2026-09-21T21:45:56Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/78388 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_16440 com_2142_5130 com_2142_16439 com_2142_9216

Chen, Clara Chen, Clara Peecher, Mark Autrey, Romana Mahoney, Joseph Nichol, Jennifer Eve 2015-07-22T22:16:48Z 2015-07-22T22:16:48Z 2015-05 2015-04-16 This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. 2015-5 Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2015-07-22 without embargo terms The student, Jennifer Nichol, accepted the attached license on 2015-04-14 at 19:36. The student, Jennifer Nichol, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2015-04-14 at 19:42. This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2015-04-16 at 09:00. DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #7861 on 2015-07-22 at 10:32:03 Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T22:16:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 NICHOL-DISSERTATION-2015.pdf: 744782 bytes, checksum: 9ece162a58d27f537253a848c13b138b (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4212 bytes, checksum: 253ba4149aa426bdae3c169c1a5b19fd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-16 application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/2142/78388 en Copyright 2015 Jennifer Nichol Contract framing Misreporting The effects of contract framing on misconduct text text Accountancy Accountancy University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.