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oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22433 2023-07-10 col_2142_5131 col_2142_14830 com_2142_5130 com_2142_14829 com_2142_8903

Economics, Agricultural Braden, John B. Netusil, Noelwah Rose 2011-05-07T13:39:41Z 2011-05-07T13:39:41Z 10000-01-01 1992 This research focuses upon the use of market incentives for environmental protection, with specific reference to nonpoint source pollution from agricultural land. The case when polluters contribute recursively rather than additively to environmental damages is investigated. While an optimal solution is theoretically possible, there exist opportunities for strategic behavior. Hence, bargaining solutions under imperfect information are analyzed. From this analysis, it is concluded that the presence of imperfect information will not distort the level of discharges from the socially desirable quantity provided contracts between landowners are correctly specified. In addition to the theoretical work, our research proposes and empirically evaluates a transferable discharge permit system for sediment from agricultural land using data for a portion of the Long Creek watershed of Macon County, Illinois. This analysis is undertaken through the implementation of a market simulation program which allows us to calculate the quantity of sediment and the reduction in costs that would occur if bargaining and contracting is permitted between landowners restricted by regulations which reflect current national and state policies. The results of this analysis point to the ability of a market type mechanism to significantly reduce the compliance costs of each of the regulations investigated. The ability of such an institution when applied to a recursively produced pollutant such as sediment from agricultural land is, however, found to be extremely sensitive to the order in which contracts are executed. Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:39:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9305633.pdf: 11224758 bytes, checksum: 2c8548a540c93892e0da81bd360f4dc1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1992 Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T14:57:35Z Item is restricted indefinitely. Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:27:01-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission U of I Only AAI9305633 (UMI)AAI9305633 http://hdl.handle.net/2142/22433 eng Copyright 1992 Netusil, Noelwah Rose Economics, General Market and bargaining approaches to nonpoint source pollution abatement problems text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.