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        <identifier>oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/50547</identifier>
        <datestamp>2023-07-11</datestamp>
        <setSpec>col_2142_5131</setSpec>
        <setSpec>col_2142_10761</setSpec>
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        <thesis xmlns="http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/ http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/etdms11.xsd http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/etdmsdc.xsd">
          <dc:contributor>Adve, Vikram S.</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>Adve, Vikram S.</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>Parthasarathy, Madhusudan</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>King, Samuel T.</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>Morrisett, Greg</dc:contributor>
          <dc:creator>Criswell, John</dc:creator>
          <dc:date>2014-09-16T17:23:42Z</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2014-09-16T17:23:42Z</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2014-08</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2014-09-16</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2014-08</dc:date>
          <dc:description>Commodity operating systems are entrusted with providing security to
the applications we use everyday, and yet they suffer from the same
security vulnerabilities as user-space applications: they are
susceptible to memory safety attacks such as buffer overflows, and
they can be tricked into dynamically loading malicious code.  Worse
yet, commodity operating system kernels are highly privileged; exploitation
of the kernel results in compromise of all applications on the system.
This work describes the Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA): a compiler-based
virtual machine placed between the software stack and the hardware that
can enforce strong security policies on commodity application and
operating system kernel code.  This work describes how SVA abstracts
hardware/software interactions and program state manipulation so that compiler
instrumentation can be used to control these operations, and it shows
how SVA can be used to protect both the operating system kernel and
applications from attack.  Specifically, this work shows how SVA can
protect operating system kernels from memory safety
attacks; it also shows how SVA prevents a compromised operating
system kernel from adversely affecting the execution of trusted
applications by providing application memory that the operating system kernel
cannot read and write and secure application control flow that the
operating system cannot corrupt.</dc:description>
          <dc:description>Item withdrawn by Laura Spradlin (lspradl2@illinois.edu) on 2014-07-14T16:01:55Z
Item was in collections:
University of Illinois Theses &amp; Dissertations (ID: 1)
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          <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/2142/50547</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>Copyright 2014 John T Criswell</dc:rights>
          <dc:subject>secure virtual architecture</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>computer security</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>security</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>compilers</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>operating systems</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>LLVM compiler infrastructure project</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Low Level Virtual Architecture (LLVA)</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA)</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>(Kernel Control Flow Integrity (KCoFI)</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Virtual Ghost</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>memory safety</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>control flow integrity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>compromised operating systems</dc:subject>
          <dc:title>Secure virtual architecture: security for commodity software systems</dc:title>
          <dc:type>text</dc:type>
          <degree>
            <department>Computer Science</department>
            <departmentCode>1434</departmentCode>
            <discipline>Computer Science</discipline>
            <disciplineCode>0112</disciplineCode>
            <grantor>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</grantor>
            <level>Dissertation</level>
            <name>Ph.D.</name>
            <program>PHD:Computer Science -UIUC</program>
            <programCode>10KS0112PHD</programCode>
          </degree>
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