2026-09-22T03:48:23Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/34562 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_11614 com_2142_5130 com_2142_11613 com_2142_8903

Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T21:25:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Popova_Anna.pdf: 345919 bytes, checksum: 4e90065d392f37a025e096b35747b3a8 (MD5) license.txt: 4061 bytes, checksum: 9ef22f0f93bf70101a60f8379c3dd411 (MD5) Item marked as restricted to the 'Administrator' Group (id=1) by Seth Robbins (srobbins@illinois.edu) on 2012-09-18T21:27:31Z Item is restricted until 2014-09-18T21:27:16Z Regenwetter, Michel Kuklinski, James H. Popova, Anna 2012-09-18T21:25:40Z 2012-09-18T21:25:40Z 2014-09-18T10:01:02Z 2012-08 2012-09-18T21:25:40Z 2012-08 Social choice theory in Economics and Political Science has highlighted that competing notions of rational social choice are irreconcilable. This established wisdom is based on hypothetical thought experiments, mathematical impossibility theorems, and computer simulations. We provide new empirical evidence that challenges the practicality of these discouraging predictions. We analyze the ballots from thirteen presidential elections of the American Psychological Association. We report on an empirical comparison of the Condorcet, the Borda, the Plurality, the Anti-Plurality, the Single Transferable Vote, the Coombs, and the Plurality Runoff rules. We find that these rules frequently agree both on the winner and on the social order. Bootstrapping reveals that the coherence among competing rules is a property of the empirical distribution of voters’ choices, and it is not specific to a particular sample. Our findings are highly robust to changes in the modeling assumptions that enter our analysis. These findings suggest many interesting open research questions for the emerging paradigm of behavioral social choice: Why do competing social choice procedures agree in real-world electorates? How broadly does the accumulated evidence against the social choice conundrum generalize to other electorates and other candidate choice sets? Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2012-06-05T14:53:25Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Popova_Anna.pdf: 354446 bytes, checksum: 1ce3856f0a8f034037cd4dd2235de542 (MD5) Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:35:50-05:00 Original Data Group with Access Administrator Release Date: 2014-09-18 16:27:16 UTC Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system Limited Restriction Lifted for Item 34836 on 2014-09-18T10:01:02Z. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/34562 en Copyright 2012 Anna Popova Alternative Vote American Psychological Association behavioral social choice consensus methods collective decision making Hare system Instant Runoff The robust beauty of APA presidential elections: an empty-handed hunt for the social choice conundrum Psychology 1299 Psychology 0338 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Thesis M.A. PHD:Psychology -UIUC 10KS0338PHD