

**Venetian Foreign Affairs from 1250 to 1381:
The Wars with Genoa and Other External Developments**

By

Mark R. Filip

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Introduction

In the years preceding the War of Chioggia, Venetian foreign affairs were dominated by conflicts with Genoa. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the two powers often clashed in open hostilities. This antagonism between the cities lasted for ten generations, and has been compared to the earlier rivalry between Rome and Carthage.

Like the struggle between the two ancient powers, the Venetian/Genoan hatred stemmed from their competitive relationship in maritime trade. Unlike land-based rivals, sea powers cannot be separated by any natural boundary or agree to observe any territorial spheres of influence. Trade with the Levant, a source of great wealth and prosperity for each of the cities, required Venice and Genoa to come into repeated conflict in ports such as Chios, Lajazzo, Acre, and Tyre. Efforts at negotiation did not produce any lasting results, and statesmen like Petrarch concluded that "inevitably, of Italy's two Eyes, one will be put out, the other dimmed."¹

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Venice and Genoa repeatedly clashed, each trying to destroy its rival. This paper will look at the historical events which shaped this era of the major hostilities between the two powers. The author will look at factors such as battles, diplomatic efforts, and government institutions which helped to influence the outcome of the various developments in this age of Venetian foreign affairs. In addition, this thesis will attempt to explain which factors were most important in determining the eventual success or failure of Venetian efforts to remain strong in the face of threats from many other powers, including most notably Genoa.

The Initial Battles: Acre and Constantinople

Although conditions which led to confrontation had been developing for centuries, early clashes between the two powers occurred during the mid-1200s. In 1257 and 1258, a relatively minor incident escalated into the First Genoese War. At Acre, an argument broke out over the ownership of the church and outlying region near St. Saba, an area in which both powers maintained commercial trading posts.² In a heated argument between sailors of the two cities, a Venetian citizen murdered a Genoan. In response, the Genoans in the city raided the Venetian settlements, sacking and partially burning the area. The Venetians within the city feared extermination. As a result, the Venetians sent home urgent distress dispatches to the Republic.

When the Doge heard about the incident, he sent representatives to Genoa to ask for retribution. This ambassador was dismissed without any explanation for the Genoan actions or any promises to take actions to improve relations with Venice. In response to this reply, the Venetians quickly outfitted approximately fifteen galleys under the leadership of Lorenzo Tiepolo, ordering him to take decisive action against the Genoans in Acre.³ This fleet, arriving in 1256, broke through a huge chain which the Genoans were using to barricade the harbor. Once inside, Tienolo's men set fire to the Genoan ships, landed on the shores, and captured the town with little resistance. The Genoese asked for a truce, which Admiral Tiepolo granted.

During this cessation of hostilities, the Genoans prepared for a retaliatory attack. First, the government sent ships to the nearby port of Tyre. From this spot, the Genoan Admiral, Pietro Mallono, sailed back and forth across Acre,

trying to draw the Venetians into an engagement. Instead of attacking prematurely, Tiepolo prepared his galleys and waited for an opportune time to engage Mollono. Finally, Tiepolo felt that conditions were advantageous, and he attacked the Genoans off the coast of Tyre. Despite the fact that there were only seventeen ships in the Venetian fleet, Tiepolo's forces trounced their enemy, capturing approximately twenty-five Genoese ships in the battle.⁴ This victory was very important for the Republic, as it severely undermined Genoa's maritime power in the Levant.

In response to this loss, Genoa again rearmed for battle. As would be proven time and time again throughout the years, a victory by one city only seemed to incite the other power to respond with renewed hatred and fervor. The Genoans built and manned four great ships and forty additional galleys. This fleet, put under the command of Rosso della Turca, soon set sail for Syria.⁵ In August of 1258, this armada met Tiepolo's Venetian fleet, a clearly inferior force both in terms of type and number of ships. Despite this disadvantage, Tiepolo used his superior tactical skills to lead the Venetians to a complete victory. The Venetian fleet captured twenty-five galleys in the battle, and then took the ships back to Acre as war prizes. The Venetians then took additional actions against their enemy, pillaging and razing Genoan areas of the city. In this effort, the Venetians captured the two columns which now stand near the Porta della Carta, as well as the Pietra del Bando which sits at the southwest corner of St. Mark's cathedral.⁶

This struggle between the two great Italian cities threatened the collective strength of Christians in the Levant. This development was of

importance to other Christian powers, who rightfully feared losing control of the rich area to the Muslims. As a result, Pope Alexander IV stepped in to mediate and forge an agreement between the two cities. The Pontiff used a variety of religious and political pressures to get the cities to agree to a truce, and believed that he had settled the problems in the Holy Land. This peace, however, was doomed from the beginning; the underlying causes of the animosity between the cities--commercial and maritime rivalries--created inevitable friction and conflict.

The peace proved to be short-lived, and the rivals became embroiled in another clash only two years later in 1261. This conflict arose when developments in the East threatened the Venetian political and economic position in this region. At this time, an aspiring Greek by the name of Michael Paleologus decided to retake Constantinople and reestablish the Greek Empire. Because the Latin Empire had become progressively weaker since it was established in 1204, Paleologus reasoned that the powers of Western Europe would not act to save the doomed state if it was attacked. This assumption, however, proved to be invalid. Much of the Venetian prosperity rested upon trade with the East. As a result, it was imperative for the Republic to have a ruler in Constantinople who was sympathetic to their interests. Venice therefore acted decisively when Paleologus threatened to gain control of Constantinople.

Despite their resolve, the Venetians had difficulty directing a response against the Greek invasion because the Venetians were taken by surprise. At the time of Paleologus's attack, much of the Republic's fleet was out at sea.

Since they could not immediately engage the main body of the attacking forces, the Venetians tried to slow the Greek advance by hiring mercenary sailors and using reserve galleys to attack Greek forces at the city of Daphnusia in the Black Sea.⁷

Unfortunately, however, this effort had little effect on the Greek forces. Led by General Strategopoulos, the invaders attacked Constantinople and took the ancient stronghold with little resistance. The conquerors then proceeded to set fire to the Venetian areas of the city, encouraging the Genoese in the area to pillage as many Venetian goods as possible. Officials in Venice of course sent troops to try to counterattack, but the Venetian forces arrived in the area too late to have any real effect. The only measure they could take when they sailed back through the Bosphorus was helping to rescue fellow Venetians who crowded on the shore.⁸

With the ascension of Paleologus, Venetian political and commercial strength in the Levant was weakened. The Republic had lost its position in a valuable trading port, and Genoa had benefited from Paleologus's victory. Earlier in the year, before the attack on Constantinople, Genoa and Paleologus had signed the Treaty of Ninfeo. Under the provisions of this agreement, Paleologus agreed to evict the Venetians from Constantinople if he conquered the city, and also agreed to grant the Genoans special trading privileges in Romania which previously had been given to the Venetians. The Genoans, in turn, had agreed to provide Paleologus with fleets which he could use at his own expense in his efforts against the Venetians. Although the Greeks did not need these ships in the conquest of Constantinople, the threat of these

Genoese ships deterred the Republic from mounting an immediate military effort to recapture Constantinople.

Upon taking control of Constantinople, Paleologus had sweeping plans for his new empire. The Greek intended to remodel the Byzantine Empire, returning the state back to the condition which existed before the Fourth Crusade. As would be expected, however, the Venetians had no intention of letting the ruler realize his ambitions. In an effort to thwart Paleologus, the Republic sent representatives to the great powers of Europe, including the Vatican, Spain, and France.⁹ These emissaries were charged with the task of winning support for a plan to form a unified army made up of troops from across Western Europe. This force would reconquer Constantinople and reassert European influence in the Levant.

Despite the best efforts of the Venetian representatives, the European rulers did not respond positively to this plan. Although the various leaders welcomed the representatives and treated them well, the rulers did not offer any men or ships to help the Venetians. This response to the Venetian request is important, because it reflects a gradual shift in the focus of most European nations' foreign policies. The fervor for the conquest of the Holy Lands, the militant spirit which fueled the Crusades, was clearly waning. Instead of concentrating their resources in the Levant, most European countries wanted to focus on the growth of their own economies and relations with their immediate neighbors. If Venice wanted to maintain its prominent position in Constantinople, it would have to fight its battles alone. Control of the East meant far more to the Venetians than the other European powers.

Therefore, other nations naturally were reluctant to commit resources to an area which they considered, in relative terms, of minor concern.

This lack of support from the other European powers did not deter the Republic. Realizing that they would need to fight Paleologus and the Genoans on their own, the Venetians assembled another fleet of warships. This armada set sail in 1262 in search of the enemy. Despite Venetian efforts, during the period from 1262 to 1264, there was never a major confrontation between the two powers. The Venetians and Genoans often met in minor sea battles, but the two fleets never entered into a decisive engagement. The Genoans intermittently would capture a convoy of Venetian merchant galleys, and the Venetians would win some naval skirmishes, but neither side could score a major victory.

Venetian Wins at Settepozzi and Trapani--The Resulting Peace

During 1264, however, fleets of the two cities met in a large-scale maritime engagement. In this year, in the Morea, Venetian galleys encountered a Genoese fleet of thirty-eight ships carrying goods to Monemvasia.¹⁰ In the battle which ensued at Settepozzi, the Venetians won a decisive victory, destroying the Genoese forces. In this clash, two of the Genoan Admirals lost their ships and the other two admirals refused to engage.

During 1265 and 1266, the Genoans avoided engaging the Venetians

the area. In 1266, however, the Venetians once again confronted the Genoans. In this clash, the Venetians achieved another victory, conclusively winning the Battle of Trapani off the coast of Sicily. This defeat was not only a military setback for Genoa; the actions of the Genoan sailors in the conflict were a source of great embarrassment for the Italian city. When the Venetians attacked the Genoan fleet, its sailors panicked. Crews abandoned their ships and tried to swim to shore. Although the Genoans claimed that their sailors were not citizens but foreign mercenaries, they acknowledged the cowardice of their admiral in the defeat.

Following this Venetian victory, Emperor Paleologus decided it was in his best interests to restore alliances with the Republic. Although he certainly would have liked to see the two Italian powers continue to weaken each other in an extended maritime conflict, the Venetians clearly were regaining their position of strength in the Levant. With the continued reappearance of Venetian influence, the Greek needed to avoid a conflict which could endanger the future of his empire. As a result, Paleologus extended an offer of mutual cooperation and allegiance to the Republic.

Venetian responses to the Emperor's offers of allegiance were mixed. Many citizens wanted to capitalize on the Emperor's deteriorating position and make a military attempt to reconquer Constantinople. Other Venetians, however, urged for diplomatic solutions. They argued that an offensive effort would be rather risky, and that the Republic would not receive any assistance in their efforts from the rest of Latin Europe. This group also cited the large expenses which would be associated with maintaining control over the city of

Constantinople. In addition, these Venetians pointed out that any military setback would encourage the Genoese to try to reassert themselves in the region. In the end, the group favoring diplomacy prevailed, and the Venetians signed a five year peace treaty with Emperor Paleologus in 1268.¹¹ The Republic agreed to stop harassing the Emperor, and in return, the Venetians were given special trading privileges and legal protections. This agreement obviously strengthened the Venetian commercial and political positions in Constantinople.

Developments Following Peace in Constantinople

Despite this treaty with the Emperor, Venice maintained a hostile relationship with Genoa. Genoese merchants were enjoying great success, using the privileges given to them in Constantinople to compete with the once omnipotent Venetian traders. Although the Venetians had won back their commercial privileges, the Genoans had been granted similar favors. The Genoans were able to make substantial profits in East/West trade by utilizing their trading posts at Pera, settlements established near Constantinople with the approval of Paleologus. The Venetians were able to return to Constantinople in 1268, but the Republic never regained its uncontested position in Levantine trade. This development was a source of resentment for Venice.

In addition, military struggles between the two Italian powers were hurting Venetian commerce. In an effort to protect her merchant ships, Venice required all of her trade to go in huge convoys.¹² Although this system allowed the Venetians to provide strong protection for commercial

goods in transit, the system presented some serious drawbacks. First, it was expensive to maintain the war galleys used as escort vehicles. In addition, the various types of ships in the convoys--galleys, tarrettes, and lateeners--all moved at various rates of speed on the open sea. As a result, captains faced a great nautical challenge to keep the boats together during a voyage. Finally, the convoy system presented lucrative targets for Genoan raiders and other pirates. If an enemy force could draw the war ships away from the merchant vessels they were escorting, or if the attacking forces could defeat the escort ships, the raiders could inflict heavy losses and reap great material gains.

In contrast, the Genoans typically sent their commercial boats out in small groups without any escort vessels. Although the Venetians were able to capture and defeat some of these Genoan merchant ships, most of the Genoan vessels were able to reach their destinations. Because the majority of Venetian war ships were being used as escort vessels, the Genoan ships did not need to worry about roving Venetian raiders. In addition, since the Genoans did not use military escorts, their galleys could harass Venetian shipping in quest of treasure.

As a result, in the late 1260s, the Venetians were eager to end their hostilities with Genoa and conclude a peace treaty. The Genoans were reluctant to come to terms because they were doing quite well raiding Venetian shipping, but outside events helped lead to an agreement. The King of France, Louis IX, was trying to persuade the European powers to reassemble a crusading force, and he wanted to have the disposal of both

Venetian and Genoan war ships to carry his forces. His pressure for a truce helped forge an agreement between the two Italian powers which was concluded in 1270.¹³

This period of peace in Venetian foreign affairs led to a period of prosperity for the Republic. During the twenty year period before the Second Genoese War, the Venetians were able to avoid any major military entanglements. In contrast, Genoa and Pisa, another Italian maritime power, were busy harassing each other's shipping. As a neutral, Venice was able to carry goods across the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas without fear of attack. This neutrality allowed Venetian merchants to take advantage of the rapid growth of local economies both in Venice and in cities across Europe.

For example, Venice developed flourishing industries in areas such as bell-casting, glass-working, wool production, and iron and porcelain manufacturing. These activities supplemented the city's traditional activities in salt and fish production. Likewise associated with the growth of the European economy was an increased growth in demand for goods from the Levant. During this period, Venice was able to expand her role in the trade with the East.

In addition, Venice was able to make increasingly large profits selling her own domestically produced goods. The Republic, of course, continued to make huge sums of money by transporting goods between the large cities of the Italian peninsula and the Levant, but Venice also was becoming a rival market to Constantinople. Local industries were able to supply the needs of cities like Alexandria, and Venice was serving as a clearing house for many

raw materials of the East such as cotton, wine, and hides.¹⁴ Finally, during this period Venetians were also able to take advantage of new trade routes across Mongol territory. These roads, some of which were "discovered" by the famous Venetian merchant, Marco Polo, led through Persia, Mongolia, and even into China.

The Peace Ends: Renewed Fighting in the Second Genoese War

Despite the prosperity enjoyed during the time of peace, Venetian tensions with Genoa heightened again in the early 1290s. During this period, hostile advances by Muslim rulers such as the Soldan of Egypt threatened Christian positions in the Levant. This situation was important to both Venice and Genoa because both cities needed safe trading bases in the Holy Land. From 1289 to 1291, the Soldan captured the cities of Acre, Tyre, and Tripoli.¹⁵ As a result, Lajazzo became the only mainland port in the Levant to remain under Christian control. In an effort to weaken the Muslims, the Pope strictly forbade any type of trade, contraband or otherwise, with the infidels. This prohibition did not stop trade with the Soldan because some merchants naturally were willing to service the needs of the Muslims for a price; however, the conquest of the former Christian ports did lead Genoa and Venice into another military conflict.

The two powers moved towards war throughout the years following the fall of Jerusalem. Despite the existence of a truce, the two cities engaged in intermittent but repeated attacks on each other's shipping. These clashes naturally kept Venice and Genoa at odds. The powers were again on a collision course, as the cities had similar goals that drew them into clashes

with each other. Each maritime power wanted to dominate trade with the East, and this objective required undisputed control of the Black Sea. Gaining control of this body of water would be impossible without engaging the other city in large scale battle.

This struggle for control of the Black Sea led to a series of skirmishes which escalated into full-scale war. During 1294, there was a minor confrontation which resulted in the plundering of several Venetian galleys.¹⁶ In response, the Venetians assembled a great escort for their convoy destined for Armenia and Cyprus, intending to defeat thoroughly any aggressor which would move against the vessels. This convoy set sail on their journey, stopping at Cyprus to overrun or raze Genoese areas of the island.

After the Venetians continued on their journey, the Genoese survivors sent word of their distress to their nation's settlement at Pera, a suburb near Constantinople. In response to the news of the attack, the Genoans assembled ships and men both from Pera and throughout Romania. This force set sail in an effort to take revenge, and encountered the Venetian fleet off the coast of Lajazzo. Upon finding the Venetian vessels, the Genoans immediately attacked. In this confrontation, the Venetians were taken by surprise. They outnumbered the Genoans, and as a result did not bother to lower their sails, an action which would have made their boats easier to handle during a battle. Loaded down with full cargoes of merchandise, and hampered by their upraised sails, the Venetian ships were very unwieldy. The Genoans took full advantage of this superior maneuverability and routed the Venetian convoy. In this engagement, the Genoans captured many ships and took rich spoils

from the Venetian cargoes.

Fueled by their initial success, the Genoans were eager to continue on the offensive. They assembled a fleet of unprecedented size, a force comprised of some 150 galleys and approximately 35,000 sailors.¹⁷ The Venetians assembled a somewhat smaller fleet, and were wary about engaging the huge enemy armada. Although the Genoans did their best to force a battle, sailing to Messina off the northern coast of Sicily, the Venetians were able to avoid a confrontation. Disappointed, the Genoese fleet returned home and did not set sail during all of 1296 because of internal political squabbling. During this year, the Venetians sent galleys which acted as raiders and pirates throughout the Levant. These raiding campaigns captured some valuable plunder, much like previous Genoan operations during the 1260s. Venetian small-scale raiding continued for three years until Genoa was able to force its enemy into a major naval battle.

A Great Clash Off Curzola

This confrontation occurred during 1298 when a huge Genoan fleet which had been plundering the coast of Dalmatia met up with an even larger Venetian force. This Genoese fleet had been exacting heavy damages along the coast, and the Venetians needed to attempt to halt the destruction. The two navies clashed near the island of Curzola in the mid-Adriatic. This battle was the largest of its time between the two cities, with approximately ninety Venetian and eighty Genoan boats involved in the struggle. In this engagement, both sides suffered great losses of men and ships, but the Genoese clearly scored a victory. Thousands of Venetian sailors were taken

prisoner and dozens of galleys were captured.

Despite this triumph, however, the Genoans were not able to seriously threaten the Republic. The Genoan fleet was in no position to push on in a continued offensive effort after its victory, and Venice quickly was able to reassemble its military fleets in its famed shipbuilding facilities. During early 1299, some adventurous Venetian raiders, led by their commander, Domenico Schiavo, even made a sneak hit-and-run attack on the city of Genoa. This attack was motivated by Venice's desire to prove that the city had not been crushed by the defeat.

Realizing the inability of either side to push the war to a decisive conclusion, the Genoans and Venetians ended their hostilities. Both cities were being drained by the military rivalry, as the struggle was costly both in terms of financial and human resources. Genoa also was suffering from internal political rivalries, a further reason to push the city towards peace. During late 1299, the two cities declared a truce. In the treaty which was signed, the powers essentially agreed to observe respective spheres of influence. Venice accepted Genoan domination of the Italian Riviera, and Genoa in turn recognized Venetian supremacy within the Adriatic. Specifically, the Genoans agreed that none of their ships would enter the Adriatic during a period of military hostilities unless the vessel was bound for Venice. The Republic also abandoned its support of Guelfs located in Monaco, a political group which aided the Pope against the German emperors and also threatened the rulers of Genoa. This treaty, signed on May 25, 1299, was intended to insure a perpetual peace between the two longtime enemies.¹⁸

Peace With Genoa, But Clashes Elsewhere

Venice's peace with Genoa, however, did not keep the Republic from becoming embroiled in other conflicts. While Genoa was always a principal item of concern in Venetian foreign relations, the Republic had wide-ranging interests which often caused tensions with other powers. Like the struggles with Genoa, these hostilities typically were the result of economic and political rivalries either on land or at sea.

During 1308, for example, the Republic became involved in a dispute with Pope Clement V over control of the city of Ferrara. This crisis was precipitated by the death of the ruler of Ferrara, the Marquis Azzo VII. The Marquis was a member of house of Este, a family that had been one of the most powerful and influential groups in Northern Italy during the preceding centuries.¹⁹ The house of Este had been in control of Modena, Padua, Verona, and Mantua at one time or another, and also was responsible for defending Ferrara from the Ghibelline captain, Salinguerra Torelli, during the early 1200s.²⁰ As a result, when Venice captured both the city and Torelli during 1240, the Este family became the rulers of the Ferrara. During their sixty-two year reign, they governed as puppets of the Venetian government. In this period, they angered several Popes by resisting strong pro-Guelf pressure in regards to political issues in Northern Italy.

At Azzo's death, there was no conclusive heir to his throne. He had not fathered any legitimate children, and had produced one illegitimate son, Fosco, who in turn had a son named Folco.²¹ Although Azzo had two brothers, he selected his grandson Folco as his successor. Upon Azzo's death,

his two brothers immediately contested his will, claiming that they should become rulers of Ferrara. Folco, in turn, appealed to Venice to intercede to protect his son's inheritance. In response to Folco's plea, the Venetians sent a military detachment to Ferrara.

This action was met with a strong response from Pope Clement V, who had been located in Avignon since 1307. Clement wanted to prevent Venice from taking direct control the city, so he acted upon a papal claim to suzerainty within the city. Based on this right, he declared the two brothers as the legitimate heirs of Azzo. Fosco became frightened when he heard of the Pope's decision. As the illegitimate son of the deceased Marquis, his base of power was rather tenuous. He did not want to challenge the Pontiff, so he turned over the city to the Republic, led the Venetian troops to a stronghold in Castel Tedaldo, and fled to Venice. Clement, standing firm, dispatched Papal troops under the control of the legate Cardinal Pelagrua.

The Papal troops entered Ferrara, and the Cardinal sent a message to Doge Gradenigo demanding that the Venetian forces withdraw. Gradenigo refused. With the Republic's troops holding the Castel Tedaldo, Venice was in a strong position to dictate the course of events, and the city did not want to give in to Papal threats. In response to the Venetian refusal, the Pope suggested a compromise. This proposal offered the Venetians control of the city, but they would rule Ferrara as a papal fief, paying an annual rent of 20,000 ducats to the Pontiff.²² This offer was summarily rejected by the Republic. They told the Cardinal that they had taken control of the city at the request of the rightful heir of the deceased Marquis. As such, they would not

rule as representatives of the Pope or pay any rent to Clement.

The Papal forces were determined to keep Venice from maintaining undisputed control of Ferrara. The Cardinal sent an ultimatum to the Venetians in October of 1308, giving the troops ten days to agree to his demands.²³ If the Venetians refused to accept the conditions of his proposal, the Republic and its rulers would be placed under interdict and would be excommunicated. In addition, all Venetian goods and property would be confiscated, all commercial privileges would be revoked, and all trade and commerce would be suspended. Finally, the Po River would be blockaded to Venetian and Chioggian ships.

This action was a substantial threat to both the political and economic strength of Venice. Realizing the gravity of the decision which now faced the Republic, the Great Council assembled. During debate on the issue, the leaders of the Republic were divided along fairly clear lines. The *case vecchie*, or more established families, generally argued that Venice should accede to the Pope's demands. This group reasoned that the Republic had not yet recovered from its extended period of war with Genoa, and that the city did not need to risk a potentially costly and risky engagement. In addition, these leaders argued that the Republic should not incur the wrath of the Pope, God's temporal representative.

The newer members of the assembly, led by Doge Gradenigo, wished to challenge the Pontiff. This group asserted that the political welfare of the Republic required Venice to extend its authority into Ferrara. These individuals stated that the Pope had no right to try to dispute Venice's

rightful claims, and suggested that Clement might have been misinformed by messengers who could have misrepresented the situation to him. These men argued that Venice could not pass up an opportunity to enhance its economic and political influence by backing down to a Pope who was at best misinformed, or at worst unjustified.

This dispute had divisive consequences both inside and outside of the Great Council. The Guelfish faction, led by the the Querini and the Tiepolo families, squared off against the pro-expansion forces led by the Gradenigo and Dandolo families. Not only was there acrimonious debate in the Assembly, there were also riots and fights in the streets, and many citizens traveled armed through the city. After much conflict, the pro-expansion forces prevailed. The Republic appointed a *podesta'* to govern Ferrara, and the residents of Ferrara were given full Venetian citizenship rights.²⁴ Although this action defied the threats of the Cardinal and Pope, the powers in Avignon took no immediate action against the Venetians. Winter had set in, making communication and military efforts difficult, so Pope Clement decided to wait before ordering an attack.

In an attempt to settle the confrontation diplomatically, the Venetians sent envoys to the Pope during March of 1309. Unfortunately, these ambassadors never had any effect on Papal opinions or actions. The day after the representatives left for Avignon, March 27, 1309, the Pope excommunicated the entire Republic. In his excommunication proclamation, the Pope imposed terms which were even more severe than his threatened actions of the previous year. In addition to all of the previous penalties, the

Pope declared that all Venetian citizens were outside of the law. As such, Venetians could be imprisoned or enslaved without any fear of incurring the wrath of God. Venetian citizens were not expected to remain loyal to their leaders or doge, and all clergy were ordered to leave the Republic within forty days.

Despite the harsh terms of this excommunication, neither Doge Gradenigo nor the Republic retreated from their positions. The Venetians knew that the Pope would call on the various Christian nations to attack Venetian possessions, and the Republic prepared to defend its interests. Acting upon the call of the Pontiff, powers from across Europe and Asia assaulted Venetian territories in April of 1309. Venetian citizens were attacked both on land and on the sea. The only destination to which ships could sail without fear of attack was Egypt, home of the Soldan.

A Combined Attack on Ferrara

In Ferrara, Venetian troops under the direction of the *podesta* prepared to face the assembling armies of Christendom. The Venetians strengthened their stronghold at the Castel Tedaldo and prepared for battle. Their enemy was assembling under the call of the Cardinal for a crusade against Venice and its possessions. In response to this request, armies from Florence, Ancona, Lucca, and towns throughout Tuscany, Lombardy, and Romagna gathered during the early summer of 1309.²⁵ The cities which sent forces were motivated by several factors--a desire to weaken Venice's political and military influence, a desire to plunder the treasures of the Republic, and a desire to remain under the blessing of the Pontiff.

These forces arrived at Ferrara and besieged the city. This attack proved to be effective against the Venetians. From the onset of the engagement, the forces of the Republic suffered a series of setbacks. The troops were struck with an outbreak of bubonic plague which killed many of the men, including the *podesta'*. Although reinforcements were sent, the epidemic severely weakened the Venetian forces. In August, the Papal forces recaptured Ferrara.²⁶ The Republic's soldiers were routed, and the vast majority of men either were killed or blinded. Doge Gradenigo was one of the few Venetians who escaped unharmed, but rumors abounded that he had deserted the forces of the Republic in an act of cowardice.

Despite this crushing loss, however, the Venetians refused to surrender. The intensity of the battle even subsided because the Pope did not want to push the offensive after becoming embroiled in a series of arguments with Francesco d' Este, one of the brothers of the deceased Marquis.

Venice, too, was occupied with others concerns. By the onset of 1310, the papal restrictions on commerce were beginning to seriously affect Venetian trade revenues. This loss of earnings was having a dramatic effect on the welfare of the merchants and people of the Republic. This problem, combined with unrest in the wake of the military defeat at Ferrara, made Doge Gradenigo's position very precarious. His enemies and opponents in the Great Council were accusing him of betraying the Republic, and asserted that the candidate Gradenigo had defeated, Giacomo Tiepolo, never would have led Venice to such harm. Conflict within the Council heated up, and demonstrations and street fights became commonplace. Gradenigo tried to

calm the situation, but eventually had to resort to ruthless suppressions of any affronts to his leadership. These actions further exacerbated tensions.

The Revolutionary Attack on the State

Eventually, this situation culminated in an uprising on June 15, 1310, led by the infamous Bajamonte Tiepolo. Enemies of the Republic prepared to stage a *coup d'etat* and topple the elected government of the Republic. In the plan for this military effort, the revolutionary forces were to divide into three groups. Under the leadership of Tiepolo and Marco Querini, the first two of these sections were to gather on the evening of June 14 at the Querini house. At dawn, these forces were to cross the Rialto, separate, and march on different routes to the Ducal Palace. A third group, led by Badoer Badoer, was to lay in wait at the small mainland community at Peraga. When the ducal forces and first two groups of revolutionaries were engaged in battle, Badoer's men were to surprise the Doge's men from behind and defeat them.

This plan did not work at all. It is possible that the revolutionaries were betrayed by a nobleman who had abandoned the insurrectionary effort after much planning had been completed.²⁷ Regardless, Doge Gradenigo knew of the plan during the week prior to the actual attack on his government. During this time, the Doge assembled many supporters both from within Venice and from neighboring towns and prepared a plan to thwart the attempted *coup d'etat*. On the evening of June 14, the Doge assembled a sizeable force within the Ducal Palace and gathered another group of armed supporters on the Piazza. On this night, Venice was struck with raging storms. Because of the tremendous amount of rain and high winds, Badoer was not able to cross to

the mainland; however, Tiepolo never knew of his failure. Ignorant both of Badoer's location and the fact that the Doge was aware of his plans, Tiepolo ordered the attack on the Palace to proceed despite the rains.

In this engagement, both Tiepolo's and Querini's groups of revolutionaries were crushed. Querini's men advanced through the streets as planned, but when they arrived at the Piazza across from the Ponte dei Dai, they were met by the waiting forces of the Doge. Most of the revolutionaries, including the two members of the Querini family, were killed. Likewise, Tiepolo's rebels also met with complete defeat. As his men advanced on the Palace, the residents of Venice rallied behind their Doge. In an event which has become ingrained in the folklore of the city, an elderly woman named Giustina Rossi who lived in the area helped to turn back the attack. When Tiepolo's troops advanced towards the entrance of the Piazza, this woman threw a heavy flowerpot, or by some accounts, a large stone mortar, at Bajamonte. Although she missed him, the object struck and killed Tiepolo's flag-bearer. Realizing that the residents of Venice opposed his efforts, and shaken by the sight of his standard-bearer killed in front of him, Bajamonte Tiepolo led his troops in retreat back across the Rialto. As they crossed, they destroyed the bridge to try to foster the success of the escape. Meanwhile, Badoer and his men soon were captured and beheaded.

Tiepolo, however, escaped death. He fled with his men to another section of the city where he was soon joined by the few survivors of Querini's band of rebels. In the area of Venice beyond the Rialto, the rebels enjoyed strong popular support, and they began to fortify their position. Doge Gradenigo,

hesitant to engage in a battle that might escalate into a full-scale civil war, offered lenient terms to the rebel commander if he would surrender. Tiepolo accepted this offer, ending the armed challenge to Gradenigo's rule. Under the terms of this agreement, Bajamonte was banished to Dalmatia for a four-year term of exile. As soon as Tiepolo departed, his home in S. Stin was razed, and the "Column of Infamy" was erected on the location. This column was a monument designed to serve as a constant reminder of the futility of trying to start a revolution against the rightful rulers of the Republic.

The Council of Ten, A New Venetian Institution

As can be imagined, this event was a serious threat to the future and stability of the city. Faced with military, economic, and political threats abroad, suffering under papal excommunication and interdict, and endangered by armed revolution at the gates of the Ducal Palace, the Republic was clearly at a crossroads. In an effort to prevent this type of event from occurring again, the Great Council established the Council of Ten on July 10, 1310.²⁸

Although this group was responsible for preventing subversion by gathering information on the activities of possible enemies of the Republic within the city, the Council also soon began to play a role in foreign affairs. This Council was subjected to several checks and balances designed to prevent it from abusing its wide-ranging powers, but also had great power which it could use to quickly respond to an internal or external threat to the Republic. As such, the Council did the Republic a great service because it allowed the government to react quickly and reach decisions on matters of

great urgency. Previously, any matter of major importance had to be debated and voted upon by the Great Council, a body which numbered approximately 1,100 members at the time of Tiepolo's rebellion.²⁹ When reacting to foreign policy issues in which a quick response was necessary, this decision-making process clearly was unacceptable. The Council of Ten was invaluable in this situation because it could, when making policy with Doge and his Ducal councillors, act with the authority of the entire Great Council. This flexibility was a great asset to the Republic in future years.

Meanwhile, the conflict with the Pope over Ferrara still persisted. This confrontation precipitated the Papal Interdict of 1310, a measure which served to undermine the economic vitality of the Republic. During 1311, in the midst of the political and economic clash, Doge Gradenigo died. This problem of the Interdict was thus passed to the Doge's successor, Marino Zorzi, causing him a great deal of consternation. Zorzi too died, however, after only three months, and the problem was passed to the next Doge, Giovanni Soranzo. This new leader set forth to make peace with the Pontiff in order to help reopen Venetian trading contacts.

An End to The Clash at Ferrara, An Uprising at Zara, and New Commercial Growth

Doge Soranzo was able to get the Pope to lift the interdict in 1312 by resorting to a rather irreverent solution--he offered to pay the Pope a 100,000 ducat indemnity.³⁰ Although this was a tremendous expenditure for a state which had already borne the cost of many years of foreign wars, the funds proved to be money well spent. Pope Clement V lifted his Interdict in

March of 1313, repealing his restrictions on Venetian commercial activities. These actions were of supreme importance to Venice because the city could resume the trading and economic activities which made her so powerful. By ending the clash with the Pope, Doge Soranzo did his nation a great service.

Later in 1312, the Doge achieved his second major foreign-policy triumph. During the Republic's years of problems with Ferrara, the Pope, and Bajamonte Tiepolo, the nearby town of Zara broke out in rebellion and threw off Venetian domination. After Venice regained internal stability following the defeat of Tiepolo, Soranzo brought Zara under Venetian control once again. This action helped to stabilize the internal conditions within the Republic.

Following the suppression of Zara, Venice entered upon a period of growth and prosperity. Her treasuries were not being drained by costly foreign wars, and her merchants could conduct business with traders across Christendom and beyond. During the years following the defeat of Tiepolo, the city signed diplomatic and commercial treaties with several powers across Europe and Asia: Sicily, Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Persia, Tunisia, Trebizond, and the Byzantine Empire.³¹ This reassertion of economic influence coincided with a decline in Genoa power as Venice's rival had become bogged down in a series of problems at her colony of Pera. In addition, Genoa also had been involved in a prolonged struggle with Morocco over control of Eastern access to the Mediterranean. In a confrontation between these powers in 1291, the Genoese dealt a crushing blow to the Moroccan fleet, effectively ending the Moroccan plans of closing the straits of Gibraltar. This action ironically had positive effects for the Republic. With open access to the Atlantic, Venetian

fleets began to expand their trade with flourishing markets in Great Britain and Flanders.

The continual expansion of foreign commercial activity and growth of the scope of Venetian foreign affairs led the city to undertake several new maritime projects. In the later part of the thirteenth century, for example, developments in nautical technology were introduced that had a great effect on the historical strengths of the city: shipbuilding and trading. With the introduction of the mariner's compass in the 1270s or 80s, cartographers and navigators were able to create much more accurate maps and charts of the seas. These new resources made sea travel safer and more reliable. In addition, shipwrights also developed the rudder during the last quarter of the thirteenth century. Previously, ships had to be steered with oars which were extended into the water from the sides of the vessels. As can be imagined, this method of navigating put severe limits on the size of ships. A large boat would simply be uncontrollable when loaded with a heavy cargo and when sailing on the open seas. With the introduction of the stern-post rudder, vessels began to grow larger.

Ironically, the rudder also contributed to a decline in the socio-economic status of seamen within Venetian society. The days of merchant-oarsmen, accompanying their goods to faraway ports, rapidly were becoming a thing of the past. The most talented citizens of the Republic were becoming merchants who traded their goods through agents set up in foreign markets. The crews of the city were still of superior talent, but the *galleotti* increasingly became men who had been born outside of the city. These

sailors were not being employed as handlers of sails or as tillers, but instead were being utilized as mere rowers. During this period, jobs on ships became more specialized, with an increasing division of labor. Previously, *galleotti* had sailed, traded, and fought as the principal weapons of the Venetian ships. Now, navigational duties were performed by men skilled in reading charts and maps, defensive efforts were handled by bowmen, and professional merchants controlled most commercial activities. As a result, many sailors on the great galleys were employed only as rowers. This job soon became a position which was regarded as an inferior means of earning one's livelihood.

The general growth of foreign economic activity, and the tremendous amount of new trading with English and Flemish ports, precipitated the development of a new type of ocean vessel in the first quarter of the fourteenth century.³² The increased volume of trade, combined with the introduction of the rudder and mariner's compass, created a demand for a new type of high-speed, large merchant vessel. This demand was filled by the merchant galley, a boat which had a tremendous influence on Venetian foreign commercial activity in the decades and centuries following its introduction.

These boats were somewhat similar to the traditional Venetian war galleys in that they were powered by sail as well as by a large crew of oarsmen. The merchant galleys, however, were longer and wider than their military predecessors, able to carry approximately 150 tons of cargo. These boats also carried approximately 50 tons of supplies which were used and traded by crewmen of the vessel.³³

Although the ship carried approximately two hundred oarsmen, these individuals principally were not used to increase the speed of the ships. When on the open seas, merchant galleys took advantage of their long, narrow shape to sail at rapid rates. Oarsmen on these ships were not needed for speed, but instead filled two important functions--increasing maneuverability and providing defensive power against raiders. The oarsmen allowed the boats to quickly and safely maneuver through harbors, and also gave the captain an auxiliary source of power when winds were low or when the ship was tacking into the wind. The oarsmen were of great value against pirates because the ships' speed, combined with a ready force of 200 soldiers, made them elusive and formidable opponents.

These merchant galleys were expensive to operate, especially since all 200 oarsmen were free men, but the advantages of the new ship justified the increased expenditures. A journey could be completed in a fraction of the time of previous trips, and the boats were virtually unassailable to roving pirates. The maneuverability of the galleys also aided in avoiding rocks or similar dangers in the water.

All of these advances in shipbuilding and the resulting upsurge in foreign trade led the Venetians to expand their Arsenal during the period around 1320. This facility produced increasing numbers of ships which the Venetians organized into convoys. These vessels were owned by the state and led by *patroni*, men who had won public auctions for control of the ships. After being approved by the Senate, these *patroni* then hired crewman for the ships. In addition, these men also organized the efforts to apportion

cargo space to Venetians who wanted to trade with foreign merchants.

These individuals, however, were not the ultimate powers in the merchant fleets. The leader of the entire convoy was the *capitano*, a government employee. These *capitani* were responsible to the various councils of the Republic and to the Doge himself. They were in charge of assuring that all merchants paid their freights duties, and that no people or extra wares were snuck into the hold. In addition, the *capitani* led and coordinated all defensive actions which might be necessary to ward off raiders and pirates. The times and routes of the convoys, as well as the rates which were charged for carrying cargo, however, were set by a vote of the Senate.

Venetian galleys were organized into fleets which roamed across the seas to ports throughout Europe and the East. Venetian strength was always largely an outgrowth of the great commercial power of the city, and in the early part of the fourteenth century the Republic enjoyed the fruits of flourishing trading activity. During the 1320s and 1330s, the Senate sent eight to ten ships each year into the Black Sea.³⁴ Venetian ships also traveled to Tana in the Sea of Azov, an important site because of its placement on the route to Persia and China. In addition, Tana was the home to especially large slave markets, sources of slave labor desired on the Italian Peninsula, in Crete and Cyprus, and in Egypt. Government-owned fleets also journeyed to Romania, the ports of Beyond-the-Sea, Cyprus, and Syria.

Other big trade stops were Alexandria and various other Mediterranean ports which gave the Venetians access to markets in the Muslim-controlled

lands of Egypt. Although the Pope had at various times forbidden trade with the infidels, and although a papal decree kept Venetian ships from journeying to Alexandria during the period from 1322 to 1344, merchants of the Republic easily found ways to service Muslim demand for wares. Ships docked at Christian territory in Armenia at the port of Lajazzo, and also at ports in Tunis and Cyprus.³⁵ Throughout the period of the official papal ban on trade with Egypt, Venetian merchants still were able to trade cotton, drugs, and spices which were either produced or carried through Muslim lands.

The Close of Peace: Struggles in Treviso

Venice's period of peace which started after the cessation of the hostilities at Ferrara eventually came to an end. During the early fourteenth century, the other cities of the Italian mainland increasingly were becoming dominated by despotic rulers. One of these tyrants was Can Grande della Scala, the young ruler of his native city of Verona, as well as Vicenza, Parma, Brescia, Belluno, Feltre, and Padua.³⁶ In July of 1329, della Scala led the Veronese armies in a successful campaign against Treviso. This acquisition made Venice vulnerable to the threat of economic blockade. This action, therefore, was of great interest to the Venetian rulers. Although Can Grande fell to a sudden illness shortly after capturing Treviso, the despot was succeeded by his equally ambitious nephew, Mastino. Under Mastino's direction, Verona imposed harsh restrictions against Venetian commercial activity. Duties were placed on Venetian goods, and chains were set up across the Po River to block Venetian trade with Lombardy.³⁷

Venice took all possible retributive actions against these measures. The Republic imposed costly tariffs on all goods which passed through the lagoons on route to cities controlled by Mastino. These duties effectively deprived the cities of Padua and Treviso of spices and luxury items from the Orient and Near East. Despite these actions, however, the Venetians were powerless to strike any real crippling blow against their enemy. Venice was not threatened on a short-term basis, but the Veronese restrictions put the Republic in long-term peril as it cut off supply lines for vital products such as grain, meat, and wood.

Under these conditions, Venice clearly would come to a point of crisis with Verona in the next several years. Direct diplomacy with the foreign city did not seem to be a viable option, despite the Republic's famed abilities in statesmanship, because Venice had little leverage with which to bargain. As a result, the city eventually responded to the Veronese threat with military actions. This decision was taken with great trepidation. Venice remembered her defeat at Ferrara, and knew that her small land-based forces would be fighting an uphill battle against the potent armies of Verona.

Despite these difficulties, Venice utilized its diplomatic skills to assemble a coalition against Mastino's armies. The tyrant's success in gaining control of mainland cities such as Brescia, Lucca, and Parma throughout the 1330s had made him a feared rival for other powerful cities on the Peninsula. Likewise, Mastino's failed attempts at acquiring states such as Mantua, as well as his unsuccessful attempt to poison Azzo Visconti of Milan, had raised additional emotions in favor of his defeat. Venice assembled a joint force of men from

the Republic, in addition to mercenaries and free men from across Italy, France, and Germany. This force numbered approximately 30,000 men, and met at the city of Ravenna to begin its campaign against Mastino.³⁸

This army was led by Pietro de' Rossi, an extremely capable and respected general of his day. Under Rossi's leadership, the combined Venetian forces began a successful campaign against the Veronese leader in October of 1336. The Venetian forces quickly broke into Paduan territory, and in November won a victory at the fortress outside the great Paduan saltworks. After this battle, Rossi proceeded to take Treviso. With the Venetian forces displaying their skill and promising future successes, other cities within Italy were persuaded to join the campaign. In March of 1337, the cities of Ferrara, Mantua, and Milan joined the coalition.³⁹

The armies of the combined Italian cities pressed on in their efforts to destroy Mastino. They advanced on the despot from several fronts, and Mastino realized that his position was doomed. In an effort to avoid complete ruin, the tyrant sent Marseglio di Carrara to Venice as a diplomatic representative. Carrara was ruling Padua at this time as a puppet of Mastino, but before the fall of the city, Carrara had been the true ruler of the city of Padua.

When the emissary met with the Doge in Venice, he offered to betray the Veronan in return for the lordship of his former city. The Doge, Francesco Dandolo, accepted this offer. The Venetians launched a phantom attack on the town of Brescia, drawing Mastino away his efforts to defend Padua. Upon Mastino's departure, Carrara opened the gate to Padua and welcomed in Rossi

and his Venetian armies. The city became free of Mastino's control on August 3, 1338, and the Veronese despot was doomed. He continued his fight for several more months, but quickly realized that defeat was inevitable.

On January 24, 1339, Mastino ended his fight and agreed to a Venetian peace offer.⁴⁰ This pact allowed the Scaligeri family to keep the town of Lucca, only ceding the city's hinterlands and outlying fortresses to Florence. In addition, Florence received a tribute payment in return for allowing Verona to retain Parma. For her own efforts, Venice received the town of Padua, as well as Treviso and its outlying areas. The Republic turned Padua over to its allies in the Carrara family, and also gave the Carraras some of the outlying towns near Treviso. Venice kept Treviso, Conegliano, Castelfranco, Sacile, and Oderzo. This area was placed under direct Venetian control.

This peace treaty marked a critical turning point in the history of Venetian foreign affairs. The territory gained in this agreement was the first territory on the mainland ever acquired by the Republic. In taking control of a prosperous and important area of the Italian Peninsula, Venice began a trend towards greater involvement in mainland affairs. By gaining Treviso and many of its surrounding towns, Venice was able to eliminate the danger of an economic blockade along the Po. The Republic also acquired a productive region which could provide grains and meats, foodstuffs which the city could not produce on its own.

The people of Venice were very pleased with the results of this military engagement against Mastino. They had crushed a rival who was undermining their economic prosperity, and also gained prestige and valuable products

through newly annexed territories. Following the signing of the peace treaty, several families which had fought with Venice, the Carraras, the Gonzagas, and the Estes, were asked to join the Venetian nobility.⁴¹ In upcoming years, Venice would increasingly be drawn to activity on the *terra firma*, despite its links with the sea.

This settlement did have its drawbacks, even if the disadvantages were not immediately seen by the exuberant Venetians. The Republic had acquired a large and critical area of the *terra firma*, but it would need to defend this land from its rivals. The rulers in Gorizia and Aquileia were longtime problems for the Venetians, and they would certainly be eager to take over Venice's new acquisitions at the first possible chance. In addition the city of Milan also emerged from this engagement in a strong military and political position. In winning the struggle, Venice had eliminated one threat, but had helped to create another. Since the Visconti's territories bordered on Venice's puppet state at Padua, there was plenty of opportunity for Milan and Venice to clash in the future. Despite these problems though, the Republic was happy with the agreement. Peace had been won, and Venetian influence now extended onto the mainland.

A Prudent Method of Administration

Venice established a system of government in her possessions that was relatively analogous to her own political structure. Each city had a chief official called a *podesta'*, a man who could either be from Venice or could also be a resident of the town in question. This *podesta'* was elected by an assembly of nobles from the respective towns through a complicated process

similar to the election of the Doge. This assembly was responsible for enacting basic administrative legislation and performing duties such as assessing local taxes, and providing civic services and ceremonies for the people.

Behind the *podesta'* and the council, however, stood the real power in the government structure. Within this system, all issues of major importance were handled by an individual called a Rector. This Rector had to be a citizen of Venice, and he was a trusted arm of the Doge and Senate. The Rector communicated with the home city about all matters of consequence, and carried out the orders of the Republic. The Rector was able to control the decision-making power because he was in charge of the town police, as well as any military personnel in the area. In reality, the Rector could make the final decision on any civil or military decision in his town or city.

The Venetians found this system to be effective, and used the format in later years in other mainland acquisitions. The structure was good because it allowed the Republic to keep strong control over matters of critical importance within its possessions. In addition, residents in the towns typically were satisfied. The Rectors and *podesta'* usually were very respectful of the rights of local individuals, and emphasized that the smaller towns and Venice could cooperate economically to the advantage of both parties. The Republic did not levy high duties on the products of the mainland towns, and also did not garrison large contingents of soldiers who would need to be supported by local inhabitants. The Venetians, of course, were not perfect, but they typically showed restraint and fairness in dealing

with their lands on the *terra firma*.

Another important event in Venetian foreign affairs occurred in 1340, although this development took place far away from the Italian Peninsula. In this year, the new Doge, Andrea Dandolo, received an appeal from Edward III of England. The British monarch wanted to hire forty Venetian war galleys to employ in his fight against King Philip of France. In return, he offered to pay for the vessels, and, as an inducement, also granted Venetian citizens the full rights and privileges of Englishmen within the British Kingdom. The Senate thanked Edward for the grant of the new rights, but would not lease any warships to the Englishman. This decision was motivated by the fact that the Venetians were concerned about a Turkish fleet of 225 ships which was lurking in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴³ With such a formidable threat in an area of such great commercial and strategic importance, Venice did not want to spare any of its naval weapons. The Republic was enjoying a period of tremendous prosperity, and it did not want to endanger valuable markets unnecessarily.

In 1342, Doge Andrea Dandolo led the Republic into a short-lived coalition and Crusade which took some action against the Turkish threat. This group was organized by the Pope and included the Byzantine Empire, the Knights Hospitallers of Rhodes, the Papal forces, the King of Cyprus, in addition to Venice. Venice contributed fifteen war galleys to the coalition, and these ships captured Smyrna on the Anatolian coast, a town which remained in Christian control for the next five decades.⁴⁴ The League never coalesced into an effective military force, however, and the group soon

disbanded. This military effort did nevertheless have positive results for the Republic. After the coalition fell apart, Venice struck an agreement with the Pope which called for the Republic to defend the Mediterranean for Christian ships. In return, the Republic received the right to retain all religious tithes collected during the next three years inside Venetian territory.

Black Death and a Third War with Genoa

During the 1340s, Venice once again entered into a war with her longtime rival, Genoa. The Genoans had not participated in the crusading efforts against the Turks, even though they too had important trade links that were threatened by the advancing Muslims. Venice and Genoa did join together temporarily in July of 1345, however, when the two cities agreed to boycott Tartar goods.⁴⁵ This action was taken in response to a Turkish attack on Venetians and Genoans who were trading in the East. The Genoans violated this pact almost immediately though, destroying any efforts at cooperation. The Tartar markets were simply too lucrative to avoid, and Tartar merchants also provided a source of precious goods such as silk and spices.

During the 1340s, the Genoans and Venetians were in constant rivalry at towns such as Caffa and Soldaia. These markets were the access points to valuable Russian commodities such as furs and slaves, and also were a source of expensive Eastern luxury goods from India, and the Central and Far East. Because of trade frictions, Venice and Genoa came to the brink of war after the break up of their short lived boycott of Tartar goods. The Venetians were angered by the Genoan violation of the pact, and also were enraged by Genoan conduct in regard to Venetian residents of Trebizond. The Venetians

charged that Genoa had not allowed traders living in the city to fortify their homes and settlements. In response to this complaint, the Genoans declared that Trebizond, as well as the entire coast of the Black Sea, was solely under the control of Genoa. Any Venetians who were allowed to live or trade in the region did so only through the beneficence of the Genoan government.

This claim was a direct threat to Venetian power in the Levant, and the Venetian leaders realized that it could not go unchallenged. If recognized, Venice would be giving up all her legal, political, and economic claims in the area. As a result, the Republic anticipated going to war with Genoa once again. This battle was delayed though, because in 1348, Venice was brought to its knees by a severe outbreak of the plague.

The Black Death which struck Venice utterly decimated the city. During the late Winter of 1348, Venetian convoys returning from Crimea unfortunately transported rats within the holds of the galleys which were infected with the disease. When these ships returned to the Republic, the rats and parasitic fleas introduced the plague into the Republic. Victims of this contagious ailment were afflicted by chills, fever, inflammation of lymphatic glands, and delirium which typically culminated in death.

Although many parts of Europe were struck by the Plague, Venice was hit particularly hard. As one of the principal ports linking Europe with the East, many rats entered into the city. The epidemic escalated steadily throughout the Spring, and reached horrific proportions by the early summer. Ignorance of the rats' role in the transmission process, compounded by the problems associated with a medieval sanitation and public health system, left

the city in a helpless position. During the hot summer months, an estimated five to six hundred people died within Venice each day.⁴⁶

The Senate and the Doge tried to find ways to stop the disease, but the special government commissions which were charged with the duty of finding a means of prevention could offer no solutions. The Senate passed a law that all people who died from the plague must be buried at least five feet underground, outside of the central islands of the city, but it was impossible to carry out these measures.⁴⁷ There were simply too many dead people which needed to be buried. Special boats were supposed to quickly ferry the dead to the outlying islands of the lagoons, but it was impossible to gather the numerous corpses which continued to grow larger each day. Despite the best efforts of the boatmen, bodies often laid in homes for days. To make matters worse, there was an acute shortage of doctors and medical practitioners. Many physicians had died, but many others quickly had left the city during the first few weeks of the outbreak of the disease. These doctors, like many other inhabitants of the Republic, fled to inland areas which typically were spared from the plague.

The disease wiped out entire families within Venice. Fifty noble houses were completely destroyed, and estimates of city-wide losses range from fifty to sixty percent of the population.⁴⁸ In terms of foreign affairs, the plague caused great hardship both for Venice and her primary economic and military rival of Genoa. As another port city, Genoa also suffered great losses from the rats which came in the holds of her galleys. As a result of the Bubonic Plague, the two cities temporarily de-escalated their confrontation over control of the

Black Sea. This abatement of hostilities, however, would prove to be very short-lived. Because of the similar economic goals of Genoa and Venice, the Black Sea inevitably would be a troublespot for the cities. Conflict would arise again as soon as the cities recovered in the most minimal sense from the destruction of the plague.

In addition to having an impact on foreign affairs with Genoa, the Black Death also exacerbated a maritime personnel problem that had been developing in the Republic for several decades. Throughout the first half of the fourteenth century, Venice had begun to experience a shortage of oarsmen and sailors. The social prestige and position of the oarsmen had been declining, and the job was becoming increasingly less desirable. In addition, the plague of course aggravated this problem. In an effort to recruit more seamen, the city offered amnesty and debt forgiveness to minor criminals if they would agree to serve as oarsmen. In addition, the Senate lowered government requirements specifying the number of personnel which were needed on commercial galleys. Although these efforts proved to be moderately successful, the Republic and her fleets were suffering during the mid-fourteenth century. At the outbreak of the Third Genoese War, the Venetian galleys were undermanned, still recovering from the effects of the Black Death.

This scarcity of trained seamen is significant in that it reflects shifts in attitudes within the Republic about both commercial and foreign affairs. Venetian business activities always had offered the promise of great profits, but now with the decreasing need for merchants to travel with their

merchandise, native Venetians were becoming less and less adept at sea voyaging. Many locals increasingly were being employed in the various crafts and industries which thrived in the Republic. Immigrants came to the lagoons as always, but these people were often more interested in work in shops on the *terra firma* than in working as oarsmen or sailors. To be sure, Venice was still a first-class naval power, but the results of the city's gradual shift away from a single-minded focus on the sea would manifest themselves later in increased activities on the Italian Peninsula.

In the short-term though, Venice became engaged in yet another naval conflict with its rival of Genoa. Despite the fact that both powers had been crippled by the Great Plague, during 1350 the long-running hostilities between the two nations erupted once again. In that year, the Genoans captured a force of Venetian galleys which were anchored at the port of Caffa on Crimea in the Black Sea. Doge Andrea Dandolo sent an emissary to demand an explanation and reparations from the Genoans, but his request was ignored. As a result, the two powers once again entered into war.

Hostilities Begin: Negroponte

Venice assembled a sizeable fleet of thirty-five galleys under the command of Marco Ruzzini. This commander led the Venetian fleet to an apparent victory in the first conflict of the war. In this battle, Ruzzini's ships captured ten of fourteen Genoan vessels which were located in the harbor at Negroponte.⁴⁸

Despite this gain, the battle was not entirely successful for the Venetians. The four Genoan ships which escaped went to the Genoan island of Chios.

There, they joined forces with nine other galleys, sailed back to Negroponte, and returned to raze the port. These four ships were able to escape only because of the ineptitude and lack of discipline of the Venetian sailors. During the initial engagement, the crewman abandoned efforts to defeat the entire Genoan fleet and instead began plundering the holds of the galleys which already had been captured. This was not typical behavior for Venetian sailors in naval conflicts.

There are a couple of possible explanations for these uncharacteristic actions. First, many of the sailors under Ruzzini's command were not residents of the lagoons. Following the losses of the Great Plague, there were only about 80,000 people within all of the lands under direct Venetian control.⁴⁹ With this population, the traditional method of conscripting one-fourth of all adult males would generate a force of only approximately five thousand men. Since each galley was manned by approximately two hundred seamen, the Venetians could only have outfitted twenty-five of their total of thirty-five ships from within the Republic. At least ten of the ships were staffed by sailors from Dalmatia or other Venetian colonies. In addition, the prevalence of non-Venetian sailors in the Republic's forces was heightened by great numbers of mercenary fighters. The fraction of the Venetian populace which survived the plague were hardly excited by the opportunity to risk their lives in a foreign war. Many of the Venetians who were ordered to report for battle exercised their option to hire substitute fighters. These mercenaries proved in the battle that they were more interested in spoils than victory for the Doge and the Republic.

When the Genoan fleet returned to Negroponte, they inflicted great damages. The Genoan galleys, led by their commander Filippo Doria, gained control of the port, looted the city, and captured some twenty Venetian merchant ships which were docked in the harbor.⁵⁰ Venice, however, was able to maintain control of the island because the Genoans did not occupy the island and the Venetian troops located in the citadel were never defeated or captured.

Following this set-back, the Venetian government took limited steps to punish the commanders and crew members involved in the battles. Although different proposals were considered, the Senate made no attempts to recover the spoils taken by the Venetian seamen and mercenaries. The Venetian rulers feared that if they impounded any booty, the mercenaries might revolt. In addition, the Senate knew it might need to attract more mercenaries as the war continued, and it did not want to take a decisive step which might make it difficult to recruit forces at a later date.

Venice also took relatively mild steps against officials and commanders involved in the incident. The *bailo* at Negroponte, Tommaso Viadro, was brought up on charges but was acquitted. Ruzzini faced a somewhat larger penalty in that he was deprived of his position as Captain General of the Sea, but he was not subjected to the beheading he could have suffered under the provisions of fourteenth century Venetian law. Neither of these men were ever appointed to a military office again, but they received very mild punishments when measured against the penalties they could have incurred.

This initial battle and retaliation was by no means the end of the war.

Venice realized that she would need help to battle with the Genoans, and quickly set out to gather allies and new mercenary forces. Many powers were either jealous or fearful of the Genoans, and these nations rallied to Venice's call for assistance. For example, Emperor John Cantacuzenos, also known as John VI, offered thirty fully-manned galleys. The Emperor also offered a contingent of eighteen ships on the condition that Venetians would pay two-thirds of the cost of using the boats.⁵¹ In return, the Emperor demanded that if the Venetians were successful they must destroy the Genoese colony of Galata located next to Constantinople, and then give back the islands of Chios and Mitylene which the Genoans had taken from him. In this way, a Venetian victory would strengthen Constantinople both economically and militarily.

Venice also received assistance from the Iberian Peninsula. The Kingdom of Aragon was located there, a nation which was another military and commercial rival of Genoa. The Catalans had been involved in a struggle with Genoa over control of the island of Sardinia, and also were emerging as a stronger rival in trade in the Western Mediterranean. The Catalans agreed to give Venice eighteen armed galleys, and also agreed to lease Venice an additional dozen ships at the rate of 1,000 ducats per month. To augment this force of twenty-odd ships, Venice recruited enough men and mercenaries to arm another contingent of approximately forty ships.⁵²

The Battle of the Bosphorus

This coalition took time to form, so very little military action took place in 1350. In fact, the treaty with the Catalans was not signed until the summer

of 1351, so the next significant battle of the Third Genoese War occurred in 1352. In mid-February of that year, the fleets of Genoa and the allied Venetians forces clashed near the Genoan colony at Galata at the mouth of the Bosphorus. In this battle, each side was ably led by a courageous and talented admiral. The Venetians were under the direction of Nicolo' Pisani, and the Genoans were commanded by Paganino Doria. Although the Venetian armada was comprised of ships of several nations, the outcome of the battle which ensued near Galata was decided almost entirely by the ships and sailors from Venice proper and the city of Genoa.

The Venetians had an elaborate and ingenious battle plan, but the directions were never carried out in the actual Battle of the Bosphorus. The Venetians had intended to meet the Iberian ships with some of their galleys off the coast of Sicily before Genoa sent any ships Eastward. Once united with the Catalans, the Venetians ideally hoped to set up a blockade which would keep the enemy from advancing towards the Black Sea and Straits of the Bosphorus. This plan was soon changed though because the Genoans sailed past Sicily with a fleet of some sixty ships before the arrival of the Venetians or the Iberians. These ships set off in pursuit of Commander Pisani, who was engaged in small scale plundering in the Aegean. At this time, Pisani also was busy preparing with the Byzantine galleys for an attack on the city of Pera.

When Pisani received communications informing him of the size of the Genoan fleet, he began a quick retreat back to the ravaged port of Negroponte. There, Pisani landed on the island and sank his galleys so they would not be vulnerable to Doria's fleet. When Doria arrived at Negroponte,

Pisani led a successful defense of the port, repelling a Genoan attack. Because Doria received news that both the Iberians and another Venetian force were bearing down on the Aegean, the Genoans abandoned their efforts to capture Pisani. Instead, Doria led his ships back to Pera. Freed of the Genoan threat, Pisani liberated his ships, and combined his forces with the galleys which had just arrived from the Central Mediterranean. Although the Venetian would have liked to link-up with his Byzantine allies and lead the assembled armada on a direct assault against the Genoans at Pera, the onset of winter made an attack impossible. The Venetian force could not fight effectively in the fierce weather and unfavorable winds, so Pisani led his ships back to the island of Crete.

After replenishing their stores, making minor repairs on the ships, and waiting for favorable weather, the Venetian armada left Crete in February of 1352. After departing, Pisani linked up with the Byzantine fleet and set off for the Straits of Bosphorus. There, on February 13th, the Venetian fleet faced off against the Genoans in one of the most brutal and bloody naval battles ever fought. The two navies met in winter during the middle of a harsh storm. Although the battle began during daylight, the fighting continued on into the night. As the hostilities continued for hours, it became increasingly difficult even to identify allies and enemies, much less coordinate any cohesive battle strategy. Many men from both sides were killed or lost in the rough seas, and few prisoners were ever taken.

At the onset of the battle, Doria had laid an effective defense at the mouth of the Bosphorus. In setting up his ships, the Genoan commander had

stationed himself so any admiral who tried to advance against his position would endanger his ships because he would need to compress the vessels in his front lines. Pisani saw that it would be difficult to engage successfully, and he suggested to his fellow officers from Aragon and the Bzyantine Empire that any attack should be postponed until morning. Unfortunately, the Iberian Admiral, Santa Paola, refused to heed the request.⁵³ The Aragonese fleet broke ranks from the rest of the armada, and set forth on a frontal attack into the teeth of the Genoan trap. Pisani did not want to begin the battle under these conditions, but his hand was forced. He followed Santa Paola and engaged against the Genoans.

The coalition fleet of the Republic soon fell apart. The Bzyantines never really entered into the fracas, and the Iberians were quickly disposed of by the combined power of the Genoan forces and the unfavorable weather. As a result, the remainder of the battle became a conflict between Venetian and Genoan forces. One of the sides was able to set some of their enemy's ships on fire, but the gusting wind quickly spread the blaze across the waters so both forces were struck by the flames.

The fighting was brutal, and the enemies were hampered by the weather and darkness. Both sides suffered great losses, but eventually the Venetians had to withdraw from the confrontation. Retreating in the cold night by the light of blazing ships, the Venetian forces finally took what ships had survived and left the battle scene. The fleet of the Republic had experienced tremendous destruction. Most of her galleys were lost, and approximately 1,500 men were killed.⁵⁴ This figure would be a high number in any time or

historical situation, but the deaths were especially painful because of the previous loss of young men in the Great Plague.

Although the Genoans won the battle in a tactical and military sense, they certainly had no cause for rejoicing. They too had lost many of their ships and hundreds of their most able young sailors. Doria knew he was in no position to push the course of the battle, and he set forth on an effort to regroup and recover. Despite all of their losses though, the Genoans had repelled the Venetian threat, and could be relatively confident that they were safe at Pera. In keeping control of Pera, the Genoans would be helped by their ally, the Turkish Soidan, Orkhan I. The Turk had ambitions of extending his influence into Europe, and wanted to do so at the expense of the Byzantine Emperor and the Venetians. The Turkish Emperor gave supplies to the Genoans, and also sent soldiers.

The Venetians knew they had no chance of gaining control of Pera under these conditions, so the ships of the coalition departed westward. The Byzantine Emperor, realizing that any hope of destroying Galata was gone, submitted to his Genoan enemy. He agreed to permit the Genoans to fortify both Pera and the colony at Galata in return for a cessation of hostilities. In addition, the Emperor agreed to allow the Genoans and Turks to keep any nation from trading within the Sea of Azov. Although these provisions were very undesirable to the Byzantine Emperor, in reality, he had no choice but to accept the Genoan proposal.

Further Hostilities

This momentous confrontation at the Battle of the Bosphorus in no way

ended the Third Genoese War. In fact, if anything, the hostilities escalated after the bloodbath. As had happened in the past, a major victory by one of the two great rivals only inspired the other city to mount an increased offensive against its foe. In an effort to exact revenge, both Pisani and the Iberians eagerly shifted their focus to the island of Sardinia. The Venetians had better luck in the Mediterranean, and there they won a decisive victory off of the coast of Lojera. This battle took place on August of 1353, when the Genoese fleet was surprised by the Venetian galleys which were accompanying Aragonese ships near Sardinia. Led again by their able commander, Nicolo' Pisani, the Venetians quickly attacked the unsuspecting Genoan forces. Although the Genoans fought valiantly for their captain, Commander Antonio Grimaldi, they lost approximately forty ships out of a fleet of fifty-eight to Venetian capture or destruction.⁵⁵

This defeat caused a great panic within Genoa. Surprisingly, the entire city went into a depression, and citizens were fearful that the setback marked the end of their power and influence. The Genoan people were convinced that Venice had gained control of the entire Mediterranean, and would proceed to strangle their enemy by excluding them from any trade or commercial activity with the East. In addition, the Genoans believed that the Venetians would be able to starve out the city by cutting the Genoans from any external food source. Since Genoa had little indigenous agricultural productive capacity, it believed that if the city were cut off from its import supplies, the nation would quickly topple.

As a result, the Genoans believed they had to take drastic action to avert

rapid doom. The city thus offered its independence to the Lord of Milan, Giovanni Visconti, who immediately accepted the proposal in October of 1353. Under the provisions of the agreement between the two powers, Milan gained complete control of Genoa in exchange for a guarantee that local laws would still apply within the submissive city. In addition, Genoan ships would still be able fly the banner of the patron saint of the city, St. George, in addition to the flag of Milan.

Venice, of course, was both angered and resentful. They had fought against the Genoans for decades, and they emerged from their conflict with no gains or control over their enemy. To make matters worse, their rival Milan had benefited from the sacrifices of the Republic and had acquired a great prize without ever sending troops into battle. This gain allowed the Visconti to continue an advance on the mainland which promised to bring him into eventual conflict with the Venetians. With the two powers effectively bordering each other through the Venetian puppet government in Padua, Venice now saw Milan emerging as a mainland version of the maritime enemy of Genoa she had just defeated.

In an effort to check the spread of the Milanese influence, the Venetians once again attempted diplomatic efforts. They tried unsuccessfully to form an enduring coalition of mainland powers who would be natural enemies of Milan. These states included Ferrara, Verona, Mantua, Montferrat, Bohemia, and Venice's own Padua.⁵⁶ Although the Republic temporarily was able to garner support for the alliance, the group never became a functional reality. Many of the states only agreed to join after Venice had given them bribes,

and loyalty within the group was lacking. After a short time, the Milanese ruler, Giovanni Visconti, was able to destroy the coalition by offering similar bribes to the leaders of the various other mainland powers.

With the break-up of the anti-Milanese alliance, the Genoese encouraged the Visconti to mount an attack against the Venetians. Old hatred for the Republic ran deep, and the Genoans would have enjoyed seeing their new ruler destroy their historical, political and economic rival. The Milanese ruler, however, did not want an immediate confrontation with the troops of San Marco. The Venetians had proved how effective and persistent they could be in battle, and the Visconti saw reason to risk an unnecessary fight. As a result, the Visconti sent an emissary to the Venetian Doge, Andrea Dandolo, to appeal for peace between Genoa and the Republic.

This ambassador was Francesco Petrarch, the famous poet, writer, diplomat, and humanist. Petrarch was a personal friend of the well-educated Doge Dandolo, and had personally asked the Doge several times in the past to work for a truce with Genoa. Petrarch believed, quite rightly, that the Venetian-Genoan struggle was destroying any chance for Italian unity and strength, and that any winner in a struggle between the two powers would emerge too weakened to ever defend and maintain control of their possessions. As the representative of the Visconti, Petrarch appealed not only to the Doge, but to the entire city of Venice. He repeated his appeal for a truce to preserve Italian unity, and explained that the Visconti would be willing to agree to a generous settlement if the Venetians would end their hostilities with Genoa. Despite his many talents, however, Petrarch's appeal

was not well received. The Venetians were still angry that the Genoans had turned control of their city over to the Visconti, and the citizens of the Republic were in no mood to lay down their arms after being deprived of their spoils after their victory at La Lojera.

Instead, the Venetians increasingly were becoming willing to continue the fight against Genoa, despite her ties with Milan. The Venetians interpreted the Milanese ruler's generous peace offer as a sign of trepidation; if he did not want to fight the Venetians on the mainland, he must not think he could win a military confrontation. The Venetians therefore gained increased confidence, and prepared to continue their struggle with Genoa, regardless of any alliance it might have. This attitude was strengthened by the fact that Genoa had been continuing to battle against the Venetians, despite the control of Milan and despite the words of peace from the Visconti. During January of 1354, the Genoans had already sent a new fleet into the Adriatic, and this armada proceeded to raid several local towns and engage Venetian ships in the area.⁵⁷

The first of these encounters occurred off the Dalmatian coast, as the Genoan galleys, led by the veteran captain, Paganino Doria, stormed the islands of Curzola and Lesina. In this raid, the Genoans attacked the islands, caused a great deal of destruction, and then fled before the Venetian ships in the area could counterattack. In response to this Genoan action, the Venetians sent out an additional contingent of ships to defend the straits of Otranto. The other Venetian ships in the area, led by Doria's old adversary, Nicolo' Pisani, tried to catch the Genoan raiders and engage in a battle.

Despite their efforts, this Venetian armada was never able to confront Doria's ships. Eventually, Pisani decided to join an Aragonese siege of Alghero. Although this may have seemed like an excellent way to take advantage of the Genoans' reluctance to fight, Pisani's decision to leave the Adriatic proved to be a grave error. His decision began a series of events which led to a great Venetian defeat.

When Doria heard that Pisani had sailed east to Sardinia, he advanced to the Adriatic, where he evaded Venetian attempts to constrain him. Once in the Adriatic, Doria struck along the Istrian coast. Getting behind the Venetian defenses, Doria made a bold attack. He assaulted and captured Parenzo along the Istrian coast, located only one hundred kilometers from the Lagoons.

When the Venetians heard of this strike on Parenzo, they took decisive steps to defend the Republic. For example, they designated a special magistrate who was responsible for overseeing all Venetian defensive preparations. As had been done before, the Venetians also passed a measure which brought in funds through a system of forced loans, and the government as well as some wealthy families armed military galleys to defend the Republic. Unlike the Genoans, Venice had no intention of appealing to another city for protection or assistance. They put great chains across the entrance to the Lagoons at the Lido entrance between San Nicolo' and Santa Andrea, and prepared to meet Doria's forces in a battle which would determine the future of their city.

This great confrontation, however, never occurred. Doria was bold, but he was not foolhardy. He knew the Venetians would be a formidable foe

fighting for their lives in their home waters, so he wisely did not push an offensive on the city. Doria retreated out of the Adriatic, and returned to the waters of the Aegean. Meanwhile, Pisani's forces arrived in the area after being recalled in earnest from Sardinia. Pisani wanted to make Doria pay for his advance into the Adriatic, and he hoped to meet the Genoans near their settlement at Chios, one of their principal resupplying posts in the area.

Pisani found Doria in port at Chios, and immediately called for the Genoan commander to engage in battle. Doria, however, refused. He was waiting for an anticipated reinforcement armada of twelve galleys, and was not going to fight Pisani until the other ships had arrived. Therefore, Nicolo' Pisani decided to leave for the port of Portolungo, near the island of Sapienza. It was already autumn, and the Venetian commander reasoned that both he and Doria would delay their confrontation until more favorable conditions arrived in spring.

The Debacle at Portolungo

Pisani was wrong, and his mistake cost him dearly. When the Venetians arrived at Portolungo, Pisani sent a small fleet of only twelve to fifteen galleys under the direction of Nicolo' Querini to hold guard over the mouth of the harbor.⁵⁸ He then took the rest of his ships, some forty boats of various sizes, and bound them together for winter. This action left the Venetians unable to defend their position from any attack of significant magnitude.

The Genoans soon discovered the opportunity to attack the Venetian ships. Many historical accounts and folktales exist which give various explanations of how Doria found out about his enemies' situation. Some relate

a story of how Doria's nephew Giovanni spied the Venetian boats lashed together during a fortuitous jaunt in a light reconnaissance boat that he had taken on a sail during one boring autumn afternoon. Other tales explain that the Genoans saw the ships when returning to shore after a storm forced them to abort an attempt to leave Chios for the winter. Regardless, Doria discovered his chance to attack the Venetians and set forth to follow up on his victory at Parenzo.

The Genoan had no intention of wasting his opportunity. On the morning of November 4, 1354, Doria attacked the Venetians with his entire armada. This assault was a complete surprise to the Venetians, who were utterly unprepared to meet the challenge. Many of the Venetian galleys were not even manned as their crews had moved to quarters on the shore. Those boats which had crews were outnumbered and taken aback by the swift Genoan advance. The protective squadron was ineffective, and Doria's ships viciously descended upon their enemies. Every single one of the fifty-six Venetian ships, including over thirty galleys, was captured.⁵⁹ Some sailors were able to escape to Modone, but others met less fortunate fates. Many were taken prisoner, and over four hundred were killed.

This was a complete defeat and disaster for Venice. Within the lagoons, the leaders of the Republic were understandably shaken. They had been forced to prepare to defend the city from the Genoans because their fleet was off in Sardinia; before the fleet returned, it was destroyed. People were outraged at Querini, as he had not fulfilled his responsibilities at Portolungo to defend the mouth of the port. His performance was inadequate, and some

even charged that he had deliberately allowed the Genoans to penetrate his defenses. As a result, Querini was stripped of his command and forced to pay a considerable fine. He was also prohibited from holding any other office for the next six years. Pisani likewise was subject to harsh punishment. He had to pay a large fine, was stripped of his command, and was forbidden from holding another Venetian military command for the remainder of his life. As supreme commander of the operation, Pisani was ultimately responsible for all events, and had to answer for the Venetian defeat.

Despite the severity of the military defeat, Venice was able to survive the defeat at Portolungo far better than might be expected. The Visconti in Milan still wanted peace between Venice and Genoa, and he was willing to offer the Republic a generous settlement to come to terms of peace. Milan was more concerned with advancing on land in the northern portion of the Italian Peninsula, and she did not want to provoke the Venetians to begin efforts to revive their aborted alliance with the various rivals of Milan. Venetian diplomats thus were able to forge an agreement which called for a three-year settlement between Venice and the Genoan/Milanese coalition. Under the terms of the pact, the two sides would refrain from any military hostilities, and neither Venice nor Genoa would send any ships to Tana during the duration of the truce.⁶⁰

Considering the fact that Venice's entire navy had just been destroyed, the city escaped rather easily. After proceeding with the aforementioned military charges against their commanders, the Venetians began an effort to rebuild their navy and maintain their political and military influence in the

Adriatic and on the Peninsula. The Republic set about the task of building replacement ships, and hired mercenaries to help maintain her defenses. Interestingly enough, the three year peace between Genoa and Venice lasted far longer than one might have expected, with the two historical adversaries refraining from combat for another twenty-five years.

An Internal Threat: A Second Attempt at Revolution

This period of adjustment also marked a transition in terms of Venetian leadership. During the first week in September, 1354, Doge Andrea Dandolo died at the age of forty-seven. His passing was a great loss to the Republic, as Dandolo was a wise well-educated man who proved to be a far better leader than his successor, Marin Falier. Although Dandolo was not particularly well-liked at the time of his death, his many literary, historical and legal contributions left him an enduring legacy of accomplishment which has given him a respected position in Venetian history. Dandolo was helpful in keeping the various classes in the city unified after the tremendous military defeat at Portolungo. Andrea also helped the Venetians have confidence that they were justified in their military actions, and cultivated civic patriotism and belief that the Venetians would eventually overcome their hardships with the Genoans.

The new Doge, Marino Falier, was elected with great confidence and enthusiasm. Unlike the lawyer-humanist-scholar Dandolo, Falier had made his name primarily as a successful military commander. He was a member of a famous and venerable Venetian noble family, and was serving at the time of his election as the Venetian Ambassador to the Pope, located in Avignon. The

newly elected Doge had been a prominent leader of Venetian fleets and military expeditions, including an effort which successfully crushed a rebellion at Zara. In addition, Falier had ruled as the Venetian *podesta'* in several places, including Padua, Treviso, and Chioggia.⁶¹ Finally, the new Doge had played an instrumental role in helping to undermine and defeat the revolutionary efforts of Bajamonte Tiepolo. Without question, prior to his election, Falier had given a lifetime of service on behalf of his state.

Unfortunately, Falier's dogeship proved to be a dismal failure. Falier is directly responsible for a series of events which culminated in his unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Republic and replace the government with a despotic system of rule.

As he began his term of office, the Doge became increasingly unsatisfied with constraints on his power imposed upon him by the ruling aristocracy in the Republic. During his years of service to the state, Falier had grown convinced that the noble elite in the Republic was using its constitutionally granted power to protect its own narrow interests, not govern the state wisely and justly. Some traditional folktales of Venice tell of Falier's dissatisfaction with the city's system of justice after a young nobleman went free after insulting the fidelity of the Doge's wife.⁶² These stories are almost certainly unfounded, but it is true that Falier and other noblemen had become convinced that a monarchical and autocratic ruler was needed in the city. As a result, Falier began to organize an attempt to reclaim control of the state from the power-sharing republican system of government in the city.

In this effort, the Doge was quite interested in the support of Stefano

Chiazza, detto Ghiaza. Falier was eager to win this support because of Ghiaza's contact and control over the Arsenal workers. These men had long served as bodyguards for the Doge during various civic and religious events, and the *arsenalotti* had historically been very faithful to the Doge. Falier and Ghiaza proceeded to formulate a plan which hinged on three factors--an imaginary threat of a foreign invasion by Genoa, a general confusion which would result within the city, and the decisive support of the *arsenalotti*. This plan was supposed to allow Falier to murder his adversaries and emerge as the Monarch of Venice.

In addition, the Doge recruited the help of Filippo Calendario, one of the men who helped to supervise construction on the Ducal Palace. Calendario was also a shipowner, sharing a link with many of the other conspirators to maritime activities. In fact, most of the men involved in the plot were typically middle or upper-middle class citizens who enjoyed the support of maritime workers and seamen.⁶³ Falier reasoned that these individuals would share a resentment against the particular nobles he was blaming for a variety of evils in the administration of the Republic.

Falier's great idea never was realized, and he, not the nobles, wound up as the victim of the *coup* attempt. Naturally, the plan was to be carried out in the utmost secrecy, with the conspirators using surprise as a tool to aid in the overthrow of the government. As might be expected, however, word of the *coup* leaked out. One of the men involved in the plan told a friend that he should stay off the streets on the evening of April 15th because it would be dangerous. This friend went to the Doge and warned him that people

might be trying to commit some sort of attack or trouble on that evening. The Doge of course dismissed the man, but the man continued to tell his story to others. Eventually the men on the Council of Ten became suspicious because they were picking up rumors of upcoming trouble from several sections of the city.

The Council of Ten immediately began to probe for the truth. This secretive institution, established after the Tiepolo attack on the government, was charged with the responsibility of protecting the security of the Constitution and Republic. As a result, the members of the Council met secretly to conduct a preliminary examination of information they had gathered about possible subversive activities. At this meeting, held at the monastery of San Salvatore, the members of the Council correctly concluded that they had reason to suspect that the Doge was planning to fabricate a foreign affairs crisis and then instigate a *coup d'etat*.⁶⁴

Acting upon this suspicion, the members of the Council of Ten shared their ideas during a larger gathering with other government official and citizens. During this meeting, the assembled groups took steps to insure that they would be able to counter any attempt to overthrow the Republic, and special plans were drawn up for the night of April 15th. These preparations included the arming of loyal men from all quarters of the city to defend the Republic. These individuals were ordered to gather in the Piazza, and an estimated force of 7,500 men were available to repel the threat on the night of the planned *coup*.⁶⁵ In addition, a smaller corps of horsemen was assembled to provide a mobile strike-force to deal with an unexpected or

faraway problems.

On the night of the planned attack, April 15th, the defenders intervened to preempt the assault. Many of the conspirators were arrested and jailed to await trials for treason. In the legal proceedings which followed, several of the prominent figures in the rebellion were sentenced to be hanged from the windows of the ducal palace facing the Piazzetta.

The defenders of the Republic also apprehended Doge Falier. The Council of Ten was reluctant to issue a sentence against the highest Venetian government official without additional input, so it asked the government to commission a special group called the *zonta* to aid in the investigations. This committee consisted a group of twenty trusted and esteemed citizens from the city. These twenty individuals, along with one of the State's Attorneys and the Council of Ten, were charged with the task of trying Doge Falier. If necessary, this group also would carry out any punishment against the Venetian leader.

The members of the *zonta* tried Falier, who admitted his guilt in a full confession. This was a crime against the state of the highest magnitude, and on April 17, 1355, the Doge was beheaded as sentenced within the Ducal Palace.⁶⁶ The body was buried in an unmarked grave at the Falier family vault outside of the city, and almost all of the former ruler's assets were confiscated by the state. The only wealth of Falier which was not seized was a sum of 2,000 ducats which was given to his widow.⁶⁷ Thus, despite being convinced that the citizens of the city would rally around him in the uprising, Falier's effort to overthrow the Republic proved to be a disaster. Both he and

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his supporters were destroyed, and their actions only led to their own downfall. In a characteristic fashion, the Republic proved to be stable and enduring, and as had happened before, a *coup* attempt was thwarted.

In this manner, the Venetian internal structure proved stronger than that of her foreign adversaries. This example provides insight into the inherent stability of the Venetian system of government. Whereas many Italian city-states during the mid-fourteenth century had fallen under the control of autocratic leaders, Venice had retained a republican structure. This type of government proved to command a great deal of loyalty from the citizens of Venice.

In retrospect, it is easy to see why some adherents of Falier were attracted to the idea of an autocratic state. Most notably, the citizens of Venice could contrast their city with Milan and Genoa, two powers controlled by despots which had just defeated Venice in a foreign war. The time-consuming Venetian governance structure must have seemed too bureaucratic to meet the dynamic challenges of fourteenth century administration. Republican governments in one sense are always less efficient than autocratic systems, with decision-making taking longer due to the greater citizen participation. Although these republican governments allow a nation to have checks-and-balances to help prevent the abuse of power, many citizens in Venice must have questioned whether or not their city could afford not to have a despotic administration. These individuals must have reasoned that a more autocratic government would provide stronger military leadership against foreign adversaries, and that an

authoritarian administration would allow for faster responses against enemies. A despot would not have to debate or ask for the approval of any councils or committees, and the Venetians would be able to respond more quickly and fight more successfully against the Genoans.

The efforts of Falier and the nobles who wanted to move Venice towards a despotic system like that of her rivals were thwarted, however, by the safeguards built into the republican system. The leaders of the plot were all publicly executed, and several of the principal informants were given permission to protect themselves from any acts of vengeance by being able to carry weapons within Venice. Far from being outmoded by the times, the Venetian Republic survived the tests of the fourteenth century and would endure for some four hundred more years. Lasting until its overthrow at the hands of Napoleon on May 12, 1797, the Venetian Republic still stands as the most successfully lasting republic ever.

Gradenigo and Peace with Genoa

After Falier's execution, Venice tried to stabilize both internally and externally. Only three days after Marino's death, on April 21, 1355, the Republic elected a new Doge.⁶⁸ This new leader was named Giovanni Gradenigo, and he was seventy years old at the time of his selection. Gradenigo was charged with the responsibility of leading the Venetian recovery, so he was eager to solve the city's problems with Milan and Genoa. The years of war between the rivals had taken a huge toll in terms of both human and fiscal resources, and Doge Gradenigo wanted to arrange a truce with the enemies of the city. In addition, external foreign conditions also

were conducive for a cessation of hostilities. The Visconti likewise was eager to come to a settlement, as the battles also were becoming increasingly costly for him.

At this time, Milan was ruled by a triumvirate of Visconti brothers. These individuals had assumed power after the death of their uncle, the former archbishop and lord of the city, Giovanni Visconti. Facing a threat to their security, the Visconti brothers asked Venice to agree to call an end to the fighting and enter into truce negotiations. Once discussions began, Venice and Milan quickly were able to come to terms. The Third Genoese War came to an end on June 1, 1355, the hostilities between Venice and Genoa were halted once again.

The treaty which ended the conflict between the powers spelled out specific responsibilities of each city, however the terms included in the pact were not very restrictive. Principally, each city agreed to keep its ships out of the Sea of Azov for a period of three years, and also agreed to keep out of the home waters of its rival. In addition, both powers placed a 100,000 gold florin security pledge with a neutral city that would be lost if they broke the terms of the treaty.⁶⁹ This treaty was very generous to the Venetians in light of their destruction at Portolungo, and the Genoans were not happy with the terms as negotiated by the Visconti of Milan. Despite their objections, however, the Genoans were under the control of Milan, so they too were willing to come to peace. This agreement did breed hostility though against the Milanese within Genoa, a contempt which would soon surface in an effort by the Genoan citizens to regain autonomy over their city.

This Genoan discontent produced a revolution against the Visconti in 1356, an event which was of considerable significance to Venice. Her principal historic rival was now focused on an internal struggle, not on a competition with Venice. As a result, the Republic was able to rebuild its naval fleet which had been destroyed at Portofino. In addition, Venice was able to start regaining her market position within the European-Eastern trade. Venice also encouraged her diplomats to negotiate mutual commercial agreements with the nations of the east, and business treaties were signed with the rulers in places such as Egypt, Flanders, and Beirut.⁷⁰ Overall, Venice's naval and commercial maritime enterprises were able to enjoy a time of growth and recovery during the years following the peace treaty with Genoa.

Venice, however, was not free from foreign problems. As the Republic continued to have an increasing interest in affairs on the *terra firma*, she began to encounter new political and economic rivals. Although Venice could enjoy the advantages of having territorial possessions, the city would now face challenges which would force it to act decisively to keep control of new areas of the Republic.

For example, in 1356, King Lajos of Hungary led his troops into Friuli. The king led this expedition in an effort to seize control of all Venetian holdings on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. Lajos previously had tried to make a similar claim, but the Venetians were able to avoid a direct confrontation during the middle of their struggle against Genoa by using some adroit diplomacy. In 1356, however, the Hungarian would not be dissuaded.

He sent his armies into Venetian territory, focusing the main thrust of his attack directly against the city of Venice. In this action, the King wisely approached Padua in an effort to get the city to break its agreement with Venice and join in the struggle against the Republic. Luckily for the Venetians, the Paduans did not accept this offer at this time. If they had, it would have given Venice another front to defend, a front bordering directly on the city. Despite the lack of Paduan support, King Lajos enjoyed some success on his own, conquering the Conegliano and Sacile. In addition, the Hungarian laid siege to the Venetian town of Treviso, located north of Venice some some ten miles inland along the Sile River.

This siege at Treviso soon took on added significance when Doge Gradenigo died. Ironically, the man whom the Venetians elected to succeed Gradenigo, Giovanni Dolfín, was trapped inside of Treviso. During August of 1356, the newly elected leader was able to slip out of the embattled city, avoiding the Hungarian troops which were besieging it.⁷¹ Upon returning to the Ducal Palace, Dolfín ascended to the Dogeship.

Doge Dolfín and Further Problems in Hungary

The new doge immediately was confronted with several foreign affairs problems. Despite the best efforts of Venetian diplomats and supporters within the city, Padua eventually threw off its Venetian domination and gave its support to Lajos. The cities of Serravalle and Asolo also had fallen to the advancing Hungarian armies, adding to the Venetian problems.⁷² Finally, the city of Treviso almost fell without a fight when an attempt to betray Venice and capitulate to the Hungarians nearly succeeded. This defection plan was

thwarted, however, giving the Venetians a small victory.⁷³

Although the Venetians valiantly tried to turn the tide of events which were plaguing their government, their efforts were ineffective. The Republic sent troops to try to regain or ravage Padua, but this battalion had little effect. The Venetians were able to impose some economic sanctions against the Paduans, but their former ally withstood the punishment and remained a supporter of the Hungarians. In a desperate effort to win time to regroup, the Venetians accepted a peace proposal that was proposed by the Pope. This agreement only lasted for five months, however, and Venice and the Kingdom of Hungary soon were at war again.

Open hostilities broke out in the Spring of 1357 when the Hungarian armies launched a second offensive after the Easter holiday. Breaking the papal truce, the Hungarian troops once again made an attack on Venetian possessions on the mainland. This advance gained ground, and only a few Venetian cities were able to maintain strong resistance against the invaders. Both Castelfranco and Oderzo were able to repel the Hungarians, as did Treviso.⁷⁴ The situation in Treviso remained precarious, however, and Venice could not feel confident about the long term prospects of its possession.

To make matters worse, Venice also could not feel safe about her own security. Although a few cities had been able to withstand the Hungarian advance, King Lajos steadily was gaining control of most of the shores of the lagoons. The Hungarians were making preparations an invasion, and Venice was hastily preparing to resist any attack. The Venetians sunk wooden posts

into the waters around the city to hamper advancing military ships, and also outlawed any boat travel within the lagoons. The Hungarian invaders had clearly advanced to a point where they were threatening the future of the Republic. Even if the citizens could keep the Hungarians out of their city, the invaders might be able to strangle Venice by cutting off all of her commercial trade to the mainland while imposing a blockade against ships from the East.

As a result, Doge Dolphin tried to find a diplomatic solution with King Lajos. The Doge knew that Venice might not be able to withstand a full-scale attack, and feared the bloodshed that would accompany any sort of invasion. In addition, Venice was running out of money in the civic treasury. The Doge therefore sent representative to King Lajos. These men were supposed to explain that Venice did not want to maintain a hostile relationship with the King, and were supposed to find out how generous the Hungarian would be in agreeing to a truce.

King Lajos did not greet the ambassadors with open arms, as he was in no hurry to stop his successful military campaign. The King had won victories in many areas including Zara, Spalato, Friuli, and Veneto.⁷⁵ The Hungarian realized that he held the upper hand, and would not lay down his arms unless the Venetians agreed to give him possession of the goal of his military campaign: title to all of Dalmatia. If the Venetians did cede over this land, they would turn over control of Dalmatian territory which stretched from the eastern border of Istria all the way south to Durrazzo. In return, Venice would then be able to keep Istria, and the King would remove all of his Hungarian troops from the Italian Peninsula north of Venice.

These demands were carried back to the Venetian government. There, several committees which were responsible for coordinating Venetian military actions heard and discussed the proposal. Naturally, many leaders were enraged, and insisted the the Republic should resist the Hungarians at all costs. These individuals argued that giving up the territory in question would be tantamount to cutting the throat of the Republic. Dalmatia was one of the main reasons Venice had always been such a strong naval power; the region supplied almost all of Venice's lumber and was also a great source of seamen. This faction pushed to continue in the military struggle against King Lajos. These individuals pointed out that Venice always had been able to persevere in the past. This was only one more time that the forces of St. Mark would defeat a foreign enemy.

Reality, however, undermined the boasts of this faction. The Hungarians had not experienced a great deal of trouble advancing on the mainland, and it was difficult to see how the Venetians could be expected to drive these invaders out of their newly conquered possessions. Moreover, the Hungarians did not even need to attack Venice to cause her great hardship. By blockading the Republic's outlets to the Sea and mainland, the Hungarians could slowly weaken Venice until it would be even less able to resist an attack. The Venetian leaders who wanted to accept the King's offer, albeit grudgingly, argued that Dalmatia realistically was lost. They asserted that Venice should keep control of her loyal mainland possessions outside of Dalmatia and assure the survival of the nation. After much arguing, the faction favoring peace won the debate, and the Republic signed a peace treaty

with the King in February of 1358.⁷⁵

In signing this treaty, Venice gave up control of lands which had been its possessions for centuries. These areas were valuable sources of raw materials and human talent as well as political assets. Although Venetian rule had always been viewed somewhat negatively by the indigenous peoples of the Dalmatian coast, the Republic had many strong links with the towns it had lost. Many Venetians had held key government posts in the administrations of the towns, and Dalmatian merchants had traded extensively with businessmen in Venice. This political and commercial contact, however, also had caused some ill-feelings. For example, the Dalmatians were not always happy to have Venetians exerting a strong influence in their domestic decision-making process. In addition, the Dalmatians had been angered when the Venetians insisted that they be allowed to use port facilities in the Dalmatian coastal towns free of charge. Finally, the Dalmatians did not like the inflexibility of having to bring, at least according to the law, all of their goods to Venetian markets before offering them at any other towns. This Venetian insistence on staple-rights over Dalmatia therefore caused friction between the two regions. This ill-will may help to explain why many of the Dalmatian towns fell so quickly to the Hungarian invaders. The Dalmatians did not feel enduring loyalty to the Republic, and would not fight on its behalf.

This military struggle with Hungary taught Venice a valuable lesson. This experience was instructional because it had shown Venice that expansion onto the *terra firma* would have dangers as well as rewards. Although

Venice could certainly gain by expanding on the mainland, greedy rivals would challenge the Republic to defend its territories. Now that Hungary had been successful, Venice could expect that other nations would be more willing to challenge the Republic. The future therefore promised additional foreign policy challenges for the city.

Lorenzo Celsi and an Eventual Uprising at Crete

Doge Dolfino died during the summer of 1361, and the Republic elected Lorenzo Celsi as his successor. The new Doge, a man of a relatively undistinguished family, took over during late August of 1361. Like Dolfino, when Celsi was elected he was outside of the city, serving in this case as the newly appointed Captain of the Gulf.⁷⁶ This fact illustrates the importance Venice placed on foreign military and diplomatic service. The Republic was not blessed with a huge supply of natural resources like many nation-states of modern times. Instead, Venice remained strong and survived numerous political and economic challenges because it was able to maintain a strong commercial and political position. This power was an outgrowth of the activities of many people within the Republic, but the foreign traders, seamen, and diplomats all played a critical role in helping to keep Venice strong and free.

Several minor foreign developments occurred during Doge Celsi's term of office. First, the Republic made peace with Duke Rudolf of Austria after the Duke had imprisoned two Venetian ambassadors who had gone on a diplomatic mission to Austria.⁷⁷ These men were apprehended in retaliation for Venice's damaging of one of the Austrian ruler's homes during the

Republic's struggle with Hungary. In addition, Venice received the King of Cyprus, King Peter during both 1362 and 1364 as a guest of the city. Finally, another famous foreign visitor, Petrarch, came to reside in the city during Celsi's dogeship. The Venetians invited the famous humanist to live in a beautiful home within the city. In return, Petrarch agreed to leave Venice his library upon his death.

A more important foreign affairs event which occurred was an uprising on the Venetian island of Crete. Interestingly, this uprising was not led, as might be expected, by the Greeks who always had lived on the island. Instead, the revolt principally was instigated by transplanted Venetians, some of whom had lived on the island for generations.⁷⁸ This uprising was an outgrowth of many different influences, but the immediate issue which ignited the conflict was a customs tax which the Venetians imposed on the island.

The underlying causes of discontent, however, went far beyond the surface issue of taxation. In reality, more enduring factors caused the residents of the island to respond with such a violent reaction. The Venetians always had carried out a rather ill-advised policy of excluding local citizens from top-level administrative posts, even if the individuals living in the colony were of Venetian descent. As a result, none of the former residents of Venice who lived in Crete ever were able to influence the resolution of many critical problems which affected the lives of those people on the island. In addition, many of the Venetian transplants were disdainful because they had been excluded from ever being able to join the Great Council. Thus, the issue

of the imposition of a tax on imports from Venice caused great anger. The leaders of the Republic, who were all located in Venice, never asked if the people of Crete supported or approved of such a measure. Although the Venetians claimed that any revenues from the assessments would be used for infrastructure work in the harbors of Crete, the residents of the island all took offense at the treatment they received from Venice.

These people of Crete offered a proposal which almost certainly would have been in Venice's long-term best interests to accept. The plan was quite modest, and did not call for any unreasonable measures on the part of the Venetians. In fact, all the residents of the island wanted to do was send a group of twenty individuals to Venice to voice their complaints to the government. Unfortunately, Venice unwisely scoffed at this modest demand. Instead the Venetians told the Cretens that the taxes would be assessed and collected regardless of any objections of those people who lived on the island. The Venetians regarded the requests of the local residents as utterly unjustified.

This response pushed the Cretens to open rebellion. The island temporarily threw off the yoke of Venetian rule, and prepared to fight against any Venetian attempts to repress the uprising. In responding to this insurrection, the Venetians severely underestimated the strength of the rebels' fury, and took a course of action which was clearly inadequate. The leaders of the Republic sent two delegations of officials to the island to explain the position of the Great Council, confident that the presence of representatives from Venice would cause the people of Crete to realize the

error of the actions. These emissaries, however, hardly placated the residents of the island. In fact, both groups of Venetian officials were forced to flee from Crete in fear of their lives.

Upon return of the second group of unsuccessful diplomats, the Venetians responded with more decisive action. They hired a leading mercenary military commander, a position known as a *condottiere*, and ordered him to suppress the rebellion. This commander, Luchino dal Verme, was given a fleet to carry his force of some twenty-five hundred men, including one thousand mounted soldiers.⁷⁹ In addition, the Republic worked on the diplomatic front, sending emissaries to the other major powers of Europe to ask them to refuse to give any assistance to the Cretan revolutionaries.

These responses were sufficient to regain control of the island; however, the incident hurt Venice on a long-term basis in several ways. The *condottiere* Commander dal Verme, and the troops cost a great deal of money, funds which were becoming increasingly scarce in the Republic's treasuries. Likewise, the underlying tensions which precipitated the incident still remained unresolved. Certainly, some of the people who helped lead the revolt may have reconsidered their decision, concluding they would be better off under Venetian control than living on an island ruled by Greeks. Other residents on the island, though, still were incensed that they could not take part in the Great Council. In addition, lingering resentment would persist because many of the leaders of the uprising were brought to trial and executed as traitors. The families of these men were naturally resentful of these actions, and support for the Venetians remained thin despite any

control that was maintained over the island. The Greeks on Crete were even less contented, and minor guerrilla activity persisted for several years following the reconquest of the island.

The Brief Reign of Marco Corner

The time of the repression of the rebellion on Crete also marked the death of Doge Celsi. Once again, the Republic elected a man as Doge who had given his nation many years of loyal foreign service. This leader was Marco Corner, a venerable individual who was well over seventy-five years old at the time of his selection. The new Doge was a somewhat controversial choice in that he was not of the typical lineage to ascend to the highest office in Venice. Corner was rather poor, and he had married a woman of an undistinguished common family.⁸⁰ Despite these atypical characteristics, however, Corner was selected by the leaders of the Republic and ascended to the dogeship during July of 1365.

Doge Corner did not rule for very long, and foreign affairs during his tenure were rather quiet. For example, none of the Venetian colonies erupted as Crete had previously. The Venetians also refused to join into a military alliance that was planning a crusade against the Soldan of Turkey. The Republic was having enough trouble securing her own possessions to start trouble overseas, so it was not eager to commit any forces in a faraway war. Commercially, Doge Corner's reign was highlighted by increased foreign trade with the merchants of Alexandria. The Venetians had not traded with the Muslims for some time due to religious pressure, but during Corner's reign the Pope gave his approval for renewed commercial contacts. Overall, Venice

in this time period tried to recover after her losses to King Lajos of Hungary. The Republic was reluctant to take risks, and tried to focus its energies on improving its economy. Doge Corner's short and uneventful reign ended with his death on January 13, 1368, and his term of office was not marked by any major events in foreign affairs.

The Beginning of the Contarini Dogeship

Venice elected another elderly man to succeed Corner. This leader, Andrea Contarini, was actually retired when he was chosen to occupy the highest office in the Republic. In fact, when told of his selection, Contarini refused the offer and needed to be coaxed and threatened in order to accept the nomination. During the next fourteen years of Contarini's term of office, the Republic was faced with many political and military crises both at home and abroad. Doge Contarini was leader of Venice during one of the most critical periods in the history of the nation.

The first challenge which faced Contarini, however, was not a major problem. The Venetians were forced to put down a rebellion in the normally quiet city of Trieste, a community which sits at north end of the Adriatic Sea, approximately twenty miles east of Aquileia.⁸¹ Although Venice was confident that it could put down the uprising, it took no delay in responding as it had with Crete. Problems with the previous uprising had proven how dangerous it could be to wait during an insurrection, so Venice quickly sent an armada of galleys to the area to regain control. These ships put the city under siege, and were determined to maintain their blockade until the people of Trieste surrendered.

This plan was complicated, however, by the efforts of the Duke of Austria, who responded to a Triestan plea for assistance by sending soldiers to help the revolutionaries. This action enraged the Venetians, who knew that they needed to win the contest with the rebellious city in order to prevent further uprisings within their territories. As a result, the Republic was determined to suppress the insurrection regardless of any foreign assistance promised to the people of Trieste. In addition, the Venetians wanted to punish the Austrians for aiding Trieste in order to discourage future meddling by hungry neighbors such as Hungary or Aquileia. As a result, the Venetians launched a two-front offensive against the Triestans and Austrians. They reinforced their naval blockade while also attacking their enemies on land. In this action on the *terra firma*, the Venetian army attacked the combined Triestan/Austrian forces and won a convincing victory. Following this setback, the Austrian troops pulled back and left the Triestans to continue the fight on their own. Without the support of the Austrian troops, however, the city soon fell to the Venetian forces. By the beginning of December, 1369, Trieste surrendered and once again came under firm control of the Republic.⁸²

Although this uprising in Trieste might not have been as critical as battles fought over other larger or more strategically important towns, success there was very important in terms of Venice's reputation and prestige. Residents in the Republic could well remember recent foreign affairs problems, and this victory helped to restore Venetian confidence. In addition, the Venetian military triumph over the Austrians signaled the fact

that Venice would not tolerate outside interference in its territories. As such, the Triestan rebellion was an important foreign affairs triumph.

The second foreign policy crisis which occurred during Doge Contarini's term was precipitated by a direct threat to Venetian commercial prosperity. In Padua, the local government had begun building a salt production facility. This action was interpreted as an affront to Venetian staple control and century-old monopoly in salt production and distribution in the region. This salt trade was of critical importance to the Venetians, and as a result, they once again decisively acted to assert their power. The Venetians sent a diplomatic delegation to the leader of Padua, Francesco da Carrara. This group expressed the Venetians' contempt for the Paduan construction efforts, and also stated that the Republic would act to stop any salt production if the Paduans did not do so voluntarily.

This act of defiance was not the first time the Venetians had experienced problems with Padua, and the Republic had been growing increasingly suspicious of Paduan loyalty for several years. Back in 1356, Lord Francesco da Carrara had seriously considered breaking his ties with Venice and joining King Lajos of Hungary when the invader was advancing on the Republic.⁸³ The Paduans naturally resented the Venetian influence within their city, and they ideally wanted to regain their autonomy if a favorable opportunity presented itself. As a result of their animosity, the Paduans did not immediately accede to the Venetian demands to halt the construction of the salt facility. In fact, The Duke of Padua called on his friend, King Lajos of Hungary, and asked for diplomatic and military support.

The King offered to help out in diplomatic negotiations between Padua and Venice, but he would not commit any troops to the Paduan cause. The Paduans accepted this offer, and Hungary began acting as a facilitator in joint talks between the discontented cities. These negotiations were started in hopes of finding a peaceful solution to the problem, however the talks produced nothing because neither side would back down. The Venetians simply would not tolerate any salt production that would endanger their monopoly in the industry, and Padua would not agree to stop its plans to build and operate the new facility. The negotiations soon ended in defeat, and the two cities prepared to escalate the disagreement into a military confrontation.

Venice once again was determined to crush this affront to its authority. The city contracted for the services of the *condottiere* Renier del Gauschi to lead its troops, and quickly attacked the city of Padua. Venetian troops ravaged Paduan lands and attacked Duke Carrara's possessions throughout the area. The Venetians also besieged the city, determined to force the Paduans to capitulate. With their troops encircling Padua, the Venetians became confident that they would once again suppress a rebellion at a neighboring city. The Duke of Padua, however, was working to attack the Republic on another front. Carrara had begun to try to act upon a scheme to assassinate several leaders of the Republic with the help of two traitorous members of the Senate.⁸⁴ This plot was discovered, and news of the murderous plans caused a great deal of both fear and anger within Venice. Both the nobles and common people within the Republic panicked, and

rumors abounded about other treacherous Paduan plans.

As a result, the Venetians gave out harsh punishments to all people implicated in the assassination plan. The two nobles who were plotting with Carrara were both given harsh sentences, with one being beheaded and the other imprisoned for ten years.⁸⁵ The two assassins which had agreed to work for the nobles both were publicly drawn and quartered.

The Venetian siege did not produce fast results, as is typical with this type of military tactic. Padua was determined to resist the Venetian soldiers, and the rebels were aided by mercenaries as well as troops given by King Lajos of Hungary. The Venetian siege was taking its toll, but the combined Paduan forces also were winning some victories. After the Paduans and Hungarians defeated Venice at both Narvesa and Fossanova, the Venetians concluded that the time had come for them to launch a more aggressive assault against the rebellious town.

The Venetians attacked the Hungarians and Paduans while they were laying siege to a small Venetian fortress. The Hungarian/Paduan forces were taken by surprise, and the Venetians won a major victory in the encounter. The Venetians dominated the military battle, and captured many of their enemies. Included in those taken prisoner was a man named Stephen of Transylvania, leader of the Paduan mercenaries and nephew of King Lajos.⁸⁶ Once the Venetians realized that they had captured the King's relative, they decided to use this resource to force an advantageous peace settlement. They brought the Transylvanian back to Venice, and contacted the King of Hungary to begin negotiations over Stephen. The Venetians offered to return the

Prince on the condition that the Hungarians would withdraw all support for the Paduan rebels. Although the King would have liked to keep aiding Carrara, the Hungarian accepted this proposal and regained his nephew. All Hungarian troops returned home, leaving Francesco da Carrara alone to continue his fight against Venice.

The Paduans had hoped to liberate themselves from Venetian domination, but without foreign assistance their efforts were doomed. Carrara knew he could not fight the Venetians without outside help, so he was forced to surrender. A peace settlement was signed between the two powers on September 22, 1387.⁸⁷ Venice once again had defeated a rebellious possession and the leaders of the Republic were determined to punish Padua for its impropriety. The Venetians razed all of Carrara's military fortifications, and required the Paduan to pay a fine of 250,000 ducats. Carrara's son was forced to go before the Venetian Senate and apologize, pledging the future support and allegiance of the defeated city. Thus, Venice had emerged strong from her second foreign affairs crisis during the dogeship of Andrea Contarini. The Republic had now twice shown other powers that Venice was willing to fight to remain in control of its possessions. Other forces could try to help any rebellious cities, but they did so at risk. The Venetians would attack any foe and persist until they had suppressed rebellions within their lands.

Prelude to the Fourth Genoese War

Venice continued to demonstrate this resolve throughout the 1370s. This decade marked one of the most important events in the history of Venetian

foreign affairs: the Fourth Genoese War. This war marked the resumption of Venice's age-old struggle with her commercial and political rival on the Ligurian coast.

The principal cause of the war between Venice and Genoa was, as always, the cities' commercial rivalry in the rich ports of the East. During the years following the Third Genoese War, the Republic had continued to maintain and improve its foreign commercial contacts. The galleys of Venice had always controlled the Adriatic, protecting Venetian commercial vessels and harassing any other vessels which tried to erode the Venetian trade monopoly in the region. In addition, Venetian diplomats and merchants worked to open new routes for commercial trade outside of the Adriatic. For example, the Venetians made sure to preserve their access to trade routes to the north. Using their supply paths, the Venetians traveled overland through Germany, Switzerland, and France.⁸⁸ The Venetians also made voyages through the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Using these routes, Venice was able to trade with the ports of England as well as with the rich commercial towns of Bruges in Flanders. Likewise, Venetian galleys also journeyed southward to Alexandria and also to Levantine ports in the Holy Land. Similarly, Venice was able to ship and receive goods from India and Persia through her commercial posts in Syria and Egypt.

All of this trade allowed Venice to remain a major world power, despite her relatively small size and population. The Republic had always derived its strength from its maritime talents and commercial abilities, and these attributes allowed the city to exert its influence far beyond the confines of

the lagoons of Venice. This activity also brought the city great riches. Venice's position as a middle-man in the East-West trade guaranteed her profits regardless of the market conditions for any products or commodities. By transporting wares across the Mediterranean, the Republic was able to amass tremendous wealth. This wealth, however, also created great jealousy and animosity from other cities, most notably Genoa. The two powers were constantly at odds, engaged in a rivalry that often led to violent clashes. Over the years, this Genoan/Venetian animosity often produced full-scale hostilities. This happened once again in the 1370s.

In 1372, the two cities clashed as a result of an incident concerning King Peter of Cyprus and Jerusalem. When Peter was crowned in Famagusta during October, Venetian and Genoan representatives at the ceremony broke into a quarrel over matters of protocol. As the arguments escalated, several Genoans drew weapons and threatened the Venetians, despite the fact that carrying swords was expressly forbidden by local law.⁸⁹ Although some of the Venetians also must have been armed, the Genoans were the only ones accused of criminal action, doubtless because of the Famagustans' animosity towards Genoa.

The charged officials were arrested and stripped of their weapons, creating a public outcry within Genoa. The Genoans naturally were upset that their diplomats had been treated as criminals, and felt that their representatives had suffered from a discriminatory application of justice. In addition, the Genoans wanted to insure that Venice was not gaining control of Cyprus, a development which would seriously harm Genoan commerce in the

East. As a result, the Genoans decided to attack the city of Famagusta. They sent fleets against the city, and their armada had great success. Famagusta fell on October 6, 1373, and the Genoans continued their offensive until they had gained control of the entire island of Cyprus. The citizens of Famagusta surrendered to the Genoans, and were forced to agree to a harsh peace settlement. Famagusta was required to give Genoa a onetime reparations payment of 2,000,000 florins, and the fallen city also agreed to pay an annual indemnity of 40,000 florins. In addition, the Genoans took hostages to discourage any retaliatory actions. Several of King Peter's relatives and approximately sixty members of the city's nobility were taken back to Genoa. Finally, the conquerors kept control of the city of Famagusta, but returned the rest of Cyprus to the defeated King Peter.⁹⁰

This turnover in influence in Cyprus did not end Venetian-Genoan contact on the island. Venetians continued to live on the island, and many owned property and real estate. The Genoese did not persecute citizens of the Republic, but Venetian commercial activities in the region of course suffered under Genoan rule. Since the two cities both wanted to control Cyprus and other trade centers of the East, they continually would be drawn into conflict.

War did not immediately break out over any developments in Cyprus, however, as both Venice and Genoa both became occupied with foreign problems in Constantinople. This crisis was precipitated by huge debts that the Emperor of Constantinople, John V Paleologus, owed to the Venetian Republic.⁹¹ The Emperor had incurred these debts in previous years funding unsuccessful attempts to resist Turkish attacks on his lands. At that time,

Adrianople as well as large portions of Thrace had fallen to the infidels, and John was no longer able to protect his possessions. As a result, the Emperor had traveled across Europe asking for military and monetary assistance. He received some limited support, but the citizens of Venice imprisoned him when he came to the Republic because he owed so much money to the city. The Emperor was able to win his release, but he left Venice with a huge debt burden. Venice generously promised not to invade to recover the debt for a period of five years, and the Emperor assured the Republic that he would begin to repay Venice.

This five year period ended, however, and the Emperor still owed a great deal of money. Therefore, Venice took action to recover the funds. The leaders of the Republic sent a diplomatic commission to Constantinople in 1375, but this group had no success. Upon the return of the committee, the Venetians decided to respond with stronger force. They sent an armada to Constantinople in the Spring of 1376, and the Venetians threatened to begin waging a war against the Emperor unless he accepted a Venetian peace proposal.⁹² This offer required the Emperor to repay all monies he owed the Republic, and also required him to let Venice occupy the island of Tenedos. In return, the Venetians would not attack and would also give the Emperor some money and jewels which had been confiscated. The Emperor really had no choice but to accept; he couldn't defeat the Venetian armada and did not want to lose control of his empire.

The Venetians were pleased that the Emperor agreed to accept their proposal. Of course, they wanted their money back, and were happy that

they could finally collect overdue payments. More importantly however, the Republic was satisfied because it had gained control of the strategically critical island of Tenedos. With Genoa effectively controlling Cyprus, it was vital for Venice to maintain a viable position at the mouth of the Sea of Marmara, a region which always always been of great importance both to Venice and Genoa. Occupying Tenedos provided a way to protect Venetian interests in this region.

In addition, many problems centered around activity in this area near the Sea of Azov and Black Sea. Both Venice and Genoa had always tried to dominate trade with Constantinople, and the cities also tried to control the island of Tenedos. By gaining control of this port, Venice could potentially block access to the Black Sea and choke off Genoan access lines. Realizing this fact, the Genoans became frightened by the Venetian acquisition of Tenedos. In fact, the Genoans decided to fight to keep the Venetians from occupying the island, a decision which led to the start of the Fourth Genoese War. Venetian possession of the island did not occur without a challenge, and this challenge escalated into full-scale hostilities between the two powers.

The Emperor is Overthrown

When the Genoans heard about John's agreement with Venice, they worked to try to avoid losing the island. If Genoa could occupy the island, it would dominate the region with its new acquisitions of Tenedos and Cyprus. The Genoan plan to try to gain control of the island required the overthrow of Emperor John V Paleologus, which the Genoans effected with relatively little

opposition during the summer of 1376.⁹³ The citizens of Constantinople did not resist this Genoan action because they were not happy with the Emperor. He had angered them by recognizing the authority of the Pope during his journey through Europe, and the Eastern Orthodox people of Constantinople regarded this act as heresy. In addition, the residents of the city were not pleased that John had lost control of Tenedos.

As a result, the Genoans tried to take control of the island. They convinced the new Emperor, John's son Andronicus, to turn Tenedos over to the Genoans. Working from their possessions of Pera and Galata, the Genoans made an attempt to conquer the territory in 1376. Unfortunately for the Genoans, however, their plans were thwarted by the residents of the island when the local Greeks stopped the Genoan advance. The Greeks were determined to resist any Genoan effort to occupy Tenedos, and appealed to Venice for assistance. The Venetians sent troops to the Greeks, and the forces happily were welcomed as protectors of the island.

This action led to open warfare. Following the arrival of the Venetians, the Genoans threatened Emperor Andronicus and told him to regain control of his possession and then turn it over to Genoa. The new ruler tried to comply with this order, but he could not impose his will on the local residents or the Venetian soldiers occupying Tenedos. Frustrated, and looking for an outlet to use to exert pressure against the Republic, the Emperor imprisoned all of the Venetians within Constantinople.⁹⁴ Venice immediately sent a diplomatic committee to protest this act and demand the release of the Venetians. This request was refused. Both Venice and Genoa were unhappy with the

situation in Constantinople, and each side began preparing for war.

The Republic immediately dispatched a fleet of galleys to insist on the safe return of all Venetians. If this appeal was denied, the ships were ordered to attack the city and overthrow Emperor Andronicus. The Venetians did not even believe Andronicus was the legitimate ruler of the Empire, and were going to replace him with his imprisoned father John. This armada, however, never had a chance to take control of Constantinople. Instead, the galleys were needed to intercept a force of Genoan galleys which were supposed to attack the Venetian-occupied island of Tenedos. The Genoans were going to receive assistance in this campaign from Emperor Andronicus, who also was sending a squadron of ships. Thus, the arguments over Tenedos had escalated into the Fourth Genoese War.

The Republic Pushed to the Brink of Disaster

This war pushed the Republic to the limits of its military, political, and economic endurance. Before the conclusion of the hostilities, Venice would face attacks against combined forces from many of her longtime enemies, including Genoa, Padua, Hungary, Austria, and Aquileia.⁹⁵ Each of these powers had reasons which motivated them to try to topple the Venetian Republic, and they all fought vigorously in an attempt to destroy their adversary. For example, the Carraresi had begun to exert a considerably more autocratic rule over Padua, and they wanted, as before, to eliminate the Venetian influence in their internal affairs. In addition, the Paduans also harbored aspirations of making their own expansion on the *terra firma*, and they were more than willing to fight if they saw a chance to seize some of

Venice's mainland possessions. Likewise, the Hungarians were rivals of Venice on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, and they hoped to weaken Venetian commercial power in the region. Aquileia also hoped to weaken the commercial strength of the Republic because Aquileian merchants could not compete with Venice. Finally, Austria hoped to extend its influence down through the Alps into the fertile Italian farmlands south of the mountains.

Venice realized that her enemies would form a coalition, so it also forged alliances with other powers. For example, Venice was able to enlist the assistance of Cyprus. The Cypriote leaders were eager to take revenge on the Genoans after their unsuccessful attempt to gain control of the island. As a result, King Peter of Cyprus led his people into a mutual assistance pact with the Republic.

The Venetians also were able to gain the support of a longtime rival, the Visconti of Milan. The leader of Milan, Barnabo' Visconti, was the father of King Peter of Cyprus's fiancée, Valentina Visconti. As a result, the Milanese also were willing to help Venice--for a price. Visconti agreed to assist Venice, but any mainland territories that were conquered would become the property of Milan. Venice, however, would remain in control of any maritime acquisitions. Venice, Milan, and Cyprus thus agreed to join efforts in November of 1377.⁹⁶ This coalition, as well as the alliance which opposed it, had considerable resources and manpower, and the battles promised to be hard-fought and dangerous.

Venice undertook considerable efforts to muster a formidable military force from within the Republic. The customary system of drafting men by

lots was used, and three men out of each draft group of twelve were asked to take up arms for the city. This ratio was high and reflects Venetian resolve to emerge victorious in the battle. The city also created special committees within the government to oversee military affairs, and collected public funds to help fund the campaign. This money was used to hire mercenaries and *condottieri* and also was used to set up defenses within the Republic.

After hastily completing preparations, Venice plunged into the conflict. The city was fortunate to be led by Doge Contarini, a wise and able leader whose talents proved invaluable during the course of the war. The Doge was popular with his people, and had earned many years of experience serving his state. Venice also was led by her commander of the sea, Vettor Pisani, nephew of Niccolo' Pisani, Venetian commander at Portolungo. Pisani had distinguished himself in other naval commands, and he previously served in the office of Captain of the Gulf.⁹⁷ In this capacity, Pisani coordinated all Venetian naval activities in the North Adriatic, keeping out pirates and protecting all Venetian shipping.

Pisani's greatest strength, however, was not his naval expertise; the commander was a zealot patriot, and he had the ability to command the respect and admiration of the entire Republic. Both his sailors and the general populace rallied around Pisani, forgiving his family for any disgrace his uncle had caused after the failure at Portolungo. In addition, Pisani was popular in spite of an incident which had occurred in the period between the Third and Fourth Genoese Wars. At that time, Pisani had a violent outburst in which he attacked another Venetian nobleman, Pietro Corner, after Corner

had questioned his honor. An official on one of the ships in the Venetian fleet was accused of violating a law against loading goods on a ship without permission of the fleet commander. Pisani testified that the ship worker had received approval from the commander (himself), but Corner challenged the veracity of his testimony. This affront enraged Pisani, who told Corner that he had better carry arms to defend himself when Pisani came to avenge his honor. Pisani proceeded to find Corner and come after him with a knife. Corner escaped, and pressed charges against Pisani. The assailant was convicted, fined, and deprived of his elected office. The Venetians never held this crime against Pisani, and the commander led the Republic into battle as he received the banner of St. Mark from the Doge in April of 1378.

Venice also was led by Carlo Zeno, a Venetian admiral in the war. Like Pisani, Zeno too had a violent temper, challenging a knight to a duel during his young adulthood when he was studying for the priesthood. This incident led Zeno to decide that he should not pursue a career within the church, and he returned to the laity to spend his life as a merchant and soldier. Zeno had been involved in a series of flamboyant episodes throughout his life, many of which doubtless were glorified since his death. Regardless, Admiral Zeno was a naval genius who relished a military challenge.

Both Zeno, Pisani, and Contarini would face many challenges over the course of the Fourth Genoese War. Less than six weeks into the conflict, Pisani led a Venetian fleet of some fifteen galleys into a battle with a Genoan armada led by Luigi de' Fieschi. These fleets met off the coast of Anzio near the mouth of the Tiber River.⁹⁸ This clash occurred during very a violent

storm, and four of the Venetian galleys could not even maneuver into the fight because of the rough seas. Despite this problem, the Venetians still got the best of the fighting. The galleys of the Republic were able to capture five Genoan ships, and also destroyed another enemy vessel by forcing it into the rocks.⁹⁹

This Genoan defeat caused a internal panic within Genoa. As had happened in the past during struggles between the enemies, Genoa reacted to a military defeat with harsh actions, redoubling its efforts. The city removed their leader, Doge Campofregoso, from office and replaced him with a new officer, Doge Guercio. This new Doge led a Genoan effort to reassemble his city's fleet, and the Genoans had another armada in the seas by winter.

Meanwhile, the Venetians chose not to follow up and try to inflict further damages on their enemy. Pisani did not have a large flotilla, and as the seas proved at Anzio, the unseasonable weather was making it difficult to coordinate any military efforts. As a result, Pisani led his galleys eastward, journeying to Cyprus and undertaking an effort to harass Genoan commerce in the Levant. On the way home from this journey, Pisani was able to gain control of both Cattaro and Sebenico, two cities located on the shores of the Adriatic. The Venetians also were able to meet up with several allied galleys which were coming from ports in the Aegean. The Commander then spent a short period of time patrolling the Adriatic trying to maintain complete Venetian control of the area. After all of these activities were concluded, Pisani made plans to return to the lagoons for the remainder of the winter, where he could make any necessary repairs on his ships, rest his men, and

pick up supplies. As was necessary, Pisani asked the Senate for permission to bring his fleet back home into Venice.

The Venetian rulers received the commander's request, but they would not accede to his petition. Instead, the Senate ordered Pisani to spend the winter at the town of Pola, located across the Adriatic in Istria, approximately due east of Ravenna.¹⁰⁰ The Venetians wanted their armada at this location because they wanted the fleet to be in a position where it could most effectively defend Venetian commercial convoys. The Senate believed that this Istrian outpost would offer the best opportunity to achieve this goal. Albeit reluctantly, Pisani sailed to Pola as ordered and prepared for the winter.

Pisani was rightfully angry at the Senate for keeping him away from Venice for the winter. He had fought brilliantly in service of the state, but he had been away from the city since April and his troops were tired. Wintering at Pola meant an additional extended period away from home and family for his entire fleet. In addition, it would be difficult to adequately repair ships in Pola, far away from the facilities and workmen of the Arsenal. The Commander protested, sending another request back to the Senate asking for permission to return home. As before, this appeal was denied.

Battle at Pola

As a result, Venice's fleet spent the winter in Istria. This refusal to let the armada return to the lagoons proved to be a great mistake, as the fleet was to suffer a shattering defeat at their station in Pola during May of 1379. Prior to this engagement, Pisani had been trying to reassemble his ships and

prepare to restore his fleet to battle condition. Although the Commander had directed efforts to protect a group of commercial grain ships which had sailed from Apulia, the Venetian fleet was hardly ready to engage in a major confrontation.¹⁰¹ Many men had taken ill during the months at Pola, and some ships were still in need of repairs. As a consequence, Pisani knew he was in trouble when he saw the possibility of being drawn into a major clash with the Genoans.

To his credit, Pisani tried to avoid entering into the battle which resulted in the Venetian defeat. He knew that his ships and men were not ready to engage their adversaries, and he wanted to avoid a confrontation until he was adequately prepared. Unfortunately, Pisani was unsuccessful in keeping his men out of combat. On May 7, 1379, an armada of Genoan ships appeared outside of the harbor of Pola. Only part of this fleet was visible, and the Venetians saw a group of sixteen enemy ships inviting them to battle. The Genoans, however, had hidden a force of six galleys outside of view of the Venetians.¹⁰² The ships were to be used to storm the flank of the Venetians in surprise if the Genoans could lure their enemy out into battle.

Despite the fact that the Venetians had approximately twenty-five ships, Pisani wanted to avoid a battle at this time. Some of his ships were filled with supplies, and would be difficult to maneuver them in a confrontation. In addition, the fleet was ill-prepared to meet such a formidable opponent because many ships were not in prime fighting condition. Finally, Carlo Zeno was supposed to join this fleet soon on the way home from a tour of duty in the Levant. Pisani wanted to wait until Zeno arrived, when the Venetians

would have a far greater chance of defeating their enemy. The Commander called a meeting to discuss the Venetian response to the Genoan call to arms, and at this council he recommended that the ships ignore the Genoan challenge and remain within the protection of the harbor.

Unfortunately, this advice was ignored. His captains, as well as additional Senate officials known as proveditors who were sent from Venice to help coordinate naval actions, interpreted the commander's advice as cowardice. They all insisted that the Venetians immediately engage in battle. The group pushing for a fight reasoned that since these same men and ships had crushed the Genoans at Anzio, they would do so again here at Pola. In the end, Pisani was forced to back down from his position. The Venetians prepared for battle in all possible haste, confident they would once again defeat the Genoans.

This engagement proved to be a debacle for the Republic. Ironically, at first, it seemed as if the Venetians would indeed win another victory. The fleet rushed the Genoans, and Pisani led the charge on the enemy. The Genoan admiral's galley was captured, and the Venetians even killed the enemy commander, Luciano Doria.¹⁰³ The Venetians were fighting valiantly, and Genoans began to pull back into retreat.

This retreat, however, drew the Venetians directly into the Genoan trap. The Venetians eagerly pursued their foes, only to be ambushed by the Genoan galleys which were hidden away from the main fleet. The Genoans proceeded to utterly rout the Venetians, and only six ships of the Republic escaped capture or destruction. Thousands of men were taken prisoner, and several hundred were killed in the battle. Led by their commander, Vettor

Pisani, the six surviving Venetian ships fled from Pola and took refuge in the port of Parenzo.¹⁰⁴

After news of this fiasco reached the lagoons, the Venetian leaders summoned Pisani back home and put him on trial for his actions. The commander was not accused of being a traitor or a coward, but he was instead charged with negligence in the line of duty. The leaders of the Republic held Pisani responsible because they believed that he did not adequately insure that watchmen were performing their duty. Pisani also was convicted of leading his galleys out of the battle after the Venetians had begun to suffer losses. This tactic may have been prudent strategically, but it was considered a criminal offense under the dictates of Venetian military law. The commander was convicted on both charges, removed from office, and sentenced to a six month term in prison. In addition, Pisani was prohibited from holding any other office for an additional five years. Many nobles wanted to issue a harsher punishment, but they were hesitant to give a tougher sentence because Pisani was so adored by the people of the Republic.

All of Venice was despondent over the crushing defeat of the city's fleet. Aside from the six battered ships in dock at Parenzo, the Republic had no galleys to use to defend the city. Carlo Zeno also was leading a second Venetian fleet, but he was off attacking Genoan shipping. The Venetian commander was expected to return shortly, but the Genoans could attack the unprotected city at any moment. Luckily for Venice, their enemy had lost its commander during the battle, and therefore the Genoans needed a short period of time to regroup after the engagement. The Venetians knew,

however, that they would be called on to fight for the survival of their state as soon as Genoa rearmed for an attack.

A Genoan Push at the Republic

Doge Contarini valiantly led the efforts to protect the city from the expected Genoan assault. The people of the city realized that the very existence of the city was at stake, and they frantically prepared to meet the Genoan attack. Rich commoners as well as noblemen gave huge sums of money in support of the defensive efforts.¹⁰⁵ These funds were used for a variety of purposes including outfitting galleys, hiring mercenaries, and building fortifications. In setting up defenses, the Venetians tried to block off all of the entrances to the city. They sunk ships to barricade the entrance to the Lido port, and set up sentinels to watch for the arrival of the Genoan fleet. They also pulled up all of the wooden piles which were used to help boatmen navigate in the shallow and dangerous waters within the lagoons. In previous wars, the Venetians had drafted soldiers from the corps of eligible men. This time, however, virtually every healthy resident was enlisted in the defense of the city.

The Venetian military prepared to meet its foe, and soldiers took positions around the city. At sea, the six ships which had survived the defeat at Pola were put under the command of Carlo Zeno's father-in-law, Giustiani Zeno. The Venetians also hired a condottiere named Giacomo da' Cavalli to try to defend the city from aggressions on the *terra firma*.¹⁰⁶ Cavalli was leading a force of over six thousand men, including sizeable numbers of mounted soldiers and bowmen. These men spread out across the shores of

the remaining Venetian territories. Meanwhile, the residents of the city patrolled the lagoons, while committees of military advisors sat at the Ducal Palace around the clock, ready to coordinate necessary responses if an attack occurred. Finally, the Venetians unsuccessfully tried to arm an additional sixteen galleys from within the city. Following a general call draft, most of the men called refused to report for battle. In fact, there were enough crewmen for only six ships.¹⁰⁷

Many Venetians would not report when called because they were indignant at the treatment given to Vettor Pisani. The commander was immensely popular with the common people of the city, and he was especially well-liked by sailors and naval personnel. These individuals did not care that Pisani had been defeated at Pola; they were confident of the commander's abilities and wanted him to lead them in the effort to defend the Republic. The seamen believed the defeat was really the fault of the Senate--they had refused to let Pisani winter in Venice and repair his ships. As a result, they rejected the imprisoned commander's replacement, Taddeo Giustinian. Unless Pisani was returned to his position, these men would not fight.

Venice desperately needed these sailors. The Genoans viciously had attacked on August 7, 1379, confirming the worst fears of the residents of the city. The new admiral, Commander Pietro Doria, led a force of approximately fifty galleys from his home port, and took a position at Venice near the small town of Chioggia.¹⁰⁸ This location was particularly troublesome for the Venetians because it potentially allowed Doria to enter the lido at Chioggia and then travel north to Venice. The Genoans also could receive food and supplies

in this area from the Paduans, former Venetian allies who had joined in the effort to destroy the Republic.

Doria came to Chioggia after he had ravaged the Venetian towns of Grado, Pellestrina, and Caorle. The enemy commander then proceeded to seize Chioggia Minor, located just across from Chioggia. In addition, Doria also attacked the town of Malamocco, but the residents put up a staunch defense and drove the attackers away from their town. Doria then proceeded towards Chioggia where he planned to rendezvous with force of some 25,000 soldiers which had come up from Padua. These men were not all from that city, but instead were from the Kingdom of Hungary as well as the Italian cities on the peninsula. Led by the Duke of Padua, these soldiers were allied in a combined force which intended to crush Venice once and for all.

Although Chioggia showed no lack of will to resist, its garrison of only 3,000 men could hardly be expected to repel attackers which outnumbered them almost ten to one. The Genoan forces attacked the city, and the men of Chioggia bravely fought to defend their town. Their efforts proved futile, however, and the enemy overran Chioggia on August 16, 1379.¹⁰⁹

The fall of Chioggia presented a very real military problem for the Venetians. Chioggia and Venice are connected by a deep water channel that gave the Genoans an access route to advance by sea into Venice when they chose to attack. In addition, if they chose to delay a direct assault, the Genoans could also use their base at Chioggia to help blockade Venice, cutting her off from her maritime contacts and supply routes. This was extremely important because the Hungarian and Paduan troops already were besieging

the city on land. With 25,000 troops, the enemy mainland forces were effectively cutting off Venice from the *terra firma*, slowly strangling the city by cutting off all of its supply routes.¹¹⁰ The Venetians realized that they were in grave trouble, and they sent diplomats to try to negotiate a truce. The Genoans, however, refused to even discuss the matter. The cities were bitter enemies, and Genoa was determined to crush its rival now that it had the opportunity.

The leaders of Venice of course were terrified. If they wanted to fight their enemies, they would need to confront a combined force of over twenty-five thousand men and the entire Genoan naval fleet. This fleet was currently docked within the lagoons, and the Republic had almost no ships of her own to use in the defense of the city. When Carlo Zeno returned he would be able to help in the naval fight, but he was at sea and it was impossible to know when he would come back. Waiting would not be possible, either, as the blockade and siege had cut the Republic off from its food supplies and commercial contacts. Unless the Venetians could break the blockade, they would inevitably fall to their enemies. Finally, the entire situation was complicated by the fact that many Venetian seamen would not defend the Republic unless Vettor Pisani was released from prison and reinstated as leader of the fleet.

Given this scenario, the rulers of the city had no choice but to free Pisani. The Venetians had sentenced Pisani to prison, but he was the only man who would be able to rally the populace in defense of the city. As a result, Pisani was released and allowed to serve once again as a naval officer. The Senate

tried to keep Pisani in a minor role, initially giving him a minor post. The people would not accept this, however, and forced the leaders of the Republic to reinstate Pisani as Admiral. Once Pisani reassumed his former command, the seamen of Venice turned out to support the defense of the city. Men who had just refused to serve under Taddeo Giustinian eagerly joined to outfit the galleys of Pisani's fleet. The Venetians were able to muster enough men to outfit a total of thirty-four warships, and Pisani led a contingent of six of these vessels out to defend the southwest entrances to the city.¹¹¹

The leaders of the Republic also took other extreme steps to help protect their territory. They ordered Venetian troops which had fought the Genoans at Malamocco to abandon their posts and fall back to areas around San Nicolo' and San Giorgio Maggiore. Rich residents also were ordered to help fight the food shortage by setting up public kitchens to help feed the poor during the siege. In addition, another forced loan was ordered, and the Republic was able to gather over six million lire, as well as valuable quantities of precious metals and jewels.¹¹²

These funds were used to redouble defensive efforts around the city. The workers at the Arsenal labored in earnest to assemble a new fleet to replace the craft that were destroyed at Pola. The Venetian Arsenal was known around the world for its ability to assemble ships quickly, and the facility was able to build a force of some forty galleys to use against the Genoans. The Venetians also built additional defensive fortifications. They put a series of timbers connected by chains across the Grand Canal to hinder any assault on the city, and reinforced this barrier with ships and cannon.

Another wall was built along the Lido, and new fortifications were built on the the islands of San Servolo and the Giudecca, and on the *terra firma*.

Despite these efforts, the Genoans would have still been wise to attack the city. Venice was still reeling from its loss of Chioggia, and although its fleet was quickly being replaced, many of the new crewmen were not veterans of the sea. Venice had developed from a strictly maritime city to a more balanced economy over the past few centuries, with many men conducting their commercial transactions on land and never venturing to sea. As a result, these sailors did not possess experience rowing or fighting on galleys.

Modest Venetian Defensive Successes

The Genoans, however, unwisely hesitated. As the Genoans delayed an assault on the Republic, Venice was able to regain its breath and train its recruits. The blockade was still slowly weakening the city, but Venice was never as vulnerable, either militarily or psychologically, as it was following the loss of Chioggia. In the break which the Genoans allowed them, the Venetians began to recover. They pushed their enemy back on land, with the *condottiere* Giacomo de' Cavalli leading efforts to break the siege of the city. The combined forces of the Republic even moved back into Malamocco and maintained control of the city.¹¹³

Upon his release from prison, Vettor Pisani combined with Doge Contarini to lead the Venetian military efforts. Pisani officially was given the title of Chief Executive Officer of the Navy, and Doge Contarini was named Captain General of the Sea. Together, these men led Venice through its efforts to

survive the Genoan blockade.

The Venetians escaped the blockade by pursuing an unusual and ingenious course of action--they cut off their enemy's supply lines, isolating the Genoans from their provisions and reinforcements. The Venetians carried this plan out by sinking ships and barricades into the waters that connected Chioggia with the land and sea. In this manner, the Venetians were able to trap the large galleys of the Genoans. All of the deep-water passages in the area were blocked, but the Venetians could still maneuver about in light craft. They were in their home waters and knew how to navigate in the tricky waters of the lagoons.

The actions needed to entrap the Genoan vessels were accomplished under the cover of darkness on the night of December 22, 1379, the longest night of the year.¹¹⁴ The Venetians landed a force of approximately five thousand men at Brondolo, just south of Chioggia. The Genoans quickly hurried to push back these soldiers, but in reality this attack was just a diversion which allowed the Venetians to carry out their offensive against their enemy. While the Genoans were busy repulsing the Venetian land assault, Doge Contarini and Pisani led the efforts to blockade the Genoan ships. The Venetians sunk the barges and ships into the shallow channels, and trapped the Genoan galleys in the lagoons. This was accomplished by blocking off the three naval access routes into Chioggia--the port of Chioggia, the Lombard Canal, and the Brondolo Channel.¹¹⁵

The Venetians kept the Genoans from removing these obstructions by patrolling the area in light sea-craft, keeping constant watch over the area.

In addition, the Venetians made certain to keep an adequate naval force at the northern access points to the lagoons--at the Lido and Malamocco harbors--in order to make the blockade complete. In this way, the Venetians created an opportunity to fight back against their enemy. Despite this blockade, however, the Republic still had grave problems. They were still not receiving adequate supplies, and they also were facing the possibility of spending the harsh winter trying to continue their blockade from their exposed location on the open seas.¹¹⁷

The Venetians knew that their blockade would allow them to buy some time until Admiral Zeno came back from his raids against Genoan shipping. They could weaken their enemies at Chioggia, and possibly even get them to make a small retreat. This action would make it possible for the Venetians to acquire some additional supplies through either mainland or naval routes.

Zeno Comes Home: Venice Breaks the Blockade

At this critical time, Venice was helped by the return of its roaming naval commander. Zeno appeared on January 1, 1380, none too soon for the people of Venice. The city was running out of critical supplies, and many of the mercenaries who were helping in the defense of the Republic were becoming rebellious. Defending Venice and maintaining the blockade had proven to be very dangerous, and many men had been killed or wounded. With Zeno's arrival, the Venetians knew they must act decisively to break the enemy blockade and regain control of the critical access point at Chioggia.

The leaders of the city made plans for Zeno to play a key part in this effort. The Commander was dispatched to help defend one of the five

blockaded entries keeping in the Genoans at Chioggia. Zeno took his eighteen ships to help strengthen the blockade at Brondolo, and also was quickly able to gain control of one of the former Venetian fortifications: the tower at Londo.¹¹³ This acquisition was crucial, for it broke the blockade of the city. The Venetians now were able to get reinforcements from their allies in Ferrara.

During the fighting to break the blockade, the Venetians killed the Genoan commander, Pietro Doria. On January 6, 1380, debris from a hit tower struck and critically injured the enemy leader, depriving the Genoans of their ranking officer in the entire campaign. The Venetians followed up on this unexpected event by pushing forward in their efforts to regain control of the islands encircling the lagoons. During February, Pisani led a successful effort to regain control of the port at Brondolo. This effort allowed the Venetians to tighten their grip on their enemy as they kept strengthening the power of their counter-blockade of their enemies. With these new Venetian victories, the future of the Genoans looked increasingly grim.

During this time period, however, the Venetians still were experiencing hardships and defeats. During April of 1380, for example, a Venetian convoy which had gone to buy grain at Sicily was intercepted by a Genoan reinforcement fleet. Under the Command of Marco Maruffo, this armada was preying on the Venetian ships which were keeping up the defenses at the entrances to the lagoons.¹¹⁷ This fleet also was busy desperately trying to engage either Zeno or Pisani in a sea battle. If the Genoan could force a confrontation and capture or destroy some of the Venetian defense craft, the

Genoans could break the Venetian blockade of Chioggia and relieve their comrades. The Genoans were starving within the Venetian trap, and unless they could be unloosed, it would be impossible for them to continue fighting. Carrara was trying to send the Genoans grain and other supplies, but Zeno was intercepting all of the convoys. The only food available was rats, mice, and other vermin.¹¹⁸

The Genoans at Chioggia Are Broken

After many desperate and bloody attempts to break the Venetian blockade, the Genoans realized they could endure no more punishment. They sent diplomatic representatives to doge Contarini and the Senate, and begged the Venetians to allow them to leave. They assured the Venetians that they would return home to Genoa, and that they would cause no more trouble for the Republic. The Venetians, of course, refused this plea. They had no reason to trust their longtime enemy, a foe which had pushed them to the brink of destruction and previously had refused Venetian advances to discuss a peace settlement. Faced with no other alternatives except starvation, the four thousand Genoans and two hundred Paduans trapped at Chioggia unconditionally surrendered on June 14, 1380. Admiral Maruffo withdrew as well, and he took his fleet back to the shores of Dalmatia.

This surrender was a great victory for Venice, and the citizens of the Republic rejoiced knowing that they had survived the most narrow escape in the history of the city. There were great celebrations, and heroes were honored for their exploits. This win did not, however, mark the conclusion of the war, as their enemy was still harassing the Republic both on land and at

sea. The Genoan fleet under the command of Marco Maruffo had pulled back to Dalmatia, and the Venetians needed to eliminate this final naval threat to their city.

As a result, Vettor Pisani led the campaign to engage and destroy the Genoan ships. After a great deal of fruitless searching, he found his adversaries and was able to force a battle during early August of 1380. This engagement, fought at the eastern side of the Gulf of Venice, unfortunately proved to be a mistake. The Genoan ships were not captured, and Pisani was mortally wounded. With Pisani's death, the Venetians turned to Carlo Zeno to complete the task of destroying the Genoans. Zeno pushed on, trying to trap the enemy fleet, but he too was unsuccessful. The Venetians continued to pursue Maruffo, but they eventually gave up on the Genoan fleet.

In addition, the Republic also continued to battle with its foes on the *terra firma*. Supplies were still scarce, and the city was suffering from shortages of many critical products. The battles with their Paduan enemy, the Carrara family, were dragging on, and neither side was able to gain a conclusive advantage. Eventually, the Venetians concluded a proposal with the Duke of Austria that allowed them to insure that their mainland territories would not fall under hostile control. Under the terms of this agreement, Austria was given control of mainland possessions such as Treviso, and Austria agreed to garrison the areas with an army to insure that the Paduans would not overrun their new acquisitions.¹¹⁹ Austria complied with the terms of this agreement and eventually withdrew from the hostilities on May 2, 1381.

Once Austria had secured the mainland territories, the Paduans realized that they would be unable to make any other gains on the *terra firma*. Padua decided it was time to end the hostilities, and entered into negotiations with the Republic. The two sides reached an agreement with the assistance of Amadeus VI of Savoy, and the powers signed a peace treaty at Turin on August 8, 1381.¹²⁰

In many respects, this treaty was rather harsh for the Venetians, especially in light of the many military victories of the Republic. Venice gave up all of her claims to Dalmatia, with the entire area going to the King of Hungary. In addition, Venice agreed to pay the Hungarian King an annual fee as a reward for recognition of Venetian commercial monopolies within the North Adriatic. The Venetians ceded Tenedos to Savoy, and turned over many possessions on the mainland, including Trieste, to the armies of the Duke of Austria.¹²¹ The Venetians and the Genoans also agreed to refrain from any commercial activities at Tana until 1383.

Conclusion of the Thesis: Long-Term Effects, Sources of Venetian Strength

Despite these sacrifices, Venice did receive some important benefits. The city had spent a great deal of money in defending itself, and had lost many of its most talented citizens in the battles. In return, the Republic regained its commercial privileges on the mainland and also recovered its dominant position in the trade with Constantinople. On paper, the war may not have seemed conclusive. In many respects, both Venice and Genoa seemed to emerge in equal positions after all of the fighting had ended.

In reality however, Genoa had been destroyed by the Fourth Genoese

War, a conflict also known as the War of Chioggia. Genoa never was able to recover, and she suffered through a period of instability which eventually ended when the city voluntarily sacrificed its independence to the Kingdom of France during the decade following the war. The two old rivals seemed as if they would merely resume their battle for the profits of the East-West trade, but the lucrative riches of the Levantine markets would soon be captured almost entirely by Venice. Genoa self-destructed, while the Venetian Republic continued its development as one of the most enduring governmental systems ever seen in the world.

In conclusion, the period from 1250 through 1381 was a time of great challenges for the Venetian Republic. The fact that the city was able to survive and prosper in this era was a testimonial to the strengths of the people and institutions of the Republic. Certain civic factors such as Venice's tradition of shared governance, its high-quality public servants and ambassadors, and its unique institutions such as the Council of Ten all helped to produce a state that enjoyed great internal stability. This strength allowed Venice to resist two major revolutionary attempts during the period in question, and also helped Venice to dominate diplomatic relations with other nations. Although the government's numerous committees and checks and balances did not provide the fastest means to rule a state, the Republic had a remarkably effective system for generating coherent and flexible policies. The Republican system presented unique challenges, and required many committed individuals who were needed to serve in posts ranging from doge to admiral to ambassador. Fortunately for Venice, the city had many

talented men who made great public service contributions, helping to lead the city to success during the years of the struggles with Genoa.

Venice also was able to prosper during this time period because of the city's great commercial and maritime talents. Venetian strength primarily did not result from any natural resources; instead, the Republic was able to flourish because Venetians were some of the best merchants and sailors in the world. Whether acting as middlemen in trade between the East and West, or carrying products to European ports in cities such as London or Bruges, the Venetians realized that their prosperity rested on their ability to initiate, preserve, and defend trading contacts throughout the world. As a result, the Republic produced great sailors and admirals, and had unparalleled ship-building facilities at the Arsenal. Venice also took special pains to maintain diplomatic contacts which preserved valuable commercial privileges.

In this era, Venetian attentions were focused on the waters, not on the *terra firma* of the Italian Peninsula. Of course, Venice had possessions and tried to extend its influence on the mainland, but the city knew that its most important priorities were the trade routes and markets which it reached in its sailing vessels. Venice would grow to become increasingly involved in mainland affairs during the course of the next century, but during the time of the great struggles with Genoa, the Republic was first and foremost concerned with maritime affairs.

These various strengths allowed Venice to overcome its rival of Genoa. After generations of fighting and hatred, the Venetians eventually emerged victorious. Following the conclusion of the Fourth Genoese War, Venetian

trade brought the city great wealth and resources. Venice was able to regain control over valuable areas in Dalmatia and enjoy the fruits of its Levantine trade. In contrast, Genoa self-destructed, weakened by years of internal dissention and civil wars.

Thus, the Republic was able to prosper and flourish. Venice, like all Italian cities, would be threatened in future centuries by the rise of powerful nation-states such as France and England; however, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Republic was one of the strongest powers in the world. Military victories of course were important, but Venetian strength came more from the commercial and civic contributions of the people of the city than anything else. The greatest factors in producing a vibrant nation were people like the merchants and seamen, and the prudent civic officials. These individuals were the true source of Venetian strength in the struggle with Genoa and other foreign affairs during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Notes

- ¹ Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 135.
- ² Wiel, Alethea. Venice, p. 161.
- ³ Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 82.
- ⁴ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.384.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 383.
- ⁶ Wiel, Alethea. Venice, p. 162.
- ⁷ Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 84.
- ⁸ Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 75.
- ⁹ Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 85.
- ¹⁰ Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 76.
- ¹¹ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.384.
- ¹² Wiel, Alatheia. The Navy of Venice, p. 170.
- ¹³ Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 77.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 79.
- ¹⁵ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.466.
- ¹⁶ Wiel, Alatheia. The Navy of Venice, p. 179.

- 17 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 83.
- 18 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.490.
- 19 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 210.
- 20 Ibid., p. 210.
- 21 Ibid., p. 210.
- 22 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.517.
- 23 Wiel, Alethea. Venice, p. 182.
- 24 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 212.
- 25 Ibid., p. 213.
- 26 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.526.
- 27 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 217.
- 28 Ibid., p. 221.
- 29 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 112.
- 30 Wiel, Alethea. Venice, p. 195.
- 31 Ibid., p. 195.
- 32 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 227.

- ³³ Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 122.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 129.
- ³⁵ Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 130.
- ³⁶ Wiel, Alethea. Venice, p. 198.
- ³⁷ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.576.
- ³⁸ Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 230.
- ³⁹ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.583.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 582.
- ⁴¹ Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 232.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. 234.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 234.
- ⁴⁴ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.596.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 598.
- ⁴⁶ Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 239.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 240.
- ⁴⁸ Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 129.
- ⁴⁹ Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 175.

- 50 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 240.
- 51 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 176.
- 52 Ibid., p. 176.
- 53 Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 139.
- 54 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 242.
- 55 Wiel, Alatheia. The Navy of Venice, p. 186.
- 56 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 244.
- 57 Ibid., p. 245.
- 58 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 179.
- 59 Ibid., p. 179.
- 60 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 255.
- 61 Ibid., p. 248.
- 62 Wiel, Alethea. Venice, p. 212.
- 63 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.630.
- 64 Ibid., p. 634.
- 65 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 251.
- 66 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 182.

- 67 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 252.
- 68 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.641.
- 69 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 255.
- 70 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 186.
- 71 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.646.
- 72 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 256.
- 73 Ibid., p. 256.
- 74 Ibid., p. 256.
- 75 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.655.
- 76 Ibid., p. 657.
- 77 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 259.
- 78 Ibid., p. 266.
- 79 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.668.
- 80 Da Mosto, Andrea. I Dogi Di Venezia, p. 137.
- 81 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 264.
- 82 Ibid., p. 264.

- 83 Ibid., p. 264.
- 84 Ibid., p. 265.
- 85 Ibid., p. 268.
- 86 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.686.
- 87 Ibid., p. 687.
- 88 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 60.
- 89 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 267.
- 90 Ibid., p. 268.
- 91 Ibid., p. 268.
- 92 Ibid., p. 269.
- 93 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.697.
- 94 Ibid., p. 697.
- 95 Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 144.
- 96 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 271.
- 97 Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 144.
- 98 Ibid., p.145.
- 99 Ibid., p.145.

- 100 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 25.
- 101 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.705.
- 102 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 191.
- 103 Ibid., p. 191.
- 104 Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 146.
- 105 Ragg, Laura M. Crises in Venetian History, p. 89.
- 106 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 274.
- 107 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 192.
- 108 Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 147.
- 109 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 192.
- 110 Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.711.
- 111 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 193.
- 112 Wiel, Alatheia. The Navy of Venice, p. 203.
- 113 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 277.
- 114 Lane, Frederic C. Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 194.
- 115 Thayer, William R. A Short History of Venice, p. 152.
- 116 Norwich, John J. Venice, The Rise to Empire, p. 278.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 278.

¹¹⁸ Ragg, Laura M. Crises in Venetian History, p. 91.

¹¹⁹ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.746.

¹²⁰ Wiel, Alatheia. Venice, p. 237.

¹²¹ Hazlitt, W. C. The Venetian Republic: Its Rise, Its Growth, and Its Fall, p.747.

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