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Baer, Werner W. Salgueiro, Egas Manuel Da Silva 2011-05-07T12:17:16Z 2011-05-07T12:17:16Z 10000-01-01 1991 The purpose of this work is to introduce learning and experimenting in a principal-agent model, where the agent has some private information which is valuable for the principal. Intuitively this should lead the principal to experiment in order to improve his knowledge. For this to be possible the information must be partially revealed by some observable output correlated with the agent's action; furthermore, the principal has to have some way to influence the agent's choices, or else he would not be able to experiment but only be a passive learner. With these characteristics, experimenting in such a principal-agent model should not be very different from experimenting a new consumer good. The innovative point arises from allowing the agent to react to experimentation. This should occur the agent being rational enough and having an incentive to keep his information private. As will be seen the most rational agent will try to blur the experiments carried by the principal and in some situations the equilibrium level of learning might be significantly impaired. A simple example of a principal-agent model with experimentation will be formulated and analyzed thoroughly. Several interesting results will be shown and the optimal behavior of both principal and agent will be derived and explained. A more general model is then introduced requiring the use of more sophisticated mathematical tools to prove the validity of the previous results. However, in some cases, this could not be attained. Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:17:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9210974.pdf: 2576786 bytes, checksum: d6bc444dde59e1911f5892a6135481a3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1991 Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T14:39:10Z Item is restricted indefinitely. Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:16:26-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission U of I Only AAI9210974 (UMI)AAI9210974 http://hdl.handle.net/2142/19748 eng Copyright 1991 Salgueiro, Egas Manuel Da Silva Economics, General Education, Adult and Continuing "Learning and experimentation in a ""principal-agent"" framework" text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.