2026-09-19T02:36:54Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/45283 2025-01-13 col_2142_5131 col_2142_16359 com_2142_5130 com_2142_16358 com_2142_234

Shanbhag, Vinayak V. Kang, Kyoungwon 2013-08-22T16:34:38Z 2013-08-22T16:34:38Z 2018-12-20T10:15:09Z 2021-01-08T10:15:07Z 2023-01-11T06:00:00Z 2013-08-22T16:34:38Z 2013-08 With increasing proportion of windpower, an important concern is that of maintaining the reliability of the electric grid in the face of higher supply-side volatility. In this paper, we examine the role of risk-based penalties in developing alternate designs in which firms combine energy bids associated with uncertain real-time availability with stable reserves bids. Such a study is carried out in a regime where firms have access to a day-ahead market, an uncertain real-time energy market and a reserves market. The resulting game-theoretic problem is a two-period stochastic Nash game with risk-based objectives and the associated equilibrium conditions are given by a complementarity problem. Preliminary numerical results on a 6-firm problem provide insights regarding the impact of reserves and risk penalties on wind-based generation, particularly in the face of high variability. Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2013-07-15T19:16:53Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Kang_Kyoungwon.pdf: 1535429 bytes, checksum: e7dc5e45694547a07d96db2cfa5bce1b (MD5) Author requested U of I Only Access for 2 years. Effective date 1/11/21. Approved by Thesis Office 1/8/21. U of I Only http://hdl.handle.net/2142/45283 eng Copyright 2013 Kyoungwon Kang Wind power Complementarity problem Nash game Variational inequality Risk Risk penalty Power market Risk penalties for enhanced reliability in co-optimized markets with uncertain generation text Industrial&Enterprise Sys Eng Industrial Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Thesis M.S. MS Industrial Engineerng