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Arvan, Lanny David Santos, Vasco Manuel Sousa Borges dos 2011-05-07T12:57:35Z 2011-05-07T12:57:35Z 10000-01-01 1991 We study a form of pre-game communication, namely, cheap-talk. The framework first proposed by Farrell (1987) is extended to symmetric games with a finite but otherwise arbitrary number of actions. An alternative theory of cheap-talk pre-game communication is proposed and its effects characterized. Farrell (1987) modelled cheap-talk with players making simultaneous announcements. We study cheap-talk with sequential announcements. The welfare implications of cheap-talk are also discussed. Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:57:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9124481.pdf: 2143140 bytes, checksum: 730b58ceb40af13dda2e9d5a80e251ab (MD5) Previous issue date: 1991 Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T14:48:19Z Item is restricted indefinitely. Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:21:52-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission U of I Only AAI9124481 (UMI)AAI9124481 http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21075 eng Copyright 1991 Santos, Vasco Manuel Sousa Borges dos Economics, Theory Cheap-talk pregame communication text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.