chairman of the Resolutions Committee--thanks also to the fact that it was speedily evident that nobody was willing to do serious battle for the antediluvian McCormick, Chicago Tribune, point of view.

"Before Lodge (Bless Him!) went to Philadelphia, he asked me for a working paper on a foreign policy plank. I gave it to him. He put it all the way through his sub-committee and his full committee and the Convention practically intact. I think it is of historical importance to nail down this fact.

"Thus it will be entirely apparent that the final platform draft on foreign policy is in almost the verbatim pattern of the original working paper which I gave to Chairman Lodge and also to ex-Governor Brucker of Michigan, who was on the Resolutions Committee.

"Before he presented the working paper to his Committee, Senator Lodge, with typical acumen, added four or five more extreme statements (all in harmony with this theme) for the express purpose of giving the little coterie of isolationists on his Committee something to knock out. One was a tacit condemnation of the House Republicans for having voted for European Relief and then against necessary appropriations for it. In due course, the 'extras' were knocked

⁴³Ibid., p. 428

down, just as Lodge had planned, and he emerged with what I consider to be a miraculous performance...⁴⁴

Vandenberg's account of the birth of the 1948 Republican foreign policy plank seems to be an essentially accurate as well as an "inside" report. One interesting note added by Anne O'Hare McCormick in the New York Times is the report that the choice of Lodge for Chairman of the Resolutions Committee was made by Robert Taft. The very fact of Lodge's appointment seemed to indicate that the internationalists would dictate the foreign policy plank to a large extent.⁴⁵

After the sub-committee had unanimously adopted the Vandenberg plank, the scene shifted to the full Resolutions Committee where the major attack on the plank by the isolationists was made. Despite this attack, however, the full committee did not change the proposals substantially. The details of the fight were not made public, but Lodge said that while there had been changes in the language of the sub-committee's version, he did not feel they weakened the stand on foreign policy. Two fairly significant changes were made: (1) a strengthening of the statement on the protection of Israel's boundaries as defined by the United Nations and favoring American aid to that new country; and (2) deletion of any reference to efforts by the United Nations looking toward international control of atomic energy. Only the Illinois members voted against the adoption of the revised plank, and they said they would not carry their fight to the floor.

In his diary Vandenberg made a parallel-column compilation of the final platform draft and of his own work. Only certain portions of this are re-printed in his Private Papers, but these are interesting as an indication of how closely his text was followed:

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 428-429

⁴⁵New York Times, June 23, 1948, p. 26

PLATFORM

We dedicate our foreign policy to the preservation of a free America in a free world of free men. With neither malice nor desire for conquest, we shall strive for a just peace with all nations.

We shall erect our foreign policy on the basis of friendly firmness which welcomes cooperation but spurns appeasement. We shall pursue a consistent foreign policy which invites steadiness and reliance and which thus avoids the misunderstandings from which wars result. We shall protect the future against the errors of the Democratic Administration, which too often has lacked clarity, competence or consistency in our vital international relationships and has too often abandoned justice.

We believe in collective security against aggression and in behalf of justice and freedom. We shall support the United Nations as the world's best hope in this direction, striving to strengthen it and promote its effective evolution and use. The United Nations should progressively establish international law, be freed of any veto in the pacific settlement of international disputes, and be provided with the armed forces contemplated by the Charter. We particularly commend the value of regional arrangements as prescribed by the Charter; and we cite the Western Hemispherical Defense Pact as a useful model.

We faithfully dedicate ourselves to peace with justice.

MY TEXT:

We dedicate our foreign policy to the preservation of free America in a free world of free men. With neither malice nor conquest aimed at any other power on earth, we shall strive for an honorable and just peace with all nations. We shall omit no efforts to this end.

We shall erect our foreign policy on the basis of friendly firmness which welcomes cooperation but declines appeasement. We shall pursue a consistent foreign policy which invites reliance and which thus avoids the misunderstandings from which wars too often flow. Thus we shall protect the future against the errors of the past when the Democratic Administration has too often compromised with our ideals and too often lacked clarity, competence, or consistency in our vital international relationships.

We believe in collective security against aggression and in behalf of justice and freedom. We shall support the United Nations as the world's best hope in this direction. We shall strive to strengthen the United Nations and promote its effective evolution and use. The United Nations should progressively establish international law. It should control atomic energy. It should be freed of any veto in the pacific settlement of international disputes. It should be provided with the armed forces contemplated by the Charter. We particularly commend the utility of regional arrangements as prescribed by the Charter; and we point with pride to the Western Hemispherical Defense Pact as a useful model.

Our faithful dedication is to peace with justice and honor.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Vandenberg, pp. 429-430

It was an internationalist plank from beginning to end. At no time during the period previously covered by this study had the internationalists so easily written in the platform so nearly what they desired. Criticism of the Administration was relatively mild and the following statement on bipartisanship was included:

"We are proud of the part that Republicans have taken in those limited areas of foreign policy in which they have been permitted to participate. We shall invite the Minority party to join us under the next Republican Administration in stopping partisan politics at the waters' edge."⁴⁷

It is perhaps further indicative of the power of the internationalists at the 1948 Convention that the nominations for President and Vice-President did not result in what Vandenberg called a "hybrid ticket." Of course the foreign policy views of the candidates are only one factor in their selection, but they are nonetheless one factor. In 1940 Willkie's interventionist views had been balanced by McNary's non-interventionist views. In 1944, Dewey, who favored full participation by the United States in post-war international affairs, was teamed with Bricker, who was of the isolationist camp.

The night in 1948 when Dewey was nominated the new candidate called a conference of about twenty Republican leaders in his hotel suite to discuss a Vice-Presidential candidate. Vandenberg states that he argued his view on the matter directly with Dewey:

"I was entirely frank in urging Dewey not to build a hybrid ticket--not to choose a V. P. who was not in full harmony with the platform and with his own consistent support of international cooperation... I argued that we could not go to the country with a ticket which did no more than personify the split on this issue among Republicans in Congress. I recommended either Stassen or Warren."⁴⁸

⁴⁷Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1948, p. 193

⁴⁸Vandenberg, p. 440

What effect this admonition had is difficult to say. Dewey later said, "I was scrupulous not to express a preference... At Philadelphia Warren was genuinely the unanimous choice of the group."⁴⁹ In so far as he had expressed himself on international affairs Warren was an internationalist, and on foreign policy, at least, there was nothing hybrid about the 1948 Republican ticket.

It was not expected that Dewey, who had helped to father the idea of non-partisanship in international affairs in 1944, would make foreign policy a major issue in the 1948 campaign. Early in the campaign Dewey drew a distinction between the phases of American foreign policy that had been the subject of bipartisan collaboration and those on which Republican leaders had not been consulted in advance. He indicated that those in the latter class would be the subject of major criticism in the Presidential campaign. He listed the Greek-Turkish policy, the discussions at the Potsdam conference, the "entire China policy or lack of policy," and the handling of the Pakistan situation as falling in the latter category. As to the European Recovery Program, Dewey said that in the form in which it was enacted it conformed very largely to the views of Republican leaders. This statement was taken to indicate that the ERP would be exempt from attack.

The bipartisan policy in general, he felt, had been limited to the formation of the United Nations and American participation in it. In the same statement he urged John Foster Dulles, his close adviser on foreign affairs, to accept the part in the United Nations General Assembly (meeting at Paris) which had been offered him by the Department of State.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 441

⁵⁰New York Times, July 2, 1948, p. 1

A week later a statement of a slightly different tone was issued by the Republican National Committee. It was a twenty-six page document written by Representative Charles Halleck on "Accomplishments of the Republican Congress." This statement accused the "New Dealers" of "fumbling and bungling" in our foreign relations, stated that thirty-two billion in foreign aid was the root cause of domestic high prices, and averred that most of our problems stem from "the betrayal at Quebec, Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam." On most foreign policies, Halleck wrote, the so-called bipartisan foreign policy has been "a myth, because our Republican leaders were not consulted."⁵¹ This document would have to be considered as official Republican policy although not a forecast of what a Republican Administration's foreign policy would be. A month later, however, the National Committee refused to use a document submitted to it entitled "Democratic Duplicity and Appeasement in Foreign Policy Administration."⁵²

In September Vandenberg issued a statement on behalf of himself, Dewey, and Dulles stating that America was united on foreign policy. It was a send-off to John Foster Dulles as he left for Paris, as well as by way of comment in the face of the blockade of Berlin by the Russians in Eastern Germany:

"Regardless of political differences at home, we are serving notice on the world that America is united to protect American rights everywhere and through firmness in the right to seek peace with justice for ourselves and the other peace-loving peoples of the world.

"It is of the greatest importance that other nations which do not understand our political system should not be misled by our political campaign at home. We shall be in internal controversy regarding many phases of foreign policy. But we shall not be in controversy over the basic fact that America is united against aggression and the foes of freedom.

"I am happy to say that Governor Dewey and I have discussed these matters many times, and one of the reasons I confidently

⁵¹Ibid., July 10, 1948, p. 6

⁵²Ibid., Aug. 15, 1948, Sec. IV, p. 7

look forward to his election as President of the United States is the fact that he deeply believes in this concept and will stoutly sustain it over the years that lie ahead."⁵³

Dulles later announced that he was going to the United Nations Assembly not only in his official capacity as an American representative but also as a Republican "with the approval and support" of Mr. Dewey. He said the Government had arranged separate communications facilities whereby he could inform Dewey quickly of important developments and "get the guidance of his views."⁵⁴

It is apparent from such statements as these not only that the Republicans were confident of victory, but that these Republican foreign policy leaders were beginning to think very seriously about the problems they would face if they became responsible for American foreign policy. So sure was Vandenberg of victory that on several occasions during the campaign he wrote Dulles to counsel extreme care against prejudicing the "incoming" Republican administration by campaign foreign policy statements resulting in commitments which would have to be met after election day.

Dulles agreed basically with this approach, but felt that Dewey was entitled to some latitude because he was, after all, running for a political office. "I hope you will be tolerant," he wrote, "of the exigencies of the campaign and of political influence from which Mr. Truman does not divorce himself and from which the Governor cannot wholly divorce himself."⁵⁵

It was true that Truman made slight reference at any time in the campaign to the part played by the Republicans in transforming his foreign policy into working policies. He continuously attacked the 80th Republican Congress as the

⁵⁴Ibid., Sept. 18, 1948, p. 1

⁵⁵Vandenberg, p. 448

worst or second worst in history. Vandenberg was much disturbed because he felt Mr. Truman failed to draw a line between domestic issues, which might be fair targets for political attack, and the area which he (Vandenberg) regarded as lying within the bipartisan foreign policy area. To Vandenberg the accomplishments in foreign affairs of the 80th Congress constituted "the most amazing record of constructive cooperation ever written in any Congress," and he thought it was responsible for the country's substantial unity in its foreign policy voice.⁵⁶ Vandenberg later made a radio address mainly to answer the Administration's attacks, although he also discussed his cooperation with the Department of State on the Berlin blockade and other pressing matters during the campaign.

In October the campaign-conscious nation was startled by the rumor that Mr. Truman intended to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow as his personal emissary to Stalin to talk peace. The proposal was blocked by the Secretary of State and others, but caused a great flurry for several days. It was regarded as a campaign blunder on the part of the President, and soon brought a statement from Governor Dewey. While there apparently was some division among Dewey's advisers on whether to exploit this "colossal error," it was decided not to do so. Instead Dewey said the following:

"The people of America wholeheartedly and vigorously support the labors of our bi-partisan delegation at Paris and specifically its insistence on a prompt lifting of the blockade of Berlin.

"The nations of the world can rest assured that the American people are in fact united in their foreign policy and will firmly and unshakably uphold the United Nations and our friends of the free world in every step to build and preserve the peace."⁵⁷

Other Republicans were not so charitable, and on the day following the Dewey statement, Taft at Nashville attacked the Truman proposal to send Vinson,

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 448

⁵⁷New York Times, Oct. 11, 1948, p. 1

saying it had weakened our position with regard to Russia, discrediting both the United Nations and Secretary Marshall. But Taft also was looking forward to future responsibilities when he said in the same speech:

"Republicans in Congress under the able leadership of Senator Vandenberg have cooperated with the President whenever they have been allowed to do so, and they have shown their complete ability to take over the conduct of foreign affairs even in the midst of a war."⁵⁸

Certainty of success lasted up through an early morning edition of the Chicago Tribune on the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November. Then the GOP faced four more years in the wilderness, and a new period opened which would bring significant developments in foreign policy in the Republican Party.

⁵⁸Ibid., Oct. 12, 1948, p. 1

CHAPTER VI

THE REPUBLICANS AND THE COLD WAR: EUROPE

It will be the purpose of this chapter and the one which follows to trace the record written by the Republicans on the foreign policy issues growing out of the great conflict between East and West that has become known as the Cold War. This conflict began in 1945 and was intensified during the years of the 80th Congress. The attempts of the American government, under divided control, to meet the early thrusts of the Soviet have been shown in the preceding chapter. It now remains to study the Republican attitudes on those foreign policy measures undertaken by the second Truman Administration, locked in a struggle with the Russian world which took many varied forms. Following this narrative it will be in order to examine the Republican record to see what it meant (1) in terms of the relative strengths of the internationalist and isolationist wings of the party, and (2) in terms of bipartisanship in foreign policy.

American aid to Europe in various forms had been continuous since 1939, although the purposes of the aid had shifted from time to time. Prior to our entry into World War II, we were the "arsenal of democracy." From 1941 to 1945, in addition to massing our own gigantic forces, we continued military aid to our allies, both democratic and communist. Beginning before VJ day and continuing into 1948, Congress appropriated many millions for direct relief aid and rehabilitation in the wartorn areas of Europe. This aid was originally granted without thought to political considerations, but soon fell under heavy criticism when it was felt that the Communists were making political capital out of our money in certain areas of eastern Europe. In 1946 Great Britain was the recipient of a \$3.5 billion dollar loan designed to save her from bankruptcy immediately following the close of hostilities. Economic and military grants to Greece and Turkey were voted when it appeared as though Western hegemony was in danger in those states.

By 1947, when it appeared that the economies of western Europe were not recovering even with relief grants and that political unrest was the immediate result, the gigantic European Recovery Program was launched to aid these countries in developing their manufacturing and agriculture to a point where internal needs could be met, and export markets could be developed. Once this was accomplished, it was hoped by some that America could finally end the seemingly endless drain of her resources in aiding Europe. The program was fairly launched in 1948 with a \$5.3 billion dollar appropriation for a period of fifteen months. It will be remembered that Republican support in Congress for the program was strong, and under the leadership of Senator Vandenberg and other GOP bipartisan leaders, both House and Senate Republicans recorded sizable majorities in favor of the new plan.¹

The 1948 Republican platform had this to say on the subject of foreign economic aid:

"Within the prudent limits of our own economic welfare, we shall cooperate, on a basis of self-help and mutual aid, to assist other peace-loving nations to restore their economic independence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms for which we fought two wars and upon which dependable peace must build. We shall insist on businesslike and efficient administration of all foreign aid."²

Early in 1949 Congress began to consider the terms under which the ERP would be extended. The Economic Cooperation Administration was eminently successful in obtaining the funds it requested to continue the program. The request was for \$1.15 billion for the last quarter of the Government's 1949 fiscal year and \$4.28 billion through fiscal 1950. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted the bill as presented with one exception. It approved an addition to the preamble proposed by Alexander Wiley (Republican, of Wisconsin) which called for the rapid unification of Europe. This change was opposed by

¹Figures A and B

²Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1948, p. 192

Chairman Connally, but the Committee unanimously reported the bill as amended.

For the first week the floor was held by Republican opponents of the bill, and these opponents proposed several amendments designed to limit or defeat the purposes of the ERP. Other Republicans, as well as the Administration leaders, defended ECA and stressed the need to continue American aid. The attack on the ERP came in the series of amendments mentioned above. It was a Republican attack, and yet less than half of the Republicans in the Senate supported this opposition. When Senator Wherry (Republican, of Nebraska) moved to cut the ERP's second-year authorization by 15 percent, the Senate defeated his amendment (68-14), and only 14 of 41 Republicans voting supported the move.³

A Taft-Russell amendment to reduce the proposed authorization by 10 percent gained the support of only 18 out of 41 Republicans, and the Senate as a whole defeated the proposed cut by a vote of 54 to 23.⁴ Senator Ellender (Democrat, of Mississippi) proposed that 25 percent (instead of 5 percent) of the counterpart funds in each Marshall Plan country be allocated to the United States for the purchase of strategic materials. Counterpart funds were the payments by the recipient countries in local currencies which were made to match the dollar allotments from the United States, and Ellender's amendments would have had the effect of diverting one fifth of these funds from their intended purpose. The whole Senate rejected this (22-56) as did the Republican side (14-23).⁵ Ellender next offered an amendment to prohibit the use of these counterpart funds in any country for government administrative expenses or for payment of interest on or retirement of national debt. On this proposal the Republicans

³Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 3682 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 1, 1949)

⁴Ibid., p. 3699

⁵Ibid., p. 3848. (Apr. 5, 1949)

voted favorably (19-17), although the Senate as a whole rejected the amendment (27-55).⁶

Among amendments from the Republican side was one by Senator Baldwin. (Republican, of Connecticut) to withhold aid from any participating country which violated a treaty with the United States. This provision was rejected (22-59), but the Republicans supported it (21-15).⁷ McCarthy (Republican, of Wisconsin) proposed an amendment to withhold assistance from any country where ECA funds were used to discriminate against American nationals or where any racial or religious discrimination was practiced in the distribution of funds. Rejection of this amendment was by a vote of 45 to 33, but Republicans favored the proposal by a vote of 28 to 9.⁸ Both of these amendments were designed to stop certain alleged mistreatment of American nationals in French Morocco who were protected under a treaty of 1912. Senators Cain, Washington Republican, and Bridges, New Hampshire Republican, cooperated to introduce an amendment to eliminate completely the ECA authorization for fiscal 1950 and to substitute "such sums as the appropriations committees...shall recommend." Quite aware that the program would receive much less friendly treatment at the hands of the appropriations committees, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected this (15-67), only 12 out of 36 Republicans voting favorably.⁹ The only other amendment on which the Republicans voted contrary to the Senate as a whole was one backed by Bridges and McCarran, Nevada Democrat, which would have required that all shipments to Europe be "appropriately labeled," presumably with some American emblem. The Senate rejected this (26-57), but the Republicans supported the amendment (23-13).¹⁰

⁶Ibid., p. 3850

⁷Ibid., p. 3872

⁸Ibid., p. 3877

⁹Ibid., p. 3989 (Apr. 6, 1949)

¹⁰Ibid., p. 4133 (Apr. 8, 1949)

When the extension bill came to the final vote, even the solid core of a dozen-or-so Republicans which had led the opposition was broken up, and only six voted against its passage, while two were paired in opposition.¹¹ It can thus be said that less than half the Republicans in the Senate in 1949 favored ending or in any major way reducing the scope of the European Recovery Program, and that only a handful were absolutely opposed to the bill in any form.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs gave the bill no less favorable treatment than had its Senate counterpart. The bill was unanimously reported, although somewhat later the minority members of the committee published a report which indicated that they had favored the "package approach" to this problem; that is, including the aid authorizations for all areas in one bill. It also voiced criticism of America's China policy.¹²

The House version of the bill did, however, cut \$50,000,000 from the 1950 funds, but this was later restored in conference committee. In the House debate, three attempts were made to reduce the amount authorized for the ERP, but all were successfully defeated on division votes with only rather minor support for the cuts. The House passed its version of the bill by a vote of 355 to 49, with the Republicans concurring by a margin of 125 to 38.¹³ Republican support in the House for the second year of ERP can be compared with 1948 in Figure B.

By 1950 the "single package" approach to foreign economic aid had returned to favor, and the result was the Foreign Economic Assistance Act. Five Programs—

¹¹Ibid., p. 4147 The twelve Senators most consistently supporting the limiting amendments to this bill were Bricker (Ohio), Cain (Wash.), Ecton (Mont.), Jenner (Indiana), Kem (Mo.), Langer (N. D.), Wherry (Neb.), Williams (Del.), Watkins (Utah), Young (S. D.), Butler (Neb.), and Malone (Nev.).

¹²H. Rept. No. 323, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (Mar. 25, 1949), pt. 2

¹³Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 4422 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 12, 1949)

ERP, Point IV, Aid to Korea, to China, and to the United Nations Children's Fund--were rolled into one bill authorizing \$3,127,450,000 in aid. This chapter will consider only those sections dealing with European economic aid.

Joint Senate and House committee hearings were held on this bill followed by separate additional hearings in each House. The House committee reported the bill on March 22, recommending \$1.95 billion dollars for ECA. This was one billion dollars less than had been requested by the Administration, but the House Committee proposed to furnish the balance in surplus farm commodities. The amendment which resulted in this cut was offered in committee by Vorys (Republican, of Ohio) and was adopted by a vote of 10 to 7 which cut across party lines.

Consideration by the whole House began on March 24 after the Representatives had approved six hours of general debate by a vote of 262 to 22, the Republicans voting 96 in favor, 15 against.¹⁴ Mr. Fulton (Republican, of Pennsylvania) moved to restore the one-billion dollar cut. Mr. Case (Republican of South Dakota) amended this proposal to reduce the restoration by \$250,000,000. This reduction was accepted, and the Fulton amendment was adopted. The result was a restoration of \$750,000,000, adopted by a standing vote of 178 to 87.¹⁵ Following this, another attempt to cut \$500,000,000 from the program was defeated (137-152).¹⁶ It was then voted that one billion of the two and seven-tenths billion dollars granted to the Marshall-Plan countries must be used to buy United States farm surpluses.

¹⁴Ibid., Vol. 96, p. 4053 (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Mar. 4, 1950)

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 7538-7539 (May 23, 1950)

¹⁶Ibid., p. 4552 (Mar. 31, 1950)

It must be remembered that on the roll call to pass the Foreign Economic Assistance Act all the programs were under consideration. In view of the fact, however, that funds for the ERP comprised more than three-fourths of the money involved, it is fair to assume that the final vote chiefly reflected the attitude of the House on European aid. The House vote was 287 to 86 in favor of the bill, while the Republican division was favorable by 78 to 69.¹⁷ The sharp contrast of this Republican vote with that of the earlier years is shown clearly in Figure B. It should be remembered, also, that the bill had been somewhat modified along lines proposed by the Republicans before it came to the final test.

The Senate Foreign Relations committee voted (11-0) to approve the full \$2.95 billion for ECA, and the bill was reported March 22. On the floor Senator Kem (Republican, of Missouri) proposed an amendment to cut the amount authorized by the bill by one billion dollars. This was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 62 to 17 and rejected by the Republicans by a vote of 24 to 12.¹⁸ Opponents of the bill as reported tried now to shave \$500,000,000 from the total program under an amendment proposed by Taft. The vote on this was 40 to 40 which meant defeat since proffered amendments are automatically rejected on tie votes. The Republicans, however, lined up behind this proposed cut (30-6),¹⁹ and on an amendment by Bridges to reduce the bill by \$250,000,000, enough Democrats joined Republicans to put it across by a vote of 47 to 33 (Republicans 33-3).²⁰ Following their efforts to reduce the amount of money involved,

¹⁷Ibid., p. 4553

¹⁸Ibid., p. 6442 (May 5, 1950)

¹⁹Ibid., p. 6445

²⁰Ibid., p. 6448

Republicans swung behind the bill on the final vote and were counted 24 to 7 in favor of passage.²¹

The Republicans in both houses were unhappy about the conference committee's version of the bill. In the House Republicans objected to the increase in the amount over what the House had authorized and voted against adoption of the conference report (74-63).²² In the Senate, Republicans objected to the guarantees offered to American investors abroad and switched from support to opposition by voting (27-9) against adoption of the conference report.²³ This last vote, however, probably cannot be taken as indicative of the Senate GOP attitude toward the entire program.

Before Congress was once again called upon to dispose of European economic aid, a Congressional election had intervened to increase GOP strength in both the House and the Senate. With this election had come a new wave of economy-mindedness. In addition, there was a major shift in American thinking on aid to Europe. Whereas the Marshall Plan and the European Recovery Programs of 1948-1950 were designed to strengthen the economies of western Europe and thus to increase their political stability and improve their world economic positions, the new emphasis was on military aid. With the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, both Congress and the Administration came to consider the most pressing need of Europe to be military forces to resist aggression which might be imminent.

The aid bills of 1951 and 1952, therefore, were entitled Mutual Security Acts and reflected the growth of military as contrasted to economic aid. In

²¹Ibid., p. 6490

²²Ibid., pp. 7538-7539 (May 23, 1950)

²³Ibid., p. 7725 (May 25, 1950)

the first of these (1951) the Administration asked for a total of \$8.5 billion for both military and economic purposes, approximately \$2.2 billion of this being for economic assistance. The House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed to cut \$651,250,000 from the total figure, and also suggested the creation of a new Mutual Security Agency. By a vote of 187 to 177 the full House cut another \$350,000,000 from the economic portion of the aid, the Republicans favoring this reduction by a vote of 149 to 14. On final passage the vote was 260 to 101, but the Republicans were divided 81 against, to 80 for the bill.²⁴

During the hearings in the Senate, Taft, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, said that the request for military aid could not be cut very much, but that he felt that the economic aid could be reduced by one-half. The Senate committee unanimously agreed on \$7,535,750,000 as a total figure, but when the debate opened, Everret Dirksen (Republican, of Illinois) immediately pushed through an amendment cutting \$250,000,000 more from the economic aid portion of the bill. The vote was 36 to 34, and the Republicans lined up behind the Senator from Illinois by a vote of 26 to 5.²⁵ The Republicans supported Dirksen again (26-7) when he attempted to increase the reduction to \$500,000,000, but this move was defeated by the Senate as a whole (41-31).²⁶ Again, despite these efforts to limit the scope of European economic aid, the Republicans were found voting overwhelmingly (22-5) in favor of the bill on final passage when the Senate itself carried the bill (61-5).²⁷

The conference committee reached a compromise figure somewhat closer to the final House bill and decided to retain the provision for a Mutual Security

²⁴Ibid., Vol. 97, p. 10954 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 31, 1951)

²⁵Ibid., p. 10885

²⁶Ibid., p. 10928

²⁷Ibid., p. 10954

Agency. The conference report was accepted by the Senate (56-25) after it rejected (48-30) a motion to recommit the bill. The Republicans favored recommitment (28-8), but subsequently voted (19-18) in favor of accepting the conference report.²⁸ The compromise version was accepted in the House by a vote of 230 to 98, but Republicans voted for rejection (78-76).²⁹ It appears that the Republicans in the Senate were very much in favor of a Mutual Security Program but definitely opposed to continued economic aid as distinguished from military aid, while at least half of the House Republicans were hostile to the entire program, especially the economic aid portion of the bill.

In 1952 the emphasis in European aid was even more on military assistance. The term "economic aid" had been dropped completely, and the bill spoke only of "military aid," and "defense support." The total amount authorized for Europe under the last category was \$1,282,433,000, which represented a considerable reduction from the \$1,637,300,000 recommended by the Administration.

The House committee voted to cut the recommended European defense support figure by only 10 percent, but the House itself later agreed to an additional cut of \$615,300,000 in the economic aid funds for Europe. This reduction came on an amendment by Vorys, Ohio Republican, and was supported by House Republicans by a vote of 160 to 10. On the vote for passage only 78 Republicans voted "yea," while the "nay" vote was 89.³⁰

In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one billion dollars was cut from the bill, which represented approximately a 12.6 percent reduction on each item. Voting for the reduction were all the Republicans (save Lodge, who did

²⁸Ibid., pp. 12479-12484 (Oct. 2, 1951)

²⁹Ibid., p. 12720 (Oct. 5, 1951)

³⁰Ibid., Vol. 98, pp. 5915-5917. (82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., May 23, 1952)

not vote) and four Democrats. Approval of the bill after the reduction, however, was by a vote of 12-0.

The Senate took up the foreign aid bill May 5 but considered it only briefly. On a motion by William F. Knowland (Republican, of California) the Senate voted (40-33) to send the legislation to the Armed Services Committee for further study.³¹ Knowland argued that with 70 percent of the aid for military purposes his committee had a "direct and vital interest in the bill." He said it should consider whether the bill should be cut beyond the one billion slash made by the Foreign Relations Committee. The Republicans voted for Knowland's motion (37-2). In spite of the fact that the Armed Services Committee was considered less friendly than Foreign Relations, the former group reported the bill out unchanged.

The only roll-call vote taken directly on the economic or "defense support" section of the bill was on an amendment by Ellender, Mississippi Democrat, to cut this portion by \$500,000,000. The Senate defeated this proposal, but the Republicans supported it by a vote of 27 to 10.³² On several other votes Republicans supported moves to reduce the over-all authorization, but on the vote for final passage, GOP Senators voted (29-5) in favor of the bill.

Figures A and B show clearly the trend of Republican behavior in Congress on the continuing issue of general European economic assistance. During the five years charted, the Republican voting shifted from strong support of the program in 1948 and 1949 to strong opposition in 1951 and 1952. In part, no doubt, this change can be attributed to a growing opposition to all phases of Democratic foreign policy, but there was also a distinct disenchantment with

³¹Ibid., p. 4774 (May 5, 1952)

³²Ibid., p. 6107 (May 28, 1952)

the idea of economic as distinguished from purely military aid. Again there was the factor of economy, and the feeling that the economies of Europe (some of them socialistic) were no longer in any more need of our dollars than were we.

As a part of this general question it is interesting to look at Republican attitudes toward aid to two countries not within the scope of the European Recovery Program--Spain and Yugoslavia. Many Republicans had been critical of our policy (undertaken in concurrence with a United Nations policy) of the removal of our ambassador from Spain. As the tensions between ourselves and the communists became greater after 1947, more and more Republicans saw no reason why we should ostracize this pre-eminently anti-Communist state from the community of the free world. During 1949 such leading Republicans as Taft, Wherry, Mundt, and Brewster made statements favorable to the re-establishment of free diplomatic relations with Franco.

During consideration of the Foreign Assistance Bill in 1950, an amendment to include \$50,000,000 in aid for Spain was sponsored by Senators Brewster, Maine Republican, and McCarran, Nevada Democrat. It was defeated (42-38), but 21 Republicans supported the move while only 14 opposed it.³³ In the appropriation stages another amendment was introduced in the Senate to provide an ECA grant of \$100,000,000 to Spain. This was amended to make the aid in the form of a loan from the Export-Import Bank, and in this form was agreed to. On this roll call 31 Republicans voted for such a loan, while only four voted against it.³⁴ In conference committee this figure was reduced to \$62,500,000,

³³Ibid., Vol. 96, p. 5855 (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Apr. 27, 1950)

³⁴Ibid., p. 11469 (Aug. 1, 1950)

and in this form it was passed. The language of the appropriation bill was such that it issued a "directive" to the President to loan this money to Spain. President Truman called such a "directive" unconstitutional, and said he would consider it merely as an "authorization," and contended he already had such authority. In each of the Military Assistance Programs of 1951 and 1952 funds were appropriated for military, economic, and technical aid to Spain, and although there were no direct roll-call votes on this issue, all indications are that Republican support remained high for cooperation with Spain.

In 1950 the President asked that Congress provide \$38,000,000 in relief aid for Yugoslavia. The Senate approved this request by a vote of 60 to 21 after it had rejected a motion by Senator Knowland to recommit the bill.³⁵ On the roll-call for recommitment, 34 Republicans voted favorably and five against, but on the vote to approve the aid to Yugoslavia, Republicans voted (24-14) in favor of such aid. A significant fact here is that had the five Republicans who voted against recommitment abstained or voted for recommitment, the bill would have been defeated. Thus it would appear that Republicans were more inclined to favor economic assistance to a non-democratic country on the Right than to a non-democratic country on the Left, even though the latter was anti-Russian, for the moment at least.

II

Turning now to the steps which culminated in an almost complete shift from economic to military assistance to Europe, it is necessary to return to the origins of the North Atlantic Pact. It will be remembered that the Senate in 1948 overwhelmingly approved the Vandenberg Resolution which drew attention to the possibility and, indeed, the desirability of forming regional groupings

³⁵ Ibid., p. 16402 (Dec. 11, 1950)

"inside the [United Nations] charter, but outside the veto" under the terms of Article 51.³⁶ In a short time the Administration had taken the initiative in entering into such a grouping in Western Europe for defensive purposes. There was already in existence the Brussels Pact under which Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had agreed to stand together if attacked and had begun in a small way to build up military forces.

It was now proposed to create a larger grouping to include not only more states of Western Europe (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Italy), but to bridge the Atlantic and include Canada and the United States. This historic pact, the first military alliance in our history, was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, and was subjected to scrutiny by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee beginning April 27.

During the negotiations leading up to the treaty, the Senate Committee had been kept informed by the new Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson. On February 18 and again on March 8 the Secretary met with the committee to review in detail the draft language agreed upon by the negotiating parties. Both Vandenberg and Connally worked for modifications of the State Department's proposals in two particular respects. One was in Article 5, the operating clause, which pledged the signatories to regard an attack against one or more of them in Europe or in North America as an attack against all. Each nation would have pledged itself to take action, including the use of armed force, to restore the security of the North Atlantic area. The Senators insisted upon changing this to an obligation to take such action "as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force."

³⁶See above p. 159

Secondly, Vandenberg, Connally, and other committee members urged that a cover-all provision be added to the treaty providing that the Pact would be ratified and its provisions "carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." The purpose of this was to make clear that Congress should not be by-passed.

After sixteen days of hearings the committee not only recommended ratification (13-0), but included in its report specific praise for the Executive for its efforts to work closely with Congress in developing this policy. By the time the Pact was sent to the Senate floor for debate so much discussion had already taken place that there was little left to say. Vandenberg and Connally opened the debate with impressive addresses. The major opposition speech was made by Senator Taft who, together with a handful of Republicans, attacked the obligation of arms aid and the proposed military implementation of the bill. It will be remembered, however, that regional arrangements were specifically endorsed by the Republican platform of 1948 and, therefore, the opposition was on somewhat shaky ground. Three reservations were introduced: In the first place, Wherry, Taft, and Watkins wanted the Pact to state specifically that no obligation was to be understood for the United States to furnish arms. This was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 74 to 21, but 18 Republicans supported the reservations, while 25 opposed.³⁷ Secondly, Watkins alone introduced a reservation stating that the United States assumed no obligation to assist another party by arms without consent of Congress. The Senate voted down this proposal (84-11), and only 10 Republicans voted "yea," while 33 opposed it.³⁸

³⁷Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 9915 (81st Cong. 1st Sess., July 21, 1949)

³⁸Ibid., pp. 9915-9916

Finally, Watkins tried to get the Senate to adopt a reservation limiting the military obligations of the United States. This last proposal stated that Congress was under no obligation, not even moral, to use armed forces under this Pact. Only eight Senators (seven Republicans) were with Watkins on this, while 87 Senators (36 Republican) voted to reject this proposed reservation. The final Senate vote on the North Atlantic Treaty was (82-13) in favor of passage, the Republicans concurring (32-11).³⁹

Whatever degree of bipartisanship and legislative-executive cooperation was operative in the Senate's handling of the North Atlantic Pact was largely lost in the debate over how to implement the Pact. As mentioned earlier, Vandenberg had specifically reserved judgement on the follow-up arms program, because he felt the early plans of the Administration indicated it was going ahead too rapidly. He was very much interested in establishing the principle of cooperative action against aggression contained in the Pact, but he feared that too much immediate emphasis on the arms program might touch off a renewed armament race between the East and the West.

Then in July, 1949, without any advanced bipartisan consultation, Truman sent to Congress a legislative request for a \$1.45 billion arms program to strengthen not only the signatory nations to the North Atlantic Treaty but certain other nations as well. The major objections among many legislators were (1) that the bill ignored the machinery set up in the treaty for handling aid--that is, the "advisory council" and "defense committee" which had not yet been established; and (2) that the bill gave the President "unprecedented" powers to run the program completely on his own, or as Vandenberg put it, "to sell, loan, or give away the entire defense establishment to anybody at anytime on any

³⁹Ibid.

terms.⁴⁰ What was wanted, Vandenberg thought, was a very brief interim bill to demonstrate our good faith pending the development of an integrated arms program as directed by the Pact itself.

After a warning of rejection by both the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee, the proposed bill was withdrawn and a new draft submitted which sharply curtailed the President's authority and tied the arms aid more closely to North Atlantic defense and the United Nations. The new version requested military aid in the amount of \$1.4 billion. Consultation with Vandenberg and Dulles (then in the Senate) continued at various stages during Congressional consideration.

After extensive hearings the House Foreign Affairs Committee made thirty-four alterations in the bill, most of them minor, and reported the revised measure favorably. Four groups of members reported minority views at different stages giving their opinions on how to meet the problem. A bipartisan group composed of Richards, South Carolina Democrat, Vorys, Ohio Republican, Judd, Minnesota Republican, and Burleson, Texas Democrat, favored an interim six-months program of only half the amount proposed. In the meantime these Representatives thought the Europeans should come up with a long-range program. They also felt that the real deterrent to Russian aggression was less apt to come from a program such as the one envisaged than from American air power with the atomic bomb.

Representative Fulton, Pennsylvania Republican, and Javits, New York Republican, also favored the interim approach, while Representatives Chipfield, Illinois Republican, Smith, Wisconsin Republican, and Jackson, California Republican, criticized the "controversial nature of the bill," and the fact that

⁴⁰Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Arthur Vandenberg, p. 507

much of the testimony on behalf of it came from military spokesmen. This latter group concluded their statement by saying:

"...We feel impelled to oppose bill H. R. 5895 on the basic ground that the method of assistance proposed in the bill is not consonant with the major objectives of United States' policy, the security of the United States and that of friendly free nations...

"...the mechanism of ground force defense, relied on in the proposed legislation, is outmoded and would be grossly inadequate in the face of vastly superior Soviet forces.

"The assistance provided under the provisions of the legislation would...impede essential economic recovery of that area.

"...Western Europe can be defended only by air power."⁴¹

The fourth minority report was from Representatives Vorys, Judd, and John Davis Lodge (Republican, of Connecticut) and was a criticism of the Administration for omitting China from the proposed legislation.⁴²

On the floor of the House an amendment was adopted which reduced the amount of direct appropriations to NATO countries to \$580,495,000. Republicans favored this reduction overwhelmingly (137-8),⁴³ and when the vote on final passage was taken, the GOP members lined up (94-51) against the bill.⁴⁴

In the Senate the bill was taken under consideration by a joint committee composed of the membership of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee. With some Senators balking at the \$1.1 billion to be furnished Treaty countries, and Secretaries Acheson (State) and Johnson (Defense) adamant that it could not be whittled, Senator Vandenberg set forth a formula which became the compromise solution. It proposed reducing the immediate cash

⁴¹H. Rept. No. 1265, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 16, 1949), pp. 62-67

⁴²Ibid., pp. 68-70

⁴³Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 11807 (81st Cong. 1st Sess., Aug. 18, 1949)

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 11808

outlay to nearer \$500,000,000 with the remaining \$600,000,000 being used to back up contracts awarded by the government as part of the Military Assistance Program. This solution was accepted although the total amount involved was somewhat reduced. The final vote on the entire bill in the joint committee was 20 to 3, with only Democrats George, Russell, and Byrd opposed.

On the floor two major attempts were made to reduce the amount authorized for this program, and both were rejected. The first was by Senator George, Georgia Democrat, who proposed a reduction of \$200,000,000 and the second was an amendment introduced by Knowland, California Republican, for a cut of \$100,000,000. On both roll calls only ten Republicans opposed the reduction, while 23 voted for it, but on final passage Republicans supported the measure (19-14).⁴⁵ The Republicans then in both houses were somewhat less than enthusiastic about the arms aid program. A majority of the House Republicans were against the bill in any proposed form even after it had been reduced in size. Senate Republicans wanted the authorizations in the bill reduced, and almost half of them voted against passage of the bill.

The change of attitude a year later on the Military Aid Program was striking. The amount requested was \$1,222,500,000 for the second year. The bill was approved (12-0) by the two Senate committees and was reported without amendment. The debate opened June 23, immediately following the Korean attack, and lasted only forty-eight hours. The Administration pressed for immediate passage in view of the deteriorating world situation, and after an initial reluctance, the Republicans agreed to go along. The bill passed the Senate on June 30 by a vote of 66 to 0, and twenty absent Senators said they favored

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 13168 (Sept. 22, 1949)

the legislation. The position of six Republicans was unknown, but with these exceptions, Republican approval was unanimous.⁴⁶

The House acted with equal dispatch. The Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the bill (24-0), no amendments were offered on the floor, and passage was by a vote of 362 to 1, the sole dissenting vote being cast by Vito Marcantonio of New York, while Robert Rich of Pennsylvania voted "present."⁴⁷ This phenomenon can only be explained by the outbreak of fighting in Korea and the threat of world war which was felt to be present.

The Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952 have been discussed briefly in connection with European economic aid which they contained. These acts merged the two previous programs of economic assistance and military aid into one bill. It was noted that Republican hostility toward these acts was mainly directed toward their economic aspects, but by 1951 the great unanimity of support for military aid had also broken up. In 1951 more Republicans in the House voted against continuing the program than voted in favor of it. In the Senate Republicans voted (22-5) for the bill on the final vote,⁴⁸ but earlier voted (16-13) in favor of cutting the military aid figure by \$350,000,000, (28-1) to reduce it by \$250,000,000, and (26-3) in favor of cutting out \$37,000,000.⁴⁹

The degree of hostility thus ranged from a desire for a slight reduction in the amount to outright opposition to the whole program. House Minority Leader, Joseph W. Martin, stated that there was a strong GOP inclination to

⁴⁶Ibid., Vol. 96, p. 9546 (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., June 30, 1950)

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 10646 (July 19, 1950)

⁴⁸Ibid., Vol. 97, p. 10954 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 31, 1951)

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 10935-10954

cut up to a billion dollars from the bill, while others, such as Representative Usher L. Burdick felt the program was not necessary at all.

In 1951 Congress authorized approximately one billion dollars less than the Administration had requested, while in 1952 the over-all reduction was nearer to \$1.5 billion. Much the same pattern was to be noted among Republicans in the latter year. The degree of House Republican opposition was slightly greater on the passage of the bill (89-78), and in the Senate larger GOP majorities were recorded in favor of proposed reductions in the amount authorized. In the upper chamber Republicans voted (22-8) to cut one billion dollars from the bill, (26-10) to reduce the amount by \$500,000,000, (33-10) in favor of cutting \$400,000,000 and (33-1) for a reduction of \$200,000,000.⁵⁰ When the reduced authorization came to a final vote, however, Senate Republicans voted (29-9) for its passage.⁵¹

In summary it can be said that while Republican support for military aid held up somewhat better than that for economic aid, there was a perceptible and continuing trend (with the exception of 1950) toward less support for all European foreign aid in the last four years of the Truman Administration.

There occurred during 1951 another debate on the manner in which the North Atlantic Treaty should be implemented and how far the United States should commit itself to the defense of Europe. The issue was the President's proposal to send four divisions of American troops to be stationed in western Europe, and the resulting public discussion became known as the "Great Debate." This "Great Debate" began with the "troops to Europe" issue, but before it was

⁵⁰Ibid., Vol. 98, pp. 6107, 6098, 6143 (82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., May 28, 1952)

⁵¹Ibid., p. 6157

finished, it had embraced virtually every phase of American foreign policy and the conduct of the war in Korea.

Two events launched the "Great Debate" immediately after the convening of the first session of the 82nd Congress. On the second day of that session Representative Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., New York Republican, introduced a resolution banning the use of future appropriations to send United States troops overseas unless Congress gave its specific consent. The resolution was intended to "avoid commitment of the United States by executive order in...wars in distant parts of the world without the knowledge and authorization of Congress."⁵²

The next day Senator Robert A. Taft, Ohio Republican, Chairman of the Senate GOP Policy Committee, launched a vigorous attack on the Administration's foreign policy in a 10,000 word speech in the Senate. Taft accused the Administration of formulating foreign policy from 1945 to 1951 without consulting Congress or the people. He ran the gamut of American policy in those years and attacked the Korean war, the huge aid programs, and among other things, he said he felt "we had better commit no American troops to the European continent at this time." Taft did not let it rest at that but stated his whole theory of American foreign policy in almost every area.⁵³ Three days later (January 8) President Truman delivered his State of the Union Message, which was chiefly a foreign policy address. On the subject of European defense he said that "strategically, economically, and morally, the defense of Europe is part of our own defense.... None of [these] countries, including our own, has done enough yet, but real progress is being made."⁵⁴

⁵²Cong. Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 8, p. 220

⁵³Ibid., pp. 220-221

⁵⁴Ibid.

On the same day Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, Nebraska Republican, the Minority Floor Leader, introduced a resolution which demanded in the name of the Senate that no American ground troops be sent to western Europe pending determination by Congress of a policy on that matter. The following day (January 9), after conferring with John Foster Dulles in a Grand Rapids, Michigan, hospital, Senator Vandenberg issued a press statement warning the nation against a deadlock in foreign policy. He urged a meeting of loyal minds on this issue as quickly as possible.

But that very evening Senator Taft continued his debate with the Administration in a speech before the National Press Club. Taft said he was willing to sit down with the President or anyone else to try to work out a middle-of-the-road, ten-year preparedness program within the limits of our economy. At a press conference the following day Secretary Acheson said he would be glad to talk with Taft or any other Republican on foreign policy. "I'm glad to know it," Taft said when informed of this comment, but he added that he was not eager to talk with Acheson. He suggested that any foreign policy conversations should include the three Senate leaders: Taft, Millikin (Chairman of the Republican Conference), and Wherry, Republican Floor Leader. However, he said he would not decline a personal invitation if it were extended.

On January 11 a debate arising out of the Wherry Resolution took place in the Senate where William F. Knowland, California Republican, and George W. Malone, Nevada Republican, spoke for the GOP. Knowland suggested that the United States provide ten American divisions for every sixty to be provided by the other NATO nations. And Henry Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts Republican, who also spoke, said that the United States "should not commit one single soldier to Europe without an ironclad agreement that the dispatch of that soldier means

the automatic commitment of a very much larger number of European soldiers."⁵⁵

At a late afternoon press conference the same day the President said there was no question about the authority of the Chief Executive to send troops anywhere in the world. He said, however, that the Administration always consults with Congressional leaders before making foreign policy decisions. Truman also said it was his intention to include some United States forces in General Eisenhower's European Command, and that if Congress tried to restrict appropriations, he would take the issue to the American people.

On January 15 Senator Taft said the nation was facing a "constitutional crisis" and called upon Congress to reassert its right to pass on fundamental principles of foreign policy. He said that unless we were prepared to set up a dictatorship in the United States, Congress should pass on President Truman's authority to send American troops to Europe. It will be remembered that Wherry's resolution was similar to a reservation proposed to the North Atlantic Treaty by Senator Arthur Watkins, Utah Republican, when the Senate was considering the Pact in 1949. Watkins proposed at that time that the United States assume no obligation for the security of the North Atlantic area and that it give armed assistance to any other party to the Pact only upon authorization of Congress. This proposal was rejected by the Senate at that time by an 11 to 84 ballot.⁵⁶

On January 24 the Wherry resolution was sent to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services without further debate or vote. The next day the Senate Democratic Policy Committee agreed to urge these committees to draw up an "affirmative" resolution supporting the President's plan to send troops to

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 222

⁵⁶See above p. 184

western Europe. All action, however, was delayed until after General Dwight D. Eisenhower, newly appointed NATO Commander, had reported to Congress February 1. Eisenhower, in general, supported the Administration's plan for aid in arms and men to Europe, and such Republican Senators as Wherry, Capehart, Cain, and Kem expressed disappointment in the speech and testimony of the General. Senator Taft declared that General Eisenhower's report to Congress made the outlook "more hazy and indefinite and uncertain than it had [been] before." He asked Congress to set a ratio of one American division to every nine the Europeans could raise and reiterated his stand that Congress should sanction further troop commitments overseas.

On February 9 former President Herbert Hoover repeated his warning against involvement of United States troops in a land war in the "quick sands of either Europe or China." He called on Congress to recover its "constitutional authority over starting war." The party's titular leader, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, however, split with these Republicans when he said on February 12 that we should reinforce our units in Europe, and he criticized proposals to withdraw to a Western Hemisphere defense line. The next few days saw Senator H. Alexander Smith, New Jersey Republican, asking for a "reasonable ratio of troops," Senator Edward Martin, Pennsylvania Republican, giving qualified support to Hoover's views, and Senator John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican, lining up solidly with Governor Dewey.

At this point in the "Great Debate" public hearings on the Wherry resolutions were scheduled, and these hearings opened February 15 with the Secretary of Defense, General George C. Marshall, as the first Administration witness. On February 14, 120 Republicans out of the 199 in the House of Representatives endorsed the principles of the Wherry resolution by putting their signatures to a "Declaration of Policy" which assailed the current Administration foreign policy as "dangerous" and tragic, and pleaded that foreign policy be "determined

with the full participation and approval of Congress." The initiators of the petition were Representatives Laverne Smith (Wisconsin), Frank Fellows (Maine), Katherine St. George (New York), Joseph P. O'Hara (Minnesota), Harry L. Towe and T. Mellet Hand (New Jersey), all Republicans, but in addition to Republicans, the petition gained support from scattered members on the Democratic side. Beyond asking for a full role for Congress in shaping foreign policy, the "Declaration" urged further strengthening of this country and hemisphere, reduction of Federal spending on non-defense items, greater cooperation from western Europe, and peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and Japan.⁵⁷

Still other Republicans voiced their views on the troops-to-Europe issue before the debate resulted in any action. Representative Leon H. Gavin, Pennsylvania Republican, supported the troops program; Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon) said it was a mistake for the United States to admit it planned sending only four more divisions to Europe; and Senator Robert C. Hendrickson (New Jersey) said he would vote to provide a reasonable supply of ground troops, the number to be determined by the best judgment of our military leaders. Knowland on February 28 introduced a resolution recommending Congressional approval of four divisions to Europe but setting a 1:6 ratio for divisions to be sent abroad in the future; that is, that for every one United States unit, the Europeans would have to recruit six.

Also on February 28, the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees released a document surveying the entire question of whether the President might commit troops without express Congressional approval. The document said there had been at least 125 incidents where the President had committed troops without legislative authorization.

⁵⁷Cong. Record, Vol. 97, p. 1258 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 14, 1951)

For approximately three weeks three committees held secret and public hearings at which Administration officials, Republican Congressional leaders, and private groups expressed their views to the committees. On March 5 the committees began work on a simple Senate resolution. The new resolution would have endorsed the Administration's authority to send troops abroad without express Congressional sanction and would have signified the "sense of the Senate" that the United States should bear a "fair share" of the defense burden of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This resolution was reported on March 14.

Meanwhile, across the Capitol the Republican Policy Committee approved on March 9 a party resolution which would bar consignment of troops to Europe without explicit Congressional consent. On March 13 Representative Harry L. Towe (New Jersey) offered this GOP resolution in the form of a rider to the draft (Selective Service) bill being considered by the House Armed Services Committee. He and other Republicans on the committee attempted to attach it to that measure but were turned back by a 14 to 24 vote.⁵⁸

The Senate debate on the committee's resolution began on March 16, 1951, and, after a brief Easter recess, voting began on amendments April 2. Wherry, who first introduced a resolution on the subject, promptly moved to displace the simple resolution with a joint one. Connally, Wherry's chief antagonist throughout the debate, raised a point of order to prevent this maneuver and was sustained by the Vice-President. The Administration won a second victory when the Senate defeated (27-62) the move by Case to prevent troops under twenty years of age from being used abroad. Republicans favored this amendment by a vote of 25 to 18.⁵⁹

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 3288 (Apr. 14, 1951)

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 3075 (Apr. 12, 1951)

An amendment by Watkins (Republican, of Utah) to lift peace treaty limitations on Italy's military strength so she could participate in NATO was accepted by the Senate (67-20) and was supported by Republicans by a vote of 35 to 9.⁶⁰ Herbert Lehman (Democrat, of New York) proposed an amendment calling for full collaboration between Congress and the President. This was defeated by the Senate (55-35) and was overwhelmingly opposed (4-41) by the Republicans.⁶¹

Both of these votes were considered rebuffs to the Administration, but the Administration's greatest defeat came on April 2 after what had appeared to be a victory. McClellan (Democrat, of Arkansas) offered an amendment expressing the sense of the Senate that no troops in addition to the four divisions contemplated for Europe "shall be sent...without further Senatorial approval." Opponents of the proposal persuaded McClellan to change the word "shall" to "should," and then succeeded in defeating the amendment (44-46).⁶² Shortly thereafter, however, Case moved to reconsider this narrow vote, and despite pleas by Connally and even some GOP leaders not to clamp limitations on the troops program, the Senate voted (49-43) to reconsider the vote, and then voted immediately by the same margin to pass the McClellan amendment as modified.⁶³ Eleven Democrats joined 38 Republicans to put this amendment across, while only eight Republicans joined the Administration's leaders in the attempt to defeat it.

Other amendments of somewhat less import followed and the Senate on April 4 granted final approval to the modified resolution by a vote of 62 to 21.⁶⁴

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 3088

⁶¹Ibid., p. 3104

⁶²Ibid., p. 3082

⁶³Ibid., p. 3096

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 3293 (Apr. 4, 1951)

Nineteen of the twenty-one negative votes were cast by Republicans, but twenty-seven Republicans voted in favor of the Resolution. By a vote of 59 to 29 the Senate then agreed to a Wherry motion to incorporate the language of the simple resolution just passed into a concurrent resolution which would open the way to possible House action. The Republicans favored this motion (40 to 5) and voted (36 to 9) in favor of the concurrent resolution when it passed (45-41).⁶⁵

III

While the central issues in American foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War were concerned with the great aid programs which were intended to help build a strong free world, many peripheral problems came to the attention of Congress on which it may be interesting to examine Republican attitudes. One of these was the question of trade with Communist-dominated states.

As early as 1948 Congress had enacted legislation designed to limit or prohibit the export of war materials to Iron Curtain countries from countries receiving United States assistance. Such a provision was included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 and another was added in 1950 to a supplemental appropriation bill (Republicans in favor 32-0). A third provision was enacted in 1951 sponsored by Senator Kem (Republican, of Missouri), and was contained in the Third Supplemental Appropriations Act. The Kem Amendment repealed the earlier amendment and spelled out export limitations in greater detail. It prohibited economic or financial (but not military) aid to any nation exporting military equipment or materials used for military production to the Russian orbit. The restrictions applied when United States armed forces were engaged in hostilities while carrying out United Nations decisions. Exceptions to the embargo could be made by the National Security Council.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 3288

Using this power to make exceptions, the Council suspended operation of the Kem Amendment for 90 days on the grounds that it was against the best interests of the United States. The Economic Cooperation Administration also objected to the amendment, complaining that it was too strict to permit effective continuation of the United States foreign aid program. On June 2, in signing the appropriation bill which included the Kem Amendment, President Truman called for prompt repeal of the provision and asked for separate legislation if Congress decided some restrictions were necessary.

Following this suggestion, a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee began study of new legislation and prepared a bill (H. R. 4550), which Representative Battle (Democrat, of Alabama) introduced on June 21; it was favorably reported by the full committee on July 16; and on August 2 the House considered the bill and passed it by a voice vote. On August 21 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the bill with amendments. The major modifications favored by this group would have made the Administrator of the foreign aid program responsible for carrying out the provisions of the bill, whereas the House version called for a special Mutual Defense Assistance officer to handle the administration.

During the floor debate on August 27 and 28, Senators Kem and Wherry attacked the bill on the grounds that its purpose was "to destroy the Kem Amendment" and replace it with "a flexible, discretionary statute, which could be interpreted by the State Department as it sees fit, and which would permit the flow of strategic materials to Red China to continue."⁶⁶ The Senate rejected (29-46) Kem's motion to recommit the bill so that a committee could hold hearings on the measure. Kem was handed a second defeat when the Senate refused (27-44) to accept an amendment substituting a version by him which was stronger

⁶⁶Cong. Quarterly Almanac, Vol. VII, p. 212 (1951)

than the original "Kem Amendment." On the first of these roll calls Republicans favored recommitment by a vote of 29 to 7, and on the second, the GOP Senators supported the "Kem Amendment" by a vote of 25 to 8. On final passage, however, Republicans supported the bill by an 18 to 16 vote. The Senate passed the bill (56-16) with the committee amendments intact, and the House accepted the Senate version by voice vote.⁶⁷

A survey of many minor issues would merely repeat the pattern already visible. This chapter has shown in some detail the behavior of Republicans in Congress on foreign policy issues involving Europe over a four-year period (1949-1952). It has been shown that a distinct trend toward less support for Administration policies developed through these years. A subsequent chapter will show some of the causes and significance of this trend in terms of intra-party and inter-party relationships.

⁶⁷Cong. Record, Vol. 97, pp. 10745-10746 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 28, 1951)

FIGURE A

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
SENATE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT

| <u>1948 European Recovery Program</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Reduce Authorization \$5.3 billion to \$4 billion | 24 | 23 |
| Passage of Act | 31 | 13 |
| <hr/> | | |
| <u>1949 Extension of ERP</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| Cut authorization by 15 percent | 27 | 14 |
| Cut authorization by 10 percent | 23 | 18 |
| Eliminate authorization-leave to appropriation | 24 | 12 |
| Passage of Bill | 32 | 8 |
| <hr/> | | |
| <u>1950 European Econ. Aid Portions of For. Ec. Assist.</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| Cut one billion dollars | 24 | 12 |
| Cut \$500,000,000 | 6 | 30 |
| Cut \$250,000,000 | 3 | 33 |
| Passage of Bill | 24 | 7 |
| <hr/> | | |
| <u>1951 Econ. Aid Portions of Mut. Sec. Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| Cut \$500,000,000 | 7 | 26 |
| Cut \$250,000,000 | 5 | 26 |
| Passage of Bill | 22 | 5 |
| <hr/> | | |
| <u>1952 Econ. Aid in Mut. Sec. Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| Cut \$500,000,000 | 10 | 27 |

FIGURE B

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
HOUSE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT

| <u>1948 European Recovery Program</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
|--|------------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Passage including W. Germany, Greece, Turkey, China</u> | <u>171</u> | <u>61</u> |
| <u>Adopt Conference Report (Spain out)</u> | <u>167</u> | <u>58</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1949 European Recovery Program Ext.</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>125</u> | <u>38</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1950 Foreign Assistance Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>78</u> | <u>69</u> |
| <u>Adopt Conference Report</u> | <u>63</u> | <u>74</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1951 Mutual Security Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>Amend to send bill to Com. to cut \$350 m. econ. aid Eur.</u> | <u>14</u> | <u>149</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>80</u> | <u>81</u> |
| <u>Adopt Conference Report</u> | <u>76</u> | <u>78</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1952 Mutual Security Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut \$615,300,000 from Eur. econ. aid</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>160</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>78</u> | <u>89</u> |

FIGURE C

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH EUROPE
SENATE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT

| <u>North Atlantic Pact</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
|--|------------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>No obligation understood to furnish arms</u> | <u>25</u> | <u>18</u> |
| <u>No obligation assumed to assist another party without Congressional consent</u> | <u>33</u> | <u>10</u> |
| <u>No obligation to use forces</u> | <u>36</u> | <u>7</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>32</u> | <u>11</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1949 Military Arms Program</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>George amendment to cut by \$200,000,000</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>23</u> |
| <u>Knowland amendment to cut by \$200,000,000</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>23</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>19</u> | <u>14</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1950 Military Aid Program</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>No amendments -- Passage</u> | <u>32</u> | <u>0</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1951 Mutual Security Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut military aid by \$350,000,000</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>16</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut military aid by \$250,000,000</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>28</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut military aid by \$37,000,000</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>26</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>22</u> | <u>5</u> |

FIGURE C - Continued

| <u>1951 Troops to Europe</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>Limit to four divisions</u> | <u>8</u> | <u>38</u> |
| <u>Recommittal</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>30</u> |
| <u>Cut four additional divisions</u> | <u>14</u> | <u>28</u> |
| <u>First adoption (S. Res. 99)</u> | <u>27</u> | <u>19</u> |
| <u>Final adoption (S. Con. Res. 18)</u> | <u>36</u> | <u>9</u> |
| | | |
| <u>1952 Mutual Security Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut one billion dollars</u> | <u>8</u> | <u>22</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut \$500,000,000</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>26</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut \$400,000,000</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>27</u> |
| <u>Amend to cut \$200,000,000</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>33</u> |
| <u>Passage</u> | <u>29</u> | <u>9</u> |

FIGURE D

MILITARY COOPERATION WITH EUROPE
HOUSE REPUBLICAN SUPPORT

| <u>1949 Mutual Defense Assistance Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
|---|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Reduce amount by \$150,000,000+ | 8 | 137 |
| Passage | 51 | 94 |
| Recommit Conf. Report | 45 | 89 |
| Adoption of Conf. Report | 51 | 84 |
| | | |
| <u>1950 Mutual Defense Assistance Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| | 151 | 0 |
| | | |
| <u>1951 Mutual Security Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| Passage of Bill | 80 | 81 |
| Adoption of Conf. Report | 76 | 78 |
| | | |
| <u>1952 Mutual Security Act</u> | <u>Favor- able</u> | <u>Unfavor- able</u> |
| Passage of Bill | 89 | 78 |
| Adoption of Conf. Report | 89 | 73 |

CHAPTER VII

REPUBLICANS AND THE COLD WAR: ASIA

I. China

By the beginning of the period now under consideration (1949-1952), it had become quite apparent that the Cold War would not be limited to Europe. While making determined efforts by subversion and coup d' etat in that area, the Communist-led nationalist movements in Asia were waging open, as well as covert, warfare against the governments of China, Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina, and others. Taking advantage of strong popular resentment against a century of colonialism or corrupt local regimes, the Asian Communists were making considerable headway in their revolutionary drives. The greatest clashes came in China, Korea, and Indochina, and these explosive conflicts posed new and difficult problems for American foreign policy.

The problems that faced the United States in China following World War II were some of the most perplexing and controversial in the field of foreign policy. The United States had long been deeply interested in maintaining the integrity and independence of that country, regarding a stable China as essential to peace in the Far East. But hopes that the Chinese Republic would serve as a stabilizing force in the post-war era were shattered by the impact of a long armed struggle and by the attitude of the Soviet Union. Twelve years of fighting and eight years of Japanese occupation had weakened and divided the country. Inflation steadily increased and production remained low. The Nationalist government failed to hold the confidence of the masses and appeared unable to solve China's many grave problems. In addition, the Soviet Union, which had agreed in 1945 to support the Nationalist government and extend it economic assistance, permitted huge quantities of Japanese war material to fall into the hands of the Chinese Communists. The

Russians also removed some \$2,000,000,000 worth of industrial equipment from factories in Manchuria after the Japanese surrender.¹

The United States, on the other hand, had extended to the Nationalist government of China substantial military and financial assistance. The State Department estimated that this aid amounted to approximately \$1,515,-700,000 from 1937 to V-J Day. This assistance was continued after the war in the form of lend-lease, Export-Import Bank credits, and UNRRA funds amounting to an additional \$2,007,700,000 by 1949.²

In the post-war period, however, the Administration decided that if large-scale aid were to be made effective, some kind of unity had to be achieved in China itself where the Communists were the principal and most threatening rivals of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. There were various proposals for creating some kind of coalition government, and this objective, in fact, was advocated by the Nationalists at that time.³ President Truman sent General Marshall to China in 1946 to try to assist the Chinese leaders in forming a coalition -- including Communists -- that would foster national unity and stability. Not only did the Marshall mission fail in respect to its efforts to form an effective coalition, but the General was frustrated in his attempts to get American assistance into what he regarded as the proper hands in China. After more than a year of futile negotiations, the mission had not achieved its goal and was withdrawn. Following Marshall's return home, the Chinese civil war broke out in earnest.

¹Wm. C. Bullitt, "A Report to the American People on China," Life, Oct. 13, 1947, pp. 35 ff.

²United States Relations with China (State Dept. Publ. No. 3573, July 30, 1949), p. 1042 (Annex No. 185) This publication is usually referred to and is hereafter cited as the White Paper on China.

³Ibid., p. 78

It was during the course of this experience that Administration leaders apparently became convinced that corruption and inefficiency in the Nationalist government nullified American assistance to Chiang Kai-shek. President Truman then placed an embargo on the shipment of arms to China for a period of about ten months.

There was intermittent Republican criticism of almost every Administration action with regard to China after the war, and there was a great deal more after-the-fact criticism of these policies when it became apparent in 1948-1949 that China was lost to the free world. The decisions at Yalta with regard to China were not immediately made public, but after they were, Republicans were highly critical. Even Vandenberg, who was one of the milder critics of our Asian policy, felt that at:

"....Yalta....F.D.R. sold Chiang Kai-shek down the river in order to get Joe Stalin into the Jap war (just four days before the Japs surrendered)."⁴

This statement was made in 1949, and in 1952 the Republican National Committee issued a document on foreign policy which put it in these terms:

"...notwithstanding the 1943 Cairo pledge to restore the boundaries of China and to return Manchuria to the Chinese people, the Administration leaders agreed (at Yalta) to force the National Government of China to surrender Manchuria, with its strategic ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and its railroads, to the control of Communist Russia. This was the price for Russia's promise to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany -- a promise already delivered free of cost sixteen months before by Stalin himself at the Moscow conference.

"China was not invited to the Yalta Conference or even consulted. But Alger Hiss was there advising President Roosevelt."⁵

Further criticism was directed at the Marshall mission and the accompanying embargo on shipments of arms to China. Former Governor Alfred

⁴Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 535

⁵Republican Natl. Committee, Foreign Policy, Democrat Record-Republican Program, pp. 2-3

Landon of Kansas attacked the Marshall program because it tried to "force Chiang Kai-shek to take in the Communists."⁶ Vandenberg said:

"I think our China policy was wrong (and always said so) in striving to force a Communist coalition on China... I think we should have taken realistic steps long ago to sustain the Nationalist Government..."⁷

Finally, the Republicans were critical of the embargo placed on arms shipments to China and in addition began to push for more economic and military aid for China.

In 1948 Congress authorized \$463,000,000 for China, to be divided \$338,000,000 for economic assistance and \$125,000,000 for military aid. The Chinese aid program was approved as Title IV of the ECA legislation, and ECA was empowered to administer the economic side of the plan.⁸ Of these funds some \$54,000,000 remained unspent at the beginning of 1949. In March 1949 the House Foreign Affairs Committee drew up and reported a bill authorizing the President to aid non-Communist China by spending the \$54,000,000 which would remain available to him through February 15, 1950. The only major opposition to the bill came from certain Republicans who objected to the fact that the President's discretion in the use of the funds had been considerably broadened as against the 1948 bill. The committee finally agreed to reinstate the 1948 restrictions and the bill was passed on April 4 by a vote of 279-70,⁹ with 116 Republicans favoring the bill and only 29 opposed.¹⁰

⁶Vandenberg, p. 527

⁷Ibid.

⁸White Paper on China, p. 996

⁹Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 3829, (81st Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 4, 1949)

¹⁰The 1948 Republican platform stated:

"We will foster and cherish our historic policy of friendship with China and assert our deep interest in the maintenance of its integrity and freedom." (Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1948, p. 193)
The Democratic platform did not mention China.

Instead of taking up the House bill as such, the Senate borrowed the gist of it, and, in the form of a new section, appended it to the bill extending the Marshall plan. Senator William F. Knowland, California Republican, submitted an amendment containing this provision. Senator Tom Connally, Texas Democrat, offered a similar amendment but would not have restricted the President's discretion by the words "areas which he may deem to be not under Communist domination." Knowland's version was adopted on a voice vote, and the House later accepted the Senate's method of handling this matter.

Following this action a running debate on China policy took place through the spring and summer of 1949. As the situation worsened, the discussion of what should be done or what should have been done became more heated. Republican criticism of the Administration's handling of the whole Chinese affair mounted higher and higher and more aid was called for. In the House Walter Judd, Minnesota Republican, for many years a Christian missionary to China, called for all-out aid to the Nationalist regime. Senate debate was touched off by a bill introduced by Pat McCarran, Nevada Democrat, which called for a \$1.5 billion loan to China for military and economic purposes. In a letter to Senator Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Acheson stated that a move such as that suggested by McCarran would be "catastrophic," and that there was no evidence that such aid would alter the pattern of current developments in China. He said that the more than two billion dollars given to China since V-J Day had not stemmed the Communist forces.

Following this statement of policy, several Republican Senators opened fire on the State Department. Styles Bridges, New Hampshire, urged a Congressional investigation of the Department's entire China policy. Bridges

accused the Secretary of what "might be called sabotage" of the "valiant attempt" of the Chinese Nationalists to keep at least a part of China free. Senator Knowland charged that we were following a policy of undermining the morale of a former friend and ally. Wayne Morse, Oregon Republican, said that Acheson's position appeared to be "a sad and late admission of a fumbling and bumbling China policy." In April Bridges and Kenneth S. Wherry, Nebraska Republican, also an outspoken critic of the State Department's China policy, were invited to the White House for a conference on China with the President and Acheson. Wherry reported that the situation was discussed in considerable detail, and that it was a "most interesting conference," in which he "learned some things he hadn't known before."

By this time outlines of the Administration's plan to arm countries against Communist aggression were becoming known to Congress. This was the \$1,450,000,000 Military Assistance Program drawn primarily for Western European nations. It made no mention of aid to China, but Senator Knowland announced that a group of Republicans planned to move to add \$200,000,000 to the measure for China.

Another policy question bothering the Republicans was the possible recognition of the Communist government of China by the United States. Late in June Senator Vandenberg expressed concern that a secret move to recognize the Communist regime was under study in the State Department. Senator Knowland then released a letter that twenty-one Senators -- five Democrats and sixteen Republicans -- had sent to President Truman on June 25, expressing bitter opposition to any such move. They requested that all possible aid be given the Kuomintang or any other constitutional government resisting

communism in China, asserting that any other policy would be inconsistent with the Truman Doctrine.¹¹ This same group got behind Knowland in pushing a military program for China similar to the Greek-Turkish aid plan, to be administered by a military mission to China like the United States maintained in Greece. Knowland told the Senate that if it were necessary to aid Greece, a nation of 15 million people, to keep it from the Communist orbit, it was of equal importance to provide the same aid for China.

The following month, Knowland and eleven other Senators drew up an amendment to the Military Assistance Program which they said they would offer whenever it reached the Senate floor. Their measure called for \$175,000,000 in military aid to non-Communist China. The Senators said that if this were not incorporated into the MAP, they would press it as a separate legislative proposal. To dramatize their position they asked Secretary of Defense Johnson to recall General Douglas MacArthur from Japan to testify before Congress on the MAP, with special reference to China and the Far East.

The Administration's response to pressure from the Knowland group was its release on August 6 of a White Paper on China prepared by the State Department.¹² This document said the Chinese Nationalists were on the verge of collapse because of the military, political, and economic incapacity of the Kuomintang leaders. The White Paper rejected the idea that greater American help could have averted successive defeats by Chiang Kai-shek at the hands of the Red armies. The issuance of the White Paper merely provoked a new outburst of the same arguments by the same people in Congress. There were further demands for new assistance to Chiang, and before

¹¹The Republican signers of this letter were Baldwin (Conn.), Knowland (Calif.), Bridges (New Hampshire), Brewster (Maine), Reed (Kansas), Mundt (S. Dak.), Ferguson (Mich.), Morse (Oregon), Young (N. Dak.), Thye (Minn.), Martin (Pa.), Butler (Neb.), Cordon (Oregon), Cain (Wash.), Taft (Ohio) and Bricker (Ohio).

¹²Referred to in footnote 2

adjournment, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called upon Secretary Acheson to clarify his position on the recognition of the Communist Chinese regime.

Late in the summer Congress focused its attention on the foreign arms aid legislation, and the supporters of military aid to China had their proposals at hand in the form of amendments to the MAP. When debate on this measure got underway in the House, John D. Lodge, Connecticut Republican, offered an amendment to the MAP to authorize a \$100,000,000 grant to China and southeast Asia, a \$50,000,000 RFC loan, and a supervisory military mission in China of American troops. The amendment was rejected by a 94 to 164 teller vote on August 18.¹³ As it passed the House, the MAP made no provision for aid to China.

When the MAP came under consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, these groups compromised on an amendment giving \$75,000,000 for use in China and the Far East. This was in the nature of a substitute for the amendment proposed by Knowland granting \$175,000,000 and was adopted by a 9 to 11 party-line vote.¹⁴ A few days later a further compromise on China aid was suggested by Vandenberg, who asked for a change in the wording to read the "general area" of China, so that it would be left up to the President to define the term "general area" and determine how the money should be spent. The Vandenberg proposal was approved (16 - 5), with the Republicans solidly in favor of the change.¹⁵

In a declaration on the floor Knowland presented the China feature of the bill as a political victory for the Republicans. He said that by including China in the program's scope, they had reversed the State Depart-

¹³Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 11791, (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 18, 1949)

¹⁴Cong. Quarterly, Vol. V, p. 358. (1949)

¹⁵Ibid.

ment's policy of writing off China. The \$75,000,000 China feature was ultimately accepted by the House and written into law.

By the end of the first session of the 81st Congress, Chiang Kai-shek had left the mainland and fled to the island of Formosa off the China coast. Before the Congress returned in January, China was under control of the Communists, and Formosa remained the last Nationalist outpost. Congress, however, continued to vote funds to the Nationalist regime, partly to aid it in defending Formosa against the Reds, and partly, perhaps, in a slight hope that Chiang might, after all, stage a comeback on the mainland. In 1950 Congress extended from February 28 to June 30 the time in which the President could spend \$103,000,000 in unused ECA-China funds. In addition a total of \$75,000,000 was authorized to be granted for the "general area" of China.¹⁶

In 1951 a portion of the \$535,250,000 for Far Eastern military aid went to Nationalist China, and \$237,500,000 in economic aid was voted to the "general area" of China.¹⁷ Again in 1952 Formosa was voted a share of the \$560,316,500 military and \$181,114,000 economic aid voted to Asia.¹⁸ In none of the latter three years did the authorization of these funds come in for any extensive debate, nor were there any votes on which Republican attitudes could be measured, but it will be shown later, that the partisan debate on China was by no means over.

II. Korea

An adjunct to the China policy debate was the problem of the United States' role in Korea. After V-J Day, Korea was administered as an occupied territory, governed north of the 38th degree parallel by the Soviet Union and south of it by the United States. Relief sent the southern part of

¹⁶Ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 204-216, (1950)

¹⁷Ibid., Vol. VII, p. 210, (1951)

¹⁸Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 161, (1952)

Korea by Congress was authorized and paid for as part of the Army's occupation program to prevent disease and unrest. It was estimated that by 1949 some \$434,000,000 in all types of aid were furnished the occupied territory.

When attempts to unify northern and southern Korea had been fruitless, and after the United Nations had upheld an election in southern Korea by which an autonomous Republic of Korea was established, the American Army withdrew, terminating its military government on January 1, 1949. The army could no longer administer the remaining relief funds it had been granted for Korean assistance. These funds, however, were transferred to the ECA for expenditure in Korea. In June, 1949, the President sent a message to Congress requesting it to continue economic assistance under a separate program.

The President's request was taken up by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which voted on July 12 to favorably recommend a bill authorizing Korean economic aid. The Committee's bill authorized the appropriation of \$150,000,000 to aid Korea by providing it with essential relief, and by helping it to establish a sound economy and to maintain its democratic form of government. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was directed to advance \$50,000,000 to Korea at once pending approval of the appropriation authorized. The Committee warned against any cuts in the money which would only curtail South Korea's recovery effort and would postpone the day when South Korea could economically take care of itself without substantial outside assistance.

It was also pointed out that the question of more aid to Korea was no longer one of relief but of economic recovery. This fact was causing a shift away from the emphasis of previous programs and was reflected in the broader scope of the proposed bill. The group admitted that no course of action which the United States might pursue in South Korea could be guaranteed to be successful, but it felt that to discontinue that aid would be interpreted

in the Far East as a failure of our policy to contain Communism and bolster South Korea against the Communist-dominated northern part of that country.¹⁹

Debate in the Senate on the proposed bill was opened and closed on October 12, 1949. Committee Chairman Tom Connally explained and supported the bill. William Knowland, California Republican, long-time critic of many of our Far Eastern policies, stated that he "most heartily" agreed with all that Connally had said relative to the bill's importance, and he joined him in urging its prompt passage. The third and final Senator to speak was Henry Cabot Lodge, Massachusetts Republican, member of the Committee, who recalled that Republican members had unanimously supported the bill in Committee. It was passed by a roll-call vote of 48 to 13. No amendments were offered to it from the floor, and Republicans voted favorably on the measure (21 - 6). The six, it may be interesting to note, were Senators Capehart and Jenner (Indiana), Kem (Missouri), Langer and Young (North Dakota), and Martin of Pennsylvania.²⁰

The House Foreign Affairs Committee, upon receiving the President's request for Korean aid, proceeded to hold somewhat more extensive hearings than did its Senate counterpart. The group indicated a desire to go into the Korean aid program not only on its own merits, but also in relation to United States' policy in the Orient as a whole. To this end, the Committee heard a long train of witnesses and spent considerable time in drafting a policy section to the bill it would report.

In drafting this part of the bill, the Committee encountered expressions of dissatisfaction with the over-all United States approach to the Far East. Two Republican members, Lawrence H. Smith (Wisconsin) and Walter Judd (Minnesota) complained that aid to Korea just treated the symptoms of a

¹⁹S. Rept. No. 748, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (July 22, 1949), pp. 10-11

²⁰Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 14339 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 12, 1949)

political, economic, and military disease being spread in China by victorious Communist armies. Judd summed it up:

"This is just the first of the rat holes we will have to start pouring money into all around China if we don't plug up the basic rat hole in China itself."²¹

There was considerable support for Judd's position, and according to John M. Vorys, Ohio Republican, also a member of the Committee, the score was about 20 to 5 against the Korean aid plan.²²

No House proposals in legislative form yet existed for the program, and both President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson renewed their requests for action. The Committee responded, and, after accepting an amendment by John Davis Lodge, Connecticut Republican, to stop Korean aid should that country form a coalition government including either Communists or collaborators with the Communist-dominated government in northern Korea, the bill was reported on July 1. The amounts authorized in the House committee version were the same as those in the Senate bill.

On July 26 a minority report was issued by Donald R. Jackson (California) on behalf of himself, Robert B. Chipperfield (Illinois), Lawrence H. Smith (Wisconsin), John Davis Lodge (Connecticut), and John M. Vorys (Ohio), all Republicans. The arguments advanced by these gentlemen in Committee on the necessity of curbing aid to a coalition government were repeated, and they also pointed to an apparent contradiction between aid to Korea, the wartime enemy, and no aid to China, a wartime ally being overrun by Communists.²³

The proposed bill (H. R. 5330) was never brought before the House, which also failed to take action on the Senate bill, and the whole matter

²¹Cong. Quarterly, Vol. V, p. 383. (1949)

²²Ibid.

²³H. Rept. No. 962, 81st Cong. 1st Sess., (July 1, 1949), pt. 2, pp. 1-3

was deferred to the second session. In spite of the failure of Congress to provide economic aid to Korea in 1949, sixty million dollars were voted in military aid as part of the Military Arms Program. These funds were to keep the Koreans in training and to equip security forces to insure their ability to serve as a deterrent to external aggression and a guaranty of internal order. The bill for \$150,000,000 "little ECA," which had failed of passage in the House in 1949, was given immediate consideration on the floor of that chamber when the 81st Congress reconvened in January, 1950. Speaking in favor of the proposal were several Democrats and four Republicans -- Charles A. Eaton (New Jersey), Francis P. Bolten (Ohio), Jacob K. Javits (New York), and William Lemke (North Dakota). Most opposition came from a group of Republicans who objected to sending more money "down the rat hole" mentioned earlier. Principal among these were Lawrence H. Smith (Wisconsin), A. L. Miller (Nebraska), John M. Vorys (Ohio), and Fred L. Crawford (Michigan). The opposition first succeeded in cutting the amount of aid from \$150,000,000 to \$60,000,000. Vorys then moved to send the measure back to committee, but this was rejected by a roll-call vote of 190-194. Republicans, however, went on record (131 - 21) in favor of returning the bill to committee.²⁴ Following this action, the House balloted on the bill itself and defeated it by a vote of 191 to 192. On this roll call the Republicans cast 130 votes against the bill and only 21 in favor.²⁵

The day after the House defeated H. R. 5330, the original Senate measure (S. 2319) was submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Secretary of State Acheson went before the group January 30 to plead for continued Korean aid, and when a Committee vote was taken the next day, the ballot was 17 to 1 in favor of the program. Only Robert B. Chiperfield, Illinois

²⁴Cong. Record, Vol. 96, p. 655 (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Jan. 19, 1950)

²⁵Ibid., p. 656

Republican, opposed the bill, although one other Republican did not vote.

The form in which the committee reported S. 2319 was the form in which the bill became law. It earmarked \$60,000,000 for Korean economic help through June 30, 1950, and authorized the loan of ten merchant ships. In addition a Formosan aid feature (mentioned above) was added to the measure. This provision gained a certain amount of Republican support for the bill as a whole, and it was approved by the House without amendment by a roll-call vote (240 - 134). On this final ballot 42 Republicans favored the bill and 91 opposed it. The final vote came, however, only after a motion by A. L. Miller, Nebraska Republican, to recommit the measure with instructions to cut the Korean aid section from \$60,000,000 to \$20,000,000 was defeated (137 - 239). On this vote 99 Republicans voted to recommit while 30 opposed the move.²⁶ The Senate concurred in the House changes and approved the revised version February 10.

Under Title I of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 this "little ECA" for Korea was continued through June 30, 1951, and up to \$100,000,000 was authorized to finance it. As a part of the big "one package" bill, this program received little attention or debate but was passed together with the entire bill. In addition to this, a small sum was authorized for Korea under the Military Aid Program the same year.

As can be seen from what has been said thus far, many Republicans -- often a majority of them -- had been in clear-cut disagreement with the Administration's Asian policy. A combination of historical and business interest factors presumably made for a great Republican concern with Chinese and Far Eastern affairs. In addition an opposition party is always looking for chinks in its opponent's armor, and the GOP thought it saw one in the breast-

²⁶Ibid., p. 1749 (Feb. 9, 1950)

plate of the Administration which opened wider and wider until 1950 when a whole section of vulnerability lay exposed.

Things did not go well for the United States in Asia during the post-war years, and the Republicans saw no reason for not laying the blame at the Democrats' door. They perhaps felt even less hesitation, because in general they had never been asked for their opinions on what could be done to save the situation in the Far East. Whereas the President and the Secretary of State took Vandenberg, Dulles, and a few others into their inner councils on Europe and the United Nations, this was never the case on Asia until Dulles helped with the Japanese Peace Treaties in 1951-1952.

An interesting thesis has been advanced on this point by James Reston, Chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times. Writing in April, 1951, Reston explains the Republican attack on Asian policy in this way:

"The imperative need to unify behind an effective American foreign policy not only broke the back of the isolationist power, but it created a fundamental political problem for the Republican party. That party has been out of power since 1932. It was blamed at the end of World War I for sabotaging the peace...It wished to avoid that charge after World War II.

"It wanted to go along with the policy of collective organization and collective security, but at the same time it naturally wanted to avoid the charge that it was merely an echo of the party in power. The Far Eastern question provided the Republicans with the answer to that dilemma. They like to complain that they weren't consulted about the Far East. I can remember Senator Vandenberg explaining all this clearly early in 1946. There must be one or two areas left out of the bipartisan arrangement, he said, for otherwise we would be left without any point of opposition in the whole realm of foreign affairs....

"Thus any Administration controversy or calamity in the Far East provides the Republicans with a political argument -- indeed with almost their only foreign policy argument."²⁷

Nowhere else has the suggestion been made that the lack of consultation between the Republicans and the Administration on Asian affairs was a matter of conscious policy on the part of the Republicans. Reston's contention is

²⁷James Reston, "Memorandum to General MacArthur," New York Times Magazine, Apr. 22, 1951, p. 5

that Vandenberg believed sincerely that Europe was the primary theatre in the Cold War and that it was essential to collaborate there, but thought the Republicans should emphasize for domestic political purposes the importance of the Asian theatre and the failure of the Democrats in that area.²⁸ The basis for Reston's analysis is, as indicated above, private conversations he had with Vandenberg as early as 1946.

The Republican reaction to the President's intervention in Korea (June 25, 1950) was, as one might suppose, mixed. Many Republicans immediately supported the move. Senator Knowland (California) said, "I think... the President of the United States today has drawn a line in the Far East which was essential to be drawn at some time... I believe... he should have the overwhelming support of all Americans, regardless of their partisan affiliation."²⁹ Senators Saltonstall and Lodge (Massachusetts) and Smith (New Jersey) voiced their agreement with Knowland's support. No Senator directly attacked the wisdom of the move at the time, but several made critical, rather than praising remarks. Kem (Missouri) asked, "Does this mean that he [the President] has arrogated to himself the authority of declaring war?"³⁰ Malone (Nevada) said, "[I am] not objecting to sending material and assistance to Korea if first the executive department... will fix a foreign policy... That has never been done."³¹

In a speech in the Senate, June 28, 1950, Robert Taft of Ohio pointed specifically to the Administration's shifting position on Korea itself. Acheson had stated, Taft charged, as late as January, 1950, that except for Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, we could not assure the rest of the Far

²⁸ Letter from James Reston to the author, March 8, 1955

²⁹ Cong. Record, Vol. 96, p. 9229. (81st Cong., 2nd Sess., June 27, 1950)

³⁰ Ibid., p. 9228

³¹ Ibid., p. 9239

East against attack. The Secretary, he felt, had made it clear that neither Formosa nor Korea was included behind the line upon which the United States would stand.

The Senator from Ohio then recalled the words of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Tom Connally) on the subject of Korea in an interview of May 5, 1950. On this occasion Senator Connally had told reporters of the United States News and World Report that South Korea was not an essential part of the defense strategy. Taft further pointed to statements by the President which indicated that our military aid to Korea was going for forces only to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, whereas the money had been appropriated by Congress with the intent to build defenses against external aggression.

This Administration attitude, Taft contended, was a direct invitation to the North Koreans to attack and to Soviet Russia to believe that Korea was a soft spot where Communism could move in without difficulty. He went on to point out that the President's intervention in Korea and his statements concerning this action indicated a complete reversal of the previous policy of the State Department, and that he, Taft, welcomed this change. He did, however, somewhat question the timing of the action and strongly attacked the President's acting without consulting Congress:

"It seems to me that the new policy is adopted at an unfortunate time and involves a very difficult military operation indeed...

".... I have only a few words to say on the legal right of the President's act.

"Although I should be willing to vote to approve the President's new policy as a policy and give support to our forces in Korea, I think it is proper and essential that we discuss at this time the right and the power of the President to do what he has done....

"His action unquestionably has brought about a de facto war with the government of northern Korea. He has brought

that war about without consulting Congress and without Congressional approval... if the President can intervene in Korea without Congressional approval, he can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America. Presidents have at times intervened with American forces to protect American lives or interests, but I do not think it has been claimed that, apart from the United Nations Charter or other treaty obligations, the President has any right to precipitate any open warfare.

"It is claimed that the Korean situation is changed by the obligations into which we have entered under the charter of the United Nations. I think this is true, but I do not think it justifies the President's present action without approval by Congress."³²

Taft went on to assert that under Section 6 of the bill passed by Congress to implement United States participation in the United Nations, the circumstances under which the President could use armed forces in support of a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations had been clearly stated. He then said these circumstances could not be said to even remotely exist. He even argued that the resolution of the Security Council was not legal in view of Article 27, which requires the affirmative vote of the five permanent members. The Russians were not in attendance when the resolution was passed.

These points brought out in June, 1950, by Senator Taft are extremely important, because they form the basis of the attack which the Republicans launched on the Administration for its policy in Korea, an attack which was continued relentlessly for two years and which, it can be argued, played no small part in the defeat of the Democrats in 1952. While much of the initial reaction in June was not critical of the President's action, more and more criticism was voiced as time went on. In August the Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a statement which revealed some of the events which they felt lay at the root of our problems in Korea

³²Ibid., pp. 9319-9323. (June 28, 1950)

and elsewhere in Asia:

"Strong bipartisan leadership and cooperation had already resulted in 1945 in the writing and ratification of the United Nations' Charter. During 1947 and 1948 this bipartisan spirit brought forth the program for Greek and Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan, the Rio Pact, and in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty. These have combined to frustrate Communist subversion and to discourage Communist aggression in Europe and in the Americas.

"In sharp contrast, however, has been the policy in the Far East, where we were consistently led to believe that Chinese Communism was only a great agrarian reform movement. After half a century of cordial relations in the Far East and especially with China, with all its troubles and difficulties, in about 1945 we were suddenly faced with a change of policy which is difficult to understand unless we evaluate the subtle betrayals of China at the Yalta Conference. This conference sabotaged the assurances given to China at the Cairo Conference of 1943, where also the future freedom of Korea was pledged. The Yalta agreement turned over to Stalin the control of Manchuria and outer Mongolia and the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. This was part of the price we paid for the unnecessary token participation of Soviet Russia in the war against Japan, one of the consequences of which was the division of Korea at the 38th parallel.

"Our Far Eastern policy, growing out of these events, consistently temporized with and capitulated to the ruthless demands of the Communists dominated by Moscow. Under it the Kremlin was, in effect, given a green light to get whatever it could in China, Korea, and Formosa. This was never a bipartisan policy. It was solely an Administration policy."³³

It can be seen that the Republicans under Taft's leadership felt they had discovered a formula for attacking the Administration at every point of its Far Eastern policy. First, they had established that they had had no part in forming it. Second, things had gone badly for us in the Orient; therefore, the policy must have been wrong. Third, we had betrayed China to the Communists (1) by territorial concessions to Russia at Yalta and (2) by attempting to push Chiang into a coalition with the Chinese Reds.

³³ Statement issued Aug. 14, 1950, by Sens. Wiley, H. A. Smith, Hickenlooper, and Lodge, with Vandenberg's office announcing that he was in "general agreement" with the views expressed. Reprint in Rep. Natl. Com., Background to Korea, pp. 54-56, 1952

Fourth, we had failed to take a firm position in defense of Formosa and China and had then invited the attack across the 38th parallel. Fifth, after inviting the attack, we reversed our policy by a military intervention that was both unwise and unconstitutionally carried out, although this latter charge was not made until sometime after the intervention took place.

With the Korean war thus launched under this severe criticism, it was not surprising that there should be criticism of its prosecution. It was a new kind of war for the United States, and decisions had necessarily to be made as to how much of our strength could be committed, how far into Korea we should carry the war, what were our aims, and under what terms we would terminate the fighting. Almost any decisions made on these points could be questioned, and every decision gave the Republicans an opportunity for attack.

The greatest conflict over the conduct of the war came between the policies announced by the President and those favored (often publicly) by the United States (and United Nations) Commander-in-Chief in the field, General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur. MacArthur's distinguished military career in World War II and in Korea had made him extremely popular with many Americans, and, because of his avowed Republican sympathies, he was a real hero to the GOP. He had on several occasions voiced to Republican Congressmen and others views contrary to the policy of the Administration on foreign affairs and to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the execution of the war in Korea.

It is not difficult to see then why President Truman touched off an almost unprecedented furor in Congress and the country when on April 11, 1951, he recalled MacArthur as United Nations Military Commander in the Far East and relieved him as Supreme Allied Commander in Japan, United Nations Commander-in-Chief for Korea, United States Commander-in-Chief for the Far East, and Commanding General of the United States Army in the Far East. In

a dramatic early morning statement, Truman said he was firing MacArthur because the General was "unable to give his wholehearted support to policies of the United States government and the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties."³⁴ He said his decision reflected "specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations..."

"Full and vigorous debate [Truman said] on matters of national policy is a vital element in the Constitutional system of our free democracy... [but] military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis this consideration is particularly compelling.

"General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The nation owes him a debt of gratitude... I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case."³⁵

In an evening radio address the same day, the President took up some of the points on which he was at issue with MacArthur. The five-star general had favored permitting the Chinese Nationalists to attack the mainland of China since Chinese soldiers were now fighting against us in North Korea. He also had suggested that United Nations forces be allowed to bomb China after they had pushed their way nearly to the Korea-China border. MacArthur felt that we could never win and hold North Korea until we were able to hit at the base from which the Chinese were pouring troops and equipment into Korea. The President said that by following these suggestions "we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war," and he repeated that the entire basis for United States participation in Korea was action to avert a general war.³⁶

³⁴Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, p. 242. (1951)

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

On the same day of MacArthur's removal, distinct legislative proposals emerged in Congress, all sponsored by Republicans. Early that day GOP Senate and House leaders met in the office of Joseph W. Martin, Minority Leader of the House. Amid telephone calls to MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo and talk of impeaching President Truman, a Republican plan was drawn up. It took the form of a resolution terming the General's removal "a situation fraught with danger.. a blow to the national unity..." and urging that the General should be invited to place his "unsurpassed knowledge of political and military conditions in Korea and Asia generally" before a joint meeting of Congress.³⁷ MacArthur's headquarters advised that the General would be "delighted and honored" to accept such an invitation. Attending the meeting were GOP Senators Taft, Bridges, Wiley, Knowland, Wherry, and H. Alexander Smith, together with House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. and other members of the House GOP Policy group.

As soon as the Senate convened on that day, Wherry obtained unanimous consent to introduce the resolution and attempted to get action on it the same day. Majority Leader Ernest W. McFarland, Arizona Democrat, however, objected successfully to this procedure, and the resolution went to committee. In the House the same resolution, introduced by Martin, was sent to the Committee on Rules.³⁸

Following these moves, Senator Richard M. Nixon, California Republican, introduced another resolution to express the "sense of the Senate that... the President should reconsider his action and should restore General MacArthur" to his command. Nixon's resolution was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, where Republican members were already drawing up a

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Cong. Record, Vol. 97, p. 3708 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 11, 1951)

a plan whereby MacArthur could speak to Congress.³⁹

In the Senate the same afternoon, many Democrats strongly defended President Truman's action, and he was not without a number of Republican supporters. Senator Saltonstall said he felt the President had no alternative but to take some action against the General, and both Senators Duff and Lodge agreed. Most Republican reaction, however, ranged from the "shocked" one of Senator Watkins to the references to Munich made by Senators Bridges and Knowland.

The action which finally brought MacArthur before Congress was a motion by House Majority Leader John W. McCormack, Massachusetts Democrat, to hold a joint session to hear him. This was passed April 11 by the House and April 17 by the Senate, and the General appeared on the 19th in the House Chamber. His speech set forth his position on the Far Eastern situation and asserted that all his aims had been shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was promptly denied by the Pentagon, and the way for an investigation was opened. In commenting on his emotion-packed address, Republicans were enthusiastic in their praise, while most Democrats were cautious or critical.

Hearings conducted jointly by the Senate's Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees began May 3 following the release by the committees of the hitherto unpublished report on China and Korea by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer submitted in 1947. In this report General Wedemeyer had told the President of the danger of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea and urged creation of an American-South Korean force to cope with the threat. The release of this report led to comments by some Republican Congressmen criticizing the suppression of the report and speculating that the whole Korean War might have been avoided had Congress been given the facts.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 3614

As the hearings began, Republicans on the Committee made a concerted attempt to open them to the public; whereas the Democrats, urging the problem of security information, fought to keep them closed. Other Senators were to be admitted, but a motion by Bourke Hickenlooper, Iowa Republican, to open the hearings beyond Senate membership was defeated (9 - 14). On the floor Kenneth Wherry, Nebraska Republican, attempted to get the Senate as a body to open the Committee sessions but failed also. In a series of four roll-call votes on procedural questions, the purpose of which was to get the Senate to consider open hearings, it is significant to note that the Republicans and Democrats voted more nearly on party lines than on most such issues. All the GOP Senators voting supported Wherry's maneuver, while all but one of the Democrats voted to block them, McCarran being the one dissenter.⁴⁰ Almost no Republican, it would seem, failed to see in the MacArthur firing an excellent opportunity to embarrass the President.

The greatest part of the testimony at the joint hearings consisted of the opinions of MacArthur, Secretary of Defense Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Between the ousted officer and the Pentagon there were several basic points at issue. MacArthur definitely favored the use of Chinese troops from Formosa, while Marshall felt the use of these troops would be ineffective and unwise. MacArthur did not believe there was any danger of bringing the Soviet Union into the war by bombing Chinese air bases across the Yalu river; whereas the Administration spokesmen thought such a move would run a definite risk of general war. Marshall also pointed out the seriousness of a situation where a field commander was making policy statements apparently contradictory to the views of the Administration.

After Marshall had completed his testimony, Senator Hickenlooper, Iowa Republican, wanted immediately to broaden the hearings by calling Secretary

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 4852 (May 4, 1951)

of State Dean Acheson , but the Committee voted (11 - 14) to hear first the Joint Chiefs. Acheson did not appear until June 1 when he stated that he was concerned not only that MacArthur's policy would have risked Russian intervention in the Far East, but that it would have endangered the solidarity of the United Nations. He disagreed with MacArthur's belief that the United States could afford to go it alone. He said that use of Chinese Nationalist troops would have raised very serious complications, particularly among the United Nations participants in Korea. Acheson further declared that MacArthur's offer to confer in the field with a Red commander on peace terms seriously embarrassed the United States government, which was considering a proposed Presidential peace statement.

Both the questioning and the testimony of Acheson ranged over the whole area of American foreign policy. The subject of the Yalta Conference was pursued at some length. Acheson stoutly defended the concessions made to Russia at that time and noted that Chiang Kai-shek had endorsed them. Republican critics, however, continued to label Yalta as a "sell-out" and as one of the main roots of present United States difficulties in Asia. The Secretary stated that there was no connection between the Yalta agreements and the Communist victory in the Civil War. He implied that the Nationalist defeat was due partially to economic collapse despite huge credits extended Chiang by the United States before the war.

Far from convincing any of his critics, however, Acheson's testimony only furnished an occasion for further demands for his ouster. Senator James P. Kem, Missouri Republican, declared June 2 that "Acheson must go --- soon," while Representative Paul W. Shafer, Michigan Republican, called the Secretary "an admitted liar."⁴¹

⁴¹Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, p. 250 (1951)

Questions were raised at several points about the so-called "China lobby," said to operate in this country on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime, and Acheson, Wedemeyer, and others were questioned on what they knew of such a group. Senator Morse, Oregon Republican, told Acheson that it had been widely charged that the China lobby had for several years been conducting a campaign against policies in China and attempting to discredit the State Department by charging that its policies reflected Communist influences. Both Morse and Brian McMahon, Connecticut Democrat, asked for an investigation, and Acheson agreed that the public should know it if any American funds had been misused for this purpose. Acheson resisted any suggestions that the State Department make the investigation, but when he returned to the hearings on June 9, he informed the Senators that President Truman had instructed the heads of executive departments and agencies to compile any data they might have on the China lobby.

At this point Senator Styles Bridges, New Hampshire Republican, declared that any China lobby would be revealed as "a very minor thing" compared to other pressure groups seeking American power. He, in turn, asked for an investigation into evidences of any pressures from "the Communist government of China" or other enemies of the United States. Bridges has since been charged, particularly in the Reporter magazine, with a close association with this still somewhat undefined "China lobby."⁴² No decision to investigate was made in Congress at this time or any time subsequently.

Considerable discussion ensued on the question of whether top American officials tried to promote a coalition Nationalist-Communist government in China in 1945. Acheson said on June 6 that MacArthur himself had approved plans in 1945 for an attempt to compromise differences between the National-

⁴²Douglass Cater, "Senator Styles Bridges and His Far Flung Constituents," The Reporter, July 20, 1954, p. 17

ists and Communists in China. This was based on an endorsement by MacArthur of a plan to use United States assistance to China as a basis for negotiation to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united, democratic China. The General, three days later in a telegram to Senator Knowland, denied strongly that this meant support of any plan to use American assistance as a weapon to force the existing (Nationalist) government into a political alliance with the Communists.⁴³

The investigation closed after nearly two full months, and the Committee began to consider what reports were to be made. On June 27 a unanimous statement was issued which warned "those who threaten us" not to mistake the controversy which had just been aired for any basic weakness or change in the "temper of our people," and on August 17 the Committee voted (20 - 3) to make no formal report on the investigation.⁴⁴ On August 20 eight of the twelve Republican members released voluminous "conclusions" on the investigation which they said they offered "as Americans," not as Senators. The eight were Bridges, Wiley, H. A. Smith, Hickenlooper, Knowland, Cain, Brewster, and Flanders.⁴⁵

The eight signers concluded that the removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional power of the President, but the circumstances were a "shock to the National pride." They felt there was no serious disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strategy in Korea, and that the testimony revealed that General MacArthur's was the only positive plan for victory there. The eight Republicans declared that under Acheson the policy of American foreign affairs has been primarily to conciliate certain of our United Nation allies rather than to advance the

⁴³Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, p. 252. (1951)

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 253

⁴⁵New York Times, Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 10-11

security of the United States. With regard to China the eight GOP Senators "had not been convinced that Chiang lost China for any other reason than that he did not receive sufficient support, both moral and material, from the United States." This last statement goes all the way in laying the complete responsibility for the success of the revolution in China at the door of an American government to whom that success meant a severe setback in the struggle with the Communist world.

Two of the Republican members who did not sign the statement issued their own opinions. Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts) said he considered "our present task and duty" to be "to deal with the present... and look ahead... rather than look backward in anger and with recriminations."⁴⁶ Wayne Morse (Oregon) was the only member of either committee, either Democrat or Republican, to defend the Administration in the final analysis. He criticized the report of his eight colleagues as partisan and biased and concluded that MacArthur should have resigned his commission "to carry the issue as a civilian to the people of the United States."⁴⁷

At the end of the period under consideration, then, the United States was still carrying on a limited war in Korea, which had by the end of 1952 become stalemated, with both sides unwilling to commit sufficient troops and equipment to push the battle line very far in one direction or the other. Peace negotiations began in mid-1951 but seemed at the close of the Truman Administration to be as stalemated as the war itself. The Republicans (or some of them) found in the situation grounds for two kinds of attack on the Administration. The continued and apparently fruitless loss of American lives led many Republicans to attack the war itself as a blunder, to call it "Truman's war," and to condemn our entry into it; while the MacArthur affair led

⁴⁶Ibid., Aug. 20, 1951, p. 1

⁴⁷Ibid.

them to criticize the way in which the war had been executed and to declare that carrying the war into China by air would have ended the whole affair much more quickly.

III. India

While the bulk of partisan controversy centered on American policy in China and Korea, Congress was obliged in 1951 and 1952 to consider certain aspects of our relations with two other important Asian nations -- India and Japan. As is well known, the position of India in the Asian cold war has been unique. While at all times standing outside the Communist orbit and being associated with the British Commonwealth of Nations, India has nonetheless persisted in a course of action considerably more independent of the United States than our own government would wish. India, of course, shares with the rest of Asia the resentment of any policy which smacks of Western colonialism or domination in Asia and has not been completely immune to the Communist propaganda which plays on this theme. Also, many of her leaders have been influenced by the Ghandi approach to world problems, and her Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, has been willing to go to great lengths to make a conciliatory approach to Communist Russia and China in order to succeed in keeping peace in Asia and the world. It is possible, too, that these leaders regard India's position as favorable to playing the role of "holder of the balance" in the power relations in that area of the world.

The United States, too, has considered India as a key nation in Asia and has been anxious to have her weight thrown clearly on our side in the battle with Communism. We do not want the millions who populate India to follow China under the Communist yolk. To this end we have striven to support Nehru's democratic regime but have been frequently irked by his friendliness to the Communist powers and his reluctance to line up solidly with

the West in the United Nations and in other international relations.

Early in 1951 the Indian government requested food in the form of grain from the United States to avert a threatened famine. There was surplus grain available in the United States under government control, and many Congressmen from both parties voiced support for an Indian aid program. At that time, however, India was opposing certain United States diplomatic moves in the United Nations, and there was considerable resentment at this expressed on Capitol Hill.

On February 12 President Truman urged Congress to give two million tons of grain to India "despite important political differences with that country." The cost of the gift was estimated to be \$190,000,000.⁴⁸ In spite of a somewhat unenthusiastic response in Congress, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on an Indian Aid bill and formally reported the measure on March 5 as a proposed gift. This bill was sent to the Rules Committee for clearance to the House floor, but this group held it up, despite the strong humanitarian arguments voiced by its backers.

In the Senate the Foreign Relations Committee held its own hearings, and on April 27 reported a bill putting the program on a half-gift, half-loan basis. The Senate itself rejected this formula, voting (52 - 32) to put India's aid on a straight loan basis and requiring India to repay the loan partially in certain oriental raw materials (Republicans: 37 - 2). With these changes the bill was passed by a voice vote on May 16.⁴⁹ The addition of the raw material requirement came at the urging of some of the isolationist Republicans such as Styles Bridges (New Hampshire), George W. Malone (Nevada), and Everett Dirksen of Illinois who said, "It's high time we get something out of this."

⁴⁸Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, p. 233. (1951)

⁴⁹Cong. Record, Vol. 97, p. 5400 (82nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 16, 1951)

After considerable prompting by President Truman, the House Rules Committee finally approved a "clean" bill authorizing the aid program on a straight loan basis. The House did not open debate until May 22. Some opposition came from Republicans such as Lawrence W. Smith (Wisconsin), Leo E. Allen (Illinois), and Charles A. Halleck (Indiana), and the latter supported an amendment to predicate aid on an attempt to get India to furnish raw materials to the United States. This amendment was accepted by a voice vote, although a slightly stiffer version had been defeated. By a roll-call vote the bill was then passed (293 - 94), with Republicans supporting it by a margin of 121 to 58.⁵⁰ The House version of the bill, which did not make the repayment in raw materials mandatory, was adopted by the conference committee and passed by a vote of 286 to 82 in the House and a voice vote in the Senate (Republicans in the House: 110 - 51).⁵¹

IV. Japan

Six years after the close of hostilities representatives of forty-eight nations signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, a peace treaty for Japan and a Japanese Security Pact. The President did not send these agreements to the Senate, however, until early in 1952, and hearings began in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in late January. By February 20 the Committee had unanimously recommended Senate ratification, but suggested the adoption of a reservation which stated that the treaty should not be interpreted to prejudice in favor of the Soviet Union the right of Japan or the Allied powers to the South Sakhalin, Kurile, Hakurai, and Shikotan Islands.

On the Senate floor support came from many quarters, but Senator William E. Jenner, Indiana Republican, proposed several additional reservations to

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 5842 (May 24, 1951)

⁵¹Ibid., p. 6187 (June 6, 1951)

the peace treaty and the security pact, and these also had the backing of Margaret Chase Smith (Republican, of Maine). Senator Dirksen, Illinois Republican, on the other hand, wanted to delay action on the treaties pending a "show down" on United States Asiatic policy as a whole, and to this end he filed a motion for indefinite postponement.

This motion was withdrawn and the first Jenner-Smith reservation was taken up. Jenner contended that certain references to the United Nations in the peace treaty would "put American boys under the control" of the world organization, and his reservation provided that nothing in the treaty could limit United States sovereignty or impose continuing limitations on Japan. It was rejected by a vote of 25 to 55, although Republicans supported it (22 - 17).⁵²

Jenner's second reservation stipulated that the treaty did not approve any of the Potsdam agreements affecting Russian-occupied former Japanese islands. The resolution of ratification under which the treaty was brought up disavowed recognition of any Yalta agreements in favor of Russia, but Jenner wanted mention of the Potsdam agreement included, contending it reaffirmed Russia's rights to the islands given at Yalta. This reservation was defeated by a vote of 27 to 54, although Republicans cast 23 votes in favor and only 17 against adoption.⁵³

The next proposed reservation brought forward by Jenner was designed to protect certain rights of Americans in reparations claims against Japan but was turned down (23 - 58) (Republicans: 19 - 21). Jenner's fourth proposal was to reaffirm the United States "open door" policy and stipulate that the only China government recognized in the treaty would be the Nationalist Chinese. Rejection of this reservation was by a vote of 29 to 48, but Re-

⁵²Cong. Record, Vol. 98, pp. 2561-2578. (82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., March 20, 1952)

⁵³Ibid.

publicans favored it (25 - 13).⁵⁴ Dirksen's motion to postpone consideration of the treaty was then defeated (11 - 64) and the peace treaty was approved by a vote of 66 to 10, nine Republicans and one Democrat opposed.⁵⁵

On the Japanese Security Pact Jenner proposed two reservations: one which would require Senate ratification of any administrative agreement covering United States troops, and another declaring that United States security rights could not expire without Senate consent. The first was rejected by a vote of 22 to 45 (Republicans: 12 - 22), and the second by a vote of 26 to 41 (Republicans: 25 - 9).⁵⁶ Following this the Security Pact was approved by a vote of 58 to 9, all opponents being Republicans.⁵⁷

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 2594. Those voting "nay" were Republicans Dirksen (Ill.), Dworshak (Idaho), Ecton (Mont.), Jenner (Ind.), Kem (Mo.), Malone (Nev.), McCarthy (Wis.), Welker (Idaho), Young (N. Dak.), and Democrat McCarran (Nev.).

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 2604-2605

⁵⁷Ibid. Those opposed were Bricker (Ohio), Dirksen (Ill.), Dworshak (Idaho), Ecton (Mont.), Jenner (Ind.), Kem (Mo.), Malone (Nev.), Welker (Idaho), and Young (N. Dak.), all Republicans.

CHAPTER VIII

COOPERATORS VS. OPPOSITIONISTS, 1949-1952

I.

The 1948 elections returned the Republicans to Congress as a Minority of 42 in the Senate and 180 in the House of Representatives. From the standpoint of their foreign policy views a number of Senate oppositionists -- including Senators Revercomb (West Virginia), Robertson (Wyoming), Moore (Oklahoma), Buck (Delaware), Brooks (Illinois), and Wilson (Iowa) -- were among the victims of the Democratic victory. This group was considerably larger than the number of cooperators who were defeated, the latter group being limited to John Sherman Cooper (Kentucky) and Joseph Ball (Minnesota).¹ Writing in the Christian Science Monitor, Roscoe Drummond pointed out that of ten Republican Senators up for re-election who supported cuts in the European Recovery Program, nine were defeated, and of six who voted against ERP, five were defeated.² Although this may have indicated that voters were strongly behind the bipartisan policy and that the oppositionist nature of the candidates had something to do with their defeat, it will soon appear certain that whatever reduction in oppositionist ranks the election may have caused, it did not forecast a more bipartisan attitude on the part of the GOP Republicans remaining.

The very fact of the party's defeat was felt by many to be a repudiation of the bipartisan or "me-tooism" approach to foreign policy. Had not Dewey been the one who first in 1944 committed the party to cooperation with the Administration? Had not he and his whole "soft" approach in the 1948 cam-

¹Although Ball was earlier an ardent internationalist, he was nearer to the "middle of the road" by the time of his defeat.

²Quoted in Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 466, citation not given

paign been thoroughly repudiated by the American people? Then surely it was time to drop the whole idea and return to the policy of presenting the country with clear-cut alternatives in the field of foreign policy. Whatever flaws this reasoning may have had, it could hardly fail to have some effect in party circles after the November humiliation. The selection of Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska to replace Wallace White of Maine as GOP Senate Floor Leader probably can be interpreted as a normal succession inasmuch as Wherry had been whip for five years, but this change did, nonetheless, place in that key position an implacable foe of the Administration's bipartisan foreign policy.

How powerful Wherry was in the role of Floor Leader with respect to influencing the voting of fellow Senators is not easy to evaluate. On frequent occasions he would point out that his bitter attacks on the Truman foreign policy or on bipartisanship as a working arrangement were not made in his role as Floor Leader but only as an individual Senator.³ The selection of Wherry came following a minor revolt in Republican Senatorial ranks on the part of a group of younger Republicans against the leadership of Taft and Wherry. Pointing to the results of the 1948 election noted above, these Senators, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts, demanded more liberal leadership. Vandenberg sympathized with Lodge and admired him, partly because of his record of solid support on bipartisanship, and Vandenberg considered Wherry the center of the isolationist wing of the party; whereas Taft had often opposed Vandenberg on foreign policy. On the other hand, Vandenberg admired Taft's leadership on domestic issues, was quite sure rebellion was not very likely to succeed, and felt that if he joined the rebellion he might jeopardize the support he needed for his own bipartisan aims in foreign policy. Vandenberg hoped that Taft would step aside, but when he did not, Vandenberg supported Taft against Lodge for Chairman of the Policy Committee

³New York Times, Dec. 26, 1949, p. 1

and Wherry against Knowland as Floor Leader. Taft and Wherry won (28 - 14), but Vandenberg felt something had been accomplished by the adoption of certain new party rules and the inclusion of some "new lookers" on the Policy Committee.⁴

Wherry's successor as Assistant Floor Leader (whip) was Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, a firm supporter of bipartisanship, while Senator Millikin of Colorado continued as Chairman of the Party Conference. On the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vandenberg remained the ranking Republican member, and with the retirement of Senators Capper (Kansas) and White (Maine), the remaining members, Senators Wiley (Wisconsin), Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper (Iowa), and Lodge (Massachusetts), all favorable to the bipartisan approach, moved up to second, third, fourth, and fifth positions respectively. While the Republicans were preparing to name a sixth member to the Committee, however, the Democrats made and announced a decision which caused the first inter-party skirmish of the new Congress. After the Committee reorganization of 1946, the Republicans had established in the 80th Congress a 7-6 majority on the Foreign Relations group. The Republicans had assumed, and perhaps had been privately assured, that the Democrats would continue this practice, but instead the Democratic leadership announced January 5 that the new ratio would be 8-5. While this did not mean the actual unseating of any Republican member, it deprived the Republicans of an opportunity to satisfy at least one of a number of requests on the part of their own membership to be appointed to one of the seats vacated by Capper and White.

But the implications of this decision were far greater than this. The move was widely interpreted by those who wanted to do so as a double blow

⁴Vandenberg, pp. 464-468. The new rule probably referred to was that by which the nominees to the Policy Committee made by the Chairman of the Conference could be rejected individually by the Conference instead of in a bloc. The "new lookers" were probably Ives-- one of the "rebels"-- and, perhaps, M. C. Smith of Maine and Vandenberg himself.

struck by the Democrats at bipartisanship and at Vandenberg's prestige. Whether or not these were factors in making the decision is not known. The Democrats probably felt they had to make places for members of their own party, but the effect was to open the way for the Republican oppositionists to charge that this was the kind of reward that could be expected from following Vandenberg's leadership in support of Administration foreign policy. It was clear that Vandenberg's influence within his own party would be reduced as a result of this move. The oppositionists were quick to point out that they felt relieved of any responsibility to support bipartisanship if that was the way the Democrats were going to behave.⁵

Vandenberg himself reacted by accusing the Democrats of having struck at the outset of the new Congress a blow against the bipartisan foreign policy that was "implicit with hostility." He contended that the implication before the country would be that the Republicans were no longer trustworthy in matters of foreign affairs.⁶ Two days later Representative Joseph W. Martin (Massachusetts), Republican Floor Leader in the House, was able to announce and praise the decision of the Democratic leadership there to retain the 14-11 ratio in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs as it had been in the 80th Congress.

Republican leadership in the new House remained in the hands of Mr. Martin as Floor Leader and Leslie C. Arends (Illinois) as Assistant Floor Leader. Republican membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee remained practically unchanged from the 80th Congress. It will be remembered that the Republicans on this Committee were considerably more "international" or bipartisan minded than the Republican membership of the House as a whole. Figure I shows the distribution of these members on a scale of votes cast

⁵New York Times, Jan. 6, 1949, p. 7

⁶Ibid., p. 1

differently than those of Noah Mason of Illinois in the 81st Congress. Only Lawrence A. Smith (Wisconsin), Robert B. Chipfield (Illinois), and Donald L. Jackson (California) cast fewer than half their foreign policy votes differently than the oppositionist Mason, while John M. Vorys (Ohio), Francis P. Bolton (Ohio), Chester H. Merrow (New Hampshire), Walter H. Judd (Minnesota), Jacob K. Javits (New York), and John Davis Lodge (Connecticut) were among the 13 percent of House Republicans opposing Mason on more than half the roll calls. (Figure II)

Following on the heels of the committee ratio flare-up came the debate on the nomination of Dean Acheson to be Secretary of State. There was no advanced consultation with the Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee as to the acceptability of this nomination, and whether there should have been or not, many Republicans were able to find in this another prop pulled from under the bipartisan approach to foreign policy by the re-elected President. As a result, the nomination was not very welcome among Republicans, by whom Acheson was not particularly respected anyway. On the vote to confirm, however, there were only six negative Republican votes, those of Bridges (New Hampshire), Capehart and Jenner (Indiana), Knowland (California), Langer (North Dakota), and Wherry (Nebraska). Vandenberg himself was cool toward Acheson and felt that the President might have made a wiser choice or at least have consulted leading Republicans beforehand. The Michigan Senator supported the appointment and asked for its confirmation, but he left the impression in his writings and speeches of the next few years that his relationship with Acheson had perhaps been less satisfactory than with any of the other four Secretaries of State during the period of bipartisanship.⁷ It can perhaps be speculated that the problem grew not only out of the differences

⁷Vandenberg, pp. 470-472

| | |
|----|----------------------|
| 0 | Mason |
| 1 | |
| 2 | Smith (Wis.) |
| 3 | |
| 4 | Chiperfield |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | Jackson |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Vorys |
| 15 | |
| 16 | Marrow, Fulton |
| 17 | Eaton, Bolton, Lodge |
| 18 | Judd |
| 19 | Javits |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |

Figure I: Voting on foreign policy issues of Republican members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; 81st Congress.




Figure II: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the House of Representatives; 81st Congress; 1949-1950; as compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois

between Acheson and former Secretaries in personality and approach, but, also, from the more self-confident attitude of the President himself after gaining the Presidency in his own right.

In addition to these two disputes as the new Congress opened, there was another factor which contributed to the conclusion that the leadership of Arthur Vandenberg was somewhat weaker than previously in the ranks of the GOP. It was probably true that during the 80th Congress some of the Republicans went along with Vandenberg on the bipartisan program because there was always the possibility at that time that he would be the 1948 Republican Presidential nominee, and they would not want to oppose a man in that position. This possibility was now removed, and so was this element of his prestige.⁸

The mood of disenchantment with the bipartisan foreign policy as it was now working (or not working), which marked the opening of the 1949 session and was soon to be reflected in the Republican voting record, burst into a full scale attack in June. The assault came, albeit in varying degrees, from a wider segment of the GOP than previously; and it was no longer restricted to specific details, dollar amounts, and technicalities of administration, but was directed at some of the basic concepts of our foreign political policies.

One of these was, of course, the Chinese issue, discussed in some detail in Chapter VII. As mentioned there, this was one issue on which Senator Vandenberg dissociated himself and his party from the Administration's record. Although there had been scattered criticism up to this time, China had for many years been out of the area of sharpest controversy. Now the full impact of the successful Communist revolution was being felt in Congress. Republicans such as Senator Taft were leading a bitter attack on the China

⁸New York Times, Jan. 6, 1949, p. 7

policy, which included charges of disloyalty in the State Department, failure to help the Nationalist Chinese, and misjudgment of the Communist aims; and the usual GOP Administration supporters, such as Vandenberg, were not attempting to reconcile their party to the Administration point of view, but rather joined in the attack (in somewhat milder terms) and pointed out that the China policy had never been a part of the bipartisan program, since the GOP had never been consulted or advised with regard to it.⁹

The existence of a report by General Wedemeyer to the Administration on the China problem and the fact that repeated demands for publication of this report had been in vain added fuel to the rising Republican fire.¹⁰ The frontal assault on the Administration on China, which was to continue for at least four years, had thus begun in earnest. The precipitating issue for a China debate at this particular time was the nomination by the President of W. Walton Butterworth, the State Department's officer, who as Director for Far Eastern Affairs had been in charge of the unfortunate China policy, to be an Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Far Eastern affairs. This promotion for Butterworth, although perhaps not the chief target of the oppositionists, was sufficient occasion to bring on the general clamor. When the nomination reached the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Vandenberg, feeling that a fresh point of view was needed in the State Department on Far Eastern affairs, voted "present," thus breaking the series of recent unanimous votes in that group.¹¹ On the floor Vandenberg stated his criticism of the China policy, his dissociation from it, and his disappointment with the Butterworth nomination, but in the final analysis he and seven other Republi-

⁹Vandenberg, p. 532

¹⁰This was subsequently published as Report to President Truman by Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, U. S. Army, reprinted as Annex No. 135 to U. S. Dept. of State, United States Relations with China, p. 764

¹¹Vandenberg, p. 533

cans voted "yea," while thirty of his GOP colleagues either voted or announced themselves against the appointment.¹²

More blows at the bipartisan foreign policy were soon to come in the debate over the North Atlantic Pact and its implementation. Although the Republicans voted 32 to 11 in favor of the Pact, the opposition included Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, which added, as Vandenberg put it, "a certain respectability" to that group.¹³ It also meant the breaking on an important issue of the "informal understanding" existing in the 80th Congress between these two Republicans, whereby Vandenberg followed Taft's lead in domestic affairs, while Taft sought to minimize conflict with Vandenberg on foreign policy.¹⁴

In contrast to the preparation of the Pact itself, on which there had been a great deal of cooperation between the Administration and Capitol Hill (Senator Vandenberg in particular), the initial proposals for the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty came to Congress with no advance bipartisan consultation. The bill called for a \$1,450,000,000 arms program, and it met almost immediate and overwhelming opposition at the Capitol. Vandenberg served notice in a press statement that he would not support this request, but favored instead only an interim measure to carry over until serious study could produce a well-thought-out program in the next Congress. This statement did the kind of thing Vandenberg had seldom done in recent years -- flatly oppose an Administration measure on foreign policy after it was sent from the State Department. His own view, expressed to his wife, was that:

"The old bipartisan business is certainly 'out the window' on this one, yet I don't want to be shoved into a position of seeming hostility to the objective (in which I deeply

¹²Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 13293. (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 27, 1949)

¹³Vandenberg, p. 498

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 318-319

believe). So it's a pretty tight 'poker game' between Acheson and me."¹⁵

In the Committee on Foreign Relations he had the support of both Republicans and Democrats in his attitude, and he was also working closely with John Foster Dulles, just appointed to the Senate from New York to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of Senator Robert Wagner. As Vandenberg's health began to fail in the last half of 1949, Dulles, as an early architect of bipartisanship, became increasingly important as the leader of the Senate group wishing to continue such an approach.

On the arms aid issue a few sharp statements by Vandenberg and others at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, where Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson were present, persuaded the Administration to submit a new draft which was considerably more acceptable. The whole affair, however, was sufficiently dramatic to lead Joseph Alsop in the New York Herald Tribune to conclude that the era of bipartisanship had died. Continuous exchange of information and continuous consultation on policy had made a success of bipartisanship in the past, Alsop said, but Republicans could not be expected to go along blindly with Administration policies after that system was dropped. While Alsop felt that Senator Connally's sensitivity about Vandenberg's key role in the 80th Congress was an obstacle to the continuation of bipartisanship, he did not see a resumption of that role as a necessity. Rather he felt:

"The need today... is only for a resumption on a reasonable, modified plan, of the normal exchange of information and prior consultation on policy without which any bipartisanship is wholly impossible.... it is certainly not a bad bet that the present situation originated, at least in part, in the White House attitude toward bipartisanship."¹⁶

Vandenberg quoted the Alsop analysis with approval, especially with regard to putting the blame on Truman, but his own reaction to the arms pro-

¹⁵Ibid., p. 504

¹⁶Quoted in Ibid., pp. 505-506, citation not given

gram debacle was stated as follows:

"The episode has not been without some collateral advantages -- from my point of view. It has publicly demonstrated that the Republican contribution to so-called 'bipartisan foreign policy' was not on a 'me-too' basis. This 'me-too' charge has been the most successful criticism which the isolationist wing of the Republican Party has been able to throw at me. I have never felt free to answer. Now events have answered for themselves. The truth of the matter, of course, is that the Republican contribution to 'bipartisan foreign policy' has always been the exact reverse of 'me-too.' The only difference is that heretofore the 'surrenders,' if you want to call them that, have occurred in private and in advance."¹⁷ [a reference to the Administration's withdrawal of the original arms aid bill]

After the "surrender" a kind of ad hoc cooperation between Vandenberg and Dulles on one hand and the State Department on the other helped to put a revised version of the bill through Congress. The votes, however, in both the House and Senate indicated that there was less Republican support for this program than for any other of similar importance since Pearl Harbor. Republicans in the Senate supported (23 - 10) two moves to cut the authorizations by \$200,000,000 and divided 19 for and 14 against on final passage. In the House a proposed \$50,000,000 cut received the support of the GOP by a vote of 137 to 8, and only 51 Republican Representatives voted to pass the bill, while 94 voted to reject it.

Even before the compromises between the Senate and House versions of the bill were ironed out, Vandenberg left Washington for reasons of health and returned only for a few brief visits before his death in April, 1951. From this time on active leadership of the Republican side of the bipartisan bloc, or the cooperators, which now became a more fitting term, passed to the hands of John Foster Dulles (until November 1949 only), Irving Ives (New York), Wayne Morse (Oregon), Margaret Chase Smith (Maine), Alexander Wiley (Wisconsin), and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Massachusetts), which is to say

¹⁷Ibid., p. 509

that there was no longer any one person who exercised an influence anywhere nearly approaching that of Vandenberg. In the year and a half before his death Vandenberg was still a member of the Senate and still a force. His offices were maintained, he announced himself on roll-call votes in the Senate, he conferred with leaders in both parties, and he issued statements of policy at infrequent intervals, but his potent influence was missing.

If bipartisanship could not be held together with Vandenberg present and voting, it was not hard to guess that its chances for surviving his departure were few. When he was no longer present and fighting, not only were the chances for effective Republican-Administration consultation and cooperation severely impaired, but the force to rally Republican votes for such a cooperative policy was missing. Taft's personal obligation to Vandenberg no longer had to be fulfilled, and many Senators who, even if not respecting him, had felt the pull of his influence, now were free to form new allegiances.

Less than three months after Vandenberg's departure, the man who had come to be called "an effective co-commander of President Truman's foreign policy" -- John Foster Dulles -- was also retired from the Senate as the result of a special election in November, 1949.¹⁸ In spite of Dulles' willingness in the past to cooperate, the Administration was quite active in insuring his defeat by Herbert Lehman. Dulles tried hard to put across the idea that on his election hung the fate of the bipartisan foreign policy, but Lehman argued that there had been bipartisanship for eight years without Dulles in the Senate and that it could continue again without him.¹⁹ Vandenberg lent his support to the Dulles thesis, but when Truman was asked whether the defeat of Dulles would mean any modification of the bipartisan attitude on foreign policy, the President replied that it certainly would

¹⁸New York Times, Oct. 25, 1949, p. 26

¹⁹Ibid., Oct. 29, 1949, p. 7

not.²⁰ Senator Ives, on the other hand, felt that a movement against the bipartisan foreign policy was building up and that Dulles' defeat might bring an end to that policy.

Partly, no doubt, as a result of the Dulles defeat, partly as a reaction to the year's other events, December, 1949, was a month for statements by many leading Republicans on the issue of bipartisanship in foreign affairs. In spite of the many obvious setbacks, many of the cooperators were not willing to recognize defeat of a favorite idea. They undoubtedly felt that the bipartisan notion had strong support in the country at large, and they wanted to continue to work for it. Following an operation, Vandenberg returned on December 22 to say that the "unpartisan" policy approach "should be continued in an effort to obtain, after full debate, a unified policy against those who would divide and confuse us."²¹ Senator Wayne Morse (Oregon) also called on his fellow Republicans to defend the bipartisan policy against attack from the midwestern wing.

On the other hand, there were for the first time since the war several direct attacks on the bipartisan idea as such. Of course the midwestern wing or oppositionists had often fought the whole program but usually had done so in the name of defending "true bipartisanship." There had long been accusations that the Administration was destroying bipartisanship, but after the events of 1949, Senator Wherry felt he could call for an end to the bipartisan foreign policy "as it is now known" and declare his unwillingness to accept (as if he ever had) future commitments "made by bipartisan big-wigs."²² Wherry proposed a nonpartisan foreign policy under which this

²⁰Ibid., Nov. 11, 1949, p. 24

²¹Ibid., Dec. 22, 1949, p. 22

²²Ibid., Dec. 26, 1949, p. 1

country could be committed to no step by the State Department until the subject in its details had been put before the full Senate.²³ A few days later Senator Jenner (Indiana) attacked Vandenberg by implication, and Senator George Malone (Nevada) denounced the bipartisan foreign policy and challenged the right of Senator Vandenberg to commit the Republican party to support it.²⁴ These statements heralded significant changes in the Congressional Republican attitude on foreign affairs and in the distribution of influence on foreign policy in the Congressional party.

II.

Two days after the opening of the second session of the 81st Congress new Republican views on bipartisanship were voiced. In view of the rising challenge to Vandenberg in the Senate and of the doubt raised by Taft's own split with him on the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senator from Ohio made a comprehensive statement of his position. He said he did not intend to join those who had challenged the Michigan Senator and the bipartisan foreign policy. While he admitted that he differed with Vandenberg on some foreign policy matters, he did not think they would be very far apart on questions facing the new session.²⁵

Taft felt that, politically speaking, the procedure of advance, secret consultation between Republicans and the Administration had certain disadvantages, but recognized the need for facing the world with a united foreign policy. He emphasized that this did not require him to go along with fundamental policies which he opposed, but he pointed out that the opposition in Congress lacked both the means and the information to devise a detailed

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., Dec. 29, 1949, p. 24, and Dec. 30, 1949, p. 3

²⁵Ibid., Jan. 5, 1950, p. 6

foreign policy of its own.²⁶

For the moment at least, cold water was thrown on the smoldering rebellion, but only four days later Taft in a debate with Senator Paul Douglas, Illinois Democrat, denied that he had ever stated he would support a bipartisan foreign policy. He also charged that any true bipartisanship which included advance consultation died when Dean Acheson became Secretary of State. In view of this Taft felt that Republicans should go along with the Administration on foreign policy until they "run up against some basic question." Then they must "assert that principle."²⁷ He said that cooperation was desirable to insure that America not speak with two voices, but that such a cooperative cause should not be called bipartisan.²⁸

At that very time, also, the split with the Administration over the China question was growing broader and deeper. The New York Times on January 5 reported that Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and faithful nonpartisan in this field, and Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, who also had supported most of the Administration foreign policy moves, had broken with the State Department over the issue of China.²⁹ Mrs. Smith was understood to have told the Department that its refusal to publish the Wedemeyer report was a denial of bipartisanship. Former President Herbert Hoover and Senator Taft recommended that the American fleet be ordered to hold Formosa from the Communists, but this did not accord with Administration policy.

Of all those who openly challenged the Administration on this issue, none was so outspoken as Senator William Knowland of California. In the 80th

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., Jan. 9, 1950, p. 12

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 18

Congress Knowland had been a supporter of Vandenberg and bipartisanship, and the Michigan Senator had praised him as a "magnificent" young Republican.³⁰ But now Knowland wanted the United States to help Chiang's fleeing government, and he threatened a long and violent series of maneuvers in the Senate. He pointed out that from his position on the Appropriations and Armed Forces Committees, he could drag his feet on ERP and the Military Assistance Program. Although he had previously supported these programs, he said he would now insist upon a resurvey of all United States economic and military commitments abroad so that more assistance could go to the Orient.³¹

As this confusing welter of criticism continued, an attempt was made in early February to get a statement to which the three major bodies of Republican policy-making could adhere. In all-day separate and closed sessions on February 6 the National Committee and the Republican Conferences in the House and Senate gave their approval to a "Statement of Principles and Objectives" designed to serve as a platform for the November elections. Agreement on the foreign policy plank was not easy to achieve. In the National Committee Werner Schroeder of Illinois attempted to put the party on record as opposed to the continuance of the bipartisan foreign policy, but was reported to have been overwhelmingly defeated. In the Senate at least Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Margaret Chase Smith, George Aiken, and Irving Ives voted against the statement as adopted, and Representatives Jacob Javits (New York) and James Fulton (Pennsylvania) promptly made known their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, both Wherry and Vandenberg declared they were pleased with the foreign policy plank. The text of that section of the statement was as follows:

"To win lasting peace, to build a country in which every citizen may make the most of his skill, initiative and enterprise, and to hold aloft the inspiring torch of American free-

³⁰Vandenberg, p. 467

³¹New York Times, Jan. 5, 1950, p. 18

dom, opportunity and justice, assuring a better and happier life for all our people, we dedicate our efforts and issue this statement of principles and objectives supplementing the Republican platform of 1948.

"We shall not passively defend the principles stated here, but shall fight for them with all the vigor with which our forefathers fought to establish what we now seek to advance and perpetuate -- human liberty and individual dignity.

"We pledge that in all we will advocate and in all that we will perform the first test shall be: Does this conduct enlarge and strengthen or does it undermine and lessen human liberty and individual dignity?

FOREIGN POLICY

"The American people face the hard fact that though they won the war nearly five years ago, they have not yet won the peace. We offer them leadership in new efforts to achieve this vital end.

"We favor a foreign policy in which all Americans, regardless of party, will join to assure peace with justice in a free world while maintaining the independence and the rights of the American people.

"We insist upon restoration of our foreign agreements to their proper place inside the Constitution and we insist that the United States shall not be bound by any course of action unless the spirit and letter of our Constitutional procedure are followed.

"We oppose secret commitments and we denounce the refusal of the Administration to furnish accurate and adequate information to the Congress.

"Under our indispensable two-party system, we shall be vigilant in critical exploration of Administration foreign policy. We favor consultation between the Executive and members of both major parties in the legislative branch of government in the initiation and development of a united American foreign policy; and we deplore the tragic consequences of the Administration's failure to pursue these objectives in many fields, particularly in the secret agreements of Yalta, subsequently confirmed at Potsdam which have created new injustices and new dangers throughout the world.

"We favor full support of the United Nations and the improvement of its Charter so that it may be an effective international organization of independent states prepared to mobilize public opinion and the armed forces of the world against aggression. We favor full support of the inter-American system as an integral part of the international organization, and of our treaty obligation in the North Atlantic community.

"We advocate a strong policy against the spread of communism or facism at home and abroad, and we insist that America's efforts toward this end be directed by those who have no sympathy either with communism or fascism.

"We support aid to those states resisting communism, but such aid should be given only if it is essential to our national security, if it is within the total limits which the American economy can afford, if it will be effective, if it is beyond the ability of the aided nation to supply for itself, and if there is a program for progressive reduction.

"The Republican party has always believed in a strong national defense. We must maintain our armed forces at a strength completely adequate for the security of our people.

"We favor the promotion of world trade on the basis of fair and reasonable competition and we assert that this can be done within the Republican principle that foreign products of underpaid foreign labor shall not be admitted to this country on terms which imperil the living standards of the American workman, of the American farmer, or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. A strong American economy is a vital factor for our security."³²

"Middle ground" was an apt term to describe the position of this resolution.³³ It could scarcely be called highly critical of Administration foreign policy, yet it did not, on the other hand, manifest an attitude of friendly bipartisanship. Indeed, the famous word was not even mentioned -- a fact which must have represented a considerable victory for the oppositionists. A reference was made, it will be noted, to "consultation between the Executive and members of both major parties in the legislative branch of the government," which might be interpreted by those who so wished as the central theme of bipartisanship, but it certainly was no ringing indorsement of the principle. The statement as a whole can be contrasted with the very uncritical statement adopted by the same groups in 1945 when the Republicans had said, "In foreign affairs we shall continue to strive to avoid partisanship."

The 1950 statement charged that the Administration had failed to "consult," and in another month Republicans were complaining further about the

³²Ibid., Feb. 7, 1950, p. 11

³³Ibid.

failure of the President and the State Department to take the GOP into their confidence. The occasion for this protest was the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty powers in The Hague March 5. No Republican had been asked to attend in the manner that Vandenberg had so often gone to such conferences, and both oppositionist and bipartisan Senators complained. Wherry said that the omission was "just another bit of evidence that the bipartisan foreign policy is only one of lip service," while Bridges of New Hampshire and Saltonstall of Massachusetts also voiced protests.³⁴

Within two days of this latest evidence of the collapse of bipartisanship, however, there were new efforts to patch up the nonpartisan idea. These efforts were more serious than had been made for over a year and began on the Republican side with a suggestion by Vandenberg that an unpartisan committee be established to study what American responsibilities in Europe would be when the Marshall Plan ended in 1952.³⁵ As if by prearranged signal this proposal was widely commended by both Republicans and Democrats. Among GOP Senators, Taft, Smith (New Jersey), and Knowland applauded the idea, while Nixon jumped in with a suggestion for a broader bipartisan conference on foreign policy to include such Republicans as Hoover, Taft, Vandenberg, Stassen, Dewey, and Dulles.³⁶

Mr. Truman, for his part, instructed Acheson to thank Vandenberg for his appeal, and the State Department announced that former Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper had been appointed as a consultant to the Secretary of State. Vandenberg indicated his wholehearted approval of this step, but there was some comment on the fact that the Administration had passed over John Foster Dulles who had formerly represented Republicans at foreign ministers' meetings. Some Republicans regarded this as a partisan act because it seemed

³⁴Ibid., March 25, 1950, p. 6

³⁵Ibid., March 26, 1950, p. 1

³⁶Ibid., p. 5

to carry a spirit of revenge for Dulles' political campaign in New York in 1949. The day following the announcement of Cooper's appointment it was also revealed that Acheson had started "a series of conversations" with Senator Vandenberg on ways and means of strengthening the bipartisan foreign policy. It was said that Truman wanted Acheson to explore with Vandenberg the possibilities of appointing a Republican as Ambassador-at-large to help work out a bipartisan Asian policy.³⁷ Within a week Dulles was appointed to a post similar to Cooper's.

Still later in April the President announced a plan to hold White House conferences to which Republicans would be invited for the purpose of helping make and carry out American foreign policy. The plan was outlined by Truman and Acheson to Senator Styles Bridges as senior Senator in the absence of Vandenberg. The President's formal statement was as follows:

"It will be my purpose as well as that of Secretary Acheson not only to keep the members of the minority currently informed, but to solicit their views and take them into serious account in both the formulation and implementation of our foreign policy."³⁸

The following day the Senate Republican Policy Committee endorsed this approach to bipartisanship after Bridges had given a detailed account, and the Chairman of the Committee, Robert Taft, said after the meeting that Republicans would "be glad to see any suggestions on cooperation from the President and to discuss them with him and his representatives."³⁹

Having traced these developments with the accent on the positive, it must be noted that all was not sweetness and light. These moves to recreate the idea of ending politics at the water's edge were certain to meet hesitation and criticism from the oppositionists. It is not hard to imagine a

³⁷Ibid., March 30, 1950, p. 4

³⁸Ibid., April 19, 1950, p. 1

³⁹Ibid., April 20, 1950, p. 6

connection between the Administration's "good will" gestures (and perhaps Vandenberg's, also) and the need to get the ECA authorization through Congress without too serious damage being done to it. The Republicans in the House announced, for example, that the Administration request for \$3,372,-450,000 would have to be substantially cut. Minority Leader Joseph Martin said after a meeting of the GOP Policy Committee that "if we are going to make cuts in the domestic field, we've got to make some in the foreign field, too."⁴⁰

At this time, also, the charges of Republican Senator McCarthy (Wisconsin) concerning the presence of Communists and Communist sympathizers in the Department of State, hitherto regarded as a personal campaign, were beginning to get wider support among his fellow partisans in Congress. Wherry said he felt that Acheson himself was "a bad security risk," and Taft said he had encouraged McCarthy to press his charge against the Department.⁴¹

At the end of March the President, in spite of his apparent moves to revive bipartisanship, denounced McCarthy, Wherry, and Bridges as "saboteurs of American foreign policy" and labeled them "the Kremlin's greatest assets."⁴² This kind of an attack, of course, gave these three Senators an opportunity to express some very unbipartisan-like views. McCarthy said he would like to plead guilty to sabotaging our foreign policy in the Far East. Bridges claimed he was only trying to sabotage subversives and would cooperate in a bipartisan foreign policy if it were truly bipartisan. For his part Wherry stated that "the best way to know who the agents of the Kremlin are is to make the loyalty files available to a duly authorized committee and let the people decide who is harboring subversives and moral perverts in high

⁴⁰Ibid., March 28, 1950, p. 23

⁴¹Ibid., March 27, 1950, Sec. IV, p. 3

⁴²Ibid., March 31, 1950, p. 1

government places."⁴³ On the same day Guy G. Gabrielson, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, called on his party to review its position in the bipartisan foreign policy. He felt, he said, that the Administration had violated bipartisanship and that the Republican party should now propose an all-American policy, regardless of party, to assure peace.⁴⁴

After the appointments of Dulles and Cooper, the question arose among Republicans as to who could and who could not represent the party in relation to the Administration. In general the cooperators such as Vandenberg, Ives, Dewey, and Hickenlooper welcomed the appointments, but Taft stated the following:

"To be bipartisan there must be real consultation on policies before they are adopted with the responsible representatives of the Republicans in Congress. It is not accomplished by the appointment of an individual Republican to executive office as a roving ambassador."⁴⁵

Taft said the conditions of bipartisanship existed for a while at the time Vandenberg was in continual contact with the State Department. While some Republicans felt that Vandenberg carried the process too far, he said, there could be no question but that he was a "responsible representative of the Republicans in Congress." Taft indicated that he felt the same objectives (of cooperation) could now better be worked out in debate in Congress.

It was the feeling of Vandenberg (discussed previously) that a Senator could not very well perform the double role of working on foreign policy in consultation with the State Department and carrying on his duties on Capitol Hill. He therefore thought that Dulles and Cooper, by consulting with Republicans in Congress, could work well toward bipartisanship. Just how well the Cooper and Dulles appointments did work or what contribution they made to the

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 5

⁴⁵Ibid., April 7, 1950, p. 1

strengthening of a bipartisan foreign policy is difficult to say. It is certain that Republican support for European Economic Assistance dropped off sharply in terms of votes from what it was in 1948 and 1949. Cooper said in May that in his attempts at cooperating with Congress on foreign policy, "the reaction from the Republicans on Capitol Hill has not been discouraging," and in August he and Dulles were members of the American delegation to the United Nations General Assembly together with Republicans Austin and Lodge.

It was also in August, however, that the four active Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (with Vandenberg in "general agreement") issued a comprehensive statement on American foreign policy (discussed in Chapter VII), which, while supporting the ideal of bipartisanship, spared nothing in attacking the Administration for its errors, past and present, which, they held, resulted in the fighting in Korea and in other phases of our current predicament. The four were Wiley, Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, and the document's author, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts. All of these men were considered internationalists, and since all of them had devoted many years on the committee to foreign affairs, a somewhat thoughtful and responsible statement was to be expected, although obviously its issuance was timed for the opening of the 1950 election campaign. Reference has already been made to the section dealing with Asia, which indicated severe criticism. Certain other parts of the statement pertaining directly to the subject of bipartisanship will bear quoting here:

"We, minority Senators of the Foreign Relations Committee, herein expressing our individual views, pledge our full support to the national effort to build strength for victory. We pay tribute to the heroism and sacrifice of our fighting men in Korea. To be worthy of them we must, above all, face the future with faith, realism and courage. In this spirit and in discharge of our duty under the American two-party system to scrutinize relentlessly the basic facts of America's position in the world, we set forth: I, an analysis of the events of 1945 which today bear so directly on America's present world

position; II, an analysis of the crucial events which began in 1947; and III, our recommendations for future action.

I - 1945

"The major tragedy of our time was the failure and refusal of American leadership in 1945 to recognize the true aims and methods of the rulers of Soviet Russia. To this failure can be traced the disintegration of our armed forces in 1945, which would not have occurred if the need for retaining adequate forces had been explained to the American people, and the senseless destruction of billions of dollars worth of military equipment which the United States and its friends so desperately need today.

"To this failure also can be traced the blindness of our leadership in ignoring the Communist attempt to capture the minds of men. We missed the opportunity to broadcast to the world our democratic doctrine of the dignity of man as the spiritual rallying point for all freedom-loving peoples.

"By this failure we lost the initiative and the influence for peace which we had won by force of arms and by virtue of our historic pioneering in the evolution of democracy.....

III - THE FUTURE

"These are all facts which must be faced. The American people will not now excuse those responsible for these blunders. The President's decision to sustain, by military action, the stand of the United Nations against aggression in Korea must receive united support. But the liberation of Korea and the mere building of strength to resist aggression are, by themselves, not enough. We shall not sleep peacefully at night until our Government's policy is based on the full realization that world dominion by Communism is still the goal of the Kremlin. It will continue to be the goal until the free nations of the world, each contributing its fair share, realistically join together through the United Nations to establish peace in a free world.

"We must reassure the world of our constant desire and readiness earnestly to search for and consider any and all proposals for peace based on justice.

"The United States must, therefore, regain the initiative and the power for the organization and preservation of lasting peace, which it threw away in 1945. This means that the present intolerable military weakness of the free world must be remedied by us and our friends at top speed. Never again must we allow ourselves to be caught, as we were when Korea was invaded, in a position where our failure to foresee the possible implications of our basic foreign policy will result in our being inadequately prepared to carry out that policy in time of crisis.

"In this crisis there can be no 'politics as usual' or 'business as usual.' This is fundamental.

"Once we regain the initiative, we can then redouble our efforts through the United Nations (1) to establish a reliable program of international inspection and control of atomic activities; (2) to halt lawless aggression of the strong over the weak and the slavery which Communism inflicts upon its victims; and (3) to pursue every effective means to give greater strength to the United Nations as a powerful force able to prevent aggression in the world, urging that, if lesser means are unavailing in this effort, a special session of the General Assembly be called to amend the United Nations Charter, as proposed in the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948.

"These things need not mean bloodshed and war. They ought to prevent war. They do mean, however, the powerful unity of the free nations acting in enthusiastic concert. In place of ineptitude, American strength and integrity must become the major encouragement for purposeful unity among those peoples who, possessing freedom themselves, seek to extend it to others. Then, and only then, will the military victory and the moral leadership which we achieved in 1945 -- and then lost in that same year -- be translated into concrete results for humanity.

"Our aims should be thought out now and translated into major long-range American policy consistent with our human and material resources. Without such major aims we cannot expect the maximum effort either from ourselves or from other peoples. Great sacrifices require great objectives. We must not wait until the present crisis is over and then fumble the ball of international peace because we are not prepared for victory. For the attainment of such aims we will hold the Administration strictly responsible.

"On the basis of honest recognition of past errors, and courageous resolve for the future, we wholeheartedly pledge our unpartisan cooperation to final victory."⁴⁶

The election came and went, leaving increased Republican membership in both Houses of Congress, but the end of the campaign saw no lessening of the anti-Administration warfare being carried on by many Republicans. In contrast, however, to the criticism based on high policy issues discussed in the document issued by the Republicans in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, post-election criticism seemed to center more directly on the person-

⁴⁶Ibid., Aug. 14, 1950, p. 1 (For section on Asia see Chapter VII, p. 224)

ality of the Secretary of State. Although begun earlier in the year, December saw a climax of the efforts to discredit Dean Acheson as the architect of a tragic foreign policy the mistakes of which were costing blood and money in Korea.

The number of Senators calling for Acheson's removal as Secretary of State had been steadily growing until it reached the extreme in a statement by Senator Kem threatening impeachment if Acheson did not resign. On December 6 Senator Taft called the Republican Policy Committee to consider the question whether the attack on Acheson should be formalized. A paper proposing that it be laid down as party dogma that Acheson must be ousted was being prepared by Irving Ives (New York), a regular Administration supporter, who, it was reported, had become convinced that there could be no bipartisan foreign policy as long as Acheson was Secretary of State. The next day, however, the Committee declined to act on the proposal. Instead, Ives was placed at the head of a sub-committee to draft a resolution for presentation to the Republican Conference. In the face of this step, Governor Dewey of New York issued a statement saying he would withhold criticism of this sort in a time of crisis. Following this, Ives showed signs of a modified attitude, and by December 14 his subcommittee found itself still unable to agree upon a resolution to present to the Conference.⁴⁷

While the Senate delayed, however, the House GOP Policy Committee, headed by Floor Leader Martin, called a Republican caucus to decide on making the Acheson issue a party matter, and on December 15, as Acheson was preparing to go to Europe for a NATO Conference, the caucus adopted the following resolution:

"In this critical hour, confidence of the American people in their leadership is essential to our security.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Dec. 13, 1950, p. 13

"It is completely obvious that Secretary Acheson and the State Department under his leadership have lost the confidence of the Congress and the American people and cannot regain it.

"Recognizing this fact, we earnestly insist for the good of our country that Mr. Acheson be replaced as Secretary of State, that there be a thorough house cleaning in the State Department, and changes in personnel and policies responsible for this lack of confidence."⁴⁸

This strong statement was opposed by only about a dozen votes in the House caucus, and when the Senate Republican Conference passed it later the same day, only five (Aiken, Morse, Mrs. Smith, Langer, and H. A. Smith) voted against it, while 23 supported it. The Senate group, however, added this paragraph:

"We pledge our fullest cooperation with the President and the Administration in a united effort to meet by the most effective means the present national crisis. For this effort there must be national cooperation in substance as well as in form, in fact as well as in name."⁴⁹

No Senator (or Representative) offered any defense of Acheson, but it was noted that Vandenberg, Lodge, and Wiley absented themselves from the meeting. It was an unusually strong attack, but was probably an accurate indication of the extent to which the oppositionists had gained influence during the year.

As shown in Figures II and III, a comparison of House and Senate voting in 1949-1950 with that of 1947-1948 shows a truly significant contrast. A glance at these is sufficient to see the shift, but the contrast is made clearer if it is noted that in the House the percentage of Republicans voting differently than Mason (Illinois) on more than half the foreign policy roll calls dropped from 55 percent in the 80th Congress to 13 percent in the 81st, and that in the Senate those voting differently than Langer dropped from 61 percent in the 80th to 37 percent in the 81st. Something of the

⁴⁸Ibid., Dec. 16, p. 1

⁴⁹Ibid.

| | |
|----|------------------------------------|
| 0 | Langer |
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Wherry |
| 7 | Butler, Jenner, Kem |
| 8 | |
| 9 | Williams, Capehart, Malone, Martin |
| 10 | Eaton, Young |
| 11 | Bridges, Schoepell, Bricker |
| 12 | |
| 13 | Brewster |
| 14 | |
| 15 | Taft, Cain |
| 16 | |
| 17 | Mundt |
| 18 | Hickenlooper (A), McCarthy |
| 19 | Ferguson |
| 20 | |
| 21 | Knowland, Donnell |
| 22 | Millikin, Gordon |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | Tobey, Hendrickson, Gurney |
| 27 | |
| 28 | |
| 29 | |
| 30 | Thye |
| 31 | Wiley |
| 32 | Ives |
| 33 | Flanders |
| 34 | Saltonstall, Vandenberg |
| 35 | Aiken |
| 36 | H. A. Smith |
| 37 | Lodge, Morse |
| 38 | M. C. Smith |
| 39 | |
| 40 | |
| 41 | |
| 42 | |
| 43 | |
| 44 | |
| 45 | |
| 46 | |
| 47 | |
| 48 | |
| 49 | |
| 50 | |
| 51 | |

Figure III: Republican voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate; 81st Congress; 1949-1950; as compared with the record of Senator William Langer of North Dakota

meaning of this change will be discussed in the concluding chapter of this study, but it is clear that the oppositionists had greatly gained in strength.

III

The 1950 elections increased the number of Republicans in the Senate by six -- making a closely divided party situation (49 Democrats, 47 Republicans). The Republican oppositionists on foreign policy could claim to have gained four adherents -- Dirksen (Illinois), Welker (Idaho), Butler (Maryland), and Bennett (Utah), while Nixon (California) and Duff (Pennsylvania) were frequently to be found voting with the shrinking group which supported the Administration. This gain was not overlooked by the oppositionist leadership, which attempted to consolidate it in two ways. The first was by electing several oppositionist members to the Republican Policy Committee when Vandenberg, Ives, Margaret Chase Smith, Hickenlooper, Bridges, and Cordon stepped down, and new members were chosen. These were Knowland, H. A. Smith, Ferguson, Brewster, Thye, and Martin of Pennsylvania, and it was generally conceded that this group was clearly more hostile to Administration foreign policy.⁵⁰ While neither Knowland nor H. A. Smith could be considered oppositionists in the same sense as Wherry, they were now among the bitterest critics of the policies pursued in the Far East. Certainly, also, dropping Ives and Margaret Chase Smith meant the loss of two devoted bipartisan supporters.

In another organization scuffle in the Senate, the issue was over filling the new seat on the Foreign Relations Committee awarded the Republicans as a result of their 1950 election gains. A leading contender for this seat was Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, a very internationalist-minded Senator. Morse had urged representation for the West Coast on the Committee and had the explicit backing of Vandenberg.⁵¹ Vandenberg was, of course, not active at

⁵⁰Ibid., Jan. 9, 1951, p. 14

⁵¹Willard Shelton, "Civil War in the GOP," The Nation, Jan. 27, 1951 pp. 75-77

this time and could not make his influence strongly felt. Since places on major committees are usually allotted by seniority, Morse stood high on the list, but the foreign policy conservatives proposed Homer Capehart (Indiana), who outranked Morse. The internationalists countered with George Aiken (Vermont), who outranked Capehart, but the oppositionists then moved to Owen Brewster (Maine), who was senior to Aiken. Finally the cooperators suggested Tobey (New Hampshire), who outranked Brewster.

Under the rule preventing any Senator from holding more than two committee posts, Tobey would have had to give up his top ranking seat either on the Banking and Currency Committee or the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Brewster did not have the top position on any committee, although he was second in rank on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Brewster, was, therefore, interested in getting Tobey to give up his post on this latter group if he went to Foreign Relations. Tobey, on the other hand, offered to renounce Foreign Relations if Brewster would do the same, thus clearing the way for Aiken. No agreement was reached, so Tobey retired from Banking and Currency, got his seat on Foreign Relations, and thus assured a continued internationalist group on that Committee.⁵²

It was clear by January, 1951, that Vandenberg would never return to the Senate, and as this became increasingly certain, the importance of Taft in the area of Republican foreign policy formation grew more apparent. Some attention has been given to the views of Taft from time to time, and in so far as possible to do so, his position on foreign policy will be clarified further in later pages. Several factors are important to remember. With the 1950 Congressional elections out of the way, the 1952 presidential election loomed increasingly larger on the political horizon, and Robert Taft was

⁵²Ibid.

again aiming at the 1952 nominating convention. Senator Vandenberg on several occasions explained the anti-bipartisan foreign policy behavior of Taft in terms of "presidential fever," and it is not unreasonable to assume that Taft's increasingly oppositionist actions might in part be explained on this basis.

Further to be kept in mind is Taft's idea of how the Republican party should arrive at a position on foreign policy. Taft did not feel that the opposition party had either the information or the mechanism to formulate a complete foreign policy program, and in spite of his general theory that the role of the opposition is to oppose, he maintained that the Republicans should follow the President's lead in foreign policy matters except where some "fundamental issue" was at stake on which the Republicans could not agree. At that point, it seemed to Taft, the Republicans should be bound by no bipartisan agreement to be silent. Rather than have advance consultation between the Administration and one or two Republicans, Taft thought Republican positions should be worked out in debate in Congress. Perhaps this analysis is too simple or too coherent, for Taft's position was certainly not unchanging or always logical, but this seemed to be the approach most often voiced throughout the years. It was, of course, quite different from the Vandenberg program.

In spite of this doctrine Taft announced on January 9 that he was ready to join President Truman in the preparation of a coalition foreign policy. He said, "I should be quite prepared to sit down with the President of the United States or anybody else on the majority side and try to work out a program which could command the unanimous and consistent support of the people of the United States."⁵³

This proposal received no direct notice from the Administration, and the next two years were to see no strengthening but rather a steady decline of a

⁵³New York Times, Jan. 10, 1951, p. 1

bipartisan foreign policy. Republican positions -- many more than one on each issue -- were, according to the Taft formula, worked out in Congress. A greatly reduced number of Republicans continued to support much of the President's program. An increasing group opposed most of that program. John Sherman Cooper and John Foster Dulles continued in the Department of State as consultants, but what fruits their efforts bore in terms of support in Congress is difficult to determine. Certainly the isolationists neither followed Dulles nor approved the role he was trying to play, but at least one observer felt his voice was not without influence in Republican circles. James Reston wrote that Dulles had influence with "that extremely important, often decisive group of Republicans, who are neither isolationist nor internationalist, but who are often influenced on critical votes by their respect for Mr. Dulles' experience and their confidence in his independent judgment."⁵⁴

Whether those Republicans in Congress supported the President's program for these reasons or because their own political and personal situation dictated such support cannot be definitely ascertained. What is certain is that the number of these Republicans decreased sharply in the period from 1950-1952. From time to time bipartisan sentiments were voiced both by Republicans and the Administration, but no pattern was worked out such as that once prevailing. In October the President offered to appoint Dulles as Ambassador to Japan following his (Dulles') contributions in writing the Japanese Peace Treaty. The appointment was declined, although Dulles' work at the Japanese Peace Conference may have had something to do with the fairly broad support in the Senate for the treaties emerging from that Conference.

Generally, however, during the last two years of the Truman Administration, bipartisanship was paid lip service only, mostly as an ideal that had died. In June, 1951, Acheson said he was doing everything he could to bring

⁵⁴Ibid., Oct. 5, 1951, p. 15

about a "return" to nonpartisanship, and that he knew of nothing that he could do that he had not done. Taft said there was little possibility of "bringing back" the bipartisan approach to foreign policy, since Secretary Acheson would not make any concession to the Republicans. Taft and others tended to trace the end of bipartisanship to the change in Truman's attitude after 1948. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times, pointed to the "ratio shift" on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the turning point.⁵⁵

James Reston and Anne O'Hare McCormick, on the other hand, felt that Vandenberg's decline and demise were the principal factors involved.⁵⁶ Reston wrote that "the so-called bipartisan United States foreign policy fell sick and died with Senator Vandenberg, and any reincarnation before the Presidential election of 1952 is highly unlikely." In further comment on the state of affairs prevailing Reston said:

"Moreover, the lapse of the bipartisan experiment now is taken for granted so generally by the leaders of both parties that they no longer make much of an effort even to minimize the conflict."⁵⁷

The details of what this situation meant in terms of Republican voting behavior have been given in preceding chapters. The general picture was one of sharply reduced support for European economic aid, criticism of the committing of United States troops to the European continent, and decreasing enthusiasm even for foreign military spending, although it is clear that most Republicans were loyal to the basic policy of the defense of Western Europe. The Far Eastern situation provided an even more fertile field for attack, and as seen in Chapter VII, the number of Republicans willing to go along with this attack became increasingly greater as long-time Administration supporters

⁵⁵Ibid., July 6, 1951, p. 22

⁵⁶Ibid., April 21, 1951, p. 16, and July 5, 1951, p. 9

⁵⁷Ibid.

(such as Margaret Chase Smith and H. A. Smith) seized upon this issue, perhaps partly to prove that they were not "me-too" Republicans. When the Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- all internationalists -- issued their all-out blast at Administration Far Eastern policy, it was clear that bipartisanship was fading fast. The outline of this attack has been explained, and although it was not always logical, it was certainly all-inclusive.

An analysis of voting on foreign policy issues in the Senate for the last two years of the Truman Administration shows several things. It shows, first of all, a more united Republican party with fewer Senators voting at extreme poles from one another. It clearly reveals also that this increased unity represented agreement on a position much nearer, although by no means identical with, the views of the oppositionists such as Wherry, Malone, Kem, and Ecton, than those of such bipartisan supporters as Wiley, Lodge, Saltonstall, and Morse. If the percentage of members of Congress voting in agreement with the extreme oppositionists on more than half the foreign policy issues coming before the Senate and House in 1951 and 1952 be compared with the same figures for previous bienniums, the results are as follows: (See Figures IV and V)

| | <u>Senate</u> | <u>House</u> |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|
| 1947 - 1948 | 39 percent | 45 percent |
| 1949 - 1950 | 63 percent | 87 percent |
| 1950 - 1952 | 80 percent | 96 percent |

The question to be answered becomes whether or not the Republicans in Congress returned to isolationism after 1949. It must be remembered that the scale used here is not designed to reveal the exact views of any group, but only to measure the strength of the groups. It is clear that the Republicans, or a majority of them, did stop supporting the economic aid program for Europe which they had strongly backed in the 80th Congress. It is also true

| | | | |
|----|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 0 | Langer-Malone | 363738394041424344454647484950515253545556575859606162636465666768697071 | Tobey |
| 1 | | | |
| 2 | Kem | | |
| 3 | Butler, Capehart | | |
| 4 | Bricker | | Morse, Saltonstall, H. A. Smith |
| 5 | Jenner | | Lodge |
| 6 | Welker, Ecton | | Duff |
| 7 | Hickenlooper, Young | | |
| 8 | Williams, Dworshak, Dirksen | | |
| 9 | Schoepell | | Ives |
| 10 | Ferguson, Martin | | |
| 11 | Cordon | | |
| 12 | Bridges | | |
| 13 | Butler (Md.), Taft, Bennett, McCarthy | | |
| 14 | Mundt, Watkins | | |
| 15 | Case | | |
| 16 | Brewster | | |
| 17 | Cain | | |
| 18 | Smith (Me.) | | |
| 19 | | | |
| 20 | Carlson | | |
| 21 | Millikin | | |
| 22 | Hendrickson | | |
| 23 | | | |
| 24 | | | |
| 25 | | | |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | Knowland, Thye | | |
| 28 | | | |
| 29 | | | |
| 30 | | | |
| 31 | | | |
| 32 | Nixon, Flanders, Wiley | | |
| 33 | | | |
| 34 | | | |
| 35 | Aiken | | |

Figure IV: Voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the Senate; Republicans; 82nd Congress; 1951-1952; as compared with the record of Senator Langer (1951) and Sen. Malone (1952)




Figure V: Republican Voting on Foreign Policy Issues in the House of Representatives; 82nd Congress; 1951-1952; As compared with the record of Congressman Noah M. Mason of Illinois

that a majority of Republicans in both houses wanted to scale down the military aid programs for Europe. On the other hand a sizable majority of Senate Republicans always voted for the military aid bills on the final vote, and a majority of House Republicans did so in 1950 and 1952. Further, Republican support for Far Eastern aid and intervention was very strong, and Republicans were often advocating a more active role for the United States in the Far East than the Administration felt wise. While there were scattered Republican criticisms of the United Nations, GOP support for continued American participation there can be presumed to have been strong. The 1950 statement, adopted by Senate and House Conferences and the National Committee, can be cited as evidence that internationalism was not dead or dying. That declaration, which was more criticized by the internationalists than the isolationists, spoke of "full support of the United Nations," a "strong policy against the spread of Communism or Fascism ...abroad," and "support of aid to those states resisting communism."

In conclusion, then, it would seem reasonable to say that while Republicans had less enthusiasm for spending in Europe after 1949, they by no means returned to isolationism. It is doubtful that a majority in either house would have favored abandoning NATO. In Asia a continued advocacy of an active role became Republican doctrine, and to some extent the increased strength of the oppositionists in this period can be accounted for by the large number of Republicans who were critical of the Administration for too little, rather than too much, American intervention there. Finally, it is evident that the Republicans were not talking like isolationists. In their efforts to attack and embarrass the Administration they did not, like their predecessors of 1918-1941, develop a theory of nonparticipation. Rather, they contented themselves with criticism of a more particular and less generalized nature.

By the opening of Congress in January 1952 the disagreements among Republicans on foreign policy were being voiced in terms of support for candidates in the 1952 National Convention. There were both presidential and foreign policy implications in the election of Styles Bridges to succeed Kenneth Wherry as Senate Floor Leader January 8. His rival for the office was Leverett Saltonstall who had been Wherry's assistant or party whip. The vote in Conference was 26 for Bridges and 15 for Saltonstall, and the ballot was not made unanimous as is usually done. Since Saltonstall was considered to be an Eisenhower man, the result was viewed as favorable to the presidential aspirations of Senator Taft, whom Bridges supported, although tradition, also, favored Bridges in that he was the senior Republican in the Senate. In terms of foreign policy Bridges was, or had been previously, much more of an internationalist than was his predecessor (Wherry), but had been of late much more critical of Administration foreign policy, particularly in the Far East, than had Saltonstall. A glance at the voting charts will show Bridges moving gradually toward the oppositionist position.

It soon became clear that foreign policy was to be one of the issues which most clearly separated the two leading contenders for the 1952 presidential nomination. While it is true that a platform acceptable to both Taft and Eisenhower was written without great difficulty, foreign policy was one of the few points on which complete agreement was not reached at the famous Morningside Heights conference after the nomination.

The issue was first clearly drawn in May when Eisenhower addressed a joint session of Congress on the foreign aid question. Taft and Eisenhower sharply disagreed on how much could be cut from the program without endangering our position in Europe. In a radio address in June Taft discussed his foreign policy views and also the Republican role in foreign policy over the past few years. He said:

".... in the Republican campaign of 1952 there must be no hesitation about attacking the foreign policy of Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson...Some Republicans would avoid mention of the subject in the campaign and they criticize me because I am not being sufficiently bipartisan.

"Of course bipartisanship today is a fraud. When Mr. Truman talks of it, he means that he will make the policy and the Republicans must always go along with it. Since 1948 he has not bothered to consult any of the Republican leadership even about the fateful step of making war in Korea.

"Mr. Truman has never extended bipartisanship to many basic questions of policy. Even Senator Vandenberg was at no time consulted about Teheran or Yalta or Potsdam or Manchuria or China. He indicated his wholehearted disapproval of our policy in the Far East.

"Mr. John Foster Dulles was consulted about the Japanese Peace Treaty and did a good job, but his recent speeches indicate his complete disapproval of many basic features of Mr. Acheson's foreign policy, particularly in Europe....

"Its [the Republican party's] candidate must not say that he approves the Acheson foreign policy, but that he will do it better. That was our fatal mistake in the last three elections. We cannot afford to nominate a candidate who will not condemn the utter failure of the Truman Administration.

"Is this isolationism? Certainly not if we support a policy which opposes Communist advances throughout the world."⁵⁸

With regard to the specific foreign policy problems facing the country, Taft's views as stated in this speech can be compared with Eisenhower's, stated a few days later in a letter to John Foster Dulles and in a press conference on June 25.⁵⁹

Eisenhower

Taft

Purposes of Foreign Policy

"American foreign policy must be based on our own self interest. Each step in the policy must meet the test: Is this good for the United States?"

1. protect the liberty of the United States
2. protect the peace of the people of the United States while at the same time protecting our liberties.

⁵⁸Ibid., June 2, 1952, p. 14

⁵⁹Ibid., June 25, 1952, p. 1

Purposes of Foreign Policy - continued

3. must be conducted so as to maintain the solvency of the United States and prevent the destruction of a free economy.

Fortress America

"America cannot live alone. We must face facts. Any thought of retiring within our own borders will certainly lead to disaster for the United States of America."

"Those who think only of Western Europe and of making it impregnable are just as blind as those who think only of the United States and of making it impregnable. Would I withdraw from Europe? Certainly not."

United Nations

"We support the United Nations."

"I am in favor of remaining in the United Nations even though our experience in Korea... shows that it is a hopeless weapon to be used to prevent aggression."

Foreign Policy Programs

"Our foreign policy programs must protect us and the areas in which we are concerned from both kinds of Soviet aggression --that is direct military aggression and aggression of political infiltration."

"Certainly we should be good neighbors and give economic aid in emergencies. Certainly we should arm those who desire to defend themselves against Communist attack. But the expense of this program must be within our economic capacity, and handouts of money cannot be the key to our foreign policy."

NATO

"We support NATO. Exclusive reliance on mere power of retaliation against military aggressors is not good enough. We must assure our Allies that we are standing with them. We must be successful in developing collective security measures that will encourage each of our Allies to develop its own economic, political, and military strength."

"It has been said that I am an isolationist because I voted against the Atlantic Pact, but I made it clear at that time that I was in favor of definitely notifying Russia that if they attacked any of the Pact nations, they would find themselves at war with us, a Monroe Doctrine for Europe. I do not want to depreciate the importance of Europe or withdraw our

EisenhowerTaft

NATO - Continued

aid, but I do wish to point out that control of the air must be priority No. 1."

The main points of difference between the two prospective nominees would appear to have been the following:

1. Taft spent much (a major portion) of his time attacking the Administration and those Republicans who supported the Administration foreign policy. Eisenhower was only "critical of the Administration for its lack of steadiness and its failure to define its goals in terms that the American people could understand."⁶⁰

2. Expenditures for foreign aid -- Taft continually emphasized the need to reduce these expenditures, whereas Eisenhower, although favoring cuts, put little emphasis on the point, but rather positively outlined the need which gave rise to the expenditures.

3. Land forces versus air power -- Taft did not favor withdrawing from Europe, but he felt our command of the air was the essential ingredient to maintaining peace. Eisenhower did not deny the need for air power but was devoted to the building of a North Atlantic land army.

In spite of the fact that Eisenhower had said that he did not think it would be possible to write a platform acceptable to both himself and Senator Taft, little difficulty was encountered in the Convention in doing just that. In fact, no dispute whatsoever was ever revealed to the public, such as so often had happened in the past. Eugene Millikin, Senator from Colorado and Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, also assumed the Chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs. Two special advisors were appointed to aid in the drafting of the plank on foreign policy -- John Foster Dulles (now having resigned from the State Department) and Clarence B. Kelland, National

⁶⁰Ibid.

Committeeman from Arizona, and both Eisenhower and Taft were understood to approve of these appointments. Dulles clearly represented the segment of the party supporting Eisenhower and had been friendly to the Administration, although he had made some more critical comments since his resignation. Kelland could be taken to represent the Taft supporters and had been aligned with the oppositionists on foreign policy issues. Dulles was sure he could write a platform agreeable to both major contenders for the nomination, and came to Chicago with a draft which was in substance accepted by the subcommittee, whose version was in turn approved unanimously by the full Resolutions Committee and by the Convention itself.

This was one of the longest foreign policy planks in party history. It discussed many phases of our foreign relations in almost every part of the world. Many of the points made in the 1950 resolution and in the declaration of the Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were repeated. "Sell out" at Yalta, bungling in Korea, and "betrayal" of Chiang Kai-shek were all discussed in roughly the same terms as had been used before. There were, however, two or three new ideas or emphases.

More attention was given to attacking the personnel who had administered as well as formulated our foreign policy. There was no personal attack on the Secretary, as one might have expected, but the criticism was broadened to imply that large numbers of civil servants at every level were responsible for failures in foreign policy and should be removed. No doubt this reflected the widespread Republican acceptance of charges of disloyalty, incompetence, et cetera, in the Department of State:

"We shall eliminate from the State Department and from every Federal office all, wherever they may be found, who share responsibilities for the needless predicaments and perils in which we find ourselves. We shall also sever from the public payroll the hordes of loafers, incompetents and unnecessary employees who clutter the administration of our foreign affairs. The confusions, overlappings and extra-

gance of our agencies abroad hold us up to the ridicule of peoples whose friendship we seek.

"We shall substitute a compact and efficient organization where men of proven loyalty and ability shall have responsibility for reaching our objectives. They will reflect a dynamic initiative. Thus we can win the support and confidence which go only to those who demonstrate a capacity to define and get results."

The idea of bipartisanship was mentioned only by implication:

"The good in our foreign policies has been accomplished with Republican cooperation, such as the organization of the United Nations, the establishment of the trusteeship principle for dependent peoples, the making of peace with Japan and Germany and the building of more solid security in Europe. But in the main the Republican party has been ignored and its participation has not been invited."

There was no suggestion that there ought to be more inter-party consultation and no promise that if elected to power, the Republicans would try a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs.

Perhaps the most interesting and important of all the new ideas in the 1952 Republican platform was the suggestion that the policy of the "containment" of Communism was a negative policy, and that a positive Republican foreign policy would not be content with mere containment but would never rest until the frontier with Communism was pushed back:

"They abandoned friendly nations such as Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia to fend for themselves against the Communist aggression which soon swallowed them..."

"We shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will penetrate the dark places. That program will give the Voice of America a real function. It will mark the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and Godless terrorism which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction..."

"The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of their end."

"Our nation will become again the dynamic, moral and spiritual force which was the despair of despots and the hope of the oppressed."⁶¹

The Republicans, it appeared from these statements, favored seizing the initiative, going on the offensive. They would not be satisfied with a mere defense of the status quo.

As in every election year since 1940, the midwestern Republicans were defeated in their support of Taft for the presidential nomination. For the second time they failed even to strongly influence the naming of the vice-presidential candidate, who in the person of Richard M. Nixon of California, was both a non-midwesterner and a Republican who in Congress had supported, with at least some regularity, the Administration's lead in foreign policy matters. The election of the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket seemed assured almost from the beginning. For the first time in twenty years the Republicans would have an official and national leader for at least four years. He would be an internationalist and could be expected to try to lead his party in that direction. For the first time in twenty years the Republicans in Congress could no longer formulate their policies with the goal of embarrassing the Administration unless they wished to defy their own, popularly chosen, head. Republicans were no longer to oppose, but rather under Eisenhower's leadership to formulate a systematic policy to meet American problems abroad. Whether or not the new "team" would be able to unite the historically divided party, whether or not the cooperators under Eisenhower's powerful leadership could gain new strength in Congress which had seemingly been lost since 1948, whether or not the old division of internationalists versus isolationists or cooperators versus oppositionists would persist or whether new issues would bring new alignments, it could at least be said certainly in June, 1952, that

⁶¹Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1952, pp. 310-314

if the party won, foreign policy in the Republican party would enter a new phase, an era which might well see changes no less important than the changes after World War I or during World War II.

CHAPTER IX
REPUBLICANS AND THE TARIFF

Woodrow Wilson once characterized the tariff as the football of politics.¹ Others have said it is a local issue; while it has also been pointed out that on no issue has Congress in recent years so consistently divided along party lines as on the tariff. The general Republican position (and also that of their predecessors, the Whigs) has been one in favor of high tariffs; while the Democrats have usually favored lower tariffs (a tariff for revenue only), especially when southern influence has been greatest. There have been exceptions in the case of both parties, and at times bipartisan coalitions in Congress have determined rates, but the generalization is valid.²

Few issues have remained as important in our politics throughout the last century as has the tariff. At one time the issue was largely sectional -- southern agriculture favoring lower tariffs, northern manufacturing wanting protection -- and in so far as Whig and Republican strength lay with the latter, protection was the natural policy of these parties. Later other groups wanted protection -- labor because it feared unemployment would result if products made with cheap foreign labor were allowed to compete with domestic goods; western agriculture to achieve parity with industry. E. E. Schattschneider has written:

"...the dominant position of the Republican party before 1932 can be attributed largely to the successful exploitation of the tariff by this party as a means of attaching to itself a formidable array of interests dependent on the protective system and intent upon continuing it."³

¹E. Pendleton Herring, "The Political Context of the Tariff Commission," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XII, p. 421 (Sept., 1934)

²David Rankin Barbee, "The Tariff in American Political History," Cong. Digest, March 1932, pp. 65-68

³E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, p. 283

Schattschneider also points out, however, that

"Partisan votes on the final passage of the bill are not often enlightening, and party lines break in the votes on the items."⁴

Another student writes in connection with the Hawley-Smoot debates (1930):

"Despite a pretense in the debates that there was some objective test of national welfare, the record of voting on individual items furnishes much evidence in support of the cynical proposition that sound protection was that which raised the prices of things produced by one's constituents, and unsound protection that which raised the prices of things made by someone's else constituents. Underlying this conflict was a strong sectional clash between country and city and between East and West. Although the lines of battle were not always sharply drawn, the western conception of what the tariff should be was very different from the eastern conception. In their speeches, and even more in their votes, the representatives of the urban East held to the view that taxes on foodstuffs and raw materials are bad because they raise living costs and the costs of production. A number of eastern Congressmen apparently accepted the premises of free trade by adopting the idea of comparative advantage and geographical division of labor, as far as it applied to foodstuffs and raw materials. But they rejected implications of such an idea as applied to manufacturing, either by the tacit assumption that the foreigner pays the tariff, or that the tariff -- in some unexplained way -- enables the domestic manufacturer to reduce his costs.

"Senatorial spokesmen for the West were very frank in saying that their idea of a just tariff was one that gave 'tariff equality' to agriculture. Not content with this generalization, they went on to give to the term 'tariff equality' a meaning very different from that given to it by Mr. Hoover and eastern Republicans in the 1928 campaign."⁵

In the first quarter of the twentieth century Republican platforms advocated the principle of basing tariff rates upon an equalization of costs of production here and abroad. This was not included in the 1928 platform, although some Republicans based their campaign arguments on it. Both in the 1928 platform and in the Report of the Ways and Means Committee of the House on the Hawley-Smoot bill, the position on tariff was something like this:

⁴Ibid., p. 415

⁵Frank Whitson Fetter, "Congressional Tariff Theory," American Economic Review, Vol. XXIII, pp. 418-419 (Sept. 1933)

"Domestic producers are entitled to a 'preferential' position in the American market; because of lower costs abroad -- principally labor costs -- a tariff is necessary to insure this; competition between American producers prevents tariffs from raising prices; the test to apply in determining the need for higher rates is the increase in imports; tariffs help rather than injure our foreign trade; everyone enjoys the benefit of the tariff; our position as a creditor nation is not to be given any consideration in the determination of our tariff policy."⁶

The last part of the passage quoted above gives an indication of the fact that by the 1930's the tariff question had taken on new dimensions. Tariff was becoming an important issue in American foreign policy. Despite the Republican attitude, the actions of the United States as a leading commercial power and as a creditor nation were bound to be felt abroad and have profound effects on world politics. Add to this the fact that the high duties of the Hawley-Smoot bill preceded an international, as well as a domestic economic depression of gigantic proportions, and the basis is seen for the Democratic attack on Republican tariff policies when the GOP was defeated in November, 1930. Democrats in the 73rd Congress did not press for revision of tariff rates, but did introduce a bill to remove from the President the authority to revise tariff rates upon the recommendation of the Tariff Commission and to require Congress to pass upon all changes. In a statement later to be a source of embarrassment to him as Secretary of State, Congressman Cordell Hull, Tennessee Democrat, said this presidential authority was "too much power for a bad man to have, or for a good man to want."⁷ In defending the flexible provisions of the 1930 tariff act the Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee stated:

"The flexible provisions of the tariff act of 1930 provide that the Tariff Commission shall, after thorough investigation, report to the President proposed changes in classifications, or the bases of value, or rates of duties, within a

⁶Ibid., p. 415

⁷"Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Treaty Act," Congressional Digest, May, 1943, p. 132

limit of 50 percent, above or below those provided for in the law. This promotes promptness in the determination of changes and affects in the least degree possible, the stability of business, or the production of articles."⁸

Democrats also called for an international conference on tariffs, and the Democratic bill was passed successfully through Congress but was vetoed by President Hoover. In vetoing the bill Hoover said the provisions would create uncertainty, break down protection, and destroy flexibility. He pointed out also that the bill further called upon the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with foreign nations, which is against the American policy of "uniform and equal treatment of all nations without preference, concessions, or discriminations."⁹

Soon after the election of Franklin Roosevelt as President it became known that an important feature of his program for the restoration of prosperity would be an attempt to enter into reciprocity tariff treaties with foreign countries. This was borne out by the appointment of Cordell Hull as Secretary of State, for the Tennessee Congressman had long been an earnest advocate of reciprocity.¹⁰ Under his leadership, Congress in 1934 passed an act, the declared purpose of which was to expand "foreign markets for the products of the United States as a means of assisting in restoring the American standard of living; in overcoming domestic unemployment and the present economic depression; in increasing the purchasing power of the American public in the present emergency, and in establishing and maintaining a better relationship among various branches of American agriculture, industry, mining, and commerce."¹¹

⁸H. Rept. No. 29, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 7, 1932), p. 7

⁹"The Month in Congress," Cong. Digest, June-July, 1932, p. 189

¹⁰"America and Tariff Reciprocity," Cong. Digest, May, 1933, p. 10

¹¹Cong. Record, Vol. 78, p. 5256 (73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., March 23, 1934)

The salient features of the program were as follows:

1. Delegation by Congress to the President, acting through the Secretary of State, of the authority for a period of three years to adjust tariff duties within certain limits.
2. Tariff negotiations by Executive agreement, which meant that the President might negotiate and ratify reciprocal trade agreements without the approval of the Senate.
3. Extension of all tariff reductions (except those granted Cuba) to the products of all countries which do not discriminate against American products.

Republicans found little difficulty in forgetting temporarily their own differences over the tariff and in uniting in opposition to the new plan. The Roosevelt-Hull program not only introduced reciprocity which many Republicans had opposed, but failed to make the proposed reciprocal agreements subject to Congressional approval. Although the Republicans themselves (or some of them) had long supported the flexible principle in tariff making, the new program introduced two features which they did not like. One of these was the idea of treaty making without Senate approval. The other was the fact that a Democratic President would now be able to adjust tariff rates on the recommendation of a Democratic State Department headed by an advocate of low tariffs -- Cordell Hull -- whereas previously it had been a Republican President who could raise or lower rates upon the recommendation of a bipartisan Tariff Commission often manned by a majority of protectionists no matter which party label they wore. The dangers of the new system to protection were obvious, and Republicans voted (28 - 5) in the Senate and (99 - 2) in the House against the reciprocal trade bill.¹²

The 1936 GOP platform stated the case in this way:

"Nearly 60 percent of all imports into the United States are now free of duty. The other 40 percent of imports compete directly with the products of our industry. We would keep on the free list all products not grown or produced in the United

¹²"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215

States in commercial quantities. As to all commodities that commercially compete with our farms, our forests, our mines, our fisheries, our oil wells, our labor, and our industries, sufficient protection should be maintained at all times to defend the American farmer and the American wage earner from the destructive competition emanating from the subsidies of foreign governments and the imports from low-wage and depreciated-currency countries.

"We will repeal the present reciprocal-trade-agreement law. It is futile and dangerous. Its effect on agriculture and industry has been destructive. Its continuation would work to the detriment of the wage earner and the farmer.

"We will restore the principle of the flexible tariff in order to meet changing conditions here and abroad and broaden by careful definition the powers of the Tariff Commission in order to extend this policy along nonpartisan lines.

"We will adjust tariffs with a view to promoting international trade, the stabilization of currencies, and the attainment of a proper balance between agriculture and industry.

"We condemn the secret negotiation of reciprocal trade treaties without public hearing or legislative approval."¹³

Whereas the 1932 platform had made a strong argument in favor of leaving adjustment authority in the hands of the President, the 1936 platform was less eloquent on this point, although still supporting the flexible tariff. The use of the Executive Agreement was condemned, but for the first time the Republicans indicated that they felt that perhaps the United States did have some responsibility in adopting a tariff policy to consider its effects on the rest of the world. The importance of tariff in foreign policy was here first recognized.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act was extended for three more years in 1937 without major controversy, although the Republicans continued in solid, though somewhat weakened, opposition. All of the 14 Republicans in the Senate voted against the bill, and the Republican vote in the House was 81 to 3 against renewal.¹⁴

¹³Printed in the Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 12901 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 15, 1949)

¹⁴"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215

In 1940, with considerably more strength in both houses, the Republicans put up somewhat more of a fight against extending the Reciprocal Trade Program for another three years. After six years of the program it was still difficult to assess what its effects had been in terms of trade stimulation. Democrats noted that imports and exports had gradually increased from 1934 to 1940, but Republicans argued that trade had increased just as much with those nations which had no agreements with the United States as with the nations that did.

All ten Republican members of the House Ways and Means Committee issued a Minority Report when the bill was sent to the floor. They attacked first the common assumption that the protective tariff policy of Republican days had brought on the depression:

"This country did not lead the way in imposing import restrictions but merely followed the policy already adopted by the rest of the world. The nations which had been at war learned many bitter lessons, but no lesson struck them more forcibly than that economic self-sufficiency is as vital to the national defense as great military and naval strength. The Central Powers lost the war largely because they were starved out. They, and other nations seeking to profit by their experience, were determined not to be too dependent on other countries in the future for essential raw materials and manufactures.

"Because the Tariff Act of 1930 was enacted at about the same time the world-wide depression began, it has been unjustly charged with largely having brought it about. However, the fact is that the Hawley-Smoot Act was not passed until June, 1930, whereas the depression began in this country at least nine months earlier, and the world price decline began five years earlier."¹⁵

The Republicans also condemned the act for placing too great authority in the hands of the Executive and for encouraging imports that compete with our products on an unequal basis:

¹⁵ H. Rept. No. 1594, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Feb. 16, 1940), pt. 2, pp. 15-16

"The inconsistency between the trade treaty and labor policies is also apparent. Recently there was enacted a law providing for minimum wages and maximum hours in industry, the purpose of which was to increase the wage level of labor and improve working conditions. The trade treaty program works at cross-purposes with this act by encouraging the importation of competitive products of foreign lands where the wages paid are but a fraction of those received by American workers, and where there is no such thing as a 40-hour week or an 8-hour day.

"The immigration law and the Asiatic exclusion law are aimed at restricting competition in the labor market and at protecting our workers from having to compete for jobs against immigrants who are used to receiving and would be satisfied with much less than the American wage scale. The immigration law and the Asiatic exclusion law still stand but they have been nullified to a large extent by the Trade Treaty Act. Foreign workers are not allowed to come here and compete against American workers, but under reduced tariffs brought about by the trade treaty program, the products of cheap foreign labor are allowed to be brought in here to displace the products of American labor."¹⁶

A great deal of attention in the statement was given to answering the argument that the Reciprocal Trade Program contributes to keeping peace. In 1940 this was, of course, an important issue, and the Republicans were anxious to deal with it thoroughly:

"While the Trade Treaty Act makes no mention of being intended as an instrument for world peace, such a secondary purpose has nevertheless been ascribed to it in official quarters. The only stated purpose of the act is the expansion of foreign markets for the products of the United States. It was only after the trade treaty program had failed to achieve any substantial success in that regard that mention was first heard of the peace aspect.

"Of course, we are all for peace. In fact, most of us are so desirous of preserving peace that any program or policy which is alleged to promote it attracts our interest even when the connection is remote and difficult to see. There is no doubt but what a great many people have been led in all sincerity to support the trade treaty program because they have been told that it contributes to world peace, but we believe they will find upon reflection that the program has not been conducive to world peace and that it has no connection with world peace."¹⁷

¹⁶Ibid., p. 23

¹⁷Ibid., p. 30

Finally, the authors of the minority report denied that the new tariff program had been successful in stimulating world trade, especially our export commerce, and the summary of their position was as follows:

"Having carefully considered the trade treaty program in all its aspects we conclude:

"1. That it has not been successful in accomplishing its purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the United States or its unstated but officially declared secondary purpose of promoting world peace.

"2. That it has not been administered in the public national interest.

"3. That it should not be extended in its present form, and as now being administered, particularly in the face of present and prospective world conditions.

"That if the present act is extended, it at least should be modified to provide for congressional approval of trade treaties before they become operative."¹⁸

On the votes party lines held firm and the Democratic majority had no difficulty in extending the act until 1943. House Republicans voted (146 - 5) against the extension and there were no Republican votes in the Senate favorable to renewal.¹⁹ One statement, not quoted, from the document discussed above gave some slight indication that the Republican position with regard to the idea of reciprocity might be changing: "While not denying the efficacy of a properly administered trade treaty program as a means of expanding foreign trade..."²⁰

The 1940 campaign platform can be contrasted with the 1936 platform in that the former did not promise repeal of the Reciprocal Trade Program. While clearly affirming the principle of protection for agriculture, labor, and industry, it had this to say about the trade-agreements feature:

¹⁸Ibid., p. 36

¹⁹"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215

²⁰H. Rept. No. 1594, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (Feb. 16, 1940), pt. 2, p. 16

"We shall explore every possibility of reopening the channels of international trade through negotiations so conducted as to produce genuine reciprocity and expand our exports.

"We condemn the manner in which the so-called reciprocal trade agreements of the New Deal have been put into effect without adequate hearings, with undue haste, without proper consideration of our domestic producers, and without congressional approval. These defects we shall correct."²¹

Obviously this does not imply repeal, and when the act came up in 1943 for another extension, the Republicans supported renewal with modifications. The Administration implied that failure to repass the Reciprocal Trade Act might result in weakening the war effort of the United Nations. While denying this contention, many Republicans were willing to go along with renewal for two instead of three years. In this form it was passed, and in the Senate 18 of 32 Republicans voting supported the extension. In the House only 52 Republicans opposed the bill, while 145 voted favorably on it.²²

The 1944 platform reaffirmed protection but clearly recognized the need to stimulate international trade:

"If the postwar world is to be properly organized, a great extension of world trade will be necessary to repair the wastes of war and build an enduring peace. The Republican Party, always remembering that its primary obligation, which must be fulfilled, is to our own workers, our own farmers, and our own industry, pledges that it will join with others in leadership in every cooperative effort to remove unnecessary and destructive barriers to international trade. We will always bear in mind that the domestic market is America's greatest market and that tariffs which protect it against foreign competition should be modified only by reciprocal bilateral trade agreements approved by Congress."²³

In 1945 the Administration attempted not only to extend the Reciprocal Trade program for three more years, but to grant the President authority to

²¹Printed in Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 12901 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 15, 1949) My underscoring

²²"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1951, p. 215

²³Printed in Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 12901 (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 15, 1949)

make agreements resulting in rate adjustments up to 25 percent above or below the rates as they stood in 1945. This would mean that rates which had been lowered the maximum of 50 percent under the original authority could now be lowered another 25 percent or a total of 75 percent from what they were in 1934. Of course, the same would apply to increases, but few increases had been made, and it was the lowering of rates which mainly concerned the Republicans. The votes in Congress show somewhat of a return to the opposition on the part of the Republicans. In the Senate Republicans were still divided, 15 for and 16 against extension of the act. In the House, however, only 33 Republicans voted to renew the program, while 140 opposed it. The GOP was defeated in three attempts to amend the bill before it passed. First, Harold Knutson of Minnesota sought to limit the extension to two years; second, Walter F. Judd of Minnesota tried to knock out the authority to adjust tariffs by the added 25 percent; and finally, Bertrand W. Gearhart of California attempted to change the bill to require Congressional approval of all trade agreements.²⁴

The Senate Finance Committee did cut out the provision for additional adjustments by a 10 to 9 vote in which Robert LaFollette, Wisconsin Progressive, joined the nine Republicans on the Committee. The Senate, however, rejected the recommendation of its committee in this respect and reinstated the Administration provision by a 47 to 33 vote. On this roll call nine Republicans broke with their party and supported the new authority. Speaking as one of these nine, H. Alexander Smith (New Jersey) said, "After careful consideration...it is my conviction that the road of trade expansion is the road the United States should take. And that road can be most effectively taken if we continue the use of trade agreements in our trade relations."²⁵

²⁴Cong. Quarterly, Vol. I, 1945, pp. 310-316

²⁵Ibid., p. 312

In 1948 the Republicans had an opportunity to show what they really thought of the Reciprocal Trade Program, since at that time they held a majority in both houses of Congress. The act was extended, but only for one year, and it was amended to include what became known as a peril-point clause. In spite of the fact that the Republicans had consistently contended that the trade agreements should be made subject to Congressional approval, the 80th Congress did not include this requirement. Instead it provided for the Tariff Commission to survey all commodities on which the President proposed to negotiate agreements and establish a peril-point -- that is, a specific rate of duty below which, in the opinion of the Commission, tariffs could not be lowered without damaging American industry or business. If the President dropped rates below this point, he was required to send an official communication to Congress explaining why.²⁶

This provision was written into the House bill by the Ways and Means Committee. A motion in the Committee to extend the act for three years instead of only one was defeated by a vote of 15 to 9, and by the same vote the altered bill was reported to the floor. The committee incurred some criticism because it held only closed hearings on the bill in 1948, and there was further complaint from the Democrats when the bill was brought to the floor under a rule which prohibited amendments. The rule was adopted, however, and the only chance the Democrats had to block action was on a motion to recommit the bill to committee. This was defeated (168 - 211), and the bill passed (234 - 119), with the Republicans supporting it by a vote of 218 to 5.²⁷

In the Senate Finance Committee an attempt to compromise on the peril-

²⁶"The Reciprocal Trade Program -- I. Tracing Its History," Cong. Digest, Apr., 1951, p. 106

²⁷Cong. Quarterly, Vol. IV, 1948, pp. 190-192

point clause was defeated by a vote of 7 to 6, and the bill was reported with that provision included. The Democrats tried in vain to get an extension of the old act, and the revised version passed by a 70 to 18 margin. The Republicans voted (47 - 1) for the one year, modified extension.²⁸

The peril-point provision, however, never went into effect. It was, of course, opposed by the President and many Democrats, and when the GOP lost control of Congress in the 1948 elections, the extension of the Trade Agreements Act by the Republican Congress was repealed, the peril-point amendment was removed, and the act was extended, retroactively from 1948, for a three-year period.

The 1948 Republican platform statement on tariff was the shortest since the party was founded. While not explaining what it meant in any detail, the GOP was cagey in its reaffirmation of protection and in its support of reciprocal trade. In its entirety it stated:

"At all times safeguarding our own industry and agriculture, and under efficient administrative procedures for the legitimate consideration of domestic needs, we shall support the system of reciprocal trade and encourage international commerce."²⁹

From this platform and from the behavior of the Republicans in the 1948 and 1949 considerations of the reciprocal trade program, there were indications of some changes and considerable dissension in the party of high tariffs. The first break from the solid opposition had come in 1943 under the pressures of the war and the new Republican internationalists. Although the House GOP swang back to almost complete opposition in 1945, the Senate continued to be split. We have noted how party statements became less dogmatic on the matter of protection, and how the Republicans, once in control of Congress and faced with the problem of what to do about tariffs, failed to

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Printed in Cong. Record, Vol. 95, p. 12901. (81st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 15, 1949)

carry out the threats made over the previous sixteen years.

Part of this could be attributed to the growing strength of the internationalists which has been detailed in previous chapters. As early as 1943 Republicans such as Willkie and Stassen were calling on the party to revise its stand on reciprocal trade, and in 1944 a more "regular" Republican, Alfred Landon (1936 Presidential nominee), came out solidly against the party's ancient tariff policies:

"Let the high-tariff traditionalists in both parties reveal how we can expand our markets without lowered tariff rates. Let them explain how else we can compete after the war with a desperate Britain and shrewd, horse-trading Russia. Let them say how the American worker, the American businessman, and the American farmer, will be better off if we maintain our traditional tariff policy...The Republican party was founded on a great truth, the immorality and economic folly of slavery. It proceeded on another great truth, that in an infant nation of great resources infant industries could grow quickest to maturity under a system of reasonable competition. Now... it must dare enunciate a third great truth, that a free and easy interexchange of raw materials and finished products among all the nations of the world is the quickest way to world prosperity, and that world prosperity is the No. 1 prerequisite not only for American welfare, but for lasting peace as well."³⁰

The 1944 platform, as quoted above, contained both elements of old-fashioned protection and support of international trade in almost equal proportions and stated them in such a way as to satisfy supporters of both ideas. This is not surprising since the plank was written by a subcommittee headed by Landon but composed of a group predominantly in favor of high tariffs, including former Senator Grundy of Pennsylvania.³¹

After the war it was the view of the internationalists that we must strengthen the economies of nations (in Europe particularly) which were outside the Iron Curtain and opposed to Communism. The European Recovery Program was the chief undertaking of the United States in that regard, but it

³⁰Ralph Robey, "A Proposed Major About-Face for Republicans," Newsweek, Jan. 31, 1944, p. 60

³¹Ralph Robey, "The Republican Platform," Newsweek, July 3, 1944, p. 56

was quickly seen that if these nations were to recover, they must sell abroad, and the United States furnished the largest, wealthiest market in the world. They could not, however, afford to sell to America if tariffs designed for protection against all foreign competition were maintained.

Another source of challenge to the principles of protection, although often coinciding with the first in terms of personalities, was the group of big businesses who began to swing behind the reciprocal trade program for reasons of its own:

"Outside of active party politics the program has definitely instigated growing dispute between Big and Little Business. Big Business, with its mass production methods and need for foreign markets, has favored the program as one allegedly tending to make it easier to sell abroad. Small Business, operating with only a limited domestic market, now fights the program as one allegedly tending to force it into competition with cheap (sometimes slave) foreign labor. This situation is no where better evidenced than in the fact that most CIO unions, which are organized chiefly among the big, mass-producing industries such as steel and automobiles, favor the current Reciprocal Trade Program -- while most AFL unions, which are organized horizontally among craft groups such as carpenters, bookbinders, glass cutters, etc., disapprove it.

"The Big and Little Business friction also often results in an anomalous situation on the management side, for much of Big Business is controlled by Republican interests, while a great segment of Small Business is run by Democrats.

"Thus it appears that the old traditional pattern of high tariff -- Republican -- North and low tariff -- Democrat -- South is no longer as clear-cut as in years past. It is also doubtful if the political line-up in Congress would follow party patterns if the main issues today involved pure economic-trade theory rather than the administrative handling of the program."³²

As early as 1943 the National Association of Manufacturers endorsed the Reciprocal Trade Program and by 1949 not only the United States Chamber of Commerce, but the American Farm Bureau Federation had swung behind it. These attitudes on the part of groups from which Republicans gain a great deal of their support were bound to cause changes in the voting behavior of

³²"The Reciprocal Trade Program -- II. The Picture Today," Cong. Digest, Apr., 1951, p. 110

the GOP in Congress. In the 1949 reconsideration of the act's extension Republicans were united in their fight to retain the peril-points clause which they had inserted in the 1948 extension and were relatively closely knit on a motion to recommit the bill to committee. On the vote for final passage, however, Republicans in both houses were badly divided. In the House 84 GOP Congressmen voted for the three-year extension without the peril-points provision, while 63 voted against it. In the Senate the vote was 15 for renewal and 18 against.³³

The 1951 legislation gained strong Republican support because of the reinsertion of the 'peril-points provision, as well as three other features which the Republicans wanted. Although GOP members of the House Ways and Means Committee were not successful in getting the peril-points clause into the bill as it came from committee, they wrote a strong minority report in favor of it and were successful in having it written in on the floor. The Republican statement called for the following modifications before the act should be extended:

"1. That, with certain modifications as discussed below, the peril-point report provisions established by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1948 be reenacted;

"2. That the President be directed to prevent the application of reduced tariffs and other concessions made in trade agreements with the free nations to imports from Soviet Russia and Communist China, and to imports from any Communist satellite country (including North Korea) which the President finds is part of a conspiracy against the free world;

"3. That, for the purpose of clarification and to facilitate procedures, certain standards be established by the Congress for the guidance of the President in determining relief under the 'escape clause';

"4. That the authority of the President to make new trade agreements be extended for a two-year period instead of a three-year period."³⁴

³³Cong. Quarterly, Vol. V, 1949, pp. 362-369

³⁴H. Rept. No. 14, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 29, 1951), p. 20

In defense of the peril-point procedure the Republicans explained:

"1. This peril-point procedure which we recommend will in no way interfere with the President's authority to make future trade agreements; and

"2. Under the peril-point procedure, no obligation is imposed upon the State Department to adhere to the Tariff Commission's peril-point findings.

"The only objection of any substance to the peril-point safeguard procedure in the 1948 extension act was the requirement that a copy of the complete report of the Tariff Commission, including the items on which concessions did not go below the peril-points, was to be furnished the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance. It was alleged by the State Department that some dissatisfaction by foreign countries might arise if they learned that their negotiators had not held out for the maximum reduction which the Tariff Commission reported could be made without serious injury, or the threat of it, to our domestic producers. To remove this objection we recommend a change in the peril-point procedure so that the information to be supplied by the Tariff Commission to the Congress will be limited only to those items on which trade agreement concessions go below the peril-points.

"Thus modified the only basic issue arising from the peril-point procedure is whether the State Department should have the benefit for its guidance of a peril-point report of the bipartisan Tariff Commission which we recommend or whether the State Department should conduct this program on only a 'calculated risk' basis without adequate safeguards."³⁵

The "escape clause" first appeared in an agreement with Mexico and provided that either party could back out of the agreement if it should be found that "unforeseen developments" were hurting domestic industry. By executive order President Truman stipulated that this clause should be included in all future reciprocal agreements. The Republican statement asserted:

"As the result of the patent looseness and ambiguity of the language of the escape clause, and as a result of the lack of any standards established by the Congress for the President's guidance in determining when relief should be granted, only one industry has ever been afforded relief by the President under this clause -- and this took nearly a year to accomplish.

. . . .

³⁵Ibid., pp. 20-21

"In order to remedy this unfortunate situation we recommend that Congress provide certain principles which will guide and assist the President in the administration of the escape clause and expedite the procedure."³⁶

The peril-point provision was included on a roll-call vote of 224 to 168, with all but four of the Republicans voting supporting it. Certain standards for the escape clause were included by a division vote of 198 to 89, and the Russian exclusion was accepted on a voice vote.³⁷

The Senate version of the bill also contained all the Republican ideas including the two-year as opposed to the three-year extension. A substitute bill introduced by Malone (Nevada) drew the support of only 15 Senators, and on the vote for passage of the original bill the affirmative vote was an overwhelming 72 to 2. The Malone substitute would have taken from the President and the Secretary of State the power to negotiate trade treaties, and would have given this power to a new, bipartisan Foreign Trade Authority. In the House only five Republicans voted "nay" when the bill passed. Thus did the Republicans come to accept and support a modified version of a program which for many years they attempted to bring to an end.

Obviously this cannot be considered the end of the history of the tariff policy of the Republican party, but it does show a return to party unity in Congress after nearly ten years of division, and unity on a different position than that of twenty years earlier. It was not a position of complete support of the President which some Republicans had previously taken, nor was it the isolationist, anti-reciprocal trade position favored by Republicans before World War II. Rather it was a stand that recognized the need for world trade, but contained elements which could satisfy the need felt by all Republicans to oppose the President's program on some points at least.

³⁶Ibid., p. 23

³⁷"Trade Agreements Extension," Cong. Quarterly, Vol. VII, 1951, pp. 214-219

The Republican tariff story, therefore, conforms to the development of Republican foreign policy as a whole during this period which will be summarized in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE NEW LOOK IN REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY

A summary of Republican foreign policy, 1939 - 1952, should perhaps consider certain general questions, the answers to which may give significance to the preceding detailed study of votes, platforms, and politics. What characteristics of an opposition party can be observed in Republican foreign policy behavior under Democratic presidents? What were the trends during this period with respect to the relative strength of the foreign policy factions within the party? Did the fundamental philosophy of Republicans on foreign policy undergo important changes between 1939 and 1952?

I

Many of the characteristics which students have observed in the activities of American opposition parties can be seen and detailed in the record of the Republicans during the period studied. They experienced and were conscious of some of the difficulties of their position. Senator Taft's comments on what he felt the role of the opposition to be have been discussed earlier.¹ One of the problems which he specifically mentioned was the minority's lack of information:

"The opposition could not really devise a detailed foreign policy of its own...because it did not have the means or the information to do so."²

Karl Mundt, then a Representative from South Dakota, wrote:

"Critics of Republicans for failure to set forth a detailed foreign policy are within their rights, but all should realize that the party of 'outs' lacks access to diplomatic pouches, to secret communiques, to tripartite conferences, to our counter-espionage reports, and to many other information sources available to the President and his Department of State."³

¹Chapter VIII, p. 253

²New York Times, Jan. 5, 1950, p. 6

³"This Month in Congress," The Republican, Apr., 1944, p. 10

When Senator Taft referred in the quotation above to "the means" to formulate a detailed foreign policy, he may have had in mind the lack of an agreed forum for policy formation. Although not always admitted by congressional Republicans, at all times during the period studied important leaders of party policy formation -- men who were influential in drafting platforms, nominating presidential candidates, and leading Republican thinking on foreign policy -- were outside of Congress. Landon, Willkie, Dewey, Stassen, and Dulles are examples of such important figures, and some Republican governors could be included in this category.

Attempts by non-congressional leaders -- even titular heads of the party -- to influence congressional party action were almost always rebuffed as being beyond the role even of a duly nominated presidential candidate. Willkie's attempt to lead party opinion on the lend-lease bill is a notable example of this, but at other times there were evidences of the same kind of struggle for the right to form the party's policy.⁴ The so-called "Governors' revolt" against the "Washington cabal" at the Mackinac Conference, and another "young Republican" uprising in 1949 both point up the problem of the opposition party in policy formation.

There is little argument over the fact that the theoretical organ of policy formation -- the national convention -- does not in fact perform that role. The struggles over clauses in the platform have their significance as tests of strength between factions and may play their part in policy evolution, but certainly the final platform, in so far as it represents a policy statement at all, can hardly be interpreted as authoritative. Members of Congress contend that party policy when the Democrats control the White House

⁴Chapter II

⁵Chapter III

is fixed by the votes of Republicans in the House and Senate, and that it is up to them to decide how they shall vote on various issues. They feel they must make these decisions in the light of what is favored by their constituents; that they are responsible to their constituents, not to the Republicans outside their own states or districts who fail to elect spokesmen to Congress.⁶

On the other hand, other Republicans, especially the defeated presidential nominees during this period, had the feeling that the votes of congressional Republicans may have jeopardized their chances of election; that the record being written by Republican members of Congress from safe districts was not one which appealed to many Republicans and independents whose votes might have captured the White House and other posts.⁷ This conviction was, of course, reinforced by the nomination in every presidential year (with the possible exception of 1948) of a candidate out of harmony with congressional leadership on foreign policy matters.

This situation clearly illustrates the lack of a procedure within the party for determining a platform for congressmen in off-year elections. In 1946 and 1950 joint statements were formulated by the Republican conferences in House and Senate and by the National Committee, but even this system could not represent all views in the party, nor represent them in any way relative to their strength in the party electorate. It is to deal with this problem that the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association urges an off-year party convention to frame a biennial platform.⁸

In view of the evident lack of agreement, not only on policy itself, but as to where policy ought to be formulated, the main Republican policy during

⁶"Revolt Inside Republican Party," United States News and World Report, Jan. 14, 1949, pp. 18-19

⁷Ibid.

⁸Am. Pol. Sci. Assoc., Com. on Pol. Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, p. 54

this period was, more than any other single thing: attack on the President. Bearing out the generally observed phenomenon that political parties are more concerned with offices than with policies, most Republicans could agree that whatever else, their role should be to heckle and embarrass the President. Even the question of how far this should be carried divided the Republicans, but during most of the period broadest agreement in Congress could be reached in attacks on any measure which gave the President added powers, in support of amendments which restricted the role of the President, in attacks on the President's handling of a program, or in criticisms of the President's chief foreign policy adviser -- the Secretary of State. This last was less true of Secretaries other than Dean Acheson, but long before Acheson occupied that office, Republicans had manifested a mistrust of the capabilities of the State Department's personnel.

In 1945 an amendment proposed by Senator Taft to "remove the President's authority" to sell lend-lease material gained wider Republican support than other proposed changes in that program. In 1948 the Republicans, including Senator Vandenberg, wanted to be sure that administration of the Marshall Plan was not placed in the hands of the Secretary of State, but rather that it should be under a special agency whose head the Senate would have a share in selecting. Also in 1948, the GOP was successful in putting the "peril-point" clause in the Reciprocal Trade Extension Act, which was designed to restrict by means of publicity, rather than by legal restraints, the power of the President in negotiating reciprocal trade treaties. These are illustrative of the general pattern. In this connection it is significant to note that it was during the years that certain groups of Republicans were trying to counter this tendency to criticize the President that the party was most badly split. Before 1943 and after 1949 there was practically no attempt to

restrain these attacks, and party unity in Congress was comparatively high.⁹

II

Bearing out this conclusion is the fact that the 1952 platform was written by John Foster Dulles and was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Platform Committee, by the Platform Committee itself, and by the National Convention virtually without modification or opposition. This could be said of no other platform during the period under study, for even in 1948 when the foreign policy plank was essentially the work of Senator Vandenberg, there was a considerable fight at both the committee and subcommittee stages. Perhaps the new unity was based in part on the fact that there was no attempt to soft-pedal criticism of the Administration. While he was active, Vandenberg was anxious, in order to further bipartisanship, not only that internationalism be firmly endorsed, but that criticism of the Administration be kept to a minimum, and in this he was successful. By 1952 most pretenses of bipartisanship had been dropped, and the Republicans in Congress were more united in their desire to attack the President's policies.

The increased unity of 1951-1952 was not complete even on this question. The most obvious statement that can be made from a study of Republican foreign policy is that there is never a single party policy. Both in 1939-1940 and in 1951-1952, periods of comparative unity, there were Republicans in Congress who voted against other Republicans on almost all issues of foreign policy. And it is probably safe to say that beyond the extremes found among Republicans in Congress there were even more extreme views held by those outside Congress who called themselves Republicans. In both 1940 and 1952 there were Republican isolationists and Republican one-worlders. The method of vote

⁹See Figure I

analysis used in this study has obvious limitations. There are probably elements of inaccuracy in the attempt to compile thousands of votes over a fourteen-year period. Certainly there are features of inexactness: the factor of absenteeism, the question of the number of issues on which roll-call votes are available, the transformation of numbers into percentages all detract from this method as a means of reaching precise conclusions with regard to individual roll calls, individual members, or even single sessions. The application of the same techniques, however, to fourteen legislative sessions and the results obtained have convinced the writer that it is a method well suited to measuring trends in the party's voting patterns over a number of years.

As will be understood from the earlier discussions, the indications of very nearly 100 percent "unity" in the 77th and 82nd Congresses (House of Representatives) by no means indicate the kind of solidarity that might be found, let us say, in the voting behavior of a British political party. The unity of these periods is a relative unity only by comparison with the intervening sessions and by use of a very liberal standard, that is, votes cast in unison on 50 percent of the issues. The purpose is not to suggest this as a new standard, but only to find a measurement criteria which will reveal trends. As seen in Figure I, it is well suited to that purpose.

What then are the trends? In brief summary they are as follows: Before Pearl Harbor the isolationist elements in the Republican party clearly dominated the congressional scene. The war years of 1943-1944 show a strong shift toward the internationalist side of the scale. The reaction to the pre-war isolationism combined with the nature of the few wartime issues of the 78th Congress can be credited with producing this phenomenon. It seems probable that this swing did not indicate so fundamental a change in party thinking as

at first might be inferred. This session alone represents wartime voting.¹⁰ It seems more reasonable to look upon the pattern for 1945-1946 as the first real and solid trend away from the situation prevailing before Pearl Harbor, although without question the "war shock" was the sine qua non of the "conversion process" discussed below. The voting in the 80th Congress was the culmination of a five or six year trend which resulted in a working majority of those who favored cooperation with the Democratic Administration in a program of support of international organization and participation in world politics. Beginning in 1949, the number of those who favored bipartisanship declined rapidly until in the 82nd Congress more than 90 percent of all Republican Congressmen and 80 percent of all Republican Senators cast votes on 50 percent or more of the issues in agreement with those members who were most bitterly opposed to the Administration's handling of foreign affairs.

As will be more clearly shown below, however, this four-year phenomenon following 1949 can be interpreted as a victory for the "isolationists," but not for isolationism. Those who favored close cooperation with the Democratic Administration found themselves increasingly out of step after 1949 with a majority of their congressional colleagues on this question, but the shift away from them did not mean a return to a position of American non-participation in world politics. The isolationists themselves did not now favor isolation and could more properly be called oppositionists. Although favoring a more restricted role for the United States in some areas than did the President, the oppositionists favored a more expanded role in other areas, and the general basis of most of their criticism had to do more with the manner rather than with the extent of that participation.

¹⁰The only foreign policy roll calls in the House in 1942 were the declarations of war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. These comprised three of the six roll calls in the Senate. Two others in the Senate dealt with our relations with Panama. Only one, on aid to China, could be considered as involving the essence of foreign policy philosophy.

An incidental feature of the compilation of votes made for this study is the confirmation of certain generally held ideas about the sectional variations within the Republican party. Using the sections delineated by Grassmuck and the same scale as that employed for the voting trends discussed above, the patterns indicated on Figure II are revealed.¹¹ Differences in the constituencies, issues, and personalities no doubt partially account for discrepancies between the House and Senate percentages. In both the House and the Senate members from the New England and North Atlantic area cast, in this period, the most votes on the internationalist side of the foreign policy issues considered. In order to rank the other regions from this standpoint the percentages may be combined with the following results:

| | <u>Oppositionists</u> | <u>Cooperators</u> |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| New England and North Atlantic | 53 percent | 47 percent |
| Pacific States | 65 percent | 35 percent |
| Great Plains | 70 percent | 30 percent |
| Lake States | 78 percent | 22 percent |
| Rocky Mountains | 80 percent | 20 percent |
| Border States | 84 percent | 16 percent |

III

It is certain that by 1939 the Republicans, with few exceptions, favored a less active role for the United States in world affairs than did the Democrats under Roosevelt's leadership. As compared with the period of the 1940's, Republicans in Congress were well unified on most matters of foreign affairs in opposition to the President's interventionism. In spite of the defection of a small group of Senators, the votes on the neutrality repeal, selective

¹¹George L. Grassmuck, Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy, pp. 34-52. The sectional definitions are as follows:

Pacific Coast: California, Washington, Oregon

New England and North Atlantic: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware

The South: Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Arkansas, Alabama

Border States: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia

The Lake States: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio

Great Plains: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin

Rocky Mts: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Mont., N. Mexico, Utah, Wyoming

service, and lend lease, as well as the compilations for the entire 77th Congress, make this very clear.¹² The opposition to Administration measures in this period was not based primarily on differences over how we could best stop the spread of fascist aggression. It was not merely a question of whether the President wanted to spend abroad too lavishly, thus endangering our national economy. The majority congressional Republican position before World War II was that the United States should disengage itself completely from any involvement in the wars or politics of Europe and Asia. The Republicans did not believe that America had a responsibility to use her power to preserve the status quo. Any financial or military help which we gave the Allies fighting in Europe would not be for our own protection, but rather, in the words of the 1940 platform, because "our sympathies have been profoundly stirred..."¹³ "Freedom in America," said fifteen Republican elder statesmen, "does not depend on the outcome of struggles for material power between other nations."¹⁴ Needless to repeat, the GOP opposed our entry into the war until the afternoon of December 7, 1941.

Public opinion polls of the period and the nomination of Wendell Willkie in 1940 indicate that the minority Republican view in Congress may have had the support of a majority of the rank-and-file in the country and certainly was espoused by strong non-congressional Republican groups. While the coming of the war resolved the immediate question, the new issue in the party became whether to regard the war as one of those unfortunate conflagrations which the United States had to help extinguish; whether the defeat of fascism would again permit American withdrawal from world politics; or whether our position as the world's greatest power would require that henceforth we must use that

¹²See Chapter II

¹³Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1940, p. 141

¹⁴New York Times, Aug. 6, 1941, p. 6

power to play the game of international politics in order to protect our own interests by maintaining stability in distant parts of the world.

The fact that Roosevelt's program of intervention and preparedness seemed in retrospect to have been correct led millions of Americans to conclude that Republican opposition to this program had been very wrong. It led to a general repudiation of isolationism, to a seeming confirmation of the dire predictions made by friends of the League of Nations, and to a strengthening of those elements in the GOP which had favored intervention before Pearl Harbor. There were famous conversions from the old doctrine to the new, such as in the case of Senator Vandenberg, and there was a clear recognition by others that the tide of public opinion was strongly internationalistic. The birth of bipartisanship in foreign policy in 1944 was no doubt partly an attempt to remove from the Republican party the stigma which attached to it because of its pre-war behavior.

The war reactions clearly carried over to assure the ratification of the United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2, and the support of a majority of Republicans in Congress for adherence to UNESCO, to the optional clause for compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and to other experiments in international organization. The idea of bipartisanship had been transferred from a campaign arrangement to a legislative one with the placing of three Republicans on the American delegation to San Francisco. It cannot be said with real assurance, however, that the Republicans would have supported an active role in world politics for the United States if it had not been for the appearance of the Russian menace even before the ink on the Charter was dry. A majority of Republicans in both Houses voted against the British Loan Agreement of 1946, and an analysis of Republican voting in the House shows that opponents of internationalism were dominant there in the

79th Congress. The Senate pattern was influenced heavily by votes on international organization to which the Republicans were committed.

A majority of the party, however, with a majority of the people, stood committed to the idea of world cooperation, although scarcely able to imagine where such a commitment would lead. It seemed clear that endorsement of an international organization was the first step, and most Republicans were willing to go along with this. The United Nations, however, depended for its successful operation on the unity of the Big Five, and it was here that Republicans found it difficult to follow. Before the war was over, serious differences with the Russians began to appear, and while the initial reaction of the Administration was to soft-pedal these disagreements, the Republicans were not willing to do so. In his famous speech of January 10, 1945, Vandenberg made this clear:

"...a great American illusion seems to have been built up -- wittingly or otherwise -- that we in the United States dare not publicly discuss these subjects [differences among the victors] lest we contribute to international dissension... But I frankly confess that I do not know why we must be the only silent partner in this grand alliance. There seems to be no fear of disunity, no hesitation in Moscow, when Moscow wants to assert unilateral war and peace aims which collide with ours..."¹⁵

Although it was often so charged at the time, this attitude could not be called a retreat to isolation. It was in this same speech that Vandenberg made his so-called confession concerning his change of heart since Pearl Harbor and reaffirmed his belief in the necessity for an active world role for the United States:

"....I do not believe that any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action...

"I want maximum cooperation, consistent with legitimate American self interest...

¹⁵Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Arthur Vandenberg, p. 132

"America has this same self interest in permanently, conclusively and effectively disarming Germany and Japan... I know of no reason why a hard-and-fast treaty between the major allies should not be signed today to achieve this dependable end...

"Let me put it this way for myself: I am prepared, by effective international cooperation, to do our full part in charting healthier and safer tomorrows..."¹⁶

Although some declared that Vandenberg was not speaking for his party in proposing such a program, it seems safe to say in the light of the record of the 80th Congress that he was entitled to speak for the views of a majority of Republicans in both Houses.¹⁷ The party did not endorse his suggestions for an allied treaty in any formal action, but official statements of 1945 indicated strong support for international cooperation in various ways.¹⁸ These also, however, indicated distrust and criticism of the Russians.

It must be remembered here that the Republicans had never been friendly toward the Soviet Union. Three Republican presidents refused to recognize the communist regime during the entire period of GOP post-war rule. There had been severe criticism of Roosevelt when recognition was finally given in 1933. If Republican aversion to totalitarianism of any kind was great, it was particularly so with regard to a totalitarianism based on an anti-capitalist philosophy. As has been shown in the case of Republican attitudes toward Spain and Yugoslavia, the GOP exhibited greater friendliness toward a dictatorship of the Right than toward one of the Left.¹⁹

Although somewhat suppressed at the time, these attitudes were expressed off and on during the war period by Republicans who thought the "strange alliance" was definitely a dangerous one and who were anxious to break the

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 135-137

¹⁷See Chapter V

¹⁸Statements adopted by House and Senate Republican Conferences and by the National Committee. New York Times, Dec. 6, 1945, p. 18; New York Times, Apr. 1, 1946, p. 1

¹⁹See Chapter VI

relationship as soon as possible -- at least from the standpoint of sending money and material to the Soviet Union. Concessions to the Soviet Union at the conference table came increasingly to be subjected to Republican attacks.

Vandenberg's position was perhaps partially based on the fact that he expressed the willingness of Republicans to cooperate in a general way while at the same time sharing the anti-Russian fears of his party. Add to this the fact that he himself once had been an isolationist, and Vandenberg looks like the very embodiment of majority GOP sentiment at the time the Republicans assumed control of the 80th Congress. The strong anti-communism of the party made it natural for it to support measures designed to stop the spread of Russian influence in various parts of the world. As America's world role became increasingly one designed to accomplish this end, Republicans found it increasingly possible to support an active political role for the United States on the international scene.

With Vandenberg in a position of leadership, a majority of Republicans in the 80th Congress came to support such an active role. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Reciprocal Trade Program were adopted with strong Republican cooperation. Criticism of Administration foreign policy did not cease, but it was of a different nature than before the war. After 1949 criticism of the Democratic course in foreign policy became increasingly bitter on many issues. Bipartisanship came to an end on many vital matters. The old isolationists, now better called oppositionists, gained in influence during the last Truman Administration, but the party did not return to isolationism. It did become critical of our Allies; it did prefer military to economic aid to Europe and often voted to restrict the scope of the former; it did manifest interest in Asia in preference to Europe, but especially in this latter respect an expanded rather than a restricted role for the United States was advocated. Republican suggestions, for instance, of what the

United States could or should have done in Asia went far beyond those the Administration thought feasible at the time. Far from criticizing the government for dabbling in affairs which were none of our business, the Republicans laid at the door of the State Department the responsibility for failing to prevent a communist victory in China and a war in Korea.

Obvious discontent with the Russians as partners in the United Nations could have led the Republicans to a retreat from that body and a return to their pre-war opposition to international organization. No doubt some Republicans have favored this, but in general the majority of them have not been desirous of withdrawing to leave the field to the Soviet Union either in or out of the United Nations.

The 1952 Republican platform, adopted without opposition at any stage, clearly indicates the degree to which the transformation to intervention had been completed. No Republican platform, even in the expansionist era at the turn of the century, laid out so ambitious a program for American participation in world affairs. Our concern in every part of the world was recognized -- Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, Israel, and the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East. Boldest of all, the suggestion for the liberation of the communist satellites implied an almost aggressive role in world politics. "We shall not allow ourselves to be isolated...", the platform read, and specific commitments were made for world trade, an international exchange of students, and ending "the neglect of the Far East."²⁰ The full power of the United States was to be used to "wage peace and win it."

From rejection to acceptance of an active American role in world affairs -- this was the basic change in Republican foreign policy between 1939 and 1952.

²⁰ Proceedings, Rep. Natl. Conv., 1952, p. 314

FIGURE I

| SENATE | | | HOUSE | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| <u>Oppositionists</u> | <u>Cooperators</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Oppositionists</u> | <u>Cooperators</u> |
| 73 percent | 28 percent | 1939-40 | 99 percent | 1 percent |
| 89 " | 11 " | 41-42 | 100 " | 0 " |
| 24 " | 76 " | 43-44 | 50 " | 50 " |
| 60 " | 40 " | 45-46 | 71 " | 29 " |
| 39 " | 61 " | 47-48 | 45 " | 55 " |
| 63 " | 37 " | 49-50 | 87 " | 13 " |
| 80 " | 20 " | 51-52 | 96 " | 4 " |

FIGURE II

| SENATE | | | HOUSE | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| <u>Oppositionists</u> | <u>Cooperators</u> | <u>Sections of the U.S.</u> | <u>Oppositionists</u> | <u>Cooperators</u> |
| 64 percent | 36 percent | New Eng. & No. Atlantic | 42 percent | 58 percent |
| 88 " | 12 " | Lake States | 67 " | 33 " |
| 85 " | 15 " | Great Plains | 55 " | 45 " |
| 70 " | 30 " | Rocky Mts. | 89 " | 11 " |
| 64 " | 36 " | Pacific Coast | 66 " | 34 " |
| 85 " | 15 " | Border States | 82 " | 18 " |

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F. CORRESPONDENCE

James B. Reston

VITA

Charles John Graham was born on May 29, 1929, in Peru, Illinois. After graduating from LaSalle-Peru Township High School in 1946, he attended the LaSalle-Peru-Oglesby Junior College and the University of Illinois, receiving Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees from the latter school. As an undergraduate he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi honorary fraternities, and while in the graduate college was the holder of the James W. Garner Fellowship in Political Science. Upon passing the Junior Management Assistant Examination, he entered the Navy Department's Administrative Intern Training Program in 1953, and after completing that program was employed as a Contract Negotiator for the Bureau of Ships. In October, 1954, he joined the Social Science faculty of Wisconsin State College, River Falls, where he is now teaching. He is married and has one child.