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oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19621 2023-07-10 col_2142_5131 col_2142_5128 com_2142_5130 com_2142_5127 com_2142_5126

Donaghy, Kieran P. Mukherjee, Jaideep 2011-05-07T12:13:18Z 2011-05-07T12:13:18Z 10000-01-01 1996 In this dissertation, we investigate the effects of different environmental-economic policy choices on the well-being of people in the affluent North and the relatively poor South blocks of countries. We also investigate how regional cooperation or noncooperation in choosing these policies affects the well-being of people in these two blocks. Dynamic simulation (system dynamics) and optimization (dynamic games) techniques are employed for this analysis. A number of system dynamics models using STELLA software were built to do what-if type simulation analyses. The larger North-South simulation model consists of population, capital, resources, pollution, and agriculture sectors and appropriate trade and pollution transfer linkages between the two regions. A general method employing three different software packages (Stella, Maple and HiQ) was developed for the solution of the dynamic game models. This method (and the associated software code) may be easily applied to larger and more complex models than those used in this study. These dynamic game models were based on capital and resource sectors only and involved solutions of computationally intensive two-point, nonlinear, boundary value ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Also, the three types of dynamic games modeled cooperative, indifferent and coercive behavior between the two blocks. The major findings of this work are: (i) exclusive, single environmental-economic policies may turn out to be counterproductive; a combination of policies is much more useful; (ii) cooperation is much more beneficial to the North than the South, and regional indifference is the worst strategy for both--thus, side-payments may be used by the North to induce the South to cooperate; (iii) modeling of strategic relations is very important--the fact that we obtained very different dynamic game results, for the three strategic stances of cooperation, coercion and indifference, indicates that ignoring these issues may cause suboptimal results in the real world. Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:13:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9702617.pdf: 9527686 bytes, checksum: 8115a1d6b4f0d54b91d47fd809b7467e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1996 Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T14:38:17Z Item is restricted indefinitely. Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:15:56-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission U of I Only 9780591089226 AAI9702617 (UMI)AAI9702617 http://hdl.handle.net/2142/19621 eng Copyright 1996 Mukherjee, Jaideep Economics, Labor Political Science, International Law and Relations Political Science, Public Administration Operations Research Urban and Regional Planning Environment and development: A study of North-South conflict text Urban and Regional Planning Regional Planning University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.