2026-09-21T05:36:31Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/42450 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_13627 com_2142_5130 com_2142_13626 com_2142_8903

Cheibub, José Antonio Cheibub, José Antonio Svolik, Milan Winters, Matthew Canache, Damarys J. Correa, Diego 2013-02-03T19:46:03Z 2013-02-03T19:46:03Z 2015-02-03T11:00:36Z 2012-12 2013-02-03T19:46:03Z 2012-12 In the late 1990s and 2000s, a new kind of social policy spread through Latin American countries. Nearly all of them currently invest in Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, i.e. programs that pay cash to poor families and impose health and education conditionalities on their children. Political scientists investigating the phenomenon commonly argue that these programs have a strong pro-incumbent effect among the poor, but these claims have been sustained by only a handful of country studies. In this dissertation, I pursue two objectives. First, I analyze an original dataset with information for all Latin American presidential elections carried out between 1990 and 2010 and show that investments in CCT programs have not had any significant effect on the electoral performance of incumbent candidates. Second, I explore multiple sub-national and survey data to demonstrate that CCT programs are associated with both electoral gains among the poor and electoral losses among the rich. I claim that the occurrence of these counterbalancing effects explain why CCT programs have not helped incumbents to win elections. Their most important electoral consequence was to trigger rearrangements in the composition of incumbents’ electoral bases, increasing the participation of the poor and decreasing the participation of the rich. Item withdrawn by Alexis Thompson (athmpsn1@illinois.edu) on 2012-12-03T19:16:51Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Correa_Diego.pdf: 2794946 bytes, checksum: 2ebd5db47a371668c172fb8c5bcb8c10 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2013-02-03T19:46:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Diego_Correa.pdf: 2794309 bytes, checksum: f7903e82e55c09b782eca597d0ba1f73 (MD5) license.txt: 4062 bytes, checksum: 270c8273ebed53ae155b53e05454379d (MD5) Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:36:00-05:00 Original Data Group with Access Administrator Release Date: 2015-02-03 13:47:48 UTC Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system Item marked as restricted to the 'Administrator' Group (id=1) by Seth Robbins (srobbins@illinois.edu) on 2013-02-03T19:47:54Z Item is restricted until 2015-02-03T19:47:48Z Limited Restriction Lifted for Item 42398 on 2015-02-03T11:00:36Z. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/42450 en Copyright 2012 Diego Correa Latin America Income Redistribution Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs Presidential Elections The effects of Conditional Cash Transfer programs on Latin American presidential elections text Political Science 1710 Political Science 0343 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D. PHD:Political Science -UIUC 10KS0343PHD