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Lamare, James R Lamare, James R Benton, Richard A Jung, Jiwook Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joel E Grant, Brandon Carlyle 2020-08-27T00:49:54Z 2020-08-27T00:49:54Z 2022-08-27T00:51:40Z 2020-04-13 2020-05 This dissertation examines the role of labor unions, via their pension funds, as shareholder activists in corporate America. For decades unions have struggled to regain their strength as representatives of the American worker, and since the turn of the 21st century they have found a creative new way of doing so. Historically, unions have limited the way that they represent workers to the point of production, as bargaining agents. However, by leveraging their positions as shareholders through their pension funds, labor unions have recently emerged as the second-largest shareholder activist group in corporate America. This presents labor unions with a dilemma, in which they serve as both the bargaining agents on behalf of workers in the workplace, as well as the fiscal agents on behalf of many of those same workers through their pension funds. This dilemma, which I refer to as the “dual-agency problem” of labor unions is discussed throughout this dissertation. Each essay of this dissertation explores a different perspective of labor union shareholder activism; the first at the union level of analysis, the second at the resolution level of analysis, and the third at the firm unit of analysis. Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'Closed Access', the embargo will last until 2022-05-01 The student, Brandon Grant, accepted the attached license on 2020-04-08 at 15:04. The student, Brandon Grant, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2020-04-08 at 15:58. This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2020-04-13 at 09:10. DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14945 on 2020-08-25 at 17:40:04 Made available in DSpace on 2020-08-27T00:49:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 GRANT-DISSERTATION-2020.pdf: 687651 bytes, checksum: f73c471cf92f49db76156644ba03cc7e (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4210 bytes, checksum: 2516c636c0e5c340ff441f388a953661 (MD5) PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt: 4556 bytes, checksum: a1490b5d0af4b13c357feea7ea029f7b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-04-13 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115860 Lift date: 2022-08-27T00:50:22Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115860 Lift date: 2022-08-27T00:51:40Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system Limited application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/2142/108246 en © 2020 Brandon Carlyle Grant Labor unions, union leadership, shareholder activism, leadership tenure, shareholder resolution outcomes, firm targets of shareholder activism Labor unions and shareholder activism: Union and firm characteristics in determining shareholder activism, resolution outcomes, and firm targets among labor union pension funds text Thesis School of Labor and Employment Relations Human Resources and Industrial Relations University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.