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oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/125541 2025-02-06 col_2142_5131 col_2142_18657 com_2142_5130 com_2142_18656 com_2142_8903

application/pdf en text Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2025-02-04 without embargo terms The student, Derrick Baker, accepted the attached license on 2024-06-26 at 14:21. The student, Derrick Baker, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2024-06-26 at 14:32. This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2024-07-09 at 12:18. DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #20881 on 2025-02-04 at 21:03:57 The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position Baker, Derrick 2024-07-09 Levinstein, Benjamin Levinstein, Benjamin Kishida, Kohei Livengood, Jonathan Saenz, Noël Epistemic Significance Of Disagreement Epistemology Of Disagreement Peer Evaluation Independence Begging The Question Principle Of Relative Settledness Proper Settledness Stability Of Belief eng Disagreement is epistemically significant. But this epistemic significance cuts in two directions. An independence principle (with respect to reliability assessments) says that my evaluations of the epistemic position of others must be independent of disputed beliefs (both the beliefs themselves and also the reasoning behind those beliefs). But this renders a set of beliefs - beliefs about the epistemic position of others - unresponsive to evidence. Disagreement is evidence that can be used in evaluating epistemic position, and it can be interpreted as evidence in dispute-dependent ways. A primary motivation for an independence principle is a desire to avoid begging the question and a view that a no question-begging norm entails independence. If this is so, then denying independence requires denying a no question-begging norm. However, a no question-begging norm does not entail independence, and therefore one can deny independence without rejecting a no question-begging norm. In the place of independence, I propose a principle of relative settledness (PRS) as a more sure guide for the epistemic significance of disagreement for our beliefs about others. PRS accounts for the fact that, with respect to the evidence of disagreement, some of our beliefs are more properly settled than others. The permissibility of evaluating epistemic position in dispute-dependent ways depends on the proper settledness of one’s disputed belief compared to the proper settledness of one’s belief about another’s epistemic position. 2024-08 Thesis https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541 Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker Philosophy Philosophy University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ph.D. Dissertation