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oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/18536 2023-07-10 col_2142_5131 col_2142_13627 com_2142_5130 com_2142_13626 com_2142_8903

Bernhard, William T. Bernhard, William T. Gaines, Brian J. Pahre, Robert D. Sulkin, Tracy E. Pemstein, Daniel B. 2011-01-21T22:45:07Z 2011-01-21T22:45:07Z 2013-01-22T11:00:22Z 2011-01-21T22:45:07Z 2010-12 The European Union relies on a complicated—some would say arcane—set of institutions and legislative rules to develop public policy that affects millions of Europeans. Actors within these institutions must effectively navigate this convoluted institutional structure in order to legislate. Crucially, government ministers in the Council of the European Union and members of the European Parliament seek to forge bicameral bargains in a complex information environment. This study examines how European politicians construct such compromises and explores how political elites coordinate around particular proposals when crafting policy. It highlights the ways in which European lawmakers manage and share information to encourage—and hamper—legislative coordination, and emphasizes the role that the European Commission—the Union’s bureaucratic arm—plays in transmitting information between lawmakers, modulating legislative efficiency. Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2010-08-27T20:11:37Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 3 Pemstein_Daniel.pdf: 1233882 bytes, checksum: f826114900427d2a272739eae418e8c2 (MD5) Pemstein_Daniel.tgz: 120162 bytes, checksum: d8373a01f8d0314c9db529d36f631607 (MD5) Pemstein_Daniel.pdf: 1233890 bytes, checksum: 627ae128ac1fca2b20cda46b44e5605a (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2011-01-21T22:45:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 Pemstein_Daniel.pdf: 1235151 bytes, checksum: e5a1c1ccfcc5f74f37ac4820e581ff6d (MD5) license.txt: 4060 bytes, checksum: 5b314a9edd89d25f4f595645bc4ba799 (MD5) Pemstein_Daniel.tgz: 814023 bytes, checksum: 290d238839a0234163428ad74d45a8ce (MD5) Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by William Ingram (wingram2@illinois.edu) on 2011-01-21T22:48:06Z Item is restricted until 2013-01-21T22:47:37Z Item reinstated by Sarah Shreeves (sshreeve@illinois.edu) on 2013-01-22T11:00:22Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Dissertations and Theses (ID: 204) Dissertations and Theses - Political Science (ID: 644) No. of bitstreams: 4 Pemstein_Daniel.pdf.txt: 336923 bytes, checksum: fbfc6cf696be2acc10b4e1951d1e2b55 (MD5) Pemstein_Daniel.pdf: 1235151 bytes, checksum: e5a1c1ccfcc5f74f37ac4820e581ff6d (MD5) license.txt: 4060 bytes, checksum: 5b314a9edd89d25f4f595645bc4ba799 (MD5) Pemstein_Daniel.tgz: 814023 bytes, checksum: 290d238839a0234163428ad74d45a8ce (MD5) Item released from any restrictions by Sarah Shreeves (sshreeve@illinois.edu) on 2013-01-22T11:00:22Z http://hdl.handle.net/2142/18536 en Copyright 2010 Daniel B. Pemstein European Union Bicameralism Bargaining Information Asymmetry Legislative Influence Coordinating Compromise: Information Manipulation and Bicameral Bargaining in the European Union Political Science 1710 Political Science 0343 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D. PHD:Political Science -UIUC 10KS0343PHD