2026-09-21T13:10:55Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/49720 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_16359 com_2142_5130 com_2142_16358 com_2142_234

Jacobson, Sheldon H. Abbas, Ali E. Jacobson, Sheldon H. Nedich, Angelia Sewell, Edward C. Behzad, Banafsheh 2014-05-30T17:06:25Z 2014-05-30T17:06:25Z 2016-09-22T20:59:03Z 2014-05 2014-05-30T17:06:25Z 2014-05 Immunization against infectious diseases is the single factor that has had the most considerable impact on world health. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the primary public health organization responsible for research, analysis, and fulfillment of immunization programs. A small number of vaccine manufacturers produce all the pediatric vaccines required to fully immunize a child against infectious diseases. To ensure adequate societal immunization coverage levels, the CDC negotiates the prices of the vaccines sold in the public sector with vaccine manufacturers. The economic competition between vaccine manufacturers and the impact of the negotiations between the CDC and the vaccine manufacturers are of particular interest. This dissertation applies game theory and operations research techniques to analyze the pricing strategies in the United States Pediatric vaccine market. The market is studied from four different aspects. First, integer programming is applied to analyze pricing strategies for pediatric combination vaccines by comparing the lowest overall cost formularies for a fixed cost of an injection. Specific emphasis is placed on examining the price of combination vaccine Pentacel under different conditions. Second, the market factors that impact the uptake of pediatric combination vaccines in the United States public sector pediatric vaccine market are analyzed. Particularly, the direct competition between Pediarix and Pentacel is studied considering the indirect presence of several market factors. Next, Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game is used to examine the prices of the monovalent vaccines in the United States pediatric vaccine market. The proposed game captures oligopolistic interactions between symmetric, capacity-constrained manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers with equal and limited production capacity) in a differentiated, single- product market with linear demand. Vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse medical events for that vaccine. Using the proposed game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed for competing monovalent vaccines. Finally, The Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin price game is employed to analyze the competition between asymmetric capacity-constrained manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers with unequal and limited production capacities) producing differentiated products in a market with linear demand. The competing vaccines are differentiated based upon the number of reported adverse medical events, the number of different antigens, and special advantages of those vaccines. Using the proposed game theoretic model, equilibrium prices are computed for competing monovalent and combination vaccines. The results presented in this dissertation should appeal to the pediatric healthcare community, including federal government officials (who negotiate the vaccine prices with vaccine manufacturers) and vaccine manufacturers (who seek effective pricing strategies). Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2014-04-23T12:53:59Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Behzad_Banafsheh.pdf: 1314097 bytes, checksum: a169f384ba1bc8f0249dd27b008793f9 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-30T17:06:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Banafsheh_Behzad.pdf: 1313647 bytes, checksum: fabfbe0a076c759b73336c3fa3e4f03c (MD5) license.txt: 4065 bytes, checksum: 53e82bb8e19c47f35a379f8b7c8296ea (MD5) Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (robbins.sd@gmail.com) on 2014-05-30T17:09:51Z Item is restricted until 2016-05-30T17:09:03Z Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:39:02-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2016-05-30 12:09:03 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 49771 on 2016-09-22T20:59:03Z. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49720 en Copyright 2014 Banafsheh Behzad Game Theory Operations Research Immunization Public Health Vaccine Pricing Analysis of the United States pediatric immunization market: A game theoretic approach text Industrial&Enterprise Sys Eng 1422 Industrial Engineering 0127 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D. PHD:Industrial Enginerng -UIUC 10KS0127PHD