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Overbye, Thomas J. Correia, Pedro Alexandre Flores 2015-09-25T20:08:10Z 2015-09-25T20:08:10Z 10000-01-01 2002 2002 However, if there is a periodical repetition of market conditions over time, it might lead to the playing of similar, repeated games (or supergames) by the participants. This repetition of games tempts participants to walk away from the best-response equilibrium strategies provided by Nash solutions. Although Nash solutions make theoretical sense in nonrepeated games, their applicability in repeated games is weakened by the fact that these solutions are not, in general, Pareto optimal. This fact paves the way to more complex games where participants are driven by profit maximization in the long run and are, therefore, enticed to explore different solutions in the short term. Knowing that they will meet in similar games in the near future makes the players adopt implicit cooperative behavior, and the willingness to work to a common end may be modeled in automata or agents, which substitute the players, that must adopt stochastic responses to the other automata strategic moves as a means to mask rationality. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:08:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3070283.pdf: 5085925 bytes, checksum: 877d87bcab8f7c34de78e9e5f308c6d0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 82068 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 124 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/80786 (MiAaPQ)AAI3070283 eng Engineering, Electronics and Electrical The Use of Noncooperative Games to Determine Strategic Bidding in Centralized Electricity Markets text Electrical Engineering Electrical Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.